

Reclaiming **Liberation** Theology



Politics of Liberation

A Critical World History

ENRIQUE DUSSEL

Translated by Thia Cooper

RECLAIMING LIBERATION THEOLOGY

Politics of Liberation

A Critical World History

Enrique Dussel

Translated by
Thia Cooper



scm press

© Enrique Dussel and Thia Cooper (English translation) 2011

First published in Spanish by Editorial Trotta in 2007.

This English translation published in 2011 by SCM Press
Editorial office
13-17 Long Lane,
London, EC1A 9PN, UK

SCM Press is an imprint of Hymns Ancient and Modern Ltd
(a registered charity)
13a Hellesdon Park Road, Norwich, Norfolk, NR6 5DR
www.scm-canterburypress.co.uk

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of
the publisher, SCM Press.

The Authors have asserted their right under the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act, 1988,
to be identified as the Authors of this Work

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library

978-0-334-04181-8

Typeset by Regent Typesetting, London
Printed and bound by
Lightning Source, UK

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>Series Editors' Preface</i>	xi
<i>Translator's Preface</i>	xiii
<i>Introduction</i>	xv
Part 1: Locating the Critical–Political Place in the pre-1492 Regional Systems	I
1 The Archaeo-System: In the Beginning was the 'Will to Live'	3
2 Stage I of the Regional Systems: The Urban Revolution and the First Political Systems	6
Mesopotamian Legal Systems	9
Egypt and Other Eastern Civilizations	13
Meso-America and the Incan Empire	16
3 The Great Empires of Horse and Iron: The First Rationalized Unification of the Political in Stage II of the Inter-Regional System	25
Chinese Classical Political Philosophy	27
The Political Thinking of the Indian Continent	37
Politics in the Empires of Iran	42
Politics in the Mediterranean World. The 'Phoenician connection': The Political System of Byblos, Tyre and Carthage	44
From the Greek <i>pólis</i> to the Hellenic Empire	47
From the Roman <i>res publica</i> to the <i>imperium</i>	61

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

4	The Rebellion of the Victims and the Slow Invention of the Secular State	66
	Discovery of the Critical Intersubjectivity from Alterity. The Jewish Diaspora and Christian Sect as Victims of the Roman Empire	67
	The ‘Byzantine Connection’: The Relapse into the Contradictory Sacralization of the Eastern Christendoms	77
	The Latin-Christian World of the Western Roman Empire	84
	Politics in the Classical Islamic Mercantile System	88
	Politics in Peripheral and Isolated Germanic Europe	100
Part 2: Locating the Critical–Political Place in ‘Early Modernity’ (From 1492)		127
5	The Context of Modern Politics	129
	The Importance of China (1400–1800)	129
	An Ancient World: The Ottoman Empire	155
	Venice: An ‘Eastern’ Political System in Peripheral Europe	158
	The Italian Renaissance: Machiavelli	164
6	The first ‘Early Modernity’: Hispanic-American Christendom (1492–1630)	182
	The ‘Spanish Project’: The Atlantic Origin of Modernity	182
	The Epiphany of the ‘New’ Other	190
	The ‘Father’ of Modern Political Philosophy: Ginés de Sepúlveda	192
	The First Philosophical Discourse against Modernity: The Critique of European Colonial Expansion by Bartolomé de Las Casas	197
	‘Modern’ University Philosophy Justifies the Colonial Order: Francisco de Vitoria	206
	The Institutionalization of the Alienation of the Other: The Testimony of Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala	210
	The Displacement of Alterity: From the Indigenous to the American Creole. The Political Humanism of Francisco Suárez	224
7	The Other First ‘Early Modernity’: Lusitanian Christendom in the Face of the Alterity of the African Slave	236
	Western Africa and the ‘Portuguese Afro-Atlantic Project’	237

CONTENTS

The First Philosophical Critique of the Legitimacy of Modern Slavery: Bartolomé de Las Casas	240
Slavery in the Liberal Bourgeois Interpretation: John Locke	246
8 The second ‘Early Modernity’: The Christendoms of Northern Europe (1630–1789)	253
The Absolute Monarchy: Jean Bodin	254
The New Paradigm of the Discourse of the Foundation of Politics: Thomas Hobbes	257
The United Provinces around Amsterdam: Baruch Spinoza	270
Philosophical Justification of the First Bourgeois Revolution: John Locke	290
Part 3: Political Discourse in ‘Mature Modernity’	307
9 ‘Mature Modernity’ in the United Kingdom and France	309
The New World Geopolitical Structure	309
Anglo-Saxon Political Philosophy: The Method of ‘Derivation’ by Impossibility: David Hume	312
From Ethics to Political Economy: Adam Smith	325
The Continental Bourgeois Revolution in France. A Modern Deconstruction of Modernity: Jean-Jacques Rousseau	338
10 ‘Mature Modernity’ in the German Enlightenment: Political Philosophy and the State	353
Politics as Guarantee of Morality: Immanuel Kant	353
The State, a ‘Transitory’ Moment in History: J. G. Fichte and F. G. Schelling	378
The Metropolitan, Colonial and Rational State: G. W. F. Hegel	387
Politics in the Thinking of Karl Marx	404
11 In the dependency of ‘Mature Modernity’: Some Themes for a History of Politics in Latin America	425
Five periods of Latin American Politics	428
The ‘State of the [Western] Indies’. The <i>Summary of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies</i> (1681)	428
Colonial political thinking in the face of the eruption of ‘mature Modernity’ (from 1750)	432

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

The political thinking of the 'first Emancipation' (from 1808): three conceptions of sovereignty	438
Political thinking in the face of the creation of the new institutions (1824-1870): failure of a Creole neocolonial hegemony	453
The new failure of the post-colonial state in the face of imperialism (1870-1930)	464
The Impossible National Sovereignty: Latin American Populism (1910-1959) (Analysis of the Political Discourse)	467
A hypothesis to analyse the 'text' of political discourse	469
A hypothesis to analyse the political-economic 'context'	479
Ideological relation of the 'text' to its 'context'	488
Synchrony, diachrony and liberation	497
An Argentine Political Decade (1966-1976) and the Origin of Liberation Philosophy	498
Some historical assumptions	501
First phase: the <i>Onganiato</i> (1966-9). Preparations	505
Second phase: crisis of the model (1969-73). Constitution	506
Third phase: 'Camporist Perónism' (11 March - 23 September 1973) Developments	512
Fourth phase: 'Metallurgist Perónism' (23 September 1973 - 1 July 1974). Persecutions	514
Fifth phase: the 'Rasputinist Adventure' (1 July 1974 - 24 March 1976). Anti-hegemonic thinking	516
Growth, maturation, precision	517
The 'Decolonizing Turn' from the People to the 'Second Emaucipation' (1959-)	520
The precursors (pre-1959)	521
The Cuban Revolution (1959-)	528
'Popular Unity' in Salvador Allende's Chile (1970-3)	535
The Sandinista Revolution (1979-90)	537
The Zapatista Revolution (1994-)	540
Conclusion: The Meaning of the Historical Reconstruction	549
On the necessary decolonizing turn of political philosophy	549
<i>References</i>	555
<i>Index</i>	577

List of Figures

5.1	The world market at the end of the sixteenth century	138
6.1	The Atlantic region: The major trade routes 1500–1800 (A. G. Frank)	184
6.2	The African and West Asian regions: The major trade routes 1400–1800 (A. G. Frank)	185
6.3	The Asian region: The major trade routes 1400–1800 (A. G. Frank)	186
8.1	Material and formal level: Natural and civil state in Spinoza	282
9.1	Moments of the model of Adam Smith in his ethics	327
10.1	Architectonic of ethics, politics and the law	363
11.1	Simplified representation of some political-ideological positions in the last two post-colonial centuries in Latin America	452
11.2	Schematic simplification of class factions and the institutions that represent them	506

Series Editor's Preface

Liberation theologies are the most important theological movement of our time. In the twentieth century their influence shook the Third and First Worlds, grass-root organizations and the affluent Western academy, as well as the lives of priests and laypeople persecuted and murdered for living out their understanding of the Christian message. In the twenty-first their insights and goals remain – unfortunately – as valid as ever.

Liberation theologies are born from the struggles of the poor and the oppressed, struggles that were translated into an epistemological break with the whole of the Western theological tradition; that is, they are not one theological school among others in the canon. Instead, they sought and seek a new understanding of theology itself. The basis of that new understanding is the attempt to do theology from the perspective of the oppressed majority of humankind. Here lies the epistemological break: liberation theology – whether Latin American, black, womanist, African, feminist, queer etc. – realizes that theology has traditionally been done from a standpoint of privilege. Western theology is the product of a minority of humankind living in a state of affluent exception and enjoying gender, sexual and racial dominance. Oppression and poverty remain the norm for the majority of the world's population. By grounding themselves in the perspective of the oppressed, therefore, liberation theologies come as close as possible to being the first truly global theologies.

This series recovers the heart and soul of liberation theology by focusing on authors who ground their work in the perspective of the majority of the world's poor. This need not mean that the authors are solely located in the Third world; it is widely recognized that the First World/Third World distinction is today social as well as geographical. What matters is not the location of one's physical space but the perspective from which theology is done. The *Reclaiming Liberation Theology* series is the first to present the writings of a new generation of thinkers grounded in the liberationist tradition to the wider public. As such, this is the venue for the most radical, innovative and important rheological work produced today.

Liberation theologies were born with the promise of being theologies that would not rest with talking about liberation and instead would actually

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

further liberation. Let us hope that they will soon one day no longer be necessary.

Ivan Petrella

Translator's Preface

Enrique Dussel's books are among the most important for constructing frameworks from which to reflect on liberative action. Dussel has been critical within the ethics, philosophy and politics of liberation. His work frames a structure that is critical to our understanding of the world and the possibilities for change.

In this book, Dussel has tackled an immense project of re-reading global political history, crucial for the discussion of global politics today. In order to begin to talk about and act on a politics of liberation, we need to decolonize political history. Dussel has taken on this enormous task, which he presents in three parts.

First, he shows us the importance of politics outside our 'normal' historical focus on Greece and Rome. He argues that we need to be truly 'global' in our reading of political history, not exclusivist. Second, from that broader historical context, he resituates the beginnings of 'Modernity', arguing in particular for the inclusion of Spain and Portugal and their political philosophies in the formation of Modernity. Finally, he re-reads Modernity in light of these shifts and explores the possible re-reading of Latin American political history in light of this global history.

In so doing, he attempts to destroy the Hellenocentrism, Westernization and Eurocentrism that lead to an inappropriate periodification, secularism, colonialism and narrowing of the parameters of history. For Dussel, the key to a politics of liberation is first to read history with a 'global' and 'decolonized' lens. Only then can the task of political liberation begin.

Dussel's is an epic and critical task, which is neither concise nor easy to explain.¹ I have tried to remain faithful to the Spanish text, rather than simplify what frankly is not a simple task! It is well worth the effort to take each piece and read it in detail, reading political history anew; a critical task in order to imagine new political futures. Having this lengthy chronology in one volume enables the reader to dip into various time periods as well as get a sense of the whole.

Dussel's reach into the varieties of written material is extensive and impressive, and I have worked from English translations of these materi-

¹ Or to translate. I'd like to thank Sarah Scott, Kelly Nelson and John Retka for their help in researching at various points. The remaining errors are, of course, mine.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

als wherever possible rather than replicate the work that other translators have done before me. I have also kept in the text his comments about the translation of some of these works into Spanish, so that you can see how the process of a 'colonizing' reading can also occur in translation. Where English translations were unavailable, I have translated from his Spanish into English.

The editing of the text was minimal, as was the editing of the footnotes. While extensive, the footnotes allow the reader to explore in more detail many of the issues that arise with this 'decolonization' of history. There has been one addition to the English text that does not appear in the Spanish version, namely an expanded section on Marx on pages 404–24.

Whether or not you agree with every detail of the re-reading of global political history within this book, Dussel has done an extraordinary job of turning our 'traditional' reading of political history on its head and has shown us the immense need for reading history again, with different lenses, in order to imagine the future.

Thia Cooper
2010

Introduction

We propose in this history to *destroy*, in the Heideggerian sense,¹ to *put forward a possible history of politics*, the history of the people, who are political actors, and the thinking (in the broad sense) or the political philosophy (in the narrow sense), which inspired them. This history is partial (a complete description is still impossible), initial (they are only working hypotheses), indicative (it will have to continue unfolding) and propaedeutic of a project for various generations to come. In general these histories, even the most famous and recent, lie within certain limiting frameworks. The *first aim* of this history is to break these frameworks, although propaedeutically. The limits we want to break, destroy, de-construct, to formulate a story from a new basis (not just re-construct), that is, 'de-structure' to compose the story from another historical paradigm, are the following:

The first limit to overcome is the *Hellenocentrism* of the fashionable political philosophies. All start in Greece. When speaking of *demo*-cracy one forgers that *demos* signifies in Egyptian 'village'; it is neither a Greek word nor 'Indo-European', if this language even exists, which is in doubt today, as we will see. When speaking of *dike*, justice, one forgets that its etymology is Chaldean and comes from the Akkadian *duku*, Semitic. And we can destroy, de-construct, one by one the more technical fundamental words of Greek politics which have their origin in the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Phoenician and Semitic world, of the Bronze Age, of the third and second millennia BCE, in the territory that the Greeks later occupy as barbarian invaders.

The second limit to overcome is the *Westernization* of the political philosophies, which do not realize the importance of the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium or Constantinople. In addition, one tends to forget that the Italian Renaissance was the fruit of exiled Greeks who left their capital city following its capture by the Turks in 1453. In 1456 Ficino began his translations in Florence. And in the same way, the glory of Florence and Machiavelli should be put in perspective with respect to the *model* of the modern state foreshadowed in the Byzantine world, Venice and Genoa; both cities are commercially, culturally and politically 'eastern' Mediterranean and therefore part of the Byzantine world.

¹ See my work *Toward a De-construction of the History of Ethics* (Dussel, 1973b).

The third limit is the *Eurocentrism* of the political philosophies, which forget through disdain and ignorance everything that was achieved by other cultures, practically, politically and theoretically. They did not study the politics of the high Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures, particularly the political and strategic culture of the Chinese Empire, Hindustan, Islam, and equally, as Latin Americans, the politics of the Aztec, Mayan and Incan kingdoms, for example. The derogatory *Orientalism* abounds.

A fourth limit we intend to overcome in this history is the *periodification* according to the European criteria of political philosophy, like the ideological Eurocentric way of organizing time and human history into Ancient, Middle and Modern Ages. All this can be partly overcome, but we still lack sufficient case studies. The new vision of the history of politics and political philosophy, which we intend to propose, in its proper periodification and contents goes *against the dominant vision* shaped by the German Romantics like Hegel at the end of the eighteenth century.

The fifth limit is the *secularism* traditional to political philosophies. The birth and development of the secularization of politics is shaped inadequately, and without historical context. One forgets that Thomas Hobbes, for example, is a political theologian who in his major work, *Leviathan*, dedicates half of it (the third and fourth parts) to laying the foundations of the king's authority in God, above the authority of the Anglican bishops, developing an *explicitly* theological biblical hermeneutic, as Carl Schmitt notes. It is a Christian political theology typical of Modernity, criticized by Karl Marx among others.

A sixth limit is the *theoretical, intellectual colonialism* of the political philosophies from the peripheral countries (the other face of the Eurocentrism of the geopolitically central countries). Most of them read and interpret the works of European political Modernity from post-colonial territory, but remain within the problematic of the philosophers of the centre (H. Arendt, J. Rawls, J. Habermas, etc.). They do so without showing the *metropolitan* vision of this hermeneutic, and not, as philosophers 'located' in the post-colonial world, providing a critical reading of the colonial metropolis. They have not reached a 'decolonizing turn'. It is frequently a colonized political philosophy, as F. Fanon or A. Memmi said.

A seventh limit, and not a minor one, which we intend to overcome as Latin Americans, is that Latin America has not been included in *Modernity* from its beginnings. It has been a principal participant in the global history of modern politics, contributing, for example, with its silver the first world currency, and with its criticism of the conquest the first modern philosophy proper. Thus we will have to redefine the beginning of Modernity. We will have to introduce Spain and Portugal ('southern Europe' according to Hegel, which is not for him or for those learned people of 'northern Europe' either properly Europe or modern), into Modernity from the invasion of America in 1492. Spain would be redefined as the first 'modern' state, and Latin America, since the conquest, would be the first colonial territory of modern-

INTRODUCTION

ity. Modern, then, is the barbaric 'other cheek', which Modernity needs to define itself. If this were so, the Spanish and Portuguese philosophers (who practised a philosophy that was scholastic in form and modern in content) and the first great Latin American thinkers of the sixteenth century would have to be considered as the *beginning of the philosophy of Modernity*. Before Descartes² or Spinoza (both of whom wrote in Amsterdam, a Spanish province until 1610, and studied with Spanish masters), Bartolomé de Las Casas, Ginés de Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitoria or Francisco Suárez have to be considered in the *history of modern political philosophy*. They would be the first modern political philosophers, before Bodin, Hobbes or Locke. One has to learn to discover new questions in order to encounter new answers. This will be the arduous task of the next Latin American generations that cultivate political philosophy.

And all this gains special relevance because of the importance which the Latino/a or Hispanic groups (communities of Latin American origin) have today in the internal politics of the North American empire. The theoretical-strategic alliance between Latin American and Latino/a philosophers in the USA has, in reality, a converging practical political significance. The 'decolonizing turn' is a global historical-philosophical change.

I for one would prefer not to read this history simply as one more story, informative of many innovatively interpreted theoretical positions, but rather as a counter-story, as an *anti-traditional* tradition, a search for what is not said, since 'what is said, is said' and not beneficial to repeat. 'That is to say', with E. Levinas, the starting point is the physical suffering of our people.

It has taken many years, even an entire lifetime to begin to discover these counterfactual hypotheses.³ I hope that it will be tackled critically by future generations of Latin American intellectuals and politicians whose passion consists in studying what has not been investigated, discovering what is hidden, from the pain of the oppressed, the excluded, the condemned and the 'condemned of the earth' and of history.

² Who in the Jesuit college of La Flèche studied Francisco Suárez first and was trained in logic with the *Mexican Logic* of Antonio Rubio (as he expressed in explicit quotations of his works).

³ Since my journey to Europe in 1957, where I stayed for ten years studying; in particular, the two years in Israel among Palestinians, and even earlier, since 1952 in my political experiences as student university leader and member of the democratic and anti-fascist political parties of my era.

Part I

Locating the Critical–Political Place in the pre-1492 Regional Systems

[1] ‘Locating’ indicates the hermeneutical action through which the observer ‘situates’ her/himself (committedly) in some socio-historical ‘place’, as the subject of a discourse’s articulation. This is the place ‘from where’ the questions come (whether one is critically self-conscious or not), which constitute the assumptions of an era’s *episteme*, like those we will develop in this critical political philosophy. We inevitably formulate the discourse ‘from some *place*’. We would like to unfurl a description, which to the highest degree possible will be conscious of its spatial, historical, social, gender, racial ‘situation’, etc. We intend to overcome certain trivial, obvious, naïve ‘places’, which nevertheless claim to be scientific or perfectly objective and which highly distort discourse. We intend our discourse not to be ‘Hellenocentric’, ‘Eurocentric’, ‘Western’, ‘colonial’, merely ‘modern’ (but also not simply ‘postmodern’), ‘racist’, ‘macho’, etc. One knows in advance that this ‘claim’ (*Anspruch*) is not perfectly possible, and therefore it is put forward as fallible, correctable but nevertheless with a sincere claim of truth (and truth with a claim to universality if one cannot demonstrate the contrary).

This critical activity, aiming to have the highest possible degree of reflection on the ‘place’ from where one formulates the discourse (the *locus enuntiationis*), will have to be permanent. For this we dedicate the first provisional theses of global historical reconstruction as a fundamental critical path. The historical reconstruction is part of the argumentative strategy. Some postmodernists are accustomed to deconstructing ‘great stories’ and find that the ‘de-struction’ of the modern Hegelian macro-story seemed to be no more than an inversion of the same discourse. This is not the case. It is a question of ontological destruction (Heidegger), discursive deconstruction (Derrida) and epistemological reconstruction (Habermas) from the victims of Modernity, the vanquished (also victims of the Heideggerian destruction, unnoticed in the Derridian deconstruction or absent in the Habermasian reconstruction). If we begin our discourse with those excluded from the process of globalization, the victims, we can no longer be merely negative or deconstructive of the modern and fragmented macro-story, which remains in the scepticism of the Rortian conversation and prevents Modernity from reconstructing its discourse. But all these semi-critical aims (de-structive,

de-constructive, re-constructive) do not show the dominating power and the sacred truth claim of 'market fundamentalism' (designated by G. Soros),¹ which today is the triumphant ideology. The critical discourse of liberation therefore has to abandon the fragmentation of its story and produce a critical macro-story with the claim of truth (that is to say, aware that it is inevitably fallible, but still advanced as a truth claim)² in order for the imagination of the victims, those dominated, to have the capacity to protect itself in a historical place with meaning, with global meaning (which will have to be corrected; therefore the macro-story is inevitably fallible). Through multiple personal experiences in base and popular groups, with feminists, ecologists, those who struggle against white racism, in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, in Europe, in the countries of eastern Europe, in the USA, I can say that those victims ask for a *positive macro-story* in order to have at least a reference which helps them avoid accepting without alternative the Hellenocentric, Eurocentric and today American-centric story, based in the market.³

1 See Soros, 2000.

2 It is not the same as to declare something falsifiable (not fallible), which includes a negative attitude: not adhering to the truth of what is declared (the non-commitment of the sceptic). The honest truth claim knows that what it declares can be refuted by a better argument, which the truth claim will accept as proper. That is to say, in the concept of the truth claim is included the possible falsifiability (and inevitable fallibility) of that declared, but it is accepted as true. The Popperian 'falsifiability' contains a sceptical attitude. The truth claim accepts the always possible falsifiability (and the inevitable fallibility of all declared), but affirms that what is declared is accepted as true (by being the result of the better argument explaining reality given to us in its historical world and perspective, in its present development) and not as such falsifiable (and by this fallible). Fallibility, for its part, has to be seen with the claim of validity.

3 In a conscious way we will declare 'American-centrism', since although we will not always call the United Statesians 'North Americans' (against the abusive aim that reduces the American continent to only the Anglo-Saxons of the north, excluding Latin America and the Afro-American Caribbean), in this case we will give it the narrow sense that 'they' assign, knowing that America is much more than the Anglo-Saxon United States.

The Archaeo-System: In the Beginning was the 'Will to Live'

[2] The genus *Homo*, like *Homo habilis*, emerged, around two million years ago, from superior euhominids which had to abandon life in the trees due to the drying up of the tropical equatorial jungle of East Africa. On descending to the ground some defenceless euhominids had to stand on two feet, modify their spinal columns, reduce their jaws (in addition, as omnivores they could chew their food faster), which permitted the growth of their heads and brains. The neck modified itself, and they developed a phonic apparatus. The growth of the cerebral neocortex, which developed their linguistic capacity, gave to that *Homo* a greater expressive capacity than other species. Maybe as a function of the hunting of animals, necessary for their omnivorous diet, they had to group together in greater numbers. The alliance between families was thus demanded for the production and development of life. Maybe the youngest members of the family were the first to be exchanged between families to create a clan of harvesters, fishermen or hunters.¹ Maybe, so that the interchange was possible, there had to be born the first social institution present in all Palaeolithic cultures on the planet: the taboo on incest, already assuming the prohibition of assassination or cannibalism within the clan. These restrictions had all the structure of future 'political institutions': the necessity to discipline instinct (*Trieb* in German, the Freudian *pulsión*), to postpone desire (the sexual access to the son or daughter, which later will become in agriculture the prohibition of eating the seed to be planted or the reproductive animal of the flock), to allow a certain suffering² to postpone greater pain³ and

1 See Morin, 1996.

2 The 'pain' of having to obtain alone the object of the hunt, or of harvesting roots, worse than hunting in groups or of working agricultural land, which also includes many 'pains' of the body; suffering of the hands, rising early, going to bed late, confronting the cold to prepare the fields, cutting the forest wood, etc.

3 Hunger, for example. The harvester, fisherman or hunter suffers more than the farmer or pastoralist to obtain much less food. Agriculture and shepherding, then, demand a certain 'discipline', but save 'suffering'. That is to say, 'discipline' does not have as antecedent the pristine 'liberty' of non-discipline (as intend certain extreme anarchists or Foucaultians, not Foucault himself), but the greater suffering of another less efficient 'discipline'. Institutional discipline (when the institution is found in its creative or 'classic' moment, not in its inefficient and therefore 'repressive' decline, without any utility for the majority) saves

death itself,⁴ the obligation to fulfil consensual law (parents do not consent to their children sexually, reserved sacredly for other families of the clan); the imposition of punishments in the case of non-fulfilment; the celebration of rites of reparation to be newly integrated in the communitarian consensus; the demand of respect for the elders who are the authority and judges, etc. The transforming of the merely instinctive and inhospitable nature, into the nice cultural 'home' (*oikós*: ecology) of the human being through work allowed an 'order' to be created. The socio-cultural order was born. Equally, a system of functions was born, where each human subject began to fulfil roles, like an actor following a script. The social and practical systems of the reproduction of life equally demanded consensus, community agreement accepted mutually, as we have indicated, by the taboo on incest, among other obligations, which language conditions and permits. That necessary and sacred order, consecrated in the representations drawn and painted in the Palaeolithic caves shows us equally, as in the case of the first mortuary rites,⁵ that there are burial ceremonies where the cadaver is the object of worship to re-harmonize it with the cosmos, where the civilizing order of work needs to capture in its institutions the violence of death to pacify it in a communitarian life (at least internally cohesive).⁶ It is a matter of a practical macro-organization, of growing complexity, of the family, clan, the alliance between clans, to the emergence of tribes and ethnicities, which move through large territories and emigrate slowly across the planet until they occupy it entirely. Forty thousand years ago, walking on the ice, intrepid people, migrating from the Far East of Asia, crossed the Bering Strait and penetrated the American continent from north to south.

[3] In the two million years from the beginning of the Palaeolithic the genus *Homo* produced the great discoveries, which would permit later development of what we call 'the political'. Human languages developed, as did complex structures of memorization and expression of meaning, which in the long term allowed the existence of systems of communitarian legitimation (intersubjective validity is always possible thanks to the existence of a communicative, that is to say, linguistic community); the mythical narrative as method was invented to memorize the explanations of all the moments of human life; fire, the greatest of all the instruments,⁷ was discovered only

suffering, although it always and inevitably includes some degree of suffering. See *Thesis 17* of my *Ethics of Liberation* (Dussel 1998a), Appendix I [404], pp. 625–30.

4 Being fed and defended in community allows a more adequate production and reproduction of human life: death is delayed, or the means of survival are increased, longevity.

5 See Morin, 1996.

6 All die, in the beginning always prematurely, the objects of some violent, chaotic, uncivilized act: the attack of an animal, another human being, magical and unknown illnesses, telluric accidents, etc.

7 Cooking food diminished the time of digestion; fire protected the cave during the night from dangerous animals. Thanks to both discoveries the time for wakefulness increased (one does not need to sleep as much to digest the food and sleeps more deeply). After millennia, fire would heat the home, drive away insects and animals, harden the wood of their weapons,

some 600,000 years ago. Finally, in this period, logic was born, which would be developed in the Neolithic, the age of cities and therefore the age of the birth of the strictly and explicitly 'political field'.

The will to live (*Wille zum Leben*), according to Schopenhauer, is at the base of all desire, motivation and movement. The whole political field is the ultimate development of this primitive will to live of the human being in the long and dark, but fascinating, mysterious and innovative Stone Age. Humanity demonstrated that it could remain, that it could exist as living, rational and pulsating; the *conatio esse conservandi* (impulse to conserve being) allowed the first history, the originating time of politics, the unfurling of the structures of proto-power, the implicit fundamental principles, the originating institutions, the horizon in which the nomads disputed 'control over territory' through which they freely strolled, where one reproduced life by harvesting, fishing and hunting. But space was becoming cramped, clans met other clans, disputed the same territory; fruits or edible roots were becoming scarce; hunted animals moved further away; there was hunger, instability, struggle between ethnicities . . . It was not the 'state of nature' of Hobbes (because there were neither solitary individuals nor extreme liberty; there were communities with minimal spontaneity within the urgent 'necessity' of reproducing life daily). The Palaeolithic community of the archaeo-system was coming to an end. A qualitative leap in the reproduction of life was necessary, in the organization of consensus, the regulation of the hegemonic struggle between the clans. It was the end of the Palaeolithic, and it was certainly not the end of a paradise of utopian liberty, but the end of a primitive, violent, hard, suffering age, which the human being aimed to overcome: instinct was diminished by the rising social 'institutions'. Instinct left its place definitively to implicit social principles and functional systems as spaces of growing liberty and improving the quality of life. A practical and technological revolution approached. It was the beginning of the 'political field', of an action, which will give a place, far from hunting and struggle, to the fundamental institutions, and where the *implicit exercise* of social-political principles is present, legitimate consensus, negotiation within a type of conviviality which guaranteed in the long term, thanks to the intersubjective systemic complexity, a greater productive capacity and reproductive stability.

burn the forests to prepare the earth for agriculture, melt metals, light their way in the night, exchange signals with distant communities, harden earth into pottery, and later bricks, etc.

Stage I of the Regional Systems

The Urban Revolution and the First Political Systems

[4] The process of globalization, in which we live today at the start of the third millennium, is perhaps the end of the Neolithic revolution, the age in which nomadic territorial occupation ended with the 'dispersion' of the hunter-gatherer clans throughout the planet. As Teilhard de Chardin suggested, a process of the 'contraction' of humanity began. The Neolithic (in a broad sense) has passed from (a) the birth of the first cities (where a very small part of humanity lived) to (b) the beginning of the twenty-first century (where the majority of humanity lives in cities).¹ With the globalization of urban civilization we will enter into a third age: deep 'super-contraction' within an unlimited virtual space of the intersubjective existence of *Homo urbanus*, having more capacity than ever in the history of humanity for fraternal communication and even solidarity, or for a pathological, autistic and exterminating isolationism. But we return to the beginning.

If linguistically 'political' comes from *pólis* in Greek, and 'city' from *civitas* in Latin, thus also conceptually politics properly said will be for me a practical field that assumes the 'city'. In effect, 12,000 years ago in some regions of the Earth Palaeolithic nomadism ended,² that of the gatherers, fishermen and hunters, that of the migratory village planters (like the Tupí-Guaraní in South America, tireless searchers of 'the land without evil') in the middle of the tropical jungle, to be replaced by a sedentary life, in territories fixed within determined frontiers, conquered and protected, 'territorialization' suitable to execute the disciplinary techniques of the agricultural revolution (which replaces the gathering of food, each time more scarce through population growth) on the banks of the rivers of the large lagoons; of shepherding

¹ The genus *Homo* has become urban, 'a being that inhabits the city', but not in the restrictive and Hellenocentric sense of Aristotle (who thought that only 'the beings who live in the [Hellenic] *pólis*' were fully 'human'; neither the Asians of the east, nor the European barbarians to the north and west of Greece were human).

² Some villages have been discovered in southern Turkey and northern Syria, in the Middle East, constituting an urban whole, from about 10,000 BCE.

(which replaced hunting), near abundant pasture for the cattle. Sedentary life permits the organization of the complex structure of laws which define the various networks of power relations among the urban inhabitants: the proto-citizens or members of the primitive urban communities.

Politics, the political, the political field, the heroic actions of the original protagonists, themselves of the city government, intimately linked to war or trade were born; the legitimate institutions in their sacrality, as Durkheim commented, and the exercise of implicit principles, narrated under the form of myths, originated there and were slowly differentiated. Sharp instruments were necessary for hunting to pierce the thick and resisting skins of animals; to kill them (immobilize them) and to live off of them (to reproduce human life). The sharp instruments of the hunters were lifted against other human beings of adjacent clans or ethnicities. The hunter gave birth to the warrior. With urban organization, the nomadic warrior, who defended the migrating clan, transforms into one who conquers new territories for the city; it is he who defends the city against other warriors. He who exercises power in the beginning is the *paterfamilias* of the clan; after the council of elders of the tribe or ethnic group. The strong warrior who imposes his will on the community also appears. The chiefs of the clans and ethnic groups are born. With the city, the elder chief is now a kinglet, frequently a warrior. The institution of the delegated exercise of power is almost exclusively carried out by those who know how to use weapons. Slowly the military profession is born and with it domination by force. It is the *potestas*. Nevertheless, the ancestral *auctoritas* is exercised by the religious chief, shaman and elders, those who have the memory of the customs, the necessary discoveries for the reproduction of life, the myths of the group.

[5] Politics, therefore, will travel a long historical path to arrive first at the first modern cities and later the republics. It is an ancient tradition proper to a certain type of organization of cities: port cities, which were born in the interstices of kingdoms and empires. When the cities increased in population, and more extensive commercial networks were created, groups of prosperous merchants emerged who organized in certain cities a specific way of structuring the exercise of power; these cities were free with respect to the more extensive territorial kingdoms or empires. They organized a type of government in the manner of a council of elders, the *senatus*, or of the most prominent members of the commercial elite's most important families. This type of city spans the last 6,000 years. We want to call attention to some of these ancient cities, which appeared already in the seventh millennium in Turkey (like Catal Hüyük, dated by the carbon-14 method to 6385 BCE); Uruk, Lagash and Kish in Mesopotamia; the Egyptian Abydos and Thebes (already in the fourth millennium BCE); those of the Indus valley (like Mohenjo Daro and Harappa); or in China (Nanking, Canton and Hangzhou); and from the third millennium BCE in the eastern Mediterranean with ports like Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, and its colony Carthage, or the Atlantic Cadiz. The Greek cities like Athens or Sparta are heirs of this

(Semitic and Egyptian) origin.³ There were many other cities of this type in the Mediterranean, including Rome, Marseilles and Pergamon. And we indicate this long process, because these cities were always *republics* at the beginning (not monarchies) governed by oligarchies, frequently rich agriculturalists, industrialists or merchants. The Egyptian *demos*,⁴ later Greek, and the Roman *senatus* were oligarchic types of this government (never democratic in the actual sense of the word, since they excluded the majority of the city's inhabitants, for being plebeian, freedmen, women, slaves, barbarians, foreigners, etc.). This *eastern* tradition will transmit itself uninterruptedly also in the Byzantine and Muslim world and (think of flourishing and semi-autonomous cities like Samarkand or Bukhara, Agra in India or the port of Malacca not far from Singapore itself) Cyprus or Rhodes, and Venice, dependent on the eastern empire, from which, as we will see, will be born the modern types of governments, in particular the mixed English system, and finally the North-American democratic republic.⁵ The first Persian emperor, of the first empire in world history, already has to make alliances with these rich and well connected cities of merchants, which protect themselves with great walls, have excellent mercenary armies and possess great cultural development and greater riches. The phonetic alphabet was not invented in vain in Sidon and Byblos. The army of Alexander was detained longer by the walls of Tyre than by the armies of the Persian emperor. This type of urban government is that which is globalizing today, passing from a mercantile oligarchy (still in Amsterdam) to a homogenized and universalized democratic citizenship. But, structurally, it is an urban process. The 'citizen' is a member of the city in a broad sense. With time the political field will overcome the city limits and politically territorialize the countryside (the agricultural space surrounding the city), to include greater spaces and constitute at the end the modern states, passing through diverse forms of institutional and territorial organization.

What is certain is that from the primitive Neolithic cities, complexity grows, oral memory becomes insufficient although it is very powerful, and slowly the most explanatory stories of the ethical-mythical nucleus of the urban community begin to be dealt with objectively with mnemonic representations. In the third millennium BCE, although rare, writing is born, first ideographic (even today present in China, with the advantage of being able to express in writing languages that are phonetically very diverse), later

3 See Bernal (1991, II) for the details of Egyptian and Semitic culture from the twelfth century BCE in Greece and Thracia. Maybe the pharaoh Sesostriis (circa 1900-1800 BCE; Bernal, 1991, II, p. 196f) crossed Turkey and Thracia (the god Dionysius was a Thracio-Egyptian cult), Scythia (to the north of the Black Sea), passing by Colchis (still with black inhabitants today: was it not an Egyptian colony?, asks Bernal [1991, II, p. 245]).

4 See Bernal, 2001, pp. 345-70: 'Phoenician Politics and Egyptian Justice in Ancient Greece'.

5 See Pocock, 1975, pp. 183f. Even the American democracies hark back to Venice; the Congress recalls the popular assembly (democratic), the Senate the representation of the principals and elders (aristocratic), the president will resemble the elected doge or the older monarch (monarchical).

syllables and phonetics,⁶ thus allowing the production of the first collections of rules consented to by the urban communities, clearly political, which we will call 'legal codes'. It is the highest institutional degree of rationalization of a community's political relations. Against J. Derrida, we want to indicate the positive, constructive and intersubjective importance of 'writing'.

Mesopotamian Legal Systems

[6] With the appearance in Mesopotamia of the first archives of private contracts (written in cuneiform on baked bricks piled in enormous libraries), rules and laws, divined first and little by little with increasing reformist intervention by the kings, the 'public' sphere begins. This sphere situates intersubjective relations in certain conditions of communitarian 'objectivity', which hinder the easy change of oral legislation for the benefit of the dominant elites who transform the laws on a whim based in private interest, against other members of the city.

Already in 2404 to 2375 BCE the *ensi* of Lagash, called Enmetena, decreed the oldest legal reform of which we have knowledge.⁷ There the king 'cancelled the obligations of Lagash, the son repaid the mother, the mother repaid the son'.⁸ For his part, Uruinimgina (2353–2342 BCE), king of Lagash, in Law 27 of his *Reforms* wrote: 'Uruinimgina promised solemnly to Ningirsu, the native god, that he never would subjugate the orphan and the widow to the powerful'.⁹ In the *Code of Shulgi* (2094–2047 BCE), Law 9, the law's critical formulation arrives at its classical expression:

I did not surrender the orphan to the rich, I did not surrender the widow to the powerful man, I did not surrender the man with one shekel to the man with one mina,¹⁰ I did not surrender the man with one lamb to the man with one bullock [. . .] I did not demand work, I made hate, violence and the clamor for justice disappear. I established justice¹¹ in the country.¹²

6 It is in one of these cities, Byblos, Tyre or Sidon, where the phonetic alphabet is perfected. In effect, the contact with the Egyptian ideographical system and the Mesopotamian cuneiform made it possible for this high intermediate culture to invent the phonetic alphabet. The commercial development of the high seas, from the Palestinian coast to the Atlantic, crossing the whole Mediterranean, gave an incentive to these cities to write longer and more precise texts. It is interesting to note that in Amerindia the Maya had ideographic writing with phonetic elements (the 'glyphs').

7 This king effected a peace treaty with the city of Lugalkignedudu, 'that constitutes the most ancient diplomatic document in humanity' (Lara Peinado, 1994, p. xix [Translation: TC]).

8 Lara Peinado, 1994, pp. 4–5 (Translation: TC).

9 Lara Peinado, 1994, pp. 24–5 (Translation: TC).

10 The 'poor' to the 'rich'.

11 The written law.

12 Lara Peinado, 1994, p. 59 (Translation: TC).

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

The same type of declaration can be found in the *Codex Hammurabi* (1792–1750 BCE):

The great gods called me, and I [Hammurabi] am the salvation-bringing shepherd [ruler], whose scepter is straight [righteous] . . . that the strong might not injure the weak, and that the widow and the orphan might be safe, I have in Babylon [. . .], to heal injuries, my precious words written upon my monument, before my image as king of righteousness have I set up. [. . .] Let the oppressed, who has a lawsuit, come before my image as king of righteousness. Let him read the inscription on my monument, and understand my precious words. [. . .] He [Hammurabi] has brought happiness to his subjects¹³ forever, and has given order to the land.¹⁴

That is to say, the oppressed, unjustly treated, who normally are illiterate, who cannot make use of their rights, have the possibility of 'coming to read the text' and knowing its legal content, the same for all people in all moments of the political system (in this case the Babylonian empire). While being 'written' modifies the subjectivity in the sense noted by J. Derrida, it is more than this; this doesn't show the universalist sense of validity which the 'text' has for the concrete and real victims of the whole political, economic or cultural system. The victims, excluded from knowing their rights by the dominant groups, cannot defend themselves. The written text universalizes the validity of the social and political laws, creates a 'public' space, that is to say initiates the long path of intersubjective validity which will develop as the 'legitimacy' of the entire political system. The Babylonian political system, with its laws 'written' and placed at the entrances of the cities, in a 'public' place, as in the *Codex Hammurabi*, in some way forms the basis for the legitimacy of the Babylonian monarchical order, and in addition contains critical explanations which permit the development of the judicial system, to include the formula repeated at times before and after: 'Do justice to the widow, the orphan and the poor' or 'the stranger'. In what sense? In the sense that the consensual rules known by the dominant members of the political system are now valid in the public sphere and divided explicitly through 'all the members' of the political system. The publicness of the rules that give knowledge of the rights and responsibilities creates a certain symmetry in the participation of those 'affected'. For this, the stones sculpted in the image of the legislator king with the laws were reproduced in great numbers.

The king played the role of mediator between gods and humans and his legitimation came to him 'from above':

The ideal community envisioned by the traditional pattern for legitimating royal authority became a tangible reality primarily through the culti-

¹³ The material aspect of politics.

¹⁴ Ibid., Law XXIV, 40 – XXV, 50; ed. cit., pp. 41–2. See the *Code of Hammurabi* (Hammurabi, 1986, par. 282 to the end, p. 74 [Translation: Davies, pp. 107–8]).

vation of relationships between the divine and human spheres. The king played a role in enhancing or blocking the engagement with the divine.¹⁵

When the king stopped fulfilling the obligations stipulated by the gods, it weakened the community he governed: if a king attempted to exercise sovereign rule without attention to its divine source, his actions usually gave rise to conflicts and contradictions within a community, which diminished its vitality and even led to its fragmentation.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the critical messianic power of the desert ascetics, *nabiim* or seers, prophets, and the people themselves could depose the kings when they failed in their responsibilities. It is important to observe that those primitive *Codes*, which normativized the system of domination, like slavery and patriarchy, nevertheless kept open a critical gap through the social pressure those systems of great economic and political injustice produced (at the material level of the reproduction of life and the lack of sufficient legitimate participation). It frequently manifested itself in great rebellions or internal or external *coups d'état* against the dominant groups. It was at the same time 'open' to 'making justice' with the poor, widows, orphans, foreigners, debtors and lenders, and to the liberation of slaves in certain political circumstances. With the coercive established political 'order' are critical norms which left space for the transformations, whose utopia showed itself as a return to the primitive equality of the desert, the nomad, the classlessness of the clans prior to the classist urban organization, a utopia existing always in the ethics of the desert tribes of brave Arabian or Persian shepherds. Mythically, Abel offers to the gods a lamb; he is the nomad prior to the city. Cain offers bread and wine, fruit of agriculture, of urban domination. Cain is the evil one, the domination of the urban and sedentary class, fixed, reproductive, with class domination. Abel is the good one, the creative, mobile, nomadic original equality. Nietzsche will glimpse in Cain the urban order as the Apollonian, and in Abel the desert, as Zarathustra, the Dionysian rupture. In effect, the urban order will always be criticized by the ethical prophets of the Arabian desert (from the prophet Hosea to Mohammed).

Here we have to stop to note one aspect. As we indicated, Hellenocentrism is the father of Eurocentrism. To show that the 'Greek miracle' – of the eighteenth-century German Romantics – is 'not' is to begin the history of politics 'anew'. In a provocative way, but highly documented, erudite and difficult to refute, Giovanni Semerano demonstrates that the king of Akkad (with Sargon I 2350–2300 BCE) succeeded the Sumerians, extended to the Indus valley and the Aegean Sea, making Akkadian (and their cuneiform documents) the first regional language.¹⁷ Later it was replaced by Chaldean.

¹⁵ Launderville, 2003, p. 289.

¹⁶ Launderville, 2003, p. 289.

¹⁷ See Semerano, 1984–1994 and 2001. Semerano will show that from the Akkadian Sargon derives the Etruscan *Tarchon/Tarchna*, in Assyrian *Sarru-kinu*, that in Latin will be *Tarquinius* (the first Roman mythological king).

So in the second millennium BCE, Chaldean was employed throughout Mesopotamia, from the Hittite kingdom (whose so-called ‘Indo-European’ language Semerano seriously puts in doubt)¹⁸ to a good part of future Greece, and also it was used as a commercial language by the Phoenicians; it also arrived in India and the south-eastern Dravidian Tamil-Nadu.¹⁹ Pre-Socratic philosophy was profoundly influenced by Semitic-Chaldea. The thesis is declared thus:

[. . .] the frequent use of Akkadian (and of Chaldean), as ancient language and fully documented, prevents us from referring to similar languages such as the historically non-existent Indo-European suggested in the manuals.²⁰

The dismantling is radical. The Greek *kéntauros* (centaur) comes from *ken* (like/as) *tora* (bull, in Akkadian and in Hebrew). In the origin of Greek philosophy is the *ápeiron* (infinity) of Anaximander. Semerano shows that the etymological root found in the Semitic *ʾapar* (dust, earth), Akkadian *èperu*, Hebrew *ʾafar*, is the undetermined dust or clay with which *ʾadam* (man) of the *ʾadama* (earth) was made.²¹

The central concept in Greek philosophy and politics of *díke* (justice) (that of Anaximander and Heraclitus) derives etymologically from the Sumerian *diku-gal* (supreme judge), from the Babylonian *diqugallu*, from the Akkadian *duku*.²² Our author is deconstructing from the Semitic languages the philosophical expressions of Thales, Anaximenes, etc.²³ Thus *arché* (principle) derived from the Acadian *arhu* (first month of the year and first moon). Ionia, therefore, was completely Semitic from the end of the third millennium BCE. Thus, ‘*Európe* (“the misty”) is called in Assyrian *arapu* or *erapu*, which signifies “western”: *Erubu*, the daughter of Cadmo (from the Akkadian *qadmu*: “the stranger”).²⁴ Zeus, the great god (Zán in Minoan), comes from the Akkadian *zanau* (to rain), *zanu* (rain). Hermes (the god Dionysius, which refers to the Egyptian god Thoth)²⁵ has as antecedent the Akkadian *herum* (excavate/dig), *ermu* (to hide), *eremu* (to cover): the god of mystery who reveals himself. Themis comes from the Akkadian *temu* (judgement, right). In Heraclitus ‘*eres* (struggle) is opposed to justice (*díke*); in the *Codex Hammurabi* one finds the concept of *arnu* (violence, struggle

18 Semerano, 2001, pp. 25–6. In his final work *La favola dell’indoeuropeo* (Semerano, 2005), he definitively destroys the ancient hypothesis about the existence of this ‘invented’ language. In reality all the etymological roots direct us to the Middle East (Akkadian, Chaldean, Babylonian languages, etc.) or to Egypt.

19 Ibid., p. 21.

20 Ibid., p. 5 (Translation: TC).

21 Ibid., pp. 32, 49–66, 96–109.

22 Ibid., pp. 35, 258–61.

23 Ibid., pp. 72f.

24 Ibid., p. 84.

25 Dionysius itself comes from the Akkadian *nasu* (to produce), Hebrew *nasah* (to pour water). He is the ‘god (*Dio*) to whom one offers’.

against justice).²⁶ The soul (*psikhés*) dates back to the etymology *'bhes* (to blow), from which are derived the Sumerian *pesh*, the Semitic *nefesh*, the Acadian (*na*)*pishu*, in all cases sigh, blow, creative words.

But the most interesting chapter of Semerano is where he shows the connection of Semitic-Mesopotamian law with Greek and Roman thinking. Lycurgus, the first legislator, is a reference to 'light of the soul' (*leukós*), as the other mythical Greek legislator (*Zá-leukos*: Celeucos). *Luk-ourgos* would be something like the 'luminous table of the law', from the Akkadian *le'bu*, from which *lex*, *legis* derives. The *ourgos* or *érgon* (work and piece of work, in Greek) comes from the Akkadian *urbu*, Aramaic *orba*, Hebrew *orbo*, which is the 'work' of the legislator. Draco is from the Babylonian *daraggu* (way, law). The same happens with Solon. Those mythical personages indicate simply the founders of the law/s, which have their first reference in the Mesopotamian Codes.

In the Roman world, this happens in a similar way. 'Horse', in Latin, *equus*, comes from *ekewu* (horse) in Akkadian; meanwhile *caballus* comes from the Akkadian *kabalu*, which signifies 'attack with carts'. The word *ius* has its root in *usu* (Akkadian: 'order', 'line of demarcation'). *Sacer* (of such importance for G. Agamben) also is related to the Akkadian *sakaru* and *sekerum* (impede access, prohibit, stop), from the Semitic *skr* (to be prohibited).

What would Nietzsche with his 'Indo-European' and anti-Semitic Dionysius and Zarathustra have thought?

Egypt and Other Eastern Civilizations

[7] Anatolia and Mesopotamia were the most developed geopolitical spaces in the Neolithic revolution (as far as we know now), which extended to the Indus Valley and the eastern Mediterranean. But 'Egypt and China remain the two original models, the basic sources of science, technique, ideology, and [political] organization.'²⁷ In effect, Egypt institutionalizes the first continuous nation-state, which will endure through all global political history, from approximately 3000 BCE to the present (it will, in one way or another, adopt its invaders, the Hyksos, Persians, Hellenists, Byzantine Christians and finally the Muslims). In Egypt (the 'adorers of Ptah'; of the same etymological origin as 'Co-ptic'), 'the state-class which became organized on the national scale was not, despite widely held notions, particularly "despotic". As a national state-class, it took account of the public interest and organized useful large-scale public works.'²⁸ Fifteen centuries before the invasions of India (origin of the *Rig Veda*), 23 centuries before the prophet Isaiah in

²⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁷ Amin, 1974, p. 52 (Translation: Pearce, p. 54).

²⁸ Ibid., p. 51 (Translation: Pearce, p. 53).

Israel, 24 centuries before Confucius, 26 centuries before Plato,²⁹ 28 centuries before the Han's unification of China, 30 centuries before Christianity, the first Egyptian dynasties, the city of Memphis and the symbolic stories about the resurrection of the dead, for whom the pyramids were built, which will end in the myth of Osiris, began their long historical path. We are at the source of Greece, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The Egyptian political system, far from depending on the will of the pharaoh, was under the empire of the goddess Ma'at, divine, natural, cosmopolitan law, of the universe and of Egypt. Firm traditions, ancient social classes, priestly clans and powerful sages organized an agricultural society, away from all danger (through the natural defence of the deserts). The divine legitimacy of its institutions, wealth in the easy reproduction of life, great technological efficiency in the management of the Nile river gave to this state a stability such that for 13 centuries (from 3000 to 1780 BCE) no other town disturbed its progress. One can highlight the myth of Osiris for its political importance.

In effect, this myth, present in the *Book of the Dead* and in numerous texts, relates to the 'final judgement' of the dead, not of a soul, typical of a dualistic anthropology, but of the whole human being with its *ra* (name and individual determination) – in the great hall of Ma'at, before all the gods and humanity:

'You have caused him to come,' say they [the gods] about me. 'Who are you?', they say to me. 'What is your name?' they say to me [. . .] 'Come and enter by this door of the Hall of Justice, for you know us.'³⁰

This myth is decisive in that it initiates an ethical–political tradition which will be typical of the Christian, Muslim and modern Western cultures. It is the invention of the intersubjectivized *singular ethical–political conscience*, which, as an always present internalized subjective judge, observes every action, even in the private sphere (the god Osiris is represented by an 'eye' in the Egyptian hieroglyphic texts), and situates the actor in the 'public' horizon of the 'final judgement' before all humanity. Without needing a secret police the Egyptian political system is present, introduces itself into the private conscience (now intersubjective) demanding the observance of traditional norms, laws of the kingdom, and obedience to the pharaoh's tax system. Each member of the system feared the omnipresent god and imagined being judged in the immense 'hall of Ma'at'.³¹ Prodigy of the hegemonic political invention! Freud does not notice that the *Über-Ich* is the myth of Osiris. We will return to this theme.

²⁹ From the first Egyptian dynasties to Plato 26 centuries passed; fewer centuries have passed from Plato to us (24).

³⁰ Lara Peinado, 1989, pp. 210–11 (Translation: Faulkner, ch. 125, p. 126).

³¹ Omni-'present' indicates precisely that virtual 'public' position of the subject before the trial of Osiris.

On the other hand, Egyptian culture contains a deep quasi-hedonistic affirmation of existence; it esteems highly the satisfaction and reproduction of human life in all possible material³² dimensions, typical of a unified carnal anthropology, of the appreciation of corporality.³³ Egyptian politics considers in the first place the fulfilment of material demands, hence the ethical-political criteria of the judgement of Ma'at: 'bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, and a boat to him who was boatless [. . .] Save me, protect me, without making your report against me in the Presence [Osiris].'³⁴ That possible accusation in the 'presence' of the gods changes qualitatively the political density of the Egyptian intersubjectivity.

Without doubt, Greek politics found its inspiration in Egypt and the Phoenician port cities (which would found, among other cities, Athens and Thebes). Plato seemed to have thought more about Memphis when he wrote *Politics* (those famous 'sages' were members of the classes of the dominant Egyptian sages) than the philosophies of Hellas, and Athenian democracy looked like many of the political systems of the oligarchic merchant republics of Byblos or Sidon (which did not accept the monarchy), even the Egyptian Sais in its internal structure.

We want to insist on this historical aspect. In the third and second millennium BCE, the future Greece was colonized by Semites and Egyptians. Bernal, in his most recent work, returns to the theme of 'Egyptian Justice' in Ancient Greece.³⁵

If Egyptian institutions, language, and thought were adopted and adapted in Mycenaean Greece, could any of them have been transmitted through the Dark Ages to the Archaic period?³⁶

Hermes plays a protagonist role in political questions; his Egyptian reference is the god Thoth of Memphis, although he also is confused with Anubis, who has to be seen with the measure, weight and value of works on the day of justice of Ma'at (the Greek Moira). Memnon (an Egyptian name), allied with Achilles, was black (like the Egyptians) and keeps the connection between the question of life after death and justice – in relation to Thoth and Anubis. The judicial-political problem was always seen with the judgement of the dead in the hall of Ma'at and the scales of Osiris. The connection between the legal and the funerary comes from there. The Greek word *aisimos* (destined), with its root in *aisa* (destiny), refers to the Egyptian *isw* (in Coptic *asou*): compensation owed:

>*Isw* is almost certainly the etymon of the Greek *isos*, with the archaic feminine form *eisé* ('equal in share, number, or right'). Compounds of

32 'Material' in the sense of ethical-political 'content', not merely physical.

33 See my *Ethics* (Dussel, 1998a, § I).

34 *Book of the Dead*, ch. 125; ed. cit., p. 209 (Translation: Faulkner, p. 116).

35 Bernal, 2001, pp. 36of.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 361.

iso – such as *isonomia* ('equality') and *isegoria* ('equal right of speech' or simply 'political equality') were essential in the formation of Greek democratic theory.³⁷

The connection between 'to weigh' and 'justice' has its root in the Egyptian *me't*, 'to measure', 'to recompense', 'to exchange'. The 'destiny' of the dead depends on the 'measurement' of their just actions on the scales on the day of justice. From there, *me't* signifies also 'truth', related to *Moirai* (in Greek). In addition, the 'witness' in a judgement (*martys*, in Greek) derives from *mtr* in Egyptian (witness). The Greek word *basileus* (official, priest, king) derives from *hrp*, which is the 'baton of command' of the person with authority. The most interesting of all, for our proposal, is the following:

There are also a number of words for 'people' or 'subjects'. One example is *demos*, originally 'territory', from the Egyptian *dmi* ('township') and *dmiw* ('townsmen'); a second is *ethnos* from *tnw>*, '*itnw*, Coptic *ato* ('census, multitude'); a third is *ochlos* ('crowd, rabble') from '*se* ('many, multitude'). None of these have Indo-European etymologies.³⁸

Consequently, one will have to work in the future not from a Hellenocentric history but giving more importance to the Semitic and Egyptian context.

Further to the east, India, before the invasions of the Iron Age horsemen, had an entire urban civilization in the Indus valley to Punjab. We have referred to this theme in other works,³⁹ so we will not elaborate it here. The same can be said of pre-Confucian, pre-Daoist China.

Meso-America and the Incan Empire

[8] Some 40 thousand years ago, inhabitants from eastern Asia penetrated America across the Bering Strait. Some 5,000 years BCE the nomadic bands gave way to agricultural communities.⁴⁰ Starting from this long indigenous tradition, with Neolithic influences from the Polynesian navigators, even further east than the 'Far East' the Amerindian urban cultures appeared in the mountainous zones, from the Mexican mountain ranges to the Andes, 'nuclear America'. They are cultures with highly developed political systems. States exist:

The class-divided formation that arose in pre-Columbian America was of the tribute-paying type. This was the case with the Incas, the Aztecs, and the Mayas. Evolving in isolation, without any danger from without,

³⁷ Ibid., p. 363.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 364.

³⁹ Dussel, 1966 and 1975.

⁴⁰ In the Valley of Mexico there are agricultural remains 7,000 years old.

owing to the small population of their continent, these formations appear to have attained a high level of development, comparable to that of Egypt and China in the Old World.⁴¹

We make some references to the political system of the high cultures, starting with the north, the regions first crossed by the invading clans.

From the Pánuco river to the north and El Salvador and Honduras to the south, 'Meso-American' cultures developed, with great population density and a jumbled articulation of different civilized groups, with more than 100 ethnicities, 200 languages and 38 types of calendars which organized the private and public life of these political communities. In the pre-classical period (1800–100 BCE) the Olmecs, in the tropical zones of the Gulf of Mexico, already in 1200 BCE, had constructed elevated platforms of more than a kilometre long in the San Lorenzo region. It was the 'True Mountain'⁴² where the origin of the universe was celebrated,⁴³ the central place of worship, and the 'public space' par excellence.⁴⁴ In this way 'the principal town acquired the signifier of seat of the lineage of leaders, sanctuary for the divinities, market where the most esteemed products arrive, head of the kingdom and the axis which concentrated power, wealth, knowledge, the communitarian identity, prestige and worship'.⁴⁵ In Maya *amaq*,⁴⁶ in Nahuatl *altepetl*,⁴⁷ which is translated deficiently by 'pueblo' (people, vil-

41 Amin, 1974, p. 55 (Translation: Pearce, p. 57).

42 In Meso-America, the pyramids, artificial mountains were the mythical reconstruction of the 'True Mountain'. It is the 'centre' of the 'political field', place of the consecration of the kings and where the Earth communicated with the Interworld and with the Heavens.

43 In a fascinating book Linda Schele's article (Freidel, Schele and Parker, 2000) describes how she discovered that the cults and representations in the Mayan ceremonial centres (but also before, among the Olmecs, pp. 128f. [ET: pp. 85f.]) are related in a direct and realistically descriptive way to the position of the stars (Milky Way, polar star, the 'three stones', etc.). Thanks to computerized models, one can reconstruct the image of the sky on 5 February (the Mayan '4 *ahaw* 8 *kumk'u*') 690 CE. The image of the nighttime sky on 5 February (the other key date is 13 August) is celebrated now by the Chamulas on 8 February (a variation produced during the last 1,300 years). This date commemorating the 'beginning of the universe' (in 3114 BCE for the Mayans) was when the gods placed first the 'three stones of the hearth' (over the 'turtle', Orion, the stars Alnitak, Saiph and Rigel) around the 'black hole' (today the nebula M 42), the original fire of the universe, the point which all the constellations rotate around in the night sky. After, thanks to the 'tree of the world' (the 'crocodile' head below, the sacred ceiba tree, the Milky Way), the gods 'stopped', unfolded 'upwards' and sustained the skies, thus beginning our actual universe (the third creation). The 'crocodile' head below (which is the Milky Way, *Wakah-Chan* for the Mayans) was already known among the Olmecs. The Milky Way, the 'White Path' (*Sak Be*), was the 'canoe' where the gods rowed and where it sank sometime before the origin of the universe. On 5 February 690, the Milky Way at dawn begins sinking slowly in the sky (read the interesting pages of Linda Schele, pp. 54–105 (English: pp. 75–122), in particular p. 93. Schele writes: 'With that discovery, I realized that every major image from Maya cosmic symbolism [represented in temples and monuments] was probably a map of the sky' (ibid., p. 84 [English: p. 87]).

44 See Florescano, 1996, p. 33 (Translation: TC).

45 Ibid., p. 39 (Translation: TC).

46 See section [238].

47 See Lockhart, 1992, pp. 14–58, in particular 'Basic Principles of Altepetl Organization' (pp. 15–20).

lage), which signifies the 'First True Mountain' (or 'hill heavy with water'), is the name of the 'political community' constituted by the *calpolli* (inter-familial group); it is the political space par excellence, the 'centre' of the 'political realm'.

Among the Zapotecs, the construction of Monte Albán (whose splendour begins in 100 BCE) shows the high degree of political development, since the religious-ceremonial centre was a powerful military stronghold, centre of distant conquests, expressed in glyphs with figures of the leaders of dominated people, and of an important commercial network.

From Chiapas to the Guatemalan highlands, around the River Usumacinta (an American Nile), Mayan culture arrived through the cities of Tikal⁴⁸ and Kalak'mul at its first political confederation.⁴⁹ The political, religious and agricultural figure of the *ahau* (the military chief) is the centre of political organization, and maybe nothing more was recorded than the recently rediscovered King Pakal of Palenque. The ceremony of the transmission of political power was represented by a mysterious 'cross' (the 'Milky Way' which sustains as the 'sacred tree' the skies from the abysses, giving at the same time 'life' to the earth, and through this permitting the birth of the 'god of maize'):

The deciphering of that mysterious scene revealed an iconography of power: in the panel of the Temple of the Cross, Pakal transmits to his son the sceptre of political power; [. . .] cedes to him [in addition] the sacred drink of the sacrifices,⁵⁰ and in the panel of the Temple of the Sun transmits to him the symbols of war. [They are] the three highest functions of the Mayan government.⁵¹

The enthronement of a king, the political power, was a truly cosmic recreation, celebrated as '4 *Abaw 8 Kumk'u*', moment of the beginning of the universe. Political power based itself on the most ancient structure of the celestial universe. This was part of the *canon* of all Meso-American stories, as Enrique Florescano indicates:

The cosmogonic myth engraved on the Palenque temples was the oldest example of this kind of story. This text began with the creation and

48 Yax Moch Xoc was the founder of the Tikal dynasty. The exact chronology of the masters of Tikal from Ahau Jaguar (from the date 8.12.14.1.5 = 292 CE), up to the Double Bird (9.5.3.9.15 = 556 CE) exists. See Scharer, 1994, p. 175. The Mayans imagined and dated events from 3114 BCE, supposed time of the birth of the First Father Hun Nal Ye. For the political organization of the Mayans, see Scharer, 1994, pp. 49ff. Tikal came to have 84 subordinate ceremonial centres in an extensive central region of the Yucatan, including all of Belize.

49 Scharer, 1994, pp. 138f.: 'The Emergence of States in the Maya Area' (pp. 143-4).

50 In addition to its religious significance, sacrifice indicates also the possibility of agricultural fecundity, an equally real responsibility. Politics, as in all cultures, has to deal first with agriculture, food, the material reproduction of human life.

51 Florescano, 1996, p. 74 (Translation: TC).

division of the cosmos, then celebrated the emergence of the land, and concluded with the founding of the kingdom and the listing of the rulers whose deeds gave prestige to the Kingdom of Palenque. The text underscored the continuity between the origins of creation and the history of the kingdoms that grew out of that fundamental genesis. In this sense the history of the earth was a gift directly attributable to divine creation.⁵²

It was, therefore, a cosmogonic conception of politics. This tripartite *canon* is encountered in all Meso-American cultures, and seems to come from that elaborated in Tula-Teotihuacán, expressed too in the *Popol Vuh*, and in México-Tenochtitlán.

It is very possible that the sudden decline of the Mayan civilization at the end of the ninth century CE was due to a generalized state of wars. In the classical era, war was a disciplined art. One had to attend to astronomical rules (when the gods or disposition of the stars required it), agricultural cycles (in the middle of the nineteenth century CE, in the Yucatan 'Caste War', the Mayans were defeated by the Mexican army because they had to return to cultivate their maize fields) and the traditions of the nobility. This allowed wars to have a well-determined political 'limit'. At the end of the classical era, war expanded to include the participation of peasants, maybe through the Toltec influence of Teotihuacán (the historical Tula). Unlimited war produced total destruction. The Mayan civilization fell into chaos, the 'natural state' of the 'struggle of all against all'.

[9] Further to the north one finds Teotihuacán, the most extensive and populated city in America until the nineteenth century,⁵³ which in 50 CE began the imposing construction of the 'Road of the Dead' (the Milky Way again), which was abandoned by its population around 750 CE (its splendour lasted more than 500 years, like the Baghdad caliphate or Modernity to the present). This imposing city is the recently rediscovered 'first' Tula,⁵⁴ which shows a collective political organization without visible chiefs, rather priests (an Amerindian Memphis), with power exercised by military and commercial orders, worshippers of the great god 'of the waters', or of the 'cave', original giver of life, and over which the Sun pyramid was constructed. The disappearance of the first Tula (Teotihuacán) produced an era of wars (like the 'Combatant States' in China, an era of great violence and chaos, like a returning 'state of nature'). The city of Xochicalco (which

⁵² Florescano, 2004, pp. 49–50 (Translation: Hancock, p. 30).

⁵³ According to some calculations, it had up to 100,000 inhabitants, with more than 2,000 manzanas (equivalent to 1.73 acres) of dwellings.

⁵⁴ I say 'rediscovered' because it was not known that this immense city was in the Valley of Mexico, until the hypothesis was recently launched, accepted rapidly by all, that in reality it consisted of the mythical city of Tula or Tollan, that of the first Toltecs, origin of all classic civilizations of the valley. There were other Tulas later, but all refer to the ideal metropolis, mythical centre of power, whose multi-location indicates its importance, like Rome. Constantinople was considered the 'second' Rome and Moscow the 'third'. It seems that the classic and first Tula was Teotihuacán.

flourished from 600 to 900 CE) was fortified, in a high and steep site, not far from where I write these lines, under the protection of the god Quetzalcóatl, the Teotihuacán symbol of power, which would also be found among the Mayans in Chichén Itzá (their classical era was from 800 to 948 CE), or in Tula (the 'second', from 950 to 1100 CE), which with its powerful confederation was in a certain way successor to Teotihuacán, in Cholula (a 'third' Tula), cities of the classical era, which like Xochicalco, would be destroyed by generalized violence.

In the Valley of Mexico, nevertheless, the political order reappeared slowly in the form of inter-urban negotiations. The more developed state system, like the Inca in the south, would base itself on the development of the interstatal structure of 'confederations', by the invading, nomadic ethnicity of the Nahua worshippers of Huitzilopochtli:

The greater historical accomplishment of the Mexican ethnicity was having created a political organization capable of leaving room for the extraordinary ethnic, linguistic, political and cultural diversity of Meso-America. The army of the Triple Alliance⁵⁵ was one of the better instruments in the pursuit of that ambitious objective. But maybe the more effective means were the formidable commercial networks that created a mechanism of the circulation and consumption of goods in all of Meso-America; the conversion of Nahuatl into *lingua franca*; the Mexican capacity to incorporate into its own culture the traditions and accomplishments of the most advanced people [. . .] and the powerful legitimating myths that forged the idea of a people predestined to rule over the rest of the nations. Within these myths, the more important of those dedicated to representing the unity of that polymorphic universe was that of the figure of *tlatoni*, that in the Mexican world occupied alternatively the places of the creator god, tutelary ancestor, guide and cultural hero, head of the kingdom, supreme priest, commander of the armies, patron saint of fertility and benevolent protector of the people.⁵⁶

The *altepetl* were organized first in the *calpolli* (the interfamilial clan).⁵⁷ A group of *calpolli* constituted a guild, various of those a *cacicazgo* (for example, the *altepetl* of Tlaxcala had four *cacicazgos* or kingdoms, those of Tepeticpac, Ocotelolco, Ticatla and Quiahuiztlán),⁵⁸ which divided up the *altepetl*'s exercise of power. The conception was dual (the 'high' and

⁵⁵ Tenochtitlán, Tetzaco and Tlacopan.

⁵⁶ Florescano, 1996, p. 166.

⁵⁷ This 'concept' is the centre of Meso-American political structure, here with Nahua denomination. *Altepetl* (see Lockhart, 1992, pp. 14f.) or political 'community', which would be translated in the colonial period as 'people', has to be retained as a fundamental category in Latin American politics. Neither *pueblo* in Spanish, nor *people* in English can adequately express its content.

⁵⁸ See Lockhart, 1992, p. 22. The *altepetl* of Tenochtitlán had four communities: Moyotlan, Teopan, Atzaqualco and Cuepopan.

the 'low': the *omé*) but within the quadruple division (or six, eight or ten, with rotating functions, as the 'rotating' sun). Each *cacicazgo* had an elected *tlatoani* (cacique or local king), which in turn became the authority of the whole *altepetl*. He divided the land, distributed the tax burdens, recruited the strong for the armies. There was no concept of the city (*pólis*) (as in the Mediterranean), but the 'head' was in reality the populated part of each *cacicazgo*. The 'neighbourhoods' (*tlaxilacalli*) of the cities were the participants of each *cacicazgo* in the urbanized territory of the *altepetl*, and in certain cases the collection of *tlatoque* governed collectively. The confederation between various *altepetl* constituted a supreme community which continued to designate itself *altepetl* (the great community of all the Mexicas). The *tlatoani* of Tenochtitlán (a Mexican *altepetl*) had the function of principal king or emperor of the confederation. There existed in addition distinct types of councils (like the *Mul tepal* within the Maya). The sacred priestly order played an important legitimizing function; the political order was founded in the structure of the universe itself. The daily rising of the sun and the moon, the movement of the stars and constellations, the rain or drought, were political moments, which allowed for the splendour of a reign or its crisis. It was a cosmopolitanism (as all those before and many later).

Through this the whole political system was based in a very efficient agricultural system, which the *altepetl* never stopped controlling. With four or five months of production the community guaranteed its survival. The remaining time was occupied in other political occupations: war, commerce and calendarized celebrations.

The *calmécac* (school of sages like the Chinese or Greeks) educated the elite which dominated the hieroglyphic-phonetic writing (in the case of the Maya), the calculation of the calendars which rationalized Meso-American life, divination, martial arts and administrative tasks. Each *calpollí* had in addition a *telpochcalli* (house of youth) where the youth of the village received military training and basic education.⁵⁹ The priests and writers differentiated themselves from the *tlamatinime*, philosophers,⁶⁰ who were occupied with transmitting the stories about the ethical-mythical nucleus of the Aztecs. The 'First Primordial Mountain' (the Major Temple of Tenochtitlán) was situated in the 'centre' of the world, and was the 'public' place par excellence; above were the three skies of the celestial region (the *Omeyocan*); below opened the nine levels of the subterranean world (the *Mictlan*).⁶¹ The *tlamatinime* studied the books (codices) of the political limits of the kingdoms; the books of the calculation of the numerous tributes; the books of the treaties and negotiations between all the kingdoms; the books of the stories of the gods (mythical cosmo-political narratives),⁶²

59 See López Austin, 1982.

60 See my work *The Invention of the Americas* (Dussel, 1995a, pp. 95f.).

61 See López Austin, 1992, p. 90.

62 The narrative fact that justified the domination of the empire was a true 'political theology' (as Carl Schmitt will call it), since Tlaccáel taught that the Aztecs served faithfully

arts, explications, laws of all the kingdoms; books of the interpretation of signs (auguries) and dreams. Thus, the political counsellors of the Mexican Confederation were educated.

[10] In the south of America the Incan Empire shone over the substratum of political systems which prepared its advent. This independent civilization, from the north of Ecuador to the River Maule in Chile, incorporating the Argentine territories from the Andes to Mendoza, had the most structured political organization in the history of humanity:

The Inca empire was ruled by a hereditary nobility centered in the sacred person of the Inca, 'son of the Sun' [. . .] The nobility, formed by members of old Inca lineages with seats in and around Cuzco, and by the heads of conquered peoples, exercised the superior functions of administration of the empire, worship, and war. Beneath the nobles by blood came a lower-ranking stratum of priests, bureaucrats, and military chieftains, and the *curacas* [community headmen], all forming a petty nobility [. . .] Further down came the temporary conscripts (*mitayos*), recruited in the rural communities for certain periods of the year for messenger services and transportation along the highways, for mining, for building, as servants for the nobility (*yanaconas*) and as soldiers. The peasantry formed the base of the social structure.⁶³

The political organization was separated from the *ayllu* (the *calpulli* of the Aztecs) who constituted the base clan. The clans were organized into ethnicities, these into provinces which grouped into states or kingdoms (ancient independent monarchical cities, now conquered) under the dominion of the city of Cuzco, the empire. As in the case of Tenochtitlán, the city of Cuzco was organized politically (and from this sacred centre, the whole empire) starting from the dual principle: the *Hanan* and *Hurin* Cuzco. But immediately, through the quadripartite principle, each part was divided in two giving place to the four *suyu*: the Chinchasuyu (*Hanan/Hanan*: the highest of the high, the most prestigious), which extended from Cuzco was the Poniente, the Antisuyo (*Hanan/Hurin*: the lowest of the high) to the north, the Collasuyu (*Hurin/Hanan*: the highest of the low) is the rising sun (Bolivia, Chile) and the Cuntisuyu (*Hurin/Hurin*: the lowest of the low) is the sea of the south. The head of the empire, the navel (*Cuzco*) of the uni-

for the survival of the universe, making war and maintaining order in the *Cmanahuac* (the 'ring' or totality of the world), to be able to offer human sacrifices that gave life to the sun (Huitzilopochtli). What better 'theology of domination' can a politician imagine? Secularized modern politics is not kept from making use of similar justifications: what is beneath the demand for the expansion of 'democracy' and the moralizing 'anti-terrorist struggle' and actual anti-drug struggle (like 'Plan Colombia' in 2001), but a new foundation of a North American politics of global domination?

⁶³ Ribeiro, 1977, p. 168 (Translation: Barrett, p. 140). For details see Dussel, 1966, § 20.

verse, was not a city but the urban confluence (in whose centre was the Sun temple: *Coricancha*) of the four *suyu* of the empire.⁶⁴

[11] The highly complex organization allows one to see nevertheless the lines of the Incan state: the head of the Inca (the royal family), then the viceroys of the *suyu* or the inspectors or supreme judges of each region (*capac apos, tokoyrikoqs*); in each region of the provinces an authority (who inspected, judged, of the royal family, who lives near Cuzco, but in the respective *suyu*: a *tocticoc*); a local leader (*curaca*) who had command over some 30,000 tributaries; a leader of 5,000 or of 1,000 tributaries (*guar-angas*); the chiefs of the *ayllus* (*pachacas*); the representative of ten tributaries (*chunga kamachikuqs*) and the father of the family.⁶⁵

Each sphere had economic administrative commands (since the system was tributary), agricultural (responsible for the construction and good use of the aqueducts), military (with a permanent army and more than 27,000 kilometres of splendid paths and bridges, from the north of Quito to the River Maule in Chile), religious (since the mythical-cosmological calendar governed private and public life around the *Inti raimi*, the celebration of the birth of the sun, the year and the new fire, the shortest day of the year: 21 June)⁶⁶ and political. On that date, by imperial order all fires of the homes of the empire went out. In Quito (the 'centre' of the world, where the 'cross' which protected the shadow of the sun of the towers erected had equal 'arms' to the north and to the south),⁶⁷ thanks to the heat (vitality)

64 The work of Martin Pärssinen (1992, pp. 171f.) gives highly important details for understanding the political-spatial and temporal organization of the Incas. To the 'dual' and 'cuatrapartite' organization, as within the Aztecs, is added the 'triad', that crosses the whole political system (the first: *Qollana*, the second: *Payan*, the third: *Kayaw*) hierarchizing power, places and the evaluative system. The famous text of Guamán Poma of Ayala *The First New Chronicle* is a testimony to this (Guamán Poma, 1980). The resemblance of the political organization of Cuzco with Tenochtitlán is surprising and shows mutual information, although indirect).

65 See Pärssinen, 1992, p. 412.

66 In the northern hemisphere, 21 December, date of the *sol natalis* in the Roman Empire, was adopted by Christianity celebrating Christmas (like the Mayan holiday of the universe's origin on 5 February). Passage of symbols from one culture to another through millennia. The Sacred Roman Empire will be as 'sacred' as the Aztec or Mayan.

67 The 'cross' has a central place in the Amerindian cosmo-vision, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. In addition to being the four cardinal points, already sacred in the Far East, it remains related to the shadow that the Sacred Tree (or a stick buried in the ground, or a tower of stone as in the Incan Empire) projects over the earth (Pachamama). In Ecuador, the anthropologist Guayasamín, nephew of the great painter, has made a video, where he shows the meaning of the 'cross' for American cultures (from Meso-America to the Incan Empire). Only in Quito (the 'centre of the world' in Maya [sic]) are the shadows to the north and south, in the winter or summer equinoxes, equal. In Cuzco, to the south, the shadow (or superior part) of the 'cross' is less. Among Mayans and Aztecs the superior part of the 'cross' is greater. Linda Schele shows this. In the 'cross' of Palenque, taking into account *Ixtam-Ye* (7-Guacamayo or the Big Dipper), the superior part is greater. This introduces the concept of the 'sun in movement' in the Mayan, Aztec or Incan cosmology. The sun 'moves' not only in the sky from east to west. It 'moves' from north to south in the shadow of the Sacred Tree over the earth, the cause of the equinoxes, and from east to west (also from the shadow over the earth) in the day, forming in the year a 'cross': the 'cross' that the sun draws over the Earth, the ceiba as empirical tree that flourishes in February and whose nocturnal flowers

of the sun which reflected off a polished concave gold surface, a piece of cotton with an incandescent substance ignited a 'new fire'. This 'fire of the Inca' and of the sun was distributed to all the homes of the empire. It was the 'sacred fire' which created the always precarious 'political order' in the face of chaos (the 'state of nature' of modern politics). The son of the Inca born on that date, the *Inti raimi*, could be elected Inca. The sun, when born, had also 'to give birth to' the possible Inca: a 'son of the Sun'. It is a self-referencing cosmopolitanism.

It was a strict communitarian system, without private property, where land was cultivated in community. José Carlos Mariátegui will assign importance to this primitive socialism, which even persists in the indigenous communities in Latin America.

The last level of legitimacy, consequently, was founded in an ontological, in a cosmopolitanism, the '*pacha-sofia*', named by Josef Easternmann,⁶⁸ which obliged all of its members, from the Inca to the last peasant or dominated village, to fulfil a mandate: 'Work in such a way that you contribute to the conservation and perpetuation of the cosmic order of the vital relations, avoiding all upheaval.'⁶⁹ The empire of the Incas, like the Aztec, was for its contemporaries the necessary mediation for cosmic survival. One of the most coherent political systems was felled by the invasion of the Europeans at the start of the sixteenth century.

We have expressed indicatively the first state of the regional systems, which have no major direct links between them. If there were some direct links in this first state between these high cultures it would have only been in the Middle East, between Egypt, Mesopotamia, Anatolia and the eastern Mediterranean. The other regions (Hindustan, China, the Amerindian cultures) still did not have (or had very few) direct historical connections in Eurasia.

symbolize the recreation of life, the 'Tree of the World' that sustains the sky and the Milky Way, they are united multifacetedly, to be, at the same time, the figure of the king, of Pakal in Palenque, who guarantees to his 'people' stability, order, justice, life. Power is 'true' when it is 'based' around the constellation of 'the Scorpion' below and the Big Dipper above, as a Milky Way that guarantees, legitimates, the political reign.

⁶⁸ See Easternmann, 1998.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 231 (Translation: TC).

The Great Empires of Horse and Iron

The First Rationalized Unification of the Political in Stage II of the Inter-Regional System

[12] We return to the Eurasian continent, to the northern desert and steppe regions of the Neolithic civilizations. From the Yellow River in China to the Iberian peninsula, there is a corridor, which from before the fourth millennium began to be travelled by humans who had domesticated the horse, possibly in the Gobi.¹ The horse, as a civilizing instrument, which only in the nineteenth century the railway would overcome in speed, allowed travel across great distances, expanding the space of political structures (and the growth of the first empires). If one adds the discovery of iron, which allowed for many new inventions, like the horseshoe, which impeded the wear and tear of the horses' hooves, harness, which permitted its better management, weaponry, means of war only superseded by gunpowder, and plough, which by penetrating deeper into the earth allowed greater oxygenation and a demographic expansion, concretized by the great warrior invasions, we pass to another moment in the history of political institutions. The 'political field' grows in complexity. These towns, which spread an ontology of light (*tò phôs* among the Greeks) and of the original 'One', will allow the organizing of *chaos* into *cosmos*, a political 'order', which will be a qualitative advance in global history.² These imperial macro-institutions will be built around the immense sacrifice of the countrymen who will pay heavy taxes, of slaves, of dominated colonial peoples. All this will produce, in the next stage, a rebellion of the exploited. In any case, it will give centuries of peace to immense cultural multitudes. Those badly named 'Indo-European' invasions, really the Iron (plough, arms, etc.) Age horsemen, have a clear warrior instinct and so base politics in war.³ 'Political space' presupposes the military defence

¹ See the contribution of Narr, 1965, pp. 578-81 on the influence of the horse in universal history.

² In general, in all my previous works I had been very negative in my consideration of the people called 'Indo-European', in reality the nomadic Iron Age horsemen (in particular before Hellenism). I want now to recognize that the ontology of 'light' also has a positive aspect: it constitutes an 'order', a *taxis* which allows the construction (as around the Totality) of a more developed stage of politics.

³ See Dussel, 1998a, [13-17]; Dussel, 1966, §§ 25-30; Cotterell, 1993; Semerano, 2005.

of the borders. Four clearly defined geopolitical spaces will exist, which, in some way, last into our twenty-first century. In its classical eras we observe the appearance of the first political systems in history:

- 1 Han China (202 BCE – 220 CE) in the Far East;
- 2 the Indian continent (the Maurya period [322–183 BCE] or Gupta [320–550 CE]), which develops an inter-cultural space (south-east Asia, from Burma to Korea);
- 3 the Persian Iranian space (from the Achaemenid Empire [559–330 BCE], to the Seleucid, to the Parthian [247 BCE – 226 CE] to the Sassanid, which is buried by Islamic invasions in 651 CE);
- 4 and finally, in the West, the Mediterranean cultures: (a) from the Phoenician culture of Byblos, Sidon, Tyre and Carthage to (b) the Hellenist culture which arrives in India with Alexander (d. 323 BCE), culminating (c) in the dominion of the Roman *Mare Nostrum*.

