Part 1. On the Historiography of Latin American Philosophy
1. Philosophy in Latin America in the Twentieth Century: Problems and Currents

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This chapter is organized according to the most significant currents of Latin American philosophy in the twentieth century. I will analyze the central problems and main philosophers of each current, although I will have to leave out many names. At the end of the chapter is a minimal and indicative general bibliography, arranged by country—even though I did not treat the theme from a national perspective—and philosophical current. The chronology may be useful to readers who are new to the subject.

1. GENERAL PANORAMA

In Latin America at the beginning of the twentieth century, a positivist philosophy (of Comtean inspiration, but subsequently Spencerian or Haeckelian) was dominant, articulated for hegemonic minorities of political society who had established the liberal state in the second half of the nineteenth century. The anti-positivist reactions (see section 2 of this chapter)—vitalist (inspired by Henry Bergson), anti-rationalist (departing from Schopenhauer or Pascal), historicist (José Ortega y Gasset), and traditional (Third Scholastic with influences from the universities of Louvain and Freiburg)—established Latin American university philosophy. These “founders,” in the sense of Francisco Romero, in some fashion identified themselves with the nascent national and industrial bourgeoisie (in countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia) or with populist movements (such as the Mexican revolution of 1910 or Cárdenas’s movement from 1934 on, Hipólito Irigoyen’s radical party in Argentina in 1918, Perón’s party from 1946 on, or Getulio Vargas’s nationalism in Brazil from 1930 on).

The founders’ consciousness was sundered by a “lack of focus,” to use Miró Quesada’s expression: “Latin Americans who gave themselves to the activity of philosophizing could understand what they read. But they could not give a complete account of what they did not comprehend.” They lived in a non-European world, but
they reflected a philosophy for which reality was European. This “lack of focus” made Latin American philosophical reflection ambiguous.⁵

The process evolved in what Miró Quesada called a “second generation,” or “normalization,” which began a “bifurcation” between a current (see section 3) inspired by Heideggerian ontology (e.g., Carlos Astrada, Wagner de Reyna) and one oriented by Husserlian phenomenology (e.g., Miguel Reale, Miguel Angel Vi- rasoro, Luis Juan Guerrero). The latter had a certain impact and formed the basis for a school whose founders also included axiologists, personalist anthropologists, metaphysicians, and thinkers with other points of view.

In the early twentieth century, a current of philosophers followed neo-scholasticism (see section 4), through a revalorization of Thomas of Aquinas; in the thirties this current turned nationalistic in political philosophy. In the fifties, it was divided because of the personalist movement (inspired by Maritain or Mounier); some became earnest collaborators in military dictatorships, while others opened themselves up to new and creative Latin American philosophical currents.

After the nineteenth century, with the rise of anarcho-syndicalist movements and in contact with the First and Second Internationals, socialist and, later, Marxist thinking (see section 5) emerged with Juan B. Justo. José Carlos Mariátegui formulated the most creative version of Marxism in the twenties; shortly thereafter, Cesar Guardia Mayorga also became known as a Marxist; frontism and World War II weakened the movement. The Cuban revolution had an impact on all of Latin American philosophy in the sixties; Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez elevated it to the stature of problematic during a period in which Althusserianism reigned (in the seventies); and today it is embattled in the crisis produced by the events of 1989.

From within Husserlian phenomenological or ontological thinking (Leopoldo Zea) emerged a problematization of Latin America as a historical question to be reconstructed with meaning (Arturo Ardao, Arturo Roig) and as a problematic to be defined and developed (Abelardo Villegas). This led to the birth of a strong current that formulated “Latin America” as an object of philosophical reflection (see section 6). This “third generation,” pressed to create and confirm an authentic Latin American identity, formed a school that was vigorously promulgated throughout the continent.

Facing the methodological difficulties of the Husserlian and Marxist currents after World War II and under Anglo-Saxon influence (Francisco Miró Quesada, Gregorio Klimoski, Mario Bunge), some thinkers (Luis Villoro, Fernando Salmerón, Alejandro Rossi) undertook epistemological studies and philosophical “analysis” in search of “strict rigor” (see section 7). This current made new contributions in universal philosophical thinking and generally elevated the level of philosophical precision on the continent.

From diverse tributaries (phenomenological ontology, Latinamericanism, and the Frankfurt School), philosophy of liberation was born, coinciding with a triple diagnostic. First, there was a perception of a lack of “rigor” and “authenticity” (this was Augusto Salazar Bondy’s position). Second, there was an awareness of the need for “militancy” (Osvaldo Ardiles) as an articulation of the theory-praxis di-
alectic. Finally, the misery of the great majority, as expressed in popular movements—student, political, social, ecological, anti-racist, and so on—was defined as a theme and context from the end of the sixties on, and before the military dictatorships—from 1964 on—in Brazil (see section 8). The movement elaborated its own discourse (Enrique Dussel, Juan C. Scannone), although it was divided into different points of view. Meanwhile, Latin American feminist philosophy produced its own discourse of liberation (e.g., Graciela Hierro).

2. ANTI-POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHIES: THE “FOUNDERS”

In 1900, José Enrique Rodó published Ariel, a true symbol of the change of century. This hermeneutic narrative demarcation of the cultural difference between Anglo-Saxon America (which a couple of years before, in 1898, had staged military occupations of Cuba and Puerto Rico) and Latin America was to traverse the entire century. “Ariel” is the spirit (the new philosophy, Latin America); “Caliban” is technology, instrumental rationality, and materiality (philosophical positivism, Anglo-Saxon America): “Thus, the vision of an America de-Latinized of its own will, without the extortion of the conquest, and later regenerated in the image of and with a resemblance to the archetype of the North, already floats in the dreams of many who are sincerely interested in our future.”

Cuba seemed to be in a similar situation in the late nineteenth century as in the late twentieth century, as we can read in José Martí: “There is another, more sinister plan than any we have known up to now in our history, and it is the iniquity of precipitating the island into war, in order to have the pretext to intervene there. [. . .] Nothing more cowardly exists in the annals of free peoples.” The failure of the Latin American governments that had been peripherally integrated with the expansion of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century (the Mexican Porfiriato, the Brazilian republic, Julio Roca’s Argentina, criticized by the radical generation of the 1890s) was analogous to the failure of its militant ideology: philosophical positivism. The reaction to each was equally virulent. Among the philosophical figures were innovative thinkers and university professors with the pedagogical vocation of founders. All of them broke new ground. They intended to write not for philosophers, but for non-philosophers, propaedeutically, in order to invoke the vocation of thinking. In some cases, as in that of the Mexicans, their reaction to capitalism and positivism was a philosophical-political response that was a true articulation of the revolutionary movement of the moment. Nevertheless, their philosophies contained clear arguments against positivism.

Let us look at some central figures and philosophical positions of this “first generation” of the twentieth century. The first was Alejandro Deustua, who received his doctorate in 1872, although he occupied the chair of aesthetics at San Marcos University in Lima only in 1888. Prior to the advent of positivism, he was trained in its doctrine, though he was never tempted by its proposals. In reality, he was its first frontal attacker. At the beginning of the twentieth century he departed for
France (the Mecca of Latin American philosophy in the nineteenth century) and got to know Henry Bergson personally. He published his first work fairly late (when he was sixty), between 1919 and 1922, in two volumes: Las ideas de orden y libertad en la historia del pensamiento humano (The ideas of order and freedom in the history of human thought). This work had a great influence on the new generation. Mariano Ibérico, decidedly a positivist, along with Deustua, brought about a definitive change by writing his thesis in 1916 on Bergson’s philosophy. Deustua went from an aesthetics of order and freedom to an ethics of value (the two-volume Las sistemas de moral [The systems of morality], published between 1938 and 1940). He knew the work of Krause, Wundt, Bergson, and Croce, and he was a true philosopher. Aesthetics is the contemplative moment; ethics, the actualizing moment (although inspired by Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion [The two sources of morality and religion]), he had his own theses: aesthetic freedom becomes practical solidarity, in the organic order of life, as a metaphysical realization of values. In the end, “In concordance with his attitude toward Peruvian politics and his social perspective, Deustua’s pedagogical reflection culminates in aristocracy. Since his confidence in this selection of the spirit was complete, he believed that the salvific formula of national life was moralized education, radiating from the elite, and only the elite.”

Carlos Vaz Ferreira, educated by Spencerian positivists, wrote in 1908, “Of Spencer’s work, in itself, little remains. But today, can anyone be sure that he has not made use of it?” The emancipated positivist retained a clear respect for science and practiced rigorous logic, but showed that it is impossible not to take recourse to metaphysics in his 1910 work, Lógica viva (Living logic). Following on from William James, Bergson, and even Stuart Mill, Vaz Ferreira related language to thought. His arguments against the positivism of the previous century mutatis mutandis served to show the limits of the analytic positivism of the twentieth century. In no way, however, does he fall into irrationalism: “Reason is not everything; reason [ought to be] complemented by feeling and imagination, but never forced, nor diminished, nor despised.” His was thus an anti-positivist vitalist rationalism of great currency, powerful ethical structure, and rigorous argumentation, expressed by a strict thinker.

Alejandro Korn (whose doctoral dissertation was titled Crimen y Locura [Crime and madness]) began as a professor of the history of philosophy in the philosophy faculty in Buenos Aires in 1906. In De San Agustín a Bergson (From St. Augustine to Bergson), he dealt, on the one hand, with Augustine, Spinoza, Pascal (who enjoyed a great reputation with members of this generation), Keyserling, and Bergson, and, on the other, with Kant (he dedicated the course that he taught in 1924 to Kant and founded the Argentinean Kant Society), Hegel, and Croce. With the first group, in the voluntarist-vitalist current, he contrasted creative life with positivist mere matter; Kant and dialectical thinking allowed him to question the naively stated object of the empiricist, assuming the affirmation of science (Einstein delivered some lectures and gave some courses in Buenos Aires in 1925) and the freedom of the subject. Vitalist-transcendental thinking (very sim-
ilar to that of Vaz Ferreira, although with less systematic penetration) constituted a categorical horizon that enabled development of a rigorous argument against the naive determinism of the positivists: “Economic freedom, domination over the objective world, ethical freedom, and self-control constitute, together, human freedom. [. . . ] It is not the struggle for existence that is is the eminent principle, but the struggle for freedom.”19 This was Argentina before its identity crisis. Coriolano Alberini deserves mention here.

