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Radical Philosophy Review provides a forum for activist scholars, community activists, and artists to explore concepts central to the humanistic transformation of society. The journal features original articles, special discussions, and reviews of interest to those who share the view that society should be built on cooperation rather than competition, and that social decision-making should be governed by democratic procedures. The journal also publishes special issues devoted to topics of particular social or political importance.

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The Concept of Fetishism in Marx's Thought (Elements for a general Marxist theory of religion)

Part I of II


ENRIQUE DUSSEL
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Abstract: In this essay, Enrique Dussel provides a textual "rereading" of Karl Marx's theory of fetishism according to his scattered but significant comments on religion as they extend throughout the whole of his work. In Part I, "The Place of the Subject of Religion in the Whole Work of Marx," Dussel demonstrates Marx's differentiation between a critique of the essence of religion and its manifestations, arguing that there is a space in Marx for an anti-fetishized liberatory religion. In Part II, "Toward a Theory of Fetishism in General," he provides a methodological account of such a religion, as well as a panorama of the content of this essence of religion. These accounts provide the basis for more clearly identifying both religious fetishism and the fetishist character of capital.

From August 20-25, 1984, I held a seminar on "Rereading Marx from the perspective of the political militancy in Latin America," in Kerala at the invitation of M. P. Joseph (Social Action Groups) and E. Deenadayalan (The Delhi Forum). Included in the 38 participants were Joseph Kottukapally of Pune and Yohan Devananda of Sri Lanka. I dedicate this work to them in remembrance of the beautiful days on the paradisiacal Charal mountain (Mar Thoma Church's Conference Centre), the land of the ancient kingdoms of Kerala, the region of "spices" where Syrian Christians arrived in the early centuries of Christianity, next to Cochin where the Greeks, Arabs, Dutch and British

carried on trade. This is a land of commitment of believers, now being mobilized by the “agitations” of “fishermen,” the prelude of greater hopes. There we read page by page, line by line, more and more texts from Marx beginning with Volume I of the Collected Works. That textual practice convinced us anew of the validity of the hypothesis of such a “rereading” from the political perspective of many Latin American believers—recently confirmed in the Sandinista revolution, but that had been planted earlier.¹

Let us take for a fundamental hypothesis for this work the quotation which appears in Volume I, Chapter 2 of Capital, the definitive work of Marx:

_The Ten Kings_ of one mind will give over their power and authority to the beast . . . It caused all _to be marked_ on the right hand or _on the forehead_ to prevent anyone to be able to buy or sell unless he had the mark or the name of the beast or the number of its name. (_Revelation_ 17:13 and 13:17)²

Here we intend to use a method similar to the one used for another work that we dedicated to technology in Marx’s thought.³

We will divide the material into two parts. _In the first_, we will try to locate the “places” where the subject of religion appears in the whole of Marx’s writings (from 1835-1883), since the theme of religion, as very few other subjects, runs through _the whole life_ of Marx, and hence _all his work_, which already shows us its importance. _In the second_, systematically—and following the method that Marx himself teaches us—“from the abstract to the concrete,” we will run through the various moments of his discourse, and the different contents of the concept. In this frequently we must make the implicit explicit in the texts. We feel that without a close reading of the _Grundrisse_ this “rereading” would have been impossible.⁴

1. PLACE OF THE SUBJECT OF RELIGION IN THE WHOLE WORK BY MARX

Since we have already treated this theme in another article,⁵ at least up to 1849, we shall repeat in part what was said in it, but we will underline new aspects in view of the basic hypothesis that we wish to test here.

1.1 From Lutheran believer to university critic (1835-1841)

Karl, born into a family of rabbis on his mother and father’s side, was baptized a Lutheran at the age of six in 1824, together with his mother. That is, he was born a Jew and educated in the semitic tradition in his early years. As affirmed in the family tree, which can be seen in his house in Trier (now a museum), he stems from a paternal branch of Marx-Levi rabbis since the middle of the 14th century (his grandfather and an uncle were still the rabbis of the city of
Trier where Marx lived until 1835). To be sure he was nourished by a profound and personal existence of the prophets of Israel as we will observe it, patented in his writings in all epochs of his life. From his first writings—so anti-Kant: “virtue is not . . . the engendering of a harsh doctrine of duties”⁵, “the happiest man is the one who has known how to make others happy,”⁶—as a eudaemonist optimist, we can now find a “leading thread” in his thought on religion:

Religion itself teaches us that the ideal being whom all strive to copy sacrificed (geopfert) himself for the sake of mankind . . . If we have chosen the position in life in which we can most of all work for mankind, no burdens can bow us down, because they are sacrifices (opfern) for the benefit of all⁹ . . . at the same time we turn our hearts to our brothers whom He (Christ) has closely bound to us, and for whom also He sacrificed (geopfert) Himself . . . it also causes us to keep His commandments by sacrificing (autopferrn) ourselves for one another, by being virtuous, but virtuous solely out of love for Him. (John 15:9, 10, 12, 13, 14)¹⁰

For Marx the student, the obliged horizon of religion is life, the life of God in the life of the people:

The young man who began his career in life . . . what we want to be in life . . . For a place in life . . . The highest that life can offer us . . . The trajectory of life . . . We cannot always choose in life . . . Beautiful facts of life . . . Instead of interlacing themselves with life they are nourished by abstract truths . . . If we are able to offer life in holocaust (das heben . . . zu opfern)¹¹ . . . He would also love the other branches because a gardener takes care of them and a root gives them strength. Therefore, union with Christ, from depth and the liveliest community (lebendistan Gemeinschaft) with him consists in our having him in our heart.¹²

It is amazing that in this text, which exposes the “foundation, the essence (Grund Wesen) . . . of the union of believers with Christ”—title of the examination given by Marx’s Lutheran professor of religion in the gymnasium of Trier; there were only seven Lutherans along with 24 Catholics in the course—are found already presaged, in clear intuitions (not concepts), his later fundamental hypotheses: the objective and true essence of religion that has to do with the circulation of life (symbolized by the prophets of Israel in the “blood”¹³), in the relationship of the sacrificial offering with respect to the divinity.
It is fitting to indicate that already in these early texts Marx refers to the God that “brought man into being out of nothing (aus dem nichts)”\textsuperscript{14} in a clear creationist indication.