Given the degree of development of these cultures, it will be possible to indicate elements not only of political organization, but also of explicit 'political philosophy'. Our proposition is not to study this theme in detail, but to break with the Eurocentric vision of political philosophy, which always begins its story with the Greeks and Romans.⁴

In a general way, from Chinese Daoism, the great Indian ontologies or salvation movements, including the Iranian, Greek and Roman cultures in the great synthesis of Plotinus' *Enneads*, the political will not be consistent. What is essential is the occupation of

the sages, the philosophers, the initiated, those who live still in the sensitive world of the opinion, corruptible (the *dóxa*, the *maya* of the Hindus), of eternal happiness: the contemplation of the divine is an ethic of *solitaria bonitas*. The good of the city, which the political promotes through prudence, is the greater *human* good: [in Greece it was the] despotic good of free citizens. The specific community is a whole; the individual one temporary part.⁵

But the human good is inferior to the divine good, and for this ultimately, politics doesn't count: 'the weakness of the common good is based, in short, in the weakness of the inter-world infra-lunar being'.⁶ The state is necessary, but as a merely inevitable condition (a lesser evil, which one has to support) which makes possible the sage's beatitude. The difference from Mesopotamia [6] and Egypt [7] is immense. In those regions prior to the invasions of

⁴ See Dussel, 1975: *Hellenic humanism*, where I begin the description from a vision of joining the Iron Age horsemen, called 'Indo-European'. This work, in all ways, was still too Hellenocentric.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

the Iron Age horsemen, the unitary corporality, the importance of concrete acts (which are already the beginning in 'this life' of 'eternal life' through the mediation of Osiris' judgement) remains guaranteed by the mythical narrative of the 'resurrection of the flesh', which is opposed ethico-politically to the 'immortality of the soul', as negation of the body, the everyday, the contingent. Politics and history have, however, a definite meaning for the Egyptian and the Semite. In the tradition of those horsemen of the steppe, the body, politics and history stop being real (they are only 'appearance') in favour of the soul, conscience, neo-Platonic One, Chinese Tao, Hindu Brahma or Atman, Iranian Ahura Mazda, the transcendent Absolute. In the horizon of the first principles of political action, far from the institutions, as we will see further on, these questions have fundamental relevance to the logic of political action in the long term. Will the Egyptian or Semitic cultures (Phoenicia, Judaea, Islamic or Christian-Latin-German, Byzantine or Slavic) not reach true hegemony later from these ethical-metaphysical assumptions? It is possibly the bit of truth in the thesis of Max Weber, which now is extracted from its narrow Eurocentric horizon (since modern Europe is the only heir of run-of-the-mill Latin-Germanic Christendom).

Chinese Classical Political Philosophy

[13] We begin in the East. As we already observed, it is not only a question of analysing the existing political order, but of referring to 'political thinking', since it was in China where political reflection attained an early formulation, which will maintain its validity almost without interruption (although with variations) for 30 centuries. In a Eurocentric vision of political philosophy this theme is not frequent, although today a fifth of humanity is part of this cultural tradition. We have to situate ourselves after the mythical Hsia Dynasty (from 1818 BCE),⁷ Shang Dynasty (from 1554 to 1040 BCE)⁸ and the 'Three Dynasties' (from 1154 BCE), which are found in the 'feudal' era, the same as the western Chou Dynasty (1045 to 771 BCE). For its part, the Eastern Chou Dynasty (722 to 256 BCE) will end in the balkanization of the era which will be named 'the time of the Combatant or Warrior States' (*Chan-kuo*) (479 to 221 BCE). China will divide itself, starting from more than 1,000 fiefs in the primitive eras, into only 14 states (sometimes more sometimes fewer depending on events) through continuous wars, maybe similar to the Mayan kingdoms (although these had no time to emerge from their crisis). In the middle of the wars, learning from their errors, they will carry out a very evolved organization of these 14 'states'; they will give birth to Mandarin bureaucracy, the development of professional armies, collecting of taxes, collection of legal codes, invention

⁷ The chronology is from de Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, p. xxvii.

⁸ To get a sense of the cultural richness of these periods, for example, near Anyang almost 150,000 fragments from the Shang dynasty have been found.

of instruments for distant commercial exchange, they will construct navigable canals which join great rivers and the impressive walls which defend the Chinese kingdoms from the northern nomads, etc.

It will also be the time (20 centuries before Machiavelli) in which Sun-Tzu writes the first work in history about *The Art of War*.⁹ Because war is essential for state politics, they have to study carefully troop morale, climate, terrain, the body of leadership and resources. The general has to have 'wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and discipline'.¹⁰

This will be, in and of itself, a fertile time of competition for the constitution of a Chinese political philosophy. The diverse kingdoms will support 'philosophical schools' ('One Hundred Schools'), and the masters will wander from one court to another proposing diplomatic and organized political-philosophical solutions in the face of war. It will be a creative philosophical era comparable only to fourth-century BCE Athens (of Socrates, Aristotle, Epicurus and Zenon), India of Nalanda between the fifth and eighth centuries CE, Islamic Baghdad from the ninth to eleventh centuries, or Paris of the thirteenth century (excepting the philosophy of European Modernity). The great political thinkers, from Confucius,¹¹ prior to the period of the Combatant States, Tseng Tzu, Mo Ti,¹² Yang Chu, Hsü Sing, Mencius,¹³ Hui Shih, Chuang Tzu, Kung-Sun Lung, Hsün Tzu, and the legendary text of the *Tao-Te-King*,¹⁴ are before the unification of the empire (and the overcoming of feudalism, more than 1,500 years before Latin-Germanic Europe) under the Han dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE, the 400 years of Chinese classical culture), and will always be occupied with an ethic or political normativity in the face of the cynicism of the strategic treaties of war.

In effect, Confucius proposed a normative and critical politics in the face of corruption and the forgetting of customs, against the political separatism of the small states and the warlike aggressiveness of the dukes, nobles and feudal men, who do not respect any 'order' under Heaven (*T'ien*) or Destiny (*T'ien-ming*).¹⁵ It is necessary to comply with the eternal hierarchy of the universe (it is in part a question of a cosmopolitanism like that of later Roman philosophers), the order between communitarian subjectivity and the venerable political institutions, which have to develop thanks to the mediation of the 'rites' (signs, justified in narratives and subjectified in an ethical discipline of the body, subjectivity in the face of objectivity), which condition individuals to the cosmopolitan order (of the universe and 'political order'). In the face of the existing chaos (the 'state of war') Confucius

9 The great treaty of the war was called for this the *Sun-Tzu* (see Ames, 1993, and Sunzi, 2006). Later it was explained and commented on in the *Sun-Bin* (Lau and Ames, 2003).

10 Cotterell, 1993, p. xiv.

11 K'ung Fu Tzu, the 'Master K'ung', c.551–479 BCE.

12 Mo Tzu, c.479–438 BCE.

13 Meng Ke (Mencius) died in 288 BCE.

14 See Star, 2001.

15 See *Analect* 3.16 (Confucius, 2003, p. 23).

taught the importance of the discipline of the subject, the articulation with 'fidelity' of the family order, municipal and provincial political structures, the kingdom and the empire, possible as future project in his era. He then idealizes the founding era of the first Chou state, which was decaying in Confucius' time, and proposes a political reform with an ethical–normative stamp.

On the contrary, Mo Ti' the 'master Mo', maybe a slave or of very humble origin,¹⁶ initiator of the Mohist school, idealized the epic Hsia dynasty. He was opposed to the hypocrisy of the rituals (including those of Confucius), the music not appreciated by the people and the lavish ceremonies of the nobility to exalt the virtue of the warrior heroes, spirits and rural gods, refuted fatalism and determinism, and affirmed the necessity of rational argumentation for reformist methods. Mo Ti's followers formed ascetic warrior fraternities (like European medieval crusades), which proposed self-defence and the construction of fortifications to the cities (as military tactic in the time of the Combatant States). It was a utilitarianism which affirmed the sense of love. It was an affirmation of particularism and local traditionalism, which today we call populist federalism, because it was regional, popular but authoritarian. Consequently, anti-Confucian Mencius, a member in the Ch'i kingdom of the Chi-hsia academy (similar to the Academy or Lyceum in Athens, whose period of glory was between 320 and 300 BCE), experienced the violence of the Combatant States.¹⁷ He travelled from one kingdom to another teaching the kings and dominant classes honesty (*yi*), the universality of humanity (*ren*) ('all [that is] under heaven'), recognition of mutual dignity and 'responsibility for the other', and the necessity of supplying food, clothing, housing and education to poor people. He proposed a morally founded politics which, together with Confucius, would be the pillar of political normativity of the later empire. Taoism (or Daoism) was more an ontology than a politics, but perfectly articulable with the Confucianism of the empire.

[14] In effect, in 221 BCE the unification of the Qin Empire (which would reign until 207 BCE), which would be succeeded by the Han dynasty (from 202 BCE), centralized the state, overcame feudalism, established Mandarin bureaucracy, practised 'legalist' political philosophy (as justification of the sovereign's absolute power) and pursued all opposition, including burning the texts of the philosophical schools contrary to the emperor and assassinating 460 philosophers critical of the empire in 212 BCE. A political, ethical and military philosophy was born that justified the 'established order', in which reside the strength, and the weakness, of the Chinese empire. The cultivation of political philosophy would establish itself in an immense body of Mandarins (120,000 in 100 BCE), in whose imperial schools (with 30,000

¹⁶ See de Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, pp. 64–76, with almost exclusively political texts; Cooper, 1996, pp. 70f.; Collins, 1998, pp. 140f.; Deutsch, 1999, p. 182.

¹⁷ See de Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, pp. 114–58.

students from 125 to 144 CE)¹⁸ the traditional statist doctrines were taught. The 'legalistic' and 'militaristic' current prepared the way for that dominant political ideology to be imposed by the empire.¹⁹ 'Legalism' (*fajia*) studied the different 'paths' or 'law' (*fa*) which could be observed to organize the state, through norms and the public and official exercise of justice; the regulation of codes of punishment as monopolistic exercise of strength on the part of the state, through an efficient tax-based economy, through a quasi-secularized bureaucratic administration, through a professionalized military system, police planning, the organization of a body of people who report crimes (a true 'intelligence' system as state apparatus, similar to the Inquisition at the beginning of European Modernity) and the utilization of personalized methods of political management. They will systematize a strategic doctrine of the rational organization of the state, which Max Weber does not see as the most advanced (which will not produce capitalism for reasons other than Weber addresses).²⁰ Already Shang Yang had refuted Confucian morality as inapplicable, and had proposed 'war' as the only means of imposing power, conceiving the people as a strong and disciplined mass, but submissive, under the centralized authority of a bureaucratized administration and an absolute monarchy.²¹ Agriculture was the economic base (a species of physiocratism); in place of an ethic. It decreed a body of obligatory laws (from which: 'legalism'), which makes us think of Habermas. The 'in-action' of Taoism, contemplative passivity of the sage's ontology, was now applied to the virtue of a patient obedience of the subject, a virtue which, as in the case of Kant, as happiness is not guaranteed, is a politics of resignation. This political philosophy in the hands of the Emperor Qin permitted the justification of the empire's foundation.

Nevertheless, the Han dynasty needed a greater legitimacy for its sustainability.²² This will start the long path of the founding of the empire's power in the Confucian ethic, which only in 136 BCE would be definitive, public and officially recognized, when it had already fallen into oblivion.

[15] For the ends of this *Politics of Liberation*, and given the importance of the theme, we want to present a synthesis of Chinese political ontology. In effect, Chinese philosophy, which develops its classic era in the middle of

¹⁸ In 1250 there were 400,000 candidates occupying the public seats of the empire (see Collins, 1998, p. 303).

¹⁹ De Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, pp. 190-223. This school continues some aspects of Mohism.

²⁰ Paradoxically, some thought that it was overpopulation with low salary (Frank, 1998) and the strength of the imperial state (Wallerstein, 1980-9, I), which would hinder industrial revolution, not capitalism (which could be born in certain Chinese regions). We see that there were other reasons (consider [pp. 69f.]).

²¹ He died in 338 BCE.

²² In the same way, when Mandeville aimed to destroy moral politics, Adam Smith tried to recover them, by the intervention of divine providence present in the market, giving a greater sustainability in the long term to the economic-political order. The hegemonic 'political order' (in the Gramscian sense) has to be legitimated with a moral foundation or it cannot be sustained in the long term.

the war between the kingdoms that will become the Han Empire, gestates in those 500 years of continual struggle. The reality for this philosophy is not the *physis* of Greek thinking, but the structure of the practices and institutions that constitute the warp and woof of reality. The philosopher confronts a strategic-military political reality, as the ontological horizon of his daily life, which is thought of as the art of survival in war, but a war where peace is the supreme good and is found underlying that entire field, in no empty way (as E. Laclau would think), but full of changing practices, institutions and structures. That totality in the practical-political process is the *Tao* (or *Dao*), the 'Way', or, better, the 'processing Totality':

Two notions thus lie at the heart of ancient Chinese strategy, forming a pair: on the one hand, the notion of a *situation* or *configuration* (*xing*), as it develops and takes shape before our eyes (as a relation of forces),²³ on the other hand, and counterbalancing this, the notion of *potential* (*shi*), which is implied by that situation and can be made to play in one's favor. In the ancient military treatises,²⁴ this is sometimes illustrated by the image of a mountain stream which, as it rushes along, is strong enough to carry boulders with it.²⁵

Jullien names this starting point, in French, *potentiel de situation*; in English, Ames,²⁶ *strategic advantage* (potential of the situation), which puts the 'strategic position' (*xing*) first, in a physical territorial sense.

The strategic fields, the situations have 'propensities' (*propension* in the language of Jullien), 'tendencies'. Stone tends to remain in the same place because it is heavy. When it is square it is more difficult to move. If it is placed on top of a mountain and is round, it 'tends to roll easily' (the difficulty now is stopping it). Thus, the Chinese define the 'strategic advantage (potential of the situation)' the 'tendency of events' as the 'field of strength'.

Chinese political-practical wisdom knows to wait for the 'situation' to transform into the 'occasion'. In Greek this was *kairós* (Hellenistic Greek is distinct from Semitic-Christian Greek). But in the Chinese case, there are many differences. The 'occasion' is the matured, prepared, observed, accompanied 'situation'. It is like the bird of prey which launches itself at the fast hare from afar, having already calculated the prey's movement. It is the non-casual coincidence. It is not the *fortuna* of Machiavelli (which is impatient and seizes the opportunity). It is true that, as with *fortuna*, one has to know to seize the 'occasion', which fades and is lost forever. But the 'occasion' (the *shi*), the 'potential' or the 'tendential force' of the matured 'situation' is prepared, helped to be fulfilled, made good use of. It is like the

²³ He seems to be listening to Foucault, with his 'field of strength'.

²⁴ See *Sun-Tzu*, ch. 5 (Ames, 1993, pp. 120-1; Sunzi, 2006, pp. 93-9). It is the concept of *Shi*.

²⁵ Jullien, 1996, p. 29 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 17).

²⁶ Ames, 1994, pp. 71f. (ET: pp. 65-107).

dancers of Knossos, who awaited the bull in all its power, and somersaulted onto its head, mounting it or vaulting off while the animal continues its quick pace. It was not force against force, like the wall which would destroy the bull's head; they utilized its force, its 'tendency', its potential to continue the bull's run but under human direction. One had dominated the animal without defeating it. The animal continues its run quickly subsumed in one movement, unknown to him but not contrary. It is using the opposite force, without negating it:

Good warriors seek effectiveness in battle from the force of momentum [potential of the situation, *shi*], not from individual people. Therefore they are able to choose people and let the force of momentum [*shi*] do its work. Getting people to fight by letting the force of momentum [*shi*] work is like rolling logs and rocks. Logs and rocks are still when in a secure place, but roll on an incline; they remain stationary if square, they roll if round. Therefore, when people are skillfully led into battle, the momentum is like which of round rocks rolling down a high mountain— this is force [*shi*].²⁷

Machiavelli knows that one has to anticipate the occasion,²⁸ but only to prevent the negative effect. The Greeks also rationalized the 'occasion' (Thucydides calls it *logismós*). They observe the mind of the enemy, their tactics, guess the possible, probable (*eikós*) moves, as rational forecast (*pro-noia*), and discover what is possibly 'more true' making it the 'most visible possible' (*alethestatón-aphanestatón*). However, the Chinese strategy, does not presume, represent, imagine, argue or have a hypothesis (there are not 'two worlds': one real and another imaginary, there is not a 'model' to imitate like 'truth'). The Chinese strategy, in the 'only possible world' (the real), is used to observe the 'tendencies' and their developments (the 'way': *tao*). One observes what is 'being sketched', born, developing, what will happen, the effects produced. Subtlety is used to describe the almost invisible aspects which only the one who has developed his/her skill of analysis will grasp. It is not to be distracted by the waves, but to observe the current beneath (which transports the logs on the surface). It is to discover the small fissure in the stone which announces its breaking, its 'change' (the classic *I Ching*, *The Book of Changes*, demands the creation of the discipline of study of the *shi*'s change). But, above all, as one cannot advance spring nor postpone old age, it is necessary to patiently await the 'maturing' of the 'potential of the situation' (*shi*) which will become the 'occasion'. It is a question of the 'long term' not the 'short term' of politics.

Against Benjamin, we would say that one has to re-value a certain 'length of time', which certainly is not the messianic 'present-time', but must be

²⁷ Sun-Tzu, ch. 5 (Ames, 1993, pp. 120–1; Sunzi, 2006, pp. 137f. [Translation: Cleary, pp. 93–9]).

²⁸ Machiavelli, 1997, p. 3.

situated in a living (organic, not mechanical) length of time, that of political life with respect to the exercise of power. The mechanical 'length of time' is repetitive; the 'length-of time' of life is 'maturation'. This last is the slow development of the 'potential of the situation' (*shi*). Or, better, it is necessary to discover that new time, which is not the mechanical length criticized by Bergson and the Chinese (maybe it is the physical time of the Greeks, and certainly of the modern Cartesians). It is the affirmation of the 'length of life', which is not the eruption of 'messianic time' (not a Chinese concept).

Machiavelli wants to domesticate *fortuna* (the enraged river) with the *virtù* (which frequently is interpreted as audacity, more than *phrónesis*) of the prince. The Chinese know that one must not confront the wild river alone; they want to use all its force to move the mill water in its streams and transport the wood from the mountains to the valleys. Intelligence is not opposed to *fortuna*; intelligence knows to channel it, direct it, help it and finally utilize it. *Fortuna* is observed as *shi*; and the 'potential of the situation' becomes the 'occasion'.

Machiavellian *fortuna* is opposed to the 'necessary', and to confronting an action to change the course of political events. To the Greek *hybris* is opposed 'virtue' (*areté*), which imposes *anangke* (the necessary) on chance. For the Chinese the 'potential of the situation' is neither purely chance nor necessary, it is the practical logic of reality intertwined with human force as 'situation'; it is neither mere chance (because it responds to the logic of subjectivity) nor is it necessary (as the lunar cycle). The *shi* is a human construction, *unintentional*, and one has to comprehend and interpret it to 'change it'.

It is another conception of politics, where one knows that '[to] not act . . . is the root of all action.'²⁹ One knows *not* to act when not acting can better achieve what one intends. When the acting distorts the spontaneity of the 'tendency', the 'potential of the situation', 'meddling' inadequately 'ruins the process'. What 'one does not dare to do',³⁰ is not through fear or timidity, but by not wanting to twist 'the logic of the happenings'. 'Acting' would be the abstract and cognitive expression ignorant of the 'potential of the situation' (or the 'political strength' of the occasion). To avoid activism, one has to know not to act: 'Reduce and reduce again until all action is reduced to non-action . . . nothing is done yet nothing is left undone'.³¹

The 'degree zero' of action would be having perfectly conformed to the 'potential of the situation', the perfect 'effectiveness', which 'conforming' to the 'potential of the situation', which giving way to the reality of the occasion is called *yin*. *Yin* is the strength that one obtains to conform 'from within' so the 'occasion' emerges, matures, arrives at its a priori unpredictable unforeseeable culmination. The bold, the hero, would be imprudent, irrational, an adventurer.

²⁹ Lao-Tzé, § 37 (Star, 2001, p. 50).

³⁰ Ibid., § 64, end.

³¹ Ibid., § 48.

[16] Political order is not a constructed 'object'. Mencius, thinker of an agricultural people (in their ancestral times) not shepherds of iron (as the Greeks), expresses: 'One cannot stretch the plants to make them grow faster.'³² The perfect action of the Prince is when he shows that he does not need to act. For him, the Prince does not have to act because in his not-acting all follow his 'tendency'. But it is not a passive *laissez-faire* (modern, of the market) but an active 'letting-be', which creates the discrete, invisible conditions in the long term so each member of society can be fulfilled. It permits the spontaneity (*sponte sua*) of each one. In the *Tao-Te-King* (*Dao de jing*) the 'path of virtue' (*Tao*) is expressed, the tendency of each thing, the 'potential of the situation' of each 'occasion' as process. 'Virtue' (*de*) is the imminent 'efficiency' of leaving what is to mature.³³

The dragon (as a serpent, as *Quetzalcóatl*), in his movement, shows the evolution, the transformation of the event, which will be displayed in metamorphosis, in many changes of skin. One has to 're-act' more than 'act'. One has to adapt to the order of 'immanence'.³⁴

The 'legalists', who justified the emperor's despotic power, legitimated the non-action of the emperor with reference to his absolute power, who nevertheless has to know to act to hinder the causes which oppose the 'potential of the situation' in the empire. The power is despotic and 'empty':

Daoism had pointed to the way of immanence which led to liberation from social constraint. Legalist despotism, for its part, forced a return to the virtue of immanence by making constraint absolute.³⁵

The 'effect' is not produced from outside technically, but in the immanence of the 'tendency of the occasion'. When force intervenes from outside in its production it weakens it. The effect has to progress, not stop. It has to be wanted as appearance, not its brutal presence.

Emptiness is the inextinguishable source of effect; it is where new effects can happen. The fullness, occupied by the effect, closes all future possibility. Having many windows and doors to the light, air, life, the open totality is the effect growing. The strength, like that of the sea, comes from below:

This humility is neither moral nor psychological; it is purely strategic.³⁶ The *Laozi* then proceeds to develop this theme at the level of diplomacy: instead of imposing its hegemony, which would inevitably be challenged, a great country, by its own choice, places itself 'downstream' so as to allow smaller countries to 'flow' toward it: in this way it gains its 'ascendency'.³⁷

³² 'The duty of ministers to reprove a ruler', 2 A 2 (de Bary and Bloom, 1999, pp. 126-8).

³³ *Lao-Tzé*, § 34.

³⁴ Jullien, 1996, p. 120 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 93).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 102).

³⁶ See *Lao-Tzé*, § 61.

³⁷ Jullien, 1996, p. 140 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 116).

China does not develop an ontology of 'wanting' (like Schopenhauer, for example), but of 'effecting', of the 'effect' (*ex factum*). 'To effect' shows it to be 'effective' (from *efficere*: 'to make of luck'). Chinese thinking is not astonished like the Greek in the face of the presence/appearance, potential/actual, empirical/ideal, to be/to become, but in the face of the events having been 'effected': the real as it is discovered as 'effect'. The prior possible conditions of the future effect are admirable, the 'effectuality' of the real. What is exciting from the events is how they can 'progress' (*yong*); how they are 'viable' (being regulated in a sense, a way: *tao*); all that is real is an effect in relation to other effects that affect each other mutually (*gan*).

It is not an effect produced as means to an end (or the end itself as effect): of the action model or a priori Idea of the conscious will. The effectuality of the 'potential of the situation' (*shi*) comes from the tendential logic of the event's practical strengths (not the 'event' of Badiou). The strategy and politics consists in knowing 'to enter' into the immanence of the 'potential of the situation' and constitute oneself as from within a moment of the situation itself. The effect is not an 'end', but a 'consequence' of a tendency.

A 'phenomenology' of the political 'effectivity' is necessary in this case.³⁸ One has to arrive at the 'bottom from where the effect is born', the 'trunk', the 'mother' of the effect.³⁹ The power to not act is the ontological origin of the effect: it dominates the source of what will be actualized. What knows to not act does not have effect. In the not-acting the effect is not yet born, it is left fallow, it is what is 'insinuated', and, if one looks after it, as a plant, it will flourish.

For that, strategically one has to attack the enemy in the state of lying fallow ('preventive war').⁴⁰ To eliminate the enemy in the belly of the mother is better than to have to face the fullness of its life. To act in the moment of the start of individualization, because only that which is individuated is opposed.

[17] Finally, Chinese thinking is an antagonistic strategic thinking,⁴¹ but it occupies itself in determining the 'potential of the situation', where acting is necessary to change the original, root, maternal conditions of the effects. Does this not sound like manipulation? Chinese thinking has a strategic sense of 'manipulation' as the nature of a game of disguises. To make the other want what one intends: thus one configures the 'situation' in such a way that the enemy will follow their tendencies (*shi*). 'Pretence' (more than ethical 'manipulation') conceals the gestating 'effect'. The Greeks called this 'stratagem'; the Europeans, Machiavelli included, lack a 'theory of manipulation'. The Chinese possess a philosophy of this 'simulation'. In China no

³⁸ Even further from what Jullien proposes (1996, pp. 149f. [Translation: Lloyd, pp. 120f.]).

³⁹ *Lao-Tzé*, § 58.

⁴⁰ Jullien, 1996, p. 152 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 139); *Sun-Tzu*, ch. 3 (Ames, 1993; Sunzi, 2006).

⁴¹ Jullien, 1996, p. 163 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 150).

one, neither generals nor soldiers, knows what the strategy will be.⁴² The work *Gui gu zi* (fourth century BCE) proposes clear manipulation in the strategy to the death in the 'Combatant Kingdoms'. It is not rhetoric, but an *anti-rhetoric*: it persuades the other fulfilling the logic of strategic manipulation. Making the other confess their positions; 'stopping' after to not allow them to know what is concealed in their first confession of intentions, using that knowledge to create the suitable 'potential of the situation'. They develop themselves technically to know the opposite and to be able to create the 'potential of the situation'.

Water is fluid, weak, but on entering a crack and freezing it breaks the harder stone. Water flows like the *tao*. It has an extraordinary accumulated potential: when the dike breaks it destroys everything. It is the image of Machiavelli but different from Westerners (who consider the violence of water as a natural fact), water (in the Chinese strategy) has to be slowly and permanently oriented (*tao*) from the beginning, from the high summits, before it has force. One has to direct it from the mountain source. If by neglect it has velocity and force, one should not oppose it but attempt to float on it and use it against the enemy (as a weapon in war).

Better still: it is to invert the image. Water, being the strategy itself, has to adapt itself to all grounds, to pass over all rocks, that is to say, enemies, depending on the form presented, because water has no a priori form. Its destructive power is in its adaptability.

China has thought about the exercise of strategic power, of feasibility, and not only of the law. Without finding any will behind the structures, one inclines toward the 'ease' of understanding the structure, the logic of what one opposes. There is no a priori subject: the subject is as the water that flows, the dragon, the *tao*, and it knows to follow its course. Nevertheless, at the end, Jullien lets out a shout:

And what if not just the greatest pleasure, but even the greatest 'profit,' as you would say, was not to win but to lose: really to lose – and to lose forever, so as to experience the weight of that 'forever,' as Sisyphus and Prometheus did (not so that that loss, thanks to the ricochets of reality, should later turn into gain)? And what if the best way to feel alive – finally beyond the world – was not efficacy but the very opposite? In that case, this essay would have to be rewritten the other way around. It would be titled: *In Praise of Resistance* – or of the nontolerance of reality – *In Praise of Counterefficacy*.⁴³

I ask: could one not replace Sisyphus or Prometheus with Moses or Marx (or Mao)?⁴⁴ In this last case, more than 'praise of resistance' will be 'praise

42 *Sun-Tzu*, ch. 11.

43 Jullien, 1996, pp. 229–30 (Translation: Lloyd, p. 197).

44 It is clear that Mao Tse-tung takes much from neo-Confucianism, but with the strong influence of the humanist messianism of Marx (see Wakeman, 1973, pp. 97–114, 238–73).

of creation', liberation, from those negated and excluded from the 'potential of the situation' (alienated, silenced, excluded, invisible, strategically inefficient, but . . . hope for a 'new' future, unthinkable for Chinese classical thinking, and maybe also unthinkable in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries in the Yang-tse Delta Valley). Jullien writes in *The Propensity of Things*:

Despite this alternation of winning and preserving power to which history is subjected, history constitutes a uniform and continuous course in which *principle* and *propensity* must always go hand in hand.⁴⁵

The empire succeeds in formulating a political philosophy that will endure for centuries to the end of the monarchy in the twentieth century, and even today renewed as 'neo-Confucianism', not only in China, but principally in south-east Asia (as in capitalist Singapore). The coherence and extreme efficiency of the Chinese political system, which organized the immense empire with an iron hand, will be from 1800 CE one of the causes of the beginning of the underdevelopment of Chinese civilization. The initial bourgeoisie (the eunuchs' lineage) will never be able to take charge of the structures of power in the face of such an organized imperial state. In contrast, the seventeenth-century English bourgeoisie find a weak state, in crisis, that it is possible to co-opt.

The Political Thinking of the Indian Continent⁴⁶

[18] The intellectual space of India, unlike China, produced the deepest and most varied ontology of subjectivity (prior to European Modernity), always intimately linked to an ethic of salvation, but did not reserve a central space for the analysis of the objective structures of politics. The interiorist vision

⁴⁵ Jullien, 1995, p. 243. In general, Roger Ames and François Jullien unify the theoretical, teleological vision of the 'two worlds', the 'ideal models' of the Greeks with Christian thinking. There would have to be a place for a third experience of original organizational criteria, for the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Semitic and Christian thinking. Between the Greek teleological theoretical world and the Chinese thinking of the 'potential of the situation' (*shi*), one would have to situate the 'creative' thinking of these Semitic peoples, of which modern European thinking is a Hellenic-Roman deformation. Another possibility than the Greek productive action and non-action which considers the operating and hegemonic 'power of the situation' opens: the messianic eruption from those excluded from the Promethean myth and the 'power of the situation'. From the 'impotent' is opened a new anti-hegemonic and anti-*shi* strategy: the 'power' of the 'impotence in the situation' – from the *negative effectuality* appears a different diagnostic of the 'power of the situation'. The 'occasion' is now an anti-Greek *kairós* and far from the Chinese: it is the *kairós* of the 'impotent', which have been charging their power in another source of history, other waters which will roll other stones, which although insignificant, because not discovered yet, make a path in very small brooks in the high summits, and which at their time (the new *kairós*) will drag along greater stones and smooth the ancient torrents that are below their level in the mountain. It is not a merely immanent corrective work; it is not a merely external action; it is a creative work from the excluded Alterity.

⁴⁶ Collins, 1998, pp. 177f.; Embree, 1988; Deutsch, 1999, pp. 24–48.

of the ascetic demands which intend to overcome suffering, negating the particular subjectivity,⁴⁷ invalidating the importance of the everyday, the *Mayan* apparent, will not be able to take into account the transcendental importance of the social 'order'.

The Brahmanic tradition of the Vedas⁴⁸ and the Upanishads (from the time of the first invasions or the presence of merchants from Iran), Buddhism (founded by Gautama, c. 560 BCE, Buddha), Jainism (which acquires its form thanks to Mahavira, 599–527 BCE) and the Brahmins produce a rich philosophical spectrum.⁴⁹ At the Vedic stage the most structured intellectual movement, Buddhism, appeared and was consolidated in the Mauryan period.

Buddhism, which preached 'separation from the world' with its monastic life, rigid organization of an extremely poor community (the *sangha*), would expand to China, Manichaeism in Iran, Egyptian-Christian and Western Benedictine monasticism (the base of Germanic-Latin culture) and would be present equally in the Sufi Muslim world. Buddhism had a very special political temperament, since, by its organizations of non-consecrated (the *bhikkhus*: laypeople), it was present in the masses, giving them a sense of discipline, order, modesty in dressing, speaking and acting, which constituted the *ethos* required in the population by the warrior princes (for example, Asoka, 268–232 BCE). Buddhism, a deeply rational ethic, born in the north of the Ganges Valley (actually Nepal), implanted itself firmly in Magadha and Kosala, where in its classical era was the city of Nalanda, the Buddhist Paris from 400 to 800 CE, the expression of a culminating moment of the history of global philosophy, with great philosophers such as Vasubandhu II, Bhartrihari (460–520 CE), Dignaga and Dharmakirti (580–650 CE).⁵⁰

Hinduism, which after the constitution of the sacred books and their commentaries had been confined to those old traditions of the Upanishads, got, thanks to the passionate debates with the Buddhists, to develop a 'logic' in the strict philosophical sense, whose tradition dated back to the *Nyaya-sutras*, which were already compiled around 100 CE, and which would influence equally all Buddhist streams.⁵¹ This philosophical logic permitted a Hindu rebirth in figures like the Advaita Shankara (around 850 CE), the ontology of 'Identity'. With Udayana (1050–1100 CE) and Gangesha (around 1200 CE) 'logic' and ontology launched their full development (the

47 See Dussel, 1998 [pp. 13–17] and [pp. 243–244].

48 The word *veda* comes from the Akkadian root *wadum*, which signifies to know something, to know someone (as in German *wissen*), and from where proceeds *videre* in Latin (to see). For its part, the Indian word *sutra* comes from the Akkadian *sitru* ('written', 'writing'). See Semerano (2005, p. 15), who shows the non-existence of the so-called Indo-European language, with these and numerous other examples.

49 Collins, 1998, p. 177.

50 See Collins, 1998, fig. 5.4 (p. 225).

51 It will be necessary for Eurocentric philosophy to integrate these developments in the studies of the history of philosophy: 'Emerging from the inchoate competition of the Upanishadic sages, Nyaya became the first real Hindu philosophical school, forming a meta-theory of argument' (Collins, 1998, p. 229).

Navya-Nyāya),⁵² and Raghunatha Shiromani (around 1510 CE) formulated notable distinctions.

The monarchy was never questioned. It is a question of improving it, giving ethical advice to the king. In Jainism, the ideal figure of the king is outlined in the *Mahaviracarita*, 12.59–77. In the *Nitivakyamrta*, 17. 180–4, we read:

A true lord is he who is righteous, pure in lineage, conduct, and associates, brave, and considerate in his behavior.

He is a true king who is self-controlled whether in anger or pleasure, and who increases his own excellence.

All subjects are dependent on the king. Those without a lord cannot fulfill their desires [. . .]⁵³

The force of arms cannot do what peace does. If you can gain your desired end with sugar, why use poison?⁵⁴

Jainism, nevertheless, distrusted politics and showed its dangers:

For when it pleases the king's mind,

A minister must harm others, and which is the source of sin.

How then can perfect righteousness arise in him,

Through which he may gain eternal bliss? [. . .]

If you spend only five days in the service of a king

You bring sin upon yourself,

And you must go, O soul, to the dark gulf of hell,

With its inevitable, intolerable, innumerable woes.

So give up the king's service; though it seems sweet as honey,

It brings scorn and disillusion, it is basically wretched [. . .]

[19] In the tradition of Theravada Buddhism (strict), the ideal (utopian) kingdom is sketched frequently:

The city becomes rich and prosperous, peaceful and happy, free from plague and calamity, and filled with people of all classes and professions and of all lands . . . even with Scythians, Greeks and Chinese. . . . [showing thus the 'centrality' of India, and continues:] All these folk coming to live in the new city and finding it so well-planned, faultless, perfect, and beautiful exclaim: 'Skilled indeed must be the builder who built this city!'⁵⁵

That 'honest city', full expression of the Buddhahood, 'city of nirvana', allows one to understand the evil of politics when it is fruit of the pas-

52 Deutsch, 1999, p. 40.

53 Embree, 1988, p. 86.

54 *Nitivakyamrta*, pp. 344–56, in Embree, 1988, p. 87.

55 *Nilindapañha*, pp. 330ff.; Embree, 1988, p. 113.

sions, impermanence, disintegration, murder, robbery, death.⁵⁶ There is then a critical vision of politics: 'Sooner or later [. . .] there comes a time when this world passes away. Then most living beings pass to the World of Radiance.'⁵⁷ There are stories about the origin of the state,⁵⁸ which in the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism (not strict) attain great importance. The argumentation in the *Mahasammata* consists first in showing the divine origin of authority, to later strongly condemn the king who does not fulfil the expectations of the gods, even suggesting tyrannicide:

How does a king, who is born of men, come to be called divine?
 Why is a king called the Son of the Gods?
 If a king is born in this world of mortals,
 How can it be that a god rules over men? [. . .]
 By the authority of the great gods a king enters his mother's womb.
 First he is ordained by the gods— only then does he find an embryo.
 What though he is born or dies in the world of mortals –
 Arising from the gods he is called the Son of the Gods. [. . .]
 But when a king disregards the evil done in his kingdom,
 And does not inflict just punishment on the criminal,
 From his neglect of evil, unrighteousness grows apace,
 And fraud and strife increase in the land. [. . .]
 Such a king will not for long anger the gods;
 From the wrath of the gods his kingdom will perish. . . .
 Therefore a king should abandon his own precious life,
 But not the jewel of righteousness, whereby the world is gladdened.⁵⁹

But it is maybe in the tradition of Hindu Brahmanism where some of the better indications are encountered. In effect, the text of the *Mahabharata* (12.59.13–30 and 93–4) speaks of the three moments of the emergence of the political order. In the first, the gods create a society in the 'golden age' (*krtayuga*) of the *dharma*, where institutions are unnecessary because of its perfection; there is no king. In a second moment, through indiscipline, boredom and disillusion it falls into corruption, unbridled desire, chaos. The gods, frightened, ask Brahma, the creator, what to do. He then 'composed a work consisting of a hundred thousand chapters out of his own mind, wherein [he describes] righteous conduct [dharma], as well as material gain [artha] and enjoyment of sexual pleasures' – see the self-conscious attitude of the political programme, explicit, as preparation for the organization of a normative 'political order'. And the text ends in search of what should bring about the project: 'Then the blessed lord god Narayana reflected, and

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

⁵⁷ *Digha Nikaya*, 3.8off.; Embree, 1988, p. 129.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *Suvarnaprabhasottama Sutra*, 12; Embree, 1988, pp. 182–4.

brought forth an illustrious mind-born son, called Virajas [who became the first king].⁶⁰

Observe anew how for a Brahman politics it was necessary to have clear ends and means, structured institutions and laws, explicitly stipulated beforehand. It is a question of a strategic-instrumental rationality in a paradigm of teleological conscience like the Hindu monastic, and Buddhist, Jainist, and the Jesuit European (of the examination of conscience), Cartesian (of the *ego cogito*; Descartes was a student of the Jesuits in La Flèche) and Weberian Modernity. We see, therefore, that the metaphor of the 'state of nature' of the *homo homini lupus* as previous to the 'political state' is very ancient. Hobbes will give it a bourgeois content, which Locke will accentuate.

[20] With regard to the quadripartite division of the sciences (a) *Trayi*: the science of the Vedas, a hermeneutics; (b) *Varta*: the science of agriculture and shepherding, an economics; (c) *Dandaniti*: the science of punishment, a politics; (d) *Anvikshiki*: a philosophy, Kautilya in the *Artha Sastra* (1.2-7) thought that 'of these four, the science of punishment, of law and order, is the basis of all other sciences; it makes them all possible.'⁶¹ In the *Sukra Niti* (1.4-19), Kautilya explains:

Other sciences treat of one or another field of human activity, whereas the science of policy [*nīti śāstra*] is helpful in all respects and conduces to the stability of humanity society. As the science of policy is the source of dharma, material gain, and pleasure, and as it is traditionally said to lead to spiritual emancipation, a king should always study it diligently. Through the knowledge of the science of policy, kings and others become conquerors of their foes and conciliators of their own people. Kings who are skillful in working out the right policy always prevail. [. . .] A kingdom divided within itself, the army disintegrated, the civil service headed by ministers disorganized – these are always the result of the ineptitude of a king who is devoid of the knowledge the science of policy.⁶²

This text of the *Sukra Niti* clearly records *virtù* in the sense of Machiavelli when it says that 'the primary duty of a king consists of the protection of his subjects and the constant keeping of under control of evil elements. These two cannot possibly be accomplished without the science of policy.'⁶³

The theme of 'politics' or the necessity to 'punish' is recurring, like when political science allows fault without punishment, when the stronger oppresses the weak (theme of the *Mahabharata*), allows itself to carry out the 'logic of the fish' (*matsyanyaya*), where the large eats the small. To per-

60 Embree, 1988, pp. 238-9.

61 Mohanty, in 'A history of Indian philosophy', as cited in Deutsch, 1999, p. 44. See equally in Embree, 1988, pp. 240f.

62 Embree, 1988, pp. 241-2.

63 Ibid., p. 241.

mit this would be to return to the state of nature, violating *dharma* in its diverse levels. *Dharma* signifies law, order, custom, practical convention, a little like *ethos* in Greek or *Sitten* in German. Each human being is situated in the *dharma* of one's family, clan, hamlet, kingdom and state. The 'castes', which in some way link to the conception of *dharma*, since they 'fix' the 'place' of conduct in the social whole, arose through successive invasions, and sacralized in this way the 'order' that prevailed after the violence of its institution, which from that moment rejects all reform. The 'untouchable', the pariah, is the one who dared to violate the established 'order', and has as punishment to be condemned to the 'outside' of valid structures: in extreme exteriority. This social structure will only be eliminated by the Islamic ethic (neither the Buddhist nor the modern colonial Portuguese, Dutch or English Christian ethic radically negate the system of 'castes').

In the Vedas, tradition, good customs, 'the consensus of consciences' (*atamnah priya*) are seen as sources of law. The laws have to be interpreted following hermeneutical rules, and commentaries and collections are necessary, to give it a judicial theoretical stamp. The community (the rural 'hamlets' which survive thanks to the abundant rains of the monsoons) has priority over the regional state (frequently of invading foreign peoples) and the merely abstract individual (still non-existent as political experience).

Politics in the Empires of Iran

[21] The first empire (properly said) in global history was the Persian, created in 559 BCE by Cyrus II as subject of the Medes (who he conquered in 550 BCE). Cambyses II conquered Egypt (526 BCE), Darius I arrived in India (518 BCE) and confronted the Scythians beyond the Danube (513). The Greeks defeated the Iranians in the battle of Marathon in 490.

The Persian state, an absolute monarchy with a tax base, organized its institutions, dividing the territory into satraps. Thanks to the horse and the empire's cared-for paths and bridges, the post from Sardis in Anatolia reached the capital Susa, or Taxila in the Hindu Punjab, in two weeks. The satrap (governor), commander of the military, inspectors, priests, scribes (who preserved and built immense archives in Persepolis), administrators of the impressive treasure, constituted the authority and provincial bureaucracy, which organized a large peasantry with an ancient class-conscious discipline. The tax, sporadic military service (following the campaigns of the emperor and military necessities of the satraps), a body of 'eyes and ears of the king', a true intelligence service that informed about all that happened in this immense political space, completed the square. An army and fleets, one that navigated between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and the other in the Indian Ocean, had as its centre the 10,000 'Immortals', a select imperial troop. The Greeks were the more disputed mercenaries, always occupying the front lines in the battles. Darius had inscribed in his tomb:

I have loved justice and what is unjust never had a place in my heart. My will was that no one commit an injustice to the widow and the orphan [. . .]. I punished rigidly he who did not tell the truth; I paid a just salary to the worker.⁶⁴

Extremely tolerant politics (as in the Aztec Empire) allowed one to respect the language, traditions, cults and gods of each conquered kingdom. It demanded from the subjects taxes, the acceptance of the emperor's dominion (which surrounded his person with mystery, as in China) and the fulfilment of the minimal laws that were necessary to unify the system. In Phoenicia or in Ionia (Anatolia) it allowed a democratic government in many cities (the ancient eastern Magna Graeca). These cities, territories of republics, produced insurrections and emancipatory revolts that were strongly repressed. Later, when the Alexandrian Empire entered into crisis, some of these cities, for example Pergamon, would organize independent kingdoms.

Zoroastrianism, which later produced Manichaeism, and returned with the Sassanids, impregnated all political life with a certain dualism, where the political remains somewhat associated with the kingdom of evil, of the 'world' which one has to abandon for the desert and 'save oneself by contemplation'.⁶⁵ We read in the *Gran Bundahishn Pehlevi*:

In the high place the light where Ohrmazd resides. In the deep the darkness where Ahriman lives. Between the two the void. Ohrmazd is aware of the existence of his adversary. Ahriman ignores Ohrmazd, wanders in the shadows. By the proclamation of Law Ohrmazd keeps to the darkness. Thus he can organize the cosmos following his ideal form, and for three thousand years Ahriman keeps himself away. At the end of this time Ahriman returns to the attack. Ohrmazd understands that he cannot defeat him, so he limits the time of the conflict, through Zman, Time.⁶⁶

This hermeneutical tradition of history and politics, assuming conservative or critical positions depending on times and circumstances,⁶⁷ would leave traces, still in the first millennium BCE, in the apocalyptic tradition of Daniel in Babylonian exile and, later, in the primitive Christian com-

⁶⁴ Herzfeld, 1938, p. 4 (Translation: TC).

⁶⁵ Remember that it is a movement of Manichaean monks in Egypt that would impel early Christian monasticism to 'renounce the world', peculiar to the Semitic and primitive Christian traditions.

⁶⁶ *Bundahishn*, I, 1 (Translation: TC).

⁶⁷ It will have to distinguish between (a) the negative critique of the valid system from a negative vision of history as such (messianism of the right, where the motivation for praxis is not a better future system: it is a question of a pessimism which looks toward the utopian past) and (b) the critique of the valid system from its systemic injustices and from its possible historical overcoming (the utopian future). The Iranian thinking is in general of the first type (since the Principle of Evil is eternal and is a necessary presence in becoming human). The Semite or later Christian is of the second type. See Dussel, 1969, ch. III: 'Temporality of existence' (pp. 75f.).

munities, which considered the Roman Empire the presence of evil: the ‘millennium of Evil’ (Babel), in the historical vision of Augustine of Hippo influenced by the Iranian Manichaeism⁶⁸ in the *Civitas Dei* with its ‘terrestrial city’ (which of Cain, opposed to the ‘city of God’ of Abel, which cannot be realized on Earth), in medieval Joaquinism, in the Franciscan messianism of Torquemada (in his *Indian Monarchy*) in sixteenth-century Mexico, and in certain modern socialist utopias.⁶⁹

Politics in the Mediterranean World. The ‘Phoenician connection’: The Political System of Byblos, Tyre and Carthage⁷⁰

[22] There are many Mediterraneans: the Egyptian in the south-east, Phoenician in the east, Greek in the north-east, Carthagian in the south-west and the Roman in the north-west. We will look at some aspects of this political space, so important for political philosophy.

Phoenicia is a narrow region (of two to four kilometres between the mountains of Lebanon and the Mediterranean) some 200 kilometres from north to south (from Mount Carmel to Nar el Kebir), composed of a collection of cities (Tripoli, Byblos, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, etc.), always politically independent, which never constituted a confederation.⁷¹ It was only unified by foreign powers (for example, it was a satrap under the Persians). Its inhabitants developed the art of navigation in the Mediterranean and taught it to the Egyptians, Cretans, Persians, Greeks and Romans. They had commercial and war fleets, and were mercenaries. The Phoenician seamen operated throughout the entire Mediterranean. They dominated the eastern Mediterranean commercially and arrived with the colony Carthage to Cadiz (Tarsus) in the Iberian Peninsula and to the gulf of Benin in Africa. They were also present in Arabia (Ophir).

The remains of the primitive city (5000 BCE) are still to be found in Byblos. In the Bronze Age (from 3100 BCE) it acquired the physiognomy of a mercantile port. Byblos had relations with the first Egyptian dynasties, was affected by the invasions of the ‘peoples of the sea’ (1200 BCE), the Assyrians (900 BCE), Persians (550 BCE), Alexander (330 BCE), the Romans (64 BCE), Byzantines (330 CE), Muslims (536 CE) and the Crusades (part of the emirate of Tripoli between 1108 and 1198 CE).

⁶⁸ Mani, the Zoroastrian prophet, at the beginning of the reign of the Sassanids (216–277 CE), died crucified to the doors of the capital city. His influence in Mediterranean culture was immense. Mazdak (480–528 CE) founded Mazdakism, a true peasant revolution that demanded equality among all mortals and proclaimed equality and community in the ownership of goods.

⁶⁹ Buber, 1991.

⁷⁰ See Jidejan, 1969 and 1971; Harden, 1965.

⁷¹ In the fleet of Xerxes in 480 BCE the Phoenician ships were commanded by three independent naval chiefs, one each from Tyre, Sidon and Aradus.

The history of the Phoenician cities is not in parallel. There is a succession in their origins, classical ages and decline. In 573 BCE only Tyre resisted, but after 13 years of siege Nebuchadnezzar occupied it. Tyre was destroyed; the other cities survived and were dominated. They rebelled against the Persians, along with the Greek cities of Ionia, and this time Sidon was destroyed in 362 CE. The other cities surrendered without struggle to Alexander, but Tyre did not. It was destroyed in July 332 BCE, after six months of siege. They were impregnable walled cities, on islands or near the sea.

The Phoenicians colonized the Greek territory in the Bronze Age. They were present in all of Greek history, before the invasions of the Iron Age horsemen. Sidon, under Straton I (374–62 BCE), made an alliance with Athens. Aristotle reunited an enormous collection of political constitutions; within the three he comments on in his *Politics* one finds Carthage, a commentary that Hegel will apply to England:

But although their constitution is an oligarchy, they are very successful in escaping faction, because from time to time some section of the [impoverished] people grows rich on their sending it out to the states.⁷²

These cities were an important historical connection in political development. They were the prototype of urban–port political systems, of naval and commercial empires, negotiated by a *republican* mercantile elite, which would quickly surpass the monarchy with a mixed regime, which would prevail, and (passing the tradition from one city to another in the long term) still exists today. In effect, Tyre founded in about 814 BCE in north Africa the ‘new city’ (*kfar hagadasha*), Carthage. Historians show the similarity of its political system with the future Venice,⁷³ and I have already indicated above that this would influence the modern English system decisively. In Malta and Carthage, for example, there was a judge (in Tyre the magistracy was dual, as with the Romans) called in Latin *sufetes*, but in Semitic *shopetim* (the Roman tribunes), elected on merit, supported by a senate (of the families of the most important traders) and counterbalanced by diverse systems of popular representation (like the magistracy of the ephors, which had 104 lifetime members in Carthage). The whole ‘people’ (as in the *demos*), as a last resort, decides,⁷⁴ but always ‘wealth (*plou̓ton*) [is] more

⁷² Aristotle, *Politics* II, ix (Translation: Saunders, p. 8), 1273^b 18–26 (Translation: Saunders, p. 50). See the plagiarism of Hegel in *Rechtsphilosophie*, §§ 245–6.

⁷³ ‘By the end of the fourth century, Carthage appears as we normally like to imagine her: she has become a sort of Venice of the Ancients, an aristocratic republic, reserved and well-ordered, in which the individual is subject to laws administered by the well disciplined and austere rich’ (Picard and Picard, 1970, p. 123 [Translation: Collon, p. 125]. ‘At the risk of anachronisms of which one must always beware, it is frequently tempting to make a comparison [. . .] between the destinies of Carthage and Venice, so strongly do the similarities *mutatis mutandis*, leap to meet the eye. [. . .] As Venice would be later, Carthage was a city of merchants’ (Lancel, 1995, pp. 117–18 [Translation: Nevill, pp. 120–21].

⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Politics* II, ix, 1272^b 9 (Translation: Saunders, p. 48). For details of the political organization of Carthage one can read the analytical and clear Aristotelian description.

esteemed than virtue (*aretês*), and the whole state fond of money (*philokhrématon*).⁷⁵ Whatever it is which the sovereign authorities take to be valuable, the opinion of the rest of the citizens follows theirs.⁷⁶ We have thus a mercantile plutocracy in the exercise of institutionalized power: the distant origin of the state directed by the future modern bourgeoisie. In all ways they distributed power so 'services circulate among all: he who orders and he who is ordered'.⁷⁷

One essential aspect is the political economy of the Phoenician cities. Between 1100 and 800 BCE the Greek cities were organized. The Phoenicians benefited from contact with Mesopotamian Semites and Egyptians with regard to 'art, mathematics, philosophy, and science'.⁷⁸ Plato admired the Egyptian stability, but immense Egypt was not a practical model for the small Greek cities. The oppositions between 'monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/plutocracy, and democracy/ochlocracy' proceeded from the Phoenician cities, never from Egypt.⁷⁹ We have suggested already that the constitutional forms of the Greek cities came from Phoenicia and Egypt, especially the socio-economic structure of slavery, present in both, but rooted even more deeply in the former. Phoenicia was a slave society; the slave was the main maritime commodity. Tyre was an enormous city in the *Lament of Tyre*, written by Ezekiel (in the Hebrew Bible) in the ninth century BCE, with contact with Tarsus (Iberian peninsula), Persia, the Red Sea and Greece, having many 'daughter cities' (colonies).⁸⁰ Slaves were captured or bought, and could be emancipated ('liberated') or 'redeemed' (one paid to free them). Thus was born an ethic of the liberation of slaves, among Phoenicians and Canaanites (which Israel would encounter, since Hebrew is a Canaanite dialect, Semitic, close to Phoenician). Slaves (*habadim* and *habadot*, which in Hebrew are those who have the hardest jobs)⁸¹ are the base of the economic structure of the Phoenicians, Greeks, Etruscans and Romans. In the midst of a political world where all societies were monarchies, the Phoenicians (and from them the Greeks) had commercial republics, democratic, with the oldest aristocratic institutions (the councils of the elders transformed into citizen assemblies). Commercial competition hindered all confederational unity (as in the case of the Greeks).⁸²

75 As is known, the 'love of wealth' is for Aristotle a perversion. The Athenian-Macedonian system was aristocratic not plutocratic. The latter will open the path to Modernity. The 'passage' from Machiavellian *virtù* to institutionality hinders the presupposed corruption (in the bourgeois plutocracy), which Pocock (1975) analyses brilliantly.

76 Aristotle, *Politics* II, 1273^a 31–^b7 (Translation: Saunders, p. 50).

77 'Tò árkhēin kai tò árkhēsthai' (ibid., 1273^b 19). Those who order also obey, because sometimes they are elected to obey the *demos*, and others to delegate the power to order [Translation: TC].

78 Bernal, 2001, p. 346. It is the question of the chapter 'Phoenician Politics' (pp. 345f.).

79 Ibid., *Okhlós* is the inorganic multitude opposed to the *demos*.

80 Ibid., pp. 352f.

81 Both 'work' (*habodah*) and 'slave' (*hebed*) come from the root *hbd*.

82 See Bernal, 2001, p. 357.

Among the Spartans and the Carthagians was a 'living quarters of comrades' (*sussitia ton hetairón o phiditia*) which came from the Phoenician *pdt(y)* (troops, soldiers or army), which later will be the Roman *curia* or the electoral colleges in the North African assemblies. The ballot boxes for voting were called in Greek *kados*, from the Phoenician *kad*.

There were, therefore, four similarities between the Phoenician and Greek cities:

- 1 lack of a monarchic unity;
- 2 lack of a centralized organization of the cities;
- 3 the slave cities were essentially centres, and frequently commercial ports;
- 4 they possessed a vertical unity, from the 'mother-city' (centre) to its 'daughters' (peripheral colonies), which did not allow for any horizontal co-ordination between colonies of the other 'mother-cities'.

Phoenician Carthage and Greek Ephesus had tens of perfectly controlled colonies.

It is time to discard as outdated the 'Greek miracle'. Greece was the culmination of a millennium-long process of Asia Minor and Egypt.

From the Greek *pólis* to the Hellenic Empire

[23] Compared with the Chinese political system, 'Greece, after learning from one of these kingdoms inspired by Egypt . . . was to develop to the full the peripheral character of its formation. The exceptional growth of commercial functions in this Greek society, together with the difficulty of obtaining even a moderate agricultural surplus from inside the country, led Greece along a new path, that of the use of slave labor on a large scale.'⁸³ The great dominators of horse and iron would transform into hunters of slaves in the north-east Mediterranean: Macedonia to the north and the 'barbaric' Scythian or Slavic European periphery. Their power would be linked to the skilful use of arms. The Greeks would be excellent warriors as, later, the Romans. Greek politics is unthinkable without slaves, 'Hoplites' or the Macedonian 'phalanx' (just like the 'legions' will be the key to Roman power).⁸⁴ The key to this military strategy was the infantry composed of free citizens. It was not founded in abundant taxation of a peasantry, which could cultivate the earth thanks to the fertile riverbanks (like the Chinese, the countrymen of the Ganges, Mesopotamia or the Egyptian Nile). It was the *demos*, the political community of an enlarged oligarchy

⁸³ Amin, 1974, p. 52 (Translation: Pearce, p. 54). This was a little like the Marxist thesis, but we have seen that slavery did not originate in Greece.

⁸⁴ *Hoplites* signifies in Greek 'heavy infantry soldier'. It was simply the 'soldier', whose etymology originates in the verb 'to arm' (*hoplízo*), or in the nouns 'arms' (*hóplisma*) or 'weapon' (*hóplon*).

or a restricted democracy, since it excluded the majority of the population of the *polis*, the 'free', inhabitants of the city (*polités*: citizen) and farm owners, who exploited their lands with slaves, and who also had to dedicate themselves frequently to commerce in the eastern Mediterranean, and in competition with Carthage in the western Mediterranean. The 'Greek miracle' was not born either from nothing or the pure genius of the invaders of horse and iron. Greece was a land largely cultivated from the third millennium by Egyptians and Phoenicians, and also by Hittites.⁸⁵ Thus the Egyptians were present in Boeotia from the early Bronze Age (to 2000 BCE). Enormous dikes were made in Lake Kopais, and deep canals that perforated the mountains to permit the excess water to flow to the sea.⁸⁶ These works were already out of action in 1150 BCE. The technology was Egyptian, like other similar works in Argolida and Akkadia, and the names of many places have equally Egyptian roots. More interesting still is the possible presence in Anatolia and Thracia of the Pharaoh Sesostri (Senwosre) recorded by the historians Herodotus and Diodorus:

He traversed the continent, until, having crossed from Asia, into Europe, he subdued the Scythians and Thracians: to these the Egyptian army appears to me to have reached, and no farther; for in their country the columns appear to have been erected, but nowhere beyond them. From thence, wheeling round, he went back again; and when he arrived at the river Phasis [in Colchis], I am unable after this to say with certainty whether King Sesotris himself, having detached a portion of his army, left them there to settle in that country, or whether some of the soldiers, being wearied with his wandering expedition, of their own accord remained by the river Phasis. For the Colchians were evidently Egyptians . . . Sesotris had subdued other nations, not fewer than Darius had done, and the Scythians besides; but which Darius was not able to conquer the Scythians; . . . they relate, however, which Darins pardoned these observations.⁸⁷

First, Sesotris [. . .] arrived from the Scythian tribes to the river Tanais, which divides Europe from Asia, and it was then, it is said, when some Egyptians were left near the lake Maeotis [the sea of Azov] founding the nation of Colchis [. . .] Later, he crossed Europe and Thracia [. . .] leaving trails as he passed.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Visiting Miletus and Ephesus in August 2003, the Turkish archaeologist from the Ephesus Museum, Doctor Cengiz İçten, talked about his recent discovery of pre-Ephesian Hittite bas-reliefs, from the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries BCE. So there was a Hittite presence before the Greek invasions. The Ephesian goddess Artemis has the physiognomy of the Hittite goddess of fecundity, with an elevated cylindrical cap absent from the Hellenic goddess.

⁸⁶ Bernal, 1991, II, pp. 133f.

⁸⁷ Herodotus, 1904, II, pp. 100–10 (pp. 120–2).

⁸⁸ Diodoro, 1933, I.53–8 (pp. 187–95; Translation: TC).

It is not strange that the Macedonians adored the Egyptian Amon Ra, who Alexander would worship when he conquered the land of the Pharaohs; he was conscious that his native gods were Egyptian.

We know, on the other hand, that Phoenicians founded Thebes and that Athens was a colony of Sais, which allows us to approach our theme from a broader horizon.⁸⁹ The political organization of the ancient Greek *pólis* was influenced by the structure of life of the eastern Mediterranean port cities, two millennia earlier, in particular the Phoenician cities, from where they imported the alphabet, the art of navigation and the political institutions:

To the virtue of having 'invented' the alphabet was added that of having outshone the Greeks in the knowledge and use of maritime routes. Homer himself, according to Victor Bérard, discovered in some oriental manual of *Nautical Instruction* the essence of the geographical framework of the *Odyssey*, as well as the outlines of the legend of Ulysses in some Phoenician 'periplus'.⁹⁰

Hellenic philosophy originated in a well-determined region, within the few kilometres separating the ancient city of Miletus from Smyrna in Anatolia:

This activity took place in what must have been a self-conscious community. Miletus, the largest city and major trading port on the Ionian coast, was only 20 miles from the island of Samos, where Pythagoras originated; Pherecydes was from Leros, an island 40 miles off Miletus; Heraclitus at Ephesus was in the next city north of Miletus, 30 miles away; Xenophanes at Colophon was another 15 miles inland, a day's journey from Ephesus; slightly farther up the coast was Clazomenae (home of Anaxagoras), with Sardis (home of the cosmological poet Alcman, who later migrated to Sparta) 20 miles inland. [. . .] Homer is reputed to have lived (or at least his tradition was perpetuated) at Smyrna [. . .] and Cyme, the home of Hesiod's father, was another 30 miles north.⁹¹

That region of navigators and merchants was under the cultural influence of Egyptian Nile Delta and Phoenician cities. After having argued at length that philosophy could not have originated in Egypt or Phoenicia, a historian of philosophy begins the life of the *first* Greek philosopher:

Thales (c. 585) was a native of Miletus, an Ionian colony of Asia Minor. Of Phoenician origin,⁹² son of Examyas and Cleohuline [. . .] Travels to Egypt are attributed to him, where he studied geometry, measured the

89 See Dussel, 1998, Appendix II: 'Sais: capital of Egypt' ([405]). See also the critique of the Hellenocentrism of Nietzsche, *ibid.* [249]. See also Bernal, 1991.

90 Lancel, 1995, 3 (refers to Bérard, 1930, 146).

91 Collins, 1998, p. 85.

92 We read in Diels A, 1: '... Phoinikes' (Diels, 1964, I, 67).

height of the Pyramids by their shadow and explained the floods of the Nile by the Etesian winds.⁹³

As a mercantile port culture, the first Greek philosophers are said to have captured some element of navigation, in particular Phoenician. It is said of Thales that he introduced 'the Phoenician practice of steering a ship's course by the Little Bear'.⁹⁴ Note the criticism made centuries later by Tatian in his *Discourse against the Greeks*, since they had taken from the 'Babylonians astronomy, Persians magic, Egyptians geometry, Phoenicians education from the letters of the alphabet. Therefore stop calling imitations inventions.'⁹⁵

[24] Ionia was an urban culture, open to the Mediterranean, not 'provincial' like continental Greece. Note that Anaximander had 'constructed a map – probably for the Milesian sailors on the Black Sea'.⁹⁶ The Ionian schools' astronomical focus was not motivated by agricultural demands as in Egypt or Mesopotamia, but by commercial navigation.

The great Pythagorean school, called the 'Egyptian connection', was constituted as a model for all future Greek philosophical schools, a little like the Buddhist community of monks, the *sangha*. It is said that it 'is hard to think that Pythagoras was uninfluenced by the Orphic beliefs and practices [. . .] rather than with the Thracian Dionysiac religion'.⁹⁷ Pythagoras (c. 582–500) 'studied in Egypt and brought back Egyptian mathematical and religious principles, and founded the Pythagorean brotherhood'.⁹⁸ Isocrates wrote: 'After he [Pythagoras] went to Egypt and became their student, he was the first to bring the rest of philosophy [Egyptian] to the Greeks.'⁹⁹

The Pythagorean theoretical and practical positions are incomprehensible without the tie to Egypt, with its festive and orgiastic cults, absent from the traditions of the Iron Age horsemen – ascetic and negative about the body, and consequently about politics.

The most Egyptian aspect of the Pythagoreans is the explaining of reality by numbers, mathematics and geometry (it was used as topography to trace the boundaries of the cultivated fields before and after the Nile floods).¹⁰⁰ This was the aspect of Egyptian thinking that would appear in the Gnos-

93 Fraile, 1965–6, I, p. 143 (Translation: TC). This example reminds me of someone who was in New York and was deemed an inventor for having calculated the shadow of a skyscraper, without noticing that to construct it is of infinitely greater scientific merit.

94 Copleston, 1993, I, p. 34 [FT: 1964, I, p. 22].

95 Tatian, 1954, I, p. 572 (Translation: Whittaker, p. 3).

96 Copleston, 1993, I, p. 36 (FT: 1964, I, p. 24).

97 *Ibid.*, p. 42 (FT: I, p. 30).

98 Bernal, 1987, I, p. 521. See in addition pp. 71–2, where Orpheus is related to Dionysius and Osiris.

99 *Bousiris*, 28 (Isócrates, 1928, I, p. 119 [ET: p. 56]).

100 I remember seeing the enormous rock in front of the Elephantine, where the height of the Nile floods from 2000 BCE was marked. From the first cataract one could anticipate the annual volume of the Nile waters. A whole geometric cartography was necessary to archive the boundaries of the properties of the Nile Valley, those of the pharaohs, temples, oligarchy, even the common property of the small villages.

tics (with the triads, Ogdoads, Enneads, etc.), the Neoplatonists and in the Kabala.

Philosophy, consequently, was not born in continental Greece, but in Egypt and the Phoenician cities, and so among the Greeks this activity began in maritime ancient Greece, commercial port cities, coexisting with the coasts of the Nile Delta and the eastern Mediterranean cities (these last as old or older than Egyptian civilization).¹⁰¹ Its political organization depended on the structure of the mercantile port cities (like Sais,¹⁰² of which Athens was a colony; like Byblos or Tyre, the origin of Thebes or Carthage). Ephesus had 300,000 inhabitants, and was a metropolis with more than 70 colonies across the Mediterranean. Heraclitus lived therefore in a capital, not a colony, of continental Greece. The Athenian Greek 'miracle' has to be sceptically deconstructed to resituate it more adequately in history. Politically this allows us to track the history of the organization of the *pólis* in the cities of the third and second millennium BCE (it is said that Plato, who also visited Egypt, wrote the *Republic* with the city of Memphis in mind, governed as it was by an elite of communities of 'sages', astronomers, mathematicians, 'lovers of wisdom').

Twenty-three centuries before the sages of Miletus (influenced by Egyptians, Phoenicians and Hittites), the Egyptians had expressed that in the 'beginning' were the 'primordial waters' (*Nun*),¹⁰³ an opinion later than Thales, from where the Sun (*Atum-Re*) and Ether or infinite air (*Shu*) proceeded, Anaximander, and finally Fire (*Tefnut*), Heraclitus. This original fire would be adored by the Phoenicians (the Carthagian god *Ba'al Ham-món* means something like the Master of Fire) as deities that, like those of the Aztecs (the smallest of the gods, Colibrí, who hurled himself into flames to be consumed and transformed into the Sun, Huitzilopochtli), demanded child sacrifices to intensify their cosmic energy.

Over those Semitic-Egyptian Mediterranean civilizations the invading Iron Age horsemen (first the Hittites) imposed their Uranic myths, under the dominion of the patriarchal diurnal *Suu* ('God' comes from 'day', like the Sanskrit *Dyaius Pitar*, the Greek *Zeus Pater*, the Latin *Jupiter*), their languages, their customs and in particular, the art of war with iron weapons and the horse, their art, science and philosophy.

Croesus, king of Lydia, Anatolia, asked for help from the Spartans, Egyptians and Babylonians (note the cultural articulations that gave origin to the primitive philosophy) in 547 BCE. He was nevertheless destroyed by the Per-

¹⁰¹ Remember that Byblos was a flourishing city in 3100 BCE, maybe before the Egyptian Memphis.

¹⁰² Sais was the capital of Egypt from 666 BCE until the occupation of Cambyses, the Persian emperor, in 525 BCE. So the Persians attacked the mother country of Athens and a little later the ancient Greek cities in Anatolia. Athens was hit strongly by the Persians, but at the same time was refuge for many Greeks from Ionia.

¹⁰³ Egypt (with the Nile and its deltas), the Phoenician cities, Miletus and the other Hellenic cities of Anatolia were situated near fresh waters (of the Nile and other rivers) and salt waters (of the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea).

sians, and with this all the Greek cities of the east Aegean. This destruction left a vast emptiness. So, when the rebellion of these independent cities was squashed in 494 BCE (when Xerxes occupied Miletus), the first communities of philosophers did not run to underdeveloped and traditionalist continental Greece, but to southern Italy or Sicily, founding the schools of Croton, Metaponto, Elea or Syracuse, now near the Phoenician, Punic culture, in the region of Carthage.

Nevertheless, only continental Greece offered sufficient resistance to the Persian Empire (the port cities did not have sufficient demographics to oppose such an impressive empire). Sparta was the first continental city with political influence. Its bond with Egypt was historic. Lycurgus took his inspiration from Egyptian political structures; they were allied in their wars against the Persians. Isocrates says in reference to the political inclination of the Spartans that the 'philosophers who attempt to discuss such things and are most highly regarded choose to praise the Egyptian state'.¹⁰⁴

[25] Athens began its long philosophical hegemony much later and in its political decline. Its failure in Syracuse (413 BCE), the occupation of the city in 404 BCE (which obliged it to destroy the great wall which united it to Piraeus port) and the installation of democracy in 403 BCE were events prior to Athenian classical philosophy. Socrates died in 399 BCE; Athens then began a long path as the capital of Greek philosophy, lasting nearly 1,000 years.

The Sophists were something like the wandering Chinese philosophers in the time of the 'Combatant States'; they strolled through the Hellenic cities. They were principally political philosophers. The visits to Athens of Protagoras (from Abdera, another port city) in 455 to 445 BCE, Gorgias (in 427 BCE) and Hippias (in 421 BCE) made philosophy present in this ancient colony of the Egyptian Sais. Only with Antiphon, Critias and Socrates (the first philosophers born in Athens) did philosophy achieved its naturalization papers in Athens. All this happened around 434 BCE when Socrates began his teaching, a century and a half after the philosophy was expressed in Miletus. So, all, together with Plato, were against the democracy installed from 403 BCE and admirers of Sparta (for its aristocratic discipline). Isocrates, for his part, 'admired the caste system, the rulership of the philosophers, and the rigour of the Egyptian philosopher/priests' *paidea* (education) which produced the *áner theoretikós* (contemplative man), who used his superior wisdom for the good of his state',¹⁰⁵ new Memphis.

The Sophists, knowing diverse cultural experiences, could discern that given by nature from that decided conventionally. Thus Protagoras was conscious that 'teaching needs nature (*phúseos*) and exercise (*askéseos*)'.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ *Bousiris*, p. 18 (Isocrates, 1928, I, p. 113 [ET: p. 54]). 'One reason for this was that both Isocrates and Plato maintained which the great lawgivers and philosophers like Lykourgos, Solon and Pythagoras had all brought back Egyptian knowledge' (Bernal, 1987, I, p. 108).

¹⁰⁵ Bernal, 1987, I, p. 104.

¹⁰⁶ Fragment B 3 (Diels, 1964, II, p. 264 [Translation: TC]).

But even more clearly Antiphon the Sophist was clearly conscious of an extremely developed and demanding ethical-political universalism, a rational hermeneutic of the myth of Osiris, expressing:

Justice (*dikaíosúne*) [would be] not violating any of the laws (*nómima*) of the city, where one is a citizen [. . .] A human being could use justice to one's advantage if before witnesses one took into account the laws, and when there are no witnesses [take into account] the laws of nature (*fúseos*), because although one hides oneself from all human beings it will not be less evil or, because no one sees, more good. Then the human being is not damaged by appearances (*dóxan*), but by the truth (*alétheian*).¹⁰⁷

Classical philosophy developed in this environment of public discussion (from 429 BCE when Plato is born, to 322 BCE when Aristotle dies), which always had as its object the concrete political practice of those independent and uneasily confederated port, mercantile, slave cities (which would never be absorbed by a larger state), which had to increase popular participation, since they needed a greater quantity of 'Hoplites' in the armies, necessary for the survival of the *pólis*, thanks to war and trade. The ancient prudence of not having mercenary armies, as Machiavelli would recommend almost 20 centuries later, had its demands: democracy, which rapidly tended toward demagoguery or tyranny, following the conservative vision of classical political philosophy. He who had fought for the city could not be refused citizenship. *Isonomía* (equal right to participate in the city government) was born.

Thucydides (c.460-400 BCE), who in his work *Peloponnesian Wars* related the 27 years of fratricidal wars, asked himself philosophically what the causes of this political system were.¹⁰⁸ He showed that 'both the plague [429 BCE] and the Sicilian disaster, along with the ultimate defeat of Athens in the [Peloponnesian] war [were] the destined punishments for its insolence and injustice.'¹⁰⁹ What lay beneath this was, for Thucydides, a will of dominion of the stronger, the desire to possess honour and wealth. Thucydides showed the impotence of justice. In the same way, Xenophon (c.430-354 BCE), in *Cyropaedia*, as a critical student of Socrates, described the method used by Cyrus II to 'corrupt' the noble 'peers' (who were the only ones who had, like the Hoplites in Greece, engaged in hand-to-hand combat), allowing the 'plebeian' servants (thirty plebeians to one noble)¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Fragment B 44, cols 1 and 2 (Diels, II, pp. 346-47 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁰⁸ Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 77f. (ET: pp. 7-32). David Bolotin is the author of the chapter.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15. See Dussel, 1958, 'Justice' (*Dike*), as much from a cosmological as political point of view.

¹¹⁰ Maybe this was the cause of the collapse of the fragile inter-urban system of the Mayan warrior cities. It was not, however, the case for Alexander or the Romans, because they had 'free' soldiers, and therefore ancient institutions due to political 'discipline' until they fell into the demagoguery, tyranny or despotism of the Alexandrian kings or the Roman emperors in its decline. See Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 97f. (ET: pp. 90-117).

to be equally elite warriors. By democratizing or equalizing the army, it had more warriors than the Medes and Babylonians, enabling their success. Revolutionizing the ancestral norms, it organized a new merit system for participation in war (not hereditary nobility), whose reward was the uncontrollable judgement of Cyrus. This led, for Xenophon, to the despotic constitution of the Persian Empire and to democracy among the Greeks.¹¹¹ Plato wrote in his *Politéia*:

[Socrates]: Then democracy comes about, I suppose, when the poor are victorious, kill or expel the others, and give the rest an equal share ('*ison*') in the constitution and the ruling offices, and the majority of offices in it are assigned by lot. [Adeimantus]: Yes, which is how a democratic political system gets established, whether it comes to exist by force of arms or because intimidation drives its opponents into exile.¹¹²

[26] Plato (427–347 BCE)¹¹³ did not regard democracy highly. The *Politéia*, frequently called the *Republic* from its Latin root, the dialogue *Politics*, and finally *Laws*, constitute a culminating moment of Athenian political philosophy. The *Republic* is, certainly, the tightest synthesis of the complete architectonic of Platonic ontology, a political dialectic. It is not only a political work but the totality of his philosophical vision; one can affirm that for Plato the *Republic* is the 'first philosophy',¹¹⁴ something more than 'politics'. In this work, in the first place (327a–367e), three concepts of 'justice' are developed,¹¹⁵ abstractly, starting from an approximation of 'giving to each what he deserves' (as a treatment of the most general principles). In the second part (367e–608c), after concluding that one cannot make 'justice' without a 'just city', he describes the 'institutions' of the perfect city which starts from a basic necessity: 'Well, then, a city comes to exist, I believe, because none of us is individually self-sufficient, but each has many needs he cannot satisfy.'¹¹⁶ But the city needs more people experienced in the 'contemplative life', because they reach dialectically, thanks to the vision of the Idea, the absolute Good. 'Politics', in its vulgar sense, gives only sufficiency of goods, but only the philosophers can reach perfect

111 This system would continue, with ups and downs, until the Ottoman Empire, with its janissaries, as we will see later on. There is a relationship between the organization of the army and the political systems.

112 *Republic*, Book 8, 557a; Plato, 2000, p. 297 (Translation: Reeve, p. 253).

113 See Dussel, 1958, pp. 49f.; 1975, pp. 9f.

114 It is not strange that the 'myth of the cave', the most splendid metaphor of the ontological experience of the villages of the Iron Age horsemen, since it expresses well the idea of Buddha, of Sankara, of Taoism, is contained in this work, and is used to explain the 'political conversion' of the sage (*Republic*, Book 7, 514a–517c [Translation: Reeve, pp. 208–11]).

115 The second is similar to the concept of Carl Schmitt saying: 'In what subject and occasion is one more capable of doing good to one's friends and evil to one's enemies?', against Polemarch (*Republic*, Book 1, 332b; Plato, 2000, p. 7 [Translation: Reeve, p. 6]).

116 *Republic* Book 2, 369 b; Plato, 2000, p. 55 (Translation: Reeve, p. 47). See *Laws* 676 a; *Protagoras* 320 c.

happiness, the ultimate end of the *polis*; they surpass the objectives of the vulgar citizens. For this, the philosopher-sages, 'guardians' of justice, have to occupy themselves (in a community of goods, of women, with strict discipline and even stricter education, almost like a Buddhist monk or a Manichaeon) with divine things, and in turn, as authentic sacrifice or donation, to govern the *polis*:

Elevating the eyes of the soul they see [the governing philosophers] in front of them what gives light to all; and when they have seen the Good in itself, they will use it as the paradigm (*paradeigmati*) for the rest of their days, in which each will govern in their day, as much the *polis* and the particulars, as themselves, and although they are dedicated to philosophy they will tend to be burdened [. . .] with the weight of political matters and some govern over others for [the good of] the *polis*.¹¹⁷

The 'institutions' that constitute the just city are found within visible things, the *dóxa*. Perfect political action is that which having contemplated (*noein*) the Divine, produces artistically a model of the city and imitates it (*mimesis*) entering anew into the 'cave' of pure appearance.

In *Laws* he treats the constitution and magistracies, mode of elections, and the education of youth,¹¹⁸ that is to say, more concrete or empirical levels of politics.

Plato still does not achieve clarity about the forms of organization of the state. He divides them into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, keeping for his ideal state a mixed form of aristocracy of the sages, which taking turns, convert themselves into something like a virtuous monarchy.

[27] For Aristotle (384–322 BCE) practical philosophy comprised only one discourse which began with *Nicomachean Ethics*, included *Economics* and ended in *Politics*.¹¹⁹ There was not an individual or abstract ethic, and later a separate politics. There was a political theme from the very beginning. In effect, in the class notes of *Ethics* he writes:

The most authoritative science, the highest master science [. . .] is obviously the science of politics (*politikè*) [. . .] It lays down which of the sciences there should be in cities, and which each class of person should learn and up to what level [. . .] Political science employs the other sciences [. . .] Its end [. . .] will be the human good (*t'anthrópinon agathón*).¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ See the commentary on this text of the *Republic* in Dussel, 1958, pp. 81f. (Translation: TC).

¹¹⁸ Note that the education of the elites was as important among the Greeks as among the Chinese (more even among the latter, in particular for the Mandarin bureaucratic structure).

¹¹⁹ Aristotle not only studied with Plato, but also with Eudoxus of Cnidus, who it is said spent six months in Egypt studying mathematics. Aristotle wrote that the Egyptians invented the 'mathematical arts' (*mathematikai teknaí*) (*De Caelo*, II, 14; 298 a).

¹²⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 to 27–1094 b 7 (Translation: Crisp, p. 4).

What today we call 'ethics' for Aristotle were the 'customs', the *ethos* of a people. The themes which he treats in those class notes gathered by his disciples are something like 'meditations on the practical field', and the themes are political from beginning to end. He writes that since 'even if the good is the same for an individual as for a city, that of the city is obviously a much greater and more complete thing to obtain and preserve [. . .] Our enquiry, then, is a kind of political science.'¹²¹ That is to say, Aristotle in *Ethics* touches some themes that are political. Politics includes – and this is the theme of the *Nicomachean Ethics* – a description of the common good (*eudaimonía*), of its praxis, of the virtues (in particular of justice and practical knowledge or *phrónesis*), of friendship,¹²² etc., and 'since happiness is a certain kind of activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue [. . .] the true politician (*alétheian politikòs*) is thought to have taken special pains over this [virtue]'.¹²³

But finally Aristotle returns to the deep thesis of the tradition of the nomadic Iron Age horsemen, where contemplative life is superior to political life, and this alone serves as secondary, as serving human necessities, merely a condition of the theoretical life:

Self-sufficiency [. . .] will belong to the activity of contemplation (*theoretikèn*) most of all. For though a wise person, a just person, and anyone with any other virtue, all require the necessities of life [. . .] the just person will need people as associates in and objects of his just actions [. . .] the wise person can contemplate even when he is by himself, the more so the wiser he is. Maybe he can do it better with collaborators, but he is nevertheless the most self-sufficient.¹²⁴

The happier life is reached in leisure (the Greek *scholé*, the Latin *otium*, the *Gelassenheit* of Heidegger); the Egyptians were the first to fulfil this:

[The activity of contemplation] seems also to possess self-sufficiency (*autarkes*), time for leisure (*scholastikón*),¹²⁵ and freedom from fatigue,

¹²¹ Ibid., b 7–11 (Translation: Crisp, p. 4). For the 'good of the city', see Dussel, 1958.

¹²² For all this see Dussel, 1973b, ch. 1: 'The Greek ethics of Aristotle' (pp. 21–44); Dussel, 1973, I, ch. 1 (*Being and Time* of Heidegger was interpreted in that chapter as an ontological re-reading of *Nicomachean Ethics*). It is known that during his stay in Assos and Mytilene (348–335 BCE) Aristotle wrote Books VII–VIII (from 1323 a) and II–III (from 1260 b) of *Politics*, the first politics. After he established the Lyceum (335 to 330 BCE) he wrote Books IV–VI (from 1288 b) and a good part of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In his final years (a little before 322 BCE), he wrote the end of *Ethics* (maybe Books VII–X, but certainly Book X, 6–9, from 1176 a) and the *Constitution of Athens*. See the chronology of the Aristotelian work in my article of 1968 'The definitive ethics of Aristotle or the contemporary moral treatment of *On the Soul*' (Dussel, 1994, pp. 297f.).

¹²³ *Nicomachean Ethics* I, 13, 1102 a 5–8 (Translation: Crisp, p. 20).

¹²⁴ Ibid., Book X, ch. 7, 1177 b 21–4 (Translation: Crisp, p. 195).

¹²⁵ From the word *scholastikón* one derives 'scholastic', which signifies those who have rest, peace, serenity, proper to those who withdraw from the city, like the sages of Memphis in Egypt, who Aristotle says were the first who had a life with *scholé*. See the theme in *Metaphysics* I, 1, 981 b 22–6 (my *Ethics*, Dussel, 1998a, [5]).

[. . . and] whatever else is attributed to the blessed person (*macario*) [. . .]
Thus it will be complete happiness for a human being.¹²⁶

Politics, then, is the most dignified of human activities, but the contemplation of the 'love of knowledge' is 'divine'. There is no difference between the Taoist, the Buddhist monk, the Vedanta or the Manichaeon. In all ways, that great imperial thinker constructed the most structured politics of the civilizing process which we have called 'stage II of the inter-regional system'.

At the level of politics, although he discussed Assos, the 'better city', in his works, he rapidly showed that it was impossible (*adúnaton*)¹²⁷ to explain in this way the Platonic models, and dedicated himself to studying empirically the structure of the 'political constitutions' or the better existing regimes (*politéias tês arístes*),¹²⁸ analysing in a masterly way the diverse political institutions, heterogeneous, because 'a state does not come from people who are alike (*homoíon*)'.¹²⁹ He studies three constitutions (of the enormous Collection that he had assembled): Sparta, Crete and Carthage.¹³⁰

In the 'definitive politics' he has a fundamental proposition: to find the maximum stability, permanence and continuity of the political order.¹³¹ The greater evil in politics is social change, revolution: 'For party strife (*stásis*) is everywhere due to inequality (*ánison*), where classes which are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion.'¹³²

The aim of his political philosophy is to find the form of the most secure, that is to say, the most stable constitution. From there arise his famous six forms of constitutions, which will pass through history with variations: monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy (descending by its value), and democracy, oligarchy and tyranny (ascending by its injustice). But, at the end, he shows that the majority of the constitutions of ancient Greece were mixed forms ('combinations of all the mentioned modes'),¹³³ which continuously moved from one type to another by diverse causes which he analyses at length, giving guidelines for a true political logic. This was the central theme of the 'definitive politics' (in the Lyceum of Athens).