The Mexican revolution in 1910 was both a Latin American and a global event. Antonio Caso took a militant and destructive pickaxe to the positivism of Porfirio Díaz, the dictator of the “scientists”—the Mexican ideological current of the nineteenth century. Educated in positivism, Caso and other young philosophers founded Ateneo de la Juventud in 1909. In addition to the authors studied by other above-mentioned philosophers (especially Bergson and the North American pragmatists, but not Kant or Hegel), Antonio Caso read the vitalist works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, and Driesch: “The mechanism of the universe maintains itself through hunger and love, as Schiller sang. . . . According to Bergson, instead of saying homo sapiens, one ought to say homo faber. Intelligence, an elegant solution to the problem of life, is the faculty of the creation of tools, instruments of action.”20 Existence as economy tends to the reproduction of life; existence as charity is the creative transcendental impulse, but in the final instance existence is an aesthetic creation: “In short, the scale of human value is this: the more one sacrifices and the more difficult it is to sacrifice the purely animal life [Porfirist positivism] with disinterested ends, until one arrives—from aesthetic contemplation and simple good actions—at heroic action, the more noble one is.”21 And inverting the Nietzschean meaning of the Uebermensch, Caso arrives at the opposite conclusion: “Nietzsche’s superman, conceived in all of his magnitude of sacrifice [as was experienced daily during the Mexican revolution, in which more than one million died], in all of his desire for the elevation of life, has everything that is noble about being Christian.”22 As in all the above examples, this is an aesthetics that culminates in a creative, emancipatory ethics. It is no abstract philosophical reflection; it is a militant philosophy, like that of the late-in-life convert to Catholicism José Vasconcelos, who became the secretary of education during the national revolutionary government. Like previous philosophies, Vasconcelos joined the popular nationalist political movements—this is why the government called upon great Marxist artists, such as Rivera and Orozco, to paint ancestral Mexican motifs in public buildings. Inverting racist naturalism (which gave supremacy to the white race), Vasconcelos defends the mestizo identity in La raza cósmica (The cosmic race). Human life is action and ought to be organized through ethical behavior. From Schopenhauer to Hindu philosophy, Vasconcelos writes,

Clearly seen and speaking truthfully, the European barely recognizes us, and we do not recognize ourselves in him. Neither would it be legitimate to talk of a return to the native . . . because we do
not recognize ourselves in the native nor does the Indian recognize us. By this fate, Spanish America is the new par excellence: newness not only of territory, but also of the soul.23

The disturbing Brazilian thinker Raimundo Farías Brito had no use for the critique of positivism. The Catholic Jackson de Figueiredo was part of the neo-scholastic renaissance; he died too young.24 Also worthy of mention are Enrique José Molina,25 who introduced Bergson into Chile and published Filósofos Americanos (American philosophers) as early as 1913,26 and Carlos Arturo Torres from Colombia.27 There were many others.

This generation of “founders” has great relevance. They were philosophers who thought about their reality with conceptual tools that they forged, frequently autodidactically, and who ought to be rediscovered for contemporary reflection.

3. EXISTENTIAL ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY: THE “NORMALIZATION”

We now turn to a “second generation.” These philosophers were professors of philosophy endowed with the formal exigencies of the academic vocation. They were inspired by phenomenology, in its diverse forms, and formulated the philosophy that predominated in Latin American thinking until the end of the sixties.

It must be underscored that there were two different styles of phenomenology. It is my opinion that these styles are the source of the “bifurcation.” Carlos Astrada wrote about them, “Between phenomenological idealism (Husserl) and existential metaphysics (Heidegger), there lies a fundamental difference. Due to a radicalization of the notion of existence, Heidegger arrives at a conception of philosophy and its task that diverges from, and even opposes, those that Husserl considers fertilized rigorously by phenomenology.”28 Astrada showed that Husserl remained imprisoned within the horizon of the object of the consciousness-entity, while Heidegger was open to the totality of the “world” where entities confront us as phenomena. This “world” was to be discovered by those of my generation as “that which is Latin American.”

One style, then, was more linked to Heideggerian ontology,29 which gives primacy to being in the historical world, with practical relations that are national, and even popular (its inheritance was to be Latinamericanist thinking [see section 6], and liberation philosophy [see section 8]). The other, more indebted to Husserlian phenomenology, which gives primacy to the subject before the object as eidos (e.g., F. Romero), of greater solipsistic inspiration (its inheritance was to be, among others, epistemological and analytic thinking [see section 7]). Both occurred simultaneously and in parallel, in mutual fertilization and communication.

In the first style, against Rodó’s Ariel, Aníbal Ponce rose up in defense of Calibán, who now represented the Latin American people, the dominated classes (the humanist Ariel had failed).31 In fact, the economic crisis of 1929 was echoed
in major political changes from 1930 on throughout the continent (Roosevelt himself compromised the state with an active Keynesian-style intervention). Heideggerian thought had a profound impact on Latin America for reasons similar to those that determined its appearance in Germany: a telluric-historical interpretation was linked to the strengthening of the project of a national bourgeoisie and to the simultaneous and massive emergence, in the more developed countries of Latin America, of a working class. Between 1930 and 1940, a group of thinkers exalted nature, geography, and the Indian. Franz Tamayo wrote,

[In Bolivia] the earth makes the man [. . . ] colossal steep mountains that are like natural fortresses and also like natural prisons [. . . ] the soul of the earth has gone through the country with all of its greatness, its solitude, that sometimes seem the cause of its desolation and its fundamental suffering. [. . . ] Díaz, Melgarejos, Guzmán Blanco, Castro, Rosas, and others [. . . ] all dominators, vanquishers, and hegemons, and all have the mestiza mark on the forehead, and the energy that they represent is of Indian origin—it is the blood of the Indian that surges up in adventurous and young blood.

On the strictly philosophical plane, Latin American students who had studied in Germany or Switzerland (for the first time superseding the French horizon) between the two wars, with Heidegger (Carlos Astrada and Alberto Wagner de Reyna), with Cassirer (Nimio de Aquín), or in Zurich (Luis Juan Guerrero), began a Latin American ontological reflection. Some opted for an affirmative attitude, an assumptive, positive vision of that which is American, which was to have a long history. Carlos Astrada’s El mito gaucho (The gaucho myth) was related to the nationalism of 1946—Astrada replaced Romero, who in turn replaced Astrada in 1956—revives the figure of the “gaucho Martín Fierro” as an ancestral, authentic, proper phenomenon. It is not strange that he later turned to Marxism following an ontological progression from Heidegger to Hegel, in the fashion of the Frankfurt school—he demanded a return to history in order to subsume negations. In this way, the gaucho (cowboy) became the proletariat as subject of history—in the Marxist tradition of José Aricó, as we will see.

Other ontologists analyzed with a tragic attitude the negation of that which is Latin American in many varied ways. Félix Schwartzmann, in Chile, wrote about that which is “bereft of history,” the “savage lands,” and the “ontological vacuum.” In Venezuela, Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla wrote about the merely turned toward the future as “expectation,” before “the something that approximates” us, as “what is to come.” Nimio de Aquín in Córdoba pondered the pre-Socratic aural entity without past guilt, the “pure future.” And H. A. Murena wrote of the “original sin” of having been expelled from Europe: “For a time we inhabited a land fertilized by the spirit that is called Europe, and suddenly we were expelled from it and fell into another land, raw, empty of spirit, to which we gave the name
America. The criollo (white child of immigrants) did not recognize the Amerindian, colonial world of the “inward land”: he negated a millenary history. Thinking along the same lines were Edmundo O’Gorman, who spoke of the “discovery” of 1492 as the “invention of America” by Western culture, which did not notice the interpretation of the “discovery” by the indigenous peoples as an “invasion” of Cemanahuac (“the whole world” in Aztec);41 and Alberto Caturelli,42 for whom to be American was “to be a brute,” without history, “immature.”43

José Gaos, a Spaniard “trans-territorialized” to Mexico, similarly departed from Heidegger in order to situate the problem of the Latin American and Mexican. His translation into Spanish of Being and Time is more than a mere translation; it is in itself a historic philosophical work. Furthermore, from the ontological horizon he demonstrated the importance of thinking “one’s own world,” whence originated the Latinamericanist current (e.g., L. Zea)—a reconstruction carried out with such seriousness and extreme rigor that he passed this attitude on to his disciples, who carried his ideas forward into analytic philosophy (e.g., L. Villoro, F. Salmerón).

Alberto Wagner de Reyna44 was educated in Lima, and he later studied with Hartmann, Spranger, and Heidegger in Germany. In 1937 he defended his doctoral dissertation, La ontología fundamental de Heidegger (The fundamental ontology of Heidegger). His mature work, Analogía y evocación (Analogy and evocation),45 concerns Kierkegaardian and Christian interpretations of Heidegger’s thought. His philosophical stature is such that he would have to be situated at the level of Carlos Astrada and José Gaos.

Danilo Cruz Vélez,46 who studied with Heidegger in Freiburg in 1951, manifested a transition to Husserlian style in his main work, Filosofía sin supuestos: De Husserl a Heidegger (Philosophy without presuppositions: from Husserl to Heidegger) and De Hegel a Marcuse (From Hegel to Marcuse, an academic philosophical work. He did not reflect on the theme of the American.

Thinkers of the other style, phenomenological, axiological, more solipsistic (following closely, as mentioned above, Husserl, Scheler, or Hartmann), achieved a broad presence in the academic world as “professors of philosophy.” Their most important representative was without question Francisco Romero;47 if one also takes into account “his not written work”—his teaching and his influence on other philosophers—his importance becomes evident. In fact, thanks to his contacts, Romero launched, from Washington, D.C., a collection of publications on Latin American thought. He intended a project of rigorous philosophy in the continent, and his enthusiasm and initiative inspired a whole generation. His theoretical works48 are closely inspired by Hartmann’s ontology, by Scheler’s position on the place of the human being in the cosmos, and by the distinction between individual and person unique to the personalists (especially Jacques Maritain). All of this stood out in his transcendentalism of the spirit and values.

In Argentina a group of great philosophers was working in this tradition. Luis Juan Guerrero, who wrote an important book on aesthetics,49 with a decisive Heideggerian influence but also with sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and others,
which makes his description of the operative constitution of the being of the work of art a philosophical example not superseded in the continent. Miguel Angel Virasoro, Vicente Fatone, Angel Vasallo, Risieri Frondizi, Arture García Astrada, Carlos Ceriotto, and, more recently, Ricardo Maliandi (influenced by Hartmann and later a student of Apel’s transcendental pragmatics) are some of the other philosophers who should be mentioned.

In Brazil, Miguel Reale introduced the phenomenological movement, in the tradition of the philosophy of law, in an “axiological personalism” linked to the “tridimensionality of the doctrine of law.” Vicente Ferreira da Silva analyzed phenomenologically the spheres of axiology, formal logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. Emmanuel Carneiro Leão needs to be mentioned because of his creative ontological thinking.

