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From Fraternity to Solidarity: Toward a Politics of Liberation

Enrique Dussel

Translated by Michael Barber and Judd Seth Wright

This article explains a material category from the horizon of a Politics of Liberation which I am elaborating. It will provide an example of a theme that requires extensive attention for its full development and the following pages merely suggest some direction for the question.

1. An Enigmatic Text of Nietzsche

Nietzsche is a genius whose intuitions exceed his capacity to express in an analytic manner whatever is indicated in a poetic, aesthetic manner. He often gives an exposition of an experience that surpasses the words aiming at philosophical univocity. In his collection of adages, Human All Too Human, after reflecting on the difficulty of “friendship” (Freundschaft), he puts forth an adage full of suggestions:

[. . .] Perhaps to each of us there will come the more joyful hour when we exclaim:

[A.1] Friends, there are no friends! [A.2] thus shouted the dying sage;

[B.1] Enemies, there are no enemies! [B.2] shout I, the living fool.

The text has two moments, the first on “friendship” (A), and the second on “enmity” (B); each with two components; the first consists in the well-known Aristotelian expression (A.1), to which Nietzsche adds an opposing dialectic (friend/enemy) of its own, outside of the Aristotelian or Hellenic context (B.1), which has, as we will see, many cultural origins and derives from diverse philosophical currents. But, above all, and in the second place, Nietzsche enriches the adage with another moment that sounds like a commentary that proposes “who” announces the contents of the first part (A.1 and B.1), which disconcerts, which provides the key to the enigma (A.2 and B.2), and which will be the theme of my commentary (in section 3 of this article).

Without yet getting to the bottom of the question, Nietzsche suggests, or so the tradition shows it, that it is very difficult (qualitatively and quantitatively) to have a true friend, especially given the proverbial solitude of philosophy that is hard to please in its eccentric, solipsistic reflections, and (in the case of Nietzsche) given his exaggerated (perhaps unhealthy) requirements about the qualities nec-
ecessary for “the friend” (since Nietzsche in his time had no close friend), and given also that his odd life involved no effort to form friendships as a condition of enjoyment. His skholé (σχολή), insofar as it involved masochism, frequently needed romantic pain to generate his strokes of brilliance. The “friend” was a characteristic for the mobs, the “masses,” “the happy one: ideal of the herd (Der Glückliche: Herdenideal) [. . .]. How can one pretend that one has aspired to happiness?”

The second moment (B.1) is the more interesting. What does Nietzsche mean when he says that “there are no enemies”? Certainly this is not something we find in the classical Hellenic-Roman tradition, but it only occurs in the Semitic-Christian-Occidental tradition that tries to reverse that earlier tradition. In what sense is “enmity” broken up by the exclamation that “there are no enemies”? It is evident that Nietzsche, the critic, who “annihilates values,” thought himself the “enemy” of vulgar society, of the herd, of the prevailing Judeo-Christian “asceticism”—as the one who reverses the reigning values. He, the “Antichrist,” is the enemy of modern society and his friends are the enemies of the common people. The critique is a return to the origin, to the ontological foundation of “distorted” values. But his “foolishness” is not as radical as the one we will seek to realize. Perhaps the more disconcerting opposition is that which is established between “the dying sage” (A.2) and “the living fool” (B.2). But we leave this for later. This text is the key to the work of Jacques Derrida, in his book Politiques de l’amitié (Politics of Friendship). How does Derrida interpret this?

2. Fraternity and Enmity: The Reflection of Jacques Derrida

In Politics of Friendship, Derrida assumes the task to think “politics,” from a horizon that surpasses the rationalistic Neo-Kantian tradition in the fashion of political philosophy (from John Rawls to Jürgen Habermas). Instead of speaking of practical-political reason, of the contract, or of discursive “agreement,” though without rejecting them, Derrida attempts to establish the political from the affective bond, from the pleasurable dimension of the drives; neurologically it would be to pay attention to the limbic system more than to the neocortical. It is not a formal, procedural consideration; rather it runs across the contents of human political life, the drives, the virtues; that is to say, the material aspect of politics. The unity of the political community is not reached only by agreements starting from reasons, but also by friendship that unites citizens in a political whole. At bottom Derrida pursues the deconstruction of the concept of fraternity, a postulate of the French Revolution. I think, however, that Derrida gets caught between these folds and in the end gets lost between them. Though Derrida appreciates E. Levinas very much, he never managed to understand him, and this deconstruction demonstrates it.

In effect, everything occurs within the ontological horizon—with two antithetical poles—but it never manages to get beyond the said horizon toward the
metaphysical or ethical limit that from a third pole would give us the ability to find the solution to the double aporia presented with grand erudition (according to the same possibilities of interpretation of the “fool of Turin”). The work is a dialogue with Carl Schmitt, through Nietzsche, when Derrida, upholding as a horizon the tradition of the treatises on friendship beginning with Aristotle, approaches various ways of treating the theme of “friendship” (or “enmity”), which determines the different ways of understanding the political, having as a permanent reference the Nietzschean aporia.

Beginning with the Prologue, however, the question is raised about what would “then be the politics of such a beyond (au-delà) the principle of fraternity.” But this “beyond” would be “enmity,” which surpasses the horizon of the political field as such. The State, as a general rule, refers itself to the family, and thus to “fratriarchy”—the brothers who sacrifice the originary father of S. Freud—for “life.” “At the centre of the principle, always, the One does violence to itself, and guards itself against the other”, in this consists “the political crime,” on the other hand, an inevitable crime within the Derridean or Nietzschean dialectic.

Schmitt wants to return to the political its strong sense, material (as will and not as a pure liberal legality), and for this he opposes to “friendship” “enmity,” remaining permanently though in a political horizon. This is an enmity that is not a mere physical, warlike crime. The difference between the “political enemy”—that one yet finds within fraternity—and the “absolute enemy”—who is outside of the political—is the theme to be clarified. That is to say, is a certain enmity possible (ontic: α.2, in Figure 1) from within the horizon of a friendship (ontological: β.1) that includes it? Is the political still possible in the face of an enmity (β.2) that is situated beyond the ontic friend (α.1) and the ontic enemy (α.2)? An ontological friendship admits the other (the political enemy), at a first level, since it is within the fraternity, and, at a second level, it no longer admits such an enemy who is outside of the horizon of ontological fraternity. Let us observe the expression: “Friends, there are no friends!” One possible interpretation is that the first “friends” means all of those who are encountered within ontological fraternity, the political community as a totality (within the political horizon as such); the second “there are no friends” refers to ontic enemies (still within the political horizon) based on an ontological fraternity that allows a certain enmity (of the political opponent) within the political field as such.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>α.1. Ontic friendship</th>
<th>α.2. Ontic enmity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β.1. Ontological friendship (Fraternity)</td>
<td>β.2. Ontological enmity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Ontological</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Totality)</td>
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Figure 1. Diverse levels of opposition.
The first aporia (A)—with respect to the second: “Enemies, there are no enemies!” (B)—is traditionally interpreted as the contradiction of a criticism of those who ought to be friends (Friends!) that they are not true friends. With respect to this interpretation as a private relation (“my closest friend”), the “best friend” refers to all fellow humans, to those who are joined together with each other in familiarity, to the fraternal community of those who are nearby. In the tradition, it is interpreted that the exclamation “there are no friends!” refers to the impossibility of the “perfect friendship,” because perfect friendship is only for the gods, which is to say, is empirically impossible. This is friendship in the Modern sense, where individuality gains importance. Though still it is “friendship” cultivated by the sages who retreat into a community (as in Memphis, Egypt) outside of the city in order to contemplate divine things. This is the philia that unites the souls of sages (beyond simple éros). Derrida devotes chapter 1 to this theme.