For Aristotle, and in general for the conservative philosophy of the cities, the Alexandrian cosmopolitanism (from 336 BCE) manifested the *hybris*, the chaos, the corruption of the customs, the disproportion (the having crossed the limit of the acceptable), the having intended to give 'human-

126 *Nicomachean Ethics* Book X, ch. 7, 1177 b 21-4 (Translation: Crisp, p. 196).

127 *Politics* II, 1; 1261^a 14.

128 *Ibid.*, 1267^b 30.

129 *Ibid.*, 1261^a 25.

130 In Book II, he criticizes the Platonic position; in Book VII he explains the theme of happiness in the ideal regime; in Book III the theory of citizens following constitutions; in Book VIII the education of youth. In this chronological order he had to write *Politics* of Assos and Mytilene.

131 Books VI-VII (from 1288 b to 1322 b).

132 *Politics* V, 1, 1301 b 27-8 (Translation: Rackham, p. 375).

133 *Ibid.*, VI, 1, 1317 a 1 (Translation: Rackham, p. 485).

ity' (the 'being humans') to the 'Asians', which together with the 'barbarians' had never been considered human by Aristotle, for whom only the 'living who by nature inhabited the [Greek] *pólis*' were human.¹³⁴ Hellenic cosmopolitanism, as later the Roman *imperium* as permanent institution, was a substantive change from the classical political system of Hellas. An imperial monarchy replaced the ancient regimes of the *demos*: the democratic community of the *pólis* lost the exercise and autonomy of political power. Nevertheless, that republican life with democratic shades, or mixtures, would survive in numerous more or less independent cities, those in which the empires would respect a true autonomy in their internal political organization. In any case, the Hellenic monarchies – Seleucid in Mesopotamia (Seleukon, the first capital, was near ancient Babylonia, and the future Baghdad), Ptolemaic in Egypt (with Alexandria as a capital) and Antigonid in Greece – are already part of the political history of the empires and the monarchies and not of the small republics. Epicureanism, Stoicism and the cynics would proliferate as the ethicists of this imperial age, where the isolated human being retreats from the city to reach immediate perfection in the passivity of contemplation (already announced by the old Aristotle), which reminds us of the Taoist, Brahmanic or Buddhist ethics of *nirvana*, now of *apatheia*, of *ataraxia*, of the ascetic sage who attempts the perfection of each one, indifferent to the politics of the empire.

[28] Aristotle wanted to strengthen the 'city-state' (the *pólis*) as the only political totality, against the expansion of Alexander to the *hybris* of Asia: 'The state [*pólis*] is by nature a thing prior to the household and to each of us individually. For the whole [*tò ólon*] must necessarily be prior to the part.'¹³⁵ On the other hand, 'man is by nature a political animal (*politikón zôon*)' and by this 'a man which is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless [Hellenic] is either low in the scale of humanity or above it'.¹³⁶ So, they are not human beings, the members of 'the nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill. [. . .] The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skilful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity.'¹³⁷ The human being, the totality of humanity, the anthropological horizon, reaches to the walls of the Hellenic cities; neither the barbarians nor the Orientals are men. Hellenism is the ontological basis of the human

¹³⁴ It is known that the 'political' in this definition is a Hellenocentric ethnocentrism: *hò ánthropos phúsei politikón zôon* (*Politics* I, I, 1253 a 3).

¹³⁵ *Politics* I, I, 1253 a 19–20 (Translation: Rackham, p. 11). See Bien, 1973.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, I, I, 1253 a 3–4 (Translation: Rackham, p. 9).

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, 6; 1327 b 20–34 (Translation: Rackham, pp. 566–7). See *Hellenic Humanism* (Dussel, 1975a).

world. So, the Hellenists have a 'distinctive aim of the constitution and the laws to enable them to exercise despotic rule (*despózosi*) over their neighbours'.¹³⁸ All this leads Aristotle to think that 'our nobles [Hellenes] regard themselves of noble birth not only among their own people but everywhere (*pantajou*),¹³⁹ but non-Greeks as noble only in their homelands'.¹⁴⁰ Finally, one must not confuse the *pólis* with the mere 'multitude of any and every class (*tó tukhón plêthon*)', since there are in the *pólis* many slaves, metics and foreigners, but only 'the number of those who are a portion of the state, the special parts of which a state consists',¹⁴¹ are human beings; that is to say, the Hellenic free men, not even the Greek women and children. The internal domination declares itself when it says: 'let us begin by discussing the relation of master and slave'.¹⁴² The worst of the description is not: 'these are by nature slaves, for whom to be governed by this kind of authority is advantageous',¹⁴³ but that he carries on to say that 'it is manifest therefore that there are cases of people of whom some are freemen and the others slaves by nature, and for these slavery is an institution both expedient and just'.¹⁴⁴ The weakness of the arguments that are used shows that it is a question of an after-the-fact ideology, a Sophism that justifies a previously adopted option.

The 'common good' of the political whole is the project of the *pólis*, the end. Meanwhile the 'common evil' is revolution, subversion, change.¹⁴⁵ Aristotle, as conservator of the valid order, wants to find the more durable regime, and he proposes 'democracy [because it] is safer (*asfalestéra*) and more free from civil strife (*astasiastos*) than oligarchy'.¹⁴⁶ The political whole is natural, divine, eternal, Hellenic. Hegel was an assiduous reader of Aristotle. He applied the logic of slave Hellenism to colonialist Modernity.

Before ending the study of the Hellenic tradition, we will examine the Stoics who will influence English Empiricism.¹⁴⁷ The exponents of this eth-

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, VII, 2; 1324 b, 4-5 (Translation: Rackham, p. 543). 'Hence even the art of war will by nature be in a manner an art of acquisition (for the art of hunting is a part of it) which is properly employed both against wild animals and against such of mankind as though designed by nature for subjection refuse to submit to it, inasmuch as this warfare is by nature just' (*ibid.*, I, 3; 1256 b 23-7 [Translation: Rackham, p. 37]). This doctrine helped Ginés de Sepúlveda justify the 'conquest' of America.

¹³⁹ This is the 'power' of the so-called ecumenical universal culture, which is in fact imperial and dominating.

¹⁴⁰ *Politics* I, 2; 1255 a 33-6, and adds: 'they imply that freedom and noble birth have two senses, one absolute (*aplós*), the other not' (*ibid.*, a 36-7 [Translation: Saunders, p. 8]).

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 4; 1326 a 19-22 (Translation: Rackham, p. 555).

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 2; 1253 b 15 (Translation: Rackham, p. 15).

¹⁴³ Book V of *Politics* (1301 a f.) occupies itself with the 'preservation' (*sotería*) of the order of the *pólis* and avoiding revolution (*stásis*) or 'the causes which give rise to revolutions in constitutions (*metabállousin hai politeiai*)' (*ibid.*, V, 1; 1301 a 21 [Translation: Rackham, p. 371]).

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1254 b 21 (Translation: Rackham, pp. 24-5). Ginés de Sepúlveda will copy this text and apply it to the American Indian in the beginning of Modernity.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 1255 a 1-2.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 1; 1302 a 9-10 (Translation: Rackham, p. 377).

¹⁴⁷ See on the thoughts of Locke sections [145-51] and of Smith sections [159-64].

ical-cosmopolitan philosophy were, among others, Zeno (336–254 BCE), Chrysippus (281–208 BCE), Posidonius (135–51 BCE), Seneca (died 65 CE) in the Roman world, and Epictetus of Hierapolis (50–138 CE) in the Ptolemaic world. From its founder they thought that the knowledge of the soul came from ‘impressions’ (*τύποις*),¹⁴⁸ which made up a sensitive perception. The soul does not have innate ideas, but elaborates them from the ‘memory’ (*μνήμη*) of impressions and ‘empirical’ (*εμπείρια*) knowledge through their ‘similarity’.¹⁴⁹ In addition, ‘reason’ (*λόγος*) exists, which constructs ‘general ideas’ (*κοινὰ ἐννοιαί*). ‘Imagination’ (*φαντασία, καταλεπτική*) played a fundamental function articulating ideas and impressions. His materialist ontology exclaimed ‘All are but parts of one stupendous whole, whose body Nature is and God is the soul.’¹⁵⁰ The universe has an active (*ποιοῦν*) and a passive (*πάσχον*) principle. The passive is the material without quality; the active is the ‘divine immanent Reason’ in the universe, Destiny, *Λόγος* (*ὁ Λόγος*), Providence (*Πρόνοια*).¹⁵¹ The Stoic ethic powerfully influenced Modernity. The end of life is ‘happiness’ (*εὐδαιμονία*), which consists in living ‘according to nature’ (*ὁμολγούμενος τῆ φύσει ζῆν*), which itself lives according to virtue, since ‘virtue, a disposition, confirms to reason’. For the Stoics the supreme virtue was ‘prudence’ (*φρόνησις*), which permitted a life in fulfilment of duty (*τὸ καθῆκον*), in the sense of right and the law of the city or empire. It was certainly not a politics critical in the face of the structure of Roman society, although it did not accept slavery naively, rebelling against the basis of the economic and military system.

Its most influential ethic teaches (against a truly extreme rationalism) that the human being is moved by passions: pleasure (*ἡδονή*), sadness (*λύπη*), desire (*ἐπιθυμία*), fear (*φόβος*).¹⁵² One has to moderate and dominate the passions, to achieve sovereignty over the ‘slavery’ of the passions. Epictetus taught that human beings have to order their ‘desires according to straight reason’. Marcus Aurelius, for his part, thought that each one received ‘a *daimon* from Zeus that is the reason of each one’.¹⁵³

The human being is naturally social and wants to live in society following an reasoned order. Stoic monism demanded the integration of the ‘instinct of conservation’¹⁵⁴ and ‘love of self’ (*οἰκειόσις*),¹⁵⁵ because the individual has to integrate into family, friendship, the city and all of humanity (near and far). Pantaenus proposed ‘sympathy’ as a sovereign cosmopolitan principle

148 Starting point of Hume’s theory of knowledge.

149 See Copleston, 1964, I, pp. 410f.

150 Ibid., p. 411 (EE: p. 388). He seems to be listening to Spinoza.

151 Then comes the ‘invisible hand’ of Jupiter who intervenes in the universe, and more concretely in the ‘market’ of Smith: ‘[. . .] nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter’, in ‘History of Astronomy’ (Smith, 1982, p. 49).

152 Hume, through the neo-Stoicism of his period, took this thesis very seriously.

153 A theme present in Adam Smith.

154 A theme in Spinoza, Hume, Smith, etc.

155 Proceeding from *οἰκία*, the house, hearth, familiar, owned, passes from one horizon to another to conceiving the universe as one’s ‘own’ house; ‘familiarity’ with the Whole.

that unifies the city and the universe, as 'universal harmony', as the omnipresent divine activity.¹⁵⁶

In the end, Stoicism proposed an ethic of rational self-control derived from the negation of self, from the dominion over the passions which enslave the human being, which Seneca scorned and had to be considered *sub specie aeternitatis*, which sounds Spinozist.

It would be interesting to question the cause of the Stoic influence on Dutch and Anglo-Saxon industrial, mercantile Modernity. The cosmopolitanism of some (the ancients) was articulated perfectly with the globalization of a industrial market which demanded true discipline in relation to nature (industrial exploitability) and politics (the asceticism of the passions against disproportionate consumption, allows the growing accumulation of capital, through the virtue of saving, which Nietzsche will call by its correct name: avarice).

From the Roman *res publica* to the *imperium*

[29] The city of Rome made history because of a special articulation of political organization, the structure of its army and the slave system of economic-mercantile production. From 753 BCE, under the power of the king, the representation of the tribes was structured by their elders (*patres gentium*) who constituted a collegial organ of government: the *senatus* (from: *senes*), an oligarchic request, controlled by the priestly community at the beginning. Its final reference was the primitive military organization of the legions (three contingents of 1,000 warriors with heavy weaponry, like the Greek Hoplites: the Tities, Ramnes and Luceres) who constituted the *comitia curata*. With the fall of Tarquin, the last king, in 510 BCE, came a separation in representation: (a) on the one hand, the senate had the supreme power (up to 49 BCE), constituted by the magistracies (the consuls, praetors, censors, curias and quaestors), based in the power of the curial elections (the ancient *comitia curata*, but now with 3 tribes and 30 curias), the tribune elections (with 4 states and 17 districts), the centurion elections (with 5 classes and 193 centurions: 18 cavalry, 80 heavy infantry and 90 light infantry), and (b), in second place, with a separated institutionality, but always battling, the assembly of the *plebs* (*concilium plebis*, not the whole Roman people but the *Lumpen*) with their tribunes. The political struggle (the strategy to transform the state thanks to the recognition of power, now divided with the 'plebeians',¹⁵⁷ the poor, the marginalized or foreigners) within the empire¹⁵⁸ was carried out within the traditional organs (a) and the 'masses'

¹⁵⁶ So important for Adam Smith.

¹⁵⁷ The derogatory sense of 'plebeian' indicates the negative oligarchic vision of 'popular' (*plebs*), not properly 'people': *populus romanorum* (the Roman people).

¹⁵⁸ Because in that moment traditional representation as the most sacred institution gave way to the unlimited power of the emperor, which would gradually absorb all power. Octavius, or Caesar Augustus, would be simultaneously named *Imperator*, consul, censor, tribune, His Holiness the Pope and *Princeps senatus* by the already corrupt senate.

(b), to achieve Roman citizenship and the defence of their interests thanks to the representative institutions (among them the tribunes).¹⁵⁹ In effect, from 509 to 300 BCE the plebeians will rebel cyclically.¹⁶⁰ It is clear that even the plebeians used slave labour; they rebelled in one part of the empire with Spartacus (73–71 BCE) and they were brutally repressed.

The Roman political system based itself in a strong militarist organization,¹⁶¹ and because of the enemies without (in the first place, all the Italian peoples) and within (in part the plebeians, but more the slaves), they could only have responded to them with a violent offensive organization. First, Rome had 'to hunt' slaves in other villages, a permanent stratagem until its fall. Second, Rome had to control Italian territory (by struggling against Alba Longa, the Etruscans, the Samnites who they robbed of their women¹⁶² – from 343 to 290 BCE – or Pirro of Epirus – who hegemonized southern Italy, already an international war). By 265 BCE Rome dominated southern Italy. Third was the expansion beyond Italy, against Carthage (264–146 BCE), which ended the Phoenician domination over Sicily and later the African province, allowing Rome to become a Mediterranean power,¹⁶³ whose geopolitical horizon would be called the *Mare Nostrum*. Nevertheless, Rome would lose the eastern provinces of the Hellenic Empire; fixing thus the present cultural frontiers (with the exception of a short presence of the Byzantine Heracles) by the dominion over those eastern regions of the empire of, first the Parthians (from Mesopotamia to Persia and Bactria), later the Persian Sassanids and, finally, the Muslims.

When Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BCE – as seen in the Greek system with the Alexandrian Empire or, as we will see, in the USA after the Second World War, and especially from 1989 – the Roman Repub-

¹⁵⁹ This political stratagem will show the flexibility of the Roman oligarchy in the face of the first 'democratizing' challenges of the plebes, later the Roman Empire's colonial oligarchies. It was a key to political escape which diminished tension and expanded participation but in political bodies with little power (since the imperial state monopolized power in the management of its legions: its military organization, under the control of the Senate, until exercised only by the emperor).

¹⁶⁰ In the year 494 BCE the first rebellion occurs and they get to be represented by a tribune; in 471 there are already five tribunes. In 451, the 'Law of the twelve tables' (*XII Tabularum Libellus*) is another achievement of the Plebes. In 366 they get a Plebeian consul, etc.

¹⁶¹ Given the geopolitics of Rome (founded on some insignificant undulations, and in a plain of hundreds of kilometres between the Mediterranean and the Apennines), the only defence of the city was its military potential.

¹⁶² Robbery is the origin of power as domination; thus, the English, Dutch and French pirates will rob the gold and the silver of the Spanish, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who, for their part, robbed the Amerindians. A worthy origin of capital!

¹⁶³ In the Mediterranean the following shipping powers existed: (1) Alexandria in Ptolemaic Egypt (dominated by Rome in 30 BCE); (2) Antioch in the Seleucid kingdoms (dominated in 190 BCE); (3) Pergamon in the Aegean and Anatolia (129 BCE); (4) Thessalonica in Macedonia and Greece (sometimes Athens, others Corinth, etc.) (127 BCE, the province Achaia; Athens is sacked by Roman soldiers in 86 BCE); (5) Carthage in the western Mediterranean (destroyed in 146 BCE); (6) Marseilles in the north-western Mediterranean (121 BCE); and (7) Rome. One by one Rome would dominate its opponents, thanks to its military (first), political and economic (later) organization.

lic transformed itself slowly into the *Imperium*. It was a radical political transformation, and of great importance for the badly named Middle Ages. If Montesquieu speaks of eastern 'despotism', Rome fell into the Age of 'despotism'.

[30] A Greek in the capital of the empire, like Hannah Arendt in the USA,¹⁶⁴ would make an apology for the mixed Roman system: Polybius (205–123 BCE), in Book VI of his *Histories*, showed that Rome owed its success to having created a mixed regime.¹⁶⁵ With a political optimism, since he attributed the Roman triumph to the type of constitution, he offered a global historical vision of the evolution of the political structures. The first system is monarchic, the second aristocratic and the third 'democratic' (which he calls *politía*).¹⁶⁶ To these three constitutional structures he opposes the defective modes: tyranny, oligarchy and ochlocracy.¹⁶⁷ The difference between the adequate and inadequate political regimes is based on certain criteria: (a) some count on consensus, others base themselves on force and terror; (b) some found themselves on law, others in arbitrariness. It is a question, however, of systems of legitimation, to which it is possible to add that all wanted to count on the affirming will of the gods, a question which we will treat in the next section, and which is unnoticed by many contemporary political philosophers. A specialist cites this famous text:

The first in order is monarchy; which is established by the bare work of nature, without any preparation or design. From monarchy arises royalty; when art has been applied, to correct the vices of the former. And when royalty has degenerated into its congenial evil, which is tyranny; the destruction of the latter gives birth to aristocracy. This again being changed, according to the natural order of things, into oligarchy; the subjects, roused to vengeance by oppression, resist the injustice of their governors, and establish a democracy. And, in the last place, when the people themselves become haughty and untractable, and reject all law; to democracy succeeds, in the course of time, the government of the multitude.¹⁶⁸

For Polybius, consequently, the power of the Roman state was due to its mixed system of constitution, but, by a natural evolution, the cycle would have to repeat. He lived in the second century BCE, so he could not predict the empire, but how would he have judged the corruption of the mixed system and the birth of an imperial and despotic absolute monarchy?

¹⁶⁴ Which is to say, a female Jewish European continental philosopher in the empire. She accumulated many negatives about Christian, philosophically Anglo-Saxon machismo, and, nevertheless, had the generosity of spirit to make an apology.

¹⁶⁵ Polybius, 1981, VI, p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., VI, p. 3.

¹⁶⁷ *Ochlós* in Greek is opposed to people (*demos*), it is the Roman *plebs* (opposed to *populus*): multitude, masses, *Lumpen*.

¹⁶⁸ Polybius, 1981, VI, p. 4 (quoted in Bobbio, 1989, p. 47).

Cicero lived through this fundamental transformation. Being a member of the oligarchy, he defended the senate, because he thought that the monarchy was the better system, although he judged that the mixed system was superior, he opposed the empire of Julius Caesar: 'It seems to me that of the three forms monarchy is preferable, but superior to it is the balanced composite of the three better forms of constitution.'¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, and this is fundamental, Roman philosophy, being an activity not properly of the *ethos* of this warrior people and supporting a 'state of law' (a little like Habermas, who hopes more for the legal and monopolist use of force on the part of the state than morality), inclined itself toward the almost exclusive cultivation of ethics (like the Confucians) and not of ontologies (like the Greeks, Taoists, Buddhists and Hindu Vedantas). However, it conceived these ethics as therapy for the individual subjectivity that seeks the *beatitudo* (the Greek *eudaimonia* or the blessed happiness of the contemplative sages, as in Egyptian Memphis in its *scholé* or sacred *otium*; it is the *vita contemplativa*) abandoning the practice of political life (the *vita activa* of the Romans or of Hannah Arendt). The Sceptics (whose political 'escapism' was almost absolute), Epicureans and Stoics (these in a much more subtly complex way) have an instrumental vision of political life (like Plato and Aristotle).¹⁷⁰ The Stoics, nevertheless, started to redefine a true horizon, which would allow a substantial transformation of universal cosmopolitan politics:

Stoic politics is built, to a great extent, on ideas not of human incompleteness but of human dignity and self-government. This emphasis, especially when combined with Stoic universalism about the potential for virtue, puts the Stoics in a position to make a strong contribution to accounts of human rights and human freedom.¹⁷¹

[31] Cicero (106–43 BCE), as a professional politician, would defend the importance of political life in the face of the corruption of the Roman institutions as the despotism of the empire began. A student of Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon,¹⁷² and a reader in Greek of Plato and Aristotle, he travelled to Greece (79–77 BCE) to study with Phaedo and Zenon in Athens and with Posidonius in Rhodes. He was a great rhetorician (81–49 BCE), who knew the rules of pragmatics; he was expelled from public matters by Caesar, which obliged him to change residence for reasons of security. He was assassinated by the *sicarii* of Caesar Augustus in 43 BCE. His head and hands were exhibited sadistically in the Forum (despotism constructs itself around terror!), and Fulvia (wife of Mark Antony, who was whipped by

¹⁶⁹ *Republic*, I, 45 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷⁰ See the studies of Martha Nussbaum, in particular *The Therapy of Desire* (Nussbaum, 1994).

¹⁷¹ See Nussbaum, 1994, p. 504.

¹⁷² See Collins, 1998, pp. 109–14.

Cicero in the *Filípicas*) perforated his tongue in a sign of repudiation. He wanted to introduce philosophy to Rome, and he dedicated himself feverishly to this in his last years (49–3 BCE). In the *Republic* (written between 54 and 51 BCE) he showed that if the perfect life demands virtue, and given that ‘virtue depends entirely on its exercise; and its most noble exercise is the government of public matters,¹⁷³ political life is superior to contemplative life. In the dialogue *The Dream of Scipio* he defended the superiority of philosophical life,¹⁷⁴ which seems more dignified. But Cicero showed that political life is superior and for this it deserves divine recompense after death; but, in this life, a life that ‘unites these two arts’ (politics and contemplation) is the better life.¹⁷⁵ With the Sceptics, Cicero affirmed the impossibility of absolute or perfect knowledge; he knew the limits of politics although he defended honesty as a universal principle. He knew also that political action depends on the ‘disposition of the judges’ (the form of the constitution), for this reason, in his confrontations with Julius Caesar, never openly, he defended the mixed form (like Polybius) and not the empire (which in reality he sees as tyranny).

The ethical cosmopolitanism is typical of a powerful empire but worn out by a true illegitimacy. The gods got further away and more numerous (like those of the colonial nations ‘piled’ in the Pantheon); the empire made itself extremely extensive; the life of each citizen was left to her/his own initiative; the ethics of salvation multiplied and the *ethos* of the empire entered into crisis. In 476 CE, the last Latin empire fell. The life of the empire migrated to the east, first to Constantinople, which would burst into the West as the Greek ‘renaissance’ in Italy. The Latin–Germanic Empire (Europe still gestating) would follow a long peripheral path for 1,300 years; a secondary path, never hegemonic in the history of global politics, until the installation of its colonial world and the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century.

173 *Republic*, I, 2.

174 *Ibid.*, I, 28.

175 *Ibid.*, III, 4–6. Cicero intended this synthesis. He was in truth much more political than Plato (who also wanted to enter politics in Syracuse), but much less philosophical. In addition he indicates that among the Greeks none was as great a political (as Cicero) and philosophical orator: ‘I notice which not a single Greek ever succeeded in working and trying to achieve something in both areas; which is to say in forensic oratory (*forense dicendi*) and in the category of private discussion’ (*De Officiis*, I, 3; Cicero, 1965, p. 105 [Translation: Griffin and Atkins, p. 4]).

The Rebellion of the Victims and the Slow Invention of the Secular State

[32] Modern politics will not be born in one day. It will need the fermentation of 15 centuries, full of intersubjective experiences and radically innovative politics, which the histories of political philosophy generally ignore due to a naïve methodological Jacobin reductionism which it is time to overcome.

At the beginning of the fourth century CE we find the western Chin in China; in 320 CE they will rule the Gupta in India; Buddhism expands from Afghanistan to China and Japan; in the Persian Sassanid Empire Shapur II takes the throne in 309 CE; and Diocletian rules in Rome until 305 CE. In a short time all will change. A new scenario of innovative political strengths will cover what we have called the Asiatic–Afro-Mediterranean ‘stage III of the inter-regional system’.¹ The classic period of this global-historical stage III is the thirteenth century CE, with its new coexisting great empires with a more developed reproduction of life, a new type of consensuality of the masses, and monarchic and oligarchic elites. The work of Janet Abu-Lughod on the ‘ancient system’ before European hegemony is excellent.² The expansion of the Mongols to the ‘ends of the earth’ (the icy tundra from Mongolia to Russia) allowed the establishment of a connection from northern China to India, the Muslim caliphates, the Byzantine Empire and Latin-Germanic Europe. This classic culmination of this historical stage took more than ten centuries to form its boundaries from Mindanao in the Philippines, to the east, to Morocco or the Atlantic *Finis Terrae* to the west, Portugal; from the icy tundra of Russia, in the north, to the steppes in the south of the Sahara.

1 This has been a central theme to which I have dedicated a good part of my philosophical and historical works – to overcome a certain pathological Eurocentrism installed for nearly two centuries in the ‘academies’ of Europe and the USA. See my works: Dussel, 1966, §§ 31–36 (work that can be consulted, like all my other works, at www.enriquedussel.org); in addition Dussel, 1969a; 1973a, §§ 6–10; 1974a, §§ 7–50; 1978, pp. 15–49; 1986; 1998 [18–26]; in particular the older articles ‘From Secularization to the Secularism of Science’ (1969c), pp. 91–113, and ‘The Negative Moment: The Atheism of the Prophets and of Marx’ (in Dussel, 1993, pp. 235–57).

2 Abu-Lughod, 1989.

The transformations will cause a revolution in the conception and experience of political subjectivity: 'free', meaning non-slave in the ancient world (stage II of the inter-regional system), becomes a decision of the will, with subjective liberty and self-referencing responsibility; public and private intersubjectivity discovers a new conception and experience of communitarian life through a new solidarity; the secularization of the political structures and, fundamentally important, the location of utopia not as Uranic transcendence (the vertically 'separated' kingdom from the Neoplatonic ideas) but as future, messianic kingdom. This opening to the future defines the factual, valid, positive political situation; the 'kingdom of Cain' (the 'earthly city' of Augustine, not the empirical city of Plato) is open to the exteriority of a 'kingdom of Abel' (the apocalyptic 'celestial city', idea of utopian transformation). The Alterity of the oppressed, victims, poor, the widow and the orphan, the foreigner, those excluded from the *demos* or the *forum*, the carnality full of necessities (eating, drinking, dressing, inhabiting . . .), cries out from their Exteriority: far from the Stoic brotherhood, solidarity with the Other is born! The enemy is discovered (the Nietzschean clamour is now possible: 'Oh enemies, there are no enemies!, yells the madman that I am').³ The ontological and ethical-political conditions make Dante, Machiavelli or 'modern' politics possible, but also the critique of the political positivity of Modernity is made possible, which today is important to us.

Discovery of the Critical Intersubjectivity from Alterity. The Jewish Diaspora and Christian Sect as Victims of the Roman Empire

[33] It is difficult to revive original situations, removing the dust of that 'already made redundant'. It is difficult to see with new eyes the political revolution of Judaism and its pristine Christian-Messianic heterodoxy in the Roman Empire. In the new *pathos* one finds the creative originality.

The critical political conception of the Semitic and Christian tradition under Hellenic and Roman domination is in general badly interpreted, given the confusion between Christianity and Christendom.⁴ Christianity is a critical-messianic religion, of clear political-prophetic meaning for the poor and slaves of the Roman Empire. Christendom, on the contrary, inaugurated principally by Constantine in the eastern Byzantine Empire, from the fourth century, confusingly subordinates the Christian religion to political-economic structures, the Hellenistic-Roman Mediterranean culture:

³ *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, I, § 376; Nietzsche, 1973, I, p. 404 (Translation: TC). We will see this Nietzschean expression re-taken reductively by Derrida (1994). On 'madness', in the sense of Paul of Tarsus, consider the expression 'Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?' (1 Cor. 1.20). We will refer in the future to this theme.

⁴ See the difference between 'Christianity' and 'Christendom' (*Christentum, Chrétienté*) in Löwith, 1964, pp. 350-415). It is a categorical distinction that one finds at the base of all the historical works I have written on the history of Christianity, in particular of Latin America or 'Christendom of the Indies' (see Dussel, 1967; 1978; 1983, pp. 76f.; 1993, pp. 33f., etc.).

Christendom is a culture that has a cultural–religious Christian component. Christendom, not quite secularized, still survives in the twenty-first century in the aim of those who want to include a Christian–cultural declaration in the European Constitution, or in the ‘crusade’ of George W. Bush in the Islamic world. It will be expressed clearly in Thomas Hobbes, as we will see further on.

Given this confusion, political philosophy starts with the Jacobin prejudice that discards narratives or mythical stories (for being religious), not distinguishing between interpreting them (a) from a rational truth claim (philosophical), or (b) from the confessional claim of validity that they can have in a historical religious community. The myths of Osiris or Adam (like Prometheus),⁵ like the *Theogony* of Hesiod, do not suppress their cultural and rational importance as the object of a philosophical hermeneutic. The philosopher analyses the mythical narrative without assuming it as confessional truth claim (as a community which accepts the text as ‘revealed’), but the philosopher assumes it as a historical fact with an observable factual performative effect; that is to say, s/he analyses the narrative from her/his aim of rational validity. That the Egyptians ‘accept’ the content of the myth of Osiris, and that they act daily, existentially and intersubjectively in the face of Ma’ar’s ‘final judgement’, signifies that the myth had performative effects in history, through its mythical truth claim accepted by the Egyptians, which produced political effects that the philosopher can interpret. The same can be said of a book like Jeremiah, the Apocalypse of John, Luke or the Letter to the Romans, today taken into account by J. Lacan, S. Žižek, A. Badiou, G. Agamben and others. These last texts had been discarded by the philosophical hermeneutic, castrating a hidden political history.

In fact, in the empires referred to before (Chinese, Hindustan, Persian, Hellenic or Roman) there had been successive social and political rebellions. The Semitic rebellions (the messianic movements of Judaism, primitive Christianity and the first experiences of Islam) produced a deep transformative action in the ancient slave political order of the second inter-regional stage, redefining intersubjectivity, as the victims subverted the systems of the exercise of power, creating new institutions, producing new laws, changing the implicit normative principles.

The founder of Christianity, Jesus of Nazareth, who emerges on the Semitic horizon (speaking Aramaic, a Canaanite dialect) within the Roman Empire, in its eastern region under Hellenist control, as a critical Israelite, bases his difference within the most ancient tradition of his Jewish people (strict observance of the ‘law’, from which he did not intend to separate). Jesus, overcoming the narrow nationalism of some Jewish sects, opens himself to the wide horizon of a universalism that will produce unexpected consequences. On the one hand, he teaches his disciples to avoid all hatred

⁵ Paul Ricœur created a philosophical hermeneutic of the myth of Prometheus and of Adam (Ricœur, 2004).

against so-called 'enemies'⁶ from a universal messianic hope,⁷ but at the same time undermines the theocratic aim of the Davidic political messianism of certain groups⁸ and opens the project to all people, far from the horizon of the kingdom of Israel,⁹ including all nations (*ethnê*), the *goim* (the 'nations'), in its new intersubjective alliance. It is a universal eschatological 'kingdom',¹⁰ an ethical-political postulate.

But even more important for a *critical* politics is the construction of an original *strictly rational category* in the history of political philosophy, the meta-category of *political exteriority*, of ethical Alterity, which, being of Jewish origin,¹¹ acquires in the teachings of Jesus a centrality, which installs itself as the nucleus of many of cultures ('Christendoms').

[34] As a philosopher, effecting a political hermeneutic, I will take as example the ethical-rational narrative devised by that Semitic master (truly an organic intellectual)¹² in the face of the question 'Who is my neighbour?'¹³, which could be translated better as 'Who is it who lives the experience of the

6 Here one finds the nucleus of the Nietzschean text, as Derrida comments on inadequately: 'Oh enemies, there are no enemies!', says the madman that I am', as we will see further on.

7 As a Roman colony, the tax collector for the Romans was the most hated person. On arriving in Jericho Jesus calls the tax collector Zacchaeus, who in thanks puts him up in his house, but before this Jesus exclaims: 'For the Son of Man came to seek out and to save the lost' (Luke 19.10).

8 When some Herodians (Herod was the native colonial leader collaborating with the Roman occupation) and some sages launch the most awkward political question for a colonial world: 'Is it lawful to pay taxes to the emperor, or not?' (Mark 12.14), Jesus (knowing that if he says 'no' he helps the political groups of the Zealots – Jewish guerrillas – and situates his project at an anti-Roman political messianic level, and if he says 'yes' helps the Herodian collaborationism), responds in a disconcerting manner, opening a gap in which Christianity (not Christendom) will establish a prophetic messianism of great political transcendence (that will produce the secularization of the state). Jesus, asking for a coin of the empire, asks: 'Whose head is this, and whose title? They answered, 'The emperor's'. Jesus said to them, 'Give to the emperor the things that are the emperor's, and to God the things that are God's.' (Mark 12.17) With that he separates strongly the (a) negative critical-messianic or prophetic function from the (b) merely positive reproduction of the dominating, slave-based political system. When he declares the 'anointed' (with the sacred oil: *meshiakh*), and these 'anointed' can be kings (political messianic-Davidic function) or messianic-prophetic critics (ethical-political function), they want to crown him 'king' to free them from the Romans. But [when] Jesus, 'realized that they were about to come and take him by force to make him king, he withdrew again to the mountain by himself' (John 6.15).

9 'The queen of the South will rise up at the judgement with this generation and condemn it' (Matt. 12.42) (refers to the co-nationals who persecute them). In the 'final judgement' (like the 'final judgement' of Osiris in the hall of Ma'at) 'all the nations will be gathered before him' (Matt. 25.32).

10 See Jeremias, 1956, pp. 45f.; Dussel, 1969a, pp. 6of.

11 See Levinas, 1968, pp. 259f.; 1973, I, chap. 3; 1977 etc.

12 This 'story' is called *midrash*. It is neither symbolic nor mythical, but rational, and is constructed over the base of selected situations of daily life with pedagogical intention. The 'myth of the cave' of Plato is a 'symbolic' story (or mythical), nor the 'parable (or *midrash*) of the Samaritan', that has no element of symbol or myth. It is an ethical-rational narrative with an explicitly methodical structure.

13 Luke 10.25-37.

face-to-face?,¹⁴ or 'Who establishes the experience of *proximity?*'¹⁵ In the face of that question, the subtle methodical expert in ethical-rational critical categories answers developing a narrative, constructing a 'history' (*story*), a socio-political story. By a path 'went down a man from Jerusalem to Jericho and some bandits assaulted him'. The hermeneutical situation starts firstly from the 'established system', the 'Totality' (the political Jewish system, the path) and a victim ('assaulted him, denuded him, beat him'). The victim of the assault was 'outside' the path, the order, the system, in the 'exteriority' of the legitimate, established political totality. With a deep critical sense, missing from the myth of the cave of Plato,¹⁶ that *rabí* (methodical master of critical rhetoric) has the most prestigious person in the social and political order of Israel walk down the path first: 'went down a priest'. And in a critical, ironic, brutal manner expresses to the 'scribe' (lawyer) who interpolates: 'on seeing him, made a detour and passed by'. The Totality of the system hindered him from opening himself to the socio-political exteriority of the victim.¹⁷ For greater provocation still (much more than the Nietzschean Zarathustra), he turns to the tribe of Levi, venerated by the Jerusalemite elite: 'a Levite did the same'. That is to say, the sages, the betters, those most venerated in the system could not assume responsibility for the victim, the Other. The horizon of the system kept them from stepping 'outside' it; outside the law. The one scorned by the values of the system, a Samaritan (a metic for a Greek, a Gaul for a Roman, an infidel for a medieval Christian or Muslim, a slave or an Indian in the first Modernity, a *Lumpen* in capitalism, etc.), again, irony, the mordant critique, the subversive intention of values: 'on seeing him, had solidarity,¹⁸ came near to him and bandaged his wounds'. These texts have not been assumed by contemporary political philosophy, either in the USA or Europe. Nevertheless, they are the most revolutionary we have observed in the history of politics to this moment, not understood in all the politics of the Iron Age peoples, called previously 'Indo-Europeans' in particular, Greek and Roman.

The concept of *plesíos* (the near or close, neighbour) or of *plesíazo* (to come nearer, to make close) in Greek does not indicate adequately the doubled Hebrew of 'face-to-face' (*paním el paním*). This is the empirical immediacy

¹⁴ 'Face-to-face' (*paním el paním* in Hebrew) is the categorical expression of a central experience for a critical politics, as we will see.

¹⁵ See in Levinas, 1974, pp. 102f.: 'La proximité'.

¹⁶ The Platonic 'criticality' is theoretical: in the cave shadows are seen, not realities; they are confused with reality by 'the majority' (*hoi polloi*), the common people. The sages, the few, the better, leave the cave: it is a politically aristocratic myth. The socio-political story of the *midrash* of the Samaritan is not mythical, it is socio-political, it is neither aristocratic nor democratic, it is *critical*; it is not theoretical, it is practical; it is not only ethical, it is socio-political.

¹⁷ See the ethical-philosophical sense of this action of 'closure' of the Totality (Dussel, 1973a, II, § 21: 'The ethical-ontological evil as totalitarian totalization of the Totality', pp. 34f.).

¹⁸ Much later we will express that this 'solidarity' (as emotiveness overturned to the critical exteriority of the victim) is not the mere 'fraternity' of Derrida, nor the compassion of Schopenhauer, nor paternalistic commiseration, nor sensitive pity, etc.

of two confronting human faces, face-to-face, lips-to-lips,¹⁹ when the suffering of the victim is revealed,²⁰ when he interprets the political responsibility for the Other and demands the overcoming of the Totality's horizon ('leaving the [established] path').

This ethical-political position is not a Stoic therapy of the desires to reach a subjective peace (no other thing is the *ataraxía* like the *apátheia*),²¹ but simply and directly the public-political therapy from the Other ('bandaged his wounds giving him oil and wine'), which gives life, the one who risks being swindled by the Other.

[35] There are two foundational categories of a critical politics: (a) the established order ('of this world': *ek toutou tou kósmou*), the Totality, as the presupposition to be deconstructed; and (b) the horizontal transcendence of historical temporality as political exteriority, future ('I do not belong to this world': *oúk eimí ek tou kósmou toutou*):²² exteriority. The 'law' structures the established order ('this order' or 'world') and is necessary. But when the 'law' kills one should not carry it out. Abraham had to sacrifice his son Isaac, as the 'law' of the Semites mandated, and as was strictly fulfilled in Tyre or Carthage,²³ but he found a way to replace him with an animal (following a Jewish tradition which Jesus joined, in opposition to the dogmatic position of the temple priests, against whom Jesus struggled). In the face of the authority of the 'law', Jesus accuses:

If you were Abraham's children, you would be doing what Abraham did, but now you are trying to kill me [. . .] This is not what Abraham did²⁴

19 In the Semitic erotica of the *Shir ashirim* (*Song of Songs*), the mouths of the lovers enter into contact (whose phenomenology Levinas realizes with such precision and beauty 1968, pp. 232–63), in 'immediacy': *ishakní mineshikót pnihú* ('that kisses me with the lips of her mouth').

20 From 1970 I insist on this experience, always political: see Dussel, 1973a, I, ch. 3, and later in volumes II–V is analysed as the interpellation of the Other as other, as the other gender or sex, as new generations, as excluded or exploited fellow citizen, as victim in an open sense; in addition, see Dussel, 1977a, § 2.6; 1986, § 4.2; 1995a (all the work, considering the Indian as the original Other of Modernity); 1996, ch. 2: 'The Reason of the Other: Interpellation as speech-act' (pp. 15f.); 1998, chs 4 and 5.

21 See Nussbaum, 1994.

22 John 8.21–47.

23 Marx knew this and called it Moloch (Phoenician god), who needed firstborn child sacrifices (like Edgar, Marx's son, who he considered 'one more victim of the idol') for the capital that produces interest (the more fetishized form far from 'actual work'). The Abrahamic myth has found a central place in the work of Žižek or F. Hinkelammert, and earlier in Hegel.

24 The dominant Judaism, and later Christendoms, affirmed a sacrificing Abraham (the Father asked for the blood of the Son). 'Jesus, however, appears to interpret this myth in a different way and recovers the original significance of the text. Abraham is liberated from the Law, took into account that the law demanded an assassination and discovers the God whose law is the Law of life [. . .] He does not kill, because he took into account that liberty is in not killing. His faith is in that: not in being willing to kill, neither his son nor others. Abraham, free by Law, was liberated to be an Abraham free in the face of the Law' (Hinkelammert, 1998, pp. 51–2).

[. . .] I do not have a demon²⁵ [. . .] Are we not right in saying that you are a Samaritan?²⁶

The law gives life when the order is just. When the law represses the possibility of the new it kills. So, what is constructed from the challenge of the victims who interpret from Exteriority (proving the injustice of 'this world', the established order, by their mere socio-political existence), from the 'order which is not of this world' (being historical, possible, more just: the 'kingdom of heaven', which Marx sensed *partially* with his 'kingdom of freedom', and Kant with his 'ethical community'),²⁷ is far from the law that kills.

In effect, Jesus died young on a cross (the electric chair of the Romans) in a strictly political situation:

We found this man perverting our nation²⁸, forbidding us to pay taxes to the emperor, and saying that he himself is the Messiah, a king [. . .] He stirs up the people by teaching throughout all Judea, from Galilee where he began even to this place [. . .] That same day Herod [the colonial collaborator] and Pilate [the imperial soldier] became friends with each other; before this they had been enemies.²⁹

It is interesting to observe that the circumstances, accusations, sentence and negotiations are political. Jesus is accused of being critical of the valid order (as much in peripheral and colonial Palestine as with respect to the empire) in favour of a 'people of the land' (*'a 'a-aretz*), the poor and oppressed. But that *critical* practice on the part of Jesus was coherent with his teachings. He had expressed: 'Blessed are you who are poor.' and 'Woe to you who are rich [. . .], who are full [. . .], who are laughing now [. . .],

²⁵ Nietzsche says: 'the madman who I am' (text already cited earlier). Jesus was also 'crazy' according to the temple priests: an insanity of 'this world', of the established order. Critical rationality of the world to come ('I am not of this world'). The ethical-political transcendentalism of the category of Exteriority was made substantive by the Christendoms (and their modern enemies) as a kingdom of heaven, exclusively religious. It lost its critical *rational* exteriority of subversive universality. All the revolutionary movements of the culture called Western Latin, European (and Byzantine, Coptic, Armenian, etc.) arise from this critical horizon.

²⁶ In Israel, to be a 'Samaritan' is at the same time someone who knows nothing of the 'Law', and also an enemy of the temple (because the Samaritans claimed that one had to worship God on Mount Gerizim). This shows the sense of the '*midrash*' of the Samaritan, but also indicates the critical sense when he spoke with the Samaritan and exclaimed: 'the hour is coming when you will worship [. . .] neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem' (John 4.20). Jesus universalizes the critical challenge of the prophets of Israel within the horizon of the Roman Empire, and further (since their messianic communities will arrive in the Persian Empire, and through Turkistan and Tarim reach Mongolia and China).

²⁷ See *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (Kant, 1969, VII, 760; p. 101 [Translation: Wood; III, p. 105]).

²⁸ The Greek expression *diastréfonta* to *éthnos* signifies 'pervert', 'twist', 'mislay', 'mobilize', producing a 'rebellion' of the nation.

²⁹ Luke 23.1-5. As we indicated earlier, 'messiah' (anointed, consecrated) can be as much the critical master (prophet) as the Jewish king. Jesus admits to being a critical master (a messiah) but not a king. He risks this misunderstanding. See Dussel, 1974a.

for you will mourn and weep.³⁰ In the caste tradition the not fulfilled 'order' (sacred) was punished with exclusion: the pariah, the last, the 'untouchable' (dirty). Jesus, in contrast, inverts the rule, and ethically and politically expresses the logic of all critical politics: the political order that excludes the weak, the economic order that produces a victim, a poor person, is perverse. The critical criterion ('damned') is the victim, the poor person, the untouchable, the 'bandit', the other as the 'sacred', the 'just'. He has subverted the ethical-political sense of all Greek and Roman knowledge of the Iron Age horsemen (those badly named 'Indo-Europeans') of stage II of the inrer-regional system. In him 'I have made justice with the widow, the orphan and the poor!' (or the foreigner) from the ancient judicial Mesopotamian codes which had expressed the same (originated in regional stage I), but now clarified and developed (inaugurating historically the inter-regional stage III).

[36] The death of Jesus is very different from that of Socrates. The two die in front of their disciples. One, Socrates, happy for abandoning the limitations that his body imposed on his divine and immortal soul, which returned to the gods. He had fulfilled the native laws although he was accused unjustly. The other, Jesus, with fear in the face of real death ('sweating blood'), awaiting the uncertain resurrection (inaugurated mythically 30 centuries before by Osiris), for having opposed the law, the political (empire) and religious (the temple, its elites and its soldiers) order, is condemned to a horrible public torment, between thieves. For Jesus the final criterion is not the law but human life. If the law kills one does not have to fulfil it; if the law gives life it is necessary to obey it:

I tell you, something greater than the temple is here. But if you had known what this means, '*I desire mercy and not sacrifice*', you would not have condemned the guiltless. For the Son of Man is lord of the Sabbath [the Law, 'this world', the 'order'].³¹

For this, Franz Hinkelammert writes that Jesus

constitutes a rebellious subject who understands his rebellion as a necessary extension of Mosaic law. Jesus, one sees in all the gospels, is this rebellious subject who asks all human beings to follow him. He is not the revolutionary subject, nevertheless he underlies all later revolutionary movements [of the West], even in the case in which the revolution devours the rebellious subject who started it. He even underlies Christianity after it comes to power [in Christendom], despite this being devoured in the course of history.³²

³⁰ Luke 6.20-6. These texts are well known in 'Western' 'Christian' culture but have not been taken seriously into account in actual political philosophy, nor has one discovered their political rational criticality that easily could be an object of a philosophical hermeneutic.

³¹ Luke 12.6-8.

³² Hinkelammert, 1998, p. 38 (Translation: TC). In this magnificent work, Hinkelammert develops the methodological thesis that 'religious' texts can be treated philosophically.

The Anti-Christ of Nietzsche has a pale critical similarity to the historical Jesus. The frequent descriptions of Christianity (even those of Rosenzweig or Levinas) do not consider the critical position of Jesus, but the fossilized position of Christendom.

The primitive community of the followers of the 'Anointed' (*meshiach*, in Greek *christós*) was called *christianoí* in the capital of the Seleucid Antioch. These 'anointed', poor, persecuted, constituted communities, at the beginning including a 'community of goods' (called 'primitive socialism', which will continue with the cenobite monks), in the houses of slaves (so numerous in the Roman Empire, as Max Weber describes), in the cemeteries or catacombs (because there the Roman army did not act out of respect for the ancestors), among the displaced, immigrants, foreigners, victims of Hellenistic-Roman domination. From Galilee they pass to Jerusalem, the Jewish capital itself, persecuted by some members of the elite, and from there to Samaria, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, Athens, Alexandria and finally Rome.³³ Like wildfire those militants of the first hour exclaimed with Tatian in his *Discourse against the Greeks*:

With us there is no desire for false glory nor do we employ subtleties of doctrine (*dógmatos*). [. . .] All who wish to philosophize (*philosophéin*) are at home with us; we do not scrutinize appearances or judge those who come to us by their looks, for we reckon that all³⁴ can be vigorous in mind, even if they are weak in body. [. . .] All this I set down, not from second-hand knowledge, but after much travel. I followed your studies and came across many devices and many notions, and finally I spent time in the city of the Romans and got to know the varieties of statues which they brought home with them from you. For I do not try, as is the habit of most men, to strengthen my case with other men's opinions; I want to compose an account of everything which I personally came to know. So having taken my leave of Roman arrogance and Athenian cold cleverness-incoherent bases of doctrine (*dógmasin asynártetois*) – I sought out the philosophy which you consider barbarous (*káta bárbarous philosophon*).³⁵

He writes: 'I take the gospel of John as a text that speaks of a reality [. . .] A text as the gospel of John cannot be treated according to the bureaucratic criteria of our university faculties today. It does not fit into any, and has to be seen with all [. . .] On the whole it shapes a categorical framework that channels through later history, and is still present in spite of all the so-called secularizations. The importance of Greek philosophy uniquely comes from the categorical framework created from these basic texts, that are *theological* only in appearance. They constitute all our thinking in categorical ends [. . .] Nietzsche still has the perception that the categorical mark of all [Western] culture of the last 2000 years was formulated by Paul [. . .] The expulsion of our original texts from the discussion of our bases reveals a great anguish [. . .]' (ibid., pp. 15–17 [Translation: TC]). It is an illuminating book.

³³ Acts (*Praxeis apóstolōn*) narrates this rapid expansion of an ethic of liberation of the Empire's victims.

³⁴ Observe the 'democratic' conception of the philosophical exercise, against the Hellenic aristocratism.

³⁵ Tatian, 1954, I, pp. 615f. (Translation: Whittaker, pp. 59, 61, 65, 67).

[37] One can see in the text the critique of the displaced (the victims) against the 'arrogance' of the citizens of the empire, and against the decadent scholastic 'coldness' of the Hellenic philosophers. The new community had an irrepressible critical young *élan*. The project of the primitive community was not to constitute a political state, but an 'ethical community' critical of the Roman Empire (and of all previous [and later] empires). It was a critical 'political theology', anticipating Hobbes, Spinoza or Schmitt, a horizon of political hope (as Ernst Bloch discovers) was presented to the slaves and victims from the Exteriority of the 'established order':

Fallen, fallen is Babylon the great!³⁶ It has become a dwelling-place of demons, a haunt of every foul spirit, a haunt of every foul bird [. . .] Come out³⁷ of her, my people, so that you do not take part in her sins, and so that you do not share in her plagues [. . .] As she glorified herself and lived luxuriously, so give her a like measure of torment and grief [. . .] And the kings of the earth, who committed fornication and lived in luxury with her, will weep and wail over her [Rome] [. . .].³⁸

It is easy to imagine the impact that these texts produced in the conscience of the millions of victims of the Roman Empire. There is also an economic-political critique:

Alas, alas, the great city, Babylon, the mighty city! [. . .] And the merchants of the earth weep and mourn for her, since no one buys their cargo any more, their cargo of gold, silver, jewels and pearls, fine linen, purple, silk and scarlet, all kinds of scented wood, all articles of ivory, all articles of costly wood, bronze, iron, and marble, cinnamon, spice, incense, myrrh, frankincense, wine, olive oil, choice flour and wheat, cattle and sheep, horses and chariots, slaves and human lives.³⁹

It seems like it is describing the New York and London Stock Exchanges. The advantage of the symbolic story is its possible re-readings in diverse

³⁶ In times of political persecution subversive language is symbolic, apocalyptic, cryptic: only the 'initiated' understand it. The Judaeo-Christian people call the Roman Empire by the name of the Babylonian Empire, where the 'first Israel' suffered the first exile. Rome is the 'second' exile.

³⁷ In Greek the imperative *exélthate* signifies 'to run away from', 'to leave': it is a new 'exodus' from slavery in Egypt, taking into account that Egypt, Babylonia or Rome are 'this world', the established order, the political 'Totality' as prison of the slaves and dominated. It is not the body or the passions that imprison the soul. It is the 'positive political order', which enslaves the 'victims'. It is a question of intersubjective socio-political categories, of greater relevance in the twenty-first century, where 'Babylonia' or 'Egypt' are globalized and still seem not to have any possible 'outside' (Exteriority). We will see, nevertheless, that the qualitative Exteriority in civil society will be possible in Difference, in the struggles for the recognition of Alterity. The primitive Christians inaugurated these critical categories in the history of politics clearly, categorically, explicitly (still not 'philosophical facts', but explicitly interpretive categories in the daily and existential struggles of a rebellious people that will end up 'inverting' the Roman Empire, from its slaves and victims).

³⁸ Revelation 18.2-9.

³⁹ Revelation 18.10-13.

times, but it is rationally precise in the use of its categories! It is a theoretical revolution of the understanding of politics, without the intention of exercising the power of the state, but of opening the conditions of possibility for the critical action of the excluded and victims (victims which are the unintentional negative effect of the political system of domination), installing thus a space of hope, of reconstruction of the slave's humble subjectivity, giving possibility to the growth of the 'critical community's' solidarity, those who struggle for the recognition of their rights.

Invisible to the eyes of all the histories of political philosophies he has produced *the main revolution in the conception of politics*, since in fact the excluded victims were always the motor of necessary political transformations. Now, they counted, at least, with the help of an ethical community ('religious'), that, thanks to the experience of the Jewish 'diaspora' in the Empire⁴⁰ and to the Roman (Byzantine or Latin) law itself, will orchestrate an organized institutionalization without parallel in history (the Byzantine, Coptic, Armenian, Latin, etc. Christian 'churches'). Since the 'churches' were strongly organized, the state (the Roman Empire first) would not be able to still call itself the intermediary between human beings and the gods. Caesar Augustus was also the Roman Pontiff.⁴¹

[38] Paradoxically it would be the Christian churches that would 'invent' the secularized state. The limited 'institutionality' of Confucianism, Taoism, the Hindu religions, Buddhism, and even Islam, hindered the *secularization* of the state in its respective cultures. This is not to say that Christianity, orienting itself within the creation of new cultures, the Christendoms, has not fallen into repeated contradictions with itself, constituting quasi-theocracies which sacralized the monarchies.⁴² But the sole fact of the Christian churches' existence hindered the definitive sacralization of the state (even of the so-called Christian state). For this reason Marx, situating himself within the most ancient Judaeo-Christian tradition, wrote (he

40 The intersubjective process in Israel (see Dussel, 1969a, pp. 52-64) has a long evolution. It originates as a tribal ethnic group in the mountains of Palestine (Gottwald, 1981 and 1985), is consolidated as a 'religious community' in exile in Babylonia (586-38 BCE), from where this experience is dispersed outside of Palestine. The Jewish community will institutionalize itself around the synagogue and the sacred text (*Tanakh*), learning to live without statal politics. The monarchy of Israel will be weak and dependent, and although it will struggle, it never will achieve autonomy in the face of each empire, in particular from when Titus destroyed the temple of Jerusalem (70 CE). The 'Christian community' starts from this exilic experience of Israel and stops having a statal political project. It will remain always a critical reserve, an 'ethical community' of the people.

41 'Pontiff' is the one who 'links' humanity and the gods, in the cosmopolitan Stoic and Epicurean vision.

42 I write 'almost' because although it will exist (for example, the Byzantine Empire or the 'Holy Roman Empire' of Charlemagne), it cannot annihilate the Christian churches in the womb; they always will corrupt the state's claim of sacrality. The existence of the institutionalized churches is the ultimate guarantee of the impossibility of the state's sacralization. The state, not being founded 'in the gods', will have to search for another source of legitimacy, and inevitably (against its will) its new basis will be the political community, the 'people'. This aspect of political philosophy has been avoided in the history of secularization.

could be interpreted in this sense, as much by Marxists as by anti-Marxist Christians):

The *confusion* of the political principle with the religious-Christian⁴³ principle has become an official confession⁴⁴ [. . .] You would like a *Christian state* [. . .] You would like religion to protect what is earthly [. . .] You understand by religion the worship of your absolute power and knowledge of governing [. . .]⁴⁵ Has not *Christianity been the first to separate the Church from the State?*⁴⁶ Read the work of Saint Augustine *De civitate Dei* or study those later Church Fathers⁴⁷ and the spirit of Christianity [. . .] return and decide what the *Christian state* is [. . .].⁴⁸

It is evident that Hobbes did not see the accurate positions of Marx – not only living before, but laying the theological foundation for Anglican Christendom – when he spoke of a ‘Christian state’,⁴⁹ like the de-secularization or re-sacralization of the modern absolute state.⁵⁰

The ‘Byzantine Connection’: The Relapse into the Contradictory Sacralization of the Eastern Christendoms

[39] The Christian communities extended through the entire empire. They arose in a Jewish horizon, deeply fermented by a plural messianism, among it the ‘Judaean-Christians’.⁵¹ Jesus spoke in Aramaic (Semitic). His disciples expressed themselves in Greek to preach in the Hellenic world. There was a

43 In reality the ‘religious-Christian principle’ in politics is a ‘critical political principle’, a question that Marx senses but does not know how to explain.

44 Marx here, as we will see, criticizes the official position of German ‘Lutheran Christendom’ in name of the most ancient Christian tradition, which he does not deny, but supports.

45 ‘Observations on the instructions about censorship’ (1842), in MEW I, pp. 11–12 (Translation: TC).

46 I have to clarify that this was my position before reading Marx seriously. See my article ‘Poverty and civilization’ (1962) in Dussel, 1973c, pp. 144f.

47 Marx indicates here a task that he carried out but not the Marxists nor very few Christians.

48 ‘Editorial n. 179 in the *Colonial Gazette*’, in MEW I, pp. 100–3. See Dussel, 1993, pp. 38f. (Translation: TC).

49 See Part III of the *Leviathan* (Hobbes, 1937, pp. 305ff.). Hobbes is read frequently in the secularized contemporary ideological political philosophy, which is actually an ideology of Anglican Christendom. His project is an ‘ecclesiastic republic’. See section [131].

50 ‘I define a church to be, a *company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Sovereign: at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.*’ (Hobbes, 1937, III, ch. 39, p. 252). Hobbes worried about hindering the existence of a community of victims that could unite without the authorization of the sovereign, the ‘valid order’. The situation in England would be similar to what the Christians found in the Roman Empire, when Caesar Augustus was Roman Pontiff.

51 An intermediate movement between Judaism and Christianity in the first century (Dussel, 1974b, pp. 53f).

Jewish philosophical tradition,⁵² but the Christians took a clearer position than Judaism in confronting the empire:

Why, men of Greece, do you want to cause society to come to blows with us? [. . .] The nobleman commands me to serve and do service; I acknowledge my obligation. [. . .] Only if I am ordered to deny him [God] will I disobey; I would rather be dead.⁵³

As one can observe, they demanded that the state not determine their religious life; that is to say, the state is secularized, as the theory of creation secularizes the cosmos, because what has been created⁵⁴ cannot be divine, which deprives it of legitimacy and religious ends. But its deconstructive function goes further. It is a question of a confrontation of worldviews, diverse *ethos*:

Now I think it is appropriate that I should prove that our philosophy (*philosophian*) is older than Greek practices. Moses and Homer will be set as our limits. Because each of them is very ancient and one of them is the oldest of poets and historians and the other the author of all barbarian wisdom.⁵⁵

For Tatian, Moses was the eldest. With him the 'Christian community' affirmed its critical autonomy within the empire. As the Christians opposed the gods, who were the legitimizing values of the empire, they were accused politically, and pursued and condemned to death, for being 'atheists'. To which Athenagoras, in his *A Plea for the Christians*, replied that the Christians 'have their own traditions' as all peoples, but they cannot fall into naïveté as the Greeks and Romans who think that 'the gods are born',⁵⁶ operate as humans and even die. The whole Roman political system was legitimated and unified through the adoration of the emperor as a god. Not to adore him was a political crime. The critical community faced martyrdom, but deconstructed the religiously legitimized foundation of the empire in three centuries.

When in 324 Constantine was crowned sole emperor, supported by the multitudinous presence of Christians in the East, Greece, Coptic and Alexandrian Egypt, Anatolia (the most populated region of the empire) and Seleucid Antioch, Christianity, a persecuted ethical critical community, would turn slowly into the basis of a new sacred legitimacy of the state. It seems that the state always needs an 'absolute' basis, but it does not discover the sovereignty of the people, a historical but always unstable (for

⁵² See the case of Philo of Alexandria (Dussel, 1974b, p. 40).

⁵³ Tatian, *Discourse against the Greeks*, 4 (Translation: Whittaker, p. 9).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5; 10-11.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31 (Translation: Whittaker, pp. 55-7).

⁵⁶ *Legation*, 20 (1954, p. 647).

dogmatics) foundation of legitimation. The Christian churches would negotiate with the monarchies or states their collaboration in that legitimizing process, betraying their original inspiration. The critical community would transform itself into the new 'basis of the state' (as the German Christendom Hegel expressed coherently with political logic, and Marx criticized correctly following the primitive Christian tradition),⁵⁷ and inevitably, in the strength of the consensus of the historical bloc in power, legitimize the oppression of the new victims of the 'Christian' Empire, which was definitively structured with Theodosius (379–95 CE).

The political organization of the Byzantine Empire is of special interest, because it is the historical link that unites the origin of Christianity, the Hellenic and Latin Roman Empire, the Islamic world and Latin-Germanic Christendom with the Italian Renaissance, a 'renaissance' of the Greek classical studies thanks to the presence in Italy of the exiled Byzantines, expelled by the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in full *Quattrocento*. Paradoxically Janet Abu-Lughod does not explain anything about the Byzantine Empire.⁵⁸ The same happens with all the histories of political philosophy in use today, including those of Leo Strauss and Sheldon Wolin.⁵⁹

The Roman Emperor Constantine 'dedicates' the city of Constantinople on 11 May 330 CE as the new and sole capital of the empire. The bishops of the ancient city of Byzantium (whose Greek origin dates back to 658 BCE as a colony of Megara) are now installed by the emperor himself. The Caesars pronounced the following formula investing the new patriarch with power: 'Saint Trinidad, who has given me the *imperium*, confers on you the patriarchy of New Rome.' In this way Alexander (bishop of Byzantium and Constantinople from 314 to 337 CE) will be the first bishop of Byzantine Christendom.⁶⁰ The ecclesial institution has negotiated its preferred situation in exchange for giving the empire divine legitimation. It is a strongly organized Ceasaro-Papism; it will maintain the Church under its hegemony, betraying the political proposal of Jesus of Nazareth.

[40] Nevertheless, a strange institution not properly of the Judaeo-Christian tradition arose: Coptic-Byzantine Christian monasticism. This institution found itself bound to Egypt (to the ancient community of sages, from the founding of Memphis, existing for 3,300 years), and was present in Manichaeism (whose monks multiplied in the Egyptian deserts 'struggling

⁵⁷ See my article 'Religion in the Young Marx (1835–49)', in Dussel, 1983, pp. 199f. Religion as the 'basis of the state' (Marx, 'Editorial, n. 179 in the *Colonial Gazette*' in MEW I, p. 344), refers to an expression of Hegel that Kierkegaard will criticize. 'Christendom' is the inversion of Christianity; it is the Christianity that has negotiated by the bureaucratic corruption of its institutions the state's divine legitimation (in exchange for cushy jobs for the ecclesial bureaucrats). It is the 'inversion' of the Christianity of Jesus of Nazareth.

⁵⁸ From Bruges and Ghent she moves to Genoa, to Venice, indicating that these last are the Byzantine presence in Italy, but nothing more (Abu-Lughod, 1989, chs. 3–4).

⁵⁹ Strauss and Cropsey, 1994; Wolin, 2004.

⁶⁰ See Palmieri, 1911, col. 1308. When Mohammed II occupies Constantinople in 1453, he will permit the consecration of the new orthodox patriarch Gregory III, but under his authority.

against the desires of the body, the origin of evil')^{61, 62} and in Buddhism (the Buddhist monks who begged for food for the community, *sangha*, in a highly urbanized civilization from the sixth century BCE in India). These communities of Christian ascetics opposed the established Christendom, criticized the legitimation of the state, and their perpetual rebellion signified a creative critical remainder, united with the poor of the empire. At the same time, the text of the message of Jesus of Nazareth was read and reread in the Christian temples. The message produced the 'conversion' of numerous members of the churches. A critical current was thus born in Christianity, with the political aim of justice, which opposed itself to the Christendoms, as Machiavelli will note with respect to Franciscan and Dominican mendicants.

Let us take as an example the re-reading of a text that will have many consequences (even in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Jesuit Reductions in Latin America; it will inspire the European utopian socialism of the same century, and from where socialism will originate, as Engels observed explicitly on numerous occasions). The first Christians in Jerusalem had a special type of life:

They were constant in listening to the apostle's teaching and in community (*koinonía*), in the breaking of bread and in prayers [. . .] The believers lived together and held everything in common (*ápanta koiná*); they sold their possessions and goods and distributed among all according to the necessity (*khreían*) of each one.⁶³

It is possible that no text in the history of Byzantine and Latin-Germanic culture (future Europe) has promoted more transformations.⁶⁴ Already in the first century it was expressed thus in the *Didache*:

Do not stop helping the poor; hold all in common with your brother and do not say *This is mine*, because if in immortality all will be common, how much more with respect to mortal goods.⁶⁵

61 Mani (216–77 CE), a Persian noble who revitalized ancient Iranian Zoroastrianism (follower of the mythical Zarathustra who lived in the sixth century BCE), produced a synthesis of Zoroastrianism, with the presence of Buddhism (that he practised in India), Judaism and Christianity. He was killed at the gates of Belapat (Gundeshaphar) on Monday 26 February 277, in his 70s (Puech, 1960, II, p. 485). His dualist influence was immense in eastern and western Christianity (through Augustine of Hippo), and his presence will be detected still in Descartes or Kant.

62 We have shown in many of our works (Dussel, 1966, 1969a, 1974a, 1974b, 1986, 1998 [pp. 13–26]) that Christian monasticism is a true deformation of the primitive spirit of Judaism and Christianity, and depends in some way on the dualist ethic and anthropology of the 'Indo-Europeans', negator of the 'body' and its 'desires', which never deals with the 'desires of the flesh' or longing of totalization of the system (since the system is *flesh*, the empire, the structure of domination). That move from the ethic of the Iron Age horsemen (called 'Indo-Europeans') to the Semite, is unnoticed by political philosophy, and Christendom itself, which does not see the 'Hellenization' of the primitive Christian experience.

63 Acts 2.42–6 (Translation: TC).

64 See 'Ownership in crisis', in Dussel, 1973a, pp. 178–89.

65 *Didache* IV, 8 (Translation: TC).

Tertullian will preach in Carthage that 'all is common among us, except women'.⁶⁶ Basil of Caesarea relates that when he was young, in the middle of the corruption of Byzantine Christendom:

I read the Gospel and discovered that to achieve perfection it was necessary to sell my goods, give them to those brothers who are poor, liberate myself from all concerns [. . .] And then I tried to meet with brothers with whom I could cross the deep sea of life.⁶⁷

Later he preached to the Byzantine Christians:

It belongs to those who are hungry, the bread you keep, to the naked the cloak that you keep in the trunk, to the barefoot the shoes that are put in the closet, to the poor the money that you hoard. You commit as much injustice as there are people to help.⁶⁸

[41] Thus Christian communities, critical of the political collaboration of the ecclesial institution with the empire, were born in this Christian civilization. John Chrysostom, patriarch of Constantinople (398–404), in perpetual confrontation with the emperor, expelled several times from his See, preached:⁶⁹

Is it not maybe an evil to possess the goods of the Lord, to enjoy alone the common goods? Is it not the Land of the Lord with all that is in it, as a Psalm says? If our possessions belong to our Lord, are we not to conserve them? All the goods of the Lord are common [. . .] Also common are the imperial possessions: the cities, the plazas, the sidewalks belong to all: all of us have the same titles.⁷⁰

In the great Hellenic cities numerous schools of thinkers critical of the imperial state were born and began the long process of constructing a Semitic-Christian synthesis assuming elements of Neoplatonism.⁷¹ In post-

⁶⁶ *Apology*, c. XLIX, in *Patrologia Latina* (Migne), vol. 1, col. 470.

⁶⁷ Basil of Caesarea, *Epist.* CCXXIII, 2; *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 32, col. 824 (Translation: TC).

⁶⁸ *Homily III* (Rufini), *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 31, col. 1, 752 (Translation: TC). He writes: *Terra communiter omnibus hominibus data est: proprium nemo dicta* [. . .] (*ibid.*).

⁶⁹ It is interesting to note that the patriarchate of Constantinople reached from Armenia (including lake Van) and Palestine, including northern Greece to Serbia: 'six provinces of Thracia, eleven of Asia, and eleven of Pontus' (Palmieri, 1911, col. 1326; see a map in col. 1348). One province of Thracia was called 'Europa', next to Scythia, Rhodope, Thracia, Haemimontus and Moesia. Then, 'Europe' was a region to the north of Macedonia.

⁷⁰ *In Epist. 1 ad Tim.*, homil. 12,4; *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 62, cols 563–4 (Translation: TC).

⁷¹ Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, with more than 150 volumes with two columns, reunites some of the works of these intellectuals not incorporated in the history of philosophical thinking; under the 'theological' clothing is concealed anthropology, ethics, politics, logic, etc., all extremely important.

Ptolomean Alexandria intellectuals like Clement (145–215) and Origen (185–253) taught and wrote in Caesarea of Palestine (where Eusebius taught, 265–340).⁷² In Caesarea of Cappadocia Basil (330–79), who studied in Athens and Constantinople, Gregory of Nazianzus (329–89) and Gregory of Nyssa (333–95) were members of this school. In Syria John Chrysostom (344–407) was included, who studied in Antioch and later went to Constantinople. At the end of the fifth century, probably, appears the pseudo-Dionysian work *Of the Names of God*,⁷³ maybe by a Syrian monk, who proposed a Semitic-Neoplatonic and Christian synthesis comparable to the Indo-European synthesis of Plotinus' *Enneads*, to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa* or Hegel's *Logic*.

Two fundamental aspects will influence future political philosophy: the deepening of the problem of subjective liberty and the radical reflexivity of the subjectivity conceived as *prósopon* (the *persona* of the Latins, the *ra* of the Egyptians, the singular person). Neither concept is found in Hellenistic-Roman classical thinking. In the Byzantine debate against the Gnostics and Manichaeans, in reference to the question of ethical evil, liberty, autonomy and the attribution of the acts to the subject will be the theoretically constructed response.⁷⁴ The modern concept of 'freedom' will be unthinkable without the creativity and maturation produced beginning in the third century, including in this all Byzantine Christian thinking, later Muslim and western Latin, to the Hispanic discussions in the sixteenth century between the Dominican and Jesuit schools: Luis Molina and Francisco Suárez relate with continuity to Wolff or Kant. Freedom and personal singularity are the ontological, ethical and historical (diachronically linear) horizon which will make modern politics possible – in addition to the other aspects already noted earlier.

[42] In effect, the Gnostics (who Irenaeus of Lyon argued against, from 130 to 202 CE) attributed 'evil' to the Aeons (spheres of being similar to those of the Neoplatonists, inspired by the Egyptian cosmogonies),⁷⁵ which manifested themselves successively in history. The first Aeon was the Father of goodness; the *Lógos* was one of them; the final Aeon was the Demiurge who created the universe, and was eternally evil. Evil, consequently, was of divine source; it is found in the created body, in material. For their part, the Manichaeans thought that evil was an original principle from the cosmos, and sexual desire one of its effects. Christians unanimously responded, following the rational conclusions of the *Adamic myth* (confrontation of two created beings, not divine: Adam and the serpent), that the human being is

⁷² See Dussel, 1974b, pp. 76–104.

⁷³ *Peri theion anomíaton (De divinis nominibus)*, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 3, cols 585–996.

⁷⁴ About this question, and in relation to Gnosticism and Manichaeism, see Dussel, 1974b, pp. 105–36.

⁷⁵ See Festugière, 1952.

the only origin of evil, being free (*eleútheron*) and autonomous (*autexoúsion*).⁷⁶ Methodius of Olympia wrote:

I hold that the first human being was created autonomous, that is to say, free, and for this the succession of his descendants has inherited the same liberty (*eleuthería*) [. . .] The creator having decided to honor the human being and make him know superior goods, gave him the faculty of working which pleases him and exhorts him to better himself.⁷⁷

Evil is found in the bad use of one's will. The effect of the act is one's responsibility and deserves a reward or demands punishment. A whole political horizon opens which will culminate in the intersubjective concept of discursive reason and free will (impossible in the Hellenic and Roman thinking, including the Stoics or Epicureans).

That subjective final reference of being free was being elaborated around disputes apparently separate from anthropology. The Alexandrian school proposed that the 'Word' (the Egyptian Thoth, the Hebrew *Dabar*, translated to the Greek as *lógos*) 'was made flesh' and so had a unique divine substance (*hypóstasis*). The Antiochene, more Semitic, school proposed that Jesus had two 'natures' (*physis*): human and divine. Little by little a new philosophical concept was maturing: the notion of the personal radically individual subjectivity: *prósopon* (the Hebrew *paním*, the 'face' of each). The Council of Constantinople of 448 differentiated between 'two natures' and 'one person'. Philosophically, at least, that is the Christological definition (Feuerbach will return creatively to that giving origin to the 'atheist' position of Marx),⁷⁸ what is important is the notion of 'person' that in Modernity will reach 'individuality' torn from a feudal communitarian meaning. The Latin-Christian thinker Anicius Manlius Boethius (480–524), student in Athens and from an ancient Roman family, treated the theme classically in *On person*,⁷⁹ proposing as (defective) definition the famous *persona est naturae rationalis indivdua substantia*.⁸⁰ Political philosophy will now count on the notion of subjects as free autonomous participants in a political community, who in addition can be the excluded poor, as the one near the path of the 'midrash of the Samaritan'.

⁷⁶ It can also be translated as 'self-spontaneous'.

⁷⁷ *On Free Will*, II, 9; *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 18, col. 244 (Translation: TC). See Dussel, 1974b: 'The doctrine of freedom from the beginning up to Methodius' (pp. 130f.).

⁷⁸ The problematic of Feuerbach, against Hegel, says that it is necessary to affirm atheism in the face of a god constructed by man, and the return to positive anthropology. It was necessary to negate the fetishism of Hegelian Christendom and return to the historical Christ of 'flesh and bone' (Dussel, 1993).

⁷⁹ In *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 44, cols 1337–54. See 'The person in the definition of Boethius' in Dussel, 1974b, pp. 274f.

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, ch. 3; col. 1, 343. This condensed definition lacks the intersubjective relation of the 'face-to-face' (see Dussel, 1986, ch. 1).

[43] Until 1453, the Byzantine Empire resisted the attacks of the Turks,⁸¹ Muslims, keeping Latin-German Europe from becoming part of the Islamic world. Its political, cultural and economic organization would be hegemonic in the eastern Mediterranean, and even in the west (if one takes into account that Genoa was also an advance guard of Byzantine politics). Bologna (the first Latin-medieval university) would imitate its university,⁸² its municipal organization of 'parishes' would allow the later institutionalization of politics in the cities (including the 'six neighbourhoods' of Venice), instituting a very sophisticated tax system, the structure of the law from Theodosius (379-95) and Justinian (527-65) with his famous *Code*, *Digest* and *Institutions* (which will be the basis of all Slavic, Latin-Germanic and Islamic law). Byzantine art would not be equalled in other art: Muslim (the mosques imitate the Constantinopolitan basilicas), Latin-Germanic (gothic with its stylized figures is a Byzantine imitation) or Slavic (Moscow and its Kremlin are strictly Byzantine).

The maximum political splendour was reached sometime before the beginning of the Muslim occupation. Heraclitus (610-41) and his dynasty (until 717) recovered Mesopotamia, defeating the Persian Sassanids, but they demilitarized the region, preparing the way for the Islamic 'holy war'. If one considers that Buddhism had also 'pacified' Afghanistan, Pakistan, northern India, Bangladesh and Indonesia, one can understand the speed of Muslim expansion. The Byzantine and Buddhist political world and Latinized North Africa gave way to a Semitic-Muslim civilization, first and notable inheritance of the Greek, Hellenic, Iranian and Byzantine world. While Byzantium carried on its millenarian cultural process and Latin-Germanic Europe travelled the isolated, secondary and peripheral space of feudalism, the Muslim world would be the great classical culture perfectly connected with all the other cultures of stage III of the inter-regional system (China and Hindustan, including Byzantium and the Slavic world). The Eurocentric vision of the history of politics has to be overcome in a real global vision of political philosophy.

All changed when in 643 the Arabs took Alexandria, burning the famous library with a good part of the Hellenic knowledge.

The Latin-Christian World of the Western Roman Empire

[44] The 'Western' Latin Roman Empire, where the city of Rome was located, (future 'Europe'), did not have as much population, culture or richness as the Hellenic 'East', dominated militarily and economically (but not in value)

⁸¹ In 447, the city of Constantinople had impressive walls with 96 towers, 20 metres in height, exterior walls of 9 metres, supported by the most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean. It resisted the Avars, Huns, Visigoths, Persians, Muslims, Bulgarians and Russians (the Varangians); it only was taken by treason in the Latin-Germanic Christian crusades.

⁸² In 425 the university of Constantinople was founded (the first that can be called one). Ten departments of Latin language and as many of Greek, five of Latin and Greek rhetoric, one of philosophy, various of theology and two of law were instituted.

by the Roman Empire. The Latin Mediterranean world was always productively and commercially poor, with low population density and cultural complexity. The path of Latin-Germanic 'Europe' was uncertain and slow, its 'Middle Age' after the Muslim invasion (not a useful category of periodization for any other culture in stage III of the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean inter-regional system).

The theoretical basis of Latin-Germanic Christendom was created by the rhetorical philosopher of Roman culture, the Punic-African bishop, Augustine of Hippo (354-430), not far from Carthage. He is the bridge between two eras and cultures: the declining Latin-Western Roman Empire (which foments with devastating critiques) and the rising Latin-German Europe. He was witness to the Germans' arrival, the Vandals, who again destroyed the now Christianized Punic cities. In his most original work, *De civitate Dei*, he proposed the original categories of a critical politics: (a) Totality, the dominant, valid, established positive political order (the 'earthly city', 'of Cain'), and (b) Exteriority, the sphere of the victims, the Alterity that interpolates, critically, as future (the 'celestial city', utopian, transcendental, 'of Abel'). His work constitutes an original chapter of Latin-Germanic 'political theology', which will continue with Hobbes, Spinoza or Schmitt. Thus Augustine writes critically in the face of the imperial state of his time:

Scipio [. . .] stopped the building of theatres, when he saw how easily you could be corrupted and perverted by prosperity, and did not want you to be relieved from the enemy's threats. He did not think that a city is fortunate when its walls are standing, while its morals are in ruins. But the temptations of wicked demons had more effect on you than the precautions of men endowed with foresight. Thus you refuse to be held responsible for the evil that you do, while you hold the Christian era (*christianis temporibus*) responsible for the evil which you suffer. [. . .] Prosperity depraved you; and adversity could not reform you.⁸³

Just like Cicero, he takes primitive Rome as an example in contrast to decadent Rome, but he has his own innovation on the Jewish tradition. This merciless critique is based in the dialectical opposition of the two 'cities', of two political categories: one, the positivity of the dominant order (Totality), oppressive and thus decadent; the other, the regulative idea of a possible utopia (Exteriority) that moves toward emancipation:

I classify the human race (*generis humani*) into two branches: [. . .] Now Cain was the first son born to those two parents of mankind, and he belonged to the city of man (*hominum civitatem*); the later son, Abel, belonged to the City of God (*civitatem Dei*) [. . .] When those two cities

⁸³ *De civitate Dei*, I, xxxiii; Augustine, 1964, I, pp. 58-9 (Translation: Bettenson, pp. 44-5).

started on their course [. . .] the first to be born was a citizen of this world (*prior est natus civis huius saeculi*), and later appeared one who was a pilgrim and stranger in the world (*posterior peregrinus in saeculo*) [. . .] Scripture tells us that Cain founded a city, whereas Abel, as a pilgrim, did not found one. For the City of the saints (*sanctorum civitas*) is up above (*superna*), although it produces citizens here below, and in their persons the City is on pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom comes.⁸⁴

There are two explicit political categories: (a) the political order given in its final state (when the Totality becomes repressive: Babel) and (b) the critical community of the excluded, oppressed, victims who always are found in the non-institutionalized sphere of political Alterity. This Exteriority plays a fundamental role in political creativity.

[45] This radical distinction is rapidly deprived of its critical character. Latin-Germanic medieval Christendom (be it the Germanic Holy Roman Empire among the Franks of the North or the Pontifical state in Italy) interprets itself, in the key of Islamic political theology, as the 'city of God', considering Islam the 'earthly city'. The transcendental of the critical category has been inverted. Politically critical Christianity in the face of the state is turned into the basis of the (Christian) state itself: Christianity has been transformed into Christendom.

But Augustine is, in addition a critic of the Roman political-cultural system, from the most ancient Semitic tradition (stage I of the regional systems) to which he belongs, and which, paradoxically, will found later Eurocentric claims (stage IV, to which belongs Modernity). Augustine starts not from Homer or Romulus, but from Abraham, to decentralize the ethnocentric Roman narrative, but unlike the later Muslims, he is Roman by birth and philosophical education:

Abraham, then, was born in that Empire, among the Chaldeans, in the time of Ninus. But Greek history is much more familiar to us than Assyrian,⁸⁵ and those who have explored the ancient origins of the Roman people have traced a chronological sequence through the Greeks to the Latins, and from them to the Romans, who are themselves also Latins. For this reason we are obliged to give the names of Assyrian kings, where necessary, to make it clear how Babylonia, the first Rome, as it were,

⁸⁴ Ibid., XV, i, 124-5 (Translation: Bettenson, pp. 595-6).

⁸⁵ Peripheral in Roman culture, for being Christian (of Semitic tradition), Augustine teaches us Latin Americans to remember the 'other' history, not the known history of Washington but that of Miguel Hidalgo; not of Hegel but Clavijero (the eighteenth-century Mexican Jesuit historian). This historical reconstruction of political philosophy, 'against the grain', as Walter Benjamin would say, indicates the intention of Augustine, but not in the face of the declining Roman Empire and rising Christian culture, but in the face of the declining, central, past metropolises and a new world that is born from the post-colonial, peripheral, future horizon.

proceeds on its course side by side with the City of God, in pilgrimage in this world.⁸⁶

In Babylonia (the 'earthly city'), the critical Alterity (the 'city of God') was already opposed, which shows that it is a global-historical category (not only applicable to Rome):

When I say 'Asia' here I do not refer to that part which is only one province of greater Asia, but what is called 'the whole of Asia'⁸⁷ [. . . that is] the third part of the whole [of the world] which [. . .] consists of Asia, Europe, and Africa. [. . .] If you divide the world into two parts, the East and the West, Asia will be in one and both Europe and Africa⁸⁸ in the other. [. . .] In Assyria the ungodly city exercised predominant power [Babylonia . . .] And he [the Babylonian king] had been on the throne for forty-three years when Abraham was born. This was about 1,200 years⁸⁹ before the foundation of Rome, the second Babylonia, as it were, the Babylonia of the West.⁹⁰

Augustine situates himself in a 'tradition', in a critical *locus enuntiationis*, external to the Roman Empire, older, and in all ways always critical, because he equally criticizes Babylonia. His critical political vision is global-historical:

The society of mortal men (*societas mortalium*) spread everywhere over the earth; and amid all the varieties of geographical situation it still was linked together by a kind of fellowship based on a common nature [. . .] human society is generally divided against itself, and one part of it oppresses (*praeualet opprimit*) another [. . .] The conquered part submits to the conqueror, naturally choosing peace and survival at any price⁹¹ [. . .] In almost all nations, the voice of nature, as we might say, has pealed out the message that those who have suffered the misfortune of defeat should prefer subjugation at the hands of the victors to total destruction by the devastation of war.⁹²

Augustine adds, in the same text, that just as 'utility and earthly greed have divided society (society which with one universal⁹³ word we call city of

86 *De civitate Dei* XVIII, ii; p. 350 (Translation, Bettenson, p. 764).