It would be fitting to mention here, although his thinking supersedes phenomenology, the Mexican Eduardo Nicol, whose Metafísica de la expresión (Metaphysics of expression) is one of the most significant works of Latin American thought. Luis Villoro’s Estudios sobre Husserl (Studies on Husserl) (1975), and Ramón Xirau’s works similarly indicate the cultivation of phenomenology by an extensive number of professors.

Francisco Miró Quesada made his debut in 1941 with Sentido del movimiento fenomenológico (Meaning of the phenomenological movement). He was never won over to the ontological style and remained at the phenomenological level of a rationalism self-conscious of its limits and of the need for a history of Latin American thought.

A phenomenological generation formed in Germany in the sixties. Guillermo Hoyos, a Colombian, strictly dominated the methodology (which passed from Husserl to Heidegger, and then to Habermas in the present day) and produced a critique of scientific positivism, subsuming it and attempting to transplant it within a more critical horizon. In a more hermeneutic line, the notable Colombian philosopher Carlos Gutiérrez, elected in the nineties to the presidency of the Inter-American Society of Philosophy, must also be highlighted. The Venezuelan Alberto Rosales, the Uruguayan Juan Llambias Acevedo, the Chilean Juan de Dios Vial Larraín, and the Colombian Daniel Herrera Restrepo, who was educated in Louvain, deserve a special place in this analysis.

4. PHILOSOPHY PRACTICED BY CHRISTIANS

Since the sixteenth century, but especially since the end of the nineteenth century, Christians in Latin America have been cultivators of philosophy. I present briefly the complex and little-studied problematic of this tradition, which is relatively independent from the other currents due to its links to extended ecclesiastical institutions. It is a matter of philosophical thought practiced by Christians outside of the context of the church, which is one of the oldest institutions in the mestizo continent. Schools of philosophy were founded by the Dominicans in
Santo Domingo in 1538, and in Nichoacán, Mexico, in 1541. The first philosophical “normalization” (with master’s and doctoral degrees in philosophy) took place in the universities in Mexico City and Lima in 1553, and bachelor’s degrees were granted in dozens of centers, from Guadalajara and Durango to Santiago, Mendoza, and Buenos Aires during the colonial period. Similarly, in the twentieth century, dozens of Christian centers of learning cultivated philosophical studies—a tradition that dates back to the schools of Alexandria in the Roman empire, the Muslims (from the rediscovery of Aristotle in the ninth century A.D.) or those of the Latin medieval period, which maintained the autonomy of reason from faith. Thousands of youths learned and appreciated philosophy through this path. In general, European neo-scholasticism (in the style of Desiderio Mercier or Joseph Gredt) by Italian, Belgian, and German authors was taught, repeated, and critiqued. Mercier’s work *Programa analítico razonado de Metafísica* (Reasoned analytic program of metaphysics) was translated in 1923 in Lima and had several editions.

The first stage was a frank anti-positivist struggle (as with the “founders” analyzed above in section 2). José Soriano de Souza, who received his doctorate from Louvain, published, in Recife, Brazil, *Lições de filosofía elementar racional e moral* (Lectures of elemental rational and moral philosophy), in which he opposed the “Cartesian-Cusanian” philosophical position. In 1908 the Benedictines, following Miguel Kruze, founded a faculty of philosophy in São Paulo, which grants degrees recognized by Louvain. In Argentina, Mamerto Esquiú, in Córdoba, and Jacinto Ríos made their arguments against positivism. In Colombia, the conservative hegemony (1886–1930) made sure that Catholic thinking occupied the faculties of philosophy during this period. In Uruguay, Mariano Soler, who had an acceptable European education, frontally attacked positivism. The most distinguished of this group was Rafael María Carrasquilla, founder of the School of Rosario; he seconded Leon XIII with respect to the movement to return to Thomas of Aquinas, and he published *Lecciones de metafísica y Ética* (Lectures of metaphysics and ethics) in 1914.

Around 1920, faculties of philosophy began to be founded around the continent (the Catholic university in Lima, in 1917; the Javeriana in Bogota, the faculty of philosophy of the Benedictines in São Paulo, the Centreo Vital in Rio de Janeiro, and the “Courses on Catholic Culture” in Buenos Aires, in 1922; San Miguel in Buenos Aires, in 1931; and Medellin, in 1936). Journals (such as *Vozes*, founded in Brazil in 1907; *Estudios*, Buenos Aires, 1911; *El Ensayo*, Bogota, 1916; *A Ordem*, Rio, 1921; *Arx*, Córdoba, 1924; *Criterio*, Buenos Aires, 1928; *Revista Javeriana*, Bogotá, 1934; and *Stromata*, San Miguel, 1937) found an attentive reading public.

A critical moment was the Spanish crisis of 1936, which divided Christian democratic thinking (which was inspired first by Maritain and later by Emmanuel Mounier), from which the Christian renovation evolved in the late sixties, from the decidedly anti-Maritain thinking that supported Franquism, whose representatives ended up collaborating in the military dictatorships of the seventies.

Thus there emerged Catholic thinkers such as Tomás Casares, César Pico, Luis Guillermo Martínez Villada, Enrique Pita, Ismael Quiles, Raúl Echauri, and Diego
Pró in Argentina. The prototype of noncritical realist metaphysics was Octavio Derisi. In opposition, Juan Ramón Sepich stands out for his acuity and profundity, not soured with right-wing political attitudes, as does Guido Soaje Ramos, a specialist in ethics. Gonzalo Casas was a distinguished critical teacher of young philosophers. Alceu de Amorso Lima and Leonel France in Brazil; Víctor A. Belaúnde in Peru; Ignacio Bravo Betancourt, José M. Gallegos Rocafull, and Antonio Gómez Robledo—noted translator of Aristotle—in Mexico; and Clarence Finlayson Elliot in Chile would join many of the above-mentioned thinkers, such as José Vasconcelos, Antonio Caso, Wagner de Reyna, and Nimio de Aquín, who declared themselves Christian. Together, they constitute a significant group of twentieth-century Latin American thinkers. In the late twentieth century, Manuel Domínguez Camargo divided Christian thinkers in Latin America into three groups. First, those who are members of the Inter-American Society of Catholic Philosophers (A. Caturelli, Stanislaus Ladusans, O. Derisi) protect a true tradition and attempt to refute Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, and others. Second are those who think that philosophy and faith do not mix with or negate each other (in the sense of Blondel’s The Philosophical Exigencies of Christianity), who are the majority and who manifest an autonomous rationality. Finally, others start from the second position and “make an effort to find a new point of departure, elaborate a new language, or construct a new type of philosophical discourse that is at the level of contemporary rationality” that is critical and Latin American.

5. MARXIST PHILOSOPHY

Marxist thought had great relevance in Latin America, a continent featuring dependent capitalism, where extreme poverty (absolute and relative: there are more poor who are poorer) continued to grow throughout the twentieth century. Marx, as a philosopher-economist, is perceived to have formulated a critique of the reality of a suffering people. Marxist philosophy therefore has political, social, and ethical meaning.

In 1846, when Esteban Echevarría wrote Dogma socialista (Socialist dogma), there was no comprehension of what socialism was to mean to Latin America. Juan B. Justo, who translated Capital in 1895, had founded the magazine La Vanguardia the previous year. He organized the International Socialist Party in Argentina in 1896, and in 1909 he published Teoría y práctica de la historia (Theory and practice of history), in defense of a social-democratic thesis. Ricardo Flores Magón represented anarchist utopian thinking and, in the magazine Regeneración and the Liberal Fraternal Union of 1906, struggled against the Porfiriato in Mexico.

Among the first Marxists was Luis Emilio Recabarren, founder of the Socialist Worker’s Party of Chile in 1912, and of the Communist Party in 1922. He wrote in 1910,
Where are my fatherland and my freedom? Did I have them in my childhood, when instead of going to school I had to go to the shop to sell my meager child's strength to the insatiable capitalist? Do I have them today, when the entire product of my work will be absorbed by capital without my enjoying an atom of my production? I aver that the fatherland is the fulfilled and complete home, and that freedom exists only when this home exists.61

Recabarren and Julio Antonio Mella, founder of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1925, who died very young in 1929, ought to be considered members of the generation of founders of Marxist critical thought in the continent. It is known that once the Third International was formed in 1919, the communist parties rapidly copied the Soviet formulations and fell into Eurocentrism in their diagnoses, and later, with Stalin, into an ideological ontological materialist dogmatism. This did not prevent the emergence of great philosophers who knew how to think in adverse situations. José Carlos Mariátegui was the most prominent, as he integrated Marx's ideas with theses extracted from the vitalism of Bergson and from the mythical-political thought of Sorel. He posited that the “Indian problem” was central to Peru and other Latin American peoples. He did not fear contradicting an ideology that had already begun to fossilize into a European-style unadulterated “classism.” When, in 1928, his publishing company, Amauta, published Siete Ensayos sobre la realidad peruana (Seven interpretive essays on Peruvian reality), he was greeted as the most original and least dogmatic Latin American Marxist of the first part of the twentieth century. He was harshly criticized during his lifetime, and after his death he was stigmatized as having been a “reformist populist” by the already triumphant Stalinist party in Peru. In a famous political-philosophical text, he wrote,

The nationalism of the European nations—where nationalism and conservatism have been identified and co-substantiated—has imperialist goals. It is reactionary and anti-socialist. But the nationalism of the colonial peoples—yes, economically colonial, even if they boast of political autonomy—have a totally different origin and impulse. In these peoples, nationalism is revolutionary, and it therefore culminates in socialism. Among these peoples the idea of nation has not yet concluded its trajectory or exhausted its historical mission.62

His words are still valid in Latin America:

Marxist critique concretely studies capitalist society. As long as capitalism has not been superseded definitively, the canon of Marx continues to be valid. Socialism—in other words, the struggle to
transform the capitalist social order into collectivism—keeps that critique alive; it continues, confirms, and corrects it. Any attempt to catalogue it as a simple scientific theory is in vain, as long as it is effective in history as a gospel and method of a mass movement.\textsuperscript{63}

And he concludes, “Those phases of the economic process that Marx did not anticipate . . . do not affect in the least the foundations of Marxist economics.”\textsuperscript{64}

The frontist and Browderista crises prevented Marxism from being expressed with philosophical seriousness and rigor.\textsuperscript{65} The great exception was Aníbal Ponce, whose works \textit{Educación y lucha de clases} (Education and class struggle) (1937) and \textit{Humanismo burgués y humanismo proletario} (Bourgeois humanism and proletariat humanism) (1935) are the most creative works after Mariátegui’s writings. Ponce was born in Buenos Aires and died in exile in Michoacán, Mexico. In a lecture that he gave in 1930 at the faculty of economics, he said, “So great is the determination to separate intelligence from life that one might say that there is some hidden fear, some usurpation to defend, some great crime to hide. Societies have never esteemed the thinker. They have considered him, and with reason, a heretic.”\textsuperscript{66}

With the Cuban revolution of 1959, the impact of Marxist thinking extended throughout the continent, especially into faculties of philosophy. The ethical and voluntaristic focus of Ernesto Guevara and Fidel Castro won over the opinion of leftist youth for a time. Guevara expresses the same intuition that Antonio Caso had at the beginning of the century:

\textit{Latifundio} . . . results in low salaries, underemployment, and unemployment: \textit{the hunger of the people}. All of these existed in Cuba. Here there was \textit{hunger}. . . . The objective conditions for the struggle are given by the \textit{hunger of the people}, the reaction to this \textit{hunger}. . . . Our vanguard revolutionaries have to idealize this \textit{love of the people}, make it into a sacred cause, and make it unique, indivisible. . . . Every day one must struggle because this living \textit{love of humanity} is transformed into concrete events.\textsuperscript{67}

This was a profound ethical sentiment rooted in physical suffering that opened altruistically to the other, the universal.