For the classical age, for Plato, Aristotle, or Cicero, “friendship” was not only intimate or private, but was always situated in the political horizon, and this still is the perspective of Schmitt, whom Derrida follows. He treats “political friends,” who maintain a certain public, not private, fraternity, and for whom it might be said that this does not mean “friends”—in the private sense. What is certain is that the text permits many possible interpretations.

In chapter 2, Derrida unfolds the second aporia (B) that permits him to confront Nietzsche’s texts. “Enemies, there are no enemies! Shout I, the living fool.” However, in a way a bit precipitately the second moment of the aporia (A.2 and B.2) appears, especially in the second statement: “shout I, the living fool.” It seems, though, that he does not point out that the question ought to have been analytically divided. First one would have to analyze the question of “enmity” (before “friendship”), in order later to reflect upon the: “thus shouted the dying sage” (A.2) and the “shout I, the living fool” (B.2). Derrida works out the second statement, now that “madness” is a theme already treated by Nietzsche:

That one must be mad, in the eyes of the metaphysician of all ages, to wonder how something might rise up out of its antithesis; to wonder if, for example, truth might be born of error [. . .]. Anyone who merely dreams of such a possibility immediately goes mad: this is already a fool.13

In that sense, Nietzsche is a “fool” who still innovates in the present, that is to say, who is “living,” but always from within the same ontological horizon, which cannot be put in question as it is. In some way he is the “absolute enemy,” not as the one who declares war, but as the one who totally criticizes merely ontic enmity. This “foolishness” of the critic is equally a “responsibility”: “I feel responsible towards them (the new thinkers who are coming), therefore responsible before us who announce them”—comments Derrida. He continues treating these themes in chapter 3: “This Mad Truth: the Just Name of Friendship.”

In chapter 4 he refers directly to Schmitt.15 He takes up the suggestion to construct a politics from the “will,” as an ontological “decision” that criticizes
liberal "depolitization" of the mere "state of law" or pure legal reference to the State. Politics is a drama which establishes itself, in the first place, in the Latin contradiction between inimicus and hostis; in Greek between ekthrosis and polémios. The amicus is opposed to the inimicus (ekthrosis) or the "private rival," even though inadvertently reference is made to a text from the other cultural tradition (Judeo-Christian\(^6\)), as we shall see later.

In book V of the Republic, Plato distinguishes war to the death, properly speaking, against the barbarians (pólemos) and civil war between the Greek cities (stásis). Likewise, Schmitt in the end has three types of enmities: two types of enmity that we have called ontic (α.2), still split into a "private rivalry" (B.1) and a "public antagonism" or politics, properly speaking, (B.2) (stásis), both of which are opposed to "absolute enmity" (β.2) from which one declares war to the death—moving out from the "political field" and penetrating the "military field" properly so-called.

Fraternity (from phratría) is based in an "equality from birth" (isogonía), in a "natural equality" (katá phúsin), which determines "equality before the law" (isōnōmia katá nómon). The philía of the indicated isōnōmia is the political friendship, fraternity, which is bound to demokratía.

In chapter 5 he addresses "absolute enmity" (hostis, polémios) or the war to the death. As much in "political antagonism" as in "absolute enmity," there is always a reference to an "ontology of the human life,"\(^7\) because the indicated dramaticity of the political lies in the perpetual possibility of the loss of life. Since every citizen is a possible antagonist in politics (in the second sense indicated, [B.2]), there is always the risk of physical death. In this case, one would have to indicate that it is human life itself that is the ultimate criterion which establishes the possibility to discern between friend and enemy: the enemy is the one who can place life in jeopardy up to the limit of murder.\(^8\) Schmitt, the same as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, or Freud, takes his start from human life, and from it discovers the importance of Will, and from there the possible material, affective, drive-directed foundation of politics.

To distinguish between the "political opponent" (α.2) and the "absolute enemy" (β.2) is to be able to distinguish between the political (fraternal "antagonism") and the military (pure "hostility"). The political becomes apparent within fraternity in antagonistic tension, within the fraternity that impedes murder—which signifies the discipline of knowing how to exercise isōnōmia. But it requires of itself greater dramaticity than the depolitized reference to an indifferent system of law with which it is necessary to comply externally and legally. Therefore, the mere liberal "state of law" can be put in question as a "state of exception,"\(^9\) which thus would additionally show the Will to be prior to the Law.

In chapter 6 he deals with the political in the situation of armed struggle.\(^20\) It would seem to be located, like the Spanish resistance to the Napoleonic invasion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, between the "political opponent" and the "absolute enemy." "Revolutionary war" or "subversive war"\(^21\) is clearly not elucidated, since Schmitt, as well as Derrida, lacks sufficient categories (as we
will see later), and therefore such war is often taken for “the most unfortunate tragedy of fratricide.”22 Everything concludes completely only in face of the evidence of the confrontation of “true brothers [against] true enemies,” while one wonders in doubt: “On biblical or Hellenic ground?”23

It is here where, without more prelude, Derrida moves additionally to the second moments ([A.2]: “the dying sage,” and [B.2]: “the living fool”) without taking advantage of its reference.24 He ought to have wondered: Why discuss a “dying sage”? Derrida never explains this fact well. In reference to the second moment (B.2), it remains hidden and without solution in all his work, since he does not explain clearly why it is living foolishness to decree that the aforementioned enmity has ceased existing. From what horizon does enmity disappear and the enemy become transformed into the “friend”? This enigma does not have a solution for Derrida (because he does not even discover it as an enigma).