87 We see that the 'orientalism' noted by Said is very ancient.

88 This Africa of the pre-Muslim Roman-Christian north, the native country of Augustine, was then part of the West.

89 The calculus of Augustine would say 1,800 years BCE, which is not far off.

90 *De civitate Dei* XVI, xvii; 231 (Translation: Bettenson, pp. 676-7).

91 It is the dialectic of the master and the slave.

92 *De civitate Dei* XVIII, ii; 281 (Translation: Bettenson, p. 762).

93 'Universal' expresses the will to construct a valid category for the whole political system.

this world [*civitatem mundi huius*]), in the same way they have divided into 'peoples, some as masters and others as subjects (*regnis praediti, regnantibus subditi*)'. Assyria in the East and Rome in the West are the examples of the 'city of Cain', and as much in Babylonia (the first great empire of the East)⁹⁴ as in Rome (the persecuted Christian people who Augustine defends from the accusation of being the empire's ruin) the people of Abel remained as critical Alterity, as the 'celestial Jerusalem'.⁹⁵ A critical universal political category is born which will relapse continually into a fixed substantive action in the confusion of the Alterity of the liberating (of the victims) emancipating critical community with the dominant society: European feudal society will be the 'city of God' – although it should be inevitably, following Augustine's logic, the 'earthly city'.

Augustine spoke of 'Europe', but his Europe which looked at the Mediterranean from the South was the Latin part of that Roman world. The Spaniard Isidore of Seville was still part of this Mediterranean, Christian, Roman-Latin world. Later 'Europe' would be something completely different; continental Latin-Germanic 'Europe', of the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne. A greater phenomenon would produce a crucial 'edge' in history. The expansion of the Islamic world (which conquers Alexandria in 643) into Egypt, which would call itself the Maghreb (and not the Punic-Christian region of North Africa) and the Iberian peninsula (from the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth centuries), would include Latin-Germanic Europe in a geopolitical horizon *peripheral* and *dependent* on the Islamic world,⁹⁶ isolated and feudal. The syndrome of the Dark Age would develop, medieval, a specifically European historical era and situation. There was no other medieval world in global history!⁹⁷

Politics in the Classical Islamic Mercantile System

[46] Muslim civilization never had a Middle Age,⁹⁸ nor a Dark Age, nor feudalism. The European Middle Age was for Islam its Classic Age, its Modernity. It was born as a mercantile civilization, urban, with great geo-

⁹⁴ *De civitate Dei* XVIII, ii; 281 (Translation: Bettenson, pp. 762–3).

⁹⁵ For Augustine there are two Jerusalems: the empirical, earthly Jerusalem, that 'kills the prophets', and the 'celestial Jerusalem that is the city of God' (see *ibid.*, XVII, iii; 284 [Translation: Bettenson, pp. 713f.]). For Augustine, as for the Christian, the critical prophetic 'messianic community' makes history in history, and constitutes a tradition: 'the people of God'. For Walter Benjamin, it seems the *Jetzt-Zeit* or messianic eruption into history of 'continuous time' does not constitute a tradition nor does it have a critical alternative community as starting point, of memory, or guarantee.

⁹⁶ See 'Europe, Modernity and Eurocentrism', in Dussel, 2001a, pp. 345–8.

⁹⁷ When the European speaks of 'medieval' (economy, culture, philosophy) s/he does not explain that no other culture had the physiognomy or the feudal characteristics of Europe. It is a historical periodization impossible to generalize. To speak of 'the Middle Ages' as a period of global history is a naïve or pretentious Eurocentrism.

⁹⁸ Even Janet Abu-Lughod speaks of the 'Muslim Middle Ages', a completely Eurocentric historical periodization.

political projections (in contrast to the provincialism of European agrarian feudalism); it united, two centuries before the European invasion of America, the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic (from the island of Mindanao, in the Philippines, to Morocco).

Islamic experience and political theory are of the greatest importance. They arose almost instantaneously as a Muslim conception of politics, *as inheritance of the Byzantine vision of existence* (which included as its own the political tradition of the classical Greek world, Hellenism and even the Latin law of the Roman Western Empire), because Islam is an essentially political religion (in this rests its strength and its weakness). It always had the Byzantine world, which nourished it, as its antagonist, from the occupation of Alexandria (Coptic-Hellenistic Christianity) in 643, until it conquered it in 1453. Samir Amin writes:

In order to understand this [the Islamic world], we must see the Arab world in its true context, as a great zone of passage, a sort of turntable between the major areas of civilization in the Old World.⁹⁹ This semiarid zone separates three zones of agrarian civilization: Europe, Black Africa, Monsoon Asia. It is therefore always fulfilled a commercial function [. . .] The social formations on the basis of which the Arab world's civilizations were erected were always commercial in nature. This means that the surplus on which the cities lived was drawn in the main not from exploitation of the area's own rural inhabitants but from the profits of the long-distance trading activity [. . .] of the surpluses extracted from their peasantries by the ruling classes of the other civilizations.¹⁰⁰

Its history determines the particular political *ethos* of this people. Born in the desert, space of Semitic hospitality par excellence (opening to the 'face-to-face' solidarity of the lost in the immensity of the mortal dunes) and follower of the 'prophet' who was expelled from Mecca in 622 for his critique against the rich merchants who traded between the Persian gulf and the Red Sea, and did not distribute their riches among the people of their respective claus. Mohammed occupied Mecca on 17 Ramadan 623. On 8 June 632 he died reuniting numerous tribes. Abu-Bakr, the 'successor' (*Khalifa*), proved the military weakness of his neighbours. Omar (634-44) occupied Bostra (634), Yarmuk (636), Jerusalem (637), Persia (642) and Alexandria (643). The Umayyad dynasty (661-750) took as its capital Damascus; the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258) founded Baghdad (not far from ancient Babylonia and Seleucia, capital of the eastern Hellenic Empire) and occupied the 'centre' for 500 years (like European Modernity to the present), until it was buried by the Mongol and Turk expansion. Abd-ar-Rahman took refuge in the Iberian peninsula, where Muslims were present from 711 CE, found-

⁹⁹ Stage II of the inter-regional system.

¹⁰⁰ Amin, 1974, p. 36 (Translation: Pearce, p. 38). For a good Arab history, see Hourani, 2003.

ing the caliphate of Córdoba, a city with 500,000 inhabitants, and where (in particular through the School of the Translators of Toledo, founded by a Christian bishop between 1125 and 1150) philosophy, mathematics, astronomy and Greek and Islamic science would arrive in thirteenth-century Latin-Germanic Europe, isolated in these and many other aspects from the 'high culture' of its period for centuries.

[47] The first theoretical conflict within the original Islamic culture was of a political nature, although with ethical implications, around the schools of thinkers of Basra and Baghdad. The caliph based himself in the 'predestination' of the omnipotent divine power to legitimize the exercise of his power, based in the arguments of the master of Basra, Hasan al-Basri.¹⁰¹ A group of thinkers opposed predestination in the name of 'free will', not making God the cause of evil, in the most ancient Semitic tradition, opposing the Zoroastrians and Manichaeans; they were the Mu'tazilites. In 743 some of these thinkers were executed by the caliph, like 900 years earlier in China in front of others criticized for other political motives. Thus philosophy was born intimately linked to Islamic political struggle.

But the Mu'tazilites were slowly accepted; they developed arguments about the uniqueness of God (against the Christians), the creation of the world (against the Greeks), using reason with high logical precision. Thus arose the *Kalâm*, a rationalized theology, which argues with reasons inspired as much by Aristotle's logic (who came to the Muslims through Christian translators) as by the 'revealed' text, the *Koran*. Another tradition, called the *hadith*, criticizes the use of reason and invokes exclusively the revealed text. A hermeneutical struggle begins – which will always have political motivations, into the twenty-first century – within the *hulama* (the Islamic 'community of lawyers' which is not an institutional church, but continues to have great political influence in the Islamic nations, today in Iran or Algeria). The hermeneutic as political struggle is understandable, since it was essential to know if the caliph was the only source of the interpretation of the *Koran*, in particular of its judicial derivations, or if the *hulama* could equally be one of the sources of interpretation. In Islam the law was Koranic (that is to say, political-religious), thus the question of the interpretation and application of the law will be always a disputed political-religious problem.

To the two groups of thinkers (Mu'tazilites and *hadith*) we add the *sufis* or ascetic mystics and, a fourth group, the cultivators of Greek philosophy (the *falsafa*). The Mu'tazilite theologians used logical argumentation with confidence. One can consider al-Kindi and al-Razi, linked to the philosophical school of Athens and through this to Proclus, the first to receive with gratitude and seriousness the contribution of Hellenic philosophy, which they knew directly through the translations from Greek carried out by Christians within Islam. They used this philosophical knowledge in the interpretation of the *Koran*. They also had knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, phys-

¹⁰¹ See Collins, 1998, p. 397.

THE REBELLION OF THE VICTIMS

ics, medicine and music, practised at the highest level of the time in the 'House of Knowledge' (the Arabic name for the university in the strict sense of the medieval Latin-Germanic tradition) of Baghdad:

In the first generation of the House of Wisdom appeared al-Khwarizmi [who] coined the term *al-jabr*, translated by the Europeans as 'algebra', while 'algorithm' was taken from his name [. . .]. Thabit ibn Qurra developed versions of integral calculus, spherical trigonometry, and analytic and non-Euclidean geometry, and reformed Ptolemaic astronomy.¹⁰²

This 'university', a true MIT of its time, would later enter into crisis, but Baghdad would continue being a centre of important investigations, only overcome by China and Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century, that is to say, 700 years later:

The most innovative were scientists: in the mid-1200s Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, one of the greatest astronomers of Islam, eliminated some of the Ptolemaic planetary eccentrics and foreshadowed the Copernican system.¹⁰³

Abu Nasr al-Farabi (c.870–950) has to be considered the first great Islamic political philosopher. First, he justified the utility and necessity of philosophy – not evident to the Muslim believer. This was possible having received the *falsafa* directly from a community that came from Alexandria in the fifth and sixth centuries CE, to Antioch, and to Harran, later to Iran, and ended up in Baghdad.¹⁰⁴ Al-Farabi had Youhanna Ibn-Haylan, a Christian priest, as a master. He had classes on the *Later Analytics* of Aristotle, the first time in Islamic culture. He travelled to the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire, Egypt and other places of *Dar-al-Islam*. In his work *On the Birth of Philosophy* he records many of these happenings.

[48] Al-Farabi (this passes unnoticed by the major commentators) was the first to think philosophically (including a political theology like Spinoza, Hobbes or Schmitt) about the Islamic conception of existence, a political conception. In general, the original Semitic thinking was political, and essentially the Islamic,¹⁰⁵ and has had great influence on modern political philosophy, through a chain of authors, among whom Marsilius of Padua has to be included, as we will see. Themes such as the state of nature, natural law, the contract and the constitution of a contractual community, positive law, the

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 404.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 427.

¹⁰⁴ Mahdi, 2000, pp. 78f. (ET: p. 53); Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 223–45 (ET: pp. 206–27); Collins, 1998, pp. 407f.

¹⁰⁵ See Dussel, 1966. In Dussel (1969a) I explain that Semitic humanism is essentially political, different from the Hellenic-Roman (ch. II: 'Intersubjectivity or Metaphysics of the Alliance', pp. 47f.), in particular, 'Intersubjectivity in Islam' (pp. 64f.). In this short chapter, I explained, more than 30 years ago, the Islamic political thinking that I synthesize again.

problem of its legislation, its interpretation or application, political virtue or destiny, providence or human liberty, etc., are questions approached by Muslim political philosophy, al-Farabi in our case.

For a Muslim the human being is intrinsically evil, just like all non-Islamic political organization is plunged into ignorance; all 'external' humanity is in the 'House of War' (*Dar-al-Harb*), of the infidels, against whom one has to make war. Outside of Islam there is no natural law without chaos, barbarism, irrationality, struggle and war (*homo homini lupus*). The prophet Mohammed updated the original 'pact' (*Sahifa*) – of divine institution¹⁰⁶ – with the 'believers' (*mu'minun*) and thus is born the 'submission (*islam*) to Allah' and the 'House of Submissives' (*Dar-al-Islam*) or believers: human universality with absolute equality among its members, without Arabs and non-Arabs, without free and slaves, without castes: the *umma*. It is a universal fraternity: 'The believers are brothers' (Koran 49.10). This utopia of universal equality makes Muslim thinking extremely attractive.

The 'successor' (*Khalifa*) to the prophet and the *hulama* interpret the Koranic law and create 'tradition' (*sunna*). L. Massignon writes:

The legislative magisterium (*amr*) is reserved for the Qur'an alone; the judiciary ministry (*fiqh*) belongs to each believer, who, by ardent and assiduous reading of the Qur'an, acquires, with the recollection of the definitions and the understanding of the sanctions which it decrees, the right to apply them. There remains the executive power (*hukm*), an *imperium* at once canonical and civil; it belongs only to God.¹⁰⁷

In this context al-Farabi produces the first philosophical exposition within this Islamic conception of political existence. The originality of his work comes from this. In effect, he begins with *Logic*, including Aristotelian ontology, but moves immediately to *Politics*, as it demands the practical conception of Semitic existence. The Semitic or Muslim perfect ethical human being is not the contemplative sage who achieves practical 'realization', happiness 'outside' the city (the Greek *bíos theorikós* or the Latin *solitaria bonitas*), but the 'prophet' who stakes her/his life on the community of equals. Al-Farabi in *The Virtuous City*, which is much more than the title suggests, begins with an anthropological cosmological exposition, and ends with a political ethic, but treats in this last aspect the articulation

¹⁰⁶ In the Koran (7.172) Allah made another pact with those who will be believers prior to creation (*Mithaq*), in eternity (*azal*), so that in some way the future believer is predestined to a certain state. This pact would be *natural*, or present at birth (*natus, naturalis*). For this reason, it was considered a universal, rational or *natural* religion (*fitra*). These themes were the object of theological disputes, but no one called into question the assumption of a 'pact', a 'contract' made at the beginning. It is the same theme of the 'covenant' of Abraham or the Christian 'New Covenant' (New Testament). The modern political-philosophical 'contractualism' is inspired in a traditional theme that is some 4,000 years old, if we consider the 'contracts' of the Mesopotamian world.

¹⁰⁷ Massignon, 1922, p. 719 (Translation: Mason, v. 3, pp. 185-6).

of prophetic action in history more than anything purely philosophical or theoretical.¹⁰⁸

In the book called the *Enumeration of the Sciences* [. . . al-Farabi] moves from language to logic, mathematics, and physics and metaphysics, and then one finds a break within metaphysics. Metaphysics does not simply crown the sciences. It does this, to be sure, but it also becomes a preface to political science; and political science studies everything that is necessary for *realization, preservation, and reform*. It is in this sense that political science includes jurisprudence and theology and deals with questions like prophecy, the divine law, and revelation, for these are seen in terms of *realization* rather than simply as theoretical matters.¹⁰⁹

[49] Like the philosophy of liberation (and in some way Levinas or Apel), politics is the first philosophy in Islam. Al-Farabi begins the exposition of his politics with a cosmology (original creation, structure of the universe, its parts, etc.). He moves to an anthropology (the structure of the soul and the body, its parts, its functions, etc.).¹¹⁰ Finally, he explains the political community (its parts, its organization, etc.). His large inheritance is present in the re-reading of his work throughout Islamic philosophy (Avicenna or Averroes and, among the Jews, Maimonides), but also, later, in 'Latin Averroism' (the presence of Muslim thinking in the Latin-Germanic Middle Age, in many non-Christian theses and in particular in the monism of the Islamic lay theocracy used against the political aims of the Christian tradition originating from the Pope and the 'Pontifical state', only ending with the unity of Italy in 1870), in Marsilius of Padua (a city in Veneto, in the *terra firma* of Venice, outside the Pontifical state) and Ockham (an English Franciscan, who like all Franciscans opposes from a metaphysics of the will the Roman rationalist Papal-Caesarian monist authoritarianism). Thus, the political philosophy of al-Farabi is an essential link in the history of modern political philosophy.

The central theme of Islamic existence, and its politics, is practical-political action as exemplary, prototypic, ideal ethical 'realization'; fulfilled in the person of the prophet:¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Neither Mahdi (2000) nor Strauss and Cropsey (1994) show with clarity what we are noting.

¹⁰⁹ Mahdi, 2000, pp. 82-3 (ET: p. 57).

¹¹⁰ It is interesting to note that in a certain way he has fallen into the Greek dualism (of the Iron Age horsemen), since also, like the Mu'tazilites, he proves the 'immortality of the soul'. It does not occur to him to oppose the doctrine of the steppe nomads ('Indo-Europeans') to the Egyptian-Semitic position of the resurrection of the 'flesh' (not referred to either as soul or body). See Dussel, 1974b.

¹¹¹ This theme, which has been the object of many unilateral interpretations (as of H. Cerutti), situates the figure of the 'prophet' as the 'perfect human being' or ethical ideal for the Semite (not the 'contemplator' of truths, but the 'realizer' of justice, firstly political). See Dussel, 1973a, II, par. 25, pp. 59f., where I treat the philosophical problem of prophecy.

Alfarabi's concern with *realization* is not confined to personal salvation but directed to the salvation of the community at large, to social or political salvation. Even here Alfarabi's concern is not just with one city of nation or with a particular community [Islamic], but with humanity at large, with civilized men everywhere.¹¹²

In contrast to the Greeks and Romans, who occupy themselves principally with private moral salvation, al-Farabi offers a political public vision of philosophy. In contrast to the Jews and primitive Christians (before Byzantine and Latin Christendom), who distinguished between the king (the Pharaoh, David, Solomon or the Roman Caesar) and the prophet (Moses, Samuel, Nathan or Jesus), al-Farabi invests in the prophet a foundational political character, legislator, essentially a politician. For the Jews and primitive Christians, 'war' was an activity of the state and, in principle, the work of the 'Prince of this world'; for al-Farabi, as a Muslim, the 'holy war' was a prophetic action, therefore, political-religious: the 'House of War' (*Dar-al-Harb*) or the infidels will transform itself into the 'House of Submissives' (*Dar-al-Islam*). This assumes a complete 'political theology', a monist theocratic-lay state, where secularization is unthinkable, in opposition to the political bipolarity (State-Church) of the Greek or Roman church, the beginning of the modern secular state, as we will see.

For al-Farabi, Allah, through the 'agent intellect' (of Aristotle, mediating a Neoplatonic interpretation), operates in the creative imagination of the prophet and reveals the 'divine law'. This is the basis of the Islamic political order. There is no other law, no natural law; positive law is nothing but analogical deduction from the revealed divine law. There is no other legislator than Allah, his prophet and his successors. The question is of 'interpretation' (the hermeneutical struggle) and of 'application' (the judicature). The (perfect) 'supreme government' dictates a body of laws. Judicial science arises, which Islam will develop (following in part the Byzantine, and so Roman, tradition). The political order, which has the cities as its base (for Aristotle the origin was the family, then the village and finally the city),¹¹³ organizes itself into 'nations' (with different languages and diverse religions) arriving at the Islamic universality (*Dar-al-Islam* or the *umma*), which has as its mission to incorporate the 'ignorant' through rational conviction and, failing that, holy war.¹¹⁴ So, the 'supreme government', in addition to

This will be understood better from the horizon of 'political theology' (from Hobbes to C. Schmitt).

¹¹² Mahdi, 2000, p. 87 (ET: p. 60).

¹¹³ Islamic civilization had included, among others, the Phoenician cities (Byblos, Tyre, Sidon, etc.) that frequently conserved their type of ancestral government. Al-Farabi certainly did not know that those Phoenician-Islamic cities, flourishing in his time (which later would be occupied briefly by the western crusades), were the beginning of the system of the Greek cities to which Plato and Aristotle refer. For al-Farabi the political regime of a small city, democratic or oligarchic, does not preoccupy him particularly. For him, as for Islamic political philosophy, the question was the caliphate, the expansive inter-ethnic state of his time.

¹¹⁴ All this is explained in his political works – *The Political Regime*, *The Virtuous City*

prophecy and philosophy, had to have character, audacity and the courage of 'warlike virtue' (military strength to expand *Dar-al-Islam*). War, conquest, domination and the slavery of the conquered were essential moments in the Islamic *ethos*. Nevertheless, for al-Farabi, war as an end in itself was the 'supreme vice'. For this, the 'supreme ruler', having dominated a city or nation, had to create immediately the conditions of friendship, justice, gentle work, persuasion and free consent. There arose thus, for a time, the House of Reconciliation (*Dar-al-Sulh*) formed for tributary countries (of Jews and Christians) who converted or disappeared. Islamic 'tolerance' (which produced an asymmetric community of Jews and Christians) had its well-defined limits.

[50] The successors to the Prophet, the caliphs, have to have *frónesis* (explained by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*), but this is not sufficient; they also have to surround themselves with the *hulama* or community of sages (like the philosophers of the *Politéia* of Plato),¹¹⁵ both needing political pragmatics.¹¹⁶ It is a question of the practical realization of a virtuous, happy, rational, political community. Thus, a political religion and an argumentative philosophy are articulated.

There are three types of negative political situations: (a) 'ignorant' or barbarian regimes; (b) evil or immoral, lacking ethical discipline; and (c) wrong, sustaining 'false' doctrines. Only the 'virtuous city' has the three positive components: (i) true knowledge (which unites divine and political science); (ii) virtue (the prophet-philosopher); and (iii) the adequate formation of character (the *sufi*). All other regimes have some elements, but none achieves the perfection of the Islamic model. In the *Dar-el-Harb* one can find six types of imperfect political regimes:

- 1 one of necessity (which fulfils the minimal bodily demands for life);
- 2 the vile oligarchic regime, which only thinks about wealth;
- 3 the regime that only attempts pleasure;
- 4 the regime of pure honour;

- and supported in his fundamental ethical work' *The Pursuit of Happiness*. This rational conviction of being the 'true' civilization, by being revealed, justifies 'holy war' as a means of universal salvation. We find a theological-political element that did not exist in this way previously (in the Chinese or Roman Empire, or in the Byzantine or Latin-German Christendoms) and that certainly will contaminate the Spanish '*Reconquista*'. It will transform this argument, known through the presence of the Córdoba caliphate. It will be the justification of the expansion of Hispanic Christendom into Latin America in Ginés de Sepúlveda's argument against Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1550. It will justify the utopian conviction of the Puritans of Anglo-Saxon Christendom (so exalted by Tocqueville but suffered by the indigenous of North America), as well as the *Western Design* of Cromwell, the *Manifest Destiny* of Monroe, and in general all of European Modernity for the past 500 years. Today still, there is no 'holy war', it is the so-called struggle for democracy, for human rights in the post-colonial world (it is 'Plan Colombia' against . . . drugs; in reality, it is the struggle against anti-globalization movements).

¹¹⁵ Al-Farabi dedicated two works, *The Laws of Plato* and *The Philosophy of Aristotle*, to the two great Greek classics.

¹¹⁶ Al-Farabi wrote *Rhetoric* to show its importance in politics.

- 5 that of tyrannic domination; and
 6 the democratic or corporative regime, which attempts liberty and equality.

The 'supreme leader' (sometimes it is unclear if this refers to Mohammed or the caliphs) is the master of the law and not its servant, by being its cause. By this:

[t]he successor will be the one who will decide about what was left undecided by his predecessor [. . .], not because his predecessor had made a mistake but because his predecessor decided upon it according to what was best in his own time, and the successor decides according to what is best for a later time. Were his predecessor to observe [the new conditions] he would have changed [his own law] also.¹¹⁷

In Islam the philosophers were from the outset a critical community which did not have definitive consent from the *hulama* (the theological lawyers). So, the universalism of al-Farabi produced fear in the most conservative Muslims when he affirmed, for example, that there 'may be a number of virtuous nations and a number of virtuous cities whose religions are different'.¹¹⁸

After al-Farabi, the greatest philosopher after Aristotle for the Muslims, the most orthodox and 'traditional' (from *sunna*: tradition) schools find in al-Ghazali a great synthesis. The Shi'ite critique, which included the Basra school and the 'Brothers of Purity', has in Ibn-Sina (Avicenna, coming from the east, who could consult the enormous library of the sultan of Bukhara and Samarkand) its great exponent, who Thomas Aquinas called 'the Commentator' (on Aristotle). In the caliphate of Córdoba, in the west, critical philosophy will flourish, and Ibn-Rushd (Averroes) will be the most important, since he will influence the Latin-Germanic thinking of eighteenth-century Europe. His rationalist critique of Islamic theocracy will have an enormous effect. His work against al-Ghazali (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*) entitled *The Incoherence of the Incoherence of the Philosophers*, belongs to the better part of the polemic genre within a thriving creative intellectual community.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *The Virtuous City* (English edition, of F. Dieterici, Brill, Leyden, 1895, p. 54; cit. Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 243 [ET: p. 218]).

¹¹⁸ *The Political Regime*, p. 53 (English edition in *Medieval Political Philosophy* of R. Lerner, The Free Press, New York, 1963; cit. Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 243 [ET: p. 224]).

¹¹⁹ In Marrakesh, I was taken to visit a beautiful building, constructed with Carrara marble marvellously sculpted (one exchanged in that time a kilo of sugar for a kilo of already carved Carrara marble), with four tall floors, where 80 Muslim students of the eighth-century *kalam* lived. When I visited the building it was inhabited by poor families, each one in a room occupied by a student in the classical period of Islam. The city of Fez had some 500,000 inhabitants, certainly more than Paris or London (which were only villages at that time). That is the difference of having been a 'central' culture but today a 'peripheral' post-colonial world.

[51] A Jewish community flourished in the Islamic world. Born in Córdoba, although he died in Cairo after a stay in Baghdad, Moses ben-Maimon (Maimonides) 1135–1204 represents the best of this tradition.¹²⁰ In the *Guide for the Perplexed* he explains that the human being is the only politician who passes laws for him/herself. What is interesting, anticipating Hobbes and our first material principle of politics, is that he shows that without this reflection and forecast of the laws the human being would not have food, clothing or housing, would not survive. Law, art and instruments permit the conservation of life.¹²¹ The multiplicity of necessities demands plurality of instruments and division of labour. Natural chaos is regulated by the law. The government heads toward the same end. Government and law head toward the ‘good order of the city’, political peace. This law is the *nomos*, directing the conservation of the body. The soul, however, demands another type of law, the ‘revealed divine law’, which the Hebrew community receives in its tradition and in its sacred text. *Nomos* or political well-being is only one condition, but is not the ultimate content of full human perfection. For ben-Maimon only Moses can really be called ‘prophet’ – in contrast to al-Farabi and the Islamic tradition. Moses is the great legislator, not Mohammed. The law of Moses (*Torah*) is the only revealed and divine law, invariable and universal in time and place. The prophet prepares himself (by natural conditions and moral education), but only God, by explicitly free consecration, elects the prophet, who is ‘flawed’ in his imaginative and rational faculties (as in al-Farabi). Prophecy is superior to philosophy, but does not oppose it. The prophet is a ‘guide’ (for the perplexed), a political founder and a legislator (like Moses). The problem for ben-Maimon will be the foundation of a perfect political community, Judaea. With Moses the situation was clear. It was the time of hope for the *Meshiakh* and so one reflected on the possible perfect state, where war will be necessary, obligatory, in the end to transform the nations (*goim*) into obedience to the *Torah*. Ben-Maimon writes that there will be a ‘permissive war . . . against the other nations in order to enlarge the boundary of Israel and to increase his greatness and fame’.¹²² It is a political conception close to Islamic theocracy, but not lay. The king is not the highest authority of the political community; he has to obey the law and the prophet. Even David and Solomon had to obey the prophets,¹²³ as in the great Semitic tradition, but when the prophets organize themselves institutionally the political phenomenon produced is what Latin-Germanic Christendom will suffer: the presence of a Church and Papacy with political power in the face of and frequently over the state.

¹²⁰ Collins, 1998, pp. 432f.; Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 247f. (ET: pp. 228–47).

¹²¹ *Guide for the Perplexed*, I, 72 (cit. Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 249 [ET: p. 230]).

¹²² Text from *Code, Yesodei ha-Torah*, in the chapter: ‘Laws with respect to the kings and their wars’ (cit. Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 260 [ET: p. 241]).

¹²³ *Guide* . . . II, 40, 45; III, 41; *Code, Melakhim*, I, 1,8; III, 1–7,10 (cit. Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 261 [ET: p. 241]).

The arguments of ben-Maimon give justifications, in advance, to some later theocracies and even a certain fundamentalist Zionism.¹²⁴

For Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508) the political state was organized against the state of nature. In the state prior to the political, nomadic happy humanity did not have private property and lived in complete liberty and equality, as the ‘children of Israel in the desert’. Political organization is a sin.¹²⁵ The prophet is far from politics; he will install in messianic times a community of priests and prophets, without states or war. By contrast, the Messiah of ben-Maimon is a warrior liberator, who organizes again the ancient political order.

In general, all Jewish thinking was sceptical of a strict natural law that would found a political order (justified through reason). This critique of natural law of some Muslim¹²⁶ and Jewish schools will also be taken up by Marsilius of Padua.¹²⁷

[52] The Muslim political vision is highly original and universalist, appearing as an extremely simple true contractual rationalism if one compares it to the other political visions of its historical moment: it had extensive influence through ‘Latin Averroism’ in Latin-Germanic Europe. For the believer *Dar-al-Islam* is the ‘universal home of the believer’, Islamic civilization. Here we find the antecedent of the ‘expansive’ vision of Western Modernity. For the Muslim the ‘exterior’, the *inimicus* (in the sense of Schmitt) situates itself in the ‘House of War’ (*Dar-al-Harb*); it is the ‘absolute enemy’ indicated by Derrida.¹²⁸ The Byzantine Empire did not possess such a broad ‘political theology’. In Christendom the concept of ‘holy war’ (the *yihad*) had still not hardened. This concept was strange to the Hellenic and Roman world and to the Byzantine world. The critical ‘exteriority’ of Jesus of Nazareth kept one from investing absolute enmity in the ‘enemy’. Islam, however, had transformed the ‘exteriority’ of Alterity into the land of war: *Dar-al-Harb*. Islamic universality (*Dar-al-Islam*) had an absolute political boundary. A true ‘political theology’ justified war. It will be in the Muslim Iberian peninsula, tempering weapons in Santiago di Compostela, where Latin-Germanic Christendom will forge the concept of Christian holy war, the crusades. When the Barbarossas (Redbeards) entered Anatolia and took

¹²⁴ See ‘The political in Levinas (Toward a critical political philosophy)’, paper presented in Ottawa (November 2002), in Dussel 2003b.

¹²⁵ The valid order (the Totality) that the prophet criticizes from exteriority stops being a critical category and becomes simply a negated being. The critical thinking of the prophets is transformed into a historicist anarchism. It passes from a category to a stage of politics.

¹²⁶ The Mu’tazilite school affirmed human liberty, more with respect to the absolute free will of Allah. To free it from determinism, even from a ‘natural law’ to which Allah would be subjected, they devised the thesis (accepted by many Franciscans, among them Duns Scotus and Marsilius) that the constantly creating and repeated will of Allah (the *sunna*) appeared to the human finite intelligence as the repetition of phenomena following a ‘natural law’. That ‘each morning the sun rises’ indicates, simply, that each day the free will of Allah returns to create a ‘rising sun’. The will as foundation of reality will reappear in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, as we will see.

¹²⁷ See Dussel, 1969a, pp. 68–9.

¹²⁸ Derrida, 1994.

Nicaea in 1097, Kilij Arslan, the Muslim Turk, saw the Germanic barbarians seizing the same 'Islamic political theology', mother of the modern European 'political theology', that Carl Schmitt studies 'as within' Europe, not suspecting the theology 'as outside', as the colonial world, prehistory of actual globalization.¹²⁹

129 Let us take a break and show the links with the future. Muslim 'political theology' transforms Exteriority into the *inimicus*, the infidel (*dar-al-Harb*). Hispanic 'political theology' of the *Reconquista* and the conquest of America transforms the Indian (the colonizable cultures) into the *inimicus* of Christendom. The 'holy war' gains a European face, the European *jihad*. Bartolomé de Las Casas will be the first critic of this 'political theology' of conquest. That 'political theology' will be secularized and will signify, as Hegel expresses, that 'England transformed itself into the missionary of civilization throughout the earth'. The modern *jihad* is at work! Previously there was a critique of the critique. Although Christianity (of Jesus of Nazareth) was critical of the empire, of the state, and proposed a secularization, removing sacred support (foundation), Christendom uses the Church for its refounding. In Italy, the Papacy not only supports the state, as in Byzantium, but is a 'Pontifical state', *contradictio terminorum*. Now Jesus of Nazareth would be effectively the 'king of the Jews', or of a good part of Italy. The invocation of Christ-king, explicitly denied by Jesus, since he was a *Meshiakh* (anointed messiah), not king but prophet (the two types of anointed in Israel). Marsilius of Padua will deny the Pope his right to temporal power (Christian orthodoxy), but rapidly Hobbes, among others, invests in the state ecclesiastical power again. It is Anglican Christendom (or Lutheran that Marx criticizes) that wants to base itself in religion, now Anglo-Saxon. A modern 'political theology' is born, secular (but not secularized because it uses religion for its ends). 'Religion is transformed into the basis of the state' (as Hegel declared). The critical politician proclaims that 'all [political] critique begins as critique of religion [fetishistic]' (as Marx indicated of Jesus of Nazareth in a narrow sense), since the religious refounding hinders all 'transformation'. The critical, prophetic religion of Jesus allows political transformation. Finally, Germany rediscovers 'political theology'. Schmitt, from the right, shows that religion was always the foundation of politics. It is the political consideration of religion. For his part, J. B. Metz shows the critical function of political theology. It is a theological or political consideration of theology. However, the Latin American 'theology of liberation', a critical 'political theology', in a different sense than that of Metz, has a double reference: *theologically* it shows the political-economic critical sense of theology (and of the Christian faith), and *politically* it shows the critical-economic sense of popular religion. It shows that politics cannot ignore the symbolic mythical narrative (as Sorel, Mariátegui and Gramsci indicate in 'popular culture') produced by the oppressed people in their political-cultural history. The 'theology of liberation' can thus be considered by political *philosophy* and by *politics* as the symbolic prolonging of a critical logic that helps the properly rational political process, mobilizing the sensitive valuative potential of a people. It can be also considered *theologically* as recovery of the prophetic and political-economic critical sense (of Jesus) frequently lost by bureaucratized Christianity. The critical Christian community (as an 'ethical community' of Kant in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*) can then fulfil a strictly *political* action, the object of political theology; can fulfil a specifically *religious* action, the object of theology. Latin American 'theology of liberation', as critical 'political theology', is a critical-political and religious novelty in universal history (of politics, philosophy and theology). Maybe the time has still not arrived for such anti-Jacobin questions, so anti-fetishist (the fetishism of a laicism of Littré, bourgeois), so anti-Eurocentric, but the critique of the purely secularizing modern and anti-popular critiques (because the poor and simple peoples, as al-Farabi and ben-Maimón said, think from the 'imagination' of the prophets, from the poetic, symbolic, religious discourses) move ahead even against their will.

Politics in Peripheral and Isolated Germanic Europe

[53] On 1 July 1097 the Turks saw the western armies invading the inhospitable lands of Anatolia:

The sun had barely risen from behind the hills when the order to attack was given. The tactics of the Turkish warriors were well practiced. [. . .] But on the day of the battle of Dorylaeum, the sultan [. . .] noted anxiously that the tried-and-true Turkish methods seemed to lack their usual effectiveness. Granted, the Franj [as the Arabs called the Franks] lacked agility and seemed in no hurry to respond to the repeated attacks [of the arrows of the horsemen], but they were perfect masters of the art of defence. Their army's main strength lay in the heavy armour with which their knights covered their entire bodies [. . .]. Although their advance was slow and clumsy, [. . .] the bulk of the Frankish army remained intact [. . .]. Some of the emirs were already counseling retreat when a cloud of dust appeared in the distance. A fresh Frankish army was approaching [. . .]. Before he [the sultan] could do so, however, a third Frankish army came into view behind the Turkish lines [. . .]. As Ibn al-Qalanisi was later to write: *The Franj cut the Turkish army to pieces*.¹³⁰

The crusades had taken Nicaea, location of the first Christian ecumenical council, not far from the legendary Troy and the Granicus river, where Alexander defeated the Persians to expand Hellenism east. Where did these European, German barbarians find the spirit for such a big task? From the shadowy Nordic forests to the Baltic (the 'end of the world') a people began to arise, although 700 more years would pass before the hegemony of the world system with the Industrial Revolution.

The Christianized Roman Empire, converted to Christendom in 313 with Constantine's proclamation, lost half of their communities (in Anatolia, the most numerous, in the Middle East, the cradle of Christianity, in Egypt, North Africa) with the Muslim advance. This truncation was compounded, from the north-east, by the invasion of the German peoples. Latin Europe, weak, isolated, secondary, will begin the long path of its re-grouping.¹³¹ From the fifth century, after the death of Augustine, a process of deep transformation of the classical Roman Empire into a progressive Christianization began. Four factors will originate European political philosophy and culture (and all relate to an ethical-mythical nucleus from Christianity).¹³² The new culture, whose religion was the creative source of European values, had as supports

- 1 Benedictine monasticism (later Cluny and the Trappist);
- 2 the empire from the Franks;

¹³⁰ Maalouf, 1995, pp. 36-7 (Translation: Rothschild, pp. 16-17).

¹³¹ See Braudel, 1978, pp. 222f.

¹³² See Collins, 1998, p. 455.

- 3 the Papacy; and
- 4 the intellectual movement that organized itself around medieval universities.

[54] The creativity of Roman-Latin culture had its source in the Benedictine community, which was different from eastern Byzantine or Egyptian monasticism, since it prioritized the essence of future Europe: *ora et labora*, by the Roman Patrician Benedict of Nursia (480–543), student of rhetoric and law. The *Regula* arose with the highly advanced ‘institutionalization’ (following Roman law) of an extremely fecund utopian social ‘community’, the basic ascetic–communitarian rationalization of the subjectivity of primitive Europe. The civilizing ‘discipline’ of the European cultural, political, social and economic ‘institutions’ is born.¹³³ The cold Teutonic shadowy forests, like the original ‘chaos’, ‘state of nature’, will be moulded by the ‘order’ (the Benedictine ‘Order’) of the southern dark-haired Latins. They will fell the trees to harvest wheat in the clearings (the Heideggerian *Lichtung*), destroying the immense conifers adored as gods. An ‘order’ is imposed over the ‘chaos’ of the Germanic blonde Nordic savagery. One has to begin over again!

In the beginning is the ‘community’ of equals. In a world of violence and war, the abbot, the major-domo and all the functionaries responsible for the community are elected democratically by the community with votes of equal value.¹³⁴ The caretaker can be elected abbot; and the abbot can return after his service to caretaking. In addition, the community rules by consensus and has to be always hospitable to the poor:

Always when they had to deal with important things in the monastery, the abbot brought together the whole community (*omnem congregationem*) and explained what the question was [. . .] because God often reveals to a youth what is best.

Above all put the greatest care in the receiving of the poor and pilgrims, because in them particularly Christ is received, since the same fear which the potentates inspire leads them to honor them.¹³⁵

¹³³ We insist, against Foucault, on the necessity of ‘discipline’ for the reproduction and development of human life. We will criticize, with Foucault, when it is transformed into institutional ‘repression’ against human life and development. The Benedictine monks educated the German barbarians in a civilizing ‘discipline’. It can be transformed, however, maybe inevitably, into an unnecessary masochistic ‘repression’, as Freud will criticize. But, against Freud, it will have to sustain the necessity of the ‘disciplined’ *super-ego*, but not pathologically as ‘oppressor’. See *Thesis 17*, in Dussel, 1998a, pp. 625f. From Max Weber we would show in this ‘discipline’ not the origin of capitalism, but a Europe that later will produce capitalism. Benedictine ‘discipline’ is the mother of Calvinist ‘discipline’, in a communitarian sense.

¹³⁴ Exceptionally, the oldest or eldest can elect the abbot. Few have emphasized the ‘democracy’ of the monastic orders that the Franciscans and Dominicans (later urban orders) and the Jesuits (strictly modern order) will also exercise strictly.

¹³⁵ *The Holy Rule*, ch. 1; Benedict, 1954, p. 309; ch. 3; p. 335; ch. 53; p. 589 (Translation: TC). Hegel indicates that alms cannot be universalized (against Kant) because it would pro-

In the chaotic and changing world, the tortuous passage from the Roman order to German Vandalism, this attitude will be foundational for the gestating society. In the first place, the tools or means of production will be used diligently.¹³⁶ Re-reading the text of the primitive Jerusalem utopian community, they must not 'have anything of their own (*neque aliquid habere proprium*)',¹³⁷ and so, a new chapter in the history of socialism: 'All goods are common to all (*omniaque omnibus sint comunia*).'¹³⁸ It is an absolute communitarianism which will underlie the later socialisms of Western culture. For this, 'distribute to each one following his necessity',¹³⁹ 'where, he who needs less gives thanks to God and is not sad',¹⁴⁰ and, 'however, he who needs more, humbles himself by his weakness and would not be vain through compassion'.¹⁴¹ The (civilizing) rule occupies itself more with daily life: the kitchen, hospital, elders, children and punctuality.¹⁴² But, what is most noticeable, in contrast to the Buddhist, Manichaeic or eastern Christian monasticism, and to the ideal of life of the Egyptian, Greek or Roman sages who exalted 'leisure' (*scholé*) above the manual labour of slaves or servants, Benedict writes:

Idleness is the enemy of the soul (*Otiositas inimica est animae*). For this at determined times the monks have to occupy themselves with manual labour (*labore manuum*) and at certain hours with the divine lesson.¹⁴³

Graeco-Roman 'leisure' (virtue) converts itself into 'idleness' (vice). Another civilization is born, the Europe of Christendom. Manual labour, even the roughest, is obligatory:

If the conditions of place or poverty demand that they occupy themselves in harvesting the crops, they are not sad; they are truly monks when they live off the work of their hands, as our Fathers and Apostles.¹⁴⁴

duce a society of idle beggars, where no one would have alms to give. The argument of Hegel is capitalist and correct. That of Benedict, however, is an essential institution for a new and changed world, since the poor who will abandon the agricultural fields and found the future cities (in the feudal centuries) will have to begin as beggars, and the Benedictines (Cluny and Trappists) will feed them and give them hospitality in that time of transition from one mode of production to the other (as Marx says). The 'face-to-face' of Levinas and the 'hospitality' of Derrida are characterized very well.

¹³⁶ Ibid., ch. 32; p. 497. A rigorous 'inventory' will take place so one 'knows what is given and received' (ibid.).

¹³⁷ Ibid., ch. 33; p. 501 (Translation: TC).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., ch. 34; p. 505 (Translation: TC). The *Critique of the Gothic Program* refers indirectly to this tradition.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. (Translation: TC).

¹⁴¹ Ibid. (Translation: TC).

¹⁴² Ibid., chs. 35–37, p. 43 (Translation: TC). It is evident that Latin America did not have Benedictine communities!

¹⁴³ Ch. 48; p. 563 (Translation: TC).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., ch. 48; p. 565 (Translation: TC).

From the eighth century, the monks penetrate the Germanic forests, creating a new culture. They teach barbarian Europe agriculture, they dedicate time to the copying and cultivating of Latin and Greek classics, saving the 'pagan' classic culture, producing the conditions of civilized, urban life. Thousands of Benedictine monasteries, Cluniac, Trappist,¹⁴⁵ cross Latin-Germanic Europe, founding a culture which, although peripheral and secondary in the stage III inter-regional system, will become hegemonic in the nineteenth century (by circumstantial factors, as we will analyse further on).

[55] The second factor that constitutes Europe is the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, which is a Christendom, a culture where the political and religious intermingle confusedly. The Pope crowned the emperor in Rome, legitimizing with *auctoritas* the *potestas* of the king. From 800, from Aachen, in the middle of the Germanic forests, the empire struggled toward the political unity of Europe, without ever achieving it. Germanic feudalization was its inveterate enemy. From a theoretical point of view, the empire structured a true state which did not have the political knowledge of the Chinese Empire (with its disciplined secularized bureaucracy, professional army without opposition apart from the Mongols in the north, unification of the commercial administration in the hands of the eunuch caste, etc.). This weakness of the empire would be its great advantage in Modernity.

On 27 August 1227 Genghis Khan, the 'conqueror of the world', died. Without meaning to, he made the connections of the commercial subsystems of the Euro-Asian steppes from China to Germanic Europe (the 'ancient system') possible. So the thirteenth century will be a classic moment in the 'ancient system's' cultures.¹⁴⁶ The crisis of the Mongolian Empire, due to the Turks, will not destroy the 'ancient system', since the contacts to the south will continue by the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Bengal (from the sea of China to India, the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, and from there to the Mediterranean, Venice or Genoa).

'Yellow fever', which caused havoc at the end of fourteenth-century Europe, and which foretold the end of a cultural state, followed the path of the sea routes. In 1320 the fever unleashed itself in the Chinese region of Hupei. It took 25 years to reach the coast of China. In 1347 we find it already in Damascus and Cairo, in Italy and France in 1348, in 1349 in Germany and Scandinavian countries, to end in Moscow in 1351. The fever route tells us about the trade routes.¹⁴⁷

[56] The third factor is the Papacy. When the Western Roman emperor disappears with Romulus Augustus (476 CE), he leaves the civilizing hegemonic

¹⁴⁵ Some 2,000 Benedictine monasteries, some 1,200 Cluniac and some 700 Trappist.

¹⁴⁶ In particular through Abu-Lughod's 'Circuit III' (which connected Constantinople with Peking) of the eight circuits of the 'Asian-Afro-European "ancient system"' (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 34). It is a central moment of philosophy in the Asian-Afro-European continent: in 1126 Ibn Rushd was born (Averroes) (in Córdoba), in 1130 Chu Hsi (in China), in 1197 Madhva (in India), in 1225 Thomas Aquinas (in Italy). See Collins, 1998, pp. 258f.

¹⁴⁷ See the map in Abu-Lughod, 1989, p. 172.

responsibility in the Latin-Germanic region of the empire to the Roman Christian community. This will determine the *weakness* of the legitimating autonomous basis (the future sovereignty) of the European monarchical states (and the Germanic Holy Roman Empire) which at the end will allow the bourgeoisie to take power in seventeenth-century England (a monarchy even weaker than the Continental ones). The Papacy will be the reference for the new civilization. The 'Middle Age' (Eurocentric denomination), which constructs itself over the ruins of the slave Latin-Western Roman Empire, will allow the organization of a feudal system (the only economic-political system with these characteristics) of 'weak'¹⁴⁸ states:

The feudal variant remained weak in comparison with the original, fully developed tribute-paying mode. This weakness, this peripheral character was to become its strength. At the beginning of the feudal order in Europe, it meant a surplus of modest size but also an absence of political, administrative, and economic centralization, the one going along with the other.¹⁴⁹ This low level of centralizing capacity was to allow freedom to the commercial sectors, as yet only embryonic. Under their stimulus, agriculture made real progress, and the surplus produced by agriculture grew naturally, so that the dialectics of increasing trade and breakup of feudal relations could get under way, leading in turn to the rise of capitalism.¹⁵⁰

The weakness of the state, especially in England, not in China or Spain, for different historical causes, will be the great advantage for bourgeois political hegemony.

The eleventh-century Conflict of the Investitures (with the reform of Gregory the Great) is a major moment in the judicial definition of the 'separation' of the state and religious institutions (the Latin Roman Church). Paradoxically it is not noted by political philosophy, from a Jacobin position, that these happenings secularize the state, thanks to the strong ecclesial institutionalization (the Roman Empire's law is the origin of the Roman Church's canonical law).¹⁵¹ No other culture had in its bosom as deeply structured a religious institution. Buddhism most resembles it, but it did not obtain the same judicial precision. The Islamic religion also does not institutionalize (the communities of *ulemas* are difficult to co-ordinate) and so

¹⁴⁸ This 'weakness' of the Latin-Germanic European states (in relation to the Chinese or Hindustanic world, and even with respect to the caliphates) will be the definitive *modern* European 'advantage', as we will see.

¹⁴⁹ Here S. Amin has not mentioned that this 'weakness' is due, among other causes, to the lack of sacred legitimacy, which the religious institution (Christian churches) has seized from the state. This 'weakening', emptying, *kenosis*, 'alignment' (Luther will translate *entäussert sich*, commenting on Phil. 2.7) will be the fruit of the strong institutionalization of the religious community, as we have already explained.

¹⁵⁰ Amin, 1974, p. 53 (Translation: Pearce, p. 55).

¹⁵¹ 'Roman law' is maybe the most important 'political-cultural' production of the Roman temperament. The Roman Church had an excellent school.

did not separate as a political institution from the caliphate, producing 'one law', Koranic,¹⁵² which can never be secularized.

[57] The Papacy, which will operate in the Italian pontifical states as one more monarchy, constitutes itself as the central reference of all European Christendom (and in particular of the thousands of monasteries, which prefer to remain free from the nearby bishops, the empire or kingdoms and link directly to Rome). It will be a prevailing factor in the weakness of the legitimation of the empire and of European monarchies (because it kept them, unlike other empires, from being founded in God's authority), until Christendom begins under the power of the modern absolute monarchies (the Catholic *patronato* in Spain, Anglican in England, Lutheran in Prussia, Orthodox in Russia, etc.). Secularization will later follow. It is not strange that Machiavelli lives in the city of Florence, which resembled the Pontifical state (he has to criticize Christendom indirectly, from an idealization of the Roman republic), meanwhile Marsilius of Padua taught in a university under the Venetian authority (outside of the papal power) and so had greater liberty to critique.

In the eleventh century, the explicit inversion of the ethical-political vision of the Jewish founder of Christianity, gestating since the birth of Christendom in the fourth century CE, in the Manichaean aspect of Augustine of Hippo, is produced.

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) – son of a Lombard, born in Burgundy, student in Bec (Normandy), Italy and Paris, became archbishop of Canterbury, showing the unity of Latin Christendom, medieval Europe in its first maturity – explained with rigorous logic the political vision of an aggressive and expansive Christendom. His argument is clear, precise, sacrificial (sadistic or masochistic, depending on whether from the dominator or dominated): God, the Father, necessarily demands the payment of an infinite unpayable debt with the blood of his Son's sacrifice. His secularized interpretation continues now.¹⁵³ It is in some way the Hellenization of Christianity, the repetition of the sacrifice of Iphigenia; Agamemnon is now God the Father.

This question is crucial for all later political philosophy (peripheral-

152 'Koranic law' will be the nucleus of the rationalized cosmovision of the Muslim culture and not 'theology', as for the Byzantines and the Latin-Germanics. In the Muslim culture, there was no division between a 'civil law' and an 'ecclesiastical law' or 'canonical' (as in the Latin-medieval universities).

153 Our interpretation will follow Franz Hinkelammert, 1991, *Human Sacrifices and Western Society: Lucifer and the Beast*. Kant, for example, has an Anselmian vision of God, when in proving the payment of happiness to the just that morality merits, has to prove the existence of the immortality of the soul (to be able to receive the prize after death) and the existence of God. In effect, God is a 'banker' who pays with happiness what the just has earned: One is paid 'all possible happiness, in the justice (*Urteile*) of a knowing and omnipotent distributor (*Austeilers*) [. . .]' (KpV, A 231; Kant, 1968, VI, 260 [Translation: TC]). The capitalist God is a 'distributive God', 'distributor', 'administrator', 'severe', who pays from a 'deposit', a 'treasure', the merit for the just. The 'merciful God' has transformed into the 'administrator God' of ethical capital that pays the debt.

medieval secondary Europe, early Modernity, the present Christian–North-American ‘Empire’). Primitive messianic Christianity opposed itself to a ‘law’ (the ‘established order’, the ‘flesh’) outside the final criteria of good and evil. For original Christianity, if the ‘law’ (‘ruling order’) is outside the ultimate criteria, the fulfilling of the law would be a ‘sin against the Spirit’, which cannot be pardoned. Jesus’ ‘concept’ of God hinders the interpretation of human sin as a debt with God. Eliminating the concept of ‘debt’, eliminates the ancient concept of ‘sacrifice’ (the Jerusalem ‘temple’ of the sacrifices is already useless) and ‘pardon’ takes the place of ‘payment’ of sin before a severe God. God is a father of mercy. Anselm inverts the question, and makes the ‘law’ the ultimate criterion of mortality, through the distorted application of a Mesopotamian theory of sacrifice (the ‘scapegoat’ of Babylonia),¹⁵⁴ allowing the conversion of the ‘earthly city’ of Augustine (medieval Christendom) into the ‘city of God’.¹⁵⁵ The critique of the established order (Jesus’ prophetic messianism) is now condemned as the ethical–political lack par excellence: rebellion against ‘order’. One has ‘to pay’ an ‘infinite debt’ to the severe God. The pardon of the merciful Father of Jesus is impossible because it is contrary to the justice of the God who demands fulfillment of the ‘law’. We will see what this entails.¹⁵⁶

[58] The people of Israel, in their history, were ‘developing’ (to use the Hegelian notion) the ‘concept’ of God: from a God of the clan (Abraham, Isaac and Jacob) to the primitive tribes, to the universal God of *Second Isaiah*.¹⁵⁷ Jesus’ (a Jewish messiah) conception of God had new developments, correlative to the unfolding concept of ‘law’. In effect, if God were a merciful Father who pardons sins, one has overcome the concept of fault as ‘debt’. I owe something when, meeting on the same level and failing to give respect, ‘I have to’ compensate their honour. But for an infinite and merciful God, sin does not produce less in him, only in the sinner. To sin is to move away from the good Father, to construct a prison (Totality of the ‘flesh’) and to suffer (as the prodigal son) distance from the father. To sin is to self-harm, to totalize oneself, to destroy oneself in structures of domination. In the ‘sermon on the Mount’, near the Ginnosar *kibbutz* where I was a fisherman on Lake Genessaret, in 1959, Jesus shows that he has come to ‘fulfil’, ‘develop’ the ‘law’, including overcoming it.¹⁵⁸ If to fulfil the ‘law’

¹⁵⁴ See Girard, 1986.

¹⁵⁵ Gilson, in his work *The Metamorphosis of the City of God* (Gilson, 1954), does not show this fundamental ‘metamorphosis’.

¹⁵⁶ Following the method of this work, we will carry out a ‘hermeneutic’ of texts taken by theologians as mere ‘literary texts’ that can be interpreted philosophically. Or, as Kant writes, when he expresses that he will treat ‘the doctrine of Christianity, even when it is not considered as religious doctrine’ (KpV, A 229; Kant, 1968, VI, 258 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁵⁷ I have treated these themes in my work *Semitic Humanism* (Dussel, 1969a, pp. 47f.: ‘Intersubjectivity and metaphysics of the Covenant’; and pp. 107f.: ‘The logic of monotheism’).

¹⁵⁸ It is frequently translated ‘to be fulfilled’ (Matt. 5.18). In Greek *plerôsai*, which comes from *plerôo* (to fill, complete, realize), can be translated as ‘develop’ (take something to its full completion).

is to put it at the service of the poor, the widow and the orphan, and the 'sabbath' at the service of human life, the 'law' demands fulfilment far from the 'established order'. In the same way, if the 'worship' of God is 'to make justice' and 'not sacrifices', the temple is not necessary: 'The hour is coming when you will worship the Father neither on this mountain [Gerizim] nor in Jerusalem [. . .] [you] will worship the Father in spirit and truth.'¹⁵⁹

The sacrifice of expiation is unnecessary. No sacrifice is necessary because sin stops being entered in the book as 'debt'! For this he taught to pray saying: 'Father [. . .] forgive our sins as we forgive our debtors.'¹⁶⁰

Diverse levels are conditioned: (a) the 'development' of the concept of God (from the 'God of the armies' of ancient Israel to God the merciful father) demands (b) a 'development' of the concept of worship (the suppression of the 'sacrifice of expiation' demanded from Abraham with his son as payment of a debt with God), and, (c) thanks to this suppression, one conceives sin as an estrangement from God, as the 'prodigal son', but not in the sense of contracting a debt, because God the father is far from contracts. ('You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you [. . .]').¹⁶¹ (d) If the sin has the suffering of the sinner as effect, sin consists in constructing with one's hands one's own prison (the system which dominates, impoverishes, humiliates). Then (e) the 'ransom' that the sinner has to pay is dictated by the dominator of the system, Satan, not the merciful Father. The 'debt' is not with God but with the devil. Finally, (f) in the 'development' of Jesus' concept of God, the merciful God takes pity on the sinner who suffers in the prison constructed with her/his own sin. God, as merciful father, decides 'to pay' Satan the unjust 'ransom' to liberate the sinner, the 'slave' of the structure of sin: 'who, though he was in the form of God [. . .] emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness [. . .] became obedient to the point of death – even death on a cross'.¹⁶²

[59] That 'obedience' does not refer to the merciful God of Jesus, but to the 'law' of the system, of Satan, who has imposed a price, a 'ransom' for the 'hostage' – like Goethe's Faust who sold his soul to the devil.

Paul of Tarsus, seen from the perspective of a critical political philosophy, expresses the theme with accurate categories: 'The power of sin is the

¹⁵⁹ John 4.21–3.

¹⁶⁰ Matthew 6.12. *Ophéilema* signifies in Greek 'that which is due to' or 'debt'. Nevertheless, Jesus is citing Ben Sira (or Ecclesiasticus) from the second century BCE: 'Forgive the injustice of your neighbour, so that when you air your sins you will be pardoned.' (28.2) For Jesus, the sin does not establish a debt but an offence that can be pardoned. Hinkelammert insists on the concept of 'debt', but in that case it weakens his argument, because he does not get to express sufficiently the new type of relation that is established between the sinner (indebted?) and God (the judge that demands a payment?). Jesus dissolves the Gordian knot, 'developing' the concept of 'debt' as an offence that does not need 'payment' to God, but 'ransom' to Satan, the 'Prince of this world'.

¹⁶¹ Matthew 5.38.

¹⁶² Philippians 2.6–7. This text of 'alienation' from God is found, inverted, as basis of the Hegelian ontology, and this is where the concept of 'alienation' in Marx comes from (recovered).

law'.¹⁶³ 'So also David speaks of the blessedness of those to whom God reckons righteousness irrespective of works: "Blessed are those whose iniquities are forgiven".'¹⁶⁴

The 'law' is an ethical criterion, but not ultimate. The ultimate criterion of the 'law' is the life of the Other, the full realization of the human being.¹⁶⁵ The 'kingdom of this world' closes in on itself when it puts the 'law' as ultimate reference. The ethical-political mistake par excellence is totalizing Totality (flesh), fetishizing the system, sacralizing the 'law' (forgetting that 'justice for the poor, the orphan and the widow' is the perfect redemption of the 'law' not fixed, fossilized or fetishized). For Jesus the system asks a 'sacrifice of expiation',¹⁶⁶ like the 'ransom' asked for unjustly to 'liberate' a hostage or a slave from debt. For this reason, he exclaims: 'The Son of Man came not to be served but to serve,¹⁶⁷ and to give his life as a ransom¹⁶⁸ for many (*anti pollôn*)'.¹⁶⁹

This 'ransom' is asked by the kidnapper, the system of domination, Totality, Satan, the apocalyptic Beast according to primitive Christianity. When the innocent victim, Jesus, is murdered by the system that demands an (unjust) 'ransom' to liberate the people from the structure of domination,¹⁷⁰ the 'system' shows its injustice. It is the 'revelation' of Jesus that is fulfilled in the praxis of his empirical death. The machinations of the system come to light. The 'law' (as ultimate criterion, fetishized, not as responsibility for the Other, the poor, which Jesus demands) is the norm for the dominant order, which shows itself as pure domination.¹⁷¹ It loses its normativity; it is pure external coercion. The 'suffering servant' of Isaiah, the prophetic Messiah, offers himself to the dominators of 'this world' to pay the 'ransom' they have put unjustly on the people ('the masses').¹⁷² On revealing the 'logic' of the domination, the disciples 'understand' the mechanics of domination; the

163 1 Corinthians 15.56.

164 Romans 4.6-7.

165 'For the Son of Man is lord of the Sabbath' (Matthew 12.8).

166 One reads in Isaiah 53.10: 'Yet it was the will of the Lord to crush him with pain. When you make his life an offering for sin . . .'

167 'To serve' is the praxis of the 'servant of Yahweh' (see Dussel, 1969a, pp. 141-69).

168 'Ransom' (*lútron*) is the key concept of the Anselmian inversion, semantic pivot of fetishism. 'Ransom' is paid for a slave or hostage to liberate him/her. It is not properly a 'debt' (as Hegel or Kierkegaard will interpret), but a 'price' that the dominator (the master) fixes unjustly on the slave, or the kidnappers who unjustly take someone as 'hostage'. Levinas (1974) discusses the theme. He who pays the 'ransom' is the 'redeemer' of the slave, and it is a question of 'redemption' or 'liberation'.

169 Mark 10.45.

170 The 'innocent' is the dominated, the 'kidnapped' for whom 'ransom' is asked. It is the system that asks ransom. Jesus immolates himself to pay the 'ransom' the system demands.

171 'You know that among the Gentiles those whom they recognize as their rulers lord it over them (*kurioeúousin*), and their great ones are tyrants over them (*kataexousiázousin*). But it is not so among you; but whoever wishes to become great among you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you must be slave [the one who has to pay the 'ransom'] of all' (Mark 10.42-4).

172 'The masses' (*hoi polloi*), the 'multitude' that Heraclitus of Ephesus scorns as the 'common people' who cannot have *lógos*.

death of the innocent just person 'opens their eyes' to the structure of the system 'Their eyes were opened [. . .]. The Messiah is to suffer [. . .] and that repentance and forgiveness (*áphesin*) of sins is to be proclaimed in his name to all nations.'¹⁷³

The final ethical-political criterion will not be the 'law' of the system but the life of the Other, far from the Totality of domination. The dominated are promised 'pardon' for their faults, the first of these being to have trusted in the 'law' and not in life. The sacrifice of Jesus liberates the people from sacrifice and from the search for justice through fulfilment of the 'law'. Philosophically-politically this inaugurated a critical praxis in the face of the whole political system of domination, the Roman Empire. A critical political praxis was the result of a demythologization (de-ideologization) of the fetishized political power of the empire (the emperor was a god). Christians were 'atheists' in relation to such gods, and as 'atheists' were sent to the repression of the empire's circuses. The 'law' of the Jewish Pharisees and Romans had been sacrilegiously dismissed from its holiness. What is holy is human life, the Other, the poor, the widow, the orphan, those who beg for justice in the Exteriority of the fetishized Totality.

However, Anselm inverts this politically critical 'logic', developing a rational discourse which justifies the 'law', the law of the system, now the Christendom of the 'God of the armies'.¹⁷⁴ Jesus of Nazareth critic of the 'law' that preached 'pardon for sins', is sent to hell: is Lucifer. The 'earthly city' (of Cain) is presented as the 'city of God'; the Christendom of the crusades, which found better arguments than the Muslims with their *Dar-al-Harb*, 'House of War', where those conquered by the 'holy war' were offered the ability to be 'faithful', to save their eternal lives by an alliance with the Islamic God.

[60] Certain steps are necessary to produce the 'inversiou'. Anselm first confuses the 'ransom' demanded by Satan as a 'debt' contracted by the sinner. Second, he inverts who 'charges' the 'ransom' or the 'debt' from Satan to the severe God of Christendom; Jesus' Father of goodness becomes the sadist who asks for the death of his Son. Third, he declares that the 'debt' cannot be pardoned, because that would be unjust. Fourth, he shows that the debt is unpayable, infinite. Fifth, although the debt is unpayable one has to pay it; *must* pay. Sixth, the Son has to be offered in blood sacrifice to the Father (and not to Satan) to pay the debt with his life: born to die.¹⁷⁵ Seventh, sacrificed (sadistically by the Father), the Son produces with

¹⁷³ Luke 24.31, 46-7.

¹⁷⁴ *Yahveh Tseba'ot* (God of the armies) (2 Samuel 6.2) is still a 'very primitive 'concept' of God, that of Nationalist Israel, that will return anew in Zionism, in Christendom (Dussel, 1969a, p. 115) and in fundamentalist Islam. It is then a recession to a concept of God criticized and overcome by Jesus of Nazareth! It is the God of the crusades; it is the 'God [who] is with us' (*Gott mit uns*) of Hitler, and it is the God of Ariel Sharon in Zionist Israel, May 2002; against that God stand Martin Buber and Uri Avnery.

¹⁷⁵ 'But as no one can pay (*reddere*) as much as he owes, Christ pays for all those who are saved' (*De conceptu virginali*, chap. 23; Anselm, 1952-3, II, p. 55). 'No one is admitted to

his blood a 'deposit', an infinite 'treasure'. Eighth, the Church, 'necessary mediation of salvation', has to make the Christian message a condition of the 'treasure's' distribution. Ninth, the 'debtors' or sinners are saved by the fulfilment of the 'law' (of God, the Church and the empire; it seems thus a complete theory of the *lex*) and *ex opere operato* through the sacraments. The 'matter' had remained well packaged and resolved. The Jesus Christ of the crusades (so far from Jesus of Nazareth!) has 'paid' the unpayable 'debt'. As compensation, it was necessary to fulfil the 'law'. The critique of the system, of Christendom, was a satanic act, of Lucifer, condemnable at the stake. The sacrifice of yesterday was now the sacrificer. Jesus of Nazareth had anticipated this: 'An hour is coming when those who kill you think that by doing so they are offering worship (*latreía*) to God.'¹⁷⁶

We see the Anselmian argumentation, the foundation of Europe self-referencing its own 'truth', of which Hegel will say 'the German Spirit (*germanische Geist*) is the Spirit [. . .] whose end is the realization of absolute Truth [. . .] The Christian principle has moved to the formidable discipline of culture.'¹⁷⁷ Anselm expresses himself in a context of strict 'justice' of the market economy where one is bought, paid, sold and demanded to repay what is owed:

In no way has man the power or right of receiving from God what God purposed to give him, if he does not restore to God the whole of what he robbed Him of; so that as through him God lost (*perdidit*),¹⁷⁸ in like manner through him God should regain¹⁷⁹ [what He had lost]. And this cannot be otherwise accomplished than that, as by being overcome¹⁸⁰ the whole of human nature was corrupted, and, as it were, leavened by sin, (and with sin god exalts no one to the perfection of that heavenly city) . . . That so long as man does not repay (*reddit*) to God what he owes, he cannot be beatified; and that he is not excused by his inability. *Anselm*. If

the kingdom of God, through what he did, but through the death of Christ, without which is not paid (*redditur*) that which is due for the sin of Adam' (ibid., p. 63). All is an 'eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth'.

¹⁷⁶ John 16.2.

¹⁷⁷ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*; Hegel, 1971-9, XII, 413. (Translation: TC). 'Christendom' is the 'discipline of culture' that converts primitive prophetic Christianity into a dominating civilization, which Kierkegaard and Marx will criticize in different ways. See Dussel, 1995a, pp. 22f.

¹⁷⁸ In Jesus' concept of God, God cannot lose anything when the sinner sins. The sinner loses and suffers as punishment the structures of domination created by his/her own sin. The sin has as punishment the suffering of the sinner who loses his/her happiness. The one who suffers more is not the dominator (subject of the sin) but the dominated (innocent); for this one has to liberate the dominated paying the 'dominator' the 'ransom'. As prophetic Messiah showing in his life 'dominating logic', as Messiah and King (political), to offer life, to liberate through struggle (even armed, as Joan of Arc, Washington or Hidalgo) against the dominator. The political heroic messiahs are also constructors of the 'celestial city'.

¹⁷⁹ God is conceived as the miser who has to recover what was borrowed to continue the banking operations.

¹⁸⁰ This 'victory' (*per victum*) situates us in the field of battle where to conquer sin one has to have war.

a man is called unjust who does not repay (*reddidit*) another man what he owes, much more is he unjust who does not repay God what he owes. *Boso*. If he can, and does not repay (*non reddit*), he is truly unjust.¹⁸¹ But if he is unable, how is he unjust? [. . .] *Anselm*. So man, who of his own accord rendered himself liable to that debt (*debito*), which he cannot pay,¹⁸² and by his own fault let himself fall into this inability.¹⁸³

From here Anselm deduces that only God can pay an unpayable debt, because God is infinite. From this is derived the necessity of the incarnation, not forgetting that the major premise is that *God cannot forgive* because it goes against justice (the conception of Jesus' merciful God):

To forgive sin thus is simply not to punish it; [. . .] it is rightly ordered that sin without satisfaction only exists but to be punished [. . .] But if sin is neither atoned for nor punished, it is subject to no law.¹⁸⁴ [. . .] Therefore unrighteousness, if it be remitted by mercy alone,¹⁸⁵ is more free than righteousness. [. . .] It makes unrighteousness to be like God. [. . .] Divine mercy of such a kind as this is exceedingly contrary to His justice [. . .] Wherefore, as it is impossible for God to be contrary to Himself, so is it impossible for Him to be merciful after such a manner as this.¹⁸⁶

Pride, the supreme sin, is not wanting to pay the debt, to fulfil the law. In later medieval philosophy, influenced by Anselm, morality will always keep a transcendental or inevitable relation with the rule, norm, law (divine, natural, positive law):

He who does not pay (*solvit*), in vain says 'Forgive;' but he who does pay beseeches, for it is a very part of his payment to beseech; for God owes nothing to any one, but every creature owes to Him.¹⁸⁷

Hinkelammert comments:

[. . .] from justice which consists in pardoning the debt, one passes to justice which consists in paying all that one owes. From a devil that charges an illegitimate ransom, one moves to a God who charges a legitimate

¹⁸¹ The one 'who cannot pay' does not have to pay; it is not thus in slavery: the one who 'cannot pay' can still be property of the creditor. The 'climate' of Anselmian reflection is strictly commercial, hard, fixed, 'eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth', contrary to Jesus' position.

¹⁸² Because for Anselm a debt with God is an infinite debt.

¹⁸³ *Cur Deus homo*, Book I, ch. 23; Anselm, I, 1952-3, 817; ch. 24; 817; 819 (ET: pp. 51-2).

¹⁸⁴ 'Being subject to the law' is the supreme ethical criterion of Anselm, Christendom, Modernity.

¹⁸⁵ 'Mercy', preached by Jesus, is now considered 'injustice'.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 12; p. 777 [ET: pp. 29-30]; ch. 24; p. 821 [ET: p. 54].

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 19; p. 807 [ET: p. 42].

debt. From pride which consists of demanding fulfilment of the law without mercy, one moves to pride which consists of demanding submitting to the law the necessities of life. From a Christianity which was part of the dominated and exploited, one passes to a Christendom [I change the text] which constitutes the ideology of an empire, in whose name it exploits and dominates.¹⁸⁸

When, during feudalism, a peasant rises up with the gospel of Jesus in his hand against the feudal master, the master, bishop and professors will remind the Anabaptist that sin is not fulfilling the 'law'. Thomas will designate the just rule of the feudal master over the servants, the *ius dominativum*, which although it was not natural law was *ius gentium*. The historical empirical social order, which Jesus gave sufficient arguments to criticize, is now the criterion of the goodness of the act. The 'inversion' has been inadvertently realized.

The Anselmian revolution is definitive. The Christian order, as Totality, can develop a politics of legitimate power. It will not avoid the intermittent eruption of prophetic messianism, in the sense of Walter Benjamin, of which Francis of Assisi is an ecological expression (and exception).

[61] The fourth factor in the formation of Europe is the constitution of communities of intellectuals who organize and defend themselves as unions, judicially autonomous, around medieval universities, and who occupy themselves with deepening the Anselmian vision of politics. The University of Bologna was founded in 1088 (in the Pontifical state), almost a century later, Paris (1160), Oxford (1170), Coimbra, Prague and Salamanca (1218), the first in Europe, which constituted communities of great importance for political philosophy in European culture. As inheritors of the three important traditions (the Semitic-Christian of the Church Fathers, so Byzantine, Greek philosophy, and the rationalist tradition of Islamic political thinking),¹⁸⁹ the universities were true corporations with judicial autonomy (Roman law), a judicial level which was never achieved in other cultures (neither Chinese, Vedanta, Byzantine, nor Islamic philosophy). Philosophy was practised in all faculties (there were three: theology, civil and ecclesiasti-

¹⁸⁸ Hinkelammert, 1991, p. 87 (Translation: TC). This is the ideology of the International Monetary Fund and of the ethic of globalization 'from above', the ethic of the market of Hayek (see Gutiérrez, 1998).

¹⁸⁹ It came from Aristotelianism through the Arabs to the Latin medieval world beginning with the taking of Toledo by the Christians in 1085. The bishop of Toledo, Raimundo (who governed from 1126–51) encouraged translation. Juan of Spain (Avendath) translated Avicenna's *Logic* into Latin; Domingo Gundisalvo did the same with *Metaphysics* and *Physics* and works of al-Farabi. In 1128 Jacobo of Venice translated Aristotle's *Analytics*. In Toledo, Gerardo of Cremona (1134–87) translated works of al-Kindi and Aristotle's *Later Analytics*, *Physics*, *On the Sky and the Cosmos*, *On Generation and Corruption*. At the end of the twelfth century, Albert the Great could begin the commentary on *Metaphysics*, although it awaited William of Moerbeke's translation in 1260 to prepare a complete translation, which Thomas of Aquinas would use. Nevertheless it is important to remember the Anselmian 'inversion' to understand how the reception of Aristotle and the Greeks produced a Latin political philosophy of very specific characters.

cal law and medicine, and the 'liberal arts'), but principally in the exercise of theology and the 'arts' (with their *trivium* and *quadrivium*). On the other hand, in the eleventh century new religious orders with urban roots arose, among a bourgeois critical elite.¹⁹⁰

In these associations reappeared the abandoned philosophical life from schools which closed centuries before, Pergamon, Odessa, Antioch, Athens (closed in 529 CE) or Alexandria (in 643 CE), like the imperial ones of Rome or of Africa, whose handwritten texts, nevertheless, had been copied in part by the Benedictines for seven centuries in their own communitarian studies. However, the School of Constantinople (founded in 425 CE, closed in 1453) would have enormous continuity, finding itself under Islamic renewal from the eighth century and the Italian 'Renaissance'. In fact, it might be the School of longest duration in history. Thus in twelfth-century Paris (Abelard was born in 1079) there is a massive study of Aristotle, coming from the Toledo School of the Translators (1126-91) and from some relevant Mediterranean ports.¹⁹¹

[62] A noble Italian, who would become a member of a poor mendicant order, Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), produced the most original synthesis of regional proportions (Latin European West),¹⁹² which can only be compared with the works of Chu Hsi in China (d.c. 1200 CE), of Shankara in eighth-century CE India, and centuries before, Plotinus at the end of Hellenism in the third century CE, or, centuries later, Hegel in nineteenth-century European Modernity.

One author is amazed¹⁹³ that Thomas will carry out seriously and without problems or opposition (on the part of the society, monarchies and Papacy) the commentary to Aristotle's *Politics*, meanwhile the Jews and Muslims

190 'Bourgeois' in its original sense of 'from Burgos' or inhabitant of a 'hamlet' (in German *Burg* signifies city: thus the cities of Burgos - as *Medina del Campo* came from *Medina* in Arabic [city], or of Freiburg ('free city' in the face of the feudal world). Francis of Assisi was a textile merchant, who, not wanting to be rich like the Benedictines through exploitation of their fields and their 'servants', preferred, like the Buddhist monks, to beg alms in the cities. The *mendicant* orders (Dominican and others) are proto-bourgeois. In addition, their organization into 'chapters' (where their authorities are elected and decisions are taken discursively) is deeply democratic: it had an ideal *consensus iuris* (those affected had symmetry in all the decisions that the elected delegates took by egalitarian vote of the communities).

191 See Copleston, 1964, pp. 223-8. In effect, until the twelfth century the Latin philosophers only partially knew Aristotle's works. In 1128 Jacobo of Venice translated the rest. There were multiple translations of the same work. Thus William of Moerbeke improved the *New Metaphysics*, translating it from Greek.

192 Thomas Aquinas was not a 'catholic' thinker, but a medieval Christian, since 'catholic' was a determination added to the Christian community after the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation. The medieval Church looked to the south, the Mediterranean, the Islamic world; it felt besieged. The 'catholic' Church is modern, looks to the Atlantic, has lost northern Europe and has been globalized empirically in America, Africa and Asia (impossible for the medieval Church, which was enclosed in the limits that Islam imposed).

193 Ernest Fortin (author of the chapter corresponding to Thomas Aquinas in Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 191f. [ET: pp. 248-75]) writes: 'It is impossible, however, to account fully for the decidedly Platonic character of Judaeo-Arabic political thought and the decidedly Aristotelian character of Christian political thought' (p. 271 [ET: p. 250]).

inspired by authors like Plato or the Neoplatonists, had to justify (unsuccessfully) the necessity of a political philosophy. In Islam, Koranic law (*fiqh*) was the dominant science (as in ancient Mesopotamia) of theocratic inspiration, which did not leave sufficient room for philosophical reason (it had to struggle to reach its autonomous 'place', as in the case of the criticized Averroes), and so a secularized politics was not accepted. On the contrary, in the culture of Latin Christendom the steady judicial–ecclesial organization, increased from the eleventh-century reform of Gregory VII and rationalized following the Anselmian discourse, secularized the empire slowly but inevitably and with this left a place for the exercise of political reason, civil law and the autonomy of secular political institutions. Political philosophy received its citizenship. Aristotle was considered the eminent result of natural reason (prior to revelation), although his results had to be subsumed (in light of the Semitic–Christian tradition). Thomas incorporates the whole problematic of the Greek ideal city, political virtues (rationalizing and augmenting his list), natural law (from a positive, natural and divine law, as Anselm indicates) and especially of the treatise on *prudentia* (the Greek *frónesis*), which is developed in a highly analytical way, and turns out to be very valuable for the description of politics as the exercise of strategic reason,¹⁹⁴ since the free decision or election (*electio*) is the fruit of 'an appetitive intellect (*intellectus appetitivus*) or an intellectual appetite (*appetitus intellectivus*)',¹⁹⁵ concluding, nevertheless, that 'election is principally an act of the appetitive virtue; and thus free will [which craves practical judgement] is an appetitive force (*apetitiva potentia*)',¹⁹⁶ against the opinion of a certain Thomist intellectualism. He also indicates that 'will and free will are not two forces but one'.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the commentaries on Aristotle's texts, in particular his *Politics*, and the multiple references to politics in all his works, Thomas possibly wrote a specific work, in 1266 according to some, on *The Regime of the Princes*,¹⁹⁸ in which showing that it is natural to live in common, he indi-

194 Having studied at the National University of Cuyo (Argentina) with eminent and up-to-date Thomist professors, I had the privilege to take four courses on ethics, one of them about 'The *phrónesis* in Aristotle and the *prudentia* in Thomas Aquinas' (with Guido Soaje Ramos). My first PhD led me to re-read the totality of the Thomistic work on politics (see Dussel, 1959, I–III). As I have referred to this great author in almost all my works, I will be brief in this exposition.

195 *Summa* I, q. 83, a. 3 (Thomas Aquinas, 1950, I, 405 [Translation: TC]), which refers to the commentary of Thomas on Aristotle, *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 2, n. 1137 (ibid., 1949, p. 311): 'Obiectum enim electionis est bonum et malum, sicut et appetitus; non autem verum et falsum, qui pertinent ad intellectum' (p. 311b). Will has priority in the act of free election for Thomas.

196 *Summa* I, q. 83, a. 3, resp. (ibid., 405b [Translation: TC]). Thomas has an impressive architectonic in his politics. He defines his practical first principles and the practical faculty of its reception (*syndéresis*); he analyses the faculties of the principles' application (*syneidesis*), arriving at the Aristotelian *proairesis*, 'conclusion of the practical syllogism' that is the 'desired justice' next to the *imperium* or act as a last resort of the will. It will serve us later as we construct an architectonic in the level C of politics and political action.

197 Ibid., q. 83, a. 4, resp. (ibid., p. 406b [Translation: TC]).

198 See Thomas Aquinas, 1954.

cates that even 'animals also have natural diligence implanted in them by which they know what things are useful or harmful. For example, a sheep naturally judges a wolf to be an enemy (*aestimat lupum inimicum*)'.¹⁹⁹

Nature has prepared food for all other animals, hair to cover them, and defenses, such as teeth, horns, or claws, or at least speed for flight. But human beings were established with nothing of the sort prepared for them by nature. In place of all of these things reason was given to them, through which they could prepare all these things for themselves by the use of their hands. One person acting alone is not enough to obtain a sufficient life, so it is natural for human beings to live in the society of many.²⁰⁰

He speaks of three evils: (*perversum*): tyranny, oligarchy and democracy.²⁰¹ The 'just regime' (*iustum regimen*) is the *politia* of the 'betters', the aristocracy or the monarchy, inclining himself toward this last regime as the most apt for Latin Europe's government.

The political tasks, finally, are driven toward the common good of the community, and within a theological vision, like the kingdom of God (to which Leibniz and Kant will refer in a secularized way):

The good (*bonum*) which is the end of the universe is manifestly significant for the universe.²⁰² The common good (*bonum commune*) following the appropriate understanding is preferable to the individual good, since any physical part is ordained by instinct to the good of the whole (*bonum totius*) [. . .] Each man has to be considered as part and has, as the final common good of the whole, God, in whom all beatitude consists.²⁰³

The end of history is community with God, the city of God of Augustine, although he continues to recognize the existence of the political community, as Aristotle knew, which has its own temporary, autonomous, natural *bonum commune*.

[63] We leave Thomas and move to an author with an ontology (or metaphysics) of power. John Duns Scotus (1265–1308),²⁰⁴ following the theoretical positions of the Mu'tazilites of Damascus and Baghdad, taking his inspiration from Avicenna and other Islamic philosophers, and in particular in Augustine of Hippo, developed a theory of the priority of will, which

199 *De Regimine Principum*, Book 1, ch. 1.4, 741 (Thomas Aquinas, 1954, 257b [Translation: Blythe, p. 61]). The text makes us think not only about Hobbes but also about Schmitt.

200 *Ibid.*, 741 (Translation: Blythe, p. 61).

201 '[. . .] *quando scilicet populus plebeiorum per potentiam multitudinis opprimit divites*' (*ibid.*, chap. 2, 747 p. 258 [Translation: Blythe, pp. 63–4]).

202 *Summa* I, q. 103, a. 2, resp. (Translation: TC).

203 *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, XIII, n. 634 (Translation: TC). See Dussel, 1973a, pp. 72f.

204 See Gilson, 1952, a classic here.

Hannah Arendt has partially recovered.²⁰⁵ From this, one can derive a political theory of power as contingent causality, which will open the way for the Franciscans' *via moderna*, William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua. Duns Scotus is not only a highly creative innovator, but is extremely relevant for the ontology of contingency.