From a strictly theoretical point of view, Sergio Bagú’s contribution was decisive: he demonstrated that the Latin American colonial system was not feudalism but dependent capitalism.\textsuperscript{68} This insight enabled the question of dependency (André Gunder Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, etc.) and Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world-system” to be formulated. All of this established Santiago as the intellectual center of the continent in 1970, with the triumph of Allende’s Popular Unity party.
Meanwhile, Carlos Astrada turned from a Heideggerian to a Hegelian ontology, and he finally developed his Marxist thinking in Córdoba. During their Mexican exile, his students, among them José Aricó, launched a theoretical dispute within Latin American Marxism, publishing more than a hundred volumes in the “Past and Present” collection with Siglo XXI. In Mexico, Marxist philosophical thinking had flourished thanks to the presence of Alfonso Sánchez Vázquez, who wrote the classic *Filosofía de la praxis* (*Philosophy of praxis*) in 1967; he later criticized the Althusserian current which had a great influence in the seventies through the work of Martha Harnecker.

In 1979, the Nicaraguan revolution gave rise to a new theoretical impulse and a profound renovation of political philosophy, which took over popular nationalist positions and opposed Stalinist dogmatism, thus innovating at all levels of reflection. Orlando Nuñez wrote about the Nicaraguan revolution,

> Some reductively proclaim that there can be no revolution unless it is with the exclusive participation of the proletariat, and other reductivists state that the proletariat are no longer the ones making the revolution, but the people. . . . The myopia of the former resides in not seeing the popular in the proletariat, and that of the latter in not seeing the proletariat in the popular.69

The work of Bolivar Echeverría and Gabriel Vargas, director of the journal *Dialectics* (Puebla), in Mexico, Nuñez Tenorio in Venezuela, Antonio García and the Althusserianist Luis Enrique Orozco in Colombia,70 as well as the three volumes of commentary of the four redactions of Marx’s *Capital*,71 ought to be mentioned. Raúl Fornet-Betancourt’s work, published in German, fills an important vacuum.72

### 6. LATINAMERICANIST PHILOSOPHY: THE FIRST “BIFURCATION”73

If we return to an exposition of the historical evolution of Latin American philosophy, we discover that what Miró Quesada called the “bifurcation” deepened (it had begun with the prior generation; see section 3). Now there was a “third generation.” In the thirties, a more detailed investigation of the history of Latin American philosophy began, corresponding to an ontological exigency in the surrounding historical world (from the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset, Sartre, Dilthey, and Heidegger) and to the strengthening of industrial national bourgeoisies when the war began in 1939. It was conceived not only as historiography, but also with the philosophical intention of discovering the problematics that were formulated and resolved by the preceding currents. From these pioneering studies was born a philosophical-historical consciousness with a continental perspective.
In fact, in a speech he gave in Montevideo in 1842, Juan Bautista Alberdi had discussed an idea for a course on contemporary philosophy, twenty years before the first pragmatic formulations of Charles Sanders Peirce:

The philosophy of each epoch and each country has commonly been the reason, the principle, or the most dominant and general sentiment that has governed its actions and conduct. And this reason has emanated from the most imperious needs of each epoch and country. Thus there have been Greek, Roman, German, English, and French philosophies, and it is necessary that there be an American philosophy. . . . There is, then, no philosophy in this century; there are only systems of philosophy, that is, more or less partial attempts, contradictory among themselves.\textsuperscript{74}

In 1912, Alejandro Korn wrote, in his work on Argentinean philosophy,

I can imagine the smile on the reader's face as he reads the following epigraph: Since when do we have Argentinean philosophy? Do we indeed have philosophy? . . . We Argentineans, the reader would say, belong to the realm of Western culture, and to this day we have assimilated only important ideas . . . [However,] our struggles were no mere brawls. Argentinean positivism is of autochthonous origin; only this fact explains its deep-rootedness. It was expression of a collective will . . .\textsuperscript{75}

Even José Carlos Mariátegui wondered, years later, is there a Peruvian philosophy? It was thus in the context of the pan-American organizations headquartered in Washington that Aníbal Sánchez Reulet published an article titled “Panorama de las ideas filosóficas en Hispanoamérica” (Panorama of ideas in Hispanic America) in 1936.\textsuperscript{76} In 1940, Risieri Frondizi contributed a section on the history of ideas to the Handbook of Latin American Studies. In 1949, Leopoldo Zea, a student of José Gaos’s, published a work in which he adopted a continental horizon: Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica: del romanticismo al positivismo (Two stages of Hispanic American thought: from romanticism to positivism). Francisco Romero himself, distanced from the faculty of philosophy in Argentina because of Peronism, published Sobre la filosofía en América (Concerning philosophy in America) in 1952. In Guayaquil, Ecuador, Ramón Insúa Rodríguez had also dealt with the theme in 1945. Shortly thereafter, in Washington, Sánchez Reulet, supported by Romero and Zea, edited a collection of the histories of thinking organized by country. Suddenly an unprecedented panorama began to emerge. Before the eyes of a new generation, there appeared the critical horizon that the philosophies practiced by the “normalizers” was alienating and “unauthentic,” inasmuch as it had not taken account of the antecedent reality of Latin American philosophy.
The affirmation of a forgotten identity, the negation of the mere repetition of what is European, required a return to what is Latin American as object (what has to be thought) and as subject (knowing who is thinking and from where they think) of philosophical reflection. In this way, with the resources of the ontological current, the question of the “Latin American being” was problematized (see section 3). The philosophers that I will call “Latinamericanists” form part of this generation, but they specialized in historical investigations, with their own philosophical stamp—that is, doing history of Latin American philosophy does not mean stopping doing philosophy as such, even if only obliquely, and this is what the analytic philosophers criticized.

Leopoldo Zea began as a historian of ideas of Mexico, and later he took on Hispanic America. His works were numerous and unprecedented. Furthermore, he practiced what we could call a philosophy “as such” (sin más) which he did not reconstitute from the perspective of the Latinamericanists’ hypotheses. The third level of his work consisted in a “philosophy of the history” of Latin America, at the beginning of which he attempted to answer the question “What is our being?” But as we have seen (in section 3), a concrete answer slipped through the fingers and little remained. Zea then attempted to navigate through a positive reconstruction of Latin America in confrontation with the West. With the passing of the decades, Zea reformulated this discourse according to the advancing development of the continent’s philosophy and history:

A more intense and harder struggle because Western domination encounters allies in our peoples, in groups of oligarchical power who also speak of freedom but only to defend their interests, interests that coincide with those of the foreign dominators. . . . Zea moves from the philosophy of what is Mexican to what is [Latin] American, and then, in a stage of maturity, to the philosophy of the Third World. . . . This humanist integration of humanity and its history is, today, the horizon from which unfold the theories of cultures of dependence and in which the philosophy of liberation has many roots.

If Zea’s body of written work is immense, his “work not written” is even greater. Like no other Latin American philosopher of the twentieth century, he propelled the study of Latin American philosophy not only throughout the continent (and to the United States), but also to Europe and the world. From his center (CECY-DEL) in Mexico, Zea has for decades radiated the Latinamericanist passion.

F. Miró Quesada, on the other hand, from his project of a historical rationality, has drawn a suggestive interpretation of the recent Latin American philosophical transformation.

Arturo Ardao is the prototype of the historian of ideas, with his own philosophical style. Similarly, Arturo Roig reflects creatively, departing from Hegel, to
discern what he calls the “anthropological a priori,” meaning “to want to hold oneself as valid (für sich gelten will)” from the perspective of a universal horizon and with reference to “the concrete figure of a people” (die konkrete Gestalt eines Volkes). The subject that is affirmed is an “us” (Latin America) before the “ours” (not only a territory) that has as a “legacy” the cultural inheritance of tradition, in the dialectic between civilization and barbarity. Thus, when we think about the “beginning” (Anfang)—which is not merely a “point of departure” (Ausgang)—of American philosophy, we must think of it as “self-consciousness,” as a thinking about ourselves, but in reality as constantly starting again. In turn, the “philosophies of accusation” are not to be left unexplored.

Abelardo Villegas published notorious works in his time. With a very purified dialectical methodology, relating the philosophical text to historical economic, political, and social structures, Villegas diagnosed that the central problem of the Latin American conflict is the contradiction between traditional and modern society. Revolution reveals the answer, which is simultaneously (in the case of the Mexican revolution, Batista in Uruguay, and the Cuban revolution) anti-traditional and anti-imperialist. The reformist movements (radical Argentineans or Peronists, Vargistas in Brazil, etc.) are included. Unfortunately, Villegas’s project has not received new contributions in recent years. I ought to mention here a whole group of Latinamericanists, such as Weinberg, Horacio Cerutti, Carlos Paladines, Germán Marquínez Argote (who organized the International Congresses of Latin American Philosophy at the Universidad Santo Thomas Aquino in Bogotá without interruption every year since 1982), Hugo Biaggini, and many others.

7. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE SECOND “BIFURCATION”

As I have mentioned, the “bifurcation” is accentuated in this “third generation.” Some started from the position of the preceding phenomenological current (this being the path of evolution of Miro Quesada and Mario Bunge; see section 3). Others, with greater rigor in the use of resources, employed linguistic analysis, and they therefore distanced themselves from the Latinamericanist tradition (e.g., L. Villoro and F. Salmerón). All were influenced by the “linguistic turn” in postwar Anglo-Saxon thought. Philosophy in Latin America took a clear forward step—although the project of quasi-perfect rigor of mathematical formalization or analysis meant an exaggerated skepticism regarding the other currents, and by the eighties, the limits of its internal and external consistency, especially with respect to practical philosophy, had been discovered. In any event, Latin American philosophy became conscious of its own methodological-linguistic mediations.

First, V. Ferreira da Silva, proceeding from phenomenology in Brazil, published Elementos de lógica matemática (Elements of mathematical logic) in 1940. Simi-
larly, Miró Quesada \(^9\) went from phenomenology to the cultivation of logic and mathematical logic (\textit{Lógica} [Logic], 1946); \textit{Filosofía de las Matemáticas} [Philosophy of mathematics], 1954), and later supported the axiomatization of juridical philosophy (\textit{Problemas Fundamentales de lógica jurídica} [Fundamental problems of juridical logic], 1956); he wrote his most important philosophical work, \textit{Apuntes para una teoría de la razón} (Notes towards a theory of reason), in 1962. Miró Quesada’s particular position in twentieth-century Latin American thought consists in his definition of reason, which allowed him to ascend to the level of logical, mathematical, formalizing knowledge without disdain for the knowledge that he termed ideological, metaphysical, or ethical; even if these forms could not achieve the formal rigor of the former, they still did not lose their rational validity. The broad rational spectrum (from the formal to the Latin American historical) corresponded, for Miró Quesada, to a strict, albeit broad, vision of historical reason.\(^{10}\)

In 1944, W. V. O. Quine and Hans Lindemann, who was from the Vienna circle and lived in Buenos Aires, visited Brazil, where interest in Bertrand Russell’s work was starting to grow. Through Russell, the mathematician Julio Rey Pastor and Gregorio Klimoski began their path. In Canada, a colleague of Romero’s in Buenos Aires, Mario Bunge (who published \textit{Causality} in 1959), attempted the most ambitious work of this current, the seven-volume \textit{Treatise on Basic Philosophy}, (1974–85); he added an eighth volume on ethics.\(^{91}\) In the prologue to the last volume Bunge writes, “The ultimate goal of theoretical research, be it in philosophy, science, or mathematics, is the construction of systems, i.e., theories . . . because the world itself is systemic, because no idea can become fully clear unless it is embedded in some system or other, and because sawdust philosophy is rather boring.”\(^{92}\) Therein lies its value and its limitation: formalizing theoretical rationalism. Leaving aside logic and mathematics, Bunge began with semantics\(^9\) and continued through ontology\(^{94}\) and epistemology.\(^{95}\) Finally, his ethics were developed from an axiological, Aristotelian teleological model—“values” as the evaluative horizon that takes over the utilitarian position; morality as the set of moral norms; ethics as the theories on values, morality, and action; the theory of action as a praxiology: “The morality advocated in this book is based on a value theory according to which anything that promotes welfare is good. Our morality can be summed up in the norm \textit{Enjoy life and help live.}”\(^{96}\)

Héctor-Neri Castañeda, born in Guatemala (his first publication in the United States was \textit{Morality and the Language of Conduct}, 1963), is the best known of the Latin American analytic philosophers.\(^97\) Castañeda has devoted himself to the development of an analysis of ethical language in a creative, rigorous, and personal manner.\(^98\) He concluded one of his first works presenting his position: “Thus Morality builds, upon the connection between the moral value of sets of actions and happiness, the basis of a special complex and pervasive network of duties (obligations, oughts, or requirements).”\(^{99}\) Ontologically, as with Moore and Bunge, Castañeda’s point of departure is an axiology, from out of which moral principles are determined with reference to an ethos. The “elements of practical thinking,” unities (noema), are analytically sought and formulated in “propositions” that can
constituted as “imperatives,” with intentions, until deontic judgments are arrived at. Little by little, the “logical structure of practical thinking,” the justification of prescriptions and intentions, imperatives and duties, is discovered, until “the structure of morality” is analytically reached.

Thomas M. Simpson (Formas lógicas, realidad y significado [Logical forms, reality and meaning], 1964), in Buenos Aires, and Roberto Torreti, in Chile, also pioneered work in the analytic tradition. Eduardo Rabossi wrote Análisis filosófico, lenguaje y metafísica (Philosophical Analysis, language and metaphysics) in 1977.

Meanwhile, in 1967, Alejandro Rossi, who had returned from Oxford, Luis Villoro, and Fernando Salmerón founded the journal Crítica, which became the organ of the analytic movement in Latin America. Carlos U. Moulines, a Venezuelan doctor living in Munich (1975), and in fact with a degree in epistemology from that city’s university, published La estructura del mundo sensible (The Structure of the Sensible World)—departing from Stegmüller’s position—in 1973. At the University of Campinas, near São Paulo, Zeljko Loparic promoted a center for logic, epistemology, and the history of science, where the journal Manuscrito was published in 1977.

In Creer, saber, conocer (Belief, knowledge, learning), Luis Villoro wondered, “How has human reason operated throughout history? Has it repeated situations of domination or, on the contrary, liberated us from our subjection?” And he concluded, “If intolerance is an indispensable part of a philosophy of domination, then critical activity is the first step toward a philosophy of liberation.” Critique starts from beliefs. Every rational being has reasons for his or her beliefs; when these reasons are sufficient they are enough; when they are insufficient, causes for their insufficiency and better reasons must be sought. When sufficient reasons are objectively justified as valid, it can be said that S has knowledge of p. To learn adds to knowledge “personal experience,” which is judged specifically in discoveries, empirical application, and wisdom. Vehemently criticizing the skepticism of scientism, which measures everything according to the disproportionately rigorous degree of justification of some sciences, Villoro concludes,

Contemporary scientism is akin to the scornful arrogance with which the civilized contemplate the beliefs of human groups that have not ascended to a specific level of technical development. . . . The West, with its colonial expansion, has despotically ruled entire peoples, destroying their cultures, with the supposed justification of introducing them to science and modern technology.

The clear defense of “wisdom,” as knowledge extracted from lived experiences, which is different from scientific knowledge, allows Villoro to be precise without delegitimizing the narrative of a Shakyamuni, a “wise man of the Shakya tribe.” Putting aside the critiques that were made of them, and that they themselves formulated, proponents of this current contributed greatly to raising the level of philosophical reflection. Born with the vocation of rigor, it achieved its objective.
8. PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION

Members of a new generation (of those born after 1930, although it was anticipated by some), began their reflection at the end of the sixties, not without some relation to the events of 1968, with respect to a philosophy of liberation, which was thus linked to Latinamericanist philosophy. Salazar Bondy belonged to this current, and he responded negatively to the question, Is there a philosophy of our America? He saw the need for the birth of a new philosophy that would be more rigorous and engaged in the struggle against the culture of domination. For Salazar Bondy, only one who understands “domination” can, without illusion, hope for an exit: “The insufficiencies and weaknesses of our philosophy, which subsist despite the present efforts and progress, are not, then, negative characteristics of philosophy taken separately and as such, but symptomatic of a deeper and more fundamental failure that affects both our culture and our society.” With extreme lucidity, Salazar Bondy concludes, “Philosophical thinking ought to become, as far as the human energies that are empowered by it, an instrument of radical critique with the goal of achieving, through analysis and rational illumination, a fully realistic consciousness of our situation.” He gives a clear diagnosis on the need for a new philosophy:

Outside of the philosophies linked with the great contemporary blocs or the immediate future, it is necessary, then, to forge a thinking that both takes root in the socio-historical reality of our communities and conveys their needs and goals, and also serves to wipe out the underdevelopment and domination that typify our historical situation. Within the general framework of the Third World, the Hispanic American countries must be challenged to construct their development and achieve their independence with the support of a philosophical reflection conscious of the historical crossroads and determined to construct itself as a rigorous, realist, and transforming thinking.

He concludes, “But there is still no possibility of liberation, and, to the extent that there is, we are obliged to opt decidedly for a line of action that materializes this possibility and avoids its frustration. Hispanic American philosophy also has before itself the option that its own constitution depends on its being an authentic reflection.” Salazar Bondy explained in 1973 in Buenos Aires, during the dialogue that I helped to organize at that time:

When philosophy set out historically to liberate itself, it did not achieve even the liberation of the philosopher, because no one who dominates another can be liberated. Thus, in truth, the only possibility of liberation is occurring for the first time in history with the
Third World, the world of the oppressed and underdeveloped, who are liberating themselves and at the same time liberating the other, the dominator. Thus, for the first time can there be a philosophy of liberation. In the concrete case of the struggle of classes, groups, and nations, there is another who is the dominator, who unfortunately I have to remove from the structure of domination: I have to dismantle their machinery of oppression. And philosophy has to be in this struggle, because if it is not, it becomes abstract thought with which, although we intend to liberate others, as philosophers, not even we are liberated.114

Salazar Bondy indicated that this new philosophy ought to respond diachronically to three criteria: to be “[a] a critical work to the extent that historical reality allows it, [b] a work of reformulation to the extent that we emerge towards a new optic, and [c] a reconstruction of philosophy to the extent that this optic gives us a way to produce a thinking already oriented in the sense of the philosophy of liberation.”115

Leopoldo Zea’s reaction116 was not so much to negate Salazar Bondy’s historiographical position—or my own—but instead to defend “Latinamericanist philosophy” in the sense that it already responded to the exigencies of the new philosophy that Salazar Bondy was looking for. This was the debate: Latinamericanist philosophy with a long existing tradition or a nascent liberation philosophy? Zea wanted to demonstrate that there had always been Latin American thought, and even a philosophy of liberation, authentic insofar as it responded to the Latin American reality.117 These philosophies responded to the reality of their time, especially the political reality. Salazar Bondy and I perfectly accepted this hypothesis, and Salazar Bondy had in fact written numerous historiographical works along these lines. We were in agreement with Zea that to a large extent “academic” or “normalized” philosophy, the philosophy of the “community of hegemonic European and North American philosophers” propounded among ourselves, was not authentic;118 it was imitative, Eurocentric—and the analytic philosophers of the sixties added, with validity, that it was not sufficiently rigorous. We admitted that for philosophy to be rigorous, it ought to depart from concrete (or particular) reality and elevate itself to universality—and in this there was concordance with the analytic and epistemological current. All philosophy departs from the concrete (Aristotle’s departed from a political reality of slavery, while Hegel’s global-historical philosophy was Germanocentric) and is raised to universality. Each philosophy is originally particular (and because of that each has deserved the label of Greek, Roman, Muslim, Medieval, German, Anglo-Saxon, and even North American, since Charles S. Peirce), as a point of departure, and at the same time each is “philosophy as such” (filosofía sin más), as a point of arrival—since they can learn/teach something “universal” from/to all others.119 The discussion does not reside here, but is located elsewhere: Zea thinks that “Latinamericanist philosophy” suffices; Salazar Bondy advocates a new philosophy that
is more rigorous, illuminating with respect to the question of “negativity,” and more linked to praxis in the question of social “transformation.” To achieve this, the social sciences, the political economy of dependence (today we would say the horizon of the “world-system”), must be assimilated. The original group identified with the philosophy of liberation, in my opinion, was in agreement with Salazar Bondy on this issue. I believe that there are four possible positions for facing this problem: first, that which admits the validity of historiographical “Latinameri-
canist philosophy,” even as a hermeneutics of the “life world”; second, that which discovers the degree of prostration of Latin American academic-normalized philosophy; third, that which indicates the possibility of a Latin American philosophy as historiography, and that dialogues with the best of the hegemonic Euro-American philosophical community; and fourth, that which attempts to develop a philosophy of liberation as differentiated from prior projects, although it ought to be articulated in conjunction with them—that is, supporting itself in historiography, in epistemological rigor, and in dialogue or clarifying debates with the other recognized and hegemonic philosophical positions.