In the same way, he “leaps” abysmally to another completely distinct tradition, the Semitic, bringing with it a collation of texts of highest complexity (which would require other hermeneutic categories than those used up to that moment) and this even though the quotations are never hermeneutically explained (quotations that, paradoxically, form a part of the best of Nietzsche’s verbal expressions of great beauty, but perhaps still incomprehensible for Nietzsche). These Semitic texts (now that the poetry of Theodor Däubler25 has its roots in Hebraic lineage) refer to the second aporia of the Nietzschean enigma (B). This text cited by Derrida, similar to that of Nietzsche, opposes friendship to enmity (in contrast to Aristotle who only speaks of friendship), but it treats an amazing statement, that goes far beyond the same Nietzschean text. He puts it this way:

Cursed is the one who has no friends, because his enemy will take a seat on the tribunal to judge him. Cursed he who has no enemy, because I will be, I, his enemy on the day of final judgment.26

Derrida circles around this question so enunciated, but he cannot resolve it. The other text, that only refers to enmity, unthinkable for Aristotle, and that Nietzsche expresses in the second aporia (B) of his statement, is encountered again within the Semitic tradition (so detested by Zarathustra): “I have heard you say: Love your neighbor and hate your enemy. But I tell you: Love your enemies.”27 We cannot follow “the goings and comings” of Derrida in chapters 7–10, where he treats the positions of other authors such as Montaigne, Augustine, Diogenes Laertes, Michelet, Heidegger, and so on. The question remains posed, in its foundation, in the fact that fraternity in the political community is impaled upon a contradiction that fractures it: the line passes between friend and enemy. It is not the complete enemy, the hostis; it is only the inimicus in the public sense (the Greek stásis) of fraternity, within the Whole of the community. But this fragmented fraternity, in addition to being defectively phallo-logos-centric, has nothing to do with sisterhood (sisterhood with the sister) but rather patriarchal fratocracia.
It is evident that Schmitt, as also Nietzsche, Weber, Derrida, and Modernity in general, understand political power as domination, and the political field is structured by a “Will to Power,” which orders this field on the basis of forces organized by the sole criterion of friends versus enemies. It will be necessary to overcome this radically.

3. Solidarity: Beyond Fraternity

We must proceed by analytically resolving each one of the steps in order to be able to reach better precision. In the first place, the first aporia (A) is encountered in that which we wish to designate an “ontological order”—like the “world” of M. Heidegger in Being and Time. The “friend” and the “sage” are placed within the horizon of the “world,” as in the illuminated space in the middle of the forest when the woodcutters have cut a good number of trees (the Lichtung of the Black Forest around Freiburg). The “friend” in fraternity (A.1) is the one who lives the unity in the Whole (of the family, of the political community). In this sense, friendship is nonetheless ambiguous: a member of a “band of thieves” is able to love with the love of friendship (with mutual benevolence) and to struggle for the common interest of the band. The totality remains affectively united for fraternity, but this has no other measure than the grounds of the whole: “being” not only understood but also equally “desired.” Therefore, the exclamation of “Friends!” (A.1) refers to those who are joined and who can receive nonetheless the inevitable reproach from the one who searches for “perfect friendship” to verify that “there are no friends” (A.2). We have not moved beyond the ontological order.

In the same way, in the second moment (A.2), the one who is the sage, the one who is in the world, the totality. He/she has the farsightedness of the system; he relies on the triumphant tradition, that of the past. The future will be a repetition of what is already achieved. Wisdom is contemplation of “the Same,” it is not novelty, it approximates death. The ontological sage is always “facing death” (in Heidegger, Freud, and Schmitt). The death of each one permits the permanence of being in the unity of the community for fraternity.

In the second place, the second aporia (B) is obligatory within the horizon of “being.” “War (pólemos) is the origin of all,” said Heraclitus.28 How is it that “being” is able to be determinate if it does not take account of the original “opposite”: “non-being”? Friendship is unthinkable for ontology without enmity. This perfectly explains the Hellenic position, and equally that of Schmitt, in the exclamation of the first moment: “Enemies!” (B.1). Up to this point everything turns in accord with Greek and Modern ontological logic.

But there soon appears a discordant, incomprehensible, unexpected moment: “there are no enemies!” (B.2). Because if “there are no friends” (A.1), then inevitably “there are enemies.” But if there are no enemies either, then one falls into an irrational cul-de-sac without any exit from the domain of ontology. In effect, that “there are no enemies” dislocates ontology, contradicts the position of Heraclitus and of Schmitt. If there are no “enemies” there is no wisdom (which
stands out from "being" in the face of "non-being"), nor is there being-for-death, and not even fraternity, because this supposes the unity of the community against the stranger, the other, the enemy (hostility in ontology is the other side of fraternity). How has it occurred to Nietzsche to place this negation in opposition to friendship? From what tradition does this disconcerting intuition arise? Derrida cites—in a sense contrary to the thought of Nietzsche—a text of the Semitic tradition that begins to weaken "enmity," but this supposes a complete collapse, a radical overcoming of ontology, a going beyond "being." The text starts by affirming fraternity, but concludes by diluting enmity; at least it opens a door for its annihilation: "You have heard it said: [α.1 and β.1]32 Love your neighbor (plerion) and [α.2 and β.2] hate your enemy (ekhthrón) [i]. But I tell you: Love (agapē) your enemies [ii]."33 This negation of the negativity of "private rival," of "political opponent," and of "absolute hostility" (of the enemy to death in war), means that the "ontological order" (i) is transcendent as such, and therefore the experience of the "enemy" occurs (the Samaritans were enemies of the Jews, as "antagonistic" brother within the people of Israel) on the basis of a type of supra-fraternity,34 of "love" (agapē) in that which Other is constituted on the outside of its ontical-ontological function as "enemy," from a trans-ontological, metaphysical, or ethical order, in which "enmity" has been dismantled.

In the Semitic world,35 an ethical experience unknown in the Greco-Roman world appears, and it is constituted philosophically in the quasi-phenomenological analysis of Levinas in the modern Western tradition. The "neighbor" of whom he speaks in the cited text is the one who is revealed in "proximity" (face-to-face, in Hebrew: פָּנִים פָּנִים [panim el panim]), that is to say, the immediate, the non-mediated, as in the nudity of the erotic contact of the "mouth-to-mouth": "who kisses me (נְבָשׁ) with the kisses (נְבָשִׁים) of his mouth."36 This experience of "subjectivity-to-subjectivity," of living corporalities "skin-to-skin," as an originary philosophical category, does not exist in Greco-Roman or modern thought. In the midrash of the founder of Christianity called by the tradition that of the "good Samaritan," the Samaritan is called "good" because he/she establishes this experience of the face-to-face with those robbed, injured, or abandoned outside the path (outside of the ontological Totality). For the Samaritan the "neighbor" is thrown outside the path, into Exteriority: the Other. And we must not forget that the Samaritans were the "enemies" of the tribe of Judah.