In the letter of November 10, 1837, as he began his acquaintance with Hegel, we can read:

There are moments in one’s life which are like frontier posts marking the completion of a period but at the same time clearly indicating a new direction.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus there is an essential necessary level and another level of manifestations, appearance, phenomenal. And so it is that:

A curtain had fallen, my holy of holies was rent asunder, and new gods had to be installed\textsuperscript{16} . . . and as the result of nagging annoyance at having had to make an idol of a view that I hated.\textsuperscript{17}

Themes continue to appear which will be repeated \textit{ad infinitum}, the altar of the holocaust of idols.

But even more important is what he says to his father:

. . . like a vigorous traveler I set about the task itself, a \textit{philosophical-dialectical account of divinity}, as it manifests itself as the idea-in-itself, as religion, as nature, and as history.\textsuperscript{18}

Now we shall see how he will develop dialectically the concept from 1857 through the following years.

The doctoral thesis of 1841 would merit a separate article, but we only wish to recall one phrase:

The proofs of the existence of God are either mere hollow tautologies . . . Did not the ancient Moloch reign, was not the Delphic Apollo a real power in the life of the Greeks.\textsuperscript{19}

Thus for the first time Moloch, the god of the Ammonites, appears to whom principally children were sacrificed in holocaust\textsuperscript{20}, and Marx knew that very well, since years later he will write:

It is known that the lords of Tyre and Carthage did not placate the wrath of the gods by sacrificing themselves but by buying children from the poor to throw them into the burning coals of Moloch\textsuperscript{21} . . . The poor child [Marx referring to his own son Heinrick Guido, who died before he was a year old in his very
poor two-room apartment in London] has been a sacrifice (Opfer) to bourgeois misery. 22

In other words, Marx considered his own child a victim of the God Moloch: bourgeois society as a whole. Marx did not confuse the "names" of idols for the Jews: Moloch is the object of the sacrifice of children by fire. Mammon, on the other hand, only in the word of Jesus (unknown in the Old Testament), is money, gold.

The young student, under the influence of the personality of Bruno Bauer, commences a critique of Hegelian religion from the Bauerian "self-consciousness"—later considered as idealist and therefore still Hegelian.

1.2 Critique of Christendom and the origin of the question of fetishism (1842-October 1843)

Marx, not yet a socialist, still a radical democrat petit bourgeois, defends freedom in general, press freedom in particular, vis-à-vis the authoritarian police State, but it happens to be a "Christian State," a Lutheran, Prussian-Christendom. 23 Before entering on the theme, and already in the article on censorship, we read:

It is the habit of pseudo-liberalism, when compelled to make concessions, to sacrifice persons (Personen hinzupfertn) . . . to preserve the thing (die Sache) itself becomes . . . Resentment against the thing (sachliche) itself becomes resentment against persons. It is believed that by a change of persons the thing itself has been changed. Attention is deflected from the censorship to individual censors 24 . . . the starting point is a completely perverted (verkehrten) and abstract view of truth itself. 25

Immediately Marx moves to state the question of religion; as much as "religion is the foundation of the State," 26 Criticism of the State assumes the criticism of its foundation: religion. For this, Marx distinguishes between "the general principles of religion," 27 as "essence (Wesen)," and its "manifestation (Erscheinung)," a particular, concrete determination. Christianity, as a positive religion, would be one of the "manifestations" of religion in general. Here Marx does not attack the Christian religion, he attacks Christendom as a confusion between the police State and the Christian religion:

The confusion of the political with the Christian-religious principle has indeed become official doctrine . . . But you want a Christian state . . . you want to base the state on faith, religion
... religion the cult of your own unlimited authority and governmental wisdom.  

And Marx comments in accord with the prophetic, Christian critical tradition of liberation:

Was it not Christianity above all that separated church and state? Read St. Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei*, study the Fathers of the Church and the spirit of Christianity, and then come back and tell us whether the state or the church is the “Christian state.”

Here Marx harshly criticizes Christendom from the “Jewish theocratic State”—attached so much by the prophets of Israel to the “Byzantine State”—the historical origin of Christendom, criticized at the very same time by Kierkegaard in Denmark. But there is rapidly produced a transition to the theme, for Marx even more important: from State to money.

Or perhaps when you say you must give Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God, do you not consider as king and emperor of this world not only Mammon of gold but also ... free thinking?

Along with Moloch now appears the other name of the idol: Mammon, named for the first time. Marx adopts the position of the prophets of Israel, explicitly, since he is compared to them as a journalist, presenting himself as “a mammoth for Judea and larva of termite for Israel”—referring to the text of *Hosea* 5:12, changing Ephraim to Judea and Judea to Israel (it might seem that Marx quotes from memory and is mistaken).

The province has the right to create these gods, but once it has created them it should forget, like the worshiper of *fetishes*, that it is dealing with gods made *from his hands*.

It is the first time he mentions the subject and now he will not abandon it to the end of his days. If Moloch is the one to whom lives are offered in sacrifice, Mammon is money, and the Fetish is the work of man himself who sees his own power in it.

Fantasy arising from desire deceives the *fetish*-worshiper into believing that an “intimate object” will give up its natural character in order to comply with his desires.
The Concept of Fetishism in Marx's Thought

Of the many texts that Marx must have known in the Bible about this subject, he couldn't fail to have been inspired by Psalm 115, in defense of Israel against foreign fetishes:

Their idols are silver and gold the work of man's hands, they have mouths but do not speak, eyes but do not see, ears but do not hear. 34

The Subject collects all its meaning in the magnificent article on "Debates on the law punishing the robbery of firewood," where Marx states the analogy of firewood or wood, the private property of the powerful, to the fact that peasants are sacrificed:

. . . there is the possibility that some young trees may be damaged, and it needs hardly be said that the wooden idols triumph and human beings are sacrificed (Minschenopfer)?

Marx couldn't help but have in mind the text of Isaiah 44:15:

Then it becomes fuel for a man; he takes a part of it and warms himself, he kindles a fire and bakes bread; also he makes a god and worships it, he makes a graven image and falls down before it.

Debrosses, On the worship of fetish gods (edit. of Berlin, 1785) 36 had suggested the subject and Marx will retain the word and the "fetish" concept—from the Portugese fetico, "made" from man's hand—in his later essential theoretical discourse, by making the fetish more adequate to a double process: to be the fruit of man's work, the objectivation of his life and the constitution of that objectivation as a foreign Power of another. Thus Marx has passed from political criticism of the Christian State to the social criticism of fetishism.