As much in Avicenna as in Duns Scotus, the theme originates in a theory of ideas which the Infinite knows. From these all the beings of the universe are created. Unlike Avicenna's intellectualist tradition (or later Leibniz of the 'best of all possible worlds'),²⁰⁶ these ideas are not necessary, neither is the creative act. To be chosen is not necessary, and although they can be created, it is by an unnecessary act, the free will of the creator.²⁰⁷ Let us summarize his argument.

Augustine, in the *Book of 83 Questions*,²⁰⁸ modifying profoundly the Platonic ontology, defined 'divine ideas', which Duns Scotus synthesizes saying: 'The idea is, in divine thinking, an eternal reason, according to which something can be formed, outside of the thinking, according to its own reason.'²⁰⁹ 'God, in a first moment, thinks into being [his] essence in an absolutely pure manner.'²¹⁰ Later he produces, for example, 'stone in its intelligible being (*esse intelligibili*) and thinks into being the stone (*intelligit lapidem*)',²¹¹ In a third moment, the divine intellect relates, if he wishes, his own intellection with the stone. In a fourth moment he knows explicitly this 'relation of reason' (*relatio rationis*), established between his intellection and the object. Scotus thinks that God does not produce ideas eternally, as Henry of Ghent writes against Avicenna, nor that these have a *real* being. Ideas are set before the divine intellect as merely possible entities²¹² (with

205 Arendt, 1978, II, pp. 125f. Arendt owes too much to Heidegger and the Greeks, and, paradoxically, does not know sufficiently her Semitic tradition. In certain moments, referring to liberty, she writes, 'that hardly we take notice [of it] before the first century of the Christian era' (p. 3). The notion of 'liberty' begins to develop with the myth of Osiris (and the 'final judgement' of *Ma'at*) in Egypt, but certainly in Israel (Dussel, 1969a, pp. 34f.: 'Liberty and responsibility'). Her references to Paul of Tarsus and Augustine of Hippo are correct, but she does not situate them within the Semitic tradition. Free will and the faculty of will were not known in the Semitic-Christian and Islamic sense by the Greeks or Romans. We know that H. Arendt wrote her thesis with K. Jasper about 'love' in Augustine, but it is in his posthumous work where he speaks to us at length about Duns Scotus.

206 For Scotus, the world is not the 'best' possible (the latter, although 'it was not, and had to be created': it was then necessary in its possibility), but simply one of the *possibles*, that is to say, *contingent* (that 'it was not and could be not created').

207 We will see that, in the same way, the elective act of will makes real *contingent* institutions or acts, by their *mode of causality*. The question is central in politics, as we will study further on.

208 Q. 46, 1-2; *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 40, cols 29-30.

209 *Oxonienis Commentary*, Book I, dist. 35, q. only, n. 12; Duns Scotus, 1912-14, I, 1,160 (Translation: TC).

210 '*Deus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam [suma] sub ratione mere absoluta*' (*Com. Oxon.*, *ibid.*, n. 10, 1,158) (Translation: TC).

211 *Ibid.*, as those in quotation marks following (Translations: TC).

212 '[...] *quia esse cognitum ab intellectu divino non ponit illud esse aliquid in entitate reali aliud a primo objecto [...] sed in intellectu praesentialiter*' (*Com. Oxon.* Book I, dist. 8, q. 5, art. 2, n. 16; I, 653).

pure logical possibility, or as pure *ens objectivum*),²¹³ not as created (without empirical possibility, but with a minimal entity: *ens diminutum*²¹⁴), and only when they are chosen from all the possible ideas (now with empirical possibility)²¹⁵ will they be converted into created entities and become individual essences, with their singular *haecceitas: ens ratum*.

Scotus distinguishes, on the other hand, in a very personal way, between *natura* (which operates by necessity: that which cannot not be) and *voluntas* (which operates causing contingency: that which cannot be). Intelligence is seen with *natura* (nature of things). Freedom as *voluntas* will have the function of being a special causality, contingent causality. In effect, one has to distinguish between the ideas as 'simply possible' or as 'future possible', the position defended by Avicenna, where the difference rests in an act of divine will which makes them real as created essences. The 'contingent futures' (the ideas of the things which can be created, which were not, which will begin to be but could 'not be') do not refer *ad esse existentiae*, because they are 'future' and not 'present', and so God did not have to create them first as possible and later as real. Its first mode of being is merely possible. But if God is the cause of its existence, being perfect, it would be a necessary causality (the 'best of all possible worlds' of Leibniz) and contingent on the next causes.²¹⁶ Duns Scotus wants to refute this position.

[64] In order for contingency to be radical, the first cause has to be contingent.²¹⁷ But this was impossible for the ontology of the *ananké* (necessity) of the Greeks and of many Muslims and Christians who attribute creation to the placing in reality of divine ideas, as an act of divine intelligence, and the intelligence, as *natura*, acts by necessity.²¹⁸ An intelligence that determines necessarily the will or a will that subdues itself necessarily to the intellect removes the radical contingency of the universe. Scotus offers then a solution that is important for understanding radical contingency.

For Scotus contingency is a fact. If someone denies the existence of contingency, one can prove it by torturing the person until s/he admits (and asks) that it is *possible* for the torture stop. The existence of contingency

²¹³ *Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 36, q. only, n. 10; I, 1,777.

²¹⁴ It is an *ens rationis* (*Com. Oxon.*, Book IV, dist. 1, q. 2, n. 3). It is purely formal (*talitas*).

²¹⁵ For Scotus, God creates equally the conditions of the *empiría*. The empirical conditions in 'this world' (one of the possibles and not the Leibnizian 'best') have been decided freely by God.

²¹⁶ Thomas says: '[. . .] they are contingent in virtue of the next causes, although the science of God that is the first cause, is necessary' (*Summa*, I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 1). Duns Scotus replies: 'Although certain things are necessary in reference to divine science, it does not follow that they cannot be contingent in reference to the next causes' (*Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 39, q. only, n. 12; I, 1,213). That is to say, it is in God where one finds the causality of the contingent as contingent.

²¹⁷ 'Nulla causatio alicujus causae potest salvare contingentiam, nisi prima causa ponatur immediate contingenter causare' (*Com. Oxon.*, *ibid.*, n. 14; I, 1,215).

²¹⁸ '[. . .] intellectus intelligit hoc modo, intelligit mere naturaliter et necessitate naturali, et ita mulla contingentia potest esse in sciendo aliquid [. . .]' (*Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 38, q. only, n. 2; I, 1,199).

depends on the causes not being necessary. If the first cause is necessary and a second cause originates, contingency would be impossible (because all successive causes would be equally necessary). The first cause must be free, so it causes contingently what is contingent. This is possible and rational: God creates the future possible ideas choosing them freely with God's absolute will.²¹⁹

But in what consists the possible? It fulfils two conditions, says Scotus: (a) its essence or nature is not contradictory, and (b) it does not exist necessarily. It is found, however, between the impossible (not *a*) and the necessary (not *b*). The stone produced as 'intelligible entity', as idea in the divine intellect, is not contradictory nor does it contradict existence although it does not necessarily exist.

In order for God to be able to create one has to 'before all production of the external thing (*ad extra*), have a possible existence (*esse possibile*)',²²⁰ possibility of essence. But it still would be possible *necessarily*, as the possibility of existence. If the possibility of essence is not given, neither is the contingent possible. But the first could be given, nevertheless the created thing would not be contingent if one had to be created necessarily (as Avicenna, or the 'best possible world' of Leibniz, where God would always have to necessarily create the 'best', so could not have created this world). It would be for Scotus a creation that is not contingent, necessary, *naturally* possible. If divine intelligence created by herself, all her creatures would be necessary. On the contrary, divine will, which necessarily loves itself, does not have to love the finite object, and for this is not moved by necessity in her desire. She loves the future possible thing with infinite freedom.²²¹

But this is not all. For Avicenna, for example, the possible being is what is not contradictory, but can be caused necessarily by God, by which it would be 'possible by itself, but necessary by another (*possibile per se necesse ex alio*)'. But Scotus is not in agreement with this 'necessity' of the mode of causing a creature's existence. His God, necessary in godself, is free with respect to creatures. The finite creatures are essences (neither particular nor universal, neither existent nor non-existent); they are non-contradictory 'possible entities'. Their existence being accidental, they could nevertheless exist in the 'necessary possible' of Avicenna (or Aristotle)²²² or the 'contingent possible' of Scotus. The mode of causality depends on the causes' mode of being. A second natural agent works by necessarily producing what produces; its causality is in a certain way necessary (natural). But if the first Cause is infinite and perfect in the order of being itself, it works freely when it creates all things. As infinite intelligence produces formally infinite pos-

219 See *Com. Oxon.*, Book I, *ibid.*, n. 14; I, 1, 215.

220 *Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 43, q., n. 3; I, 1, 277 [Translation: TC].

221 'Non est autem ita quando voluntas infinita respicit bonum amabile finitum; quia licet ibi actus sit infinitus quantum est ex parte voluntatis divinae, non tamen est infinitus quantum ex parte objecti' (*Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 10, q., n. 11; I, 687).

222 '[. . .] Aristotle simul et Avicenna posuerunt Deum necessario se habere ad alia extra se' (*Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 8, q. 5, art. 2, n. 9; I, 647).

sible ideas with its *esse cognitum* (known being); but as infinite will chooses the future possible with its *esse volitum* (wanted being). But a third moment is necessary for the wanted thing to be an existing thing. It still lacks the executive power of God to produce a *contingent* existence.

For Scotus, 'the creating consists in causing freely possible beings whose existence is not necessary'.²²³ For Scotus the universe is contingent, in continual innovation, irreversible, unpredictable *ante rem*, crossed by unrepeatable temporality, as it is from distinct perspectives for Bergson, Berdyaev or Prigogine.²²⁴ It is not a question of either chance or *nature*, but of an original causality which starts from free will. It seems like what we hear still in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Carl Schmitt. The sole contingency that Avicenna or Aristotle accepted was chance or evil as error – since the 'phenomena' appeared to be contingent, but at base were equally necessary, thanks to *physikón nómos* (natural law). *Episteme* in the Greek sense came from the illusion of contingency, the necessity of the universe eternally revolving, repetitive, equal, determined, predictable, divine. The contingent universe of Scotus will be later secularized, the divine being a free causality and before the universe: the universe stopped being 'full of gods' and could be celebrated as radical contingency, not as defect but as a proper mode of being.

²²³ Gilson, 1952, p. 329. I owe to this work many of the quotes used. I believe that the interest of these distinctions for a critical political philosophy will be understood. As someone writes: 'To create a new political order one must cause freely possible institutions whose existence is not necessary'; the contingency of the possible order allows us to understand the meaning of the history of politics as unpredictable, irreversible, which indicates to us chaos theory or the logic of complexity of Prigogine, Capra or Morin.

²²⁴ See, Bergson, 1934, p. 115: 'I would like to return to the theme that I already touched on, the continual creation of unpredictable novelty that seems to happen in the universe.' He explains: 'Time is that which hinders what all is already given a blow' (p. 118). Berdyaev says: 'For the monist ontology [of the Greeks] is not only the appearance of evil which presents a difficulty, but also novelty' (1946, p. 181). 'Or the primacy of the being over liberty or the primary of liberty over the being. Two types of philosophy are thus determined.' (p. 121). About political order, the Russian philosopher tells us: 'The metaphysical reflections that are read rest on a sharp sense of evil that dominates the world [. . .] My thinking reflects the rebellion of the human personality against the universal harmonious objective, illusory and crushing, against the objective social order, against all the consecrations of the objective universal order' (p. 7). What Berdyaev wrote thinking of socialism we can apply today to the necessary, irreversible, objective, north American, neoliberal process of globalization. Boehme states: 'Outside of nature is Nothing; that is to say, an eye of eternity, an unfathomable eye that is Nothing, that sees Nothing, that is without foundation (*Ungrund*), and this eye is a Will' (p. 123). Prigogine, for his part, says: 'We live in a evolutionary universe [. . .] the laws of nature [. . .] no longer deal with certitudes but possibilities' (Prigogine and Nicolis, 2001, pp. 174–5 [ET: p. 155]). And: 'We consider the big bang an irreversible process *par excellence*. [. . .] This irreversibility would result from an instability in the preuniverse induced by the interactions of gravitation and matter. [. . .] The birth of our universe is no longer associated with a singularity, but rather with an instability' (pp. 188–9 [ET: 166, 179]). The creationist intuitions from the original free will of Duns Scotus, founding the contingency of the universe, shows us a theoretical-critical attitude analogous to the actual 'chaos theory' and complexity, which starting from thermodynamics has overcome the linear universe of univocal, necessary, predictable, repeatable effects that reigned over the epistemology from Aristotle to Newton and Einstein. We will see later what this means for politics.

[65] Summarizing, Scotus affirms that the essence, in the order of duration, does not have in its intelligible being a priori existence; it does not have a 'from where' to exist; it is only possible. And Avicenna is right, against Averroes, to affirm that nevertheless it could become necessary by its cause. If God creates it out of necessity, it would be a possibility whose existence is necessary.²²⁵ For Scotus, against Avicenna, by being the free and unpredictable cause, the existence itself of the possible is contingent. The *ex nihilo* ('from nothing') is the contingent cause extrinsic to the creator as unpredictable, undetermined, absolutely free will. Gilson says:

Because God causes in a contingent manner God can cause something new, just like God can cause something eternal. It is sufficient that God's free will has eternally wanted the existence of a temporal being.²²⁶

What is most interesting now is to move to the level of human finite will, where real; philosophy could retake all that 'near God' as an ideal counterfactual moment: 'If we were infinite and perfect beings²²⁷ . . . we could . . . But as we are not perfect, then . . .'. Kant²²⁸ put in front of the finite understanding which only knew 'objects' the *Intellectus archetypus* (of God) which could know the *noumenon*, the phenomenological order as 'constitution'.

For Scotus the 'natural' order was opposed to the order 'of the will'.²²⁹ The will, *ut voluntas*, free, always has to first count on the will *ut natura*, tendency. First, the object presented by intelligence is loved; prior to *natura* as much intelligence (*intellectus intelligit: esse cognitum*) as appetite (*voluntas amat: esse volitum*). Second, it is chosen (not only from a want [*velle*] but also from a non-want [*nolle*]) formally as will that is determined freely itself. Against al-Farabi and the Islamic philosophers,²³⁰ Scotus rejects that

²²⁵ This is the position of Hegel, for whom the 'possibility' (*Möglichkeit*) of the phenomenon becoming a real thing is by 'necessity' (*Notwendigkeit*). Its real existence denotes its necessity. See *Encyclopedia*, §§ 142f. (Hegel, 1971-9, VIII, pp. 279ff.) and *Logic*, II, 3: 'Die Wirklichkeit' (Hegel, 1971-9, VI, pp. 186f.). Not for Scotus, for whom mere existence indicates the presence of a free election of existence itself, by what is contingent.

²²⁶ Gilson, 1952, p. 337 (Translation: TC).

²²⁷ The principle of impossibility is used by Popper when he declares in his critique of historicism: 'If we would possess an infinite intelligence of infinite speed we would be able to effect a perfect planning of future economic happenings. But, as we are a finite intelligence of finite speed, perfect planning is impossible' (see Hinkelammert, 1984).

²²⁸ In 1770 Kant put first 'divine intuition' (*die göttliche Anschauung; divinus intuitus*) that knows the essences in God (a Leibnizian Platonism) to differentiate it from the human understanding that 'knows symbolically' (*symbolische Erkenntnis; cognitio symbolica*) (*De mundo sensibili atque intelligibili*, § 10; Kant, 1968, V, 41 [Translation: TC]).

²²⁹ 'Iste autem modus eliciendi operationem propriam non potest esse in genere nisi duplex. [a] Aut enim potentia ex se est determinata ad agendum ita quod [. . .]; [b] aut non est ex se determinata, sed potest agere hunc actum vel oppositum actum, agere etiam vel non agere. Prima potentia conjunctur dicitur natura, secunda dicitur voluntas. Unde prima divisio principiorum activorum est in naturam et voluntatem' (In *Metaph.*, Book IX, q. 15, n. 4; cit. Gilson, 1952, p. 574).

²³⁰ And also against Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* (1999).

'fantasy' (imagination) can be the cause of freedom, because in the end it is a representative moment and in a certain way determines the will from outside itself as *natura*. The free spontaneity of will is shown not as much in the want of the object (even in a fantasy) but in the 'non-wanting' power (*nolle*). In addition, will can 'focus' or 'move' the intellect and the fantasy toward a wanted object, over another, or reject both.²³¹

Thus the human act, effect of freedom, will be contingent by analogy on the mode of existence of the universe, but in three diverse degrees: (a) *libertas ad oppositos actus*, when something is wanted or not wanted; (b) *libertas ad opposita objecta*, when this or that is wanted; and (c) *libertas ad oppositos effectus*, when this real thing is wanted as effect. These three dimensions of the contingent are caused by this triple freedom, and are different dimensions of contingency: every real thing or act, which could be possible, (a) could be not wanted,²³² (b) could have other content (to be wanted as another possibility) and (c) could not be the effect of contingent causality (not necessary or natural) of making the thing real, existing. Freedom intervenes in all the moments of attaining the real thing. Duns Scotus writes:

Nihil aliud a voluntate potest esse totalis causa volitionis in voluntate secundum quod voluntas determinat se libere ad actum volendi causandum [Only the will can be total cause of volition in the will inasmuch as the will is determined freely causing the act of desire].²³³

Volition (*volitio*) is the motor, the motivation; want is the cause of the movement, and not wanting immobility; it is the cause of this or that, and is the power to effect a real act or thing.

As a last resort, the effect, the act or thing possible can 'not come' to exist. Between the *esse cognitum* (possible) and the *esse volitum* (wanted and chosen) there is still a distance from realizing the *esse realis contingens*, distance which the *potestas operandi* covers as energy, strength or 'power' to make an effect exist.²³⁴ In the latter consists the 'power of the will' (*potestas voluntatis*), the final foundation of an ontology of political power as will (a want to cause the real as means for communitarian life) or

²³¹ Today we know the anticipatory functions that the limbic-affective system carries out above the neocortical-cognitive system (Damasio, 1999). It is surprising, nevertheless, taking into account the limited resources of his time, that Duns Scotus has intuited the affective-motor functioning (causing) of the indicated limbic system, essential for life. The medieval or actual cognitivism, neo-positivist or foundationalist universalist, will have to be redefined from the Freudian 'unconscious'.

²³² Although successively one can realize that first wanted and later that not wanted.

²³³ *Additio magna*, in P. C. Balic (ed.), *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les Quatre livres des Sentences*, Institute of Philosophy, Louvain, 1927, p. 299; cit. Gilson, 1954, p. 590 (Translation: TC).

²³⁴ By analogy with the *potentia creandi* of the creator God that brings into being the idea thought, beloved and chosen to be a contingently created *real* thing. It is the moment of 'feasibility'.

as mere power of the will (as faculty or capacity of causing).²³⁵ The known object is a cause *sine qua non* of volition itself, (merely possible). However, a cause ('condition' I would say) 'without which' one is not given the object of want (one cannot desire what is not known) is not the same as the 'total effective cause' for which the thing thought into being is freely chosen and carried out. The 'being known' of the thing is not due to the will. Neither is the thing the cause of the will, which moves freely. The thing given to the will by the intelligence is wanted by the will as total cause of its possible existence. Intelligence is the formal cause: the will is the integral or material cause (with respect to the real existence of its content, because only the wanting has the 'power of the will of acting or not acting'. The intellect fulfils a proper task: it conceives, judges, compares, deliberates, drives; if it did not happen it would not have volition; without the will all remains in the ineffective 'possibility':

That the will is free, does not result from it directing all its force upon its object; on the contrary, whatever force it directs against its object, even more it directs itself, so having moved toward an object, it moves freely and, in virtue of its absolute freedom, could choose to not move toward it.²³⁶

The priority of will over intelligence is analogous to the superiority of freedom over nature, both being opposite modes of causing their effects.²³⁷

Duns Scotus concludes by repeating the irreducible contingency of volition and its effects. Contingency, positive mode of the creature, cannot be proven a priori, but is an a posteriori fact. There are 'avoidable' things which one cannot keep from having a cause, as all the effects. The cause of 'avoidable' facts is a free cause, contingent. In the environment of free will there is no determinism, nor act as nature.²³⁸ Human will (also political) produces then possible 'ideas', which are projected, alternative, contingent

235 In a Nietzschean way, against Nietzsche we say: the happiness of living wants to cause, as expansion of the happiness *ad extra*, other beings with whom one can celebrate life. To want to cause is to expand life creating community, a community of free contingents (Nietzschean Dionysian) not of co-active necessity (Apollonian).

236 *Com. Oxon.*, Book 2, dist. 7, q. only, a. 1, n. o; II, 412-13 (Translation: TC).

237 '*Quia natura et voluntas sunt principia activa habentia oppositum modum principiandi; ergo cum modo principiandi voluntatis non stat modus principiandi naturae; sed voluntas libere vult finem; ergo non potest necessitate*' (*Com. Oxon.*, Book I, dist. 1, q. 4, n. 1; I, 154).

238 It will be important later to know what is meant by 'social laws' (or economic, as in the case of Marx). There are 'tendencies' that operate as if they were effects of the 'compulsion of the facts' behind the backs of the conscious agents, *unintentional*, but the social or political facts do not stop being contingent. If more tables are produced by carpenters than the market requires, their price will fall, in principle. 'In principle' but not empirically, because some tables can be destroyed or one can raise the necessity for tables by *contingently* adopted means (propaganda, for example), and in that case the price of the tables is not lowered. But in both cases, what raises or lowers the price is contingent (not necessary by 'natural necessity', but by social 'tendency').

futures (which can be or not be, of this or that manner, and which at the end are carried out or not: three inevitable dimensions of the contingent).

For Scotus, however, the proper cause of *contingency* is precisely free will (not only practical intelligence),²³⁹ which opens the whole horizon of human activities (and the sciences). However, what interests us here is the 'political field' in a properly strategic dimension with all its uncertainty, undecidability and finitude.

[66] Next we explain the two clearest and opposed political projects: that of a militant Christendom and that of a universal temporal empire (Eurocentric), differentiated from the religious community. The one is the model that Kierkegaard will critique; the other is the secular European universalism, which will fall into crisis with the USA's ascension (expressed in the work of Carl Schmitt).

The first of these is expressed in the political theory of Roger Bacon (born between 1210 and 1214, and died before 1300), a Franciscan, like many of the great reformers. Paradoxically, and this Gilson does not see,²⁴⁰ Bacon explains the model of 'Christendom' (*christianitas*),²⁴¹ what today we would call a 'culture' (in the German sense of *Kultur*), whose end would be:

To give to individuals as people what they need to conserve health, prolong life in an admirable manner, acquire the goods of fortune, virtue, discretion, peace, justice, and to triumph magnificently over all they oppose.²⁴²

This 'Christian Republic' would not have 'civil law', only canonical. It would be a universal Pontifical state imposed over Saracens, Tartars, Jews and pagans or idolaters, in a clearly Eurocentric conception. Our author thinks that Islam will disappear through its own contradictions, and suggests that experimental science, instruments of observation and machines (which had such importance in his project) must be used not for its conversion, but for its extinction. It is a Christian replica of *Dar-al-Islam* ('House of the faithful'), since it hoped to be able to 'convert the Tartars and destroy the Sarracens',²⁴³ opposing in this way the project of Raymond Lull. It is the radical metamorphosis of Augustine's city of God. The 'earthly city' (of Cain) appears fetishized as the 'city of God', an inversion that Marx (and the philosophy of liberation) will criticize bitterly. There is only one 'city'

²³⁹ *Com. Oxon.*, Book II, dist. 25, q. only, n. 23; II, 702.

²⁴⁰ Gilson, 1954, pp. 85f. This magnificent work, *The Metamorphosis of the City of God*, is conceived by Gilson within a Eurocentric vision and 'Christendom', appropriate for his time (beginning of the twentieth century).

²⁴¹ Following J. Rupp, this meaning reaches the nineteenth century and is in texts of Pope John VIII. *Cristianitas* is neither the Church nor the empire, but a *respublicum fidelium*, which, I think, looks like *Dar-al-Islam*.

²⁴² *Compendium studii philosophiae*, ch. 1 (Bacon, 1858, p. 393). 'To triumph [. . .] over all that which one is opposed', of course, it is equally the 'just war' against the infidels.

²⁴³ Gilson, 1954, p. 115.

for Bacon; the Christian Republic is the city of God, the historical name of Augustine's earthly city. The identification of a culture with the Christian religion deprives it of its critical prophetic messianism, losing its Alterity, Exteriority, and being subsumed in the Totality as its 'foundation'.²⁴⁴

Rebellious Florence, forming part of the Pontifical state, always struggled for its autonomy, a space of permanent political conflict. From this arose Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), an exiled layperson, who wrote *On Monarchy*, a project inverse to that of R. Bacon. His tomb is found in Byzantine Ravenna far from Papal power.

Dante imagines the existence of a universal empire or monarchy, which, dominating the kings of Europe and the *condottieri* which multiplied throughout Italy, would impose order and peace on the world (which Eurocentrically consists of Europe): *humana civilitas, civilitas humani generis* (human civilization, the civilized human kind). 'The task proper to mankind considered as a whole is to fulfill the total capacity of the possible intellect all the time.'²⁴⁵

What is fundamental is peace, fruit of justice among equals, for which is needed a judge with authority (the emperor, *primus inter pares*, as the protector of the peoples against their unjust princes). His authority would extend itself to Europe, Africa and Asia. Rome was only an antecedent.

This empire would have relations with the Papacy, but would be a completely autonomous temporal state. Idealizing positively the Roman Empire, the new empire would be its prolongation and development:

We have shown now convincingly that the Roman people were intended by nature to rule the world; therefore the Roman people in subjugating the world attained by the Empire is right.²⁴⁶

Like Machiavelli, in the *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy*, he criticized the Italian (and European) present from a remote Roman past transformed into a regulating idea. Dante conceived a secular, temporal state, completely autonomous from the Roman Church. He removed from the Papacy its temporal or political power. As a brilliant artist of the word, Dante disarmed the ordinary metaphors which justify the temporal power

²⁴⁴ The Christian religion being the 'foundation' of the [Christian] state' (as for Hegel), 'the origin of all' political 'critique' has to be logically 'the critique of the religion' of Christendom.

It is the position of Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Marx, of the philosophy (and theology) of liberation. This political question is today still essential, not only in the north American Christendoms (Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush), European and even Latin American (the fundamentalism of Augusto Pinochet), but, analogously, in the other fundamentalisms (Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu or Jewish).

²⁴⁵ 'Proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti, est actuare semper potentia intellectus possibilis' (*On Monarchy*, I, 4; Dante, 1916 [ET: p. 8]; cit. Gilson, 1954, p. 120).

²⁴⁶ *On Monarchy*, II, 6 (ET: p. 46).

of the Papacy, the 'two swords' or the 'keys' to 'unlock all'.²⁴⁷ For Dante, the emperor, in the temporal order, receives authority directly from God, not through the Papacy. In this form the human being needs a double authority: politics in the empire and prophecy in the Church. Now the possibility of a 'society of humankind' different from the 'Christian Republic' of Bacon would be given, but it would not be the 'earthly city' of Cain following Augustine, since this assumed the 'totalization' or struggle against the 'city of God' or 'kingdom of God' (which also is not the Church for Augustine). We find another type of political categorization, which will be imposed in the final centuries of the European Middle Age and Modernity: the differentiated political state and religious community. This formulation was conceived by a Florentine exiled layperson (Dante Alighieri) in conflict with the Pontifical state, not by a Roman cleric (like Roger Bacon).

Thomas Aquinas spoke of the human being having a 'double end' (*finis duplex*); Dante, in contrast, indicated that the human being has 'two ends' (*finis duos*). The Church depended directly on God through the Pope, meanwhile the empire depended directly on God through the emperor. Two *potestates* (and *auctoritates*) were differentiated anew after ten centuries of confusion (from Constantine).

[67] Only ten years younger than Duns Scotus and Dante, it is not strange that Marsilius of Padua (1275–1342), from the University of Padua, lived in a region under the autonomous influence of the Republic of Venice which confronted the Pontifical state and the empire. Marsilius was freer than a Florentine. His position in *Defensor pacis* (1324) was a move forward very clearly with respect to Dante. The leader receives political power not from God but from the people, *populus* (as in Venice the doge received for its delegated exercise, as service). The people is the sovereign power. So the leader had to be elected by a political body, constituted by the totality of the patricians of the people (it was the *Maggiore Consiglio* of Venice). The leader had to respect the laws and could be dismissed if he did not obey the body. It seems to be based on Aristotle's *Politics*, but Marsilius has before his eyes the political organization of the city that governed over Padua: Venice. His philosophers of reference are Aristotle, but equally al-Farabi and ben-Maimón.

Marsilius applies analogously the same principles to the Church. He shows that the institution of the presbyteries was ancient, but not that of the bishop or Pope. He demands a strict democratization of the Roman Church, the Pontifical state. The Christian people have to choose their pastors and their authorities (as happened in the ancient tradition of the early Church).

²⁴⁷ *On Monarchy*, III, 9 (ET: pp. 76–80). Dante shows that Jesus asks that each disciple have a sword (12), but Peter exclaims: 'Master, here there are only two swords.' Jesus responds to them: 'Enough already'. And Dante comments that Peter is not being allegorical but speaking empirically of two swords, and not of the temporal and spiritual power of the Papacy.

Marsilius defends the elective monarchy (as much for political society as the Church). But having as reference the popular assembly that elects the monarch, passes laws and elects the body of judges, we see the sketching of the slow differentiation of the three powers in a mixed system like Venice. In 1297 the *cerrata* is produced in Venice which still, when he writes *Defensor pacis* some 40 years later, had not shown its oligarchian effects.

Following a Franciscan line, Scotus-like almost, Marsilius teaches that natural law does not exist (cannot be known or recognized by all the nations),²⁴⁸ but the laws are the product of the legislative will of the people's political power. They are contingent.

The beginning of the collapse of the European 'ancient world' toward Christendom occurs when the Turks conquer Constantinople in 1453 (preceded by the occupation of Kosovo in 1389 and Thessalonica in 1430). A year later, in 1454, just as Augustine began *The City of God* in 413, two years after Alaric took Rome, Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) initiated the *De pace fidei*.²⁴⁹ The great political tragedy of his time is the struggle between religions. Wycliffe died in 1384; John Huss in 1415; in 1440 the schism of the Eastern Orthodox Church was complete. In his work, Nicholas of Cusa initiates a macro-ecumenical dialogue between a Greek philosopher, a Roman Italian, a Muslim Arab, a Hindu, a Syrian-Chaldean, a Jew, a Catholic Frenchman, a Spaniard, a Tartar and a Bohemian, to try to arrive at minimal agreements. I think he intended to organize a real dialogue with Muslims in Cairo, Alexandria or Jaffa. It was a politically impossible dialogue. A world is disappearing, but before that happens, it will try a return to the sources of European culture, thanks to those exiled from Constantinople, in the 'Renaissance'. Europe, besieged by the Islamic world, isolated more than ever from the 'ancient system' by the Turkish invasions which advanced to the walls of Vienna, will look to the south, to the Mediterranean, having as space of contact Italy, confronting Islam. All will change with Modernity.

²⁴⁸ See Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 317f. (ET: pp. 276–95).

²⁴⁹ Marsilius had shown that certain political and ecclesiastic reforms would permit 'peace' (the theme of 'peace' will arrive, passing through many others, at Leibniz and Kant), Cusanus however would like to show that 'peace' was the fruit of a renewal of 'faith' (Eurocentrically conceived, inevitably).

Part 2

Locating the Critical–Political Place in 'Early Modernity' (From 1492)

[68] In this second part we will discuss the beginnings of modern political philosophy. Normally it is explained that philosophy derives from the European 'Middle Ages'. During that time the 'classic age' of Islamic thinking took place and a stage apparently without greater importance in the long course of the Chinese Empire. We begin narrating from the fifteenth century, when the connection through the Euro-Asian steppes, from China to the German Holy Roman Empire, passing through Kabul to India, touching Baghdad and the rest of the Byzantine Empire, established by the Mongols, was interrupted. The Turkish invasions had Balkanized the cultures. Nevertheless, one has to attempt a true evaluation of the situation, showing the importance of the existing civilizations.

In this 'old system' (stage III of the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean inter-regional system), whose 'extremes' (even for Adam Smith in 1776) were Japan to the east and the British Isles to the west, Europe was a secondary region, peripheral and isolated (apart from the weak connection the Italian shipping powers established, from Venice, Amalfi or Genoa, for example). The central and north European continent, the territory of the German Holy Roman Empire, was completely 'disconnected' from the rest of the system.

The weakness of the still feudal European monarchical state (a feudal master calls himself an incipient king, in growing alliance with the rising bourgeoisie) cannot be compared to the strength of the Chinese Empire, by now 17 centuries old, for example, with the thriving commerce of the kingdoms of Hindustan, or with the caravan mercantile and shipping paths of the Islamic commercial world.

We see first a stage parallel to the Chinese Empire (like the end of the 'ancient system', but from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries) (1); the Ottoman Empire, constituted the 'wall', which isolated Europe (2); next, Venice, which connects the 'ancient system' with the future political Modernity (3); and the era still preparing the new age, the Italian Renaissance (4). We will call this new age from the fifteenth century, 'Early Modernity'.

The Context of Modern Politics

The Importance of China (1400–1800)

[69] In this section I reflect on a topic that has occupied me since the 1960s. I will deepen some new theoretical possibilities too. Europe has only been 'central' in the last two centuries, so what has not been subsumed by Modernity may emerge, thrive and be rediscovered not as an anti-historical miracle, but as the resurgence of many political traditions concealed by the dazzling 'shine' of Western politics, of the Modernity whose technical and economic globality is not a *cultural globalization of the valued daily life* of the majority of humanity. From that non-included potentiality, the alternative 'exteriority' (never assumed; scorned and not valued), arises a project of 'trans'-Modernity, 'far from' Western Modernity, which will redeem a creative function significant for the twenty-first century.

The 'hypothesis' of a *World-System* arose as counterpart to a first Eurocentrism, which thought that Europe, from its so-called Greek and medieval Latin origins, produced 'from within' the values, the instrumental and political systems (Hegel, Marx, Weber or Sombart), which were universalized in the last five centuries, Modernity. This Eurocentric position formulated at the end of the eighteenth century,¹ with the German 'Romantics' and the French and English 'Enlightenment', reinterpreted all world history, projecting onto the past a Europe as 'centre' and aiming to show that all had been prepared in universal history so that Europe was 'the end and the centre of world history', as said by Hegel.² The 'encyclopaedists' first produced this distortion of history (*L'Esprit des Lois* of Montesquieu is a good example).³ The same happened with the 'Enlightened' English, and in Germany with Kant and Hegel, so that the 'east' was the childhood (*Kindheit*) of humanity,

1 Until that moment Europe knew clearly that the most advanced cultural 'centre' was in the south (Muslim, from the Maghreb to Egypt, this last was for Europe the place of 'classic' culture as Bernal [1987, I] has demonstrated) and the east (including the Islamic world from Baghdad, although in crisis throughout the Ottoman Empire, Hindustan and China). See Abu-Lughod (1989), who begins with France, Flanders, and after goes to the east; it is a story that still starts from Europe, without being Eurocentric.

2 See my book *The Invention of the Americas*, pp. 19f. (Dussel, 1995).

3 Published in 1748, he writes in Book VIII, ch. xxi: 'China is, therefore, a despotic state, whose principle is fear.' In 1762 Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger wrote *Recherches sur l'origine du despotisme oriental*. It is all false.

a place of despotism and non-liberty, from where the Spirit (the *Volksgeist*) moved to the west, on the way to the full realization of liberty and civilization. Europe had always been chosen by Destiny to be the final sense of universal history.

In contrast, the vision derived from a world market tried to show that, from the end of the fifteenth century, Europe, invading America, began to unfold that *world-system*, first as the Iberian *world-empire*, superficially controlling Africa and Asia, and continentally America. Thanks to the historical exposition of Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein had the creative idea of writing the history of this process: 'In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, there came into existence what we may call a European world-economy.⁴ He did not suspect the scope of the expansion and commercial weight of China.

This vision of things subsumed Latin American 'dependency theory', not denying it but integrating it, and giving it a much more plausible historical framework. It limited the 'centrality' of Europe to the last five centuries, and stopped its acclamation as the eternal 'centre' of world history. 'Modernity' was the management of the 'centrality' of the world-system. Spain and Portugal, supported in the Genoan capital,⁵ constituted the 'first Modernity'.⁶ So, the discussions of Bartolomé de Las Casas against Ginés de Sepúlveda were the beginning of the discourse of Modernity (Ginés being a modern intellectual, expressing a Eurocentric vision). J. M. Blaut himself links the *Rise of Europe* to the discovery of America (1492),⁷ and agreeing with Marx (cited by I. Wallerstein), this discovery constitutes a fundamental moment in the origin of capitalism and 'primitive accumulation'.

[70] In my recent work *Ethics of Liberation* I explain why Spain, and not Portugal or a Muslim Maghreb nation or China, could 'discover' America.⁸ Starting from this anti-Eurocentric hypothesis (of the 'first' Eurocentrism), when one speaks of the 'discovery of America' one indicates simultaneously and necessarily: *world-empire*, capitalism and Modernity, not for Wallerstein, who reserves the concept of 'Modernity' for the time of the 'Enlightenment'. I give another sense to his thesis.

In any case, this 'hypothesis' of the *World System* assumed that the 'Rise of the West' started from the *comparative advantage* that modern Europe (in particular, thanks to the Renaissance) had from the great scientific discoveries, precious metals (silver and gold), the new workforce incorporated into the system (the Indians, the African slaves from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in America), the new foods (the Incan potato, maize,

⁴ *The Modern World System I*, ch. 1 (Wallerstein, 1974, *The Modern World-System*, p. 15 [ST 1979, I, p. 21]).

⁵ Arrighi, 1994.

⁶ Now it will include equally the intra-European domination of Amsterdam, France and the United Kingdom before the Industrial Revolution.

⁷ Blaut, 1993, pp. 187f.

⁸ Dussel, 1998, [pp. 30-3], pp. 52f.

the Mexican *tomatl* and *chocolatl*, etc.),⁹ the millions of kilometres incorporated into the agriculture of the European colonies by the conquest and the invention of new economic instruments. All this permitted the triumph of Europe in competition with the Islamic world, Hindustan, Southeast Asia or China. In addition the Europeans, thanks to the caravel (invented by the Portuguese in 1441), were the only ones who could cross the oceans, arm their boats with high-powered cannons and dominate the Atlantic (so-called from the sixteenth century geopolitical 'centre' of the world) and later the Indian and Pacific oceans. Europe originated the world-system thanks to the invasion ('discovery') of the American continent and its overcoming will have to be born 'from *within*' that process of globalization begun in 1492, which has deepened itself through the end of the twentieth century.

To speak of 'trans'-Modernity will demand a new interpretation of the whole phenomenon of Modernity, to count on moments which *were never incorporated into European Modernity*, and which subsuming the better of European and north American Modernity, will affirm 'from *outside*' itself *essential components of the excluded cultures*, to develop a new political future, that of the twenty-first century. To accept that massive exteriority will allow one to understand that there are cultural moments situated 'outside' of Modernity. One will have to overcome an interpretation that still assumes a 'second' and very subtle Eurocentrism,¹⁰ and move to a non-Eurocentric interpretation of the history of the world-system (after the *world-empire*), controlled by Europe for only 200 years, not 500. So the fact that other cultures, scorned until now, are emerging far from the horizon of European Modernity is not a miracle arising from nothing, but the return to being actors as they had been in history in recent eras. Although Western culture globalizes itself, at a certain technical, economic, political, military level, it does not exhaust other moments of enormous creativity, which affirm from their 'exteriority' other living, resisting and growing cultures.

In a previous work I tried to show why China could not discover America.¹¹ Although it occurred to me to consider China inferior (from an economic, cultural, technical and even scientific point of view) to the Europe of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, I argued that China could not be dominant in the 'new system', because it did not find America, and it had not, because the 'centre' of the inter-regional system was found to the west

⁹ Ninety-four percent of the tubers used for human food in the nineteenth century came from Amerindia.

¹⁰ The 'first' Eurocentrism is that of Hegel or Weber, who assume the superiority of Europe; superiority proved 'from' factors purely internal to Europe itself. The 'second' type of Eurocentrism, which has overcome the first, thinks still from Europe, although it accepts that Europe achieved dominion by external moments (for example, the American precious metals), which will permit it to triumph in competition with the Muslim world, Africa and Asia, from 1492. The descriptions start from Europe. Africa or Asia are the external, far-off, later world. We intend to overcome this 'second' Eurocentrism to indicate the sense of a 'trans'-Modernity as project, as alternative.

¹¹ Dussel, 1998, [pp. 30-1], pp. 52-4. This turned out to be completely false (see Menzies, 2003).

of China, in Hindustan and the Muslim world.¹² For this America was outside of its horizon, and if it arrived in Alaska or California, it would not encounter anything of commercial interest. With that I thought that China remained peripheral, or at least was not central in the world-system, relegated to a moment previous to capitalism and Modernity for not having discovered America. In addition, the Italian Renaissance being the beginning of Modernity (a thesis of G. Arrighi), in China there was only a Renaissance-like proto-process in some of its great cities like Peking, Nanking and Hangzhou. But it was aborted in the face of the expansive presence of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and later English and French colonialism. China was not modern, capitalist or central, but remained in the 'dark night' of eastern despotism, in the 'Asiatic mode of production'.

We knew nothing about the advances that China had made over Western culture. Gavin Menzies' study makes reference to new facts.¹³ Although one knew that China surpassed Europe for centuries from a political, commercial, technological and even scientific point of view,¹⁴ now one added the evidence of the distances that the fleets of enormous and numerous ships, *junks*,¹⁵ travelled (thanks to their experiences of more than 800 years in the Indian Ocean, and by the development of astronomy, cartography, instruments of measuring latitude and longitude, etc.). Between 1421 and 1423 Zheng He (1369–1431), eunuch, merchant and navigator, and the four admirals under his control, with their respective fleets, mapped the South Atlantic (from western Africa to South America including Antarctica and the Falkland Islands, to locate the star Canopus) and the north (from the Caribbean to Greenland, navigating between the North Pole and the empire of the tsars of China on return), in addition to the south-eastern Pacific (coasts from Chile to Peru) and the north (from California to Mexico), eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean to Australia. In 1424 the Ming emperors (1368–1644) resolved to abandon the undisputed dominion of the oceans, and end, by a historical strategic error, a 'world market', leaving a vacuum of naval and commercial power.¹⁶ A few decades later (and using, sometimes without knowing it, Chinese maps, which arrived in the West via

¹² That I call, in English, *Inter-regional-System: Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean*, and not *world-system*, still not including America, since it is before 1492.

¹³ 1421: *The Year China Discovered America*, 2003. This work, like that of Martín Bernal and A. G. Frank, is received with suspicion by the Academy. Nevertheless, in my historical studies (*The Invention of the Americas*: Dussel, 1995), where I used the map of Henricus Martellus of 1487 of the fourth peninsula of Asia, his arguments with respect to his fundamental thesis are irrefutable (weaker details do not stop their force). This work has the new historical vision of a more humble European Modernity, certainly not Weherian!

¹⁴ The works of Needham (1954–85) opened the way.

¹⁵ Some of these ships were up to 100 metres in length and could transport up to 1,000 tons of goods. The caravels had a capacity of 50 tons. The only advantage of the caravels was that they could navigate against the winds, meanwhile the junk ships utilized the marine currents and the winds, having to plan their trajectories using only the two factors.

¹⁶ The emperor Zhu Gaozhi decreed on 7 September 1424 that 'all the voyages of the treasure ships are to be stopped'. (Menzies, 2003, p. 79 [English: p. 53]).

Venice) Portugal would fill this 'vacuum' in the Indian Ocean, and Spain in the Atlantic.

European culture, less developed (in comparison to the Islamic, Hindustanic and Chinese), separated by the Ottoman-Islamic 'wall' from the central regions of the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean continent,¹⁷ so peripheral, will start a later slow development. So, against the thesis of M. Weber, Europe never was superior to China and Hindustan or the Arab culture before the end of the eighteenth century; on the contrary, until the fifteenth century it suffered a secular underdevelopment, which certain favourable junctures, among those its geographic situation (near the American continent, to create a colonial system), will remedy.

[71] A recent work proposes a new hypothesis,¹⁸ which would be a good argument in favour of re-thinking the history of politics. I will indicate summarily some of the sustainable theses and I will try at the same time to note my differences.¹⁹

It is 'known', and that obviously frequently hides great truths, that China was, until the eighteenth century, considered by the Europeans an economic, political and cultural power.²⁰ Adam Smith refers to the economic magnitude of China. In frequent passages of his work *The Origin of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), observing its greatness and the lowness of its salaries, he writes:

China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world. [. . .] The accounts of all travellers, inconsistent in many other respects,

¹⁷ See the 'Historical Introduction' of *Ethics of Liberation* (Dussel, 1998a).

¹⁸ See Frank, 1998, Amin, 1999, pp. 291-326; Arrighi, 1999, pp. 327-54, and Wallerstein, 1999, pp. 355-72. I have to admit that I accept almost all the critiques of the three authors against A. G. Frank; nevertheless the three admit that Frank has pointed to a forgotten truth: the importance of China. I say forgotten, because if China was the first producer of the world market until the eighteenth century, the most populated, etc., the description of the *world-system* had to begin by taking China seriously. And no one did this.

¹⁹ I accept A. G. Frank's critique of the concept of the 'Asian mode of production', that it commits an 'orientalist' fallacy (to use the term of Edward Said), but there is a large gap from this to leaving all sense of the concept of 'value', 'capital', and 'capitalism'. This is an interesting question which A. G. Frank does not ask: was China from 1400 to 1800 a mercantile capitalist country? I think he has provided the starting points (a theme, therefore, for future discussion) to say that China had regions that developed serious forms of proto-capitalist manufacturing production at the level of 'formal subsumption' of surplus value in the work process (but not 'material' or 'real' 'subsumption') in the conceptual sense of Marx in *Das Kapital* - in many Chinese factories or 'artisanal workshops' producing porcelain, pottery, silk fabric, etc. S. Amin is right to show that in the Chinese state, with great power and organization, a certain rising bourgeoisie (the eunuchs) had never been able to exercise power, and this hindered the normal growth of capitalism. In all ways A. G. Frank allows us to launch more creative questions than those he asks, since he has neglected the category of 'value' (not only 'exchange value') in Marx.

²⁰ In the fifteenth century, when England had 3 million inhabitants, Spain 10, France 18, Europe 69, China already had 125 million. In 1800 Europe had 188 million, and China almost double: 345 (Frank, 1998, p. 168).

agree in the low wages of labour, and in the difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing up a family in China.²¹

Consider that Smith uses the terms 'industrious' and 'wages' like he will for England or Scotland, for it seems improbable that such manufacturing 'industriousness' and 'wages' do not give to the owners 'surplus value' in a strict sense:

The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been of so long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient for all those [. . .] purposes; unless, perhaps, we give credit to the wonderful accounts of the wealth and cultivation of ancient China.²²

*China is a much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference between the price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is any-where in Europe.*²³

The life of the elites is much more 'developed' in China than in Europe (the 'luxury', which Sombart demands for capitalism):²⁴ 'The retinue of a grandee in China or Hindustan accordingly is [. . .] much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe.'²⁵ But, in all ways, the masses of workers are poorer:

The real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life which is given to the labourer [. . .] is lower both in China and Hindustan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part of Europe.²⁶

For Adam Smith, however, the discovery of Hispanic America will allow Europe to buy in both markets (the richest and the most varied until the industrial Revolution):

The silver of the new continent seems in this manner to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce *between the two extremities* [*sic*] *of the old one* is carried on, and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one another.²⁷

21 Vol. I, Book I, ch. 8; ST: Smith, 1984, p. 70 (English: p. 80).

22 Ibid., Book II, ch. 5; p. 331 (English: pp. 388-9).

23 Ibid., Book I, ch. 11, Digression, First period; p. 182 (English: p. 210).

24 See Sombart, 1965.

25 Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 11, Digression, Third period; p. 198 (English: p. 228).

26 Ibid. (English: p. 229).

27 Ibid., p. 199 (English: p. 230).

It is interesting to note that the 'two extremes' of the *older* inter-regional system are connected in the *new* system with the 'New World' constituting the 'first world-system'. Europe can then 'buy', thanks to Latin American money (Peruvian–Mexican silver), in the Chinese 'market'; that is to say, it can 'sell' very few commodities (except silver), fruit of its 'industriousness' by subsuming European 'salaried work', because it is a productively 'under-developed' region unable to compete with the major 'development' of the production of Chinese commodities such as porcelain utensils, silk textiles, etc. The source of the 'silver-money' is America: 'In China, a country much richer than any part of Europe', repeats A. Smith, 'the value of the precious metals is much higher than in any part of Europe [. . . thanks to] the discovery of the mines of America.'²⁸

The crisis of Chinese hegemony in the 'ancient system', the first capitalist system, due to causes still needing to be studied in greater depth,²⁹ allowed the *Rise of the West*.

[72] Max Weber intuited that Europe was not the region most prepared to effect the Industrial Revolution, China or Hindustan was. He dedicated his sociological works at the ethical and religious level to proving why China and India could not originate capitalist society. The fruit of his enormous investigations³⁰ concluded with the same response: China and Hindustan could not be capitalist because of . . . their corporative regime of ownership, having a bureaucracy, which hindered competition, etc. And, on the contrary, studying the ethics of the prophets of Israel³¹ reveals that this began to prepare the long path, which would culminate in capitalist Modernity, whose final chapter would be the Reformation, which would give impulse to the Calvinist ethic;³² these are the conditions for the realization of the capitalist system. Calvinist individualism, wealth considered as divine benediction, competition, private ownership and the discipline of an austere subjectivity permitted the origination of capitalism, not Chinese corporativism or the magical quasi-feudalism of the Brahmanic culture of Hindustan.³³

²⁸ Ibid. He concludes the digression with the variations of the value of the silver; p. 229 (English: pp. 231–4).

²⁹ Among them: the low salary in China did not allow the use of the machinery, remaining at the level of a capitalism manufacturing porcelain and silk with creation of absolute surplus value, having only subsumed formally the artisanal process of traditional production. The political crisis within the Manchurian dynasty and central China, the necessity of ending southern colonization and the occupation of western China (a territory almost double that occupied by China in all its history) shut China within its own limits; it lost interest in the external market, producing a vacuum that Europe would fill, the UK in particular. The loss of the seas or the repression of the rising bourgeoisie on the part of the imperial state shows the difference from England, an island with a monarchy in crisis.

³⁰ See his works *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I–III*, 1920–1 (partially translated in Weber, 1951 and 1958).

³¹ Weber, 1952. For my part, I also began a critique of Eurocentrism (in the opposite sense to Weber), to demonstrate that the 'ethos of the prophets' was critical of Modernity (Dussel, 1969a; written in 1964).

³² See Weber, 1930.

³³ Nevertheless, the actual capitalist development of Japan, Singapore or Taiwan, of neo-Confucian ethical inspiration, can show us the mistakes of the Weberian hypotheses, since

It seems impossible that millions of wage workers producing porcelain (the regions around Sian, between the Huang-ho and Yangtze rivers), from where the silk route started to the west, or silk textiles (near Huang-ho or in the cities of Changchou and Fuchou on the east coast), did not produce surplus value as Marx would define it. It was at least a regional capitalist system, although there is only *formal* subsuming of the process of work and *absolute surplus value* is obtained, as we have already indicated, but aborted for fortuitous reasons, as we will see further on. This is far from, and more complex than, an 'Asian mode of production'.

It seems then that China was until the eighteenth century the more powerful commodity producer, and the China Sea a mercantile centre without equal in the world-system (the articulation of the Old World with the New World-system from 1492). A. G. Frank studies some causes of the diverse crises of China and Hindustan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Ming Dynasty (1368-1644),³⁴ which signified for the Chinese Empire a moment of high development (with regions that produced high surplus value), will enter into relative crisis with the arrival of the Manchurian Dynasty (1644-1796), when in Europe the fashion is the 'Chinese fashion' (*chinoiserie*) of Rococo (porcelain utensils, paintings of shellac over wood,³⁵ canopies in the gardens to take tea, decorated Chinese *pavilions*, silk fabrics for robes with wide sleeves, etc.).³⁶

The interpretation of 'first Modernity', with Spain and Portugal as reference, thanks to the 'discovery' of Hispanic-America and so first unfolding the 'world-empire', would have to be deeply reconstructed assuming a strong presence in the production and trade of China and the Hindustan until the eighteenth century. In effect, the 'ancient system', the *old world* of A. Smith, which I called stage III of the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean inter-

the Confucian familial corporative relations permit perfectly the organization of the capitalist task, even transnationally, and even with greater efficacy.

34 Today I am reading a journal of art, which states that on 14 December 1600 a 300-ton galleon left from Manila, *San Diego*, which was destroyed by Dutch pirates. 'On discovering the rest of the shipwreck in 1991 more than 5,000 pieces had come to the surface [. . .] more than 800 porcelain pieces from the Ming era, 24 sheaths of Japanese swords, gold and silver money [. . .] Chinese ceramics . . .' (M. L. Campollo, '400 Years Later Arises Incomparable Evidence: Treasures of the *San Diego*', *Casas y Gente* [México], 116 [1987], p. 59).

35 In the same journal of art I read on page 8: 'A singular example of English furniture: the Windsor study', by A. de Neuvillate, stating that John Belchier constructed in 1720 a *writing desk* (photograph included) 'in black lacquered wood' with 'legs and Japanese scenes'. On the doors are 'two personages of Japanese mythology of a refinement that speaks by itself of the rank of the English furniture [*sic*] of the eighteenth century'. Including an Asian figure was the 'great fashion' in the English eighteenth century. The figures may be Chinese, and J. Belchier maybe only polished the furniture, because it shows a clearly imperial shape. The mastery of the cabinet-maker and painter, that the author calls English, had to be Chinese. The piece was worth 1.5 million dollars in 1996.

36 Starting in 1724, the Manchu dynasty conquered the west, occupying Tibet, Sinkiang (from the Tarim to Dzungaria or Russian Turkestan), Mongolia, including Manchuria to the north, and to the south fixing its frontiers with Burma, Siam, Laos and Vietnam from the River Sikiang, proportions that China had never reached before.

regional system,³⁷ will be prolonged in Asia, by the enormous productivity of China, from 1400 to 1800 (with regions of mercantile or capitalist production, but without the development of its naval power in the oceans and therefore enclosed in its national horizon). On the contrary, the annexation of Amerindia in 1492 on the part of Spain will permit Europe to begin unfolding the world-system, now really incorporated into commerce and 'global'.

Europe still had a secondary and quasi-peripheral significance in reference to Asian continental cultural and economic space, although rearticulated for the first time since the fifteenth century. Since the seventh century Muslim expansion, Europe had lived separated from the Afro-Asiatic continent.³⁸ Thanks to silver, and to a lesser extent gold, precious metals as money (the origin of monetary capitalism) and as a requirement of the lack of silver in the external market of the Chinese system (metal, which paid for the right to enter the market, given that China did not have colonies nor external military occupation, but dominated productively the international market of the Asiatic south east), Spain (and Europe thanks to her) had 'money' to 'buy' in the indicated Chinese market. From the Atlantic, from the Caribbean to Seville, and from there to Amsterdam or Central Europe, or from Genoa and Venice to the eastern Mediterranean, and thanks to the Portuguese and Muslim connection to Hindustan or China to the east; or from the Pacific from Peru and Mexico, from Acapulco, and from there to the Philippines to China by the west, the precious metals integrated Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century in the 'ancient system' as the extreme west of the rising world-system, only a secondary region with respect to the production of commodities, Europe could sell nothing relevant to China, but could buy with Hispanic-American money.

This period of the first European Modernity,³⁹ the Hispanic, humanist, monetary and mercantile Modernity, develops thanks to the opening to the Atlantic, still not the geopolitical 'centre' of the world-system (it is the sea of China in the Asiatic south-east, with Hindustan and China itself as frontiers). It is a Modernity that for a 'long time' and 'global space' is still peripheral to Hindustanic, Chinese and even Muslim worlds with respect to the connections with the 'east'.


37 See Dussel, 1998a, [pp. 18–26], pp. 36–42.

38 The Muslim expansion from 623 CE 'separates' Europe from the Latin-Mediterranean, and the German-North-European, from the connection with stage III of the inter-regional system, which had as pivot of commercial contact Baghdad, and China and Hindustan as the locus of greater productivity.

39 See my article 'Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity' (Dussel, 1998c).

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

Figure 5.1 The world market at the end of the sixteenth century



[73] In this era the 'coloniality of power' is produced: European power has a rising colonial periphery (Latin America in the sixteenth century, Anglo-Saxon America in the seventeenth century, some small enclaves or regions of slave contact on the west African coast, and some islands, ports or backup in the Muslim world or in the Far East; thanks to those it can make 'purchases' in the market hegemonized by China and Hindustan). China is closed with its nationalist project and will lose its external market.

Thus as Greece was peripheral to the Persian–Egyptian world (before Alexander) and still achieved hegemony with Alexandrian Hellenism, so too peripheral Europe will strengthen under the Hindustanic and Chinese presence. Meanwhile China is a continental power with an external market near its coasts (the sea of China or the western Pacific),⁴⁰ an external market, which meant very little in relation to its enormous internal market. Europe, which still suffered from the plague's depopulation, and little demographic growth, had to enter the oceans, after its weak eastern territorial expansion (the crusades), thanks to its naval nations (Portugal and Spain, initially supported by Genoa, later overcome by Holland, the United Kingdom and France). Thanks to these 'external' contacts, a revolution was produced in the vision of the world, astronomy and the sciences, from 1492 to the middle of the seventeenth century (an ideological–scientific revolution following Spain and Portugal which with Charles V had taken the achievements of the Italian Renaissance and would culminate in Amsterdam, the ancient Hispanic colony, and the United Kingdom).

Indigenous America receives the impact of the first globalization, the conquest, and racism, the myth of European superiority, economic exploitation, political domination, and the imposition of the external culture, which produces the syndrome of the 'coloniality of power', Aníbal Quijano's

⁴⁰ Hindustan spilled over to Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Malacca, occupying the maritime west of the Chinese market.

expression: the colonizing power negates the Amerindian and the European commands from a subtle racism. In all ways, the indigenous will keep an 'exteriority' to the world-system. It is the first colonization, 'early Modernity'.

Amsterdam, from 1630,⁴¹ continued the process of mercantile capitalism, partly replacing the presence of Portugal (and Genoa) in the Chinese-Hindustanic world, but without fundamentally changing the structure of European dependence. Only 3 per cent of the commerce in Malacca was Dutch. They could not sell any 'product' made in Europe to the Chinese or the merchants of Hindustan. They could 'buy' with Hispanic-American silver in the Chinese market, and they dominated the naval routes militarily, but without being able to impose any of their own products. The Chinese were not interested in protecting their market militarily, since they did not have an eastern rival, and in addition an almost total productive global monopoly, because they were the only ones who supplied the most required commodities: porcelain utensils, silk fabrics, tea, etc.

European domination, principally of the United Kingdom and France, although the latter to a lesser extent, will occur thanks to the Industrial Revolution, which will be founded ideologically on the 'Enlightenment' and the 'Romantic' movement. Taking as the symbolic date the French Revolution (1789), this domination is only two centuries old. Europe has not *always* been the 'centre and end of universal history' as Hegel thought; or received from the prophets of Israel an ethical-political superiority, as M. Weber thought; in fact, it has not even been the 'centre' of the world-system for five centuries (from 1492). We adopt, therefore, a critical position as much against the 'first Eurocentrism', of Hegel or Weber, as against the European 'common sense' present still today, the 'second Eurocentrism'. The question now would be to explain the *Rise of the West* from the *Decline of the East*. That means thinking globally, overcoming the 'second Eurocentrism'. The world-system, 'world system' with the annexation of the 'New World' by the 'Old World' (understood within its two extremes: from Europe to China and Hindustan), has an overall movement, as a heart, whose first throbbing is situated in the east. The decline of the east allowed this, not as an instantaneous miracle, and in this I. Wallerstein is correct in his critique of Frank, but as the organization of the 'centre' of the *world-system* in hands of the West, and not only through conditions and attributes exclusive to the previous history of Europe (an interpretation, which tried to find the 'intrinsic' European superiority over other cultures). To think non-Eurocentrically is to be able to imagine that the Industrial Revolution was possible also as a European response to a 'vacuum', produced in the market previously hegemonized by China and Hindustan, caused by a particular structure (an autocratic imperial state, which would hinder the triumph of the bourgeoisie in China) and multiple political crises (low sal-

⁴¹ See Wallerstein, II, 1980.

aries, and demographic explosion due to the economic wealth from 1400). This 'vacuum' could be 'filled' by a growing European production, arising from the end of the fifteenth century. It is not an instantaneous miracle, as I. Wallerstein explains. Marx indicates correctly that the expansion of the market, as all exchange, can produce the development of production.⁴² And given the high European wages and the low population in the United Kingdom, in relation to China and Hindustan, the only solution (to expand production and reduce the wage cost in the product's value or price) was to use machinery.⁴³ Subsuming machinery in the production process (which Marx describes as the means necessary to create 'relative surplus value')⁴⁴ gave in a few decades a comparative advantage to the United Kingdom and to France (and little by little to all northern Europe) over China, Hindustan, the Muslim world, Hispanic America, eastern Europe (the Russian Empire, Poland, etc.) and southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, southern Italy, etc.). By the beginning of the nineteenth century, between *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations* of 1776 of A. Smith, when China was still the richest country on Earth, and *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, which Hegel wrote in the 1820s, the East would be seen only as eternal and miserable 'eastern despotism'.⁴⁵

[74] Africa remains relegated as the slave continent, forgetting that Egypt was a black African civilization,⁴⁶ and in the Congress of Berlin in 1885 will be cut into pieces by the European powers. In the Eurocentric memory of the north (Anglo-Saxon and Germanic), southern Europe will be a moment of the late 'Middle Ages' or 'part of northern Africa' (Africa begins in the Pyrenees!), and Latin America, for its part, with its indigenous and African population, will also be relegated as a distant peripheral colonial world of pre-industrial Spain and Portugal.

The 'Enlightenment' will cement over the previous interpretation of ancient secondary 'disconnected Europe', the Medieval 'Dark Ages', and in the best of cases, until the fifteenth century, peripheral to the Muslim, Chinese, Hindustanic world, a much more cultured, developed 'eastern' world, 'centre' of the ancient world, and the most dense part of the world-

42 Marx (1974), *Grundrisse*, Introduction (ST: 1971, I, p. 20; ET: 1973, p. 99): 'For example, if the market, that is the sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in quantity.' It 'expands' for the United Kingdom and 'contracts' for China and Hindustan; the 'production' 'expands' for the United Kingdom because it has contracted in China and in Hindustan.

43 In Anglo-Saxon North America (the Yankees) this was not the reason for machinery (or the Industrial Revolution); it was the lack of small owners who worked their lands with their own hands. In Anglo-Saxon North America, machinery was necessary to raise the productivity of free labour (for more units of the product or hectares worked). In Hispanic America the existence of abundant and cheap indigenous or African slave labour (like the Anglo-Saxon southern colonies) had no need for a quick Industrial Revolution, as in China and Hindustan.

44 See *Towards an Unknown Marx* (Dussel, 2001b).

45 The 'Orientalist' ideology is born.

46 See Bernal (1987).

system until the end of the eighteenth century. From Hegel, Marx and Comte to Weber, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Popper, Levinas, Foucault, Lyotard and Habermas, Eurocentrism will shine unopposed. And it will dominate the colonial world with the display of 'Western culture', the 'eternal' most developed centre of humanity (irreplaceable critical conscience, as J. Habermas thinks).

This will justify European 'civilizing' expansion. 'England is transformed into the missionary of civilization to the world',⁴⁷ wrote Hegel triumphantly, which excluded and ignored as non-existent all previous and contemporary cultures ('peoples without history'). This process of 'exclusion' or negation in 'exteriority',⁴⁸ effected by modern reason because it was valueless according to modern values, the criteria of civilization, imposed by Europe, was extended rapidly from the beginning of the nineteenth century to all non-European cultures with some surprising results, since being negated, given their industrial inferiority, the neocolonial elites (educated in Europe and the USA) applauded that Eurocentric ideology.

The *exclusion of the non-European* from being civilized gave to Europe (already exercising military, economic and political domination) a cultural and ideological domination. The non-European disappeared from all practical and theoretical consideration. The Spanish, Portuguese ('early Modernity'), Chinese, Hindustanic, and Muslim worlds (with respect to its 'centrality' in the ancient world and through the end of the eighteenth century) will accept the northern Eurocentric interpretation, and its westernized elites, from Mao Tse-tung in China (was not *standard* Marxism a form of Eurocentric expansion?), and, as Paul Sartre indicated in the 'Introduction' to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*. It will be the peripheral 'echo' of the superiority of Western culture (even the revolutionary left) today globalized thanks to transnational corporations and globalizing financial capital.⁴⁹

Thus, the political philosophy of the non-European cultures has to be studied.

[75] In the sixteenth century China had eminent philosophers. The most influential philosopher in modern China was Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529).⁵⁰ A model of fidelity to power yet critical of it, he was harshly punished on two occasions (first to the limits of his strengths, but he was also a prizewinner for his doctrine)⁵¹ and returned each time to a higher level in the empire. He knew the most extreme poverty and was in contact with

47 Hegelian expression from *Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, IV, 3, p. 3; in Hegel, 1971-79, XII, pp. 538 (Translation: TC).

48 See Dussel (1977a).

49 See Hardt and Negri, 2000.

50 See Wang Yang-ming, 1963; Wakeman, 1973; de Bary and Bloom, 1999, pp. 842-55; Collins, 1998, pp. 314f.; de Bary, 2000, pp. 47f.

51 Wang confronted the eunuchs from a position critical of the neo-Confucian Mandarin Enlightened aristocracy of the school of Ch'eng-Zhu, who began with the 'method of mind and heart', concentrating in the unity of All.

the poorest people.⁵² He was a victorious strategist in the wars against the northern nomads who, after being defeated, were incorporated into the empire and educated in 'popular communities'. He was a great politician and better administrative organizer, a multifaceted personality, heroically coherent, deeply contemplative and had enormous strategic capacity, in the best Chinese tradition. Being neo-Confucian he captured the Buddhist meditative experience and the Taoist ontology. He raises the classical question of the 'great apprenticeship' (*Zhu Xi*)⁵³ in the following way:

The *Great Learning* was considered by the former scholar [Zhu Xi] as the learning of *the great person*⁵⁴ [. . .] *The great person* regards Heaven, Earth, and the myriad *things*⁵⁵ as one body, the world as one family, and the state as one person. . . . Thus the learning of the *great person* consists entirely in getting rid of the obscuration of selfish desires by one's own efforts to make manifest one's luminous virtue, so as to restore the condition of forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and the myriad *things*. [. . .] *loving the people* is to put into universal operation the function of forming one body. [. . .] Human nature being universally good [. . .] incorrectness enters when one's thoughts and intentions are in operation. Therefore one who wishes to *rectify* one's mind must *rectify it* in connection with the operation of one's thoughts and intentions. [. . .] The extension of knowledge is not what later scholars understand as enriching and widening knowledge. It is simply extending one's innate knowing to the utmost. This innate knowing is what Mencius meant when he said, '*The sense of right and wrong is common to all human beings*'.⁵⁶

To put oneself in a learning posture is to open oneself to the universe, rectifying the partiality of egoism. In the face of the strict *curriculum* of the Mandarins it is necessary to acquire a position that allows human nature to expand, because in its ontological origin the mind and the principle of the things are the same: 'What Zhu Xi meant by the investigation of things is "to investigate the principle in things to the utmost, as we come into contact with them".'⁵⁷ To make the son 'intelligible' is to understand his fealty, his loyalty to the father. Principles help us to understand our fealty and loyalty as a thing; it is a principle of commiseration; to understand this is to develop the innate knowledge of a filial being. 'To know and to practise' are one and the same:

52 Mao Tse-tung took this for his great example (see Wakeman, 1973).

53 It is the aptitude for learning.

54 The ideal Chinese human being, like an English *gentleman*, or the Greek *kaloskagathia*.

55 By Buddhist influence, 'things' are not mere natural substances, but 'happenings': to give food to the simple people, to open a battle, to pardon a debt. 'Things' are 'acts'.

56 De Bary and Bloom, 1999, p. 846.

57 Ibid., p. 849.

The knowing and acting you refer to are already separated by selfish desires and are no longer knowing and acting in their original substance. There have never been people who know but do not act.⁵⁸

Wang made two great discoveries. The first (in a time of great concentration and study, exiled politically and in the middle of the poor, in 1508, in Lung-ch'ang) was that all knowing comes from practice. However, 'to practise' as *experience*,⁵⁹ to 'know' what the peasantry is one has to have the experience of living, eating, feeling, dancing with them . . . Then the peasantry is known, their sufferings, hopes, narratives, imagination.

The second great discovery (his second retreat due to political exile) was of 'innate knowledge', which emanates from the 'substance' of the spirit and allows one to judge good and evil.⁶⁰ With 'knowledge' as innate and universal, how can someone commit evil? Injustice and evil are products of the particular will, which is opposed by its corruption to the substance of the spirit. The innate practical 'knowing' discerns what coincides with the substance (good) and what is opposed (evil). This 'knowing' is practical. Four levels are determined:

The substance of the mind is without good and without evil; the activity of the will possesses good and evil; innate knowledge (*liang-chih*)⁶¹ is 'knowing good and knowing evil; to rectify (*ko-wu*) things is to do good and remove evil'.⁶²

The ethical-political task consists of 'rectifying' the sincerity or loyalty to the substance of the will to practise the good when the corruption of evil has interfered in events ('things'). In the 'Great harmony' (*Ta-t'ung*) the power of the empire, communities and individual practices are articulated without contradiction.⁶³ This harmony is shown through the 'love of the people' (*ch'in min*), where the practical-political man of Wang is distinguished from the sage of Chu Hsi. The 'love of the people' is shown through 'renewing' or

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 850.

⁵⁹ In the sense of Horkheimer (Dussel, 1998a, [pp. 229f.]) or Rigoberta Menchú (ibid., [p. 284]). Mao Tse-tung, in *On Practice* (1971, p. 7), says: 'That which is true or not knowledge or theory is not determined through a subjective appreciation, but through objective results of social practice. The criteria of truth cannot be other than social practice.' This sounds like a Hegelian-Marxist categorization, but its 'content' refers to Wang Yang-ming. 'Doing something' helped integrate mind with action; true knowledge (which corresponded to Mao's urging to complete acts once begun rather than to Marx's praxis) was fulfilment in action' (Wakeman, 1973, p. 257).

⁶⁰ The 'heavenly principle' (divine): 'knows what our volition (*i-nien*) wills by judging the morality of concrete events' (Wakeman, 1973, p. 254). He approaches the *synderesis* of the medieval Latins.

⁶¹ It would be something like 'moral conscience', the interiorized Osiris, the Freudian *Über-Ich*.

⁶² Cit. Wakeman, p. 260, n. 6.

⁶³ Mao uses this expression: 'State power and political parties will die out very naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony' (*Ta-t'ung*) (cit. Wakeman, p. 102).

'renovating the people' (*hsin min*) through education, the essential political task. All concludes with a demand of political commitment.

One has to have the attitude of learning and practising to 'develop the innate knowledge' (*chih liang-chih*). For this reason, Wang Yang-ming was very active in his educative politics – this seems to be the opposite to his contemporary Luis Vives, the great 'Marrano' – in popular teaching, 'covenant communities' (*hsiang-yueh*: rural base communities of co-operative work and apprenticeship) in the south of Guangzhou. This education was imparted at the political level, in the organization of communal life and in the army.

It is not possible to forget the tragic and utilitarian individualism of Li Zhi (1527–1602). Coming from a decadent family of the city of Quanzhou (Fujian province), which was occupied with the external market now in crisis with the Ming, Li Zhi passed the rigorous Mandarin exam, but did not present himself in Peking to sit the final evaluations, as protest against the bureaucratic centralism of the empire. For 30 years he studied Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. He could not accept the sclerotic mechanics of the teaching institutions. He then proposed learning by discussion and became a monk with a radical individualist conception.

One has to find [. . .] the desire for goods, for sexual satisfaction, for study, for personal advancement, for the accumulation of wealth; [. . .] all the things that are productive and sustain life in the world, everything that is loved and practiced in common by the people, and what they know and say in common.⁶⁴

Confucius never taught people to study Confucius. [. . .] Confucius said, 'In ancient times learning was for one's self [not for the sake of others],' and said, 'The noble person seeks it for himself' [. . .] Because it was for one's self, his [Confucius'] teaching of others was based on his own self study.⁶⁵

As in the Italian Renaissance (from Genoa and Venice to Naples), there was a 'humanist' movement in the great metropolises of the Middle East, Afghanistan, India and China.

[76] Huang Tsung-hsi (1610–95), a contemporary of John Locke, was very significant, an example of a responsible, political, public thinking of the common good.⁶⁶ Situated in the middle of the seventeenth century he sketched, unlike Lü Liu-liang (1629–83) or Tang Chen (1620–1704), a critical synthesis against the bureaucratic immobility of the Chinese Empire, within the Manchu dynasty, practically from its origins. Huang criticized less the Sung Dynasty (960–1279 CE), which suffered a serious defeat at the

64 De Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, p. 872.

65 *Fenshu* 1:17 (de Bary and Bloom, 1999, p. 870).

66 See Huang Tsung-hsi, *Waiting for the Dawn*, 1993.

hands of the Mongol invader and the Yüang Dynasty (1268–1368), than the Ming Dynasty, which his father served (which had fallen in 1644), in permanent conflict and persecution due to the machinations of the eunuchs of the Peking court. Imposing the new Manchu dynasty, from a less populated and culturally developed nation than nuclear China (in Huang's vision), and with the first emperor dead, Kang-hsi is elected as his successor, which awakened certain hopes. Huang wrote his work *The Hope of the Dawn* (*Ming-I tai-fang lu*)⁶⁷ in 1663,⁶⁸ which, although contextual (one year after the election of a new emperor), possesses an original theoretical framework, which refers to Chinese political philosophy as a whole.

We must not forget that Huang is in a political system that governs over 150 million inhabitants.⁶⁹ In 1411 the Grand Canal, which united Peking with Nanking (not far from the port-city of the ancient Hangzhou), was opened.⁷⁰ 'The economic and financial results of the "China trade"' were, says A. G. Frank, 'that China had a balance of trade surplus with everybody else, based on its unrivalled manufacturing production and export of silks, porcelain, and other ceramics'.⁷¹

China, unlike peripheral Europe, practised a philosophy critical of a deeply structured, extremely bureaucratized, centralized and strong state, with traditions uninterrupted for more than 18 centuries, a degree of continuity equalled only by the Egyptian state. Critical political philosophy was not asked in China, as it was with Machiavelli, how to found a small new Italian state with firm bases to permit stability, or, as with Hobbes, how to base the legitimacy of a strong state in the face of the feudal chaos of war.⁷² On the contrary, in the face of the ancient and bureaucratically centralized state, which had hegemony in the world market,⁷³ Huang asks: how to explain

67 The original title was *Tai-fang lu* ('The hope of a visit', or 'Plan for . . .'). The 'visit' was of the new Emperor Kang-hsi. In addition, *Ming-i* has much significance. The *i* signifies 'peace and order', and *Ming-i* can signify 'explanation of [the principles of] good government'. But it signifies also 'hidden brilliance' or 'repressed intelligence' (title of hexagram 33 of the *Book of Changes* (*I Ching*) of the Confucian tradition), with an ontological content. It signifies the moment of the cosmic cycle during which the forces of darkness dominate, but virtue perseveres in its integrity, awaiting the future dawn: *Hope of the Dawn*. Chi Tzu, during the Shang dynasty (1766–1122 BCE), is the patient sage, jailed for criticizing the 'decadent *Tao* of the king'. Later he was liberated and wrote the political principles of the *Great Plan*, a section of the *Book of Documents* (*Shu ching*). Is Huang writing a book for 'the hope of the visit of the (Manchu) prince' Kang-hsi?

68 Spinoza suffered persecution in Amsterdam.

69 In 1650 Europe had about 100 million inhabitants. But Machiavelli, for example, in his works referred to a political community, the city of Florence and surroundings, with about 100,000 inhabitants. Locke had as reference an England with about 8 million inhabitants (Frank, 1998, p. 168).

70 Peking had about 600,000 inhabitants; Nanking one million; Canton, one and a half million (Frank, 1998, p. 109).

71 Frank, 1998, p. 116. 'The entire world economic order was – literally – Sinocentric' (*ibid.*, p. 117).

72 'Feudal wars' (although the category 'feudalism' in a strict sense is not valid for any culture outside of Europe) that the Chinese state had overcome definitively from the beginning of the second century BCE.

73 China was absolutely self-sufficient; it did not need to buy any European product

the corruption, inefficiency and deep injustice of the empire to the simple Chinese rural people? He is registered thus in the long list of subversive intellectuals in Chinese political history.

[77] For Huang, as for Ku Yen-wu (1613–83), the problem of the Chinese state lay more in the super-centralization of power than in its dispersion or the chaotic lack of organization, which deprived local officials of authority, responsibility and creativity. It was an autocratic state. Huang had an extraordinary knowledge of his own culture (literature, philosophy, religious traditions), in particular of his history.⁷⁴ As the son of a famous bureaucrat and disciple of Liu Tsung-chou (1578–1645), he could, during long years of study, consult, reconstruct, synthesize and express in writing the history of China from a neo-Confucian vision with Taoist elements.⁷⁵ He participated in the guerrilla resistance of the Ming against the Manchu.⁷⁶ *Ming-i tai-fang lu* (*The Hope of the Dawn*) was the first and most famous of his political works. Drafted ten years after abandoning the struggle against the new Manchu dynasty, he affirms that he is in a period of extreme darkness:

I have often wondered about Mencius' saying that 'periods of order alternate with periods of disorder'⁷⁷. [. . .] According to the 'Twelve Cycles' of Hu Han, from 477 B.C.⁷⁸ to the present there has been one long cycle of disorder [. . .]. 'Dawn is just breaking and the light is still quite faint'⁷⁹, but how could I, on this account, keep my opinions to myself?⁸⁰

From 477 BCE the fetishization of power was produced: the emperor believed that he was the seat of power and not the people.

Why was the Ming Chinese nationalist dynasty defeated? To answer this, Huang makes use of a critical horizon opposing counterfactually the honest ancient dynasties with the actual bureaucratic and corrupt empire. Against the interpretation of Hu Han (1307–81), who thought that from the death of Confucius, for 2000 years, 'the time for change has not arrived', Huang

until the beginning of the nineteenth century. This was the reason the United Kingdom declared the 'Opium War' (1840–2), to oblige them to buy something: the opium that England obtained in India with violence, and which for ethical motives China did not want to acquire or distribute in its territory (but which English immorality obliged them to acquire). It is as if today Colombia waged a victorious war on the USA to distribute drugs. European colonialism was at odds with all ethical principles.

74 He wrote *Records of Confucian Thought in the Ming Period* (*Ming-jubsüeh-an*). See the introduction to Huang's work, written by de Bary (1993, pp. 1–85).

75 One of the 'Six notables' ('Six noblemen') of the Tung-li movement during the Ming dynasty, which did not keep him from dying in prison.

76 He did not defend the Ming dynasty but China against the foreign dynasty (of the Manchu north).

77 Inevitably one thinks about the cosmic forces of the *Yin* and the *Yang*.

78 Approximate beginning of the 'time of the warrior states'; the totality of the Chinese Empire begins after this era (in 221 BCE with the Emperor Qin, or in 202 BCE with the Han dynasty).

79 Expression of Chi Tzu.

80 Preface (Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, pp. 89–90).

awaited a great change (as a Chinese Ernst Bloch). But this change had to be deeper than a mere renewal of dynasties: 'Whether there is peace or disorder in the world does not depend on the rise or fall of dynasties, but upon the happiness or distress of the people.'^{81, 82} For Huang, from the end of the Chou (third century BCE), the dynastic changes had not brought any benefit to the people. The Ch'in produced a first trauma in Chinese civilization from which they could never recover. The second trauma was the conquest of the Mongols (1211-79 CE; Marco Polo visited its capital Hangzhou). For him, the primitive situation of the empire had reached the culmination of its civilizing development with the 'Three Dynasties' (220-80 CE):

Until the end of the Three Dynasties there was Law. Since the Three Dynasties there has been no Law. Why do I say this? Because the Two Emperors and Three Kings knew that all [that which is]-under-Heaven could not do without sustenance and gave them fields to cultivate. They knew that all [that which is]-under-Heaven could not go without clothes and therefore gave them land on which to grow mulberry and hemp. They knew also that all [that which is]-under-Heaven could not go untaught, so they set up schools, established the marriage ceremony to guard against promiscuity, and instituted military service to guard against disorders. This constituted Law until the end of the Three Dynasties. It was never laid down solely for the benefit of the ruler himself.⁸³

The present is criticized from the horizon of the original order:

In ancient times all [those who are]-under-Heaven were considered the master, and the prince was the tenant. The prince spent his whole life working for all [those who are]-under-Heaven. Now the prince is master, and all [those who are]-under-Heaven are tenants.⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the solution, the 'Great Plan', cannot be an imitation of the plan contained in the *Rites of Zhou* in Mencius' time, but has to be relevant to the seventeenth century, meaning not only a radical change of the system of government, but also a new conception of political strategies and power. It stands out that his political critique situates itself at the level of institutional reform.⁸⁵

In the classical system (*feng-chien*) – not a feudal system, but an order prior to the empire, whose base was a system of communities with co-

⁸¹ In the original *wan-min*. In Chinese *min* is the common 'people'; *t'ien-hsia* ('all under heaven'); *t'ien-hsia chih jen* ('the people of heaven'). These 'universalist' concepts are essential to political philosophy, even Mao-Tse-tung, and the present.

⁸² Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993; *On Ministership*, p. 95.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, *On Law*, p. 97.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, *On the Prince*, p. 92.

⁸⁵ In a work I am writing now, I will call level B that of the 'institutions', where the implicit principles (level C) are fulfilled, framing the exercise of strategic action (level A).

responsible pacts, of common ownership of the land – the leader had to fulfil strict demands in the service of the people. In the impersonal bureaucratic Mandarin system, the emperor and his lieutenants reached conceded privileges without clearly stipulating the obligations: fixed, centralized and unilateral taxes, which impoverished and destroyed the people and provinces. All this started with the Ch'in.

In his historical vision, with an architectonic aim, Huang insisted that there were three stages in the political development of Chinese civilization (and, consequently, of 'humanity'; 'Sino-centrism', to use Frank's expression, existed and continues now). First was a primitive society where each attended to their own interests and satisfied their primary necessities, without idealizing this utopian communality.⁸⁶ Second, a more civilized state developed, which demanded from the leaders great discipline and sacrifice for the common good. Power was exercised in all ways without any delegation from Heaven. It was a theory of power of secularized inspiration more Taoist than Confucian, and so more critical. Third, the despotic dynastic stage of the empire was organized, the political-economic institutionalization of 'Evil', which produced an infinite multitude of victims.

[78] The philosopher Teng Mu, who opposed the Mongolian conquest from a quasi-anarchist position, wrote *The path (Tao) of the Prince*. Huang has great affinity with him, but maintains an equilibrium between the anti-institutionalism of Teng and the political cynicism of other philosophers. Against the Confucians who proclaimed the necessity of fulfilling the order, Huang is opposed to the established order, whose ideal, in the critical vision of the philosopher, is the interest of the dominating bureaucracies. The politician and leader would have to be, on the contrary, a sacrificed 'human being with nobility' (*chün-tzu*), a 'noble man' in the neo-Confucian conception, critical of the established imperial order and responsible for a new future order.