Salazar Bondy’s project, and that of a philosophy of liberation in a strict sense, is distinguished from the first type of Latinamericanist philosophy (see section 4), although the former can be considered a movement that emerged from “Latinamericanist philosophy.” But, since it is not only a particular process (although it set out from this particularity), it is also a “universal philosophy”—that is, it opens itself to globality (but in the sense of linking up with the philosophical movements of liberation in the periphery in general—of underdeveloped nations, dominated social classes, ethnicities, the marginal, women, homosexuals, chil-
dren, youths, popular culture, discriminated-against races, and on behalf of the future generations in advocating the ecological question, etc.). The new philosophy, whose agenda was opened by Salazar Bondy from a negative moment (as “philosophy of domination”), has evolved in recent decades.

Some, such as Osvaldo Ardiles in the seventies, who belonged to the Latinamericanist ontological current developed this philosophy with a political consciousness, from an analysis of continental reality as it was practiced by nascent Latin American critical social science (think here of Fals Borda, Sociología de la liberación (Sociology of liberation), published in 1969), and arising from militant en-
gagement with popular groups in action against the military dictatorships. The “late” Heidegger was criticized with and through Emmanuel Levinas (thanks to the contribution of J. C. Scannone), allowing for the emergence of a Latin American thought which discovered that the domination of the exploited Latin American people originated with the beginning of the “world-system” itself in 1492. The reality of Latin American oppression, criticized by Bartolomé de las Casas in the sixteenth century (in the first counter-discourse of modernity), was the point of departure for this uniquely Latin American philosophy in terms of theme, method, and awareness of a different discourse. Immediately, positivity, the dignity of the cultural alterity of the Latin American historical subject, was affirmed from the perspective of a project of liberation.
Perhaps the philosophy of liberation (which emerged in late 1969 in Argentina) began with my work *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana* (Towards an ethics of Latin American liberation) (five volumes written between 1970 and 1975). A group of philosophers emerged at the Second National Congress of Philosophy (Cordoba, 1972), whose discourse had as its point of departure the massive poverty of the underdeveloped and dependent Latin American continent. It was a reflection by those oppressed by and/or excluded from the system (politically, economically, erotically, pedagogically, etc.)—in the way that pragmatists did from the perspective of the process of *verification*; it was a practical process not of freedom, but of *liberation*, which departed from another process—not that of the modern consciousness, but that of becoming aware (*concientización*), which required the outlining of an alternative project to the one constructed by the “principle of hope.”

This current has followed several paths. Some thinkers were included because of their ethical analysis, with links to Levinas or Marx (an ethics of liberation), others returned to an indigenous hermeneutics of long tradition (Rodolfo Kusch), while others set out from popular wisdom (J. C. Scannone, Carlos Cullén). Still others dealt with ideological deconstruction (Hugo Assmann) or with the critique of utopian reason (Franz Hinkelammert). Some turned frankly nationalist or populist (Mario Casalla); others inserted themselves within the study of tradition (L. Zea); or emerged from an ideological practical project of rationality as emancipation and solidarity (F. Miró Quesada), or as a philosophy of intercultural dialogue (R. Fornet-Betancourt); or they emerged from concrete situations, such as Cuban Marxist humanism (Guadarrama). Because of the thematic of the philosophy, there are also a pedagogy of liberation (Paulo Freire since his famous *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 1968) and a philosophy of erotic liberation (begun by Vaz Ferreira and continued with a strictly philosophical conceptual horizon, not without its own ambiguities due to the social context of the period, begun by me in the seventies, and adopted into feminism by Graciela Hierro, among many others).

The debate established by Karl-Otto Apel and representatives of the philosophy of liberation began to give this current greater significance, with the possibility of incorporating the achievements of the “linguistic turn.” From the popular culture of the oppressed and excluded (the majority of humanity living in the Southern Hemisphere), a strictly Latin American philosophy was formulated. The challenge was launched.

### 9. SITUATION AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

As could be observed at the 19th World Congress of Philosophy in Moscow (1993), and the 13th Inter-American Congress of Philosophy in Bogotá (1994), the “bifurcation” of the sixties and eighties (between epistemological and analytic philosophy and Latin American historical-political philosophy) is beginning to be
transformed into a possibility for dialogue. This is a result of two factors. First is the weakening of dogmatism, which affirmed its own discourse without sufficient critique and ignored other discourses (such as pre-pragmatic analytic philosophy, reductive and one-dimensional mathematizing epistemology, Marxism and Stalinism, historicisms that expected too much from mere reflection on the past, crises of political and social alternatives, etc.). Second, there is a healthy skepticism (that does not require arguments that exceed reasonable exigencies in order to validate rational consensus, and that therefore also opposes the skepticism of extreme rigor), which today allows a more tolerant discussion with other positions, that is, a fertile dialogue between the different currents in the late twentieth century. Perhaps a rational exchange between Latin American philosophers, aware of their own limits, the hegemonic European-North American philosophical community, and Afro-Asiatic philosophers will allow a “world” philosophy to emerge for the first time. Should not the constitution of this first global dialogue (West/East, North/South) between continental philosophical communities be one of the initial and central tasks of the twenty-first century?

Translated by Eduardo Mendieta

NOTES

General note: All quotations in this chapter were translated by Eduardo Mendieta.

1. See the bibliography, section 1.
2. See F. Romero, Teoría del hombre (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1952). The full name, nationality, dates of birth and death (if it has taken place), and principal works of the Latin American philosophers named in the text can be found in the chronology and/or in the bibliography at the end of this chapter.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. With respect to the “professorial style” of this concrete generation, Salazar Bondy indicated (as did I) that its philosophy was “imitative or inauthentic,” and not with respect to the totality of Latin American thought that affirmed itself as existing and as historical reflection (which in no way is negated). See Enrique Dussel, “Leopoldo Zea’s Project of a Philosophy of Latin American History,” in Amaryll Chanady, ed., Latin American Identity and Constructions of Difference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 26–42.
6. Miró Quesada, Despertar y proyecto. This was the second institutionalization (“normalization”) of university philosophy; the first “normalization” began in 1553 with the foundation of the first universities in Mexico City and Lima and philosophical studies within the renovated second Scholastic cultivated with precision by some great creative Latin American philosophers.
7. See the bibliography, section 3.1.
10. Alejandro Deustua, Las ideas de orden y de libertad en la historia del pensamiento humano (Lima: E. R. Villaran, 1919); see A. Salazar Bondy, Historia de las ideas en el Perú contemporáneo (Lima: Moncloa, 1967), vol. 1, 149ff.
14. See Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Conocimiento y acción (Montevideo: Martíno y Caballero, Impresores, 1908), 100.
16. In Lógica viva (Montevideo: Impresora Uruguaya, 1957), in the chapter on “false precision,” Vaz Ferreira writes, “There are scientific systems, whole theories [. . . ] that can be considered illustrations of this fallacy—for instance, Herbart’s psychology. This author attempts to explain psychology through mathematics [. . . ] Such explications are deceptive: they claim that psychology has acquired precision. [. . . ] This precision is false and illegitimate” (110).
17. It ought to be recalled that Korn was mayor of his town, Ranchos, when he was a field doctor; municipal manager of La Plata; dismissed during the coup of 1893; and a representative of the Radical Party (early populism, before Peronism). As part of the university reform of 1919 he was appointed dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires. In the thirties, when the socialist Alfredo Palacios won the election in Buenos Aires (similar to Hamburg, Germany, where the door was opened to the triumph of Nazism), Korn entered the socialist party to oppose the military coup of 1930, which allowed Captain Francisco Romero, who supported the coup, to occupy an undisputably preeminent position in the philosophy faculty until 1946.
21. Ibid., 16.
22. Ibid., 17.
25. See Roberto Escobar, La filosofía en Chile (Santiago: Universidad Técnica del Es- tado, 1976), 63ff.
26. See Germán Marquinez Argote, La Filosofía en Colombia (Bogotá: Editorial el Búho, 1988), 343ff.
27. See the bibliography, section 3.2.
28. Carlos Astrada, *Idealsimo fenomenologico y metafisica existencial* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1936) p. 6. The bibliography in this chapter calls attention to the fact that Astrada achieved a high technical level in the use of sources by the range of canonical issues he wrote about.


30. This distinction, however, should not be seen as immutable, since J. Gaos, republican and anti-Francista, was Heideggerian and advocated the study of that which is Mexican. Carlos Astrada himself ended up adhering to Marxism after the fall of Peronism.


32. In Latin America the peripheral bourgeoisie in countries with populist governments searched for national emancipation; the German or Japanese bourgeoisie sought, instead, global hegemony, in competition with Anglo-Saxon domination of the global market.


35. Only if the history of Europe and its change of “meaning” in the periphery of capitalism are taken into account can the division between Romero and Astrada be understood. In 1930, with the anti-nationalist “military coup,” Captain Romero took over the chair of philosophy in Buenos Aires; in 1946 it was taken over by Astrada, during the military coup that later gave rise to Peronism. In 1956 Romero returned with the “liberating revolution” that brought independence from North American expansion. In 1966, with Onganía’s military coup, some went into exile; in 1976, with the neoliberal military coup, others went into exile. One has to be extremely careful not to confuse the “sense” of each one of these divisions and situate them in the periphery. Hitler was not the same thing as Adenauer, but Getulio Vargas and Cárdenas were not simply Hitler, and Frondizi and Chilean Christian democracy were not simply Adenauer. Therefore, Astrada was not Heidegger (although he had much in common with him), and he and Romero did not have philosophical-political analogues in Europe.