1.3 Origin of religious criticism of political-economy (October 1843-1844)

It would seem that Marx wrote the Introduction to the criticism of the philosophy of law of Hegel and at least the first part of The Jewish Question in Kreuznach before moving to Paris in exile. They are pre-socialist (pre-communist) works and belong to the democratic radical petit-bourgeois period—an essential point to keep in mind since socialism is not his framework of reference, but still the bourgeois reformist positions in the matter of religion.

In this pre-socialist epoch "communism in particular is a dogmatic abstraction (and) religion and politics are the subjects which form the main interest of Germany today"—from a letter to Ruge in September 1843 from Kreuznach. 37
The themes of the *Introduction*, perhaps those most utilized in the matter of religion by later Marxists (being pre-socialist texts) continue to be political (except for the last page which would belong to the Paris period):

For Germany the criticism of religion is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the promise of all criticism . . . The basis of religious criticism is: Man makes religion . . . religion an inverted world consciousness . . . Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against the real distress . . . It is the opium of the people . . . the criticism of theology (turns) into the criticism of politics.  

Evidently Feuerbach was behind more than one expression:

The criticism of religion ended with the teachings that man is the highest being for man.  

If it is understood that all this criticism is raised against religion as Hegel understood it, against the religion of domination or Christendom, the prophetic or liberation Christian believer will have nothing to object to; furthermore, he will even fundamentally agree with Marx’s explicit expressions.

In *The Jewish Question*, the matter continues to be the “Christian State,” but the requirement for the “abolition of religion in general,” both Christianity and Judaism as concrete manifestations of abstract essence, will allow us to initiate the distinction of different planes—which we will deal with more precisely in the second systematic theoretical part.

| Various levels of essence and its manifestations, abstract and concrete, profound and superficial |
|---|---|---|
| Level I | General abstract essence of religion (implicit in Marx) | |
| Level II (concrete essences or fundamental manifestations) | A. Essences of religion as liberation (implicit in Marx) | B. Essence of religion as domination (Christendom, fetishism) |
| Level III (concrete or founded manifestations) | A.1 Profound plane | B.1 Profound plane |
| | A.2 Superficial plane | B.2 Superficial plane |

When Marx is referring to the “abolition of religion in general,” in the concrete—given the Feuerbachian criticism against Hegel, and the anti-Hegelian criticism against Christianity or Judaism—it treats of a religion in its general essence “as domination,” as justification of the State. Marx is always situated in Level II.B of the above scheme, but does not see (even though there are positive indications as we shall expose) nor thereby deny, the absolutely abstract essence of religion (Level I) (as the abstract relation of human person and the absolute,
be what it may, although eternity of matter would be affirmed, with which a pantheism would be accepted) and its possible concrete manifestation: the general essence of religion as liberation (level II.A). We will touch on this subject later. Here we would only indicate that the abolition of religion in *The Jewish Question* is the abolition of determination, of a general concrete essence, of a phenomenon which we will later expose as religion on its still more abstract essential level. Marx thus makes his first declaration of atheism: negation of the god of a religion of domination since in this case in religion (and even the atheist State) man "acknowledges himself only by a round about route, only through an intermediary." The proclamation of "atheist" without the affirmation and reality of a truly free man is not enough. Sufficient is the full political State, by its essence, "the generic life of man," with which Marx still manifests himself to us in something Hegelian—to be sure critical, thanks to Bauer and Feuerbach, but likewise suffering its limitations.

Having arrived in Paris in October, he makes contact with the industrial working class; having read the article of Engels, "Outline of a criticism of political economy," the *rupture*—word of Marx and not here of Althusser—is produced at the end of 1843 or beginning of 1844.

We are trying to break (*Zubrecker*) with the theological formulation of the question. For us, the question of the Jew's capacity for emancipation becomes the question: What particular social element has to be overcome in order to abolish Judaism?

Soon Marx makes a *complete turn* from a Bauarian theological criticism against positive religion in favor of a State as the expression of the generic man according to Feuerbach. He now launches an economic criticism against fetishist practical religion in favor of the proletariat:

Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of his religion in the real Jew . . . What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money.

Now, contrary to what was said in the first part, it is not necessary to abolish religion to intend a free State; now it is necessary "to end the empirical essence (economic) of religion," and Judaism as a religion of domination is annihilated. And this, because:

Money is the estranged essence of man's work and man's existence, and this alien essence dominates him, and he worships it.
Now we have explicit, although undeveloped, the category of "fetishism" in its definitive economic meaning. Marx is supported and thereby is located in his tradition in the intuition of Thomas Munzer—as he will also recognize Luther for his correctness on the question of money, loan at interest, etc.

Paradoxically, Marx turns "religious" (turns object of religious criticism with intrinsically religious categories: such as "money is the jealous God of Israel") to the political economy that he has just discovered.

And therefore now it is not a question of the free State (of the radical petit bourgeois of the first part of The Jewish Question), but it is a question of articulating what really can be "the total recuperation of man: the proletariat"—on the page that surely should be added at the end of Introduction to the criticism of the philosophy of law of Hegel in Paris. The last text quoted from The Jewish Question is a good anticipated and explicit summary of the subject that occupies us in the Paris Notebooks and in the Manuscripts of 44. Fetishism will be the alienated essence of man:

What was the dominion of one person over another is now general of the thing over the person, of the product over the producer.\(^5^0\)

Political economy conceives the community of men, their human essence in action, their complementation in generic life; in true human life, under the form of exchange and trade.\(^5^1\)

My work would be free vital expression, therefore to enjoy life; under the conditions of private property it is the alienation of life . . . my work is not life.\(^5^2\)

From his first economic studies, Marx discovers the alienated essence of work as death of the worker and production by his own hands of his opponent, his enemy, the fetish:

. . . dead (tote) capital always keeps the same pace and is indifferent to real individual activity . . . The worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit of his dead mammon (toten Mammons).\(^5^3\)

Only—through the sacrifice (Autopferung) of his body and spirit the worker can be satisfied.\(^5^4\)
The Concept of Fetishism in Marx’s Thought

... the object which labour produces—labour's product—confronts its as something alien, as a power (Macht) independent of the producer. The product of the labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become a material (Sachlich).\(^55\)