The prince has to have collaborators, ministers and administrators, not eunuchs who fulfil his every whim. They would have to be 'colleagues' who could sincerely correct his errors, with equal authority. The ministers are 'to serve [. . .] for all [those who are] -under-Heaven and not for the prince'.⁸⁷ 'The terms 'prince' and 'minister' derive from their relation to all [those who are]-under-Heaven'.⁸⁸ In this he followed a 'popular' tradition (not populist) already ancient in China. Mencius had written: 'The people are of greatest importance, the altars of the soil are next, and the ruler is of least importance.'⁸⁹ The people before all! The people themselves were not the final reference, since they had to be disciplined and educated in fulfilment of the customs. For the Confucians, in a strong ethical position, were 'more

⁸⁶ 'In the beginning of human life each man lived for himself and looked to his own interests' (Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, p. 91, beginning of the work).

⁸⁷ Ibid., *On Ministership*, p. 94.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 96.

⁸⁹ 7B:14 (de Bary and Bloom, 1999, I, p. 156).

important the rites than the laws'.⁹⁰ For Huang the rites were important, but also the laws.⁹¹ In China the law (*fa*) is the norm, rule, model, method. Against the 'legalists', who were identified with the empire, and against the 'militarists', who were inclined toward anti-legal populist localism,⁹² Huang demands a legal order, which the emperor has to obey, a Chinese constitutionalism,⁹³ a law, which has not been promulgated for the sole benefit of those who govern. Each dynasty dictated its own 'Code', which tried to base itself in the first laws; the most famous of these was the *Great Tang Code* (present in all legal bodies until the Republic of 1912, whose influence would reach Korea, Vietnam and Japan).⁹⁴ However, it had deprived the rights of the people, the regions, the families. So, the Confucians trusted more in the 'man with nobility' than the legal coercive bureaucracy. For Huang the laws had become 'illegal laws', 'laws without law'. Nevertheless an equilibrium was necessary to overcome the dilemma: should it be said that

[t]here is only governance by men, not governance by law,' my reply is that only if there is governance by law can there be governance by men [. . .] If the Law of the early kings were still in effect, there would be a spirit among men that went beyond the letter of the law.⁹⁵

The laws could be modified.⁹⁶ Huang desacralized the dynastic codes, although the key to the system is the 'knowledgeable king' who fulfils the rites and laws for the benefit of 'all [those who are] under heaven', and respects the institutions. The first of these, according to ancient custom, was that the princes had to name a 'prime minister', a chancellor, which the Ming eliminated. In former times a prime minister was named who, like the emperor, was chosen for his capacity and personal virtue. This election of a 'noble man' was even more important when the emperor was succeeded by his son. If the successor was not suitable, the prime minister chosen replaced the incompetent prince.⁹⁷

⁹⁰ De Bary, 2000, p. 15.

⁹¹ Huang thought, like Hegel, who died defending a constitutional monarchy, that the dynasty needs a law to limit its power.

⁹² See in de Bary and Bloom (1999, I, pp. 190–223) the problem of 'legalists' and 'militarists' in China. The 'legalists' (*fajia*) were identified with the origin of the Mandarin bureaucratic empire (in the second and third centuries BCE). Many of them were 'anti-intellectualists' and opposed to philosophers, because they fell into an anti-legal scepticism. The 'militarists' were inspired however in the philosophy of Mo Ti.

⁹³ De Bary, 2000, pp. 90f.: 'Chinese Constitutionalism and Civil Society'.

⁹⁴ The *Codex Hammurabi* (which would impact from Babylonia on all the legal bodies of the later Mediterranean) of China.

⁹⁵ Huang, 1993, p. 99.

⁹⁶ Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), prime minister of the Qin, wrote in the *Book of Master Yang* (*Shangjun shu*): 'A wise man creates laws, but a foolish man is controlled by them; a man of talent reforms rites, but a worthless man is enslaved by them' (de Bary, 1999, I, p. 194). See de Bary and Bloom, 2000, pp. 98f.: 'Neo-Confucian critiques of dynastic law'.

⁹⁷ 'In the ancient times the succession passed, not from father to son, but from one worthy man to another' (ibid., *To Establish a Prime Minister*, p. 101).

The Chinese Empire, unlike European states, except for the eighteenth-century Prussian bureaucracy,⁹⁸ was firmly institutionalized thanks to its impressive Mandarin bureaucracy. The Mandarins were formed in public or imperial 'schools', which constituted the natural place of philosophy, discussion, 'memory' of the empire, its justification and critique. Chinese philosophy was eminently political, statal, educational. Classic works, such as *Book of Rites (Liji)* and *Rites of Zhou (Zhouli)* of the Han Dynasty, constitute the textual references of the demands of universal education. From 987 to 1126 CE a programme of educational reform was carried out with the slogan 'Harmony without uniformity' (*he er bu tong*), since from Mencius well-being in the reproduction of life presupposed scholarly education. Zhu Hsi (1130–1200) wrote the preface of the classic work *The Great Teaching*, based in the *shexue*, the 'community of study', founded in the roots of the rites and the world of the local life of the village (*she*), from where one was taught (*xue*). This pedagogical current specialized in popular education, of rural children, and in education of the future officials of the bureaucracy.⁹⁹

Huang criticizes the lack of liberty of the 'schools', since 'since the Three Dynasties right and wrong in the world have been determined entirely by the court'.¹⁰⁰ In the 'schools' one learns and repeats only what has been established; 'the place of the schools has been taken by the academies'.¹⁰¹ During the Han Era, '30,000 scholars at the Imperial College engaged in outspoken discussion of important issues without fear of those in power, and the highest officials were anxious to avoid their censure'.¹⁰² The decline of the 'schools' produced the crisis of the state through not having a knowledgeable critique.

It was necessary to improve the libraries of the empire. For each work published by the prefectures or districts one had to send three copies: 'one to go to the Imperial Repository (*pi-fu*), one to the Imperial College, and one to the local school'.¹⁰³

To transform the bureaucratic system one had to have stricter entrance exams for future officials and those who studied in the imperial college,¹⁰⁴ where were admitted a few favoured people, frequently sons of the members of the bureaucracy,¹⁰⁵ with weak educational backgrounds and knowledge

98 The eighteenth-century 'Reform' of German universities, tackled by the Humboldt brothers among others (see Collins, 1998, pp. 618–87), has to be seen with the formation of the Prussian *Beamter* (resembling the Chinese Mandarins).

99 See de Bary, 2000, pp. 45f.

100 Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, p. 105: *Schools*.

101 Ibid. In the 'academies' one studied freely, privately; in the imperial or public 'schools' one had to start with the doctrines decreed by the empire.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., p. 109.

104 It was a kind of *Collège de France* in its good days in France but more important through its direct link with state structures.

105 Huang, 1993, pp. 111–21: *The Selection of Scholar-Officials*. It is interesting to see the knowledge that a candidate had to possess in the Sung era and the reforms realized over the centuries. For example, Wang An-shih abolished the writing of poetry (*shih*), or Liu Mien, Ch'üan Te-yü, etc. (ibid., pp. 112–13).

of the classics but not of contemporary happenings. Once they entered the service of the empire, strict fulfilment of duties was the criterion for promotion, and not theoretical study or nepotism.

Huang shows, with great vision into China's next three centuries, the importance of changing the capital of the empire from Peking, too far to the north, to Nanking, more in the centre,¹⁰⁶ thinking only of the Mongols, their eternal enemies.

After the reform of the state bureaucratic structures Huang tackled four central strategic themes: the frontiers, the peasantry and the problem of land, the military problem, and the financial question, showing a political development much greater than any philosopher of his era in Europe.

[79] When Machiavelli said that an unarmed reformer – like Savonarola – could not triumph, and even less with mercenary soldiers, he referred only to the figure of a minuscule Italian *condottiero*. Huang poses the military problem with the scope of a Carl von Clausewitz, but of an empire many times greater not only than the Prussian, but western Europe as a whole.

In the T'ai-tsung era some border areas were defended by 100,000 soldiers each. Nevertheless they were too few and too dispersed; there needed to be a better distribution of the defence forces. He proposed that they arrange the armed forces in the north (in Mukden), the east (to Kansu) and south (to Yunnan). He gave them great autonomy of movement, and each region had to act and provide for the formation of those advanced military posts, counting on personnel, which were not sent to other regions (to prevent protests and improve the stability of the army).

But the theme par excellence in China was the payment of land taxes, the cause of the fall of the last dynasties. In the Han dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE), one paid up to a fifth of the production in grain, but the lands were held in common, and one paid the 'fifth' when each one had received what they needed to live. When the Ch'in privatized land¹⁰⁷ (ending 'feudalism') one paid 1/30, but this soon became 1/10. The state did not have to give any service in exchange. In the time of Huang, tax reached 3/10. The poorest peasants could not pay such taxes. In the Three Dynasties there were new types of land, and each one paid according to its quality. Later this sane classification was lost. New taxes kept appearing (on liquor, salt, all type of products). Century after century, the situation worsened. The empire only considered its necessities not the people. After centuries of exploitation it was necessary, as Su Hsün (1009–66 CE) called for, to work on 'a system of rivers and highways, canals and roads, waterways and roadways, ditches and lanes'.¹⁰⁸ There were no passable paths neither was a good irrigation

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 122–4: *Choosing a Capital*. Huang did not imagine the greater danger would come from the sea and was wrong to propose a port-capital. He should have thought of a continental capital. In 1602 Matteo Ricci, the Italian Jesuit sage from the Portuguese Empire, was established in Peking. European colonialism apparently started inadvertently.

¹⁰⁷ Huang, 1993, pp. 128–38: *Land System*. Huang was a historian and showed, following well-defined stages, the great structural changes of the Chinese tax system.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

in agriculture possible. The 'military farms' seemed to be a solution (since they occupied 1/10 of cultivated lands).¹⁰⁹ Huang thought that the experience could be expanded to the whole empire, assuming the suppression of private property,¹¹⁰ since in his ideal, each rural family had the land necessary for their survival. That minimal but necessary quantity was called 'the ideal parcel', some 100 *mou* for which one had to pay a 'home tax' (*hu tiao*) in silk garments, in addition to the land tax (*tsu*) and the services (*yung*). A work tax (*li-chia*) and army tax (*hsiang*) also existed. In certain periods, payment was demanded only in silver.¹¹¹ But if silver was scarce the price dropped and the taxes also. Huang demanded that at the least 'the necessary parcel' be distributed to all peasants, and that no tax be paid in silver, with classified types of land.

[80] Huang also treated the reform of the army. The Ming made use of mercenaries. Later, the generals had their personal armies. The majority of the more than 3 million soldiers lived on agricultural cultivation or were fed by the local people. There was a clear separation between the soldier and the people (*min*). The soldier, growing old, could not return to normal life after 30 years of service, and frequently ended up as a criminal. Huang proposed that the adults have a military service with representation from, and sustained by, the family units, one soldier per 50 adults. So from 10 million family units, one could have more or less a million soldiers. In addition those sent would have to rotate. The soldiers would have their military service near their villages, with the exception of the troops sent to the north (who rotated frequently anyway). Huang showed the importance of the appointment of generals, their subordination to governors, their formation and their co-ordination in times of peace and of war. There was a supreme military commission, an imperial guard, 31 regional commands, 493 guards and 359 independent stations. To end, Huang guaranteed that the military had to 'learn that personal concern for the ruler and love of the people are the basis of military service, and that crudeness and violence are not to be mistaken for ability. If this is done, all men would be revolt-proof.'¹¹²

Huang also treated the theme of finances. He was asked if one had to eliminate gold and silver as payment. After a long historical description of the uses, he showed that with the Yuan (1280-1368 CE) copper money was abandoned and one began to use 'paper money',¹¹³ with which one could

109 Each member of the army was given 50 acres (*mou*) to enable the subsistence of one's family, and a high-yield agricultural cultivation was organized.

110 Huang enters into a long description of land taxes, whose payment became demanded in silver, although the norm had been silk fabrics, which kept the peasants in extreme poverty (1993, pp. 131-8). Huang edits the *Collection of Ming Statues* (*Ming hui-tien*).

111 We have already indicated that the 'ancient system' demanded great quantities of silver for China. For this reason, in the sixteenth century the conquistadors in America were anxious about the precious metal (that ended up in China).

112 Huang, 1993, p. 149, *Military System* (Part 3).

113 Under the Emperor Hsien-tsung (c.807 CE) 'paper money' supported by the imperial Treasury was used, a negotiable paper document that one acquired with copper coins and

pay taxes. With the Ming, however, 'paper money' fell into disuse.¹¹⁴ With the lack of silver everything lost value (land, food, goods). Huang reflects:

The price of goods has likewise dropped to less than 10 percent of former times. Is there perhaps a superabundance of goods? No, it is because there is no money [of silver] in the markets.¹¹⁵

Huang, like Proudhon, proposes to abolish 'the cash system' with money in silver and gold, and return to payment in copper coins (very abundant)¹¹⁶ or in goods (grain, silk, porcelain, etc.).

He is drastically opposed to misappropriating the wealth of the poor people in the 'extravagant' rites of Buddhist origin. With a neo-Confucian disciplinary sense (similar to Calvinist neo-Stoicism in Europe) he proposes that the rites be abolished in favour of a return to the 'spirit' of the Chinese rite. Concluding:

The way of the ancient sage-kings was 'to uphold essentials and eliminate nonessentials.' The 'scholars' of recent times have not recognized this and talk of commerce and industry as nonessentials, which they foolishly propose to eliminate. Now industry was certainly something the sage-kings wanted to develop, and they also wanted merchants to be plying the roads, because both industry and commerce are essential.¹¹⁷

He speaks also of second rank 'officials', an infinity of functions and denominations, starting from the assumption that 'where there was one sub-official in ancient times, today there are two'.¹¹⁸ He launches a fierce critique against the eunuchs, who, when they became ministers, 'served their lords as slaves' and not as equals in honour and the demands to serve the people.¹¹⁹ They exclaim: 'The Prince, our Father, is Heaven itself!'¹²⁰ For Huang it was the depravity of politics.

Nine-tenths of Huang's works were destroyed by persecution and fire, and *The Hope of the Dawn* itself was purged page by page, according to the testimony of Ch'üan Tsu-wang (1705-55).

used throughout the empire. It was not money but means of payment or credit. These 'commercial documents' (*hui-p'iao*) were still used privately in the T'ang dynasty.

114 At the end of the dynasty (1628-44) a return to paper money was tried for the last time. The proposal was to buy with 30 million in paper money the same quantity of silver. But Huang comments in the voice of a merchant: 'Change an ounce of silver for a piece of paper? I'm not crazy!' (ibid., *Finances*).

115 Ibid., p. 153, *Finances (Part 1)*.

116 'We must abolish gold and silver and make copper the standard of value for all goods. In the capital and each of the provinces an official should be charged with casting of coins' (*Finances [Part 2]*, p. 156).

117 Ibid., p. 160, *Finances (Part 3)*.

118 Ibid., p. 161, *Subofficials*.

119 Ibid., p. 166, *Eunuchs (Part 1)*.

120 Ibid., p. 167.

We can conclude that Chinese political philosophy, including Huang Tsung-hsi, defended, on behalf of those who we can classify as 'critics', a 'change' to the *political institutions* (level B of the architectonic), within the 'reformist' horizon, since one could never try a radical critique, external to the possibilities of Chinese philosophy. The Confucians and neo-Confucians, Taoists or Buddhists, like Kant in the West,¹²¹ could never justify 'a new, non-dynastic regime'¹²², since they had a monarchical concept of the exercise of sovereignty. The new solutions (reform of the Chinese imperial state) – why Huang wrote *The Hope of the Dawn* – are always directed toward a 'prince with nobility', a 'sage king'. The reforms are always conceived 'from power', lacking a fount of radical criticism. The limitation of Chinese political philosophy was its positivity, strength, coherence, stability, as oligarchic bureaucratic empire, with numerous but extremely poor people ('all [those who are] under heaven'). The empire, on the other hand, had a clear world market hegemony in the ancient and new world systems, at least to the end of the eighteenth century, the Industrial Revolution, which it was impossible to carry out in China due to its 'virtues'. Compared to the thousand-year-old Chinese empire, the 'weak' European monarchies (in particular the English), little populated, with high salaries, would allow the class 'dominated' in China (the bourgeoisie, confined to 'eunuchs', not having children, so no hereditary accumulation of the 'bourgeois family') to organize the Dutch, English, and French states to fulfil 'their own interests' (the proverbial *selfish*), which were considered the 'vices' of the feudal and landowning 'ancient regime' (which from the seventeenth century produced wealth, *positive* public effects) as Mandeville defined.

Who would have imagined that from 1839 to 1949 we would have encountered a 'China humiliated and sick'?¹²³ In 1912 one can observe on a map of China that tsarist Russia occupied Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang; Great Britain: Tibet, Sikang, Szechuan, Hunan, Honan from Nanking and Hong Kong; the French: the south (Yunnan, Kuangsi); the Japanese: the eastern Shansi, Peking, Mukden; the Portuguese: Macao. Only Kansu and Kikunor had not been conquered by foreign powers.¹²⁴ Was this the end of China? No. It was only a 150-year eclipse. What is 150 years for a 2,500-

121 He writes in *Metaphysics of Morals*: 'The sovereign has only rights against his subject and no duties [. . .]. Therefore a people cannot offer any resistance to the legislative head of a state which would be consistent with right [. . .] Once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things' (MdS, A 175–183; B 204–212; Kant, 1968, VII, 438–442 [Translation: Gregor, pp. 95–8]). Kant is the example of the conservative, the 'reformist' who removes from the people all right of radical transformation; but he falls into the contradiction of obliging them to obey the 'new government'. And if the ancient sovereign recovers the government? The people would have to repudiate the new government and recognize the old and thus to infinity, without any criteria of the legitimacy of its base. The conservative contradicts himself, as the positivist (à la Kelsen).

122 De Bary, 'Introduction', in Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, p. 59.

123 Braudel, 1978, p. 180.

124 See the map in Kinder and Hilgemann, 1966, II, p. 90.

year-old state (including the 'Warrior State' era) with 1,300 million human beings?

Throughout its history, China maintained the perennial priority of the material political principle (at least in theory and in the majority of the critical cases: the service to the happiness of the people) and of the strategic principle of feasibility (with strongly structured institutions and of a great strategic, economic and military efficacy in the organization of imperial power). Nevertheless it never will glimpse another hegemonic mode of the legitimacy of power. The formal principle of quasi-democratic or oligarchic plutocratic consensus will have to be sought in political organization of the great cities' and ports' commercial or manufacturing elites under a relative autonomy in the face of the emperor's power. One never questioned the legitimacy of the emperor's power, the son-of-Heaven, who reigned over 'all [those who are] under Heaven', and over the eunuchs, financiers, merchants, under the zealous fiscalization of the political bureaucracy of the Mandarins.

All that has been said about China would have to be extended to Hindustan, under the Mongols and other prosperous kingdoms of India, and the Asiatic south-east. Unfortunately there is no room to explain this further.

An Ancient World: The Ottoman Empire

[81] Geopolitically, the Ottoman Empire holds the greatest importance for a definition of Modernity. It is the *wall* that hinders contact between Latin-Germanic Europe and the geopolitical and commercial centre of the ancient system. The Mediterranean, the door of Europe for contact with the world and the Slavic regions to the Black Sea, was in the hands of the Ottomans, with the exception of the Italian naval powers. This impossibility of connecting to the east will demand opening to the Atlantic, and the beginning of Modernity. The Spanish Empire (Charles V, 1500-58), the Ottoman Empire (Suleiman I 'the Magnificent', 1520-66) and the rising Russian Empire (Ivan 'the Terrible', 1530-84) were three conflicting micro-structures without a clear hegemony, which only with Amerindian silver and gold leaned towards Spain and Europe.¹²⁵

The geopolitically favourable situation that gave birth to the Ottoman Empire, a military theocracy, was the result of the weakening of the Byzantine Empire, destroyed by the Seleucid Turks in the battle of Mantzikert (1071). The Seleucid Turks were later massacred by the Mongols, who in 1258 occupied Iran, Iraq (ending with the centrality of Baghdad) and Anatolia. In addition, the armies of the fourth Latin-Germanic crusade occupied and burned Constantinople, disorganizing the eastern Christian Roman

¹²⁵ The battle of Lepanto (1571), which ended Ottoman control of the Mediterranean, occurred 25 years after the discovery of the Potosí and Zacatecas mines (1546). The accumulation of silver paid the immense Spanish fleet.

Empire further. Finally, the Black Death played havoc in Muslim countries too. Cairo, which lost a third of its inhabitants in the first epidemic, around 1450, had only 150,000 inhabitants (from the 250,000 who had lived there in 1300).

The Turks, of Siberian origin, contiguous to the Mongols, occupants of Mongolia and known by the Chinese (called Tu-Keuh) already in the sixth century CE began their march to the west, partly running away from the Huns, partly looking for grazing for their herds of horses, necessary for the warrior nomads. The Seljuk Turkish clan reached Samarkand in the eighth century. In the ninth century they embraced Islam. From 1261 they slowly occupied all of central Anatolia. One of the Turkish tribes, whose tradition dated back to the mythical warrior Ertoghrul, achieved great military successes. His son Osman installed the Osmanli Dynasty, which quickly took Bursa as its capital, north-east Turkey.¹²⁶ They transformed themselves from mountain guerrillas who destroyed the Byzantine frontier regions into professional warriors, with excellent weapons and new tactics better adapted to the geography, superior to the Byzantines and Europeans of the era, with a system of communitarian-military ownership under the absolute management of the emir, and later of the sultan.¹²⁷ Their conquests reached Europe. Murat I occupied Adrianopolis in 1369, the new Turkish capital Edirne, putting Constantinople in danger and entering central Bulgaria and western Thracia. The occupation of all Slavic Europe to the west of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire began. Sofia fell in 1385. In 1396 they defeated the crusaders in Nicopolis. Mehmed II (1451-81) finished unifying the Ottoman Empire, which had entered into crisis following Timur's conquest (d.1405, leaving the victorious Turkish front to protect the rearguard of his empire against China). The crucial world-historical fact occurred on 29 May 1453, when the janissaries entered Constantinople, transforming a growing emirate into a sultanate, which replaced the caliphate of Baghdad, separated for two centuries. The new Ottoman Empire took the place of the Byzantine Empire, also erased from history irreversibly. In 1590, during the period of maximum splendour, when Murad III died, the empire reached from Anatolia, Syria and Iraq to Iran in the east, from Egypt to Morocco in the west, from Greece to Budapest, further than Belgrade, in the north-west, and from Armenia to the Caspian Sea in the north-east.

[82] As with the Greeks and Romans, the army was the centre of Ottoman theocratic-political power. At the beginning the Osmanlians were bands of mounted archers with light arms, shields, spears, swords, iron truncheons, javelins and crossbows; they were experts in ambushes and surprise attacks,

¹²⁶ See the works of Kinross, 1977; Imber, 2004; Hourani, 2003, pp. 263f.

¹²⁷ 'This Ottoman system of land tenure through military fiefs differed essentially from the feudal system in Europe, in that the landholdings were small and above all seldom hereditary. For all land was the property of the state. Thus at this stage there was to arise in the Ottoman dominions no landed nobility, such as prevailed throughout Europe. The sultans retained absolute ownership of the soil they had conquered' (Kinross, 1977, p. 33).

frequently at night. They fired the 'trick bow' with great dexterity on the galloping horse. Quickly they organized permanent armies, chiefly with cavalry,¹²⁸ formed by 'Timariots', which attacked by both flanks encircling the enemy.

Nevertheless, it was not the most noted military institution: the 'janissaries'.¹²⁹ The personal protection corps of the sultan was formed by slaves, mainly of Christian origin, and eunuchs, subjected to an extremely hard elite military education and who enjoyed great economic privileges. This corps, formed by thousands at the beginning, came to have 40,000 members in the seventeenth century. It was the most select of the Ottoman army, like the Persian 'Immortals', who occupied the central place on the battlefield, the rearguard watching for the final assault.

In addition, the Turks counted on corps of professional soldiers trained in the palace school. In 1527, 5,000 of these running armed forces could be counted. They preceded the janissaries in battle. The Azabs, who were the rural youth or from poor neighbourhoods, were enrolled in great numbers to form the bulk of the army, the infantry of the front lines.

The Turks were the first to use firearms, cannons of great size, and later very versatile cannons of different sizes. Constantinople fell by the fire of enormous cannons, which destroyed the walls of the thousand-year-old city, previously invincible. In 1527 Istanbul had only produced 1,027 (mainly small) cannons.

This enormous and efficient army appeared at the walls of Vienna in 1529, and remained in her outskirts for nearly two centuries, without ever being able to take her, but creating a spirit of continuous shock within the Hapsburg subjects, who, on the other hand, reigned over the Hispanic Empire until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The political organization of the empire was a copy of the Byzantine Empire: even the Greek names were translated into Turkish, when its phonetics could not be imitated. The provinces, districts, mode of taxes and application of justice proceeded from the Muslim tradition of *shari'a* but kept many specific Turkish-Byzantine elements. The 1487 *Code of Bursa* was the model the later Turkish codes of law imitated. Education, especially in the *madrastas*, imparted under the authority of the muftis and where the *ulemas* (Turkish Muslim intellectuals) were educated, was divided into

128 To each knight was assigned a village or rural community, like the 'encomiendas' in sixteenth-century colonial America, over which he governed; in addition, he collected taxes for the sultan and kept one part as his inheritance. This privilege obliged him to be disposed to form part of the army when the sultan summoned. He had to recruit other knights, their horses, arms, auxiliaries and food for the campaigns, in proportion to the importance of the village or rural community. It was an economic-military and political system but it was not feudal.

129 The mode of 'recruitment' (of the janissaries) explains its nature well (Imber, 2004, pp. 141f.). *The Laws of the Janissaries* stipulated the conditions of the election of youth who would form part of this army corps, the place (proceeding from the Balkan peninsula and from Anatolia, whose inhabitants, of Christian origin, were converted to Islam) and mode of its demanding formation, the methods for the use of arms and the military strategy, etc.

ten disciplines (as in Byzantium or Paris). Within those were found logic (Aristotelian), metaphysics, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, mathematics, astronomy, etc.

With the occupation of Gallipoli in 1354, the Turks began to see the importance of constructing a fleet, installed first in the Aegean and Black Seas, then the Mediterranean along the Maghreb, and later the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Until 1571 (Lepanto) the Turks had greater presence in these seas than Constantinople or Venice. Later, with the decline of the Mediterranean, due to the discovery of the Atlantic, the Turkish Empire would enter into a crisis, which would lead to its total destruction at the hands of the English and French at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which would end in the First World War and in the birth, thanks to Kemal Atatürk, of the secularized republic of Turkey at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Venice: An 'Eastern' Political System in Peripheral Europe¹³⁰

[83] Venice was born and developed in the European 'Middle Ages'. It has to be taken into account due to its influence in the Italian Renaissance, and because it was the political model that the English (and North American) system would imitate. Venice, like Genoa (also within the Byzantine space) and later England, arranged a naval commercial system, whose mercantile class had from its origin the liberty to exercise hegemonic power in the historic bloc of the state. The English looked to Venice as an ideal, because although distant and 'eastern', it was never opposed to its interests, while Genoa, allied with Spain, was a terrible adversary. Its influence in the 'Atlantic world' ('modern') is observable, for example, in the presence of Venice in the work of Shakespeare.

Venice was a 'republic' from the beginning. The inhabitants of the Adriatic lagoon, fleeing the barbarian invasions, took refuge in the freshwater islands, which opened to the Byzantine sea par excellence, the Adriatic, dominating commerce with Constantinople. In the fifth and sixth centuries CE, the islands were already inhabited by numerous communities of fishermen. In 814 CE, the city dedicated itself to Saint Mark, whose remains a Venetian merchant supposedly acquired from a Christian Coptic community in Egypt. The lion (logotype of the evangelist Mark) provided the villagers of a growing city with an aggressive personality. The primitive 'patricians' constituted the ancient families who organized political life around a *consiglio* (council) where all participated directly in the decisions. In 829 the Byzantine Empire named a sole authority, a colonial magistracy (Venice was dependent on Constantinople at that time), which in the Venetian dialect is

¹³⁰ I write these pages in the library in front of the palace of the doge, here, in Venice, on 15 April 2001, enveloped in the magnetism of this beautiful city, 'eastern' until the end of the fourteenth century, the moment of its commercial and political apogee.

doge (in Italian *duce*: 'he who conducts', 'conductor'). He was not a king, he was not a noble, he was a judge with a determined length of service and functions. Very quickly, in the face of the successive crises of the Byzantine Empire, the doge came to be elected by the Venetians themselves; he is represented kneeling before the Venetian lion (the political community, the 'city'): the doge was a servant, not a dictator or a *condottiero*. He was a deeply 'institutional', limited judge, disciplined under the power, which would later be called the *Maggiore Consiglio* (the Greater Council; the *Consiglio Grande* of Florence would try and fail to imitate it), which removed from office some doges.

For some, the originality is in the creation of the Venetian 'citizenry'. Due to the fact that the inhabitants had occupied 'part of the sea' to make habitable land, they did not recognize any authority previous to them over the parcel of land where they constructed their habitation, their homes. In all of Europe, the land, the ground was always subject to a previous jurisdiction (the feudal master, king, empire, Papacy). In Venice there was no previous jurisdiction:

Venice was founded in the sea, and by the law of the people the cities built in the sea belong to those who built them [. . .] For this reason Venice intends to be free because it was not built on land.¹³¹

The Venetian citizenry lived and defended their *libertà* in a *vivere civile* of great autonomy. The patrician was on his land, ground (*in solo*) won from the sea (*in mare*), where he had built his house, and for this was 'free' (*pretendunt libertatem*), without dependence on any other kingdom or master. That citizen, founding patrician, was not a nobleman nor a feudal master; he was the *civis originarius, de intus* (from within, to differentiate himself from the foreigners: *from without*), an 'elder' (patrician), frequently commercial. When richer, he was more influential. When more influential he had to collaborate monetarily with the *comuna*; in fact it had a deep solidarity with the members of what had been an extremely poor community of wretched fishermen. In Venice the *comuna* was the whole. If the Athenian was a citizen when he participated as hoplite in the Greek army, the Venetian was that by belonging to a family with property in the islands, officially related somehow with commerce. One could be a member of the *Maggiore Consiglio* at 25 years of age. It organized itself in 1170 and restructured itself on 28 February 1297 in the *cerrata*, enabling the creation of a list of the patricians who had not served; from that date, the demands for participation in the *Consiglio* were 'more difficult', 'narrow' and in fact 'closed' to foreigners (all who were not Venetian patricians).¹³²

¹³¹ Baldo, *In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Comentarii*, Venice, 1599, ch. 43, n. 8 (Caravale, 1997, p. 357).

¹³² The certification of being a natural member of a patrician family was highly bureaucratized. Natural children were not recognized, and a little later neither were those recently

[84] Venice owed its success, like England (proportionally), partly to its geopolitical situation. Being a city of islands, independent of all kingdoms (on 'terra firma') and with a special relation to the Byzantine Empire (first dependent, later allied in the Byzantine wars against the Saracens of Sicily and, finally, home to exiles in 1453), it became a republic free of all lordship and author of its own and *sui generis* political system. Perhaps it was a system inspired by the ancient Phoenicians, which through the Greeks was present in Byzantium; in any case, the Venetian political system was 'eastern', not western or Latin-Germanic European. Modern democracy, therefore, has its original inspiration in the 'East'; in the eastern Mediterranean, eastern Roman Empire, those ancient cities, the Muslim cities, from Tyre or Sidon, Muslim from the seventh century CE and Christian through the crusades, Bukhara or Samarkand, and in the Hindustanic cities, like Agra or Madurai, Malacca, or Hongchau,¹³³ which the Venetian Marco Polo stopped to admire. There was a trail of great commercial cities from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with more or less republican governments (senates of merchants) dominated by empires, which demanded taxes and permitted them a certain autonomy.

At the base of the Venetian political system was the *Maggiore Consiglio* (whose splendid room, where the great community met, is still found today on the third floor of the palace of the doge,¹³⁴ whose immense windows look over the Grand Canal, with great Tintoretto paintings, the cowardly 'capture of Constantinople', showing the fire that burned through the destroyed metropolis), with the participation of 1,200 patricians in the thirteenth century, from the 27 principal families among others. The Venetian Republic was a direct democracy, with the *Maggiore Consiglio* the last resort of the power of all other institutions. Savonarola's Florence from

arrived. They were 'families' of hundreds of members who could live in different islands or jurisdictions of the city, so were present in all the institutions. The familial corporative spirit was fundamental. It was the *Cosa nostra*, under the dependence of a great *paterfamilias*. It was the recognized organizing base of the city.

133 Marco Polo describes well this immense city, many times larger than Venice, in number of inhabitants, naval traffic, wealth, technology (printing, paper, paper money, compass, gunpowder, silk fabrics, porcelain, etc.) and cosmopolitanism. In the Chinese city Marco Polo met Christians, Jews, Muslims, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, Hindus, Taoists and members of other religions. The city had great canals and extraordinary refinement. In reality Venice was one of the most 'developed' cities of the stage III 'inter-regional system', as I previously explained (Dussel, 1998a). Venice had another advantage: the possibility of an autonomous, sovereign, controlled, political system managed exclusively by the commercial patricians (bourgeois). There were bourgeoisie in all cities, but under the power of the sultanate, *rakhás* or the Chinese emperor: they never could control the totality of the political apparatus. This hindered the origin of capitalism, in its early stage, as in Venice (and in some other Italian cities, briefly, never as long as in Venice). Genoa is another example, but its political system would not be as pure as the Venetian, neither would it have the breath of the 'Venetian miracle'.

134 It is the most splendid building (53 by 25 metres and 15 metres tall) in Venice (after the church of the doge, the Byzantine basilica of Saint Mark, which is of the Greek rite, in whose alphabet all inscriptions were written until the fourteenth century) which shows the power of the *Consiglio*.

1494 and Calvin's Geneva were pale imitations of Venice. Its 'myth' had a great impact; modern 'republics' used it as their initial political regulative model. It was a historical utopia.

The *Minore Consiglio* (Lesser Council) elected the doge, six delegates from the ancient islands or neighbourhoods of Venice and five representatives of the first Venetian jurisdictions on 'terra firma' (Padua became part of this region).¹³⁵ It met daily. In reality it was the *Consiglio* of the doge. This magistracy of the doge was chosen by the *Maggiore Consiglio*, in an extremely complicated way, to avoid corruption or favouritism.¹³⁶ The doge took an oath for what he was not permitted to do. He swore before all respect to the Venetian 'lion'. He was elected for life. His life was generally ascetic, not ostentatious; he had the appearance of a sage, although in many cases he had to be a hardened soldier, a skilful diplomat and an astute merchant.

[85] The third most ancient political body was the *Quarantia civil vecchia* (40 members), occupied at the beginning with customs, internal commerce and administration.

From 1229 arose the 'Senate' or the *Consiglio de' Pregati* (from 30 at its beginning, to 200 members in its final years), which declared war, named the most important authorities (including the candidates for bishop). When the revolt of 1310 tried to transform the Republic (the *Comuna*) into a *Signoria* (noble aristocratic system, like Florence), the *Consiglio de' Dieci* was organized. This Council of the Ten was like a ministry of the interior or government, responsible for information, police and justice.

One could imagine that the three modern powers had arisen, conveniently 'separated'. Nevertheless, it was not thus. One writes in this respect:

[The Venetian system] completely ignored the separation of powers. [. . .] The Venetian council in which all participated, under the same title and without retaining exclusive competence in the exercise of the jurisdictions (*jurisdictio*) of those who took part, as we know, was constituted by numerous citizen *officials* (*oficia*): the specific competence in each matter, which characterizes the *officials* (*oficia*) before the *councils* (*concilia*) [. . .] was legitimated in the complex internal exercise of the unique power of the communal jurisdiction.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ In each location (the 'Senate', basilica, etc.) were seven armchairs: the principal, in the centre, for the doge, and next to him the other six, three to the right and three to the left, reserved for the six representatives of the oldest neighbourhoods of Venice. This speaks of a political system with urban representation for centuries.

¹³⁶ There may not be a more complex 'procedure' in the history of the election of a magistracy. The Major Council drew lots, and a child was the one in charge of drawing the numbers; they obtained the names of 30 patrician members of the Council. These elected 9; these 9 elected 40 electors, who drafted 12; these 12 elected 25, who drafted 9 and who, at their time, elected 45, who drafted 11, who elected 41 electors (all members of the Major Council); these elected the doge.

¹³⁷ Caravale, 1997, pp. 327, 349-50 (Translation: TC).

That is to say, the 'communal' authority, whose last resort was the *Maggiore Consiglio*, was not divided or separated to keep watch over each other mutually, but was exercised *in toto* ('la complessa *jurisdictio* municipale') in each case. It was a power divided and increasingly institutionalized; the organisms were not 'limited' mutually, nor were they fiscalized, but they fulfilled their respective functions. In addition, power was structured not only in the Councils, but equally in citizen 'officials' (*officia* or *magistrature minori*), linked to the guilds (*arti*) and to the religious fraternities.

Venice was an extremely active participative *political community* that, at the apogee of its political and economic power, dominated the market of the eastern Mediterranean to Cyprus and the coasts of Asia Minor (which included the Adriatic, Aegean Sea, the Black Sea and the Red Sea) from the first crusade. It would begin its decline with the *discovery of the Atlantic* (which would deprive the Mediterranean of its centrality for Europe and would convert it into a secondary sea), and the 'invasion' of the Amerindian continent from 1492. The continental empires with great territorial armies, and equally present in the sea with immense naval forces, like the Turks¹³⁸ and Spain under Charles V, meant the end of Venice, which had benefited from a very special historical moment. From the eighteenth century, London, Edinburgh or Manchester, after Seville (in the sixteenth century) and Amsterdam (in the seventeenth), would be the Venices of the Atlantic.

Dante's *On Monarchy* and Marsilius of Padua's *Defensor pacis* were already in the fourteenth century the expression of the political philosophy of Venice. Only the Venetians had liberty, the autonomy to criticize the empire and the Papacy, and to put, like Marsilius of Padua, the *popolo* as the last resort of sovereignty (*potestas*) or of the power of the state.

[86] Donato Giannotti (1492-1573), although Florentine, wrote a *Repubblica de' Veneziani* (c.1527), which became a classic since it explained the organization of the Venetian state:

He conceived a study in three parts: one book would delineate the general structure of the government (*l'amministrazione universale*); another would treat in detail (*particolarmente*) the diverse magistracies, and the third the *forma e composizione di essa Repubblica*, a phrase that suggests theoretical analysis.¹³⁹

Giannotti published only the first part, about the *cose universali*, which, starting from the study of geopolitical conditioning, had to pass from the *universale* to the *particolare*. The organic proportions of the Venetian 'political whole' had never been spoiled, which 'contrasts with the miserable

¹³⁸ The Turks, for their part, were only a power of the Mediterranean, and for this reason were displaced by Spain at Lepanto (1571), who dominated the Atlantic. The Turks, like the Venetians, would later opt for not 'connecting with the Atlantic'.

¹³⁹ Pocock, 1975, p. 274.

present of Italy'.¹⁴⁰ The equilibrium between the 'many' (in the *Consiglio*), the 'few' (the *Consiglio de' Pregati*) and the 'one' (the doge) was praised; it expressed social classes, since 'in Venice there are poor people, middle classes and elite, *popolari, cittadini* and *gentiluomini*'.¹⁴¹ The nucleus of the republic consisted of four parts: 'the creation of the magistracies, the deliberation about peace and war, the proclamation of the laws and the election and election [of the public posts]'.¹⁴²

These are functions of the political community fulfilled in the *Maggiore Consiglio*, the body, which creates the magistracies, declares war, passes laws and judges the charges of the accused. 'Consensus' is the foundation of the legitimacy of all political actions. *Virtù* has left its place to the rational 'institutionalization' of public discussion in the *Consiglio* through secret voting, by a successive process of *consultazione, deliberazione* and *esecuzione*.¹⁴³ The first moment, that of the *invenzione* or consultation, is typical of the 'few'; deliberation and decision is the moment of the 'many'; execution is of the 'one'. The moments of the practical act governed by the *phrónesis* of Aristotle are institutionalized in a successive process of diverse bodies. It has passed from 'prudence' guided by *areté* (subjective 'virtue') to the communitarian consensuality of secularized public 'institutions' of legitimation (the 'virtue' of the republic). Venice is the 'bridge' between the ancient world (Greek, Roman, Byzantine) and Modernity, without being 'modern': The council is constituted by few, of those who are esteemed; the deliberation by many, so that liberty [of discussion] remains guaranteed; and those who exercise authority will possess it in virtue of the republic and not by their own presumption or connections.¹⁴⁴

In this way Venice succeeded, with republican 'institutionality', in containing the 'contingency' (*fortuna*) of unpredictable politics, hindering the corruption of the citizens and governors, and thus achieving a prolonged stability. It is the 'republican myth of Venice', which rises dangerously before all European monarchies.¹⁴⁵ Venice is present in all later modern politics, as the example of a republic whose institutions maintained equilibrium between complex political institutions and diverse classes and social interests. It was not a 'mixed' government in the sense of Polybius, but the

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 277.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 278.

¹⁴² Giannotti, 1819, I, p. 51.

¹⁴³ Ibid., III, pp. 32-3. I remember having imitated in my youth the Italian union workers movements' method of 'see, judge and act'. Who knew it had such an ancient and prestigious origin?

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., III, p. 41 (cit. Pocock).

¹⁴⁵ For his part, Gasparo Contarini would write *De Magistratibus et Republica Venetorum* (published in Paris in 1543, and translated into English as *The Commonwealth and Government of Venice*, London, 1599), which would launch the 'myth of Venice' in England prior to the revolution of 1688: 'The *myth of Venice* consists in affirming that this city possesses a group of norms for the taking of decisions that guarantee the complete rationality of all and the total virtue of those who take them. The Venetians are not inherently more virtuous than other men, but they possess *institutions* that make them so' (Pocock, 1975, p. 324).

mature fruit of a creative evolution adjusted to the reality of a political community *sui generis*.

The Italian Renaissance: Machiavelli

[87] Our strategic Florentine thinker struggled in an Italian world where the *governable institutionality* of Venice did not reign and where nevertheless one had to find minimal stability. Within the reduced and peripheral world of the Mediterranean, in the Italy 'reborn' with classical (Graeco-Roman) studies, which tried to find its inspiration in such ancient political models, with the influence of the Byzantine elites exiled by the Turks in 1453 from Constantinople, southern Europe transformed itself into the necessary 'connection' with stage III of the *Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean system* (from the fourth century CE to the end of the fifteenth approximately). It was, against existing hegemonic opinions, and in my interpretation, a pre-modern moment; the final stage of a Europe in crisis, which had to build bridges with the 'ancient regional system' (which extended from Japan to England,¹⁴⁶ the two limiting islands, *finis terrae*, whose prominent regions were China and Hindustan). Italy is *Mediterranean*; it looks to the East; seeing the Ottoman Empire. Modernity, however, will be *Atlantic*;¹⁴⁷ it will look toward the West; it will install itself in the first place in America (to Acapulco over the 'South Sea' of the Aztecs), later in Bantu Africa and will reach the 'Arabian Sea', Ormuz, Ceylon, Malacca, Macao and the Philippines.

As the centre of the preparatory stage, the heart of Renaissance Italy is the pontifical state, which divides the peninsula into two regions: the south, the Sicilian kingdom, under Catalan-Spanish dominion; the north, regions of European trans-alpine contact. In the middle of the peninsula are Rome, Florence, Bologna and such other 'cities' with 'communal' political organizations more or less original in their organization and autonomy, small city-republics tolerated by the Roman sacred monarchy, frequently under the power of the *condottieri* (political-military leaders). This is an event *prior* to Modernity. Historically it is a horizon *previous* to the world, which opens in 1492, the strict 'origin' of Modernity.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ We have insisted that being 'islands' permitted these two countries to be dominant (the first in Asia and the second in the 'global system'). Both could have been conquered (as Taiwan), but had elements in their favour at key moments. Almost defeated, a *kamikaze* (tornado) saved Japan from an immense fleet and from an army even greater than the Chinese-Mongol emperor in 1281. In the same way, a terrible storm sank the 'Armada' of Phillip II in 1588. Destiny was in favour of the two islands situated at the extremes of the 'ancient world'.

¹⁴⁷ In historical order: Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, France (and later the USA) are 'Atlantic' powers. Geopolitics is the precondition of mercantile navigation, economic expansion, political-military domination and cultural hegemony.

¹⁴⁸ Dussel, 1995a, 1996 and 2001a. I leave out, for now, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Galileo is not in any way a 'renaissance man', depending on the 'revolution of daily life' that the 'discovery of the New World' will produce in the European *Weltanschauung* in

Renaissance political theory, in particular Florentine, confronts the power of a confessional monarchy, the Papacy (a Papal–Caesarianism distinguished from the Ceasaro-Papism of the Byzantine and European Christendoms until its mature secularization two centuries later). To liberate itself from the tutelage of Rome, from a Christian religion inverted in the Anselmian way, Christendom of the law and of the sadistic payment of debt, establishes a slowly secularized, republican, autonomous ‘political field’, and begins the slow modern development of the *consensual democratic principle* of ‘popular sovereignty’, together with a new definition of the strategic task of political action. Both levels are mediated by a new institutional structure, a new ideal model of the state: a ‘republic’. These three levels are the object of Machiavelli (1469–1527): (a) to recommend to the politician a properly strategic *mode of proceeding*, making possible the use of practical-political reason (in the level of the struggle for hegemony) against the ancient concept of *virtue* (Greek *areté*); (b) to take as example the Venetian or ancient Roman ‘republic’ against the pontifical monarchy, opening the broad field of a new institutionality of the state; (c) to study the ancient Roman religion (in opposition to Christendom), trying to find a new type of legitimacy (at the level of secularized principles). Unlike the contemporary Chinese political philosopher Huang Tsung-hsi, who questioned the causes of the decline of the Manchu dynasty, Machiavelli tries to study the causes of *instability*, of the lack of *governability* of the leaders of the Italian Renaissance cities, in a truly dramatic situation of institutional chaos, warring, political, without the possibility of continuity or stability of efficient institutions, which were the fruit of the bureaucratic exercise of power guaranteed for centuries in China or in mercantile Venice.

[88] Humanity had known as a mode of government, of states or macro-institutional systems of great proportions, only monarchy (or analogous forms), which dominated numerous cities with large populations and regional territory. Phoenicia before falling under Persian dominion, however, was constituted by autonomous republican cities, independent (governed by commercial elites). Under their influence they organized the cities of Greece, republics, which had sometimes a government of elites (oligarchic or aristocratic) or ‘democracy’ (which excluded the majority of the

the sixteenth century. In 1519–21, Magellan and Elcano took the first empirical route around the earth so the discoveries of Galileo were possible a century later. (Many crucial experiences happened in that first century of early Modernity under Hispanic domination!) The scientific ‘formulations’ of the seventeenth century (Newton, Galileo, Descartes, etc.) are ‘modern’, but depend on his hypotheses (as the *abduction* of Peirce) that the ‘first’ Modernity happened in the ‘Spanish’ sixteenth century, and not the Italian Renaissance. Hispanic Renaissance humanism is the heir of the Mediterranean pre-modern Italian Renaissance, which will ‘open’ itself through the Hispanic peninsula to the broad *modern* world of the ‘tropical’ or equatorial Atlantic (prior to the ‘North’ Atlantic). Amerigo Vespucci is Italian and will draw the famous maps in 1504 to the Medici, but he operates within the ‘Portuguese world’, which is not strictly Italian. I am conscious that an absolute division between these two ‘worlds’ (Renaissance and Hispanic) is impossible, but I try to ‘conceptualize’ stricter limits in the description of the origin of Modernity.

population), and republican Rome (among other powers of the Mediterranean, although it left a place at the end always for the monarchies or the empires, like the Hellenistic or Roman empires). The great cities, under the Pharaonic, Persian, Hellenist, Roman, Byzantine empires, the caliphate of Baghdad or the Ottoman or Chinese empires, continued being governed in a quasi-republican way at the communal level, with relative autonomy and paying tax to the empires. But the republican system had never been implanted in states of greater proportions. For the first time, Modernity will organize republics (mixed in some cases), which will govern many regional territories, numerous commercial cities, towns and nations frequently with diverse languages or dialects. The *particular* states were born thus,¹⁴⁹ institutionalizing great territorial extensions, numerous cities and enormous populations,¹⁵⁰ Machiavelli, classifying the types of government better (in anti-monarchic intention) than Aristotle himself (with his six regimes), writes:

All the States and Governments (*stati*) by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been and are either Republics or Princedoms [. . .] Of Republics I shall not now speak.¹⁵¹

Either it is a monarchy (now called 'principality') or a republican government (democratic, aristocratic, mixed, etc.). He tried to overcome the Roman papal monarchy and permit the exercise of the Florentine community, in the manner of Venice, saving historically and patriotically the ancient republican Rome before the empire and counting on a government, which would represent the political community and which will permit its liberty, its autonomy. But the search for the type of better 'institution' (republican or a 'principality') had as its end the achieving of stability, 'maintaining'¹⁵² a certain political 'order', which would allow the *vita civile*¹⁵³ as a *vivere libero*,¹⁵⁴ a *vivere civile*.¹⁵⁵

149 We will not refer to 'nation states', because they were *multi-national*. Within the cosmopolitan 'globality' (or universality) and singular states (provincial or regional), we will speak of '*particular states*', with the everyday sense of the '*nation state*'.

150 Badly called 'nation states', because they included many nations, as Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, etc. In Europe none of those 'nation states' were 'uni-national', but 'pluri-national', so we will call them 'particular states'.

151 *The Prince*, chs. 1-2; Machiavelli, 1997. Consult the works of Pocock, 1975; Chabod, 1994; Copleston, 1958; the 'Introduction' of C. Vivanti, in Machiavelli, 1997, I, pp. ix-cxliii; Fraile, 1965-6, III, pp. 298f.

152 In the *Discourses* to 'maintain' is one of the most frequent words (for example, Machiavelli, 1997, I, pp. 231, 248, 258, 283, etc.) '[. . .] *Non si mereviglieranno che tanta virtù si sia per più secoli mantenuta in quella città*' (*Discourses*, Book I, ch. 1; 1997, I, p. 199; ST: p. 29; [Translation: Thomson, p. 5]).

153 *Ibid.*, ed. ital., pp. 258, 271, etc.

154 *Ibid.*, p. 331.

155 *Ibid.*, p. 218. '[. . .] *lo impero romano con le sue arme e sua grandezza spese i tutte la repubbliche e tutti i viveri civili*' (*ibid.*, Book 2, ch. 2; p. 334; p. 199 [Translation: Thomson, p. 156]).

Cities have their origin in the former of these two ways when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely (*vivere securi*) if they lived dispersed in many and small societies, each of them unable [. . .] to stand alone against the attacks of its enemies; [. . .] and thus becoming an easy prey to the invader [. . .] they restrict themselves to dwell together in certain places (*eletto da loro*), which they think will be *more convenient to live* in and easier to defend.¹⁵⁶

It is the obsession with security, permanence, stability (always from the horizon of life) in the chaos generated by a European Mediterranean in inevitable decline. The crisis produced at the end of the Medici government (1434–94), until the return of Cosimo de Medici (1537), permits a culminating moment of Florentine political philosophy. Together with Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini (1483–1540) is asked: which is the better political principle, which are the better institutions, what type of comportment do the political actors have to adopt to permit Florence the stability that has not been reached with the fiery millennialist discourse of Savonarola? In addition, the intent to imitate Venice (even organizing a *Maggiore Consiglio*, a ‘Lordship’ and the election of a *Gonfaloniere* very similar to those of the Adriatic city) would not bring the hoped for result. It did not have the necessary republican *virtù*, and Florence did not have the geopolitical position of Venice.

[89] After youthful experiences in the Florentine diplomacy, Machiavelli returns to the town of San Casciano, and begins the reading of its dramatic present starting from the Roman Republic. He meditates and takes notes on Titus Livy’s work, applying the past to the present, trying to learn from Rome to interpret its era. His ‘theoretical framework’ starts from two traditional extremes and recovers new meaning. The contingency, unpredictability, unrepeatability of complexity, the state of disequilibrium of the original chaos, and finally, the always imminent and inevitable danger of *fortuna*, which nevertheless has to be ‘secured’ by the complex institutions, which make the contradictions of interests of the powerful ‘patricians’ (the *ottimati*), the people, the citizens and foreigners manageable. The *continuity* of the institutions would have to depend on the *virtù* of the ‘political actor’ (appealing to a traditional semantic content and transforming it in a new way). The *virtù* of *The Prince* would be different from that of the *Discourses*. The *Discourses on the first decade of Titus Livy*, with a more pessimist disposition with respect to the possibility of immediate reforms, thinking in the long term about institutions, open the broad horizon of problems of principles and systemic mediations, proposing as model a ‘republic’ in the classical moment of Roman politics (thinking more of Sparta than Athens, more of Venice than Florence). *The Prince*, with a more optimistic attitude, making use of a short-term possibility (like Huang in China, who hopes

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., Book 1, ch. 1; p. 199; pp. 29–30 (Translation: Thomson, p. 5).

that one prince takes the recommendations of his work so that he can save the empire immediately), but within a institutional pessimism, explains the possibility of transformation starting from the concrete subjectivity of the charismatic political actor privileging him in the origin of the new order, 'as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths'.¹⁵⁷ It is the founding *event* of a new order. Machiavelli, in his solitary confinement, comments on the Roman institutions in the *Discourses*, but he discovers that

[w]e must take it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions, that no commonwealth or kingdom ever has salutary institutions given it from the first or has its institutions recast in an entirely new mould, unless *by a single person*. On the contrary, it must be from *one man* that it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that all similar reconstruction must depend.¹⁵⁸

Machiavelli abandoned for a time his notes on Titus Livy, and wrote in a few months the strategic advice, starting from his political experience, that he would give to an Italian *condottiero* to fulfil the foundational political praxis directed at originating and conserving a new order (*ordine nuovo*) at the concrete level of instrumental reason. The 'instituting actor' would be a 'prince' (Lorenzo de Medici, Gian Carazzo Visconti, Ladislao of Naples or Cesare Borgia).

The work would have a destiny distinct from the intention of its author. Numerous political actors (Napoleon, Bismarck, Hitler and Perón) will read it thoroughly, as a treasure of recommendations on how not only to obtain power, but how to conserve it and how to discover the causes by which it is lost. His architectonic interest, nevertheless, was different. Machiavelli tried to describe the mode of the *rising* and *maintaining* of a 'new order', while Hnang in China proposed to *renew* an 'ancient order'. Machiavelli is revealed as a liberating politician, although his councils have as horizon the problematic of Renaissance Italy, not modern, closed to the complexity of the 'world-system' inaugurated by the discovery of the islands, thanks to the fearlessness of the Genoan Christopher Columbus. Machiavelli had Fernando of Aragón as one of his exemplary figures, but only as an actor in Mediterranean politics – Italian (the kingdom of the Two Sicilies) – and in no way as the creator with Isabel of Castile of the 'state of the West Indies', the Atlantic colonial world outside of Europe, of which Machiavelli only had secondary information.

The Prince, therefore, is situated at the individual level of the political actor: the Florentine institutions having been unsuccessful, he strategically proposes the use of practical-political reason in order to create a 'new order'

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., Book 1, ch. 9; p. 224; pp. 61–2 (Translation: Thomson, p. 33).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 223; p. 60 (Translation: Thomson, p. 32).

over which an age of peace and prosperity could be installed.¹⁵⁹ The structural concepts of his political reflection have been defined by Pocock as:

Experience, prudence and the *arcana imperii*, fortune + faith = providence; providence – faith = fortune; providence + prophecy = revealed eschatology; virtue and grace.¹⁶⁰

In effect, the Roman goddess and the ambiguous meaning of *fortuna*¹⁶¹ starting with the Christian interpretation was transformed from ‘destiny’ into divine ‘providence’ (Pocock’s formulation: ‘fortune + faith = providence’).¹⁶² But the Renaissance secularization of Machiavelli removed from the religious interpretation its sense of providence (‘providence – faith = fortune’; sacralized again with the ‘invisible hand’ of the God of the ‘market’ of Adam Smith) and it was transformed now into mere *fortune*, the chaotic, complex, unpredictable happening, ‘luck’ (which has to be interpreted first as complexity not at odds with ‘mere luck’), which keeps the political actor from having ‘control’ over the effects of his/her actions. The institutions (objectively) or *virtù* (subjectively) give a certain ‘frame’ to *fortune*, but when there are no sufficient institutions or *virtù* is absent, the danger of chaos is imminent, inevitable:

I compare this [Fortune] to a swollen river,¹⁶³ which in its fury overflows the plains, tears up the trees and buildings [. . .]. Every one flies before the flood, [. . .]; and notwithstanding this state of things, men do not when the river is in its ordinary condition provide against its overflow by dikes and walls,¹⁶⁴ so that when it rises it may flow either in the channel thus provided for it,¹⁶⁵ or that at any rate its violence may not be entirely unchecked, nor its effects prove so injurious. It is the same with fortune, who displays her power where there is no organised valour to resist her, and where she knows that there are no dikes or walls to control her. If you

159 When I say ‘strategically’ I mean the order of political feasibility, the world of the practical mediations of politics. It is architectonically ‘strategic reason’ (practical-political), not instrumental (technical), nor formally consensual (discursive reason), nor material in contents (reason whose criteria is human life in community). See Dussel, 1998a, ch. 3, about the ‘principle of practical feasibility’.

160 Pocock, 1975, p. 48.

161 Like ‘luck’ (‘good fortune’), as the ‘unforeseeable’ and terrible goddess who had to be worshipped carefully.

162 For a Greek, the unforeseeable happening was determined by the *anankhe* (necessity) or the *tyche* (assigned by the gods), or for a Roman by ‘destiny’, for the Christian ‘divine providence’. Boethius represents the passage from the Roman *fortuna* to a Latin Christian *fortune* (Pocock, 1975, pp. 36ff.), in the sense of providence. Joachim de Fiore, with his Franciscan millenarianism, reunites however ‘providence + Apocalypse = eschatological vision’ of the future.

163 It is the preferred metaphor of the books of ‘strategy’ in China.

164 The Chinese strategy does not ‘fix’ the fury of the waters, but studies its course and launches it against its opponents. One uses the force of the water.

165 The Chinese strategy never ‘resists’ the force of the water. It studies its ‘tendency’, its sense, rides over it (like the dancers of Knossos over the bull) and directs it from within.

now examine Italy, which is the seat of the changes under consideration, and has occasioned their occurrence, you will see that she is like an open country, without dikes or any other protection against inundations.¹⁶⁶

When there are still not institutions, or the institutions are corrupt or inadequate, the political actor has to manage the unpredictable (*fortune*) following a logic, a political rationality, which will be called *virtù* (not the Confucian *rìtè*, Greek *areté* or medieval *virtus*, but something distinct). The Christian *vita activa* is transformed into the *vita civile*, with a public component, political, secularized in the Florentine 'civic humanism'.¹⁶⁷ These themes are explored by the theoreticians of Florence, such as Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) and Leonardo Bruni (1361–1444), for whom the active *virtù* can manage *fortune*, when it participates in the life of the city, the election of the magistrates, the passing of the laws and the making of decisions. The corruption of the city is not the fruit of *fortune*, but of the lack of active participation in political life, of the *vivere civile* lacking the civic *virtù*.

[90] I think that the *virtù* of Machiavelli could be synthesized in a concrete content, and within a characterization, which I have not seen attributed to the great Florentine, even by Pocock. Machiavelli's *virtù* can be described, in the first place, in those who exercised it:

To come now to those who by their courage and ability, and not by fortune, have risen to the rank of rulers, I will say that the most eminent of such were Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and the like.¹⁶⁸

All those named are 'founders' of *new* orders, and creators of a completely new institutional structure. Machiavelli wants a new republican order for Florence, taking its inspiration from classical Rome and contemporary Venice. However, not having consensual conditions, neither within the 'greats' (*ottimati*) nor in the 'few', the 'people' (*popolo*), the 'many', it will be necessary to count on a *condottiero* (Lorenzo de Medici?),¹⁶⁹ who has a very extraordinary 'quality': the 'happy shrewdness' (*astuzia fortunata*).¹⁷⁰ Max Weber says that

'charisma' [. . . is a] quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural [. . .] powers [. . .] as a 'leader' [. . .] prophets, persons with a reputation for therapeutic or legal wisdom, leaders in the hunt, or heroes in war.¹⁷¹

166 *The Prince*, ch. 25; p. 187; p. 329 [Translation: Detmold, pp. 94–5].

167 A theme studied by Hannah Arendt (1958) among others.

168 *The Prince*, ch. 6; p. 131; p. 103 (Translation: Detmold, p. 20).

169 The work is dedicated to him (*ibid.*, Dedication; pp. 117–18; p. 45 [Translation: Detmold, p. 3]).

170 *Ibid.*, ch. 9; p. 143; p. 161 (Translation: Detmold, p. 35).

171 *Economy and Society*, I, ch. iv.10 (Weber, 1944, p. 193 [Translation: Fischhoff, p. 241]).

I think that the *virtù* Machiavelli describes is the *quality* or proper characteristic of the 'political charisma', of the *charismatic* politician, in the Weberian sense, which is opposed to traditional control (and legitimacy), and even to the institutional,¹⁷² when it has been corrupted. It is a founder and not a citizen (actor of the *vivere civile*), who organizes the new efficient institutions (as the classical Romans or Venetians).

The charismatic politician exists above all thanks to the complicity of the people, since a tacit alliance exists (like demagogic tyranny, but not negative) between him and the people:

The people [. . .] seeing that they cannot resist the nobles, have recourse to the influence¹⁷³ and reputation of one man, and make him prince, so as to be protected by his authority. [. . .] But he who attains the principality by favour of the people stands alone,¹⁷⁴ and has around him none, or very few, that will not yield him a ready obedience. Moreover, you cannot satisfy the nobles with honesty, and without wrong to others, but it is easy to satisfy the people, whose aims are ever more honest than those of the nobles; the latter wishing to oppress, and the former being unwilling to be oppressed.¹⁷⁵

Machiavelli is thinking about a popular leader. And for this the prince 'is obliged always to live with the same people' (*medesimo popolo*),¹⁷⁶ since one only

become[s] a Prince by the favour of the people', and for this he 'must endeavour to preserve their good will, which will be easy for him, they will ask of him no more than that he shall not oppress them'.¹⁷⁷ [. . .] It is essential for a prince to *possess the good will and affection of his people*, otherwise he will be utterly without support in time of adversity.¹⁷⁸ The charismatic prince creates a firm bond with his people, controlling the 'greats' within and his enemies without, and bases thus the exercise of his power, not only with military force and good walls, but in that he 'is not

172 He did not know bureaucratic power as the Chinese, neither the 'state of law' (modern legal). Huang's book *The Hope of the Dawn* is also directed at a prince who will be charismatic, but not to create a *new* order, but as prince of an *ancient* order that has to *transform* following the ancient spirit. In a certain way, Machiavelli also takes the ancient order (Roman classic) as example, but the charismatic prince is a 'founder', because the prevailing disorder in Florence and Italy could not be accepted as a starting point. Huang started with the empire as order over which the *transformation* would occur.

173 The people need the charismatic person, and respond to this 'popular praising'. The leaders are invested with leadership by the people.

174 Not surrounded by people (the 'greats') who limit their power.

175 *The Prince*, ch. 9; pp. 143-4; p. 163 (Translation: Detmold, pp. 37-8). Chapters 9 and 10 are the 'centre' of the work, the fundamental theses of the charismatic prince.

176 *Ibid.*, p. 144; pp. 163-5 (Translation: Detmold, p. 38).

177 *Ibid.*

178 *Ibid.*; p. 144; p. 165 (Translation: Detmold, p. 39).

hated by his people'.¹⁷⁹ Synthetically: 'it cannot be regarded as an easy undertaking to attack a prince in a city which he has thoroughly fortified, and who is not hated by his people' 'it is impossible not to foresee difficulties in attacking a Prince whose town is strongly fortified and who is not hated by his people'.¹⁸⁰

[91] If *virtù* is making oneself worthy of the admiration of the people by his 'happy shrewdness', not so much to be loved as to not be hated, the charismatic actor will have to care for his 'mythical image' before people and greats within and before the enemies without. To cultivate that 'image' is not only hypocrisy, but it is necessary to create (and develop) that aura to be able to fulfil with authority the necessary functions for spectators (the other political actors) who have a priori positive expectations: if one 'believes' that someone has to do something, one grants beforehand that 'credit', within whose positive horizon it is easier to fulfil the task (easier than when there is positive complicity in the hope of fulfilling the action of the actor). For this reason, Machiavelli always advises the prince to adopt a rhetorical position, as in a theatre (the public-political field) where one is observed, to create a legitimacy, which brings a consensus, which guarantees the long-term actions of the prince.

Those who are princes through ancient dynastic inheritance are respected and maintain power by 'tradition' (a mode of dominion and Weberian legitimacy). This is not Machiavelli's case, since stability is guaranteed. Those who have eliminated the ancient masters (like Darius the Persian) will not have greater difficulty pacifying the state, like Alexander,¹⁸¹ if they do not stop to reorganize the ancient masters. Public evil is not a good start to a principality, because the charismatic prince cannot 'appear' odious,¹⁸² although it is frequently necessary to take decisions that 'can be considered' so. For Machiavelli, then, the charismatic prince has to be very attentive to the 'image' that his person projects (since his power is not only military,¹⁸³ but emanates from his status as 'redeemer'),¹⁸⁴ and from there the many Machiavellian attitudes (to give them their traditional name) derive from

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., ch. 10; p. 146; p. 173 (Translation: Detmold, p. 41).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Alexander the Great (*The Prince*, ch. 4) may be the ancient charismatic leader who Machiavelli most admires. Ferdinand of Aragón will also be the prototype of the 'happy shrewdness' of his time, without understanding his 'opening' to the Atlantic and the organization of a colonial world outside of the Mediterranean. For Machiavelli, Ferdinand is a European king, not the 'first modern king', not thus a Lorenzo de Medici, enclosed in the end of the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance, who looks toward the Mediterranean and the Turks.

¹⁸² Ibid., ch. 8.

¹⁸³ He dedicates chapters 12-14 to this.

¹⁸⁴ 'You must not, then, allow this opportunity to pass, so that Italy, after waiting so long, may at last see her deliverer appear. Nor can I possibly express with what affection he would be received in all those provinces that have suffered so long from this inundation of foreign foes' (ibid., ch. 26; p. 192; p. 343 [Translation: Detmold, p. 101]).

Machiavelli's obsession with the care with which the political leader has to 'represent' his 'role'.

Machiavelli's formulation is distinct. On the one hand, the prince has to 'avoid the infamy of those vices, which would rob him of his state',¹⁸⁵ the charismatic politician cannot scandalize his people, but 'need he care about incurring censure for such vices,¹⁸⁶ without which the preservation of his state may be difficult'.¹⁸⁷ He explains: 'It remains now to be seen in what manner a prince *should conduct himself* towards his subjects and his allies.'¹⁸⁸

The problem that Machiavelli confronts is new: the public representation of modern subjectivity. It is the beginning of a fissure between an ethic (abstract) and a strategic-public action.¹⁸⁹ Its 'fields' evidently are diverse, although we would have to know how to articulate them (impossible for Machiavelli, which drives him toward the separation of ethics and politics). If ethical virtue can be lived in a naïve way, without precautions within 'us', it cannot be exercised in the same way in a public action. It demands a much more complex implantation; there are many diverse spectators, observing each detail with distinct finalities (one has to anticipate misunderstanding, evil talk, treason, competition in the struggle for the hegemony of the exercise of power, etc.):

For a man who, *in all respects*, will carry out only his professions of good,¹⁹⁰ will be apt to be ruined amongst so many who are evil. A prince therefore who *desires to maintain himself*,¹⁹¹ must learn to be not always good,¹⁹² but to be so or not as necessity may require.¹⁹³

The event is situated as a theatre, in a political field: one 'who in all respects will carry out [. . .]'. The politician 'who desires to maintain himself'; is an actor; but an actor of many other fields also (home, neighbourhood, religious community, trade union, sport, etc.). One cannot, nor does he have to, show himself in all those 'fields' in the same way. 'Not to be good' in a naïve and *private* sense according to the criteria of a 'field' (for example, at home having always to tell one's spouse the truth) 'can be bad'

185 Ibid., ch. 15 (Translation: Detmold, p. 60).

186 Ibid.; p. 144; p. 165 (Translation: Detmold, p. 60).

187 Ibid., ch. 15; p. 160; p. 229 (Translation: Detmold, p. 60).

188 Ibid., ch. 15; p. 159; p. 227 (Translation: Detmold, p. 59).

189 The ethical principles will be subsumed in the political field and will constitute something that Machiavelli cannot formulate (and in fact enunciates in a misleading way): a political normativity that, while not properly ethical, is on a more concrete level still strictly normative.

190 'Goodness' in the sense of medieval ancient virtue.

191 This is the end.

192 Following the ancient sense of 'goodness'. What would the new sense of political 'goodness' be? The response to that question is what we will call in a future work: 'political claim of justice'.

193 *The Prince*, p. 159; p. 229 (Translation: Detmold, p. 59).

or counter-productive in the public environment (where one does not have to lie, but it is not possible to express *hic et nunc* always the truth or one's intention, because it would be political suicide; the Kantian expression of *fiat justitia pereat mundus* is false).¹⁹⁴ So: 'All men when they are spoken of, and Princes more than others from their being set so high, are characterized by some one of those qualities which attach either praise or blame.'¹⁹⁵

The rhetorical sense of Machiavelli is clear. He has a new theoretical problem. With singular and autonomous subjectivity rising slowly, the political field shows its autonomy in the normative level of the ethical-abstract environment. So, one does not negate the virtue ethic, but changes its sense, and there is a demand for a new political normativity. Machiavelli shows the difficulty in the public exercise of the problems tackled with a private ethic.

It was inevitable that Machiavelli had misleading expressions (not mistaken), since he sees a problematic that is still real in the strategic field (*level A*, in our architectonic description), the empirical uncertainty of the application of normative principles of politics:

It is not necessary, however for a prince to possess all the above-mentioned qualities [virtues]; but it is essential that he should at least *seem to have them*. [. . .] He should have a versatile mind, capable of changing readily, according as the winds and changes of fortune bid him; and, as has been said above not to swerve from the *good* if possible, but to know how to resort to *evil*¹⁹⁶ if necessity demands it.¹⁹⁷

Here 'good' and 'bad' have diverse meanings and are situated in diverse 'times' and 'fields'. 'Good' has a sense of subjective coherence, individual, private; in the medieval sense of the concept. Meanwhile 'evil', in contrast to the naïve and private level, is the public and political act not easily acceptable in the private environment: for example, when one kills someone (in a war of just resistance in defence of the innocent). Good can be affirmed at an abstract level. Principles are found at levels of greater complexity. The 'Do not kill!', so clear in the abstract, becomes impossible in the act of war, when one kills an enemy soldier in an invasion. It does not stop being a politically just act of defence, which eliminates the enemy, but it can be considered 'evil' by an abstract ethical principle.

Nevertheless, one can get from this problematic to the Machiavellian expressions: 'the means which he employs for this will always be accounted

¹⁹⁴ It is a postulate: it is logically possible always to tell the truth, and would be just. Empirically, nevertheless, there are occasions when, without lying, one has to hide the truth. It is a postulate of orientation not an empirical-universal demand.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ There are acts that can seem 'evil' according to an ancient sense of virtue. Machiavelli indicates that one has to know to confront the adverse judgement from a traditionalism that does not capture the new sense of the 'good'. In reality, the concept of 'political claim of justice' would have been the solution of this apparent *aporia*.

¹⁹⁷ *The Prince*, ch. 18; p. 166; p. 251 (Translation: Detmold, p. 68).

honourable, and will be praised by everybody; for the common people are always taken by appearances and by results, and it is the vulgar mass, which constitutes the world.¹⁹⁸

The charismatic prince, founder of a republican order, is a solipsistic subjectivity within a paradigm of conscience, who discovers the uncertainty and management of the contingency of strategic action, which takes into account the existence of *fortuna*, the changing 'times and circumstances'.¹⁹⁹ He searches for security within the protection that the fulfilment of *virtù* gives, an experience of behaving according to a *practical knowing* within the charismatic function of the sixteenth-century Italian *condottiero*, the figure that moves toward Modernity. He does not have the help of the democratic consensus, which grants legitimacy, not only security.

[92] As *presupposed* and the *purpose* of *The Prince* (the charismatic prince has to found a state with sustainable structures), Machiavelli describes in the *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy* (working on this book intensively in the Orti Orcellari from 1516–17) what interests him more: the 'institutional' horizon of the possible state, since 'the Florentines never had achieved the political institutions capable of stabilizing the city'.²⁰⁰ To advise how the Florentine *institutions* (*level B*) would have to be, Machiavelli appeals to the study of classical Roman political organization:

I have thought fit to note down with respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the malignity of Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right understanding of ancient and *modern* affairs; so that any who shall read these remarks of mine, may reap from them that profit for the sake of which a knowledge of History is to be sought.²⁰¹

On this point, as on many others, Machiavelli is opposed to Guicciardini's thesis, the *ottimate* much more ironic, sceptical and measured than Machiavelli himself,²⁰² inspired directly in Venice, which did not have social tensions.

In effect, Machiavelli thinks, against conservative positions, that the tension between the social classes is the origin of creative fecundity. Possessing a historical–archaeological intention, not a traditional typology (of the six types of government), he leaves to one side the monarchy or the principality already studied and dedicates himself to the republics, which he classifies in a *sui generis* manner. It interests him to study how political systems 'rise' historically (like the 'principalities' in his previous work). The republic,

198 *Ibid.*, ch. 18; p. 167; pp. 251–2 (Translation: Detmold, p. 69). These expressions isolated from their context sound oligarchic, derogatory to the people; similar to the tyrant in his demagogic actions. They show confusion to a sharp observer without a sufficient theoretical frame to analyse adequately what he discovers in the complex reality of his time.

199 *Ibid.*, ch. 25; p. 188; p. 331 (Translation: Detmold, p. 94).

200 Pocock, 1975, p. 111.

201 *Discourses*, Book 1, preface; p. 198; p. 29 (Translation: Thomson, p. 4).

202 See Chabod, 1994, pp. 101–5.

born dependent,²⁰³ faces many difficulties in freeing itself.²⁰⁴ The state that has an independent origin, free, like Rome (and Venice, but not Florence), has more possibility of stability. There are republics founded by a legislator who gives them a coherent and well-maintained law (like Lycurgus among the Spartans, whose primitive order lasted eight centuries, 'assign[ing] their proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons').²⁰⁵ Rome, in contrast, did not have a legal code or a political structure from the beginning, like the Spartans. It was not like that of Solon in Athens who giving all the power to the people never obtained long-term stability. So 'since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was given a place in her constitution, Athens, as compared with Sparta, had but a short life'.²⁰⁶ Rome, unlike Athens, knew to develop its institutions to overcome its original deficiencies, and this constituted its *virtù*, since being attentive to the necessary changes of the times, fruit of a fecund and constant confrontation between the senate and the plebeians, it acquired experience in negotiations and achieved fertile transformations:

So that Fortune, if she bestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second; because although the original institutions of this city were defective, still they lay not outside the true path which could bring them to perfection.²⁰⁷

Thus, 'for many centuries [. . .] maintained it replete with such virtues'.^{208, 209} It was important that the political community was invested with a special *virtù*. Exercising *virtù*, supporting her more than in fixed or traditional ordinances, Rome could be open to 'times and circumstances',²¹⁰ to the *occasione*, and so could better manage *fortuna*. The primitive monarchy knew to accept the senate, but demand the consul. The people put pressure on the senate, and for this reason the tribunes were created.²¹¹ Machiavelli inclines himself toward a 'popular principle'.²¹²

203 Like all the colonial and post-colonial countries of the southern hemisphere, like Latin America. Remember that Athens, for example, was a colony of Sais, the great city of the delta of the Nile, Egyptian capital of its moment.

204 See *Discourses*, Book. 1, ch. 2; Machiavelli, 1977, I, p. 202; p. 33 (Translation: Thomson, p. 9).

205 *Ibid.*, p. 206; p. 38 (Translation: Thomson, p. 12).

206 *Ibid.*

207 *Ibid.*, 206; p. 39 (Translation: Thomson, pp. 12-13).

208 *Virtù* has changed its sense. In *The Prince*, *virtù* was a quality of the prince, solitary, 'careful' of his presence (appearance and reality) as charismatic 'leader'. In the republic, *virtù* is a communitarian quality of the citizens. We will return to this theme. In addition, *fortune* in the first work is unpredictable happenings. Now it is the fruit of the 'corruption' of the political community.

209 *Discourses*, ch. 1; p. 199; p. 29 (Translation: Thomson, pp. 7-8).

210 *The Prince*, ch. 25; cit. earlier.

211 Remember Rome, like other cities of the Mediterranean, had to take this 'dual' magistracy of the Semites. In Tyre, Sidon or Carthage the 'two' *shuffetes* existed, who fulfilled analogous functions before the plutocratic senate.

212 See Pocock, 1975, pp. 196f. 'The ideal type of perfectly stable government [. . .] implies a preference for a more popular form of government' (p. 197).

But the 'popular principle', which arose from class conflict, demands a discipline now called the Roman public *virtù*:

Nor can we reasonably pronounce that city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of *virtue*; for virtuous actions have their origin in right training, right training in right laws, and wise laws in these very tumults (*tumulti*) which many would thoughtlessly condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments, not to violence hurtful to the common good (*commune bene*), but to laws and ordinances beneficial to the public liberty (*publica libertà*).²¹³

What is important then is 'the creation of a guardianship of freedom; for according as this is placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the State will be more or less lasting',²¹⁴ the *vivere libero*. All rests in the 'effects produced in Rome by the controversies between the *commons* and the *senate*'.²¹⁵ For the republic to live tranquilly, it had to dominate the people, and 'either, like the Venetians, they must have refrained from employing the commons in war, or else, like the Spartans, they must have closed their country to foreigners'.²¹⁶ But the Romans did everything to the contrary.

[93] This is central, like Cyrus among the Persians, since to be able to keep its liberty, the city had to 'arm its people'; within the Mayans of the Yucatán this may have destroyed the civilization. Roman *virtù* includes the *virtù* of the warrior-citizen, the *vivere popolare*. To keep liberty demands growth. To grow, it was necessary to accept the majority of the conquered people, to promote in Rome the expanded popular limit. The nobility (or oligarchy) did not easily concede these rights to the people; but Rome had to concede these rights to the *plebs*. It slowly reached a structure where dynamic structures were negotiated between the patricians and the people (the *ottimati* and the *gentiluomini* for Machiavelli, in the Florence of his era), in continuous evolution. The *vivere civile* demands knowledge of how to treat the enemies *from without* (other Renaissance cities), and finds itself in the *vivere libero* (opposed to the *vivere servo*)²¹⁷ *from within*. To join this contradiction, to be free (from within) and flexible with those from without, one has to organize an armed community. Moses, like the charismatic prince, has Joshua, the warrior who occupies the Promised Land,

²¹³ *Discourses*, Book. 2, ch. 4; p. 209; p. 42 (Translation: Thomson, pp. 16-17).

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. 5; p. 320; p. 43 (Translation: Thomson, p. 18).

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. 6; p. 213; p. 47 (Translation: Thomson, p. 21).

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15; p. 49 (Translation: Thomson, pp. 22-3).

²¹⁷ *Discourses*, Book. 2, ch. 2; p. 334; p. 200 (Translation: Thomson, p. 156): 'There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient greatness [Roman] and this modern decay [Samnites] have arisen, since they can be traced to the *free life* formerly prevailing and to the *servitude* which prevails now.' Latin America should similarly re-read history to discover not the lamentable state of Florence, but the worse state of Latin America (from Argentina to Mexico)!

to overcome the error of Savonarola, the 'unarmed prophet'. The *vivere civile* is political and military, against Guicciardini, who thought more of Venice,²¹⁸ which used mercenaries, so that the patricians would be able to focus on politics and commerce (an aspect that did not interest Machiavelli). The importance of war (the 'state of war' of J. Locke) is one of the characteristics of Modernity. In fact, from the end of the fifteenth century in the Atlantic the Europeans begin unfolding the 'world-system' with military occupation, thanks to the use of armed violence in the colonial world,²¹⁹ which Machiavelli ignores, but the reading of his work will be of great utility for all the *modern* metropolitan powers. His *Discourses* have to be read with *On the Art of War*.²²⁰

Machiavelli shows that it was not only *fortune* that created the immense Roman Empire, but Roman *virtù*, citizen and warrior *virtù* at the same time:

Many – opinions contrary to that of Machiavelli –, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have thought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to their good fortune than to their valour.²²¹

It is said, the Romans never had two important wars (or enemies) at the same time, and they always counted on allies within the enemy people. Machiavelli shows that both facts, far from being the effect of *fortune*, were a test of the Roman *virtù* (diplomatic and warrior),²²² which knew to hinder adverse circumstances and create suitable ones. Similarly, they neither organized a league of equals with other cities (like the ancient Tuscans or Aztecs) nor absorbed into their city the defeated (as the Spartans or Athenians tried), but the Romans made alliances keeping 'the chief command, the seat of government, and the titular supremacy'.²²³ As seat of the alliance, Rome conquered an empire exterior to Italy where its allies resided, who quickly 'found them-

²¹⁸ In the same sense, Arrighi (1994, pp. 118f.) shows that Venice, having hired protection *internally*, counted on a superior position to Genoa, with the Spanish Empire as its *external* protective military force. Arrighi forgets that Spain was the current imperial power, and Genoa was the external manager of Spanish financial capital (after the expulsion of the Jews from southern Spain, who had been the *internal* Spanish financial bourgeoisie). Arrighi has a special blindness for Spain. For him, the Renaissance is the origin of Modernity. Spain, as Machiavelli thought, had its own *popular* army, like Rome. Arrighi sees that the Dutch produce an 'internalization of protection costs' (p. 152), but not that Spain had done this before.

²¹⁹ See Dussel, 1995a.

²²⁰ 'Art' in the sense of expertise, technical exercise of instrumental reason, not of strategic reason (politics). Machiavelli, rightly (and in the present), saw the geopolitical importance of the military structure, but he ignored the economic level. Guicciardini is more lucid in this question. Consult *Dell'arte della guerra*, in Machiavelli, 1997, I, pp. 529f.

²²¹ *Discourses*, Book. 2, ch. 1; p. 327; p. 191 (Translation: Thomson, p. 149).

²²² *Ibid.*, ch. 4; p. 338; p. 205: 'And if you are not ready for war and well provided with arms, you will not be able to order or rule' (the occupied city) (Translation: TC).