Like philosophy, effecting a political hermeneutics of a symbolic text,37 I will take this midrash as an example of a narrative or ethical-rational tale38 constructed by this Semitic master in the face of the question "Who is my neighbor?"39 which could be better translated as: "Who is he/she who confronts the Other in the face-to-face?" or even: "Who establishes the subject-subject relation as proximity?"40 In the face of this question, that subtle, methodical expert in critical ethical-rational categories answers it, structuring a narration with pedagogical intention, which contains the "story" of a sociopolitical tale.

On the road "a man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and some bandits attacked him." The hermeneutic situation departs first of all from the "established
system,” “totality” (the Jewish political system, the road), and a victim (“attacked him, stripped him, pounded him with sticks”). There was the victim of the attack “on the side of” the road, of the order, of the system, in the “exteriority” of the political, established, legitimate totality. With a profound, critical sense, that does not exist in the “myth of Plato’s cave,” 41 this rabbi (methodical master of critical rhetoric) makes the most prestigious of the social and political order of Israel first pass along the road: “a priest passed,” one who was going to the temple in fulfillment of the Law. And in a critical, ironic, brutal way it is expressed that the victim interpellates the “scribe” (jurist): “seeing him, he took a detour and passed him by.” The totalization of the Totality, of the system in which he finds himself, formally fulfilling the Law, impedes him from opening himself to the sociopolitical exteriority of the victim. 42 For better provocation still (much more than the Nietzschean Zarathustra), the story turns to the tribe of Levi, the most venerated by the Jerusalem elite: “a Levite did the same,” that is, one who also sought to fulfill the Law. That is to say, the sages, the best, the legalists, the most venerated of the system could not assume responsibility for the victim, for the Other. The legitimate horizon of the reigning system clouds their minds or impedes them from taking a step “outside” of it, outside of the Law (since one can end up being impure and this would keep them from fulfilling their required worship). The despised according to the table of values of the positive system, the one who was outside the Law, a Samaritan (a barbarian for a Greek, a Gaul for a Roman, an infidel for a Medieval Christian or a Mahommedan, a slave or an Indian in early Modernity, a lumpen proletarian in capitalism, a Sunni in Iraq for a Marine, etc.) furthers the irony, the scathing critique, the subversive intention of values: “upon seeing him, he felt solidarity for him, 43 approached him and bound up his wounds [. . .].” These texts have not been taken seriously by contemporary political philosophy, neither in the United States nor in Europe. However, it is the most revolutionary thought that we have been able to observe in the history of Western politics, impossible for Greek or Roman politics even to think.

The concept of plesiós (the nearby one or the “near” one, neighbor), or plesiázó (to come near or “to be made near”), in Greek does not indicate adequately the Hebrew reduplicative of “face-to-face” (paním el paním). In this case, it is the empirical immediacy of two human faces confronting each other, which, when it “is revealed” in the suffering of the victim, 44 to that degree appeals to the political responsibility for the Other and requires the overcoming of the horizon of Totality (the “going outside of the path” that has been established).

This ethical-political position is not a stoic therapy 45 of the desires in order to reach subjective peace (for nothing else like apátheia is ataraxía), but rather the simple and direct “public-political therapy from the point of view of the Other” (“he bound his wounds, pouring oil and wine in them”); so life goes for the one who dangerously risks getting involved for the Other.

The foundational categories of a critical politics are then two: (i) the “established order” (“of this world”: ek toú tou toú kósmou), Totality, as what is presup-
posed in order to be deconstructed; and (ii) the horizontal transcendence of historical temporality as political exteriority, future in time ("I do not belong to this world": oûk eimi ek tou kósmou tou tôn):46 Exteriority. The "Law" structures the "established order" ("this order" or "world") and is necessary. But when the "Law" kills, it is necessary not to fulfill it, because the spirit of the law is life. Abraham had to kill his son Isaac, but Abraham himself, evading the law for love of his son (Anti-Oedipus), searches for a way to replace him with an animal (according to an interpretation of one Jewish tradition, in which Jeshua was included, in opposition to the dogmatic position of the priests of the temple who affirmed that Abraham perhaps killed his son to fulfill the Law and who were the enemies of Jeshua). Before the authority of the "Law," Jeshua accuses the very court that judged him:

If you were sons of Abraham you would comport yourselves like him. On the other hand, you are trying to kill me [. . .]. Abraham did not do this [. . .]. Do we not have reason to say that you are a Samaritan? [exclaimed the members of the Sanhedrin . . .] I am not crazy [the accused defends himself].

The "Law" gives life when the order is just. When it represses the possibility of novelty the Law kills. Therefore, that which is constructed from the challenge of victims who interpellate from the exteriority (ii) (proving by its mere sociopolitical existence of the injustice of "this world" (i), the established order), from the project of a new order that "is not of this world" (that is historical, really possible, more just: it is the postulate that Marx explains in the economic field as a "Reign of Liberty," and that Kant explains as a "regulative idea" in his "ethical Community"48) is beyond the Law that kills. Jacques Lacan introduces the theme by making the Law in some way the equivalent of the Uber-Ich (superego), when in his Seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,49 he explains: "In effect, with the reservation of one very small modification—Thing in place of sin—this is the discourse of Paul with regard to the relations of the Law and sin, Romans 7:7. Beyond what is thought in certain media of these sacred authors, it would be mistaken to believe that the sacred authors do not have a good reading."50

This has produced recently in political philosophy a rereading of Paul of Tarsus,51 which allows us nonetheless to invert the interpretation now in fashion. In general, it is understood that the Law, as formal obligation, denies desire, and in the degree to which this desire presses to fulfillment sin appears, which Bataille takes as a foundation of eroticism (as occurs in the enjoyment of the transgression of the Law). Nonetheless, with Hinkelammert, I feel obliged to interpret the relation of Paul of Tarsus in an inverted way. The fulfillment of the Law produces death, for example, of Steven in Jerusalem, because he was stoned for not having fulfilled the Law—and Paul looks after the clothes of the murdered. It is the Law that required Abraham to kill his son. Paul, in fulfilling the Law persecuted the Christians; that is to say, the Law produced death. It was thus necessary, in the name of Life, not to fulfill the letter of the Law that kills (but to fulfill its spirit).
The death that produces the Law, when it has become fixed, entropic, is oppression of the dominated. In this way, to free oneself from the Law is to affirm Life, or, better, to affirm a Law of Life—that supposes the transformation of the formalist fulfillment of the Law. The Life of Nietzsche is the originary life of the system itself, it is never the Life of the oppressed, of the excluded, of the victim, of the weak in the exteriority of the system dominated by “the Aryan warrior.”