Marx summarizes all this in the following way:

Having seen that in relation to the worker who appropriates nature by means of his labour, this appropriation appears as estrangement, his own spontaneous activity as activity for another and as activity of another, vitally as sacrifice of life (Aufopferung), production of the object as loss of the object to an alien power.\(^56\)

From a religion of domination, the doctrine of creation is a reaffirmation of that loss, that dependence, and therefore Marx rejects it here.\(^57\) The negation of such a "god" is the question of atheism:

Atheism as the denial of this unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation ... Socialism is man’s positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated through the abolition of religion.\(^58\)

This is Marx's definitive position on the question and therefore in the future he will never accept a militant atheism—for which Bakunin will attack him in his time:

Communism is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, this form of human society.\(^59\)

Communism as a horizon required by a fetishized situation is a limit, a horizon, a utopian concept; it is not a moment of history. The fetish Mammon, money, rises in contrast to it:

If money is the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me ... It is the visible divinity ... It is the common whore ... the divine power of money lies in its character as men's estranged, alienating and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind.\(^60\)
And for all this, political economy "does not offer us any explanation." Anyway we will have to wait for the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* to study the "development" of the concept of religion, in its negative essence or as fetishism he has explicitly stated it in the *Manuscripts of 44*, as an anti-fetish religious criticism of capital, of political economy.

1.4 Materialist criticism of religious idealism (1844-1846)

Keeping in mind the definitive stage of Marx's thought on religion, this money which is later transformed into the theoretical foundation of religion as an ideology doesn't have much importance. Actually it is a self-criticism of Marx's Bauerian stage. Religion of domination, of Prussian Christendom or the Bauerian theology, is a false problem. The real problem is fetishism (because it is practical-effective religion, the founding moment of capitalism) or the praxis which the material world (of products, the securities of human life) exercises. However, from this horizon we find some useful elements:

In order to be able to change love into *Moloch*, the devil incarnate, Mr. Edgar begins by changing him into a god. And once converted into god, namely, a theological object, he falls naturally under the criticism of theology, apart from which as is well known, God and the devil never walk very far away from each other.  

Perhaps of greater interest for our purposes is the attack that Marx makes against "naive materialism" since it will be said of the materialism which is imposed in the Stalinist stage beginning in 1930:

The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the material on which its labour is realized, in which it is active, from which and by means of which it produces.

This material with a productive sense (the object of work) is not of an intuitive consciousness (as for Politzer or Kontantinov):

The chief defect of all previous materialism . . . is that things (*Gegenstand*), reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.

Today, when many Marxists ask the question: which is first, "conscience" or "matter"? The relation is intuitive from knowledge, passive, and therefore is part of a "naive materialism," and not "subjective." In this latter case matter is consti-
tuted as “matter” out of the subject of work (active or productive) or practice (revolutionary or historical). Nothing is farther from Marx than cosmological or intuitive “naive materialism” that absolutely determines subjectivity:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. 65

In the final instance it is the person who changes the circumstances. Thus “naive materialism” does not interest Marx:

For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is the nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin) and which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach either. 66

Marx is not thinking of the matter of the positivists of the late 19th Century—who will have so much influence on Lenin—but matter of production, nature in relation to “the production of life”: “The production of material life, and there can be no doubt that this is a historic fact, a fundamental condition for all history,” 67 and thus for all religion. Religion of domination will justify domination; but a religion of liberation will justify liberation in strict historic materialism, a question that Marx could not envision.

One should not think of counterposing a cosmological “inert matter” against “conscience,” because if it is true that “life is what determines conscience” it must not be forgotten the object which it determines conforms to real life, “it is the real living individual themselves and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.” 68

1.5 Criticism of Christian Socialism for being utopian (1846-1849)

After self-criticism in the anti-Bauerian form Marx enters a frankly political, and not now anti-idealistic, philosophical period. Religion is not considered an ideology of domination but a possible foundation of revolutionary political deviationism.

In the three times in these years that Marx touches on the question of religion, he does so in the same vein:

It is self-evident that Kriegers’s amorous slobberings and his antithesis to selfishness are no more than inflated utterance of a mind that has become utterly and completely absorbed in relig-
ion . . . seek to foist off all the infamies under the signboard of communism . . . We demand in the name of that religion of love that the hungry should be given food, the thirsty be given drink and the naked clothed. A demand which has been reiterated ad nauseam for 1800 years already, without the slightest success. 69

Marx strikes out violently against a religion of resignation (so criticized today by the religion of liberation):

Such a doctrine, preaching the voluptuous pleasure of cringing and self-contempt is entirely suited to valiant monks, but never to men of action, least of all in time of struggle. 70

Like the founder of Christianity, Marx demands justice now, satisfaction for the poor now, not in a beyond which mystifies history. For the founder of Christianity the Kingdom of God is "among you" already, here and now and it is to be built without delaying.

In the same way—and at times in the same words—Marx rejects the clientelism of Christians who now recall that there is a social problem, frequently being reformist anti-revolutionary organizations which are inspired by the "social principles of Christianity"; however, this subject should be taken up with great care because the social gospel was a social movement which must still be studied and has much that is positive for "Christian socialism" of the 20th century:

The social principles of Christianity justified the slavery . . . glorified the serfdom . . . and are capable of defending the oppression of the proletariat . . . place the compensation for all infamies in heaven . . . declare all the vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed to be either a just punishment for original sin and other sins. 71

It is an accurate criticism—and totally assumable for a Christianity of liberation—against "religion of resignation," or domination and fetishist. In the third part of the Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx synthesizes his criticism of the reformist opportunism of some Christian socialists of the epoch—who in Marx's eyes show themselves to be extremely dangerous, like the Pharisees were for Jesus for being the closest:

As the parson has ever gone hand in hand with the landlord, so has Clerical Socialism with Feudal Socialism . . . Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates
the heart-burnings for the aristocrat . . . Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel.\textsuperscript{72}

It should not be forgotten—in its positive aspect—on the other hand, that Marx likewise had a great appreciation for primitive Christianity where one finds the "open door" to contemporary understanding in the Third World to a present religion of liberation. By all means all of Marx’s criticisms are extremely useful for such religion as liberation (whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist).