²²³ *Ibid.*, ch. 4; p. 338; p. 204 (Translation: Thomson, p. 161).

selves surrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the Roman power [. . .] they too became subjects'.²²⁴ Machiavelli demonstrates that the complex *virtù* of the Romans assumes not only the internal fecundity of the political community to overcome institutionally, positively and creatively their class conflicts, but also the external power of confusing their allies and of launching a colonial expansion into the Mediterranean. This is the effect of political *virtù*; it was necessary to grant Roman citizenship to the foreigners (in and out of the city) to have sufficient population, and for the elites of previously enemy peoples to feel an integral part of the empire. He showed a rising Atlantic Europe, although not consciously, since his reflection was situated only in Italy and the Mediterranean, the *modern* necessity of an external colonial world.²²⁵

[94] The corrupted city (or people) is opposed to public *virtù*, not *fortune*. 'A corrupt People (*popolo corrotto*) obtaining Freedom can hardly preserve it.'²²⁶ For Machiavelli, the 'material' of the political body is the people, from there

Where the body of the people is still sound, tumults and other like disorders do little hurt; but that where it has become corrupted, laws, however well devised, are of no advantage, [. . .] must be saved not by the excellence of the people collectively, but of some one man then living among them.²²⁷

What is it that corrupts and how does one analyse the diverse levels of corruption? Machiavelli concludes that what is corrupted is the *ethos* of the total people:

In Rome it was first of all the institutions (*ordine del governo*) of the State (*stato*), and next the laws as enforced by the magistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of the State consisted in the authority (*autorità*) of the people, the senate, the tribunes, and the consuls; in the *methods* of choosing and appointing magistrates; and in the *arrangements* for passing laws. These institutions changed little, if at all. [. . .] But the laws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at elections, and many others, were *altered* as the citizens grew more and more corrupted (*corrotti*).²²⁸ As good customs stand in need of good

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 339; p. 205 (Translation: Thomson, p. 161).

²²⁵ In reality the Roman colonial world was not 'external' but colliding, contiguous to its frontiers.

²²⁶ Title of chapter 17 of *Discourses*, Book 1; p. 243; p. 85 (Translation: Thomson, p. 54).

²²⁷ In the ancient and traditional sense that Machiavelli discredits definitively: a private, individual, abstract 'virtue'. Ibid., pp. 244-5; p. 88 (Translation: Thomson, p. 55).

²²⁸ Ibid., ch. 18; p. 246; p. 89 (Translation: Thomson, p. 56). In the 'architectonic' of *Politics of Liberation*, we situate the fundamental situations in *level B*, and the practices, strategic action, in *level A*.

laws for their support, so laws, that they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover, the laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning, when men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad.²²⁹

Machiavelli tries to transform corrupt Italian politics from the ideal of the institutions impelled by a public, civic, popular *virtù*. Being within the pontifical state, he puts Roman civic religiosity as example of a Christendom, which was in contradiction with Christianity 'in its origins', since 'had not this religion of ours been brought back to its original condition by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic, it must soon have been utterly extinguished'.²³⁰

For Machiavelli, the Romans 'with the help of the peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience, called in the aid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society'.²³¹ He does not defend secularization but a 'practice' of popular religion for the ends of political education. 'Extremely fierce people' were transformed into a people who knew 'to maintain civility (*civiltà*)'.²³²

Machiavelli thinks from a practical, strategic *ego*, whose *virtù* is of the Renaissance Italian charismatic *condottiero*, who is still far from Ferdinand of Aragón, who through Isabel of Castile (ignored by Machiavelli in his evident machismo: *fortuna* is a woman, which one has to tame) is constituted for the first time as 'I, the King' (the *ego*), where he earns his Atlantic, *modern* character. Machiavelli thinks of a 'political community', which has to abide by Roman republican *virtù*, which it is necessary to re-implant in Florence, within an Italian project of deep renewal, emancipation, liberation:

And if, as I have said, it was necessary for the purpose of displaying the *virtue* of Moses²³³ that the people of Israel should be held in bondage in Egypt [. . .] It was necessary that Italy should have been brought to her present condition of being in a worse bondage than that of the Jews, more enslaved than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, without a

229 Ibid., pp. 245-6; p. 89 (Translation: Thomson, p. 56). How far is Machiavelli from the vulgar 'Machiavellianism'? It seems to be an equilibrated and responsible political ethic in the face of the Florentine and Italian corruption.

230 *Discourses* Book 3, ch. 1; p. 419; pp. 309-10 (Translation: Thomson, p. 250). As in the 'theology of liberation' in Latin America, Machiavelli indicates the regeneration of Christianity by a return to its original source.

231 Ibid., Book 1, ch. 11; p. 229; p. 67 (Translation: Thomson, p. 38).

232 Ibid., 'And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman History, how much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the people, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame' (ibid., p. 229; p. 68 [Translation: Thomson, p. 39]). This position is adopted in 'early Modernity' before the Enlightenment by Spain and England (with Hobbes), with Catholic or Anglican Christendoms at the service of the state, impossible in Machiavelli's Italy.

233 The 'virtue of Moses', as we will see in a future work, is a 'liberating virtue', not simply 'foundational'.

head, without order, vanquished and despoiled, lacerated, overrun by her enemies, and subjected to every kind of deviation.²³⁴

The call to 'liberation' cannot be more vehement,²³⁵ coming to write, like John Locke, the very limit of politics (when it is transformed into war or revolution): 'For war is just when it is necessary, and a resort to arms is beneficent when there is no hope in anything else.'²³⁶

Many readings of the brilliant Machiavelli are possible. It would be good to comment on Guicciardini's works, from the *Discorso di Logrono* to the *Dialogo del Regimento di Firenze*, but this would be too lengthy.²³⁷

²³⁴ *The Prince*, ch. 26; p. 189; p. 335 (Translation: Detmold, p. 98).

²³⁵ In the title, he uses the Latin term *libertas*, translated into English as 'liberty' (ibid.).

²³⁶ *The Prince*, p. 190; p. 337 (Translation: Detmold, p. 99). The text of Titus Livy (Book IX, I, 10) is: '*Iustum est bellum, Samnites, quibus necessarium, et pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes*' ('that was a just war which could not be escaped and those arms sacred in which lay their only hopes', cited correctly by Machiavelli in *Discourses*, Book. 3, ch. 12; p. 458; p. 360 [Translation: Thomson, p. 291]). Locke uses the same words in ch. 19 (§§ 226f.) of his *Second Treatise on Civil Government*.

²³⁷ See the corresponding chapters of the work of Pocock, 1975, pp. 114-55 and 219-71, so erudite and valuable.

The First 'Early Modernity'

Hispanic-American Christendom (1492–1630)

[95] Now we can explain a new theme: *Modernity* in a peripheral secondary Europe, with respect to China, Hindustan and even the Ottoman Islamic world, but the beginning of and connection with the 'new world-system'. Europe, nexus of America ('new' world) with the 'old' world (the stage III Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean regional system), constructs the new system, the first world system (including America as the 'fourth' part of the world, the other 'three' being Asia, Africa and Europe). Starting from the colonial world, peripheral Europe will construct a new type of civilizing structure, which from the Industrial Revolution (see Chapter 9) at the end of the eighteenth century will permit it, *only then*, for two centuries, to be the 'centre'. It began with the 'World-Empire' (Spain and Portugal), and later unfolded a capitalist 'world-system', following Wallerstein's proposal. We will show the theoretical-political development of the successive stages of this history from a non-Eurocentric, and so post-colonial, perspective.

The 'Spanish Project': The Atlantic Origin of Modernity

The logic of totality confuses the life of the system with reality itself. The affirmation of the life of the system is the negation of the Other, the exclusion of Alterity. Early Modernity is constituted from a Eurocentric affirmation of everything Western and from a negation excluding the two historical modes of Exteriority: the Alterity of the original American inhabitant, the Indian (from the far east of the Far East) and the African slave (from the eastern Atlantic coast). This Alterity moves from complete Exteriority, prior to the conquest or the process of slavery,¹ to an oppressive subsuming in America, which negates all recognition of the dignity of the Other, through

¹ Prior to the 'colonial subsuming', the Inca speak in Garcilaso's 1609 work *Royal Commentaries that Treat the Origin of the Incas* (title of the work published in Lisbon, in the printing of Pedro Crasbeeck; see Garcilaso de la Vega, 1967, p. 13); Guamán Poma of Ayala in the first part (original pages from 1–369) of his *The First New Chronicle and Good Government* (Guamán Poma, 1980, 1–339); *Popol-Vuh* (1974) or León-Portilla (1979). See Dussel, 1966, 1967, 1973a (III–V, in the initial paragraphs of each chapter on the hermeneutic of symbols), 1978, in particular 1995, ch. 6; also Dussel, 1998a [pp. 10–12].

an unheard of inhuman bloody violence, origin of the process of Modernity, as the hidden face of the Exteriority of the system, unknown also by modern and contemporary philosophy. Amerindian colonization and African slavery have left indelible marks and demand a deep practical and theoretical, ethical, cultural and economic-political transformation, which will only end in a future trans-modern stage through the affirmation of the Alterity excluded for centuries.

Latin-Germanic Europe, through the failure of the crusades and in the face of the impossibility of breaking the Muslim-Turkish circle (displayed strongly from the taking of Constantinople in 1453, reinforced with the occupation of the Balkans and the siege of Vienna, and its presence in the eastern Mediterranean to Sicily and southern Spain), had closed around itself similar to the medieval era, to continue being a civilization not only peripheral but isolated from all connection with Hindustan and China (productive and commercial centres of the 'ancient system', which dominated stage III of the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean inter-regional system).² The connection was broken by the decline of the Mongol civilization, which united China with Byzantium, and through the disappearance of the caliphate of Baghdad, which served as centre from 762 to 1258. The islands of Japan in the Far East, and England in the west, were the two geographical limits of the 'ancient world'.

The Italian Renaissance of the *Quattrocento*, in large part an effect of the contribution of the Greek exile from Turkish Constantinople, was still a pre-modern, Mediterranean phenomenon, and its horizon of understanding did not expand beyond the Latin-Muslim inter-continental world.


The European feudal 'cloistering' could not be broken except at its extremes, where the walls raised by the Muslim world could be overcome.³ The walls broke, in Russia, thanks to Moscow, which defeated the Mongols, extending their conquests through the frozen tundra, the 'end of the world', the northern Muslim world, which unfolded through warm deserts and steppes, and reached the Pacific in the seventeenth century. The other natural path of the 'de-cloistering' of the Muslim siege, which culminated in the process of the Iberian '*Reconquista*', began with the exploration of the south-eastern Atlantic by Portugal, and the taking of Ceuta in 1415. The decisive moment was January 1492, when Isabel of Castile took the splendid city of Granada, heir of the caliphate of Córdoba. Ten months later the Genoan Christopher Columbus reached islands on the western Atlantic coast.

² See Dussel, 1998a, [p. 18].

³ On the other hand, the socio-economic category of feudalism is not valid for the Muslim world, an urban and mercantile culture par excellence. In China (200 BCE), feudalism (if one inappropriately uses this category) had disappeared. In Hindustan, to the south of the Muslim presence in the sultanate of Delhi, feudalism did not exist. 'Feudalism' and 'Middle Age' are exclusively European categories not applicable to any other cultural region. The critique of the categorical 'Eurocentrism' of the European social sciences and history needs to continue.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION


Figure 6.1 *The Atlantic region: the major trade routes 1500–1800*
(A. G. Frank)



1. Mexico–Havana–Seville (Cadiz)
+ Manufactured goods ↔ silver
2. West Africa–The Caribbean + Slaves
↔ rum
3. The Caribbean–Western Europe +
Manufactured goods ↔ sugar, molasses
(silver)
4. Northern West Africa–Southern
Europe + Weapons (textiles) ↔ leather
5. Northern English colonies–United
Kingdom + Manufactured goods ↔
raw materials (money)
6. Northern English colonies–The
Caribbean + Molasses (silver) ↔
manufactured goods, naval instruments,
transport
7. Northern English colonies–West
Africa + Transport, services ↔ rum
8. Northern English colonies–Latin
American colonies + Food, tobacco ↔
manufactured goods, services
9. Southern English colonies–The
Caribbean + Molasses ↔ slaves
10. Southern English Colonies–Europe
+ Manufactured goods ↔ rum, tobacco
11. Southern English colonies–West
Africa + Northern colonies sales' route
↔ slaves
12. South America–West Africa +
Slaves ↔ gold, silver
13. Mexico and Peru–Manila (Chinese
galleon) + Silver ↔ Chinese porcelain,
Japanese weapons

THE FIRST 'EARLY MODERNITY'

Figure 6.2 The African and West Asian regions: the major trade routes 1400–1800 (A. G. Frank)




1. Europe–Asia, route around Africa + Silk, cotton fabric, spices, pepper ↔ silver
2. Europe–West Asia, Mediterranean route + Silk, cotton fabric, coffee, spices ↔ silver, gold, metal products
3. West Asia–India, Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea route + Silk, silk fabric, spices, pepper, rice, wine, indigo, paper, steel, glass, precious woods, ships, etc. ↔ minerals, metals, horses, luxury goods, silver
4. Europe–The Baltics–Russia + Grains, steel, linen ↔ wool fabric, silver
5. Northern Russia–West Asia + Textiles, rugs ↔ skins, leather, silver

6. Russia–Central Asia–China + Silk, tea, paper, precious stones, medicine, jade, weapons, tobacco, sugar, grains, food ↔ drugs, skins, horses, jade
7. South Central Asia–Northern India + Silk fabrics, sugar, cotton, indigo, tobacco ↔ horses, camels, sheep
8. East Africa–Arabia and India + Rice, textiles, porcelain ↔ slaves, precious stones, gold
9. Northern East Africa–Southern Europe + Gold ↔ weapons, leather
10. West Africa–West Asia + Gold

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

Figure 6.3 *The Asian region: the major trade routes 1400–1800 (A.G. Frank)*



1. India–Southeast Asia + Peppers, spices, rice, sugar, elephants, copper, other metals, rubies, gold ↔ cotton fabrics, diamonds, slaves.

2. South-East Asian archipelago–China + Peppers, spices, rice, sugar, heavy metals, jade, fragrant woods, precious stones, amber, silver ↔ silk, textiles, porcelain, porcelain, gunpowder, weapons, steel, worked silver, nickel, bronze

3. Continental South-East Asia–China + Rice, sugar, cotton, amber, jade, wood, tobacco, ships, silver ↔ porcelain, silk fabrics, weapons, gunpowder, steel, tea, zinc, salt, paper, etc.

4. South-East Asia–Japan (Taiwan route) + Spices, pepper, sugar, medicine ↔ copper, steel swords, services, silver

5. China–Manila galleon–Acapulco + Spices, pepper, sugar, medicine ↔ silk fabrics, porcelain, worked silver

6. Central Asia–China + Silk fabrics, reas, porcelain, weapons, paper money ↔ horses, camels, sheep, jade, medicine, silver

7. Japan–China + Silver, copper, swords, steel ↔ silk fabrics, porcelain, tea, sugar, manufactured goods

If only the 'Portuguese project' of reaching Asia through the south-east Atlantic⁴ had been fulfilled, as France, Germany and England still slept the medieval siesta, enclosed in a continent, which only opened itself to the exterior through the south, Rome, Venice or Genoa (thanks to trade), Latin-Germanic Europe would have reconnected peripherally with 'the ancient system',⁵ but *Modernity* and modern European philosophy would not have emerged, traditionally beginning with Descartes (student of the Spanish Jesuits in La Flèche, southern France), with the publication of *The Discourse on Method* in 1637 in Amsterdam (a Spanish province made independent in the early seventeenth century). Having reached Hindustan and China, the cultural, demographic and productive centre of the era, following the European naval roots to the south and east the cosmic-astronomic vision would not have changed much. Europe would not have done anything other than become reconnected with 'the same'.

[96] The complete revolution in the 'understanding of the world', from an ontological, cultural, theoretical, scientific, religious, social, technical, political and economic point of view, would be produced (unnoticed by the learned post-Hegelian historians of academic philosophy) by the 'discovery' of the 'fourth part' of the world, which put the Confucian, Vedanta, Buddhist, Muslim or Christian conceptions (of the universal cultural-religious levels) into crisis, far off for those far away and internal for those nearby. China, for example, did not directly see the effects (until the opium war, the liberal Republic of 1912 or the Maoist revolution) of those 'external' changes starting from 'colonialist' Europe's 'discovery of the fourth part' of the Earth. Latin Europe, the south-east, connected to the Mediterranean and open to the Atlantic, was the 'bridge', which would see an immediate and direct impact, not later like the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic or Slavic cultures (following the diachronic order: the beginning of a revolution of daily life, science and philosophy in Portugal and Spain, less in Renaissance Italy, France, continental Germany, England and the Scandinavian countries). The *modern* 'awakening' of Europe occurred from west to east in Europe and from the more developed south (in contact with the Muslim world) to the north (isolated and provincial). This contradicts everything taught by the traditional history of philosophy (and is the thesis at the base of this historical introduction to politics). Paradoxically, the beginning of the history of the philosophy of Iberian (or Latin) America was not just the first chapter of the history of the philosophy in that region, but together with Spanish and Portuguese philosophy (from the University of Salamanca, hegemonic in the Council of Trent, to Coimbra) was *the beginning of all modern philosophy*. When in the seventeenth century, at the end of a long unfolding, Modernity reached northern and western Europe – the Baltic Hanseatic League or

⁴ See sections [116f.].

⁵ See Dussel, 1998a, [2].

the Königsberg of Kant – the slow path of its ‘early’ constitution will have ended, and ‘*mature* Modernity’ emerged.

We will examine some events and philosophical texts that have not been considered ‘central’ to the constitution of European modern political philosophy, since, in the majority of cases, they are only interpreted as worthy of being treated in the ‘area studies’ of Latin American or ‘Latin’ history or philosophy (never in a department of philosophy or of the history of philosophy). We plead for a new epistemological ‘location’ of our themes in *area studies*. It is a central epistemological problem, which determines many other philosophical themes and which we call the *decolonizing turn* (with respect to the linguistic and pragmatic ‘turns’).

The ‘Portuguese’ and ‘Spanish’ geopolitical projects are ‘European’ projects. It would be naïve, although habitual and frequent, to think that Africa begins in the Pyrenees or that Europe ends in those mountains.⁶ This opinion, apart from being an insult to North Africa, shows the unpardonable ignorance of the high level of culture reached by Muslim civilization, which for centuries advanced and fed culture, literature, the sciences (astronomy, mechanics, mathematics, etc.) and Latin-Germanic European philosophy, at least from the eleventh century. If Spain was part of Africa in the fifteenth century, it means that it was philosophically and scientifically more *developed* than the north of the Pyrenees (an inversion of the later historiographic perception of the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), although equivalent to Renaissance Italy (with Byzantine connections), which has to be considered its primary inheritance.

[97] The ‘Portuguese project’,⁷ in alliance with Genoa, was a mercantile project, which began from the understanding of the world, which had been gestating for 4,500 years, from the Phoenician Byblos, Tyre, Carthage or Cadiz to the Greek, Roman and Byzantine world. Genoa reached India and China by the Ottoman Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Portugal tried to navigate through the south-eastern Atlantic, coastal Africa, to reach the Arabian Sea (the Indian Ocean). This does not mean a change in the understanding of the world since it is no more than the naval military dominion of the trade routes, although not including European products in the intercontinental mercantile exchange. Europe would not be able to sell to India or China any relevant product. In fact, when the Portuguese dominated these routes, they

⁶ This is not the hypothesis of Collins (1998, pp. 574–82). He dedicates only a few pages to Spanish philosophical thinking and none to Hispanic-American. He refers rarely to the theme (which I have been working on for 40 years): ‘It is conventional to begin this history with Hobbes and Locke, but the pattern first becomes visible in the Catholic sphere, with Vitoria, Suarez, and the Spanish liberals who created international law’ (p. 525). On the other hand, Collins never takes seriously as an initial moment of the theoretical unfolding, ‘discovery’, ‘colonization’ and ‘use’ of a colonial periphery. Paradoxically he maintains a Eurocentric vision, although critical. For the contribution of the Iberian Muslim world to Europe, see Vernet (1999).

⁷ We will return to this when we speak of African slavery in America in sections [122f.].

only 'ensured' passage like a policeman who, in the best of cases, charged toll taxes.

So Portugal did not separate from the ancient system to form the beginning of modern philosophy or the phenomenon of Modernity.

We want to develop the following hypothesis: between the 'ancient world',⁸ where Europe was an isolated, secondary and peripheral region, and the dominion over the 'new world'⁹ (during the Hispanic-American sixteenth century), the origin of European Modernity,¹⁰ two facts occur unnoticed by historians of philosophy (and other epistemic-social specialities). Modernity did not travel directly without mediation¹¹ from the Italian Renaissance (preparing Modernity, in my interpretation) to the seventeenth century 'scientific-technical' and 'philosophical revolution' (Galileo, Descartes, Bacon and Newton). Some 150 years were needed so that: (a) the 'ancient paradigm', to speak like Thomas Kuhn, of the 'ancient world' enters into crisis, and thus (b) the conditions of historical possibility occur, so (c) a 'new paradigm' can be explicitly formulated. From 1492 to 1630, with a scientific and philosophical methodology inspired by the epistemology of the world of Islam, the Latin Middle Ages and the Renaissance (the 'ancient method'), but from a modern problematic (in content), the assumptions of the 'ancient paradigm' (scientific-philosophical) were criticized, the conditions were created and a 'new paradigm' began to be formulated but not in a sufficient and explicit way. The sixteenth century is not part of the 'Middle Ages' but the first century of Modernity. It is the *early Modernity* of a Europe, which begins its 'opening' to a 'new world' by 're-connecting' to part of the 'ancient world' (Atlantic to Pacific), Asia, constituting the *first* 'world-system'. The sixteenth century is the 'key' and the 'bridge', *already modern*, between the 'ancient world' and the complete formulation of the paradigm of the 'modern world'. Copernicus advances heliocentrism as a

8 That I repeat again is the Asiatic-Afro-Mediterranean stage III (from the fourth to the fifteenth century CE), which has as current of connection the Muslim world present from Morocco to the Philippines. See Dussel, 2001a, pp. 345ff.: 'Some aspects of Modernity and globalization'.

9 The *mundus novus* of Americo Vespucci in 1503 (Dussel, 1995a, ch. 2).

10 'Modernity' has a double content: to be the 'new' and the 'most developed'. Although, as we will see, from a strictly philosophical point of view Cusanus, Ockham and Marsilius of Padua indicate a deep crisis in the 'interior' of Europe; they in no way show a 'new world' that revolutionizes the 'understanding of the world'. Only the badly named 'discovery of America' will have historical relevance, as well as epistemological, transforming itself into 'the new image of the world'. Machiavelli (already in 1517) and Luther (in the same year) like Descartes (much later) will speak of its novelty as the 'discovery of a new continent'. Edmund O'Gorman is correct when he speaks of the *invention of [a certain] America*. What we are now suggesting is that the invention of America 'outside' signifies 'inside' a redefinition of the *content* of Europe: a 'discovery of Europe' as modern, in reference to the other; 'new' by having discovered the 'new world' and 'more developed' by 'concealing' another 'less' developed. Modernity includes 'novelty' and a civilizing task with respect to a barbarian, 'immature' (*unmündig* will say Kant, and earlier Ginés de Sépulveda).

11 About the moment where the 'scientific-technological revolution' begins, Collins tells us: 'The scientific-mathematical and philosophical networks overlap to a high degree in the 1600s, so much so that they appear to be one revolution rather than two' (1998, p. 543).

'hypothesis' in 1514, when Bartolomé de Las Casas in Cuba understands the central political problem of *Modernity to the Present*, but it is Kepler who formulates the laws of the planetary system in 1609. Machiavelli begins the *Discourses* indicating that the political innovation expressed in his work is as '*che si fosse cercare acque e terre incognite*',¹² but he does not express the concept of the modern absolutist state, like Hobbes. Ginés de Sepúlveda, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez are still necessary. The 'discovery' of America produced an explosion of imagination in Europe, which was the 'beginning' of the *New Age*. Nevertheless, it needed the *whole* sixteenth century to make possible the formulation of the new model (scientific and philosophical, political) 'detonated' with the 'discovery' of America. The effective empirical circumnavigation of the Earth between 1520 and 1521 by Magellan and Elcano significantly changed daily (and scientific-philosophical) experience.¹³ These navigators were compelled by the 'discovery' of the new world on the orders of Spain, with the use of new technologies; the principal one being the ability to navigate with sails and a compass, day and night, against the wind and tide, drawing precise maps of the high oceanic sea, without needing to remain near the continental edges, as the Chinese had to do a century earlier.

Europe opened onto an immense exterior space. In that context 'the Other' (the indigenous and the African slave) will be an Exteriority part of the new understanding of the human being, as its shadow, as that ignored, that excluded, that negated.

The Epiphany of the 'New' Other

[98] The 'I conquer' in relation to the American Indian is the *practical-political* antecedent to the Cartesian *theoretical-ontological* 'I think'. So, the empirical history of the conquest of the Caribbean,¹⁴ the birth of the Mestizo and the slavery of the Afro-American is the origin of Modernity, of the *ontological experience* from where one understands the new European philosophy. The 'opening' of Europe to the planet 'as a true globe', as Carl Schmitt said, was produced by the unfolding of a 'colonial world' (for more than one century, and in the decisive century, Latin American). For diverse reasons, biological (diseases), strategic (types of arms, use of ships, movement over terrain by the military corps, understanding 'war' as such, knowledge of the territory, etc.) and cultural (free understanding of military strategy in the face of the exclusively symbolic understanding of the warrior-ritual action), the Europeans defeated the Amerindians easily from a military point of view. This triumph gave the modern conquistador

¹² *Discourses* Book I; Machiavelli, 1997, I. 197 (Translation: Thomson, pp. 3-145).

¹³ The Chinese circumnavigated the earth between 1421 and 1423 (Menziès, 2003).

¹⁴ We have dedicated nine volumes to the violence of the conquest (Dussel, 1969b) and in a systematic way in our classes in Frankfurt in 1992 (Dussel, 1995a).

an absolute political and economic domination, used in a heartless inhuman way to organize the structures of domination, for five centuries, from the colonial and post-colonial world. It developed a claim of *superiority*, which it did not have with the more developed Arab, Hindustanic, or Chinese world.

The 'appearance' of the Other, as a phantasm, the semi-naked indigenous, which Columbus saw on the beaches of the tropical islands of the western Atlantic 'discovered' in October 1492, was rapidly 'covered' by the mask of the 'Others', which the Europeans imagined.¹⁵ They did not 'see' the Indian: they imagined Others already in their European memory. The Other was interpreted from the European 'world'; it was an 'invention of Europe'.¹⁶ That Indian was seen as the European Alterity, as the 'infidel', who for 1,000 years had struggled against the Christian in the Mediterranean.¹⁷ So the Other was violently attacked, disarmed, dominated and rapidly decimated. In effect, in some regions the indigenous saw their population reduced in one century to 10 per cent of its original number. The violence was brutal; the Amerindian civilization became aware of having fallen into a final hecatomb, it was the 'end of times' of the Fifth Sun; it was the Aztec *tlatzompan*, the *pachacuti* of the Incas, the passage to another era:

The 11 Ahuau Katún, first of the count, is the initial *katún* [. . .] It was the seat of the *katún* when arrived the foreigners with reddish beards, the sons of the sun, the white men. Ay! We are sad they arrived! From the east they came, when they arrived to this land the bearded ones [. . .] Ay! We are sad because they came, because they arrived those [. . .] who exploded fire from the ends of their arms!¹⁸

The 'conquest' ended at the River Maule in southern Chile in the 1530s. A military epic was fulfilled, which had started in the year 719 with the 'Reconquista', in Covadonga, in the northern Iberian peninsula. For 800 years the Spanish Christians had struggled against the Muslim 'infidels' and for decades against the Amerindian 'infidels'. An American genocide finished this 'heroic' exploit, fruit of a true 'holy war'. It was the beginning of Modernity. The messianic expansion of Western culture had produced (unplanned) a refined, useful and exploitable 'colonial world'.¹⁹ Modernity occupies this 'vacuum' subsuming and dominating the American Indian.

¹⁵ This abysmal event divides two moments of world history, like an incomparable 'before' and 'after', in Bartolomé de Las Casas, *History of the Indies*, Book 1, ch. 40 (Las Casas, 1957, I, p. 141).

¹⁶ See the famous work of O'Gorman (1957-8).

¹⁷ See Dussel, 1967.

¹⁸ *The Book of Books of Chilam Balam* (Chilam Balam, 1991, p. 68 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁹ Subirats, 1994, pp. 73f.: 'The holy war'. This 'conquest' will be the origin of the providential destiny of Spain and Portugal, the *Western Design* of Cromwell, the *Manifest Destiny* of North American Monroeism, and the apocalyptic-fanatical vision of Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush in our own time.

The Alterity of the Indian, his/her distinct exteriority, cultural and anthropological richness is negated violently; they become the means of 'being-in-the-wealth' of Modernity. The Indian becomes 'labour' for the mines, haciendas, tropical exploitations . . . with difficulty and only exceptionally being recognized in his/her exteriority, distinct cultural Alterity.

The 'Father' of Modern Political Philosophy: Ginés de Sepúlveda

[99] Ginés de Sepúlveda (d.1573) was one of the first to try to justify European expansion philosophically with an argument that would be imposed, modifying its strategy over time. The task seems impossible: to use reason to show the rationality of a venture that appears irrational to all views (from the fifteenth century to the twenty-first): to show the justice of an offensive war, destructive of peoples and cultures with their own land who had never attacked the Europeans, so it was impossible to define them as 'enemies' (in the sense of C. Schmitt). They were innocent and resided peacefully in their own territories. One had to produce a total *inversion* in the theory of law and of war, since it was without precedent in the history of philosophy. That inverted argument, unfortunately, is still used today.²⁰

The justification of the conquest of the cultures in Latin American territory, philosophically, *is the explicit beginning of modern philosophy*, at the level of world political philosophy, not by its method, but certainly by its geopolitical and modern thematic. Europe had to articulate 'reasons' to occupy externally and morally with good conscience 'spaces' considered 'empty'. No one in the sixteenth century dared to explain so clearly the argument, which will be transformed, refined, 'improved' through the centuries to prove the rationality of Western colonial expansion.

Sepúlveda, the first modern political philosopher with an 'Atlantic' sense of the problematic (not solely 'Mediterranean'), a consecrated humanist student favourite of the Renaissance and Aristotelian Pomponazzi, applied the traditional arguments innovatively to the 'new situation'. The recently discovered 'Indians' were not identified with the 'barbarians' of the Greeks or with the Muslim 'infidels' of Latin-Germanic Christendom; they were the 'far-off' inhabitants of the 'fourth part' of the world.²¹ For the Greeks, Chinese or Christians before 1492, the 'barbarians' were those inhabitants

²⁰ The North American State Department justified attacking a country, like Nicaragua in the times of the FSLN, because it was not 'democratic'; today it creates suspicions against Hugo Chávez in Venezuela of being a dictator, because he does not respect the Department in the 'security' of the Hemisphere. The 'democratic' country (USA) wages an offensive war against another country in the name of 'democracy' ('human rights'), because of the supposed illegitimacy and perversion of the 'non-democratic' country (the concept of 'democracy' or of 'human rights', obviously, is determined by the State Department, and consists in what is favourable to US interests). This tautological and self-referential argument Ginés de Sepúlveda uses for the first time *ad extra*, with respect to a peripheral country.

²¹ The concept of 'discovery' is already Eurocentric. Historically it was an 'invasion' (see Dussel, 1995a, ch. 7).

external to but bordering civilization, 'always' known. In addition, they were 'regional' barbarians (from Greece, China or Christendom). Now, however, they were *world* barbarians, non-bordering, peripheral and uncivilized with respect to the 'centre' of the new world-system and considered 'inferior' (underdeveloped, according to the European criteria) to the western civilization.

With an ironic and critical sense, Montaigne wrote about cannibals: 'we may well call these people barbarians, in respect to *the rules of reason*'.²² 'The rules of reason' will always be the foundation of the justification, and for this reason the syllogism will be tautological or self-referential. The argument from Ginés to Locke or Hegel is expressed thus: (a) we have 'rules of reason', which are 'human' rules in general (by being 'ours'); (b) the Other is a barbarian because s/he does not fulfil these 'rules of reason',²³ his/her 'rules' are not rational 'rules'; because one does not have civilized rational 'rules', one is a barbarian; (c) being a barbarian (not fully human) one does not have rights; further, one is a danger to civilization, and (d) like all dangers, one has to eliminate it like a 'rabid dog' (an expression used later by Locke), to immobilize it or 'heal it' from its disease; and this is a good; one has to negate as irrational *alterative* rationality. That which is negated is not 'other reason' but 'the reason of the Other'.²⁴ So, for the so-called civilized, the war against savagery would always be a 'just war'. It is the modern universalization, later secularized, of the *Dar-a-Harb* ('House of War'), against whom the Islamist has to make 'holy war'.²⁵

Ginés de Sepúlveda frames war, and just war, within natural law and people. He proves that war is necessary even for a Christian. In war one has to fulfil, in order to be just, certain necessary conditions, within the European philosophical tradition.²⁶ For this reason, Ginés repeats the traditional arguments at in the beginning of the *Democrates Alter*. In the face of the 'discovery of America' he has to meditate on 'such savage people who inhabit the western and southern lands, and who the Spanish language commonly calls Indians', since the arguments do not apply due to the unique situation.²⁷ Thus Ginés puts forward a completely new argument:

²² 'On Cannibals', in Montaigne, 1967, p. 208 (Translation: Frame, p. 156).

²³ They are found in the 'exteriority' of our world, far from Being (Heidegger); they are 'nothing' (Dussel, 1977a), 'barbarians'.

²⁴ See Dussel, 1996.

²⁵ The Muslim 'infidel' has not entered into a 'Covenant' with God, and so does not have rights. Only the members of *Dar-al-Islam* (House of Believers) are full members of political society. The Spanish (later, as still intra-European inheritance, all the rest of the Europeans and North American Puritans) were contaminated with this exclusive 'political theology' that now is applied to the colonial and post-colonial periphery. In the twenty-first century begins the Muslim fanaticism (of the Taliban), of the Christians (the North American right in power) and of the Jews, as suffered by the great philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in Paris at the hands of his conservative brothers of Algeria (shown in the politics of Sharon against the Palestinians in Israel), which show the same tautological logic.

²⁶ See Ginés de Sepúlveda, 1967.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45 (Translation: TC).

It will be always just and conform to natural law that such people [barbarians] submit themselves to the empire of princes and nations *more cultured and human*, so that by their virtues and the prudence of their laws, they abandon barbarism and are re-educated to a more human life²⁸ and to culture and virtue.²⁹

[100] But this is not all. We still need to address the level of the theoretical hermeneutic or of principles. Now one passes from anthropology to practice, to the theory of war:

And if they reject that empire one can impose it through arms, and the war will be just according to the declared natural law [. . .] In sum: it is just, convenient and conforms to natural law that the honest, intelligent, virtuous and human men rule over those who do not have these qualities.³⁰

The argument is tautological and inverts the meaning of the question. It is *tautological* because the European definition of honesty, intelligence, virtue or humanity necessarily differs from that of other cultures. To declare non-human the contents of humanity of another culture (identifying their own cultural contents with all humanity) gives the ability to declare all other cultures inhuman, and so one can always have a just war against the members of other cultures. In addition, it is an *inversion*, because it tries to justify the right of the attacker (conquistador, colonist, European) under the rubric of a just war, but the problematic is never situated from the point of view of the Other's (Indian's) right to a just defence against the attacker. The attack is not based in any justified cause on the part of the attacked. It is evident that the defensive war of the Indian is a just war, but it is excluded from the argument. It is concluded the inverse had to be justified: the attacker is just, and the attacked has caused the attack. The attacked is the culpable.³¹ Ginés indicates that people like the Europeans (or neighbours in Euro-Asia or North Africa) would not be cause for a just war:

When the pagans are no longer pagans [. . .] there is no just cause to punish them nor to attack them with arms: in that way, if one finds in the New World some cultured, civilized and human people³² who do not worship idols, but the true God³³ [. . .] war would be illicit.³⁴

28 'Humanity' is defined by the European. The European conception of 'the human' has a claim of universality.

29 Ginés de Sepúlveda, 1967, p. 85 (Translation: TC).

30 Ibid., 87 (Translation: TC).

31 This argument is not only of Ginés or of Locke but equally of Kant, when he defines the *Aufklärung* as 'man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity (*aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit*)' (A 481). See Dussel, 1995a, ch. 1. The *slowness* of Ginés (1967, 80) is the *Unmündigkeit* of Kant: immature, barbarian. 'They are inferior to the Spanish as children to adults [. . .] I am speaking of apes to men' (ibid., 101 [Translation: TC]).

32 According to the European definition of such concepts.

33 That is to say, if they were Christians. Note the tautology.

34 Ginés de Sepúlveda, 1967, p. 117 (Translation: TC).

For Ginés, as later for Locke, private property and inheritance were institutions belonging to all properly human civilization:

[But I find] on the contrary in those institutions (*instituta*) a proof of the rough barbarism (*ruditatem barbariam*) and innate servitude of these men [. . .] They have [certainly] a republican institutional mode (*institutam republicam*), but no one possesses any thing as their own (*cuique suum*), not a house, nor a field that can they can prepare nor leave in a will to their inheritors [. . .] subjected to the will and caprice [of their masters] not to their liberty (*suae libertati*) [. . .] All this [. . .] is certain sign of the spirit of slaves and submission of these barbarians.³⁵

The conclusion is clear:

What more convenient and wholesome thing could happen to these barbarians than their remaining submitted to the empire whose prudence, virtue and religion has converted the barbarians, who hardly merited the name of human beings into *civilized (civiles)?* beings [. . .] Virtue, humanity and true religion are more precious than gold and silver.³⁶

We see, explicitly, the argument that proves the just expansion of European Modernity, the process of 'Westernization' (today globalized in its postmodern stage), although difficult to later express with such clear cynicism. The later argumentation will have the same contents and premises and will reach the same conclusions.

With the Indian proven inhuman and the invading European war just, the territory is 'empty' of all civilized culture for its possible 'modernizing' occupation. Carl Schmitt states this explicitly, although this is unnoticed by the specialists:

No sooner had the contours of the earth emerged as a *real globe* – not just sensed as myth, but apprehensible as fact and measurable as space – than there arose a wholly new and hitherto unimaginable problem: the spatial ordering of the earth in terms of international law [. . .] Thus began the epoch of *modern* European international law that lasted until the twentieth century.³⁷

And in a naïve way, not noting the colonialist and Eurocentric sense of his expression, Schmitt adds:

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 110–11 (Translation: TC).

³⁶ The Europeans obtained precious metals from the Indians as reward, unequal (in favour of the Indians), for the good that they have received (virtue, humanity and the Christian faith).

³⁷ Schmitt, 1979, p. 73 (Translation: Ulmen, p. 86). The chapter is called 'The first global lines'.

The struggle over land- and sea-appropriations of the New World began immediately after its discovery. [. . .] Since these lines were drawn during the *first stage* of the *new* planetary consciousness of space, they were conceived of only in terms of surface areas, i.e., superficially,³⁸ with divisions drawn more or less geometrically: *more geometrico*.³⁹

When the Spanish conquistador sketched the plan of a new city in sixteenth-century Latin America, he drew it by squares starting from a plaza, also square, in the centre. The mathematic and geometric sense was modern. The *terra mater* of the Amerindian cultures and of the European 'old world' had died and in its place reigned an 'empty' and abstract spatiality, which the dominating foreigner (the modern European) had to occupy:⁴⁰

Most essential and decisive for the following centuries, however, was the fact that the emerging new world did not appear as a new enemy, but as *free space*, as an area open to European occupation and expansion.⁴¹

See the naïve 'Eurocentrism' of these intellectuals. Did it not occur to Schmitt that an indigenous reader would see the colonialist cynicism? In effect, for the Europeans 'these were initially nothing more than crude seizures⁴² of land as part of an immense appropriation',⁴³ for the conquered cultures (the 'other face of Modernity')⁴⁴ it was a time of struggles, humiliation, exile and of death.⁴⁵ The ethical-political justification of the 'just war' and the occupation of the 'empty' Earth of the 'barbarian' populations, colonial, 'outside' of Europe, had begun.

38 Schmitt had to write: 'for a modern European'.

39 Schmitt, 1979, pp. 73-4 (Translation: Ulmen, p. 86).

40 This 'empty' land, which negated its previous occupants, is the *ego conquiro* father of the *ego cogito*, origin among others of Hitler's doctrine of *Lebensraum*, which justified the Aryan expansion, or the occupation of the 'empty land' of certain Zionists (who betray the ancient traditions of prophetic Judaism) against the Palestinians. Schmitt writes: 'From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, European international law considered Christian nations to be the creators and representatives of an order applicable to the whole earth. The term "European" meant the normal status that set the standard for the non-European part of the Earth' (1979, p. 74; Translation: Ulmen, p. 86). 'In 1492, when a "new world" actually emerged, the structure of all traditional concepts of the *centre* and *age* of the earth had to change' (p. 75; Translation: Ulmen, p. 87).

41 Schmitt, 1979, p. 75 (Translation: Ulmen, p. 87).

42 'Taking', in German *nehmen*, is, for Schmitt (mistakenly), the etymological origin of *nomos* (law). So the title of his work: *The Nomos of the Earth*, which originates in Latin America. 'These sprang from what I call *global linear thinking*, which represents a chapter in the historical development of spatial consciousness. It began with the discovery of a "new world" and the start of the "modern age" (Schmitt, 1979, p. 75 (Translation: Ulmen, p. 87).

43 Ibid. (Translation: Ulmen, p. 87).

44 See Dussel, 1966.

45 'The 11 Ahau is when begins the count because it is the *katún* that passed when the strangers arrived from the east' (Chilam Balam, 1991, p. 49 [Translation: TC]).

The First Philosophical Discourse against Modernity: The Critique of European Colonial Expansion by Bartolomé de Las Casas

[101] Bartolomé de Las Casas is a critic of Modernity, whose shadow covers the last five centuries. He has the 'maximum possible world critical conscience', not only from Europe – as I thought until writing these pages – but from the Indies themselves, from the Amerindians. He develops a coherent theory of *the universal claim of truth*,⁴⁶ for all serious and honest participants (European or Amerindian, and African or Arab), against relativism or scepticism in the manner of Richard Rorty, in intercultural dialogue. This can articulate in a distinguished way a position not only of tolerance (purely negative) but of full responsibility for the Other (a positive attitude), from a *universal claim of validity*,⁴⁷ which ethically and politically obligates one to take 'seriously' the rights (and responsibilities) of the Other, which continues as an example for the twenty-first century.⁴⁸

In the life of Las Casas (1484–1566) we can see the moments of his ethical-political philosophical position with respect to the critique of Modernity. At first he was simply an Andalusian who went to the Indies (1502) as a soldier. Later he became a Catholic priest. In 1514 he changed his existential orientation and began the struggle against the injustice suffered by the Indians. In that moment he began his critical thinking explicitly in the American continent (and in Modernity). In 1547 he discovered that the African slaves suffered the same injustice. He matured in his theory.

In the face of the reality of a violence that will be extended later to Africa and Asia, in the face of not hearing the cry of the Other, arises this first philosophical discourse against Modernity. Europe did not have an entirely tranquil conscience. At the beginning, the critique was still possible. The political philosophical thinking of Bartolomé de Las Casas has an epistemological importance still not recognized by the history of modern philosophy. It is the first critical discourse of all of Modernity; 'localized' critical discourse, located in America itself, from 'outside' Europe (in its 'exteriority') until his death 52 years later. Las Casas was a learned critical observer. We will consider first one text among many, which situates itself as a 'bridge' between two eras: between the conception of the 'old world' (which unfolds itself before the Ottoman–Muslim world) and the 'new world' as 'world-system', which unfolds itself before extra-Mediterranean cultures, those of the western Atlantic and later in the Pacific.

⁴⁶ See Dussel, 1998a, chs 2 and 5.

⁴⁷ Our argument presupposes a clear difference between 'truth claim (*Anspruch*)' and 'validity claim' (Dussel, 1998a, [153f.]; 1998b and 2004a). This distinction is impossible in a consensualist theory of the truth like those of Apel or Habermas.

⁴⁸ We will show how Bartolomé de Las Casas readies philosophically to articulate an honest universal claim of truth while accepting the dissent of the Other, the right of the Other to this dissent, and for this, the honest responsibility (obligation) of defending his/her position with arms ('just war' of defence against the Spanish Christians) to the 'final judgement'. There has not been a more coherent and critical position.

In 1552 Las Casas wrote the *Treatise on the Indians who are Made Slaves*,⁴⁹ and argued the injustice of making the Indians slaves, an act which would only be justified through a just war, which Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda agreed with to some extent:

It seems that there has not been just cause [. . .] because neither by injuries that the Indians caused, nor because they persecuted, opposed, nor worried (because they never saw or knew them), *as the Turks and Moors of Africa do*,⁵⁰ neither because they had our land, nor had been Christian (because they never were, or at least there is no evidence of this, *as Africa in the time of Saint Augustine, and the kingdom of Granada, the Empire of Constantinople and Jerusalem*),⁵¹ neither because they are properly hostile or capital enemies⁵² [. . .] They only for the enlargement and preaching of the faith among people and the land of the gentiles [. . .] there never was a divine or human law, which consented or permitted war, all condemn it for introducing it as Mahoma introduced it.⁵³

We are at the 'beginning of the beginning' of Modernity. The references are 'extra' Latin-European. Nothing has justified the war, the 'conquest' of the western Indies, the first European 'colonies'. The gradual accumulation of capital will be encoded over the colonies, structures of a still regional hegemony (exercised over the Atlantic Ocean, and not over India or China), which will last almost three centuries, until the Industrial Revolution, which 'overcomes' Hindustan and China. He argued the critique with a new strategy in political philosophy: the *first* critique as the 'world-system' is gestating (origin of 'globalization'), a critique of the violence, which establishes the new system.

[102] Bartolomé de Las Casas assumes decidedly in his argument the dominated indigenous perspective as the starting point of his critical discourse, organized logically and philosophically from the horizon of the *modern* scholasticism of the School of Salamanca, the most important sixteenth-century European university centre, around the Dominican convent of San Esteban. Bartolomé had great military and political experience in the

49 Las Casas, 1957-8, I, pp. 258f.

50 'Because they never knew them' is a reference to the newness of the event. In addition, its signs are related to the Mediterranean, to southern Europe. The most developed cultures were in southern Europe and nothing of geopolitical importance of the 'world-system' could come from northern Europe.

51 All the references have to be in the light of the south of European Christendom, the Mediterranean, from Augustine to Granada, Constantinople or the crusades in Jerusalem. Later Descartes, Spinoza or Hobbes will not refer to the south, the Mediterranean, but the West, the Atlantic, the 'New World'. They will be protagonists of a 'second' moment of early Modernity (which assumes it is the 'absolute beginning' of Modernity for European philosophy to the present).

52 Explicit reference to the two types of antagonists, the theme that will occupy Carl Schmitt.

53 Las Casas, 1957-8, I, pp. 258-9 (Translation: TC).

Indies, giving him an advantage over the philosophers of 'Santiesteban'. He reached Santo Domingo in the Caribbean on 15 April 1502 (when he was 18 years old). In 1514, three years before the beginning of the Lutheran Reformation, when Machiavelli was writing *The Prince*, following Antón de Montesinos and Pedro de Córdoba in 1511 in Santo Domingo, Bartolomé changed the existential project and was transformed from 'encomienda priest' into 'defender of the Indians'.⁵⁴ Immediately he discovered in the Other,⁵⁵ as Horkheimer would say, the misery in which the conquest had reduced the Indian to an 'original negativity':⁵⁶

Into this sheepfold, into this land of meek outcasts there came some Spaniards who immediately behaved like ravening wild beasts, wolves, tigers, or lions, which had been starved for many days. And Spaniards have behaved in no other way during the past forty years, down to the present time, for they are still acting like ravening beasts killing, terrorizing, afflicting, torturing, and destroying the native peoples, doing all this with the strangest and most varied new methods of cruelty, never seen or heard of before.⁵⁷

Las Casas is dramatic in his description of the disproportionate violence with which the European treats these first colonial populations. The negative description is compared dialectically with the cultural positivity and original ethic of the indigenous, prior to the arrival of the European:

And of all the infinite universe of humanity, these people are the most guileless, the most devoid of wickedness and duplicity, the most obedient and faithful to their native masters and to the Spanish Christians whom they serve. [. . .] And because they are so weak and complaisant, they are less able to endure heavy labour and soon die of no matter what malady.⁵⁸

54 The situation of this ethical change in favour of liberation of the Indians can be seen clearly in his autobiography: 'The clergyman Bartolomé de Las Casas [. . .] went about his concerns [business we would say today] alike the others, sending his share of Indians to work fields and gold mines, taking advantage of them as he could [. . .] One day [. . .] at Pentecost time [. . .] he began to consider [. . .] Ecclesiastes [Ben Sira] ch. 34: [Who offers in sacrifice something robbed is guilty . . . To offer sacrifice with that which belongs to the poor is the same as killing a child in the presence of his/her father . . .] he began to consider the suffering and servitude of these people' (*History of the Indies*, Book III, ch. 79; Las Casas, 1957-8, II, p. 356 [Translation: Collard, p. 208]).

55 See Dussel, 1998a, ch. 4.

56 See the 'original negativity' in Dussel, 1998a, [p. 209], moment 1 of figure 4.3.

57 *Brief account of the Destruction of the Indies* (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, p. 136 [Translation: Briffault, p. 29]).

58 *Ibid.*, p. 136 (Translation: Briffault, p. 28). The text abounds with the qualities of the Indians: 'They are also poor people and few possess or want to possess temporal goods [. . .] They are that also clean and not busy and lively understandings, very capable and obedient to all good doctrine; suitable to receive our sacred faith [. . .] In these gentle sheep, and of the aforesaid qualities given by their Maker and Creator [. . .]' (*ibid.*). These formulas are frequent: 'so gentle, patient and humble' (*Apologetic History*, preface; Las Casas, 1957-8, III, p. 3 [Translation: TC]).

The derogatory judgement of those who negate the dignity of the person and the culture of the Indian is false:

[They have] published that they were not people of good reason to govern themselves, lacking police, and republican orders [. . .] For demonstration of the truth, which is contrary, [some examples] are brought and copied in this book.⁵⁹ With respect to politics, I say, not only were they shown to be very prudent people of living and distinguished understandings, having their republics [. . .] prudently ruled, supplied and justly prosperous [. . .].⁶⁰

The theoretical structure of the Lascasian accusation begins with the 'dialectic of master and slave' (two and a half centuries before Hegel) in an explicit way. Either one assassinates the Other (a), or under fear of death (b) pardons the life of the Other but condemns it to 'servitude':

The common ways mainly employed by the Spaniards who call themselves Christian⁶¹ and who have gone there to extirpate those pitiful nations and wipe them off the earth is by unjustly waging cruel and bloody wars.⁶² Then, when they have slain all those who fought for their lives or to escape the tortures they would have to endure,⁶³ that is to say, when they have slain all the native rulers and young men⁶⁴ (since the Spaniards usually spare only the women and children),⁶⁵ who are subjected to the hardest and bitterest servitude ever suffered by man or beast,⁶⁶ they enslave any survivors.⁶⁷

59 Here Las Casas enumerates the territorial organization, cultural, religious and ethical structure of the American peoples, in an immense and authentic *Apology* (from there its name: *Apologetic History*), in two enormous volumes (Las Casas, 1957-8, III and IV, from pp. 470 and 472, in two columns and large format. The work culminates (ch. 263, IV, pp. 434f.) with a description of what a 'barbarian' is and the four ways of being so, indicating that the only relevant title of barbarian would be that of the 'infidel' or stranger to the Christian faith, but this type of barbarity neither is guilty nor merits any pain nor just war.

60 *Apologetic History*, preface (Las Casas, 1957-8, III, pp. 3-4 [Translation: TC]).

61 Las Casas indicates that 'they call' themselves 'Christian', but in truth are not. Even better is the contradiction itself of the understanding of Christianity.

62 If the 'master' kills the Other, the dialectic is not initiated, it is simply the annihilation of the exteriority.

63 For Las Casas the indigenous rebellions originated within those who 'thought about liberty'. The 'colonial Order' was inaugurated.

64 Centuries ahead of contemporary gender sensitivity, he speaks of 'male people' to distinguish them from the 'female people'.

65 This text distinguishes the economic-political domination of the Indian, the sexual violation of women and the pedagogy of the domination of children (Dussel, 1973a, II, beginning). Dussel (1973a) was inspired explicitly in this text to develop a politics, an erotics and a pedagogy (vols. III, IV and V).

66 It is the 'slave' for life, explicitly.

67 *Brief account* . . . (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, 137 [Translation: Briffault, p. 31]).

[103] From a political perspective, Las Casas shows a surprisingly critical and modern position. His argumentative strategy will follow approximately these steps:

First, all human beings, the Christian or European as well, can (and have to) have a reasonable, honest and serious 'universal claim of truth' to affirm or to believe that one's practical and theoretical position is true for all. What one affirms as true (for finite human beings) may be false, but it is not false until the opposite is demonstrated.⁶⁸

Second, when two cultures encounter each other, as in the case of the invasion of America, one has to admit that the other culture, as totality, has also a universal claim of truth. To remove from the other this right is 'bad faith'. The participant in the European or Christian culture in an honest way can in his/her internal code consider the 'claim of truth' of the participant of the other culture as an 'insurmountable ignorance' but s/he cannot be considered guilty for this.

Third, the 'time for discussion' arises, since one can only demonstrate to the other culture its falsity through rational arguments and coherence of life experience (effectively articulating praxis with theory) and thanks to this causing the will (ethically) and reason (theoretically) of the Other to accept the reasons, a process of consensus. The acceptance of the dissent of the Other, in the environment of mutual non-validity (simultaneous to the granting their right of claim of truth), opens a space not only to tolerance (negative), but also to respect and patience with the possibility of the indigenous non-acceptance of the reasons (if it is with an honest claim of truth) the European offers. The claim of validity (or the 'acceptability of the Other' on the part of the European) has as limit the liberty of the Other: the autonomy to not accept the argument and remain in dissent. A practical process follows, which Las Casas shows in an equally surprising way.

Fourth, in this argument, the indigenous not only have the right to affirm their beliefs as true (since they have not been falsified), but the responsibility to fulfil them. Las Casas affirms that the human sacrifices of certain indigenous to their gods not only are not against 'natural law', but may be situated within a rational argument (at least within the argumentative resources of the indigenous cultures before the arrival of the Europeans), so that not recognizing the sacrifices, not proven irrational, is an ethically guilty act. Further, if someone opposed it by force, by arms (as Ginés and Francisco Vitoria), the war of the indigenous would now be 'just', as they would be defending their *responsibility* to fulfil their obligatory sacrifices.

Fifth, Las Casas starts from the premise that the Other, the other culture, is free by natural right to accept or reject the arguments. To make war or to use force so one accepts (it is a question of consensus or a normative

⁶⁸ Even for a believer, Christian, Náhuatl or Muslim, divine revelation cannot be made false, but its reception, its interpretation, its applications are human, and for this reason can be false.

procedural problem)⁶⁹ the *content* of truth of the European conquistador ('universal claim of truth') is irrational and ethically unjust, because no one can nor has 'to accept' the truth of another without reasons (by pure violence, fear or cowardice).

Sixth, the only rational and ethical solution for an honest and serious universal claim of truth (whose criteria are the production, reproduction and development of human life)⁷⁰ is to argue and give a coherent ethical example in one's praxis. If one uses violence, there is no 'universal claim of validity', since what is valid is that accepted by the Other freely. If the liberty of the Other is negated, one imposes an assumed truth *without validity*; one shows in the actions the contradiction of having, on the one hand the aim of the free and rational assent of the Other, and on the other, of negating it: one doubts the claim of validity. He shows the dogmatism, fanaticism and confusion of trying 'to make accepted' one's own truth without convincing. For Las Casas, on the contrary, the non-acceptance of the truth of one on the part of the Other is possible, where an honest and serious 'claim of validity' will *await* the historical maturation of the Other.

[104] This argument is valid for the indigenous (or the slave, Moor or Arab). It is the 'maximum world critical conscience possible', not only European. We see the argument in Las Casas' texts. Let us take the most problematic example.

Against Ginés and those who think that human sacrifices are opposed to natural law, and so a just war will save the sacrificed innocents, Las Casas writes:

Men, by natural law, are obligated to honour God with the best means within their reach and to offer, in sacrifice, the best things. [. . .] It is incumbent upon human law and positive legislation to determine what things have to be offered to God; this last is entrusted to the entire community. [. . .] Nature suggested and taught [. . .] that lacking a positive law that orders the contrary *they have*⁷¹ to immolate even human victims for the true or false God, *considered to be true*,⁷² offering the most precious thing, which shows them to be especially grateful for the benefits received.⁷³

The offering of sacrifices is not of natural law but a positive decision that the members of a culture can rationally take. It is not contrary to natural law. 'The fact of immolating people, although innocent, when it is done for

69 See Dussel, 1998a, ch. 2.

70 Dussel, 2001a: 'Human life as criteria of truth'.

71 Observe that he speaks of a 'responsibility' now, not 'right'.

72 Here Las Casas concedes to the Other 'claim of truth', while it cannot be falsified, and also universal 'claim of validity' in its respective cultural universe.

73 *Apology* (Las Casas, 1989, pp. 155-6, 157, 160 [Translation: TC]). If there is not an available argumentative resource in a given culture, 'we are obliged to offer what to us seems the most important and precious good, that is, *human life*' (ibid., p. 161).

the well-being of the whole republic, is not so contrary to natural reason [...] This error can likely have its origin in natural reason.⁷⁴ Las Casas establishes the right 'of dissent':

They would act lightly and be worthy of repression and punishment if they abandoned something so arduous, so important and so difficult [...] those Spanish soldiers will offer faith, but taking no notice of this and the grave testimonies of great authority, until with more convincing arguments they will show them that the Christian religion is more worthy than theirs to be believed in, *which cannot be done in a short space of time.*⁷⁵

Las Casas is conscious of advancing for the first time daring critical judgements, since he writes that re-reading his *Apology* against Sepúlveda, 'I took and checked many conclusions that before me no man dared to touch or write, and one of them was that it was not against natural reason or law *excluding all divine or human positive law* to offer men to a true or false God (taking the false as true)⁷⁶ in sacrifice.'⁷⁷ Las Casas will be opposed to even the more progressive theorists (such as Vitoria, Soto or Melchor Cano). He comes to recognize the responsibility of the indigenous to effect a 'just war' in defence of their traditions against the European Christians:

Given that they delight in maintaining [...] that, in adoring their idols, they adore the true God [...] and that in spite of the supposition that they have an erroneous awareness, until the true God is preached to them *with better and more credible and convincing arguments,*⁷⁸ above all with examples of Christian conduct, they are, without doubt, *obliged to defend the worship of their gods and their religion with their armed*

74 *Ibid.*, p. 166 (Translation: TC).

75 *Ibid.*, p. 154 (Translation: TC).

76 If that which is 'false' has not been falsified (through lack of available argumentative resources), the 'claim of truth' continues being universal, honest and serious. Las Casas always gives to the Other, with respect to their Alterity, the right to a 'claim of truth', counterpart to the proper 'universal claim of validity', when it is proposed seriously and honestly to convince the Other with reasons (not violence). If one does not concede to the Other 'claim of truth' but the subject of 'guilty ignorance', one could by violence impose 'the' truth, our 'truth', that 'we possess' certainly not falsifiable. In that case, the European will not have a 'truth claim' but dogmatic knowledge, and having surpassed the limits of a 'finite' reason, would affirm its truth as not fallible, as 'absolute', containing inevitably a completely erroneous moment. It is the incapacity to evolve, to learn anew, to advance historically, in addition to being unjust with respect to the dignity of the Other as a subject of argument, having located them 'asymmetrically' and therefore 'in agreement', not free and rational 'agreement' with the Other but through violence. It is not rational but a simple external 'affirmation' of the Other imposed without conviction or intersubjective validity. Power and violence do not give reasons in favour of the truth; they impose an 'un-truth' for the Other.

77 Letter for the Dominicans of Guatemala of 1563 (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, p. 471).

78 The position of a universalist critical rationalism remains clear and does not keep (against Rorty, *avant la lettre*) the recognition of the Other in all their freedom and responsibility from being coherent.

forces against all who try to deprive them of such worship [. . .]; they are obliged to struggle against these, kill them, capture them and exercise all the rights corollary to a just war, in accordance with the rights of people (*ius gentium*).⁷⁹

Neither in the history of Europe nor in the five centuries of Modernity had anyone so clearly formulated these strategic political and ethical criteria! In the face of the 'insurmountable and excusable ignorance'⁸⁰ one has to concede, using the categories of my *Ethics of Liberation*, a 'universal claim of truth' and from a European 'universal critical claim of validity' it is necessary also to respect the 'time' required for them to exercise the conditions of possibility of an honest and serious acceptance of the argument of the European. The only 'just war' possible is that of the indigenous in defence of their own customs against the European Christians. The position of Bartolomé de Las Casas is the 'maximum critical consciousness possible' and is conscious of its originality.

[105] In later years Las Casas reflected on the responsibility, which he assumed in the face of the liberty of the Other, as the origin of legitimacy from 'consensus', a Latin and Spanish word used by Las Casas already in his era, arriving at a critical level hardly reached later in Modernity. In Peru, when the *encomenderos* propose to the king to purchase the *encomiendas* in perpetuity, Las Casas argued against said sale of the Indians. His thinking expressed itself in his works of political philosophy *De regia potestate*, *De tesauris* and *Treatise of the Twelve Doubts*, which constituted the culminating argumentative moment against the right and legitimacy of the sale and purchase of free subjects. The basis of the entire rational theory of legitimacy is: 'From the principle of humankind, all humans, lands, and things, by natural and human law, were free [. . .] or are free and not subject to servitude.'⁸¹ As normative universal principle of political validity or legitimacy, he writes:

No king or leader, as supreme as he is, can order or mandate anything with regard to the republic (*republicam*), to the detriment of the people (*populi*) or the subjects, without having had their consensus (*consensum*), in due and licit form. It would not be valid (*valet*) by law. [. . .] No one can legitimately (*legitime*) [. . .] cause any detriment to the liberty of their people (*libertati populorum suorum*); if someone decides against the common utility of the people, without the consensus of the people (*consensu populi*), the decisions are null. Liberty (*libertas*) is the most precious and estimable thing that a free people can have.⁸²

79 Las Casas, 1957-8, V, p. 168 (Translation: TC).

80 Ibid., p. 166 (Translation: TC).

81 *De Regia Potestate*, I, § 1 (Las Casas, 1969, p. 16 Translation: TC).

82 Ibid., § 8; pp. 47, 49 (Translation: TC).

THE FIRST 'EARLY MODERNITY'

In this Las Casas was not innovative but applied the ancient tradition of Roman and medieval law in defence of the new and modern 'political actor': the American indigenous, citizens (potentially) of the colonial periphery of rising Modernity. Given the illegitimacy not only of the intended sale of the indigenous in the *encomiendas* of Peru, but also of the conquest, Las Casas begins a political campaign for the 'restoration of the Incan Empire to the Incas', that is to say, a strategic action to fulfil an act of restitution demanded by historical justice. Legitimacy demands the 'consensus of the people' governed who have full authority over their goods and over their kingdom. It is the 'first principle' worked out in the *Treatise of the Twelve Doubts* (1564). He argues:

All the infidels, of any sect or religion [. . .] with respect to natural and divine law, and what they call law of the people (*ius gentium*), justly have and possess mastery over their things [. . .] And also with the same justice possess their principalities, kingdoms, states, offices, jurisdictions and estates [the] regent or leader cannot be another but *whom all the society and community elected originally*.⁸³

The Roman Pontiff has given to the Spanish kings the responsibility and obligation of 'preaching of the gospel' which gives them a 'right over things (*ius in re*)',⁸⁴ but the right *in potentia* is only through the consent of the indigenous, with the free acceptance of such preaching. Without that consensus the right does not pass to its exercise *in actu*, as 'the right to things (*ius ad rem*)'.⁸⁵ And as that consensus has not existed on the part of those affected, the conquest is illegitimate. In addition, 'the expenses and costs that for the achievement of said end were necessities', and against what John Locke will argue, are on the account of the Christians and the indigenous cannot be obliged to pay them, 'if they of their will do not wish to pay'.⁸⁶ He concludes:

The King is obligated then, our master, under penalty of no salvation, to restore those kingdoms to the King Tito [thus was named a still-living Inca], successor or inheritor of Guayna Cápac and of the rest of the Incans, and put in this all their strength and power.⁸⁷

The Europeans will never abandon a colony. But, and this is a limitation of the providentialist position of Las Casas, it 'would be unlawful for the Spanish to abandon such regions and they would sin mortally if they did. To this, as has been said, they are obliged, by necessity of salvation, because

⁸³ *Treatise of the Twelve Doubts*, First Principle (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, pp. 486-7 [Translation: TC]).

⁸⁴ *De Thesauris* (Las Casas, 1958, p. 101).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Treatise of the Twelve Doubts*, Principle V (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, p. 492).

⁸⁷ *De Thesauris*, p. 218 (Translation: TC).

of the disappearance of faith.⁸⁸ It is illegitimate to impose on the Indians a dominion against their will, but it is equally illicit for the Spanish to escape the responsibility to save the Indians through Christianity. The only solution is that the Indians govern themselves regionally under the empire of the king of Spain, having received the Christian faith rationally and freely.

Bartolomé de Las Casas will be known in Modernity as a political failure, although also the first critic and the most radical sceptic of the civilizing claim of Modernity. The Jesuit Reductions, like those of Paraguay, in which the indigenous community governed themselves (through the 'paternalism' of the Fathers), without direct relation with Spain but under the empire of the king, were what historically approximated the Lascasian ideal. These failed equally in the eighteenth century through the impact of the bourgeois Enlightenment of the Bourbons.

'Modern' University Philosophy Justifies the Colonial Order: Francisco de Vitoria

[106] None of the 'ancient' cultures (from China to Islam) could have hegemony over the *transoceanic* universal cultures. China, Hindustan or the Muslim world will not have the type of dependent subsystem that European Modernity calls 'colonies'. It is particular to the European economic, political and cultural system, which will give many benefits but will install a 'centre-periphery' asymmetry, which still exists. The Amerindian cultures, without horse or iron, permitted that peculiar type of relation within economic-cultural systems. Europe, although it was a secondary and peripheral culture in the Euro-Asian continent until the fifteenth century, 'will accumulate' territories, populations, wealth, information and geopolitical experiences starting with its American 'colonies', since until the eighteenth century Europe only had outside of the American continent a few ports, islands, places that functioned as points of contact for commerce, Latin America being the richest and most significant of those 'colonies'.

In Spain, the existence of this colonial world produced the debate already started in Latin America. In its most progressive aspect it had two strands: that of the Dominicans, earlier and more theoretical; and that of the Jesuits, later and more practical.

Through the influence of the Lascasian political current,⁸⁹ beginning in Santo Domingo with Pedro de Córdoba and Antonio de Montesinos in 1511, the Spanish Dominicans assumed a vision critical of the Conquest. Of all the philosophers (or those who argued philosophically) who entered into the discussion over the Indies, the most famous was Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). In 1539 he was the first in Europe to dedicate part of his university courses to the theme of the American indigenous. Such Salamanca

⁸⁸ Ibid., ch. 36.

⁸⁹ See Dussel, 1967.

philosophers were 'modern'.⁹⁰ Still no one has studied the 'modern' part of the philosophy of the second Scholasticism in sixteenth-century Europe. For example, Tomasso de Vio Cayetano (1469–1534)⁹¹ was modern in his theory of analogy, since he did not repeat the medieval theses and started from an extremely developed doctrine. In politics he was opposed to the theocratic conception of Boniface VIII in the bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302). This bull did not contain any new theory, since it simply expressed the position of Egidio Romano (d. 1316), Augustinian like Luther and in the tradition of Bernado de Claraval (1090–1153). Egidio wrote *De ecclesiastica potestate* following Augustine of Hippo in respecting the necessary 'order' of things, since 'if the kings and princes were submitted to the Church only in spiritual questions, one sword would not be subordinated to another [and] there would not be an *order* in the powers.'⁹² Egidio deduced that the Popes have temporal power over *believing*, Christian kings – in contrast to Hobbes, for whom the Anglican Church will be submitted to the king of England. Marsilius of Padua (1275–1343)⁹³ and William of Ockham (1290–1350),⁹⁴ who died in Munich under the protection of William of Bavaria, were opposed to the claims of the political dominion of the Papacy and the empire. It was not extraordinary that the brilliant young Vitoria, who studied in Nominalist Paris as a student and professor from 1513 to 1522, thought that Christians do not have dominion over the Amerindians (because they never had been subjects of the Christian kings,⁹⁵ not even believers), neither the emperor, nor king, nor Pope. In general, Vitoria is presented as the founder of international law⁹⁶ and a defender of the indigenous at the same level as

90 Which assumes the positive aspect of great global novelty, but, at the same time, from Heidegger, the postmodernists and anti-Eurocentrists, the negative aspect of the 'coloniality of power', as Aníbal Quijano would say.

91 For Cayetano there are three types of infidel pagans, non-Christians or barbarians (terms frequently taken as synonyms): (a) the Jews, heretics and Muslims submitted to Christian principles (as in Castile); (b) those who occupy territories that were Christian and now are 'enemies' of the Christians (the Turks, for example); (c) those who never were submitted nor Christian-occupied territories (as the Tartars). Against these last 'no king, nor emperor, nor the Roman Church has to war against others' (*Com. Sum. Theol.* II–II, q. 66, a. 8). The Amerindians are classified as the third type.

92 *De ecclesiastica potestate*, Book I, ch. 4 (Aegidius, 1929, p. 13 [Translation: TC]).

93 In *Defensor Pacis*, knowing the elective experience of the 'Great Council' with respect to the Venetian doge, he indicates that the power emanates directly from the people, who elect the king (*Dictio* I, ch. 9, § 2; Marsilius of Padua, 1980, p. 40); and there is not a place for a universal emperor, and less even for a universal Papal power, not even over the other bishops (*Dictio* III, ch. 2, § 17; p. 606), since, as a last resort, he would have to exercise a universal council (*Dictio* II, ch. 18, § 18; p. 382). This Nominalist tradition, for the Castilian and Hispanic experience, will be adopted and developed by Vitoria and Suárez.

94 He also did not accept the universal power of the emperor, or the temporal power of the Pope. He governed only with 'spiritual power' (*Dialogus*, Pars III, tr. II, Book I, ch. 25; Ockham, 1614, pp. 896f.).

95 Venice equally claimed its liberty before the empire, given its geopolitical position of semi-subordination to the Byzantine Empire, like Genoa.

96 See Botella, Caneque and Gonzalo, 1998, pp. 143f.; Guy, 1985, p. 96; Fraile, II, 1966, pp. 313f.; Vitoria, 1960, p. 549, in the introduction to the *De Indis*, of Teófilo Urdanoz (Translation: Pagden, p. xvi).

Bartolomé de Las Casas.⁹⁷ Both judgements can be sustained. Nevertheless, we would like to show him as the 'father' of judicial Modernity in the question of the European expansion, in the justification of the colonial world of the *world-system*, and therefore I will judge him, from this new perspective as the founder of the *ius gentium europaeum* (as C. Schmitt understands it).

Vitoria treats in his *Relecciones* [*Re-readings*] extremely coherent themes around a central nucleus:⁹⁸ the critique of the claims of the Papacy and the empire⁹⁹ from a Hispanic point of view – remember that in Medina del Campo the *comuneros* were flattened – from the affirmation of 'human life',¹⁰⁰ and having as a 'bridging' theme 'human sacrifices' moves to the justification of the rising colonial 'order'.¹⁰¹

I will show only the skeleton of the argument, without lingering on the reasons he gives for the illegitimacy of the conquest.¹⁰² The critical position of Vitoria is seen in this conclusion: 'Christian princes, even on the authority of the pope, may not compel the barbarians to give up their sins against the law of nature, nor punish them.'¹⁰³

But immediately, with reason to invalidate the conquest, Vitoria gives other 'modern' mercantilist arguments, which have been enunciated naively (not cynically). Returning to a 4,000-year-old principle, which originated in the Semitic deserts of the Middle East, the argument hangs on the 'responsibility to hospitality' that one has to the foreigner, stranger, pilgrim, in the *Codex Hammurabi*, for example,¹⁰⁴ but he subsumes it within the horizon of Modernity:

97 See, for example, Beuchot, 1998, p. 67 (Translation: Millán, p. 26): 'Bartolomé de Las Casas intends to follow Vitoria and Soto [...] including it seems to be inferior in comparison with those two masters.' On the contrary, the position of Las Casas ends by being radically different from the two Spanish thinkers.

98 The author of the introduction writes in contrast to our opinion when he considers all the *Re-readings* dictated from 1527 to 1541: 'Before this conjunction of disparate themes' (Vitoria, 1960, p. 82).

99 To this refer the following *Re-readings*: *De potestate civili*, *De potestate Ecclesiae priori y posteriori*, *De potestate Papae et Concilii*.

100 *De homicidio*, *De matrimonio* (referred to the English problem, in defence of Spain and the Papacy now), *De temperantia*.

101 *De Indis* and *De iure belli*. The remaining *Re-readings*, *De augmento caritatis*, *De eo ad quod tenetur*, *De simonia* and *De magia*, refer indirectly to some aspects, but remain outside of our consideration.

102 In *De Indis*, First *Re-reading*, first part ('On the dominion of the barbarians') one sees that the indigenous had 'true dominion, public and private' (op. cit., I, 5; Vitoria, 1960, p. 651 [Translation: Pagden, p. 239]) and there is no right of conquest by a so-called irrational state, of heresy, etc. In the second part ('By what unjust titles . . .') he discards as a reason for the conquest that the emperor has some right (ibid., II; pp. 667f. [Translation: Pagden, pp. 251–77]), or the Pope (II, 2; pp. 676f. [Translation: Pagden, pp. 258–64]), through being in a state of 'insurmountable ignorance' (9f.; pp. 690f. [Translation: Pagden, pp. 266–9]), because they are 'obliged to accept the faith of Christ under pain of mortal sin' (10; p. 692 [Translation: Pagden, p. 271]), and does not accept there would be reason to make war (11f.; pp. 693f. [Translation: Pagden, p. 272]), and gives still many reasons against the legitimacy of the war against the Indians.

103 Ibid., II, 16; p. 698 (Translation: Pagden, p. 273).

104 See Dussel, 1998a, [6]: 'I have made justice with the foreigner'.

THE FIRST 'EARLY MODERNITY'

If there are any things among the barbarians which are held in common both by their own people and by strangers (*hospitibus*), it is not lawful for the barbarians to prohibit the Spaniards from sharing and enjoying (*communicationem et participationem*) them.¹⁰⁵

[107] He continues that in virtue of 'the society and natural communication' (*societatis et communicationis*):

The Spaniards [a] have the right to travel (*ius peregrinandi*) and dwell in those countries, so long as they do no harm to the barbarians, and cannot be prevented by them from doing so. [. . .] The Spaniards may [b] lawfully trade among the barbarians (*negotiarum apud illos*), so long as they do no harm to their homeland. In other words, they may import the commodities they lack, and export the gold, silver, or other things which they have in abundance. [. . .] If [c] children born in the Indies of a Spanish father wish to become citizens (*cives*) of that community, they cannot be barred from citizenship or from the advantages enjoyed by the native citizens.¹⁰⁶

These rights seemed universal, convenient and just, but given the situation of the Indies in 1539, given the conquest of the Caribbean, Mexico and Peru (with Pizarro and Almagro), these affirmations are either naïve or cynical, since no one 'travelled' to the Indies for aesthetics or tourism, to contemplate its beauty or effect a fair exchange of goods. Las Casas described the colonial situation in its unjust violence much more adequately. With Vitoria are we before the discovery of 'international laws', in the 'private subjective' level or the 'public' level between states? I think that it is the development of the *ius gentium* of medieval Christendom (of a secondary culture peripheral to the Muslim world) as foundation of the *ius gentium europium*, as C. Schmitt explains in *The Nomos of the Earth*, first structure of the law, not simply symmetrically 'international', but strictly as imperial, colonialist, Eurocentric 'Metropolitan law'.¹⁰⁷ The laws for those who [a] make pilgrimage, those who [b] trade or those who [c] can be transformed into citizens with full rights (according to the *ius solis*), are only the rights of the metropolitan Europeans. These rights are enunciated in name of the 'right of all peoples', but only Europeans can be their subjects, because Vitoria is not referring to the right of pilgrimage, of trade or of adopting the rights of citizenship of *the indigenous in Europe*.

It is a euphemism to speak, for example, of 'trade' in the *Encomienda* system, where the indigenous gave *free* labour, without receiving anything in exchange; and the gold and silver they extracted became the private property of the metropolitan subject or the crown, without any exchange or reward

105 *De Indis*, III §4; Vitoria, 1960, p. 709 (Translation: Pagden, p. 280).

106 *Ibid.*, 2; p. 705; 3; p. 708; 5; p. 710 (Translation: Pagden, pp. 278–81).

107 The king demanded that Vitoria not address questions about the Indies in his courses. This explains his contradictions.

for the indigenous. The indigenous were obliged to leave their lives in the depths of the mines through the *Mita* mining system, considered payment of a tax for colonial domination, without receiving salary. Vitoria does not recognize the 'right' that indigenous people have, and that Bartolomé de Las Casas gives them, of rejecting such pilgrimage, trade and the so-called rights of citizenship of the Europeans, when their cruel and unjust actions show they bring nothing beneficial to the invaded peoples, but produce death, offences, violations, domination of all types. Vitoria rejects the indigenous right to oppose the violent Spanish presence.

Unfortunately, like Locke later, Vitoria recognizes the right the Spanish (but not the indigenous) have 'to seize the goods of the enemy [the Indian] as indemnity for the costs of war, and for all losses unjustly caused by the enemy'.¹⁰⁸ Once 'the victory has been won and property restored to its rightful owners, and peace and security [of the conquest] are established, it is lawful to avenge the injury [received by the Spanish] done by the enemy [the guilty indigenous], and to teach the enemy a lesson by punishing them for the damage they have done'¹⁰⁹. Vitoria concludes:

If the barbarians attempt to deny the Spaniards in these matters which I have described as belonging to the law of nations (*ius gentium*), that is to say from trading and the rest, the Spaniards ought [*debent*]¹¹⁰ [. . . to use] reasoning [and if it] fails to win the acquiescence of the barbarians, and they insist on replying with violence, the Spaniards may defend themselves, and do everything needful for their own safety [. . .] and exercise other rights of war.¹¹¹

Vitoria legitimates the conquest when he takes the starting point or perspective of a European mercantilist 'in' America.

The Institutionalization of the Alienation of the Other: The Testimony of Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala

[108] There were three moments in which the indigenous communities suffered increasingly the process of modern colonial domination. First, the indigenous suffered the horrors of conquest, and those who survived were inserted into the *encomienda* and *mita* systems, objects of Las Casas' critique. Second, from the 'Junta Magna', which Philip II brought together to unify colonial politics, headed by the viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, the Franciscan messianic utopias and the fighters for the indigenous commu-

¹⁰⁸ *De Indis*, Second *Re-reading*, 18; p. 827 (Translation: Pagden, p. 304).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 19; p. 829 (Translation: Pagden, p. 305).

¹¹⁰ It is a 'responsibility' correlative to the 'responsibility' that Bartolomé gives to the indigenous of making sacrifices to their gods and of defending the customs against strangers.

¹¹¹ *De Indis*, First *Re-reading*, III, 6; pp. 711-12 (Translation: Pagden, pp. 281-2).

nities received the shock of a new colonizing project. A new anti-Lascasian strategy was decided. The counter-argument within modern rationality was orchestrated during the government of the decidedly Eurocentric viceroy, who entrusted (so it seems) his cousin, García de Toledo, to write the *Opinion of Yucay*,¹¹² which tried to demonstrate that the Incas were illegitimate and tyrannical, so the Europeans were justified in carrying out the conquest and the *repartimiento* of the Indians to emancipate them from oppression. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda's position had been modified but still imposed as hegemonic argumentation. From economic-communitarian reciprocity one has passed to despotism; a demographic hecatomb (in some regions only a third of the population remained); the indigenous abandoned the communities and wandered about the viceroyalty (the *yanas*, whence the name *yanaconas*), among other motives to avoid paying the taxes demanded in silver.¹¹³

Third, under the hacienda regime, the new organization of mineral exploitation, the payment of taxes in silver and the Reductions (of very diverse types), the indigenous communities remained subsumed in the colonial society. We will situate ourselves in this moment.

We will linger on a dramatic story, a critical protest, a final attempt to change things: the impressive work of Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala. *The First New Chronicle and Good Government* (starting from experiences probably between 1583 and 1612, but written in 1616)¹¹⁴ is a 'testimony' to the *interpellation* of the Other, the only perspective of its kind, since it is the authentic hermeneutic of an Indian, of an Incan family, written and sketched with a splendid semiotic capacity and an inimitable mastery.

Guamán Poma, even more than the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, an indigenous who knew the Quechua language and traditions of his dominated people, shows hidden aspects of the daily life of the indigenous community prior to the conquest and under colonial domination.¹¹⁵ Guamán Poma produces an interpretive synthesis, a critical narration, which contains an ethic and a 'location' of his vision from an extremely creative central position as much in time as in space. First, he expresses:

112 From 15 March 1571; *Collection of Unedited Documents of the History of Spain XIII*, 1842, pp. 425-69.

113 See Wachtel, 1971, pp. 134f.: 'The de-structuring'. The author shows (in the figure on p. 184) that in the time of the Inca the *ayullu* (basic community) paid taxes in work and products to the *curacas* (caciques) and to the Inca; the *curaca* paid taxes to the Inca and provided services to the *ayllu*; the Inca gave services to the *curaca* and to the *ayllu*. The wealth remained in a closed circuit in the Incan Empire. With the conquest the *ayllu* pay taxes in silver (received in salary) to the *curaca* and to the Spanish; the *curaca* pays taxes to the Spanish and gives services to the *ayllu*; but the Spanish does not give any service to the *ayllu* nor to the *curaca*. In addition the wealth of the Spanish leaves the Peruvian circuit and goes to Europe. It is the 500-year-old colonial extraction of wealth today globalized, changing mechanisms but not its deep sense of transference of 'labour-value'.

114 See R. Adorno, 'The writing and editing of the autograph . . .' in Guamán, 1980, I, xxxiif.

115 See Gutiérrez, 1992, pp. 616f.; Subirats, 1994, pp. 141f.; Wachtel, 1971, pp. 245f., etc.

Consider that the Indians in the time of the Incas committed idolatry like the heathens, worshipping the son as the father of the Inca, the moon as his mother, and the stars as his brothers and sisters [. . .] Despite all this, they kept all of God's commandments and his good works of mercy in this kingdom, things that the Christians themselves do not keep, even today.¹¹⁶

He adopts the Christian perspective, maybe as strategy for the political acceptance of his proposals. From this he critiques the praxis of domination of the Spanish Christians themselves. It is a closed argument, which shows the performative contradiction of Modernity in its totality. See how Guamán distinguishes between the belief, which we would be able to call theory (or cosmovision), and the Christian practice or ethic. In the time of the Incas, they 'worshipped' their cosmovision (from Christian dogmatics) but 'kept the commandments' in their ethical conduct, 'what the [European] Christians do not keep now'. That is to say, the indigenous were, practically, even before the conquest, better 'Christians', by their practices, than the Spanish Christians 'now'. The *Chronicle* is an argument against the Spanish conquistadors in the name of the Christianity they preach.¹¹⁷ Like the Creoles, the Indian Felipe Guamán, already Christian, thinks that the Spanish have not brought Christianity,¹¹⁸ an opinion he derives from a hybrid understanding of the time and proper space of his syncretistic narrative. He unifies in a 'great story' (not merely fragmentary) the Incan and Christian vision from the oppressed existence of the Indians, 'the poor of Jesus Christ'. He has his own vision (Indian, American, from the poor and oppressed) of his own Christianity:

I tell you truly that God became man and true God, and poor. For, if He had come with all His majesty and light, no one could have drawn close to him.¹¹⁹ [. . .]Therefore, He ordained that He come in poverty, so that the poor and the sinners might draw close and talk with Him. Thus, He decreed that His apostles and saints should be poor, humble, and charitable [. . .] I tell you truly, by counting on my poverty, by introducing

¹¹⁶ *The First New Chronicle*, p. 912 [p. 926]; Guamán Poma, 1980, III, p. 854 (Translation: Frye, p. 291).