36. The Argentinian gaucho, like the Colombian or Venezuelan llanero, was the prototype for Sarmiento’s “barbarian.” Astrada recuperated the positivity of this prototype.


43. I believe that Caturelli does not realize that he has used the same expression that Kant used in his definition of Aufklärung: “Unmundigkeit” (see Dussel, 1492: El encubrimiento del Otro, 19–30.


48. See Francisco Romero, Filosofía de la persona (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1944) and Romero, Teoría del Hombre.


53. See the bibliography, section 3.3.


55. See Arturo Ardao, La filosofía en el Uruguay en el Siglo XX (Mexico City: FCE, 1956), 163ff. In his work La iglesia y la civilización (1905), Ardao demonstrates an open, liberal, anti-positivist spirit. Enrique Legrand, an astronomer, in Divagaciones filosóficas (1906), showed the ability of a believing scientist to maintain the mutual autonomy of science and faith.

56. See Leonardo Tovar González, “Tradicionalismo y neoescolástica,” in Marquiz Argote, La Filosofía en Colombia, 320ff.

57. The 1st World Congress of Christian Philosophy of 1979, held in Córdoba, published three volumes entitled La filosofía cristiana, hoy [Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1980. It was chaired by the dictator General Videla, who made a speech written by Alberto Caturelli that was the extreme expression of this attitude.


59. Manuel Domínguez Camargo, “La neoescolástica de los siglos XIX y XX,” in Marquiz Argote, La Filosofía en Colombia, 262.

60. See the bibliography, section 3.4.


64. Ibid., p. 75.
68. The most important works dealing with this debate were Sergio Bagú, *Economía de la sociedad colonial* (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1949); Caio Prado Júnior, *Historia econômica do Brasil* (São Paulo: Circulo do Livro, 1982); and Silvio Frondizi, *La realidad argentina, ensayo de interpretación sociológica* (Buenos Aires: Praxis, 1960 [1957]).
70. See Orlando Fals Borda et al., *El marxismo en Colombia* (Bogota: Universidad Nacional, 1983).
72. See R. Fornet-Betancourt, *Ein anderer Marxismus? Die philosophische Rezeption des Marxismus in Lateinamerika* (Mainz: Gruenewald, 1994). This is the first work that studies the development of Marxism in the continent in a philosophically strict manner.
73. See the bibliography, section 3.5.
76. See the bibliography, section 1.
81. To a certain extent, Emilio Uranga in *Análisis del ser del mexicano* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1952), in which he defined Mexican being by its “radical ontological insufficiency,” had already closed the path toward ontological analysis of the American being. In turn, Luis Villoro, in *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1950), following the negative tradition, showed that given that the Indian was “the other,” the only way of overcoming discrimination was by integrating him into the Mexican as such, and he thus disappeared as an Indian.
83. To Sobrevilla, in *Repensando la tradición nacional I*, vol. 2, 835, Miró Quesada’s project appears to be a contradiction between his formal conception of rationality (in his works on logic, mathematical logic, formalization of a juridical philosophy, and the theory of rationality) and what he is trying to achieve in his works on the history of Latin American ideas. We will return to this theme, but here it is necessary to take into consideration that Miró Quesada’s theory of rationality is flexible and that he is aware of its limits. Fur-
thermore, with reference to ethics, or the experience of having to formulate an ideology for a Peruvian political party, he understood the difficulty of axiomatization and the need of a "broad" concept of rationality (which I think would not be accepted by Mario Bunge, for instance, who is far more reductivist with reference to these questions).

84. See Roig, *Teoría y crítica*, 9ff. It is a matter of a historical "reconstruction" of subjectivity, a fertile method for a history of Latin American philosophy.

85. Ibid., 100ff. On the concept of "recognition," see 106.


87. See the bibliography, section 3.6, especially Jorge Gracia, ed., *El análisis filosófico en América Latina* (Mexico City: FCE, 1985).

88. Note that rigor is desired in the linguistic apparatus but not in the socio-historical apparatus (which is another epistemological horizon that these philosophers do not attempt to broaden).


91. See also M. Bunge, *The Mind-Body Problem* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), in which he makes note of a theme of great importance.

92. Vol. 1 deals with designation, reference, representation, intention, content; vol. 2, with interpretation, meaning, truth, precision, contiguous fields. It is to be noted that this is all a pre-pragmatic reflection.

94. Vol. 3 deals with substance, form, thing, world (only as the totality of real things), possibility, change, time-space; vol. 4, with system, life, mind, society, a systematic vision of the world. This work deserves special study. For Bunge, ontology is the formal reflection of systems as systems (formal systematizability). It would be interesting to compare this position with Niklas Luhmann’s, which is, in synthesis, “Everything interacts with other things, so that all things cohere forming systems” (vol. 4, 245). This is neither atomistic, nor holistic, nor scientistic. The “systematicity” of things is diverse (insofar as they are heterogeneous systems). Lastly, since the universe is the sum of all systems, “it endures eternally although no part of it does” (246).

95. Vol. 5 deals with cognition, knowledge, investigation, communication; perception, conception, inference, exploration, conjecture, systematization; vol. 6, with understanding, production of evidence, evaluation, epistemological change, types of knowledge, results; vol. 7, with formal science and physical science.

96. Bunge, *Treatise on Basic Philosophy*, vol. 8, 398. But this is precisely where the difficulties begin. How can the majority of humanity, in misery, in the peripheral world, accomplish this philosophical objective? Bunge indicates that this would be more concrete levels of reflection on application that depart from what has been presented.

97. Castañeda’s students included Ricardo Gómez, an excellent Argentinian epistemologist living in Los Angeles, and Jorge Gracia, a Hispanic-American living in Buffalo, who has produced extremely relevant work since he is a true “intercultural bridge” between the United States and Latin America.


100. Villoro, Creer, saber, conocer (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1982), 9.
101. Ibid., 292.
102. “In an acquired dispositional state which causes a coherent set of responses and which is determined by an object or apprehended objective situation” (ibid., 71).
103. Ibid., 175.
104. Ibid., 220.
105. Ibid., 294–295. And he adds, “Skepticism toward every possibility of innovation and profound change accommodates very well to conformism with the existing situation and its structures of domination. It is not without reason that technocratic and conservative focuses on social life often attempt to disguise themselves with a scientistic posture” (ibid., 296).
106. Ibid., 227. Here the “second” Villoro follows the “first” (the phenomenological and historian of ideology Villoro), and encounters the “third” (his present political philosophy).
107. From within the current, Gracia writes, “A more serious weakness from the philosophical standpoint that I see in the work of Latin American analysts is their lack of interest and competence in the history of philosophy in general and particularly in the history of Latin American thought. [...] At a time when the analytic tradition in the Anglo-American world is opening up to other philosophical traditions and trying to engage in dialogue with them, some Latin American analysts seem to be going in exactly the opposite direction” (“Impact of Philosophical Analysis,” 138–139).
108. See the bibliography, section 3.7.
109. This is Miró Quesada’s “fourth” generation (Proyecto y realización, 184). The term “generation” is not meant here as a category, but as an approximate indication of membership both in a certain problematic and in a certain time (where the age of the philosopher is an ambiguous term, which nevertheless indicates a certain historicity).
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., 127.
113. Ibid., 133.
114. A. Salazar Bondy, “Diálogo con los expositores,” Stromata (Buenos Aires) 29 (Oct.–Dec. 1973): 441–442. I must mention here that Salazar Bondy was pleasantly surprised to encounter a philosophical movement, with publications, a presence in the universities, and interdisciplinary congresses, that had been developing for several years, called “philosophy of liberation,” whose existence he had not known of. He immediately felt himself a member and entered into the constructive discussion. It was as if it were a project of his own that he had not been able to develop. He honored us greatly when he said, “I find it very interesting what you are doing, [since] you are in fact attempting a reformulation of the traditional problematic of a new optic” (“Filosofía de la dominación y filosofía de la liberación,” Stromata, 29 [Oct.–Dec. 1973]: 397).
116. Both in Zea, La filosofía americana, and in his critique of Salazar Bondy (and me) in San Miguel (see Zea, “La filosofía latinoamericana como filosofía de la liberación,” Stromata, 29 [Oct.–Dec. 1973]: 406: “Enrique Dussel, in turn, has formulated a similar need and, with Salazar Bondy, he has asked: is an authentic philosophy possible in our underdeveloped, dependent, and oppressed continent, even culturally and philosophically?”).

118. Zea himself wrote, “Not to want to become aware of our own situation explains partly why we have not been able to have our philosophy” (“La filosofía como compromiso,” in Leopoldo Zea, *La filosofía como compromiso y otros ensayos* [Mexico: Fondo de cultura Económica, 1952], p. 33). Note that here Zea agrees with Bondy and me.

119. See Antonio Sidekum, ed., *Ética do Discurso e Filosofia da Libertaçâo. Modelos Complementares* (São Leopoldo, RS: Editora Unisinos, 1994). This volume emerged from a meeting at which the question “Is there a Latin American philosophy?” was discussed.

120. Salazar Bondy advanced to the first position, called attention to the second position, and attempted the third position, which we had held independently in Argentina since 1969–1970. On the fourth position we agreed personally in 1973. Salazar Bondy experienced the entire process of development of the philosophy of liberation, which he had not known about, but which he recognized immediately.


122. I refer to the military dictatorships of dependence, which began with Castello Branco in Brazil (1964) and Onganía in Argentina (1966), and that were later generalized (Banzer in Bolivia, Pinochet in Chile in 1973, Videla in Argentina in 1976, etc.). These historical “ruptures,” until there was a return to formal democracy in Argentina in 1983, produced deep fissures in philosophical development, as we have seen. The European “fissures” (the irruption of Nazism and fascism in the late twenties, and the return to democracy in 1945) were equally acute and produced important “philosophical” effects. One has to know how to analyze them analogically with Latin America, where those dictatorships have not yet ended. In Latin America there were many expulsions of philosophers, similar to those from the Frankfurt school, many analogous to Walter Benjamin (think of the philosopher Mauricio Lopez, tortured and assassinated in Argentina in 1976), many Mar- cuses (more than ten professors, including me, shared a commitment to the philosophy of liberation and were expelled from the university and the country), and many collaborationist Heideggers (although they remained philosophers). The historical analysis of the global periphery is more complex than is that of Europe or the United States.