1.6 Theoretical-creative transition (1849-1856)

These difficult years of family and political struggle for Marx in his London exile left no important writings, but in another sense, it was a time of incubation—as partial testimony are the London Notebooks of 1851-1853. In 1842 G. F. Daumer had published in Brunswick his work on Worship of fire and Moloch among the Ancient Hebrews. In the review of the work Religion of the new era (Hamburg, 1850) Marx severely criticizes him for not having known how "to exalt the practical process" which conditions religion, ironically concluding:

Mr. Daumer doesn’t know that struggles of the lower against the higher classes were necessary even to produce a degree of culture for Nuremberg, and to enable the virtue of a fighter against Moloch according to Daumer.\textsuperscript{73}

This is the type of religious work that stays only on the ideological level and doesn’t know how to study the material level of the production of historic social human life in its concrete situation. On the other hand, Marx criticizes the populist use of religion. In Class Struggles in France from 1848-1850 he wisely indicates:

Bonaparte no longer needed the Pope to become president of the peasants but he needed to keep the Pope to keep the peasants of the president. The credibility of the peasants had elevated him to the presidency. With the faith they were losing credibility, and with the Pope they were losing the faith. He had to restore the power that sanctifies kings . . . The party of order proclaimed . . . the conversation of the living conditions of his domination of property, family, religion and order.\textsuperscript{74}
“Bonapartism” was a new projection of the Christian State, a *new Christendom* at the service of populism—well known in Latin America and India; in this last country with the claim of a Hindu State and intelligently manipulating “communitarianism” or interreligious struggle. Religion now appears as an ideology of class domination, an aspect which had not been indicated previously:

Religion presented (its role) of class domination and conditions thereof, as the reign of civilization and as necessary conditions for material production and the social relations of interchange that are derived from them.\textsuperscript{75}

It is in this time that Engels—whom we have not included methodically in this work—wrote *The Peasant War in Germany* (1850), where we can read:

Thomas Munzer by means of the Bible confronted the feudal Christianity of the first centuries . . . The peasants used [like today in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Latin America in general] this tool against the princes, the mobility and the clergy. The Luther turned it against them. With the help of the Bible the divine origin of the monarchy was justified.\textsuperscript{76}

It is a magnificent example, which we shall later “develop” theoretically in order to understand the “concept” of religion in his rich internal dialectic contradiction.

Therefore [Munzer thought] heaven is not something of the other world; it must be sought in this life, and the believer’s task is to establish here on earth that heaven which is the Kingdom of God.\textsuperscript{77}

A Christianity of liberation affirms the very same thing—with the addition that the Kingdom begins now but is not totally realized in history.

In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852-1854) and *On the Spanish Revolution*, Marx goes back over some ideas already exposed in *The Class Struggles in France*. In *The Anti-Clerical Movement: Manifestation in Hyde Park* (1855) we read that “such is the present English oligarchy; such is the Church, its twin sister.”\textsuperscript{78}

In this period of silent study in the British Museum one can note the fact that the concept of religion is found developed with respect to the conflict of classes, a fundamental question which we shall have to take into account in the second part of this work.
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The Concept of Fetishism in Marx's Thought

1.7 Religion in the first definitive theoretical writings (1857-1864)

It would seem that in these writings from the Grundrisse (1857-58) through the Contribution to Criticism of the Political Economy (1859), the Manuscripts of '61-'63, and the Manuscripts of '63-'65, there was little or nothing on religion. However, it is during this period that for the first time Marx's specifically scientific discourse is developed in this criticism of the political economy, and thus it is also for the first time that the question of religion as anti-fetishist criticism of capital begins to take definite shape.

In the Grundrisse the references to our subject are numerous; it is sufficient to point out the theoretical place that religion will now occupy in the discourse on "capital in general."

The Christian religion was able to be of assistance in reaching an objective understanding of earlier mythologies only when its own self-criticism had been accomplished to a certain degree. The power of money, i.e. the exchange relation establishes itself as a power external to and independent of the producers. What originally appeared as a means to promote production becomes a relation alien to the producers.

Then, the question of fetishism begins here with money, as was to be expected. Now Marx has his explicit concept:

In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth . . . Each individual possesses social power in the form of a thing.

Here is where Marx speaks of three levels: the primitive of personal communitarian dependence; the capitalist of "personal independence based on dependence regarding things" (fetishism); and thirdly, "free individuality based on the universal development of individuals and in the subordination of their common monetary social productivity." We see then, that for Marx that the question of Fetishism had to be stated from the beginning—here in the case of money; in Capital in commodity, and from the horizon of utopia as the frame of reference necessary for understanding.

To take the thing relations as giving basis to the personal is discovered as an ideological mechanism:

. . . from the ideological standpoint, as this reign exercised by relations appears within the consciousness of individuals as the reign of ideas, and because the belief in the permanence of the
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ideas . . . nourished and inculcated by the ruling classes by all means available.83

And soon, perhaps using his *Notebooks of Paris of 1844*84 he returns to the theme of fetishism:

Money is the hangman of all things, the Moloch to whom everything must be sacrificed. Money indeed appears as the Moloch to whom real wealth is sacrificed.85

So then these can be seen as the application of the question of fetishism to money and not to commodity, because in the *Grundrisse* the question of fetishism has not yet discovered the definitive order of categories:

From its servile role, in which it appears as mere medium of circulation, it suddenly changes into the lord and god of the world of commodities. It represents the divine existence of commodities.86

Soon after Marx copies the texts from *Revelations* 17:13 and 13:17,87 where the Beast, the Anti-Christ marks his people on the forehead (like slaves in the Roman Empire). Marx frequently shows this gesture of the Beast, Satan, of “marking” his victims. Even money has this sign or mark:

Gold is therefore nominally undepreciable . . . but merely expresses a given quantity of its own substance, merely carries its own *quantitative definition on its forehead.*88

It is a known fact that for the Hebrews any figure was idolatrous because they were prohibited from making the representation of anything (vegetable, animal, or person), in order not to fall into totemism, idolatry or fetishism. Consequently, Jesus asks for a coin with the image of Caesar—for bearing a human figure is a sign of idolatry: “Whose portrait and inscription are on it? Caesar’s they replied. He said to them, then give to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s” (*Luke* 20:24-25)—with which he in no way approved their paying tribute but simply warned them to get out from under that idolatrous object. Money, like the slave, carries “on its forehead” the sign of its lord: They have been submitted by him. The Beast is capital, the autonomous power that affirms itself as subject.