In the same way we can now point to the essence of solidarity (beyond the mere fraternity of the Law, in the system as totalized totality as domination). In effect, the “Enemy!” (B.1, α.2, or β.2) can be the mere “enemy” of the “friend” in and of the Totality (i) (be it ontic, functional, or ontological). But for “the Other,” that which situates itself beyond the flourishing system, in its Exteriority (ii), this “enemy” is not his/her enemy (Figure 2). In the Code of Hammurabi, which is constituted from the horizon of a Semitic metaphysics, which is not that of the Roman law as studied by G. Agamben, because it is more complex and critical, it is expressed: “So that the strong do not oppress the poor, in order to create justice for the orphan and the widow, in Babylon [...] Let the oppressed affected in a process come before my statue of the King of Justice and be made to read53 my written stele.”

The “enemy” of the “strong” is the poor, insofar as they are potential possessors of the goods of the strong, given the state of necessity in which they find themselves. The orphan is the competitor of the proper child; the widow is the enemy of the one who desires to appropriate the goods of her deceased spouse—that is the theme of the Code of Hammurabi. That is to say, the “enemies” of the dominators of the system, of totality (i), are not necessarily the “enemies” of the dominated, of the oppressed, of the excluded (ii). These, the excluded and dominated, cry out now comprehensibly (but they are discovered neither by Nietzsche nor by Derrida): “‘Enemies [of the system], there are no enemies [for us]!’, because we ourselves are the enemies of the system!”

Now Derrida cites the text of Däubler, but he himself does not achieve clarity in his commentaries. We have equally two moments in the new text; but it (the
text) introduces in the first (1) the opposition friend–enemy (and not only to the friend as in [A.1]); and, in the second, it distinguishes between two types of enemies (2):

[1.a] Cursed he who has no friends, [1.b] because his enemy seats himself in court to judge him [1.b].

[2.a] Cursed he who has no enemy, [2.b] because I will be, I, his enemy on the day of final judgment.

The first moment (1) treats the totalized order, of the flesh (i). From the point of view of the flourishing morality, one has to have friends in order to have a defense, possibilities of success, when one is surrounded by intrasystemic enemies (1.b), in an empirical judgment.

The second moment (2) is upsetting for the ontological order: the one who has not known how to have enemies is cursed (2.a). But, what class of enemies is this? Now it treats those enemies which are caused by one’s solidarity, by one’s trans-ontological friendship with the poor, the orphan, and the widow, with the Other, with the unprotected in inhospitable rough weather, in Exteriority of power (ii), of the Law, of wealth. The one who establishes the relation of solidarity, who is cordial with the miserable (miseri-cordia, compassion) surpasses the fraternity of friendship in the system (α.1–β.1 in [i]) and endangers him/herself in opening him/herself to the wide field of Alterity that originates because of a pre-ontological “responsibility for the Other.” Metaphysical or ethical solidarity is prior to the deployment of the (ontological) world as a horizon wherein one “decides” to help the Other or not. But the one who helps the Other, in an empirical realization of solidarity, does not avoid the fact that he/she was always already responsible for the Other before. The one who does not help the Other betrays that pre-ontological responsibility. In a way there will then be an a priori pre-ontological solidarity and a trans-ontological empirical effecting of the solidarity, it makes concrete: “Give bread to the hungry” (from the Egyptian Book of the Dead).

In the system, the face for the Other presents itself before the court of Law of this system, which always declares it guilty (because of defending the enemy of the system). The defense of the defenseless, because of solidarity, leaves the tutor of the orphan as responsible before this court of the system and as occupying the place of the victim (by substitution) in his/her defense; she/he is the witness (μαρτυς): she/he gives the testimony of the innocence of the Other. The former enemies of the one responsible in solidarity are not now her/his enemies (γ.2), and her/his former friends (α.1–β.1) in the system (when they were exploiting in fraternity the poor, the orphan, and the widow) are now her/his new enemies. Now her/his new friends have been won for a new type of friendship: solidarity with the Other, with the oppressed, with the excluded (γ.1) (Figure 3).

He/she who was a friend (α.1–β.1) held the poor, the orphan, and the widow, as his/her radical enemies (γ.2). It is now a different enmity from the mere enmity
in the system (α.2–β.2). The enemy in the system can be a competitor in the marketplace, an opposing political party, and even a foreign enemy in war. But all those enemies affirm the Same (i).

On the contrary, the poor, the exploited, and the excluded support the system from below. If they withdraw, the system falls to pieces. They are the radical enemies of the system in alterative exteriority (γ.2) (beyond the absolute enemies of Schmitt). Now, the one who has negated the enmity of former enemies, exclaims: “Enemies? [of the dominant perhaps, but, for the victims, among themselves] there are no enemies!” (Transforming the statements [B.1] and [B.2]). The exploited and excluded who were from the start the enemies, are not now enemies: the opening in solidarity to the Other dismisses the former enmity for an alterative friendship: solidarity (γ.1). Upon establishing solidarity with them now, the situation with respect to former friends of the dominant system has been transformed into something distinct: now this one is a traitor who deserves to be judged as guilty (S), and for a greater contradiction in the court which intends to condemn this one, he/she must testify in favor of the Other (the enemy of the same court), taking, on the day of judgment, interior to the system, the place of the Other, of the exploited, of the accused whom he/she now defends and for whom he/she substitutes.

Whereas the judge of the transcendental (E) or ethical-metaphysical tribunal curses all those who have not made themselves enemies within the system (2.a), who are the enemies of the poor and oppressed (and who are the dominators of the system)—enemies who “throw themselves on top of” the one who is in solidarity with the Other, with the exploited and the excluded—the one who has not transformed former friends in the system into enemies shows that he/she continues considering as enemies the poor, the Other, and in this it is manifest that he/she is a dominator. And therefore he/she will be declared guilty on the day of transcendental ethical-political justice: “I will be, I, your enemy on the day of final judgment” (2.b). As we have said, the “final judgment” of the Egyptian Goddess Ma’at is the metaphor of “ethical-political conscience in solidarity” which has for its universal criterion the requirement of the negation of
enmity toward the poor ("Give bread to the hungry"); the poor which is always a latent danger for the rich, the powerful, the order strengthened "with its blood" (in Judaic or Aztec metaphors). The "myth of Osiris," celebrated in Egyptian Memphis (twenty centuries before the ontological "myth of Prometheus" chained to the Totality), and even its corollary the "Adamic myth" (which Paul Ricoeur studies in his work The Symbolism of Evil) lie at the origin of the ethical critical myths of the ancient Mediterranean, from whence proceed Athens and Jerusalem.