125. See Carlos Cullén, *Reflexiones desde América*, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires: Ross, 1986). This work has to be taken into account from the perspective of Rodolfo Kusch.

126. Hinkelammert’s work is of great interest, particularly in view of the debate with K.-O. Apel in September of 1993 in São Leopoldo, Brazil.

127. In *Razón y Liberación: notas para una filosofía latinoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, 1973), Casalla does not overcome the horizon of the total- ity. The alterity of the oppressed class, the poor, and the marginalized (different levels) are not clarified: the national is identified as the popular.

128. For Zea, in *Filosofía de la Historia Americana*, the “assumptive moment” supersedes and subsumes the emancipatory project of independence, whether liberal or conservative,
but, as with Vasconcelos’s cosmic race, only a national liberation, which is not the same as popular liberation, is proposed.

129. Miró Quesada’s commitment to philosophy of liberation did not come from the level of what he called “pure philosophy,” but from the “ideological character” of certain rational discourses. His Humanismo y Revolución (Lima: Casa de la Cultura del Perú, 1969) is not a work of philosophy of liberation, but it indicates how he formulated the political problem. For him, “ideology”—theoretical justification at the practical level—can be formulated rationally departing from teleological principles: “Political problems can be faced through theoretical principles, through rational rules that allow the achievement of objective and valid conclusions for all humans” (Humanismo y Revolución, 21). Throughout his analysis, Miró Quesada follows the rationalist Aristotelian model. Here, he has not formulated the difference between theoretical and practical rationality. He thinks that the first operates in ideology with the same rules as practical reason (a problem which, posed in a different manner, has not been solved by the rationalism of Apel and Habermas).

Compare Miró Quesada’s Humanismo y Revolución and my Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana, vol. 4, Políticas (Bogotá: USTA, 1980). When Miró Quesada learned of the existence of liberation philosophy, in the seventies, he understood its importance, since it allowed him to formulate the theoretical-ideological principle that he needed. I think that the question is far more complex, as I show in my Ethics of Liberation (Madrid: Trotta 1998). For me, practical reason is the first reason (and not simply ideological reason), just as ethics is prima philosophia.

130. The very worthy analysis by the Cuban team, like that by H. Cerutti, tends to confuse the planes, since it claims to analyze everything through the criteria of a universalist, humanist “Engelsian materialist” Marxism (see Pablo Guadarrama, Humanismo y Filosofía de la Liberación en América Latina [Bogotá: El Buho, 1993]), or from the perspective of a “classism” in which the category of “people” is populist (see Horacio Cerutti, Filosofía de la Liberación Latinoamericana [Mexico City: FCE, 1983]; there is a response to his objections in Dussel, La producción teórica de Marx, 400–413, and El último Marx, 243–293).


132. These currents, or philosophical styles, in the nineties are an epistemological and pragmatic philosophy (that subsumes analytic thinking), from out of the brain-mind problematic; a “continental” philosophy (especially from Kant to Habermas), as history of contemporary philosophy, including the modernity-postmodernity debate; a Latin American philosophy, philosophy of liberation, and political philosophy (this last one in expansion, through positions such as that of Carlos Pereyra in Mexico, which has as tributary some Marxism, and with debates on the question of “democracy” drawing on political science), with works such as those by Guillermo O’Donell, “Apuntes para una teoría del Estado,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 40, no. 4 (1978): 1157–1199; and with philosophical works such as Enrique Serrano, Legitimación y racionalización. Weber y Habermas: la dimensión normativa de un orden secularizado (Barcelona and Mexico City: Anthropos-UAM, 1994).

133. On December 5–9, 1994, Latin American philosophers participated in the 2nd Congress of the Afro-Asiatic Association of Philosophy in Cairo, Egypt. This was the beginning of a dialogue between the philosophers of the peripheral world (the so-called Third World).
INDICATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

A bibliography on this theme, on its own, could be hundreds of pages long. I wish only to indicate some works in order to inform colleagues of other cultural horizons. This is a minimal, but reasoned, bibliography.

1. General Bibliography

These works concern the entire Latin American continent and not countries or currents.


2. Bibliography by Country

In this section are works that touch on nations as a whole, although they study authors who belong to particular currents.

2.1. Argentina


2.2. Mexico


2.3. Brazil


2.4. Peru


2.5. Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador


2.6. Venezuela, Colombia, Central America


2.7. The Caribbean


3. Bibliography of Philosophical Currents

*I include in this section some representative philosophers of the respective philosophical currents.*

3.1. Anti-Positivist, Vitalist, Spiritualist


3.2. Existential and Phenomenological Ontology

———. *Dialéctica e historia.* Buenos Aires: Juárez Editor, 1969.
3.3. Philosophy Practiced by Christians


3.4. Marxist Philosophy


Fornet-Betancourt, R. *Ein anderer Marxismus? Die philosophische Rezeption des Marxismus in Lateinamerika*. Mainz: Gruenewald, 1994. (This is the most important work on the theme.)


———. *Siete Ensayos sobre la realidad peruana*. In J. C. Mariátegui, *Obras completas*, vol. 2. Lima: Amauta, 1959. (There are translations into English and other languages.)


3.5. Latinamericanist Philosophy


3.6. Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science


3.7. Philosophy of Liberation


**MINIMAL CHRONOLOGY**

*The country in parentheses indicates where the person was born.*

1810 Juan Bautista Alberdi born (Argentina; died 1884)
1826 Mamerto Esquiú born (Argentina; died 1883)
1842 Jacinto Ríos born (Argentina; died 1892)
1849 Alejandro Deustua born (Peru; died 1945)
1853 José Martí born (Cuba; died 1895)
1857 Rafael Carrasquilla born (Colombia; died 1930)
1860 Alejandro Korn born (Argentina; died 1936)
1862 Raimundo Farias Brito born (Brazil; died 1917)
1865 Juan B. Justo born (Argentina; died 1928)
1867 Carlos Arturo Torres born (Colombia; died 1911)
1871 José Enrique Rodó born (Uruguay; died 1917)
1872 Enrique Molina born (Chile; died 1964)
1873 Carlos Vaz Ferreira born (Uruguay; died 1958)
1876 Ricardo Flores Magón born (Mexico; died 1922)
1882 José Vasconcelos born (Mexico; died 1959)
1883 Antonio Caso born (Mexico; died 1946)
1886 Coriolano Alberini born (Argentina; died 1960)
1891 Luis Guillermo Martínez Villada born (Argentina; died 1956)
1891 Francisco Romero born (Argentina; died 1962)
1893 Mariano Ibérico born (Peru; died 1974)
1894 Carlos Astrada born (Argentina; died 1970)
<table>
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<td>Juan Ramón Sepich born (Argentina; died 1979)</td>
<td>Ismael Quiles (Argentina; died 1993)</td>
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</table>
| 1907 | Eduardo Nicol born (Spain–Mexico; died 1990) | Octavio Derisi born (Argentina; )
| 1909 | J. B. Justo, *Teoría y práctica de la historia* | |
| 1910 | C. Vaz Ferreira, *Lógica viva* | |
|      | A. Caso, “Conferencia del Ateneo” (Mexico) | |
|      | Miguel Reale born (Brazil) | |
|      | José Gaos born (Spain–Mexico; died 1959) | |
|      | Aníbal Sánchez Reulet born (Argentina; died 1997) | |
|      | Risieri Frondizi (Argentina–United States; died 1982) | |
|      | Leopoldo Zea born (Mexico) | |
|      | Arturo Ardaño born (Uruguay–Venezuela) | |
|      | Francisco Larroyo born (Mexico) | |
| 1915 | Alberto Wagner de Reyna born (Peru) | |
|      | Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez born (Mexico) | |
| 1916 | A. Caso, *La existencia como economía y caridad* | |
|      | Vicente Ferreira da Silva born (Brazil; died 1963) | Ortega y Gasset’s first visit to Argentina |
| 1918 | Francisco Miró Quesada born (Peru) | |
| 1919 | Mario Bunge born (Argentina–Canada) | |
| 1920 | Danilo Cruz Vélez born (Colombia) | |
| 1921 | Paulo Freire born (Brazil; died 1999) | |
| 1922 | A. Korn, *La libertad creadora* | Jackson de Figueiredo, *Pascal e a Inquietação Moderna* |
|      | Gregorio Klimoski born (Argentina) | |
|      | Arturo Andrés Roig born (Argentina) | |
|      | Luis Villoro born (Mexico) | |
| 1923 | A. Deustua, *Estética general* | |
| 1924 | Héctor-Neri Castañeda born (Guatamala–United States; died 1991) | |
| 1925 | Augusto Salazar Bondy born (Peru; died 1974) | Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla born (Venezuela) |
|      | Fernando Salmerón born (Mexico) | Einstein’s visit to Argentina |
1928 J. C. Mariátegui, *Siete ensayos de la realidad peruana*
Ernesto Guevara born (Argentina–Cuba; died 1967)
1929 J. C. Mariátegui, *En defensa del marxismo*
Thomas Moro Simpson born (Argentina)
1930 Eduardo Rabossi born (Argentina)
1931 Juan Carlos Scannone born (Argentina)
Rodolfo Kusch born (Argentina; died 1979)
1932 E. Martínez Estrada, *Radiografía de la Pampa*
Alejandro Rossi born (Venezuela–Mexico)
1933 Hugo Assmann born (Brazil)
1934 S. Ramos, *El Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en México*
Abelardo Villegas born (Mexico; died 2001)
Enrique Dussel born (Argentina–Mexico)
1935 Guillermo Hoyos born (Colombia)
1936 C. Astrada, *Idealismo fenomenológico y metafísica existencial*
1937 A. Ponce, *Educação y lucha de clases*
1939 A. Wagner de Reyna, *La ontología fundamental de Heidegger*
1940 J. Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica*
V. Ferreira da Silva, *Elementos de lógica matemática*
1941 O. Derisi, *Fundamentos metafísicos del orden moral*
1942 Jorge Gracia born (Cuba–United States)
1943 L. Zea, *El Positivismo en México*
Carlos Cullen born (Argentina)
1944 W. V. Quine gives lectures in Brazil: *O sentido da nova lógica*
1946 D. Cruz Vélez, *Nueva imagen del hombre y de la cultura*
Carlos Ulises Moulines born (Venezuela–Germany)
1948 C. Astrada, *El mito gaucho*
1949 S. Bagú, *Economía de la sociedad colonial*
1952 F. Romero, *Teoría del Hombre*
J. Gaos, *En torno a la filosofía mexicana*
1955 F. Miró Quesada, *Filosofía de las Matemáticas*
1957 L. Zea, *América en la historia*
1961 M. Bunge, *Causalidad*
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