. . . capital therefore appears as the predominant subject and owner of alien labour, and its relation is itself as complete a contradiction as is that of wage labour.89
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For its part, in the *Contribution to Criticism of the Political Economy* (1859), we can see that the later theme of fetishism is placed very near the beginning of Chapter 1, in order to explain the "social character" (in its negative sense) of individual work in capitalism:

Something that characterizes work that creates exchange value is the social relationship of persons is presented so to say, inverted, that is as a social relationship of things. If it is correct to say that the exchange value is a relationships of persons, it must be added, however, that it is a relationship hidden under a material wrapper.  

The theme of fetishism appears on this page under such expressions as "mystification" or "illusions." Already it is definitive a systematic "place" and referring to merchandise.

In Chapter 11, about money, the theme appears again, also without designation:

The owners of commodities entered the circulation process merely as custodians of commodities, one is a personified sugar lump and another is gold personified. They are a necessary representation of individuality over the base over a determined stage of the social process of production.

Now it is money that is fetishized given the grade of development—the second level of *Grundrisse*—isolated but socialized in the abstract-mercantile relationship of capitalism. This is the second systematic place, after fetishism of commodity comes that of money.

In the *Manuscripts of 1861-1863*, Chapter III (whose chapters 1 and 2 form the *Contribution*), we wish to specially emphasize two important passages where perhaps for the first time Marx gives a name to the type of inverted relationship in the capitalist system:

The form of revenue and the source of revenue are the most fetishistic expression of the relations of capitalist production. It is their form of existence as it appears on the surface, divorced from the hidden connections and the intermediate connecting links. Thus the land becomes the source of rent, capital the source of profit, and labour the source of wages. The distorted form in which the real inversion is expressed is naturally reproduced in the views of the agents of this mode of production. It is a kind of fiction without fantasy, a religion of the vulgar . . . However, of all these forms, the most complete fetish is inter-
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est-bearing capital . . . The land or nature as the source of rent, i.e., rented property, is fetishistic enough . . . Interest-bearing capital is the consummate automatic fetish.\(^{92}\)

In these two pages—perhaps the most important text on the subject, since it includes capital as a whole: the productive and circulatory process, industrial capital, commercial and interest rate as fetishized forms—“fetishism” now acquire a sufficient theoretical development. Let’s quote another text without comment:

The complete objectification, inversion and derangement of capital as interest-bearing capital . . . is capital which yields “compound interest.” It appears as a Moloch demanding the whole world as a sacrifice belonging to it of right\(^{93}\) . . . Thus it is interest . . . which appears to be the creation of value arising from capital . . . In this form all immediate links are obliterated, and the fetishistic feature of capital as also the concept of the capital-fetish, is complete.\(^{94}\)

As can be seen it is already an anticipation of chapter 24 of Volume III of *Capital*. But something later gives us still another surprise, since the concept of fetishism is applied to the productive level:

Since living labour . . . is incorporated in capital, and appears as an activity belonging to capital from the moment that the labour-process begins . . . Thus the productive power of social labour and its special forms now appears as productive powers and forms of capital . . . which having assumed this independent form, are personified by the capitalist in relation to living labour. Here we have once more the perversion of the relationship, which we have already in dealing with money, called fetishism.\(^{95}\)

That is to say, the worker himself considers “work itself objectified” past work accumulated in capital as something strange, as value of capital. But furthermore, the worker considers himself as capital, as a resource, as a moment of capital, which has already been sold: “Personification of a thing and dehumanization of a person.”\(^{96}\) We will return to these questions in the second part. All the same, we can conclude that it was in 1861-1863 in the *Manuscripts* of those years, that Marx acquired explicit awareness of the “fetish form” (not yet “fetish character”) of all capital. We will study the texts on fetishism in *Capital* in the second part of this work.
1.8 Some themes on religion in the definitive epoch (1865-)

To many contemporary Marxists attention could be called to the fact that Bakunin would make "vehement attacks against the International—which Marx headed—as a *negator* of atheism." In fact, Marx had taken a totally firm position on atheism. In 1871 when he had already published Volume I of *Capital* and was writing many of the manuscripts for volumes II and III, in a letter to Friedrich Bolte on November 23, 1871, sent from London to New York, regarding some questions over the International, he touched on the point. In the second question he dealt with the matter of "sects"; not only is the International not a sect but also it "is very suspicious of the amateurism, superficiality and bourgeois philanthropy of certain semi-socialist sects." And he tells Belto that in 1868, Bakunin tried to found a second International with himself as head under the name of "Alliance of Socialist Democracy":

His program consisted of contradictory quantity of confusions: class equality, exclusion from the right of inheritance as a point of departure for the social movement (a Saint Simonian foolishness) requirement of atheism as dogma of the members etc. and as principal dogma (proudhonian) the political abstention of the movement.

He then calls attention to the fact that among the Bakunian "foolishness (Blödsinn)" is found "atheism (Atheismus als Dogma)", which furthermore is considered a "story for children (Kinderfabel)."

In truth this position was already for Marx an important conclusion within the International. Therefore in the work written between January and February of 1872 on the "Attempted Exclusion of the International" published in French in Geneva shortly thereafter, Marx writes in reference to the "Section of Socialist Atheists" that they cannot be accepted as members, since in the case of the Young Men's Christian Associated (YMCA)—it is interesting to know that the YMCA asked to be a member of the International—it was not accepted because "the International does not recognize theological sections (theologische Sek- tionen)."

It is clear, then, that for Marx an "atheist section" was a theological institution which must be excluded. And this is so much so that in an article of August 4, 1878—five years before his death—on the history of the International and in answer to George Howell he again affirms, on the question of the "religious Idea" that the best example of how the problematic should be dealt with is how the case of Mr. Bakunin was dealt with and his "section of socialist atheists,"
which was not accepted because, like the YMCA, the General Council made clear that it could not recognize theological sections.\textsuperscript{101}

For Marx atheism was a theological question and should not be introduced as a factor of contradiction in the working class. Then there is a great distance of this political position of Marx, from the dogmatic position (which Marx opposes even for its name: "atheism as dogma") of later Marxism which deformed the clear decision of the First International in this respect.