The court of the system (S) judges according to the formalism of the Law of totality (i). The other ethical-metaphysical, transcendental, or alterative court (E) judges critically from the life of the victim, that is to say, according to the criteria of the oppressed and excluded, and therefore founds the new and future system of law (ii). Before this ultimate court (which is the critical consensus of the community of the oppressed and excluded), it is the plebs which amounts to the consensus popoli of Bartolomé de las Casas. A "on the day of final judgment" (which acts as a postulate that establishes a criterion of orientation, logically thinkable, but empirically impossible to realize perfectly, and which since the beginning has exercised its function in all acts of justice that are fulfilled according to the requirements that the necessities of the Other, of the poor, of the orphan, and of the widow establish), the traitor is very similar to the one Benjamin describes as the one who irrups in the "now-time" (Jetzt-zeit) as the "messiah." The messiah is the cursed and the traitor from the point of view of former friends in the dominant system: the messiah has turned into their enemy, not an ontic one (α.2), but an enemy much more radical still than Derrida’s "absolute" or "ontological enemy" (β.2) (the barbarian on whom one has made war to the death). It is Miguel Hidalgo, whom a court with a majority of criollos (white Mexicans) condemned to death (for having raised up an army of Indians and slaves against the king) in 1810. The Other is the "radical enemy" (γ.2) because the Other demands of the system, of the totality (i), a complete inversion of its sense: the Other is the metaphysical enemy; the Other demands the transformation of the system as totality.

I think that now it is understood of whom it is said "Cursed is he who has no enemy!" (2.a). That one is cursed in the eyes of the Judge who judges on the basis of the Alterity of the poor, of the Other, simply because the cursed one has lived in complicity with the system, exploiting and excluding "the poor, the orphans, and the widows," the Other. This cursed one does not have to have been persecuted and does not have to have had enemies; it is the sufficient sign (that one should be judged) to have negated solidarity and to have maintained oneself in the dominating fraternity. And because this cursed one has done nothing for the weak, then he/she will be judged as guilty before the ethical-metaphysical alterative court of history.

This introduces the last theme, perhaps as unclear in Nietzsche as in Derrida. It treats the second moment (B.2) of the second Nietzschean aporia: "Shout I, the living fool." Here, moreover, enters the entire essential theme for the philosophy of all times.
It treats of the opposition between the “wisdom of the sage” (σοφια των σοφων) as being-for-death (wisdom in the dominant system, that is to say, “wisdom of the flesh” (σοφια σωματος) (A.2), and the “critical knowledge,” that is, “madness for the system” (μωρα του κοσμου) as being-for-life (B.2). The messiah of Benjamin was the “fool” before the wisdom of the system. In all the commentary, Derrida never gives a clear explanation of this dialectical opposition. I think that now we have sufficient categories to understand the question.

The “consensus of the excluded” (ii) is “wisdom” as exteriority (logos, dabar). When that critical consensus forms—the consensus that delegitimates the “state of law,” which as the will of the oppressed (in a “state of rebellion”) puts in question the same “state of exception” (of Schmitt)—the word critically breaks in upon the prevailing system of domination: the “word (ii) made flesh (i)” enters into the Totality, the flesh, destructuring the system of domination. The meshiakh of Benjamin now justifies with an anti-systemic wisdom (“madness” or “fondness” of the Totality), against the “wisdom of the sages,” the former friends, a new wisdom, namely that of the enemies of the system in their liberating praxis, those who are no longer the enemies of the meshiakh.

Hidalgo in Mexico, one of the priestly class, of the white race and in the position of Spanish dominator, struggles against the same elite to whom he had belonged, in a war for anti-colonial Emancipation. His reasons sounded to the ears of his former friends (the Spanish Viceroyal authorities who persecuted him militarily, the bishops who excommunicated him, and the criollos who condemned him to death) as senseless madness, unjustified rebellion, betrayal of the lese majeste. The empirical fact involves the death of the innocent one, of Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, who, taking solidarity as presupposed, discovers himself as already always responsible for the Other, and he is the fool hostage in the hands of the system. To this event, the death of the innocent guilty of solidarity, Levinas gives the name of the revelation in history of “the glory of the infinite.”

We treat here, then, a central moment of Politics of Liberation, namely, the moment in which the community of the oppressed and excluded, the plebs (messianic people in Benjamin’s sense), from the exteriority of the system of power of those who “order ordering” (as the ELZN, the Zapatistas, express it), tend to constitute from below an alternative Power, that of the new people (populus), constructed from the “madness” of a dominating system. The wisdom of the critical sage, popular wisdom of those “from below,” has been able to unfold, to express thanks for its previous subjective “liberation” against the system of domination on the basis of the power of solidarity, love, and friendship for the poor, the orphan, the widow, and the stranger. Such wisdom is already suggested by the system of law that includes its contradiction (the victims of the Law), exemplified in the Code of Hammurabi, that Semitic king of Babylon, a city whose ruins are near the present Baghdad, destroyed by the barbarians at the beginning of the twenty-first century, enemies of all the wretched of the Earth. And with Nietzsche, against Nietzsche, we can exclaim at the end that only when
those “condemned” enemies of the dominators of the world free themselves, then, and only then “there will come the more joyful hour.”

Notes

1 With assistance from Kepa Zubizarreta.
7 On the material aspect (concerning content, *Inhalt* in German) of ethics, see Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la Liberación* (Madrid: Trotta, 1998), chaps. 1 and 4. On the material aspect of politics, see my upcoming work *Política de la Liberación*, secs. 21, 26 (vol. 2), 33, and 41 (vol. 3).
8 “Shout 1, the living fool” (A.2). As will be seen, being “a fool” means a wisdom that is more than mere “ontological knowledge,” and that criticizes that same ontology, but in the case of Nietzsche this critic is like a pre-ontological critic still making ontological reference to that which returns in the remote originary, Hellenistic past; whereas that which we propose amounts to a trans-ontological limit in reference to exteriority or alterity, which is the proposal indicated by Paul of Tarsus: “madness for the world.”
10 Ibid., ix.
11 Ibid.
12 In this article, the concept of “metaphysics” has two completely different senses: first, in its traditional sense and so as Nietzsche here uses it (it is “metaphysics” in a sense that is ontic and innocent of a critical realism); second, in the sense that Levinas uses it (where ontology is the order of Totality and metaphysics is of the order of Exteriority), which is metaphysics as trans-ontology: meta-physics. See Enrique Dussel, “Ontology and Metaphysics,” *Philosophy of Liberation* (New York: Orbis Books, 1985), sec. 2.4.9.
14 Ibid, 39.
15 Ibid, 83ff. Derrida will produce the work central to this question of Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993).
16 It is the text of the gospel of *Matthew* 5:44: “Love your enemies.”
17 Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 123.
18 See chapter 1 of my *Ética de la Liberación*; and chapter 1 of the *Second Part* of my *Politics of Liberation* (Madrid: Trotta, forthcoming).

Now it would still be necessary to make a distinction between “revolutionary war” or “emancipatory war” (progressive, democratic) and (fundamentalist) “terrorism,” before the newness of a global “revolutionary war” (with differing interpretations).


Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 164. That of “biblical” would have to be expressed simply in “Semitic” (on the contrary a confrontation between theology and philosophy has to appear), already that is an opposition between two *culturally distinct* experiences and which claim equal rights to be analyzed hermeneutically by philosophy.


Cites Derrida, *Politiques de l’amitié*, 190; *Politics of Friendship*, 165. The “final judgment” of Ma’at is an Egyptian theme that precedes the Hebrew references by nearly twenty centuries.


Because “[terrestrial] life is the death of each one [. . .] Our life comes to us for death” (Heraclitus, fragment 77, Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 168).

In Nietzsche one can intra-ontologically understand the negation of a certain *enmity*, that of the “strong,” which supports the domination of the “weak” (the Judeo-Christian ascetics, the Semites). This is done in such a way that when the “strong” (the warrior, the “originary Greek”) undertake to annihilate the prevailing values, which means an inversion or a constitution of the past vices of the “weak” as if they were positive values, the strong affirm themselves as *friends* to the “strong,” which means the enemies of the system (of the “weak”). But the negation of this *enmity* is effected as the affirmation of “the Same,” of the *foundation*, of the being-past of the ancient system. The Modern Western world (of the “weak”) contradictorily calls itself a Greco-Roman inheritance: Nietzsche, by affirming originary *Hellenicity* against Judeo-Christian decadence, does not leave the realm of ontology. It is not a matter of a *solidarity* with the “strong,” now oppressed and needing to be affirmed anew (nor is it a matter of *fraternity*: the “strong” do not need that decadent friendship). It is sufficient to have hate or *enmity* for the “weak” who now masochistically and ascetically dominate against the Life of the “healthy” and “strong” (it is a vitalism of the right, reactionary, pre-fascist).

For Nietzsche that text manifests that “cowardly humility” of the “weak” that is not able to confront with pride the enemy as an enemy to be conquered. It is an operation of “weakness” before “power,” which does not attack it from the front but by a detour to situate itself in its back, to eliminate it by betrayal.

See Figure 1.

*Matthew* 5:43.

After making the *critique* of enmity within the people of Israel, the *critique* of enmity against those *outside* of the people will appear. The *goim* (non-Jews: Roman pagans, for example) will be invited to form part of the “new people.” It would be negation-overcoming (subsumption) of “absolute enmity,” in a new *universal fraternity* postulated, for example, in Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* (every postulate affirms a logical *possibility* and an empirical *impossibility*) for all humanity (beginning with the Roman Empire in the case of primitive Christianity). The *empirical possibility* of the postulate is not found now within the horizon of politics nor of philosophy; it is within a
horizon of hope proper to the mythical-religious narrative—as studied by Ernst Bloch in *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), vols. 1-3.


36 *Song of Songs* 1:2.

37 The so-called “biblical” or “religious” element of a text, within the Jacobinism of Modern European thought, discredits texts that are “symbolic-narrative” and those on which the philosopher, as a philosopher, can effect a philosophical hermeneutic. Hesiod’s *Theogony* is just as much a symbolic narrative as the *Exodus* of the Jewish narrative tradition. Both can be texts of a philosophical hermeneutic. These texts are not philosophical for their contents, but for the mode of reading them. I would thus like to free myself from the epithet that my analysis is “theological” because it takes for its analysis these “symbolic-narrative” texts.

38 This “tale,” which teaches by inventing or taking an example, is designated a *midrash*. It is properly neither symbolic nor mythical, but properly rational, and is constructed on a basis of selecting situations of daily life with pedagogical intention. Plato’s “myth of the cave” is evidently a “symbolic” (or mythical) tale, but the designated “parable (of midrash) of the Samaritan” is not since it does not have a symbol or myth. It is an ethical-rational narrative with explicit methodical structure.


41 The Platonic “critique” is theoretical: in the cave shadows are seen, not realities; “the many” (hoi polloi), the vulgar, confuse them with reality. The wise, the few, the best, leave the cave; it is a politically aristocratic myth. The sociopolitical tale of the midrash of the Samaritan is not mythical, it is sociopolitical, it is not aristocratic or democratic, it is critical; it is not theoretical, it is practical: it is not only ethical, it is sociopolitical.

42 See the ethical-philosophical sense of this action of a “closing” or a “totalization” of Totality (Enrique Dussel, “The Ethical-Ontological Evil as Totalitarian Totalization of Totality,” in *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, vol. 2 [Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973], sec. 21).

43 The verb σπαγχνίζομαι (spākhnizomai) used in the Greek text proceeds from the root of the substantive “bowels,” “viscera,” “heart,” and signifies “to be moved,” “to take compassion upon.” I choose this root to express the feeling of “solidarity” (as critical emotivity upset at the suffering exteriority of the victim). It is rather radically different from the mere “fraternity” of Derrida; but neither is it the compassion of Schopenhauer, nor paternalistic commiseration, or superficial pity. It is the metaphysical desire for the Other as other.

44 From 1970, I insist in all my works that this experience is always political. See Dussel, *Para una ética de la liberación*, vol. 1, chap. 3, and subsequently in vols. 2 and 5 it is analyzed as the interpretation of the Other as other, as the person of another class or sex, as new generations, as exploited or excluded fellow citizens, as victim. Furthermore see Dussel, *Philosophy of Liberation*, sec. 2.6; *Ethics and Community* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), sec. 4.2; *The Invention of the Americas* (New York: Continuum, 1995); *The Underside of Modernity*. Apel, Ricœur: *Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996); and *Ética de la Liberación*, chaps. 4 and 5.


46 *John* 8:21-49.

47 Additionally: “spirit” (pneuma in Greek, ruakh in Hebrew) is of the ethical-metaphysical order (ii) of Alterity.

48 See *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (Kant, *Werke*, vol. 7 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968], 760).