We have quoted some texts of young Marx on atheism. From all of them we can deduce that for Marx atheism is not an essential moment of socialism, much to the contrary, already in 1844 he considered it surpassed, and we see that the "definitive" Marx, before his death, frontally opposed it as a political error. What would he say today to a Third World, Asia, Africa, Latin America where the people are subjects of a deep ancestral religiosity? Surely he would be much more political than many apprentices pretending to be revolutionaries.

Time and again, here or there he names capital with a New Testament term:

It is admirable that they dare an attack against the fortress of an army and against an army of forty thousand men . . . while the sons of Mammon were dancing, singing and feasting amid the blood and tears of a humiliated and martyred nation.\textsuperscript{102}

While the semi-barbarian defended the principle of ethic (China) the civilized counterposes the principle of Mammon.\textsuperscript{103}

Those British inspectors who have assumed the protection of the oppressed masses . . . with an immovable-energy and a spiritual superiority for those who in this time of adoration of Mammon will not find many parallels.\textsuperscript{104}

I gladly concede the right of translation, but not in this land of Mammon called England.\textsuperscript{105}

Marx also referred to capital with other names:

The British stock exchange offered for the French, the apostles of financial speculation congratulated each other and shook hands and the conviction prevailed that finally the golden calf had been elevated to the all powerful god and that Aaron was the new French autocrat.\textsuperscript{106}
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Barely did the French values begin to descend, the crowd went head over heels to the temple of Baal to get rid of the state bonds and stocks.\textsuperscript{107}

An industry like the vampire [a figure he will use in \textit{Capital}] must suck human blood, especially the blood of children. In ancient times, the killing of children was a mysterious rite of the religions of Moloch, but was only practiced on solemn occasions, perhaps once a year, and furthermore Moloch had no special preference for the children of poor people.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{NOTES}

OF: Marx-Engels Fundamental Works (Mexico: FCE, 1982)
CW: Marx Engels Collected Works (London: Lawrence, 1975)
MEW: Marx-Engels Werke (Dietz-Verlag: Berlin, 1956)
MEGA: Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (Berlin, 1929)


2. We shall quote \textit{Capital} and the other works of Marx, in the following order: Spanish, English, and German. \textit{Capital} (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1979, p. 106; CW, I, p. 90; MEW XXIII, p. 101). Marx's text is quoted in Latin from the Vulgate. He had already copied it in the \textit{Grundrisse} next to the text from Shakespeare on the "gelded gold" (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980, I, p. 173; New York: Vintage, 1973, p. 237; Berlin: Dietz, 1974, p. 148). The theme had been related to "money as world currency." It should be pointed out that Engels, years later, when in \textit{The Book of the Apocalypse} (1883) he refers to the subject, writes: "This crisis is the great finale between God and the Antichrist, as others have called it. The decisive chapters are 13 and 17" (text included in Hugo Assmann's book \textit{Karl Marx - F. Engels, On Religion} (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1974; MEW, XXI, p. 11)). Engels quotes Marx's same text as in \textit{Capital}, and comments something before: "Christianity, like every great revolutionary movement, was established by the masses" (Ibid, p. 324; p. 10).

3. Cf. my work preliminary to the \textit{Historic Technological Notebook of Marx in London (1851)} to be published at the University of Puebla; and in \textit{Philosophy of Production} (Bogota: Nueva America, 1984).

4. See our work to be published on \textit{To Read the Grundrisse}.


7. "German test in high school" (OF, I, p. 4; CW, I, p. 8; MEW, EB I, p. 594).

8. Here the word "to sacrifice oneself" is not used in its subjective sense (to do penance, to produce pain), but in its objective sense: to worship, to effect a ritual. *Opfer*: to offer in holocaust.


13. On the concept of "blood" in the Old Testament, numerous Bible dictionaries can be consulted where the relation is established between life (*nēfesh*) and blood (without blood the living animal dies), *II Samuel* 23:17. Also, see the article "haima" in the *Theol-Woert Neue Testament* of Kittel of Behm, Volume 1, pp. 171-176 (the subject of *basar vadam* "flesh and blood in Jeremiah 19:54; Matthew 16:17; Hebrews 2:14"). We have touched on the subject in my work *Semitic humanism* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1969, p. 27). Later Marx will still write: "The state must consider...in the transgressor who gathers firewood, a human being, a live member of the community (*lebendiges...Gemeldeglied*) through whose veins its blood circulates" (OF, I, p. 259; CW, I, p. 236; MEW, EB I, p. 121). For the Hebrew and for the Christian "blood" is life. The life of Christ—in Marx's high school test—is communicated to the community (in the later question of "fetishism" Marx will always relate fetishization to the social relation of work opposed to communitarian work). In the *Grundrisse* he will indicate that the circulation of value is like a "circulation of blood" (*Blutzirkulation*) (op. cit., II, p. 4; p. 519; p. 416). For Marx, then, man's life—blood—will be sacrificed to the fetish as his life—blood.


15. OF, I, p. 5; CW, I, p. 10; MEW, EB I, p. 3. Marx uses the Hegelian technical word "zur Erscheinung eines wesentlich." The "manifestation" of the "essence" will be for Marx his definitive philosophical frame of reference (up to his last manuscripts of *Capital* in 1878).

16. Ibid., p. 10; p. 18; p. 8. In *Capital* I, chapter 24, he will likewise speak of "Europe's old idols."

17. Ibid., p. 10; p. 18; p. 9.

18. Ibid. To be noted in the expression: "concept" (*Begriff*) of divinity and dialectic "development."
19. OF, I, p. 69; CW, I, p. 104; MEW, EB I, p. 371. In this text on Moloch, Marx crossed out the following words: "to whom men are offered in holocaust (menschenopfer)."

20. It is also quoted in the Grundrisse (for example, op. cit. v. 11, p. 133; p. 199; p. 113), and frequently in Capital—as we shall see. Consider in the Old Testament Leviticus 18:21: "You shall not give any of your children to devote them by fire to Moloch." Likewise on II Samuel 12:30; Jeremiah 32:35; Zephaniah 1:5; and in the New Testament: Luke 20:2-5; under that name he appears in I Kings 16:31; Hosea 2:15; etc.

21. "Agitation against Prussia," March 1855 (MEW, XI, p. 132-133; when there is no Spanish or English translation we will go directly to the German edition).