50 Ibid., 103.

It would be a good theme for discussion to show how, for example, Leo Strauss (who finds inspiration in Alfarabi, the great Islamic philosopher, who seeks the *concilium* of philosophy and the *Koran*, but who at the end identifies the *esoteric* of his doctrine with Greek philosophy and the *exoteric* with the narrative of the *Koran*; in Strauss, in the same way, philosophy is the *exoteric*—the rational—and the biblical narrative the *exoteric*—the religious imaginary) or Hannah Arendt (who in the end continued being a disciple of Heidegger and never went beyond ontology)—both these did not capture the originality of the Semitic experience (as Levinas knew how to explain it).

Observe that the reading of this “text” allows the oppressed to confront the very *content* of the Law, which could be contrary to the distorted *oral* interpretation that the oppressor would be able to make of it had it not been public and *objectively* expressed as *written*. In this case, the *writing* is a condition of the *universal* of the law in protection of the oppressed. Furthermore, we would be able to make another exegesis of the sense of the “being-written” not coinciding with that of Derrida.


The arrow to would indicate the opening of *solidarity* from the totality of the “flesh” (the system, totality, fraternity) toward the exteriority of the Other as other, the “love of responsibility” (*agápe*).

Before the Other, thrown off the path, subjectivity suffers an impact on its “sensitivity,” in its capacity of “affectivity” in so much as it can be *affected* by a traumatism.

This “madness,” “foolishness” is confused with the mere pathology of the mentally infirm. Such infirmity was diagnosed as being inhabited by a “demon,” and from there to “possessed,” a “fool” or mentally infirm, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, *the critic* on the basis of the alterity of the exploited or excluded Other (the political critic). These two were mistaken to be the same. Therefore, before the court Jeshua says: “I do not have a demon (*daimónion*)” (*John 8:49*) (correctly translated as: “I am not mad”). The legal system has difficulty in distinguishing between the thief (who does not fulfill the Law) and the *radical* critic (who seeks to change the *total system* of the Law). Therefore, the simple thief was joined to the subservives who have *solidarity*: according to political messianism (Barrabas) and according to prophetic messianism (Jeshua): “they crucified two outlaws with him” (*Matthew 27:38*).

In Greek *martirion* means “proof,” “testimony.” And so the “martyr” is to be the “witness,” the “proven,” the hostage who, responsible for the Other, provides testimony for the victim of the system before the court of that very system. As if the system could suspect itself, it is lost!

Empirically that court is the “critical consensus” of the community of the oppressed and excluded (see my forthcoming *Politics of Liberation*, pt. 2, chap. 5).

This is the “Law” that would kill Isaac, but Abraham does not fulfill it; it is that which kills Jeshua. Of this, Paul of Tarsus exhales that the Law which ought “to give life (*zoe*), gives death (*thanaton*)” (*Romans 7:10*). When Paul says “You shall not desire” (*ouk epithuméteis*) (*Romans 7:8*), he does not treat Lacanian “desire” (desire as an impossibility of reaching satisfaction in the object), which opposes itself to the mere “drive” (which reaches satisfaction). Here the “desire of the flesh” is exactly “to want to totalize the system” (the fetishization of Totality) in *fraternity*. The Law of the system does not obligate the one who discovers *solidarity*, because that one does not accept the “drives” of the system, the “desire of the flesh.” In the system of domination there is not then consciousness of “fault” (*amartia*: sin), which consists in the “negation of the Other.” The totalized formalism of the Law kills; kills the Other; is the desire of the death of the Other. When the “spirit” of the Law reveals itself, formalist law shows all its murderouse power (it is the Law which justifies the death of the Other). For its part, the “désir métaphysique” of Levinas is not that “desire” of the system (the *fraternity*: the “desire of the flesh”), but a “desire for the Other as other,” in its Distinction (it is, again, *solidarity*): “The metaphysical desire (désir métaphysique)
has another intention—it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness: the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it” (E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969], 34).

61 In 1546 this thinker writes, defending the indigenous of Peru, a political historical work: De potestate regis (see my Politics of Liberation, sec. 6, 101ff), where he justifies the illegitimacy of every decision of the King which would be opposed to the consensus populi.

62 “History is an object of a construction whose place is not constituted by homogenous and empty time [i], but by a full time, now-time [ii]” (Theses on the Philosophy of History, 14; in Discursos Interrumpidos I [Madrid: Taurus, 1989], 188). And yet: “In this structure is recognized the sign of a messianic delay or said in another way: of a revolutionary juncture in the struggle in favor of the past oppressed person” (Ibid., Theses, 17; p. 190). Messianic “time” is the irruption in history of solidarity; that is to say, of somebody who is encountered invested with responsibility for the Other who obligates one to work against the current: it is the irruption of the critical “word” (ii) which becomes present in the “flesh” (i): the system of “unbroken time.”

63 Miguel Hidalgo is obligated either to deny his cause (to be a traitor to his oppressed people), held as a hostage by the Spanish in the Mexico of 1811 (a situation considered by Levinas in his second great work of 1974), or to die as a traitor (“of his king and his God”). What made Hidalgo unacceptable is that having belonged to the dominant group (as white criollo and priestly authority before the people) he would have betrayed his friends (of New Spain, the colony) and would have turned into a friend of the enemies of the colonial system.

64 Paul of Tarsus, 1 Corinthians 1:18. The rest of the texts are from 1 Corinthians 1:26–2:14.

65 Isaiah 29:14. This “wisdom of the system” dominator is then “wisdom of the flesh” (σοφία σαρκός), “the dying sage.”

66 The Totality, the system, is the “flesh,” (i) but inasmuch as it is a subjective, existential, anthropological category. Moreover, the “flesh” is the unitary expression of being human (there is neither “body” nor “soul”; the Greek soul is immortal; the Semitic flesh dies and revives). See Enrique Dussel, El dualismo en la antropología de la Cristianidad (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guadalupe, 1974).

67 The “world” is also the totality of the system, but as a category that expresses a more objective, institutional, historical level as a structure of political power.

68 This Semitic “dabár,” or Greek “logos,” originates in the ancient manifestation of the Egyptian god Ptah, whose “language” (like that of the Semites) was the word as wisdom, the goddess Thoth. Egypt is behind Greece and the Palestinians (among whom one finds the Jews, whose Hebrew language was a Canaanite dialect).

69 John 1:14.

70 See Ernesto Laclau, La razón populista (Mexico: FCE, 2005).

71 Nonetheless, we ought to add to Benjamin two fundamental aspects, not clear in his reliable individualism: (a) the messiah has a memory of heroic deeds (a memory of the struggles of a people, and for that also another history [ii] than the history of unbroken-time [i]); and the messiah (b) is a messianic community (a people), a collective actor of the construction of another future system (ii), beyond the “Egyptian enslavement” (metaphor of the oppressor ontology).