24. OF, I, p. 150; CW, I, pp. 110-111; MEW, I, p. 4. This makes us think of the future expression of fetishism in Capital, Volume I, Chapter 1: 4: "as puzzling (sachliche) relationships of persons."


32. OF, I, p. 187; CW, I, p. 147; MEW, I, p. 42.


36. "Bonn Notebook" (1842) (OF, I, p. 540; MEGA, I, 1/2 (1929), p. 115). There Marx notes the text of Bartalomi de las Casas on "gold as a fetish in Cuba" (Cf. OF, I, p. 283; CW, I, pp. 262-263; MEW, I, p. 147). This whole "Bonn Notebook" deals with religion: C. Meiners's General Historical Criticism of Religions where he studies
various types of sacrifices to the gods; J. Barbeyrac's Moral Treatise of the Church Fathers; C. Bottigor's Ideas About Artistic Mythologies, etc.

37. OF, I. p. 458; CW, III, pp. 142-143; MEW, I, p. 344.


39. OF, I, p. 497; CW, III, p. 182; MEW, I, p. 385. From his Feuerbachian influence of this epoch, he will write the "old" Marx, April 24, 1867: "The worship of Feuerbach produces in one a very humorous effect" (MEW, XXXI, p. 290). Marx knew how to be autocratic even with humor.

40. Ibid., p. 463; p. 146; p. 347.

41. Ibid., p. 466; p. 149; p. 350.

42. Ibid., p. 469; p. 152; p. 353.

43. Ibid., p. 470; p. 153; p. 354.


46. Ibid., p. 485; p. 169-170; p. 372.

47. Ibid., p. 490; p. 170; p. 377.

48. Ibid., p. 487; p. 172; p. 375.

49. This page, which we think was added in Paris in 1844, begins with the question: "Where then does the positive possibility of German emancipation lie?" (OF, I, pp. 501-501; CW, III, p. 186-187; MEW, I, p. 390). He will come back to this "positive (positiv) possibility," source of the negation of the negation, the analectic moment par excellence, the total contradiction in the deep-rooted poverty of the proletariat before it exists as such.


51. Ibid., p. 138; p. 536.

52. Ibid., p. 156; p. 547.


54. Ibid., p. 55; p. 238; p. 474.

55. Ibid., p. 105; p. 272; p. 511.

56. Ibid., p. 119; p. 281; p. 522.

57. Cf. Ibid., p. 154-155; p. 304-305; p. 544-545.

58. Ibid., p. 156; p. 306; p. 546.

59. Ibid., p. 156; p. 306; p. 546.

60. Ibid., p. 179; pp. 324-325; p. 565.

61. Ibid., p. 104; p. 271; p. 510.
66. *German Ideology* (Ibid., p. 48; p. 40; p. 44).
67. Ibid., pp. 28-30; pp. 41-43; p. 29.
68. Ibid., pp. 26-27; p. 37; p. 27.
70. Ibid., p. 174; p. 49; p. 15.
74. Ibid., pp. 197-198; pp. 56, 59-60.
75. Ibid., p. 198; p. 60.
76. Ibid., p. 211; p. 350-351.
77. Ibid., p. 213; p. 353. Engels quotes the text of Munzer when he speaks of destroying the priests of Baal (another Hebrew name of the idol). Marx likewise speaks of the Baals in a letter of January 11, 1859 (MEW, XIII, p. 169): "And you will not show pity to the idolaters (text of Deuteronomy 7:5) cries Munzer," and quotes Engels (op. cit., p. 362). And Engels still comments that Munzer used the only language that this (people) could understand: that of religious prophecy" (Ibid., p. 218; p. 357). Important commentary for Latin America, Africa and Asia at the present time.
78. Ibid., p. 232.
80. Ibid., p. 71; p. 146; pp. 64-65).
81. Ibid., I, p. 85; p. 187; p. 75. Marx had stated this theme in an unpublished work (*Das Vollendete Golsystem*, 1851, p. 41). On p. 34 he had written: "Relations must be organized on religious, political bases, while the Power of money is not the nexus between things and persons."
82. Ibid., I, p. 85; p. 158; p. 75. See the same theme at I, p. 84; p. 157; p. 75. The individual is the one who should have communitarian control over the social nexus and not things through money over individuals (I, pp. 89-90; pp. 161-162; p. 79).
83. Ibid., I, p. 92; pp. 164-165; p. 82.

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84. MEGA, I, 3, pp. 568-579.
85. Grundrisse (op. cit., I, p. 133; p. 199; p. 113).
86. Ibid., I, p.156; p. 221; p. 133.
87. Ibid., I, p. 173; p. 237; p. 148. And he quotes the same text again at Ibid., III, p. 153; not included in the English; German edition p. 895.
88. Ibid., I, p. 58; p. 134; p. 53.
89. Ibid., I, p. 433; p. 471; p. 374.
90. Contribution (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980, p. 17; MEW, XIII, p. 21). Further on he tells us: “All these objects of worldly pleasure carry on their foreheads some fatal” (p. 73; p. 69), in reference to the Beast of the Revelations.
91. Ibid., pp. 81-82; p. 76. This text corresponds to that of the primitive draft (Urtex) of this Contribution (cf. Grundrisse, III, p. 126 ff; not included in the English edition; German edition p. 901 ff). Here he again quotes Revelations 17:13 and 13:17.
94. Ibid. p. 896 (p. 410; p. 462; p. 1460).
96. Ibid. (p. 363; p. 390; p. 2161): “Personifizierung der Sache and Versachlichung der Person.” There are other references to the question of fetishism, for example in Notebook XIV, p. 817 (III, pp. 114-116; III, pp. 129-131; MEGA II, pp. 1316-1318).
98. MEW, XXXII, p. 328.
99. Ibid., p. 529.
100. MEW, XVIII, p. 19.
101. MEW, XIX, p. 144.
104. Letter of March 15, 1859 (MEW, XIII, p. 203).
106. Letter of March 31, 1859 (MEW, XIII, p. 284 ff). Evidently it is a reference to Exactus 32. See other references in a letter of October 4, 1853 (MEW, IX, p. 325).
108. “Inaugural speech of the International” between October 21 and 26, 1864 (MEW, XVI, p. 11). Children were working in the factories; they were “subsumed” by capital in a very special way—the rate of surplus value was higher than with adults.