¹¹⁷ There are exceptions: 'Consider: when wise men [. . .] holy doctors of the Church, illuminated by the Holy Spirit [. . .] as the right reverend Fray Luis de Granada [. . .] the reverend Fray Domingo [de Santo Tomás . . .] many other holy doctors and lawyers, teachers, and learned men [. . .] Others [however] who have not gone so far as to write the letters a, b, c, want to call themselves learned: no, they are asses and frauds, and they should sign their names "Don Drunkard" and "Dona Blockhead"', he writes with humour, irony and sarcasm (*ibid.*, p. 855 [Translation: Frye, pp. 291-2]).

¹¹⁸ In the process of independence at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth (as in the case of Friar Servando de Mier in Mexico), that non-responsibility of the Spanish 'nor of Christianity' was the cause of the negation of other benefits that could have been brought to America together with the conquest and colonial organization.

¹¹⁹ Among the Incas no one should look at the sun (*Inti*), not even the Inca.

myself as a poor man among all those animals who devour the poor, they also devoured me, just as they devour the poor.¹²⁰

The story is constructed, normatively, from the horizon of the dialectic, which is established between (a) the 'poverty, humility and happy equilibrium of the satisfaction of the basic necessities' of the Inca past, against (b) the 'wealth, pride and infinite and unsatisfying longing' for gold and silver, the idol of the Europeans. It is a categorical critique of Modernity from the world prior to Modernity; from an ecological utopia of ethical-communitarian justice, where there was 'good government' and no violence, robbery, filthiness, ugliness, sexual violation, disproportionate brutality, suffering, cowardice, lying, 'pride' . . . death.

[109] The work is divided into three parts. First, is shown, informatively and in Quechua, the political-cultural order prior to the conquest. It is the utopia *ex quo*. Second, he describes the atrocities of the modern dominion over the great Inca culture, comparable in its splendour to those of the Roman Empire, Chinese and others taken as examples by the Europeans. In the third part, which always begins with '*conzedérese*' (consider), a face-to-face with King Philip III of Spain is established, to explain to him possible solutions in the face of the disastrous Indian disorder.

In the first part, Guamán Poma shows a *sui generis* integration of the Christian and Incan chronological traditions under the dominating logic of the classical 'five stages', as much in the Aztec and Maya world as the Inca. It starts with the Judaeo-Christian Old and New Testament and European history, but this is articulated in an unexpected way in the history of the Incas. The 'First world' (as the first Sun of the Aztecs and Mayas) is that of Adam and Eve,¹²¹ the 'Second' is that of Noah; the 'Third', that of Abraham; the 'Fourth Stage of the world', from 'king David',¹²² the 'Fifth', the current order in the indigenous cosmovision begins 'from the birth of Jesus Christ'.¹²³ Then, follows the history of the 'Popes' Peter, Damasus, John and Leo.

Then the story, until now purely European, is interrupted with an exemplary sketch: 'The Pontiff's Throne / the Indies of Peru, above Spain / Cusco / Below the Indies / Castille'.¹²⁴ In the spatial imaginary of Guamán Poma 'on top', with the mountains as horizon and the Sun (*Inti*) in the sky was Peru. Cuzco was at the centre with *its* 'four'. 'Below' was Castile, in the centre, equally with 'four' regions. The Incan spatial logic organizes the European world. Immediately afterwards appear Almagro and Pizarro, with their boats, which arriving from Europe now situate the story in Peru.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ *The First New Chronicle*, 902-03 [916-17]; II, 845-6 (Translation: Frye, pp. 281-2).

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 22 [22]; I, p. 16.

¹²² *Ibid.*, s.n. [28]; p. 23.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 30 [30]; p. 25.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 42 [42], p. 35 (Translation: Frye: p. 18).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 45 [46]; p. 39.

Located by the 'discovery' in the Indies, paradoxically, only now, and for the first time, and without an Incan description of the origin of the cosmos, which suggests a certain Eurocentrism of the 'Christianized' Indian, he begins the narration of the 'five stages' or 'generations' of the Amerindian myths,¹²⁶ a whole discourse of great complexity, which shows the way in which Guamán Poma structures his 'cosmovision' as a hybrid. The story has diverse levels of depth, its own bipolarities and significant structures of great wealth.

First are the 'five generations' of indigenous (beginning with the 'four generations' from Uari Vira Cocha Runa to Auca Runa).¹²⁷ The 'fifth' is the Incan Empire,¹²⁸ with the description of the 12 Incas, from Capac Inca. But it is interesting to note that in the reign of the second Inca, Cinche Roca Inca, two stories are articulated (the European and the Incan, comparing the Incas to the Roman emperors). Guamán situates the birth of 'Jesus Christ in Bethlehem' here.¹²⁹ A little later, the apostle Bartholomew was present in Peru installing the 'cross of Carabuco', in the province of Collao, testifying to the tradition of the preaching of Christianity in the age of the apostles.¹³⁰ This manner of uniting chronologies (Western Christian culture with the Incas) shows a mode of the historical story, the 'meaning of the history', exemplars, which he teaches to try to establish comparisons in the centre-periphery *chrono-topos*, where the periphery is 'above' and not 'below', and where it is the 'location' of the discourse, the *locus enuntiationis*.¹³¹

Next he describes the lives of the 12 'Coya queens and women', spouses of the Incas,¹³² the 15 'captains' of the empire¹³³ and the four first 'ladies' of the four parts of the empire.¹³⁴ One can observe that the 'Inca Coya' and the 'queens' of the four regions show a clear presence of the woman within the Andean cosmovision: the man (the Sun) and woman (the Moon) are always together.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 48 [48]; pp. 41f.

¹²⁷ For Guamán, it probably pertains to a provincial pre-Incan aristocracy; he idealizes the time prior to the Incas, labelling them 'idolaters'. Maybe that refutes the argument of Francisco of Toledo, the viceroy, accepting certain critiques against the Incas, but not against the culture of the Tawantinsuyo in its totality.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 79 [79]; pp. 63f.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 90 [90]; p. 70. 'He was born during the time and the reign of *Cinche Roca Inga*, when the Inca was eighty years old. It was in the time of *Cinche Roca Inga* that He suffered martyrdom and was crucified' (ibid. [Translation: Frye, p. 39]). The birth of Jesus Christ initiated the 'fifth age' of the European-Christian chronology, but now was articulated with the Incan 'fifth age'. As the New Testament story said: 'In the time of the emperor Tiberius . . .' (Luke 3.1). Guamán Poma is expressing metaphorically: 'In the time of the emperor *Cinche Roca Inga* . . .'

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 93 [93]; p. 72. In that time were great catastrophes, so the era is called the *pachcuti* (what transforms the earth) or *pacha ticra* (what puts the head down) (ibid., p. 95 [95]; p. 74).

¹³¹ See Mignolo, 1995, 5; 2000, pp. 51f.

¹³² Ibid., 120 [120]; p. 99.

¹³³ Ibid., 145 [146]; p. 122.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 174 [176]; p. 154. There are lists of other 'ladies' of each region of the empire.

Ending the long list of principles, Guamán describes an unknown group of ordinances, mandates or laws promulgated by the Incas (a Peruvian *Code of Hammurabi*, but much more complete than the Mesopotamian, with varied themes).¹³⁵ From Cuzco, the authorities of the empire 'mandate and order' the diverse regions, provinces, peoples, communities, diverse structures of government, accountancy, administration, military, construction of aqueducts and paths, temples, palaces and houses; principal and secondary priests, assistants, fiestas, rites, cults, traditions, gods (*huacas*), the mode of organizing the farmers, harvesters, tax system, distribution of land, the ethical codes of the family, marriage, education, judges and judgements, testimonies; all this shows the political complexity of the Incan civilization.

Later he describes the obligations of men of various ages (which he calls 'paths'),¹³⁶ as well as those of the sick and disabled (called *uncoc runa*):

He married the blind man to a woman who was also blind, the lame man to a woman who was also lame, the mute man to a woman who was also mute, the dwarf to a dwarf, the hunchback to a hunchback, the cleft-nosed man with a woman who was also cleft-nosed [. . .]. These people had their croplands, houses, estates and the help of their service. Because of this saintly rule and orderliness, there was no need for hospitals¹³⁷ or for begging in this kingdom, for no other kingdom in Christianity nor among the infidels has ever been nor could be so [orderly], no matter how Christian . . .¹³⁸

[110] When a child was born in the Incan Empire s/he assumed a parcel of land, which if it could not be worked by him/her had another for its 'food and sustenance'. At death, the land was redistributed. At birth a child was not given a certificate or a document but the means to reproduce one's life until death. This type of institution is what Guaman says is not found in another civilized system.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 182 [184]; pp. 159–67. It orders: 'We decree that lazy, dirty pigs shall be punished with the filth from their *chacara* [field], their houses, or the plates they eat on, or from their heads, hands, or feet. They shall be washed and shall be forced to drink their own filth from a *mate* [drinking gourd], as chastisement and punishment' (ibid., p. 189 [191]; p. 164 [Translation: Frye, p. 64]). Cleanliness was as important as the triple mandate: 'Do not lie; do not stop working; do not rob.'

¹³⁶ Ibid., 194 [196]; pp. 169f. The warriors at age 33 (although they were from 25 to 50); 'the elders who walk' (from age 60); those from age 80; those sick or disabled; the youth from age 18; 12; 9; 4; the child who crawls; the child from one month old. Each age had its rights from the beginning, and later also responsibilities.

¹³⁷ This Incan institution was interesting to Michel Foucault.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 201 [203]; p. 177 (Translation: Frye, p. 72). Equally, 'the women [. . .] sick, lame and blind, widows, hunchbacks, and dwarfs. All of them had fields, croplands, houses, and pastures, from which they made a living and were able to eat, so that they did not need to beg for alms' (ibid., 222 [224]; p. 197 [Translation: Frye, p. 79]).

They also describe the ages ('paths') of the women.¹³⁹ The activities are explained month by month.¹⁴⁰ They show the gods ('idols'), rites, sacrifices,¹⁴¹ ceremonies of sorcery, fasts, penances, burials; the 'Coya nuns' (vestal virgins of the Sun).¹⁴²

Next is a 'chapter on Justice',¹⁴³ which contains the 'punishments' the Inca applied to those who did not fulfil the regulations. There were caves (*zancay*) where poisonous animals ate the enemy (*auca*), the traitor (*yscay songo*), thief (*suua*), adulterer (*uachoc*), wizard (*hanpioc*), people who speak out against the Inca (*ynca cipcicac*), etc., alive. There were minor prisons, lashes, stoning, gallows to hang the guilty by the hair until death, etc.

They had great feasts,¹⁴⁴ sacred and profane, 'love songs' (*haray harawi*)¹⁴⁵ with beautiful music and dance, and regional dances. He describes the great palaces (with sketches of great value), cities, great stores of goods, statues, platforms of the Incas, types of gifts. Finally he explains some political functions:¹⁴⁶ the viceroy (*Yncap rantin*), the mayor, greater bailiff, the co-town councillor (*tocricoc*), administrator (*suyucoc*), messengers (*chasqui*), 'the wise ones' (*sayua cchecta suyoyoc*), which confirmed the land of each one, the Inca and the community. In addition, he explains the paths,¹⁴⁷ the hanging bridges, etc. And he concludes speaking of the secretaries of the Inca, the accountant and treasurer (with his *quipoc*: text written in knots of string, with those who measured, memorized numbers, taxes, debts, etc.),¹⁴⁸ the visitor, the royal council. He concludes the first part:

Christian reader, here you see the whole Christiau law.¹⁴⁹ I have found no Indians who are greedy for gold or silver, nor have I found any who

139 Ibid., 215 [217]; pp. 190f.

140 Ibid., 244 [246]; pp. 219f. At the end of the work there is a very valuable description of the 'workers', of the country men and women (ibid., 1130 [1140]; III, 1,027), where Guamán corrects a part of his first description made from 'above', from the *fiestas* of the Inca.

141 Certainly human sacrifices, from 'creatures of five years' old (ibid., 267 [269]; I, 241), others two years old or adults.

142 Ibid., 299 [301]; pp. 272f.

143 Ibid., 301 [303]; pp. 275f.

144 Ibid., 315 [317]; pp. 288f.

145 This work has given testimonies unknown in any other source in Qnechua (ibid., 317 [319]; pp. 288f.)

146 Ibid., 340 [341]; pp. 312f.

147 I remember in my youth ascending mountains 6,500 metres in height in Uspallata, in a long valley, quickly we crossed an absolutely straight path, running to the horizon (maybe some 30 km). It was the path of the Inca, some 4,000 km from Cuzco. In effect, says Guamán: 'With their league and measurement marked out and signposted, each path four staves wide and by the two sides put stones that go straight, that are not made in all the world the kings as the Ynga' (ibid., 355 [357]; p. 327 [Translation: TC]). In the Mediterranean I have seen the stone paths of the Roman Empire, from North Africa to Palestine, Italy or Spain. None was as 'straight' as those of the Inca.

148 Ibid., 361 [363]; pp. 332-3, where one can see the drawing of this predecessor of modern bookkeeping.

149 He wants to say: in the customs of the Incas one can observe still all the beauty and value of that better in the Christian ethic.

owe a hundred pesos, nor liars, nor gamblers, nor sluggards, nor whores, nor buggers [. . .] You claim that you will repay what you have taken; but I do not see you repaying it, neither in life or in death. It seems to me, Christian,¹⁵⁰ that you are all condemning yourselves to hell [. . .], against the poor Indians of Jesus Christ [. . .] Just as the Spaniards also had their idols, as the reverend padre Fray Luis de Granada has written [. . .], the Indians, being barbarians and gentiles, wept for their idols when they were smashed in the time of the conquest. But you have your own idols – your treasuries and your silver – all over the world.¹⁵¹

It is a ferocious critique of European Modernity, in its permanent cynicism contradicting its own values from the sixteenth century to the present.

[III] In the second part of his magnum opus he shows the contradiction between the preached Christianity and the perverse praxis of early Modernity. It is the most heartless, ironic and brutal description of the violence of the first expansion of Western culture. He begins the story with the question the Inca Guaina Cápac asked Candía, the first Spaniard to reach Peru: 'Wayna Capac asked the Spaniard what it was that he ate. He replied in the language of the Spaniards and by signs pointing at things that he ate gold and silver. And so [the Inca] gave him a lot of gold dust, silver, and gold utensils.'¹⁵² All are to search greedily: 'gold and silver': 'All said: Indies, Indians, gold, silver, gold, silver of Peru.' Until the musicians, sang the ballad *Indies, gold and silver*:¹⁵³

And in some parts of this kingdom the *Pueblos* of the poor Indians have been depopulated because of gold and silver.¹⁵⁴ This is what the first men were like: they did not fear death, with their self-interest in gold and silver. Worse still are the men of this life today – the Spanish *corregidores*, priests, and *encomenderos*: with their greed for gold and silver, they are going to hell. [. . .] The Indians felt abandoned by their gods, by their king, by their great lords and captains during this time of the conquest. Nor did they have the God of the Christians, nor the king of Spain, nor did they have justice.¹⁵⁵

After the chaos and initial violence 'the good government', written ironically, of the viceroy Mendoza begins:

¹⁵⁰ It is the reproach of a 'Christian' Indian.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 367 [369]; p. 339 (Translation: Frye, p. 99).

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 369 [371]; II, p. 342 (Translation: Frye, p. 103).

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* (Translation: Frye, p. 104). The 'de-populating' was due to the violence of the conquest, the de-structuring of the Incan agricultural system (for example, the Inca maintained aqueducts of up to 400 km in length in perfect conditions, through the mountains, with bridges of stone, etc.; the European colonial world allowed the destruction of the whole hydraulic system constructed over 1,000 years) and in particular to illnesses unknown by the indigenous race.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 374 [376]; p. 347 (Translation: Frye, p. 105); 389 [391]; p. 361 (Translation: Frye, p. 117).

[. . .] you poor, foolish, and incompetent Spaniards, who are as proud as Lucifer: Luzbel (beautiful light) became Lucifer, the great devil. You are the same as he. I am shocked to see how you yearn to hang yourselves, to behead yourselves with your own hands, to draw and quarter yourselves, to hang yourselves like Judas and hurl yourselves into hell. You yearn to be more than what God decreed you should be. If you are not kings, why do you yearn to be kings? If you are not princes, dukes, counts, marquises, or gentlemen, why do you yearn to be such? If you are taxpaying commoners – shoemakers, tailors, Jews, or Moors – then do not rise up and disturb the land; rather, pay what you owe.¹⁵⁶

He describes one by one the public functions and the way they oppress, rob, punish and violate the Indians, so 'the land will be lost, the entire kingdom will become desolate and deserted, and the king will be very poor'.¹⁵⁷ And 'after having completed their terms in office, none of these most Christian governors has ever been found to have favoured the Indians. Instead, they have all come to add more burdens on the Indians and to favour the citizens, the wealthy, and the mine owners.'¹⁵⁸ Guamán is scandalized, in particular, about the way in which the authorities, even the Spanish and slaves, use the women, since 'they go around robbing their haciendas and fornicating with the wives and taking the virginity of the maidens. And thus they are lost and become whores and give birth to many Mestizos¹⁵⁹ and the Indians do not multiply.'¹⁶⁰ The Spanish, in particular the Christian 'encomenderos of this kingdom',¹⁶¹ are criticized for their actions, which show a particular sadism, since 'they punish the poor of Jesus Christ in the whole kingdom'.¹⁶² Guamán dismantles one by one the injustices of the whole colonial political and economic order of Modernity. The Church is not spared his accurate, ironic and sharp critique.¹⁶³ He collects documents about 'treatments' and

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 437 [439]; p. 405 (Translation: Frye, p. 144).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 446 [448]; p. 413 (Translation: Frye, p. 149).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 485 [489]; p. 453 (Translation: Frye, p. 164).

¹⁵⁹ Guamán particularly scorns the 'Mestizos'.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 504 [508]; p. 468 (Translation: TC)). One of the obsessions of Guamán is that 'soon the Indians of this kingdom will die' (ibid., 520 [524]; p. 483 [Translation: TC]), given that the Indians are snatched from their natural spouses. The Spanish miners 'force their way on some of the daughters of their Indian servants and deflower them, and they force their way on their servants' wives by sending their husbands off to the mines at night, or by sending them somewhere far away' (ibid., 526 [530]; p. 489 [Translation: Frye, p. 180]). The suffering of the Indians in the mines, on those farms, is unimaginable (see pp. 488–505). He characterizes the Spanish as of low stature, fat, lazy, proud, and sadists in the treatment of the domestic Indians (pp. 506–15): 'You are against the poor of Jesus Christ' (ibid., 543 [547]; p. 515 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 548 [562]; pp. 519f. (Translation: Frye, p. 205).

¹⁶² Ibid., 552 [566]; p. 523 (Translation: TC). 'And also the women because they tame them and withhold the cup and personal services [. . .] And fornicate with the single women and widows' (ibid., 556 [570]; p. 526 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁶³ Ibid., 561 [575]; pp. 533f. 'The Indians make many whores and there is no remedy. They do not want to marry because they go behind the father or the Spaniards. And thus the Indians do not multiply in this kingdom, but mestizos and mestizas and there is no remedy'

'sentences', to give examples of the unjust oppression exercised over the Indians.¹⁶⁴

There were also Indians who collaborated with the conquistadors, '*mandoncillos*', who frequently passed themselves off as nobles to be able to command in the name of the Spanish. There were Incas, 'principal' men, who had under their orders 1,000 tributary Indians (*curanga curaca*) or 500, or 'greater foremen' over 100, or '*mandoncillo* of 50 Indians', of 10 and of five.¹⁶⁵ The *curacas* direct the mines and sawmills. These exploiters, thieves, 'drunks', liars, 'fakers', highwaymen, 'take the hacienda of the poor Indians'.¹⁶⁶ He continues with 'ladies, queens, and Coyas', the women of the '*mandoncillos*', who are called '*doña*'.¹⁶⁷ To top it all off, the Christian Indians, collaborating with the Spanish to impart 'justice',¹⁶⁸ given the generalized corruption (not permitted in the times of the Incas), did not always fulfil their functions.

Finally Guamán confronts the Indians themselves, the poor people:

If the *doctrina* padres and priests, the *corregidores*, the *encomenderos*, and the Spaniards would leave them alone, there would be saints and great, Christian learned men among them; those people hinder them with their business dealings.¹⁶⁹

That the Indians remain better and more 'political' they owe to the memory of their ancient customs despite the extortions the conquistadors exercise. Modernity is the cause of corruption and destruction. Next Guamán describes the beliefs, 'from below', of the indigenous (as he had described before the gods of the time of the Incas): the crucified Christ, the Trinity, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the saints, purgatory, devotions, baptism, alms. Now the poor people asked for alms (in contrast to the time of the Incas): 'The inspectors of the Saint Mother church are guilty of not taking care of

(*ibid.*, 565 [579]; p. 534 [Translation: TC]). The critique against the Church and the clerics continues through p. 663 (702 [716]), one of the institutions that occupies him in a particular way. The Franciscans and Jesuit fathers are the only ones who end up in good standing. This shows a hypothesis at the base of the ideological history of Latin America. See 635 [647]; pp. 603f., and 479 [483]; p. 447 (Translation: Frye, p. 487): 'If only the priests, the Dominicans, Mercedarians, and the Augustinians acted like these padres of the Company of Jesus, who have no desire to return wealthy to Castile nor to build up their estates! Their wealth consists of souls!'

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 712 [726]; pp. 670-87.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 738 [752]; pp. 688f.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 791 [805]; p. 736 (Translation: TC). Guamán belonged to a family of Yarovilcas, local nobles prior to the Incas (see *ibid.*, 1030 [1038]; III, 949). Some impostor *curacas*, collaborating with the Spanish, stripped them of their lands. Guamán scorns the '*mandoncillos*', *curacas* who 'pretended to be' nobles. Through his mother he could be linked to some secondary lineage of the Incas.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 757 [771]; II, pp. 707f.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 792 [806]; pp. 739f.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 820 [834]; p. 764 (Translation: Frye, p. 271).

the poor, infirm, disabled, lame, one-armed, old, blind and the orphans of each people.¹⁷⁰

The situation of the Indian had worsened visibly with Modernity. Thus appeared the '*criollos* and *criollas*, Indian men and women born into this life during the time of Spanish Christians', who are corrupted easily because they have lost their community; they are transformed into *yanacunas*,¹⁷¹ into drunks, '*coqueros*' (drug addicts), and 'the most Christian of them, even if he knows how to read and write, wears a rosary, dresses like a Spaniard with a ruffled collar, and seems like a saint, when drunk will speak with the demons and worship the *wacas*.'¹⁷² There remain only a few 'Indian philosopher-astrologers [who] know the hours, weeks, days, months, and years, for planting and harvesting the crops every year . . .'.¹⁷³ Our author ends the description of the lamentable state of the Indies: 'the author wandered in the world, poor, among the other poor Indians, to be able to see the world, attain [knowledge], and write this book and chronicle in service to God and His Majesty and for the good of the poor Indians of this kingdom.'¹⁷⁴

[112] In the third part, from the utopia of the past¹⁷⁵ through the negativity of the harmful present, Guamán imagines now a project of 'good government', from the future utopian horizon of the 'City of heaven for the good, poor sinners'¹⁷⁶ and of the 'City of hell [for] the avaricious man – the ungrateful – lust – pride, punishment of the proud sinners and rich men who do not fear God'.¹⁷⁷ This claim occupies the first part ('Consideration of the Christian of God's world').¹⁷⁸ The 'question of the chapter'

170 Ibid., 845 [859]; p. 791 (Translation: TC).

171 Ibid., 857 [871]; p. 803 (Translation: Frye, p. 272).

172 Ibid., 863 [877]; p. 809 (Translation: Frye, p. 277).

173 Ibid., 884 [898]; p. 830 (Translation: Frye, p. 277).

174 Ibid., 902 [916]; p. 845 (Translation: Frye, p. 281).

175 There is a double past, that of the Inca taken frequently as reference point. But at times is noted a certain critique of Incan domination seen from the regions far from Cuzco (to which belonged Guamán). One reads: 'the fourth, the *Auca Runa*, were people of little understanding, yet they were not idolaters. The Spaniards were also people of little understanding, but from the very earliest times they were heathen idolaters, just as the Indians from the age of the Inca on were idolaters' (ibid., 911 [925]; vol. 3, p. 854 [Translation: Frye, p. 291]). It seems that, for Guamán, the greater development of civilization includes idolatry, but this was not so for the simplest peoples, without mutual domination, such as the civilizations prior to the Incan Empire. 'The ancient Indians knelt and prayed, raising their hands and looking up at heaven until the fourth age of the world [. . .] The Indians in the time of the Incas committed idolatry like the heathens, worshipping the sun as the father of the Inca' (ibid., 912 [926]; p. 854 [Translation: Frye, p. 291]).

176 Ibid., 938 [952]; p. 88 (Translation: Frye, p. 952). 'For the poor who kept the word of God, the upper-world city of God'. In this city enter very few Spanish and all the oppressed Indians, the 'poor of Jesus Christ'.

177 Ibid., 941 [955]; p. 882 (Translation: Frye, p. 318). Our author comments: 'Consider how the Indian men and women in this life bear with such patience the evils of the Spaniards, priests, and *corregidores*, the mestizos, mulattos, and blacks, and the *yanacunas*, and *chinaconas*, who rip out the lives and the entrails of the Indians. Consider' (Translation: Frye, pp. 317, 319).

178 The theme in the final 'index' (ibid., s.n. [1186]; III, 1,067), treated from ibid., 909 [924]; III, 852.

follows,¹⁷⁹ where he argues within a highly rational and dense political logic about the most serious problems, which have been discovered in his *Chronicle* putting in the mouth of the king of Spain 'questions' launched at the 'author'. Finally, he describes with sadness 'the world [to which] returns the author', his poor starting point, 'the people of the poor of Jesus Christ', after more than 30 years, as he has travelled in poverty throughout the whole of Peru, to inform the king of Spain and propose to him correction in the face of such disorder.

The beginning of the 'Considerations' has a sense of cosmic knowledge. 'God created heaven and the whole world, and all that exists there.'¹⁸⁰ He divides time into 10 ages, having 'Peru' as the axis, not Spain or Judaeo-Christianity. The four from the Uari Vira Cocha until the Auca Runa; the fifth of the Incas; the sixth of Pachacuti Ruma (the man who inverted all: the cosmic revolution previous to the conquest); the seventh of the '*runa* Christian conquest'; the eighth of the wars between the conquistadors in Peru; the ninth of 'Christian justice, the well-being' of the first colonial era; the tenth, the imposed colonial order.

Guamán begins, from the origin and process of the 'universe' (*pacha*), with a first 'consideration': service to the 'infirm and pilgrimaging people', who fulfil 'Christian law and the law of every native in his own kingdom throughout the world and Christendom', with the *corpachanqui* ('You must give hospitality!').¹⁸¹ The 'works of mercy' are the final criteria of Guamán, compassion for the weak person, the infirm, the poor. In this ethical demand the 'ancient law' of Peru and Christianity coincide reinterpreted by our 'author'. Guamán had a messianic interpretation of Christianity, an anticipated theology of liberation:

Jesus Christ died for the world and for men. He underwent torment and martyrdom [. . .]. In this life he was poor and persecuted; afterwards, on Judgement Day, he will [. . .] bring presents, garlands, and jewels to pay the poor who have been disdained. [. . .] The first priest in the world was God and living man, Jesus Christ, the priest who came from heaven as a poor man, and loved more the poor than being rich. Jesus Christ was the living God who came to bring souls, not silver, back with him from the world [. . .] St. Peter [. . .] left everything to the poor [. . .] They [the apostles] were all poor, and they demanded no salaries or wages, nor did they seek for treasure or food to eat.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ From *ibid.*, 960 [974]; p. 896.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 911 [925]; p. 852 (Translation: Frye, p. 289).

¹⁸¹ Again a 'law' prior to the Incas is referred to: 'The first Indians, though they were idolaters since [the time of] the Incas, had faith in and kept the commandments of their gods; they obeyed the law and did good works' (*ibid.*, 914 [928]; p. 857 [Translation: Frye, p. 292]).

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 936 [950]; p. 876 (Translation: Frye, p. 311); 962c [979]; p. 899 (Translation: Frye, p. 337).

To sum up: 'whoever defends the poor of Jesus Christ serves God, for that is the word of God in his gospel; and by defending Your Majesty's Indians, he serves your royal crown.'¹⁸³

In addition, he recommended ordering the institutions with a certain unity, since anciently all were under the paternal power of *one sole Inca*, meanwhile in the colonial disorder 'there are many Incas. The *Corregidor* is an Inca, his dozen deputies are Incas, the *corregidor's* brother or son, the *corregidor's* wife . . .'.¹⁸⁴ With the presence of the Europeans all had worsened for the Indians: 'consider how many struggles the Indians have in this life. *In the time of the Incas they did not have so many.*'¹⁸⁵ For 'good government', power needed to be restored to the Incas:

Then you must consider that all the world is God's, and therefore Castile belongs to the Spanish, the Indies belong to the Indians, and Guinea [Africa] belongs to the blacks. Each of these are the legitimate proprietors, and not only by law. [. . .] The Indians are the natural owners of this kingdom, while Spaniards born in Spain are foreigners (*mitmacs*) here in this kingdom.¹⁸⁶

[113] Starting from the Incan understanding of geopolitical spatiality, Guamán tries to justify his project counting strategically on the help of the king of Spain. As the ancient Incan Empire had been the 'centre' of the universe (*Pacha*), its 'navel' (*Cuzco*), from where extended the 'four parts' of the world (toward the four cardinal points, as in China or within the Aztecs in the *altepetl*)¹⁸⁷ shaping a 'cosmic cross', he now proposes, extrapolating those imaginary geopolitical structures in a more global world, and putting King Philip of Spain in the 'centre', with his 'four parts' or kingdoms: the Incas, who re-took power in America, the Christians around Rome, the Africans of Guinea and the Ottoman Turks Greater China.¹⁸⁸ A 'monarch of the world' with 'four' kingdoms (a globalized projection of the Incan

183 *Ibid.*, 972 [990]; p. 906 (Translation: Frye, p. 345).

184 *Ibid.*, 914 [928]; p. 857 (Translation: Frye, p. 292).

185 *Ibid.* (Translation: Frye, p. 294).

186 *Ibid.*, 915 [929]; pp. 857-8 (Translation: Frye, p. 294).

187 See Lockhart, 1992, pp. 14f.: 'Altepetl'. For the 'dual' organization and 'four' regions of the Incan empire and the culture of the high plateau see Pärssinen, 1992, 171f.: 'Principles of the Dual and Quaternary Structures'.

188 'Consider the great majesty of the Inca Topa Inca Yupanqui, king of Peru [as had] kings, princes, and emperors of the world - the Christians, the Great Turk, the king of China, the emperors of Rome and all of Christendom, and of the Jews and the kings of Guinea' (*ibid.*, 948 [962]; p. 888 [Translation: Frye, p. 324]). The Inca was a king at the same level as other cultures, and in addition the 'Inca kept four kings, for the four parts of this kingdom' (*ibid.* [Translation: Frye, p. 324]). Our author proposes a new project: 'the monarch should be the king Don Philip III. [Under him will be four minor kings:] first, I offer one of my sons, a prince of this kingdom, a grandson and great-grandson of Topa Inca Yupanqui [reproducing the project of the *Indian Monarchy* of Torquemada . . .]. The second a prince of the black king of Guinea. The third of the king of the Christians of Rome [. . .]; the fourth the king of the Moors of the Great Turk. All four shall be crowned, with their scepters and fleece' (*ibid.*, 949 [963]; p. 889 [Translation: Frye, pp. 325-6]).

Empire, but proposed the restitution, like Bartolomé de Las Casas, of the autonomy of the Incas, although 'under the hand' of the king of Spain:¹⁸⁹ 'For he is the Inca and the king, and no other Spaniard or priest needs to enter, because the Inca was the proprietor and the legitimate king.'¹⁹⁰

This 'restitution' was necessary to develop a variety of measures, at all levels of administrative structure, political, ecclesial, military, sexual, educative, etc., which Guamán describes with infinite patience. For example, here is one final quote:

Consider this: the *Corregidor* comes in saying, 'I will do justice for you,' and he robs. Then the *padre* enters: 'I will make you a Christian; I will baptize and marry and teach you,' and he robs and extorts and steals wife and daughter. The *encomendero* and the other Spaniards say: 'Justice! Serve the king, because I am his vassal,' and he robs and steals everything one has. The noble *caciques* and petty authorities are even worse; they utterly skin the poor unfortunate Indians.¹⁹¹

After these dramatic 'considerations' he passes to the second point organized around 15 questions, which the 'author' has King Philip ask. The second of these says:

'Tell me, Don Felipe Ayala, about those times: how could there have been so many Indians in the time of the Incas?' I say to your Majesty that, in those times, the Inca alone was king [. . .] But they lived under the laws and commandments of the Incas, and, because they had a king, they peacefully served in this kingdom; they multiplied, and had estates, plenty to eat, and their own children and wives.¹⁹²

In the fifth question the king enquires:

'Tell me, author, how will the Indians become rich?' Your Majesty should know that they should keep community estates (which they call *sapsi*), with fields planted with corn, wheat, potatoes, peppers, *macno*, cotton, and grapes, [as well as] textile workshops, dyeworks, coca fields, and fruit orchards.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 949 [963]; p. 889.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 916 [930]; p. 858 (Translation: Frye, pp. 294-5).

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 957 [971]; p. 893 (Translation: Frye, p. 331).

¹⁹² Ibid., 962 [976]; p. 896 (Translation: Frye, p. 335). 'Tell me author, why do the Indians not multiply now? Why are they becoming poor? I will say to Your Majesty, first, that they do not multiply because all the best women and maidens are taken by the *doctrina* padres, *encomenderos*, *corregidores*, Spaniards, stewards, deputies, and officers, and their servants. That is why there are so many little mestizos and mestizas in this kingdom. They claim that the women have lovers as a pretext for taking them and their estates from the poor. [The Indian] preferred to die once and for all rather than face all the harm that was being done to them' (ibid., pp. 897-8 [Translation: Frye, p. 335]).

¹⁹³ Ibid., 963 [977]; p. 898 (Translation: Frye, p. 336).

'Good government' would exist when 'all the Spanish [...] live like Christians'.¹⁹⁴ Guamán, like Karl Marx, organizes his argumentative strategy following the same principle as the critic from Trier: to show that the one who claims to be Christian is in an evident contradiction between the perverse acts and the ethics dictated by Christianity.¹⁹⁵ What world met the 'author' upon returning to his town?

For thirty years he had been serving His Majesty. He now found everything fallen to the ground, and his houses, croplands, and pastures invaded. He found his sons and daughters naked and serving taxpaying Indian commoners. His children, nephews, nieces, and relatives did not recognize him, because he was so old when he returned. He must have been eighty years old, all grey-haired, thin, naked, and barefoot.¹⁹⁶

His *Chronicle* would remain buried in a European library in Copenhagen until 1908. The world of the poor 'Indians', the 'poor of Jesus Christ' in Modernity, would wait centuries for justice . . .

The Displacement of Alterity: From the Indigenous to the American Creole. The Political Humanism of Francisco Suárez

[114] The Jesuits, who arrived in America decades after the first religious orders, found a certain 'colonial order', confronted an existing state of things. In Peru, one meets, for example, José de Acosta (1540–1600), whose judgement is more conservative or less critical than Bartolomé de Las Casas and similar to that of Vitoria, since he does not accept the argument of Ginés de Sepúlveda but affirms the legitimacy of the conquest to Christianize America. In *De produranda indorum salute*,¹⁹⁷ he indicates that the Indians are called barbarians because 'they reject straight reason and the common way of life of the people',¹⁹⁸ without noting the Eurocentrism of such a definition, since he is speaking of the European 'straight reason' and the 'common way of life' (naively identified with that 'human'). For Acosta there are three types of 'barbarians'. First, 'those who do not separate too

194 Ibid., 966 [984]; p. 902 (Translation: Frye, 340).

195 The text of Marx to which we refer says: 'The State [German Lutheran] which acknowledges the Bible as its charter and Christianity as its supreme rule must be assessed according the words of the Bible; for even the language of the Bible is sacred. Such a state [...] finds itself involved in a painful contradiction, which is insoluble from the standpoint of religious consciousness, when it is referred to those words of the Bible 'with which it does not conform and cannot conform' (*On the Jewish Question*, I; Marx, 1956, MEW I, pp. 359–60 [Translation: Tucker, p. 38]). See Dussel, 1993, pp. 133f.

196 Ibid., 1094 [1104]; p. 1008 (Translation: Frye, p. 348)

197 From the Preface (Acosta, 1954, 391f.).

198 Ibid., p. 392 (Translation: TC). All 'people', evidently, think as the Europeans. It is a decided Eurocentrism.

much from straight reason and the general purpose of humankind',¹⁹⁹ and who have 'a stable republic, public laws, protected cities, obeyed judges, and most important, use and knowledge of letters, because everywhere there are books and written monuments, people are more human'. The Chinese, Japanese and 'many provinces in eastern India' have this degree of development. Second, 'included the barbarians, who although they did not use writing, nor philosophical and civil knowledge, nevertheless they have a republic and true judges, and seats or stable populations, where they keep police and armies and captains, and finally some solemn form of religious worship. Of this kind were our Mexicans and Peruvians.'²⁰⁰ The 'third class of barbarians' are 'similar to wild animals, who hardly have human feelings'; they are the Caribbeans, as 'infinite herds', the *mojos*, *chiriguanos*, those from Brazil, Florida, etc.

Acosta opposes Ginés and being a humanist does not admit so easily that the more virtuous and learned have to be in charge of the roughest and most ignorant:

Whoever wants to deduce from this that it is licit to seize from the barbarians the power they possess, with the same reason will conclude that where an adolescent or a woman rules they can by force stop the kingdom [. . .] Regarding the philosopher himself [Aristotle], about the just war against the barbarians that refuse to serve, this is darker and instils suspicions that it does not come from *philosophical reason*, but from popular opinion.²⁰¹

For Acosta, who already knew about the experiences of his Jesuit brothers in the Far East, civilizations in full development and superior in many aspects to Europe, it was necessary to establish differences between the cultures of China and India and others:

All these nations [China and Hindustan] have to be called to the Gospel in a way analogous to what the apostles preached to the Greeks and Romans [. . .] Because they are powerful and they do not lack knowledge and have to be defeated and subject to the Gospel *by their reason* [. . .]; and if one wants to subject them through force and with arms, one will only make them enemies of the Christian name.²⁰²

Alonso Sánchez, Jesuit missionary of the Philippines, although he had known the method of 'peaceful cultural adaptation' used by the fathers Ruggieri, Ricci (in China) and Nobili (in India), opposed Acosta, advising

¹⁹⁹ This and all the following texts are found in *ibid.*, pp. 392–4 (Translation: TC).

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Book II, ch. V (p. 437 [Translation: TC]). He accuses Ginés of being more an ideologue than a philosopher.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, Preface (p. 392 [Translation: TC]).

the use of arms in America, China and India. That Eurocentrism, shared by the Roman authorities, had harmful consequences.²⁰³ Bartolomé de Las Casas was even more radical, since he thought that in America arms were unnecessary.

[115] For his part, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) signified the political-judicial culmination of the philosophy of the Hispano-Luso ‘first early Modernity’, base of the developments of the new political philosophy of the seventeenth century in France, Flanders, England and Germany. Although implicitly recognized, it has not been given the place it merits in the history of modern political philosophy.

Suárez is situated in a surprisingly creative way to overcome the Nominalist positions (of Duns Scotus and Ockham accepting the knowledge of the ‘singulars’, although in a differentiated way), Scotist (by the notion of ‘concept’)²⁰⁴ and Thomist (in the analogy of being), from the modern experience of subjectivity, which has to be criticizable and positive. It is a ‘modern’ synthesis, which serves as a bridge between the beginning of the sixteenth century, which confronts the problems of the ‘discovery’ of the New World (the absolute Alterity of the indigenous) and the new experience of the individual subjectivity of North European Modernity, which the Jesuit movement develops in southern Europe.²⁰⁵ Suárez is the great master of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European rationalism. His *Disputationes Metaphysicae* had 19 editions between 1597 and 1751 (eight in Germany alone). His political writings were praised by Grotius as ‘without equal’; Descartes, Jesuit student in La Flèche, remembered that he read it closely (‘he is the first author who came into my hands’); Spinoza was inspired by him to read Revius, Franco, Burgersdijk and Heereboord (this last Suárez calls ‘*metaphysicorum omnium papam atque principem*’); Leibniz meditated on it in his youth; Vico dedicated an entire year to study it,²⁰⁶ Christian Wolff²⁰⁷ and A. G. Baumgarten too.²⁰⁸ Suárez permitted northern European philosophical thinking, under the theologizing influence of Lutheranism,²⁰⁹ to make the secular level of philosophical reason auton-

203 Acosta wrote his opinion in 1586 in *Opinion about the war of China*, and in *Response to the fundamentals that justify the war against China*.

204 See Minges, 1919.

205 The ‘examination of conscience’ that Suárez practised each day gave him sufficient material for a metaphysics of the self-conscious reflection of his own subjectivity. Descartes, who also practised a daily ‘examination of conscience’, began his philosophical discourse with a conscious self-reflexivity about his own *ego: ego cogito* signifies: ‘I am conscious of being conscious’ without any objective content. The ‘individuality’ of the subjectivity of the ‘examination of conscience’ made the initial ontological philosophical moment. See Wilson, 1965.

206 See Fraile, 1965, III, p. 468.

207 Wolff structured his *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia* of 1729 explicitly from Suárez (see *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967, VII, pp. 340–1).

208 His *Metaphysics* of 1739 shows the Suarezian presence.

209 See Streitcher (1928) and K. Eschweiler (1928) on the influence of Spanish philosophy, in particular sixteenth-century Suarezianism, on seventeenth-century German philosophy.

omous (which, paradoxically, will have Suarezian inspiration). Randall Collins writes:

Suarez's philosophy became the centre of the curriculum in Catholic and many Protestant universities (especially in Germany) for 200 years [. . .]. Wolff takes [from Suarez] ontology as purely self-contained argument over first principles, governed by the principle of non-contradiction. From thence he deduces the principle of sufficient reason that governs physical, non-logical necessity [. . .]. This is a touchstone of Leibniz's philosophy as well, and it is implicit in Kant's problematic of pure reason, the justification of the synthetic a priori. When Schopenhauer at the beginning of his career proposed to overthrow constructive idealism and return to Kant, his first statement was *The Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, with its explicit admiration of Suarez. Still later, Heidegger, the product of a Catholic seminary education – revived the ontological question [. . .]. This was one more move on the turf delineated by Suarez.²¹⁰

Suárez is particularly innovative in the theory of cognitive subjectivity. He accepts, on the one hand, that 'our understanding knows the singular material for its own species',²¹¹ following a Nominalist thesis, but at the same time has the capacity of knowing the universals through an inductive abstracting process,²¹² following the rationalist thesis. For Suárez, in a much more complex way, and nearer to Kant than the *Logique de Port-Royal*,²¹³ the act of knowing (*actus ipse, conceptus formalis, conceptus subiectivum*) is produced when a representation of the object,²¹⁴ present as an impression of subjective reality (species 'imprinted' by the 'active intellect' over the 'passive'),²¹⁵ is referred to as the thing (*conceptus objectivum*) in an 'express' way: the thing is known *in actu* as object (a known thing).²¹⁶

²¹⁰ Collins, 1998, p. 580. From 1550 to 1620 the University of Salamanca had matriculated on average 6,000 students, about 3 per cent of the male population. This quantity will be equalled by the USA in 1900 and by the United Kingdom in 1950 (*ibid.*, p. 581).

²¹¹ He writes: '*Intellectus noster cognoscit singulare materiale per propriam ipsius speciem*' (*De Anima*, IV, 3, 5) (Translation: TC).

²¹² '*Intellectus cognoscit proprio conceptu universalia, abstrahendo a singularibus seu non curando de illis*' (*ibid.*, IV, 3, 11).

²¹³ See *The Order of Things*, III, 3 (Foucault, 1996, 67f.).

²¹⁴ To speak of *objectum* is a 'modern' novelty.

²¹⁵ This 'active intellect' (of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas) will remain subsumed in Modernity in the productive and creative capacity of human reason in the 'constitution' of the 'object' (until Husserl or Heidegger). It will be 'subjectivity' as activity. The 'passive genesis' of Husserl will investigate the 'material' presuppositions of subjectivity.

²¹⁶ Suárez writes: 'It is not that in which (*in quo*) is produced knowledge [. . .], but it is that whereby (*id quo*) the object itself (*ipsum objectum*) is known with respect to the formal concept of the known thing (*conceptus formalis rei cognitae*), since for the thing to be thought into being it is necessary that in some way it is formed vitally (*vitaliter*) in the intellect' (*De Anima*, IV, 5, 11 [Translation: TC]). Unfortunately Suárez has been compared to Thomas Aquinas, in insignificant inter-scholastic disputes, or has been used to modernize from Kant or Heidegger (for example with Maréchal or Rahner), but the much more important historical task of showing the central philosophical themes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries intuited and initiated by Suarez has not been effected. This is important in my aim

[116] Meanwhile, at the political level, the colonial world had already reached a state of 'normality', like slavery; it was a 'fact' and so one could not criticize its possibility. Suárez, nevertheless, through the geopolitical and historical situation of Spain, proposes certain theses that appeared excessively progressive in other parts of Europe, like James I's England.²¹⁷ We observe his most important political-philosophical positions, which will have great relevance in nineteenth-century Latin American emancipation,²¹⁸ among other effects.

The law, an inductively universal concept abstracted from its singular species,²¹⁹ is based in a relation determined with the free subjectivity, and while free 'rectitude of conscience (*conscientiarum rectitudo*) rests upon the observance of laws [and interests us then] the study of the law as binding upon the conscience (*conscientiae vinculum*)'.²²⁰ The physical law necessarily inclines the agent to work; the law, which constitutes the right, 'bonds', relates, inclines the agent, intrinsically, as 'binding upon the conscience'.²²¹ The obligatory law is based in the will, which one promulgates (the legislator). The 'obligated' will indicates a bond with the 'obligating' will,²²² legislative, and the obligation is an 'imposing a moral necessity of action'.²²³

It is a philosophy of law that sets out from the free individuality of the modern subject without discarding the community to which it is linked in an intrinsic internal or constitutive way, *ex creatione*, obligated to carry out its ethical nature, also affectively.²²⁴ This obligation is not a recommendation

to show how philosophical Modernity began in Spain in the sixteenth century, and is formulated at the end of that century with Suárez and others.

217 *Defensio fidei* (published in 1613) was a work burned in England and condemned in France for showing that kings did not receive power (*potestas*) directly from God. Also negated, as usual in Spanish political philosophy, was the Pope's temporal power.

218 In Hispanic America, with the king of Spain, Ferdinand VII of Bourbon, Napoleon's prisoner in 1808, the whole process of the Emancipation was undone starting from a Suarezian judicial reasoning (*Vitoria* too), but not from the French Enlightenment philosophy: with the king being imprisoned the 'pact' of the kingdoms with the sovereigns does not exist, and so the 'kingdoms' recover their *principatum* (sovereignty).

219 '*Dicemus enim primo de lege in communi et deindi ad singulas species descendamus*' (*De legibus*, Prologue). Marx wrote methodically: 'From the abstract one rises to the concrete' (see Dussel, 1985a), but the abstract for Marx was the singular, and the concrete was the universal (the whole), from where he would 'descend' to the explicated singular. Suárez rises first inductively from the singular (considered) to the universal (constructed), and from that now 'descends' to that singular to verify the universal description in its specific difference.

220 *De legibus*, Prologue (Translation: Scott, p. 14).

221 Kant will comment, following the Suarezian tradition, that in the *Faktum* of the moral law is included an 'obligation'. The 'obligation' is possible in the ethical subject (not with physical or natural necessity) if it is autonomous, which has to affirm 'freedom' (that as *noúmenon* is empirically unknowable for Kant) as the postulated fundamental practice, as one of the four 'Ideas'. All is based on the law being obligatory.

222 For Suárez, the last resort was the will of God, and later that of the human legislator. For us it will be the political community itself, as 'sovereign' (*principata*), as legislative communitarian will it is given the legitimate law, and by this one has to obey it (is obliged).

223 (Translation: Scott, p. 26) '*Imponendo moralem necessitatem operandi*' (*De legibus*, I, 1).

224 'The inclination itself of the appetite (*fomitis propensio*) [. . .] might be termed 'law' [. . .] because it inclines thereto [to sin]' (*De legibus*, I, 1,4 [Translation: Scott, p. 23]).

of a type of 'advice', but it is the rule of the 'precept' *due*.²²⁵ One will have to distinguish between the 'common right' and 'one's own' or particular. The latter is what 'every man has, either over his own property or with respect to that which is due to him', which in a certain way is before the law (as promulgated) but is different from the common right.²²⁶ We see a description of the types of 'differentiated' rights:

Since the eternal law²²⁷ and natural temporal law²²⁸ have been discussed, the discussion of the positive law should follow. [. . .] We subdivided this phase into the divine²²⁹ and the human²³⁰ [. . .] In the opinion of Justinian, human law (*lex*) may be divided into that which pertains to common law (*ius*)²³¹ and that which pertains to the particular law (*ius*) (*proprii*). The former relates to the *ius gentium* [. . .] we are dealing with particular human law to which the name of positive human law has been applied, and which is said to be peculiar to any given state, commonwealth (*rei publicae*)²³² or similar perfect community (*perfectae congregationis*).^{233, 234}

Here Suárez is the master of European modern political philosophy, and with much more clarity than Hobbes and later Hume he explains a political theory valid in Hispanic America until the nineteenth century, which will justify the Creole struggle for emancipation, and allow the overcoming of 'late Modernity'.

[117] In the first place, the power (*potestas*) or 'principality (*principatus*)', the 'sovereignty', which Bodin defined, resides in the people or community,

225 In Latin *necessitudo* indicates a coercive type of necessity, that of the 'debtor' (which comes from *debitum/debitor*). In the Mexican náhuatl *mazehual* means the 'merited-debtor' (debtor of the life merited by the god).

226 *Ibid.*, I, 2, 5 (Translation: Scott, p. 30).

227 Suárez moves from the constructed universal concept of law as such (book I of *De legibus*) to his *differentiae*, in first place as eternal law in book II, chs 1-4.

228 As natural law in book II, from ch. 5 to 16.

229 As divine positive law in Books IX and X.

230 From ch. 17 of Book II.

231 As the law of people (Book II, chs. 17-20), unwritten or customs (Book VII) or written.

232 In Suárez *reipublicae*, in genitive, 'of the public thing' or 'that public' or communitarian. It is not the form of government distinct from the monarchy. It is a synonym of community.

233 Unlike Aristotle, for example, Suárez is thinking of a 'community (*communitas*)' that 'may be still further augmented, becoming a kingdom or principality by means of the association of many city states' (*ibid.*, III, 1, 3 [Translation: Scott, p. 364]). Suárez is thinking of Castile or Aragón, modern nations.

234 *De legibus*, III, 1, 1-2 (Translation: Scott, pp. 361-2]). Suárez will devote Book III to the written civil or positive political law. In addition, he will write about canonical law (Book IV), penal (Book V) and meritocratic (Book VIII). A more systematic treatment of the theme has not been written. It is the first in all of Modernity. It is similar, in its logical constitution to a modern 'treatise', *Metaphysical Disputations*. In four moments of his life, Suárez reflected intensely on the theme of rights and laws: in 1561-2 as student in Salamanca; in Rome as professor between 1582 and 1584; in Coimbra between 1601 and 1603; and in the writing and editing of *De legibus* around 1612.

who receive it from the Creator, not directly from human nature.²³⁵ No individual or immature community can exercise such a mandate; it can only be exercised when it has a sufficient civilizing development:

Said power resides not in individual human beings separately considered,²³⁶ nor in the mass or multitude of them collected, as it were, confusedly, in a disorderly manner, and without union of the members into one body; [. . .] the agent of the power (*subiectum potestatis*)²³⁷ must exist prior to the existence of the power (*potestas*) itself [. . .] it does not reside immutably therein, but [. . .] by its own consent (*consensu*)²³⁸ [. . .] Though by nature it may be free and may possess within itself the power to which we refer.²³⁹

The position is analytically complex. It does not begin from an individualism or a feudal communitarianism. The subject is found always in a political community. However, being the subject of power, it reflects on it and reaches an explicit consensus, without ever losing power although it is transferred.

A first fundamental consensus (a posteriori) of the political community exists, yet may not be written about explicitly:

The multitude of mankind should, then, be viewed [. . .] with regard to the special volition, or common consent, by which they are gathered together into one political body through one bond of fellowship [. . .]

The human multitude has to be considered [. . .] when by a special will (*speciali voluntate*) or common consensus (*communi consensu*) is united in a political body (*corpus politicum*) with a bond to society²⁴⁰; [. . .] not without the intervention of the will and the consent (*voluntatum et consensuum*) on the part of the human beings who have assembled into this perfect community.²⁴¹

235 'Human principates did not originate with nature' (ibid., III, 1, 12 [Translation: Scott, p. 371]).

236 Against the metaphysical individualism of North European Modernity.

237 Note the actual expression.

238 Observe anew the quasi-Habermasian expression. In another place we note this theory of 'consensus' in Bartolomé de Las Casas, in 1536 (in *On one mode*; see Dussel, 1995a).

239 Ibid., III, 3, 6-7 (Translation: Scott: pp. 379-81). The position of Suárez, like Las Casas and Vitoria, is clear: 'Man is by his nature free and subject to no one [. . .] so that human sovereignty is contrary to the order of nature' (ibid., III, 3, 3 [Translation: Scott: p. 363]).

240 Ibid., III, 2, 4 (Translation: Scott, p. 375). Suárez writes, as later Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, taking his inspiration from Leibniz (who refers to Suárez): 'for a mystical body (*corpus mysticum*) which, morally (*moraliter*) speaking, may be termed essentially a unity (*per se*)' (ibid.). For Suárez, this 'mystical body' is the empirical political body. For Leibniz and Kant the 'ethical community' (*moraliter* says Suárez) is transcendental; it is the 'kingdom of the spirits'. Take into consideration that the consensus ratified a posteriori (not as a pact a posteriori of isolated individuals, as in Hobbes) constitutes explicitly the 'link to society' (*societatis vinculo*) (ibid.) as such.

241 Ibid., III, 3, 6 (Translation: Scott: p. 380).

The human being is not, naturally and primarily, an isolated individual being. S/he was always in community. Although 'in the nature of things all men are born free',²⁴² s/he is always *subiectibilis*: a subject or capable of being a member of a political body.²⁴³ As in Ch. Peirce or in K.-O. Apel, the community is the starting point, but the singular subject does not dissolve either in the face of the original reflexive consensus or in the later pact with the ruler but can ask for an explanation from his/her freedom and never-infringed power.

This is because the community, to be able to exercise power empirically, creates institutions, magistracies or kings. Suárez thinks that the human being has the *principatum* or capacity to govern or to submit to institutions in a natural, free and mediated way:

The civil magistracy [political government: *magistratum civilem*] accompanied by temporal power for human government is just and in complete harmony with human nature.²⁴⁴

The delegated exercise of power, in certain cases, is reserved directly for the people or the community, as within the Byzantine republics, for example, Venice. Speaking of its 'legislative power' he writes:

This legislative power (*potestatem legislativam*) has also in its due time autarchic communities that are not governed by kings but by themselves (*per se ipsa*) aristocratically or popularly (*populariter*) [. . .] like Venice or Genoa and others, which although they have a doge or principal (*principem*) do not transfer (*transferunt*) all power;²⁴⁵ in those the regime is mixed and the supreme power (*suprema potestas*) is [. . .] in the whole body together with the head [. . .] From this form the power of legislating resides in the whole.²⁴⁶

The political community, the final repository of political power (*civile potestate*), can transfer or move it (*translata potestate*) to a magistrate or king, prior contract or pact.²⁴⁷ It is not a complete or irrevocable 'alienation (*alienatio*)', but a conditional, limited condition, never the last resort of power. The power emanates from the people, in the final instance:

²⁴² 'Ex natura rei homines nascitur liberi' (ibid., III, 2, 3 [Translation: Scott, p. 373]).

²⁴³ Ibid., III, I, II.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., III, I, 2 (Translation: Scott: p. 364).

²⁴⁵ 'Reserving' the right of judgement or revocation of the pact is the 'last resort' of power that the free subjects of the political community flaunt. A more complex and interesting solution than many later reductivist positions.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., III, 9, 6 (Translation: TC).

²⁴⁷ There is a first consensual reflective moment of wanting to form part of a community (first consensus) and the second consensual act of transferring original power, conditionally, to a particular authority (be it the doge or the king) (the political pact properly said). Here there is no Leviathan.

Civil power (*potestate civili*), whenever it resides, in the right and ordinary course of law (*legitimo*),²⁴⁸ in the person of one individual, or prince, has flowed from the people as a community (*ab populo et communitate manasse*), either directly or indirectly.²⁴⁹

Suárez reaches one of the main expressions of world political philosophy:

Such power, in the nature of things (*potestas ex natura rei*), resides immediately in the community; and therefore, in order that it may justly (*iuste*) come to reside in a given individual, as in a sovereign prince, it must necessarily be bestowed upon him by the consent of the community (*ex consensu communitatis*).²⁵⁰

[118] Suárez thinks that the types of government are of 'positive institution', although democracy is the only one, which does not demand specific organization, since it fulfils the demands of being the 'natural institution or emanation, simply by abstaining from a new or positive institution'.²⁵¹ In the case of the monarchy, which transference is not absolute (as in Hobbes), natural, or of divine institution (as James I, the Scottish king of England intended),²⁵² but human and conditional on a pact or positive agreement:

[When] the monarchical nature of the government of such a state (*reipublicae*) or province is brought about by human disposition (*ex hominum institutione*) [. . .] the principate itself is derived from human beings.²⁵³ Another proof of this derivation is the fact that the power of the king is greater or less, according to the pact or agreement (*pactum vel conventionem*) between him and the kingdom.²⁵⁴ [. . .] Once the power has been transferred (*translata potestate*) to the king, he is through that power rendered superior even to the kingdom which bestowed it; since by this

²⁴⁸ The concept of 'legitimacy' in Suárez has a classic conceptual clarity: it is the power that counts on the consensus of the people, or that fulfils the pact contracted through consensus.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 4, 2 (Translation: Scott: pp. 383-4).

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.* (Translation: Scott, p. 384).

²⁵¹ *Defensio fidei*, III, 2, 8-9 (Translation: TC).

²⁵² One can understand the anger of the king when, in *Defensio fidei*, Suárez writes: 'The Power of the king comes [. . .] by true natural consequence that shows natural reason; by itself *immediately* [the political power, even of the king] is given by God solely to such subject in who is found by strength of natural reason. However, this subject is *the people itself*, and not some person within it' (*Defensio fidei*, III, 3, 2 [Translation: TC]).

²⁵³ This was effected by election, consent of the people, just war, legitimate succession or by some gift. 'When the community is autarchic, it elects voluntarily the king, to whom it transfer its power.' (*De legibus*, III, 4, 1 [Translation: TC]).

²⁵⁴ In Spain, not only in Castile or Aragón, but also in the 'Kingdoms of the Indies', were the kingdoms that carried out the pact with the king of Spain. When Ferdinand VII was captured by Napoleon, the 'Kingdoms of the Indies' recovered their power, their autonomy, their liberty equal to the other 'kingdoms' of the Hispanic peninsula in 1809. This was rejected by James I of England, so the *Defensio fidei* of Suárez was burnt in the public square of London. Anglican Christendom was more royalist and conservative (Hobbesian) than the Spanish.

bestowal the kingdom has subjected itself and has deprived itself of its former liberty.²⁵⁵

This delegation is an alienation, although conditional, to give governability: 'the transfer (*translatio*) of the said power from the *res publica* (commonwealth) to the prince is a delegation, a transfer (as it were), that is to say, a limited alienation (*alienatio*) of the whole power which resided in the community.'²⁵⁶ That 'transference' of power can be invalidated, and the community can recover thus the exercise of power, or part of it, since the authority was conceded 'for a certain use' and not as inalienable property. The question is treated in chapter 19 of Book III of *De legibus*. Suárez explains one case of invalidation:

The political judge receives from the people his power (*ab populo potestatem*); the people could not give it to him without this condition, that the laws of the prince were not obligatory if the people themselves did not consent also in accepting them.²⁵⁷

Even in the case of a 'non democratic (*non democratico*)' regime, although the 'people transfer to the prince supreme power', there are many exceptions where one cannot accept the legitimacy of law (ch. 19, 7-13), as when 'the law is unjust'; when it is 'too burdensome'; when 'the people do not observe the law', and in the case of tyranny:

If the king changes his just power into tyranny, abusing it to damage the city, the people would be able to use their natural power to defend themselves, *because it never has been deprived* [. . .] For it is licit to repel force with force [. . .] necessary for the proper conservation of the republic, [and for this] is meant the exemption from the first pact where the republic transferred their power to the king.²⁵⁸

When the people condemn the king's exercise of power, and since they have never been deprived of power, 'that power remains (*permansisse*) in the community' as if 'it had not been transferred to the prince'.²⁵⁹

In addition, the Pope does not have power 'to give civil laws'²⁶⁰ neither does the emperor have 'universal power' to enforce Christendom,²⁶¹ less even 'in all the world (*universum orbem*)'.

²⁵⁵ *De legibus*, III, 3, 6 (Translation: Scott, pp. 386-7).

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 3, 11 (Translation: Scott, p. 391). In the case of the Roman 'senate' Suárez recognizes that the community is of that type of republics 'which are free in fact and which retain in themselves the supreme power' and only 'commit the task of legislation to a senate' (*ibid.*, 12 [Translation: Scott, p. 391]).

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 19, 2 (Translation: TC).

²⁵⁸ *Defensio fidei*, III, 3, 3; VI, 4, 15 (Translation: TC).

²⁵⁹ *De legibus*, III, 21, 6 (Translation: TC).

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 6 (Translation: TC).

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III, 7 (Translation: TC).

[119] Suárez criticizes anticipately and explicitly the loss of normativity of modern political-strategic action, as in the common interpretation of Machiavelli, for having a minimalist vision of politics:

[For Machiavelli] political stability and its conservation searches for secular power (*potestatem laicam*) and civil law directly and primarily [. . .]; the material (*materiam*) in law serves political stability and its conservation and growth; to this end the laws are given, since a true honesty is found in them, immediately becoming a false and apparent honesty, including concealing what is unjust if it is useful for the republic (*reipublicae utilia*).²⁶²

Anticipating Kant, he observes that the law 'cannot mandate an act purely internally directed'²⁶³ (it cannot demand morality immediately), but, although it rules over 'exterior acts', it can 'indirectly mandate the internal act, as consequence' (legality is completed necessarily with morality).²⁶⁴ The question is: 'can the civil law obligare subjects in the jurisdiction of conscience (*conscientiae foro*)?',²⁶⁵ and he responds:

[. . .] the metaphor of the word *foro*. The principal meaning is the place in which the judgements were made, but later it meant the judgement itself, and thus a double jurisdiction is distinguished; the internal and the external. [. . .] Coercion (*coactio*) does not possess the power of obligating the conscience, either it is morally (*moraliter*) impossible, because a just coercion assumes guilt [. . .], or it is insufficient, because with it in many cases the republic could not be helped sufficiently.²⁶⁶

We are in the presence of a European modern political philosophy in its most positive sense, without the reductionisms of the Hobbesian or later liberal Lockean individualism. This theory will serve as theoretical-political justification for the communities of Latin American Creole and Mestizo emancipators around 1810, to recover the power of the community (the 'State of the Indies') transferred to the king of Spain or Portugal by an originally implicit pact (in the case of Portugal, the Brazilian community made a 'new pact' in 1821 with the son of the king of Portugal, who would be

²⁶² Ibid., III, 12, 2 (Translation: TC). It is interesting to note that he has a normative sense of political action, against the mere strategy of modern politics of success 'in the short term'.

²⁶³ Ibid., III, 13, 2 (Translation: TC).

²⁶⁴ Ibid., III, 3, 9 (Translation: TC).

²⁶⁵ Ibid., III, 21, title (Translation: TC). It calls attention to the 'modernity' of the terminology. The Jesuits are the masters of the 'examination of conscience', which Descartes will practise daily in La Flèche. Although Suárez defines legality in the external jurisdiction (like Kant), he shows that the civil law has equally internal imperative capacity. He aspires to a strong political normativity, greater than the Habermasian.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., III, 21, 2; III, 21, 8 (Translation: TC). The theme would demand an extensive treatment impossible in this short panorama.

the Emperor Pedro I of Brazil and Maranhão). But the Suarezian ideology will not only motivate the Creoles and Mestizos (another type of Alterity than the Indians), but also will encourage the communitarian experience of the Jesuit *Reductions*, the more distant origin and immediate historical antecedent that inspires the first European socialists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Mably and Morelli, from where arises the *révolution des égaux* with Babeuf in 1794 in the middle of the French Revolution (the future Revolution in the heart itself of the bourgeois Revolution) and the later socialism.

In effect, the eighteenth-century Creole Jesuits return to indigenous origins to define themselves in the face of the absolutist Bourbonic Europeans. This is a great generation, with figures of intellectual eminence such as José Gumilla, Vicente Maldouado, Juan de Valasco, Juan Ignacio Molina, Francisco Xavier Clavijero, Francisco Xavier Alegre, Andrés Cavo, Andrés de Guevara, Diego José Abad, Rafael Landívar and other Jesuits. The 2,500, exiled through the Bourbonic expulsion of 1767 in Hispanic America and of 1759 in Brazil), wrote in Europe, Italy and other countries not only the colonial history of America, but narrated indigenous cultures and life prior to the eighteenth-century European invasion.

Mariano Picón-Salas calls it 'writings of the Jesuit *Émigrés*'.²⁶⁷ They offer a philosophical interpretation of the Creole state of mind (remembering the more consensual stage of the Austrians) against the Enlightenment Bourbonic absolutism (which was anti-popular and repressive in its colonial conception of politics). Andrés Cavo indicates that the Mexican indigenous had a 'cultural level [. . . that] was much higher than that of the Spaniards themselves when the Greeks, Romans, Gauls, Germans, and Bretons first came in contact with them'.²⁶⁸ Clavijero²⁶⁹ does not write a history of the Creoles but of the Aztecs, as defence against the ignorance of C. Pauw's questions about the American indigenous.²⁷⁰ Pedro José Márquez writes an aesthetics of the Mexican art of the Aztecs.²⁷¹ The distance of Europe permits him to appreciate better the stature and personality of the American indigenous cultures.

The affirmation began in the eighteenth century, new recognition of an Alterity, which had been negated since the conquest in the end of the fifteenth century.

²⁶⁷ Picón-Salas, 1965, pp. 815f. (Translation: Leonard, pp. 129-46). See Cavo, 1836; Decorme, 1941; Furlong, 1946; Alegre, 1956.

²⁶⁸ Quoted in Picón-Salas, 1965, p. 186 (Translation: Leonard, p. 138).

²⁶⁹ See Clavijero, 1945.

²⁷⁰ See Pauw, 1768-9.

²⁷¹ In Italian: *Due Antichi Monumenti di Architettura Messicana*. He describes the works that were 'ruthlessly destroyed by the Spaniards but deserved to be compared with the finest attainments of the Chaldeans, Assyrians, or Egyptians' (quoted in Picón-Salas, 1965, p. 187 [Translation: Leonard, p. 139]).

The Other First 'Early Modernity' Lusitanian Christendom in the Face of the Alterity of the African Slave

[120] We could discuss the Portuguese expansion in Brazil, the conquest of the Amerindians in that immense continent. But we will instead focus on what distinguishes Portugal from Spain.

The hermeneutical re-reading of the famous Aristotelian text floated over Modernity for centuries. Nevertheless, remember that Greece and Rome were slave civilizations of a cruelty without equal, hidden only by a distorted interpretation under the Western philosophical mantle of 'Hellenist Humanism' (in part invented by German Romanticism) of modern European 'classic' culture. It is not unexpected that an Aristotelian text was used argumentatively and philosophically by Ginés de Sepúlveda in the dispute of Valladolid in 1550 when he expressed that the American Indian is a 'slave by nature'.¹ Modernity later applied this argumentation to the Africans of the western coasts of the Bantu continent.

The extraction of precious metals in Mexico (Zacatecas, Durango and the mine region) and in Peru (Potosí, Huancavelica, etc.), the first money of the 'world-system', and the original accumulation of the rising European capitalism, transformed the life of the African continent, in particular the slave kingdoms of the savannah to the south of the Sahara, organized around a weak exploitation of gold, in comparison to the substantial quantities in the Latin American mines. The decline of the routes, which crossed the Sahara from Nigeria to the Mediterranean or to Egypt, allowed the growing sale of African countrymen from the communities with less warrior organization. The elites of the ancient Muslim kingdoms were transformed into hunters of countrymen of other ethnicities, who were sold to the Europeans in exchange for arms (produced in Europe) and for precious metals (extracted in Latin America with the blood of the Indians). The slavery of the undefended Bantu peasants, of African religions in their majority, was born thanks to the complicity of groups of African merchants, frequently Muslims, with the Europeans. The 'triangle of death', with one corner in

¹ 'He is by nature a slave (*phúsei doulos*) who is capable of belonging to another' (*Política*, I, 2, 1254 b 21 [Translation: Rackham, p. 23]).

Europe, another in West Africa and the third in tropical Atlantic America (from the Caribbean, a new 'American Mediterranean', which replaced the European and Muslim Mediterranean, to the northeast of Brazil and the southern US colonies), remained until the nineteenth century.

Western Africa and the 'Portuguese Afro-Atlantic Project'²

The north of Berber West Africa, colonized for more than 3,000 years by the Phoenicians (Punic culture), later occupied by the Romans, and Christianized with exponents like Augustine of Hippo, was invaded by Muslims (647–710 CE). The Berbers constituted the Maghreb in a semi-autonomous region of the caliphate. The Atlantic coast was dominated by the Almoravids (from 1054 CE) and later by the Almohades (from 1160 CE), fundamentalist Islamist communities, which in the twelfth century arrived from Córdoba at the gold mines of Ghana (in reality Senegal). In the south, the white Muslim nomads and merchants met the sedentary black Bantus. 'The pagan black person was in the eyes of the white person a possible slave; the black Muslim was transformed into the equal of the white.'³ The Bantu peasants were taken as slaves to the Muslim Mediterranean (the other commodity was gold) or through the desert (via Timbuktu, Gao, Takeda, Kanem) to Egypt. The kingdom of Ghana, converted to Islam in 1224, was later absorbed by the kingdom of Mali, which in 1312 was in its splendour, occupying territories from Dakar to Takeda, with the gold mines of Galam-Bambouk and Bouré.⁴ In this Sudanese–Nigerian region the Sonrhay kingdom reappeared (from 1464), which in the sixteenth century dominated the region (Senegal, Mali and the north of Nigeria). To the east were the communities of the Moshi-Dagomba and of the Hausa. All these kingdoms were Islamicized. However, the Yoruba, the people of Benin (who came into contact with the Portuguese in 1484) and the Noupé of Nigeria (in particular the Oyo kingdom with its capital Ifé) remained in the Bantu tradition. To the south one finds the Congo, whose Zaire river was discovered by Diego Cao in 1484. And further south was the kingdom of Angola. Meanwhile the Bantus, in the centre of Africa, went to Mutapa and South Africa.

The entire civilization of West Africa, in continuous movement, contact and growth, suffered the destruction wrought by European slavery, which paralysed its slow progress. The treatment of slaves was not the cause but the effect of the original modern event: the invasion of the Latin American

² About slavery, see Blackburn, 1997; Genovese, 1971; Curtin, 1985; Williams, 1944; Bastide, 1967; Dussel, 1982. About slavery in Latin America: Saco, 1938; Vilar Vilar, 1977; Mellafe, 1973; Knight, 1974. In Brazil: Freyre, 1979; Cardoso, 1977; Conrad, 1972. In the Caribbean: Handler, 1974; Aimes, 1907; Patterson, 1973. In Mexico: Brady, 1965. In Central America: Sherman, 1979; Zavala, 1953. In Greater Colombia: Escalante, 1964; Jaramillo, 1968; Acosta, 1966. In the Southern Cone: Sempat, 1965; Scheuss de Studer, 1958; Cruz, 1942. In Peru: Bowser, 1974.

³ Cornevin, 1964, I, p. 161 (Translation: TC)

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 161–77.

continent, the discovery of gold and silver, and the direct connection with the Orient achieved by the Portuguese. The kingdoms of the African savannah remained surrounded and entered into crisis.

Genoa, which had been with Venice a Byzantine province, had a certain supremacy in the western Mediterranean and had begun the discovery of the African eastern Atlantic, continuing a tradition initiated by the Phoenicians with their voyages. They disembarked in the Canary Islands in the fourteenth century. But its Mediterranean geopolitical situation, being only a port city (and not a continental country), meant it was not favoured in carrying out an Atlantic politics. It had to ally itself with Portugal to begin the slow reconnaissance of the Atlantic.

In 1147 the kingdom of Portugal, ancient Roman Lusitania (the first capital of Burgundy was Oporto), reconquered Lisbon from the Almoravids. In 1395, João I defeated the Castilians and ensured his independence supported by the Pope and England.

The naval 'School' of the Portuguese Prince Henry (1393-1460), called 'The Navigator' (which used Chinese maps from the Venetian trade, so the 'discoveries' were really 'recognition' of Chinese cartography),⁵ had excellent cartographers, astronomers, technicians in boat building (the 'caravel' was invented in Portugal in 1441) and seamen experienced in the navigation of the Mediterranean, and counted on the help of scientists (mathematicians, astronomers, cartographers, etc.) who were communities of Jews⁶ and Muslims who ran away from the first Almoravid persecutions, later the Almohades, and the Hispano-Christians. There were also Genoan navigators. Very quickly Portugal (the *Finis Terrae*) overcame its Arab and Renaissance masters in the discovery and dominion of the Atlantic, and transformed itself into the first European oceanic power. In general, the historians of modern philosophy (European-North-American) are completely blind to the importance of these events and so ignore the importance of Portugal,⁷ and later Spain, in the original constitution of Modernity. The University of Coimbra processed scientifically, philosophically, theoretically all these events. Europe emerged and liberated itself from the siege of the Turkish-Muslim culture *only* by the opening and constitution of a

5 The map of Heinrich Hammer from 1489 (see Dussel, 1995a) is a testimony to the Chinese discoveries, prior to 1492, except the Roman cartography put South America to the south of China. In the map of Waldseemüller from 1507, South America appears twice: once south of China and the other in its correct place, with the American coast of the Pacific, from Tierra del Fuego to Alaska, demonstrating again the Chinese cartographic presence (since no one in Europe knew the Pacific coast of America in 1507).

6 It was the Jew Abraham Zacuto who perfected a metal version of the astrolabe (he explained it in 1480 in his work *Almanach Perpetuum*), which could determine with extreme precision in reference to the stars the latitude in any place of the earth. The navigation of coastal traffic had been left behind; it was possible to advance into the ocean, as the Chinese had done centuries before.

7 Baruch Spinoza (in reality 'Espinosa', which comes from 'thorn' or 'thorny') belonged to a Jewish community of ancient intellectual tradition, which passed through Portugal (Sephardic) and was exiled in Amsterdam. The mother of Montaigne also belonged to an ancient Jewish Portuguese family.

world-system, which came to dominate territories and peripheral-colonial cultures, a structure, which China and Hindustan did not develop, which unfolded itself over the oceans and by a geopolitics combined and divided by both Iberian countries from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century. It is the 'rupture' from the ancient theoretical-scientific, philosophical and theological paradigm and the creation of the conditions that lead to the 'world-system', the origin of 'globalization' and therefore modern philosophy. We move from stage III to stage IV of the inter-regional system, now empirically global.

[121] In the fourteenth century, the naval-commercial power of Genoa had already come to an agreement with Portugal about the dominion of the African Atlantic.⁸ The 'Portuguese project', according to the millenarian conception accepted within the cultures of the Mediterranean of the exclusive existence of 'three continents' (to the east of the Mediterranean, Asia; to the south, Africa; to the north of the Mediterranean, Greece, Rome, Marseille . . . Europe),⁹ consisted of southern Africa until the European discovery of the always searched for path to the Orient, to the 'sea of the Arah's' (the Indian ocean), naval geopolitical centre of Hindustan and the Chinese system (in addition to the caravans which through Turan and Tarim had united China with India, the caliphate of Baghdad and Byzantium) for centuries. Portugal was still, as the Renaissance of the *Quattrocento* (Mediterranean, which opened to the south-eastern Atlantic near the African coasts), the final moment of the 'old world'.

Portugal conquered Ceuta in Muslim North Africa in 1415, discovered the Madeira islands in 1419, in 1431 the Azores, in 1434 Cape Bojador, the islands of Cape Verde in 1461, the Gold Coast in 1470, and in 1497 found the Cape of Good Hope, a path to India.

In 1441 an expedition sent to western Africa captured some Africans and ransom was asked. In 1444, 235 captives, white Berbers and black Bantus, were the first slaves sold in Portugal. The treatment of slaves was well established in Africa from the ninth century CE to supply workers for the gold mines of the Sudan. 'The armies of Mali, Great Fulo, Kokoli, Mane, and Songhai undertook wars and expeditions in which large numbers of captives were taken.'¹⁰ African slaves reached Cairo and Baghdad. The Portuguese created the *feitorias*, where they bought captives to be sold in the eastern Atlantic islands. The Madeira Islands exploited sugar in connection with Genoans and Dutch; in 1500 there were 211 sugar mills with slaves, which produced about 220,000 *arrobas*. One could also get sugar in San Tomé and the Canaries. Simultaneously Africans were sold in Europe. Quickly, they exhausted the discovery of gold (the nuggets were picked up in the

⁸ See Arrighi, 1994, pp. 109f.

⁹ Only after the decline of the western Roman Empire will one begin slowly to speak of 'Europe'. For the Greeks, 'Europe' are the cultural barbarians to the north of Macedonia. Classical Greece did not define itself as 'European'.

¹⁰ Blackburn, 1997, p. 102.

rivers and ground level deposits were few). From 1519 the growing and systematic form of slavery was institutionalized for the production of sugar,¹¹ which began equally to be exploited in the Caribbean, a region that rapidly overtook the Atlantic islands in its output. In the beginning the Portuguese had a monopoly, legitimized by pontifical 'bulls', under the mask of 'crusades' against the Muslims. The trade was much more profitable than that in India.¹² In Lisbon, the *House of Slaves* was born, which focused on the 'treatment of slaves', parallel to the *Clearing House* of Seville, dedicated to the Spanish 'trade' in Indians.

The economy of Caribbean tropical goods replaced the south-east Asian trade, in climates of more than 20°C on average and more than 1,000 millilitres of annual precipitation. The slavery of the Bantu peasants of the western coast of Africa was born, and managed by the African slave trading colonial powers (Portugal, England, France, Holland, Denmark, etc.). In 1525, the first African slaves reached Santo Domingo, coming from Andalusia.

The First Philosophical Critique of the Legitimacy of Modern Slavery: Bartolomé de Las Casas

[122] From a philosophical point of view, the acceptance of slavery in the Muslim, Byzantine and European thinking, as effect of a just war, as ransom for the losses of an unjust attack or simply by nature, was global. For the Christians, in all ways, although slavery could not be assigned through 'original sin',¹³ it was not condemnable as a positive institution when the causes of its legitimacy were provided.¹⁴ The modern scholars of the 'second Scholasticism' (Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, etc.) criticized the injustices committed against the slaves,¹⁵ but no one questioned the institution of slavery before the 1540s, a century after the 'treaty' of Portugal in western Africa.

An author taken as pro-slavery,¹⁶ Bartolomé de Las Casas, was the first to criticize the institution of slavery. From 1768, people have insisted that Las Casas accepted early in his life the sending of slaves from the Peninsula

¹¹ In 1519 the gold era ended in Santo Domingo and the Caribbean and the exploitation of sugar began. See Moya Pons, 1971, pp. 243f.: 'Making a new economy: the rise of sugar (1519-1522)'.

¹² In 1506 the spice trade was worth 35,000 ducats and the slave trade 120,000 ducats (48 million 'reis').

¹³ 'In the state of innocence one cannot have this type of domination, of one human being over another' (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 96, a. 4 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁴ See Höffner, 1957, pp. 460f.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ For example, Paget Henry (2000, 4, pp. 72 and 74) says Las Casas was not critical of slavery. For a list of the critiques against Las Casas beginning in 1768 with the *Recherches Philosophiques* of Corneille of Pauw (cf. Pauw, 1768-9), see the work of Pérez Fernández, 1991, pp. 31-68.

as a partial solution to the Indian problem.¹⁷ In 1516, he thought that slaves 'blacks and others' could be brought in order to work in place of the Indians.¹⁸ He neither brought the first slaves, nor took part in the 'treaty', nor traded. In 1518 he 'advised' 'the sending of black *Bozale* slaves',¹⁹ returning to the theme on another occasion.²⁰ In 1531 he repeats this error, not looking at its justification but simply accepting a given situation.²¹ In 1543 he thought about bringing slaves to Chiapas, where he was bishop.

Slowly he began to discover the problem of African slavery with equal clarity to that of the Indian. On his return to Spain, when he was exiled from the bishopric of Chiapas (1547), he stopped in Lisbon some time maybe to study the question of slavery.²² It seems he read works of Gomes Eanes de Zurara (*Account of the Events of Guinea*, unedited, c.1446-52), García de Resende (*Account of King Juan II of Portugal*, published in Evora, 1545) and Fernão Lopes de Castañeda (*History of the discovery and conquest of India by the Portuguese*, edited in Coimbra in that year of 1547).²³ A little later he achieved the liberation of the slave Pedro before the Council of the Indies.²⁴ Writing in 1560 Book 3 of the *History of the Indies*, he shows his complete change of attitude:

The cleric [Las] Casas gave first this advice that gave licence to bring black slaves to these lands, *not noting the injustice with which the Portuguese took them and made them slaves*; after he saw this, he did not give it, because they always were *unjustly and tyrannically made slaves*, for the same reason²⁵ as the Indians.²⁶

What is not noticed in this expression of repentance and correction of judgement is that it is the testimony of a radical change in his posture in the

17 He accepted at the beginning that human beings who were already slaves (white or black) in Europe could be sent to the Indies.

18 *Notes on remedies*, 'Eleventh remedy' (Las Casas, 1957-8, V, 9).

19 Pérez Fernández, 1991, p. 184 (Translation: TC). The slaves coming from 'Guinea' directly were called 'Bozales', not those brought from Europe.

20 *Notes on Remedies for the Indians* (ibid., p. 34) spoke of 20 slaves for sugar mills, and another *Notes on Remedies* (ibid., p. 39), 15 slaves.

21 *Map of the Council of Indies*, from 20 January (ibid., pp. 54-5), but now there are 'five or six hundred blacks' (Translation: TC).

22 From 1545 he had contact in Honduras with Pedro de Carmona, a slave whose owner had promised freedom at his death in writing. Yet, when his owner died he was sold repeatedly. Las Casas helped him; they travelled in 1547 to Spain and succeeded. Pedro de Carmona achieved his liberty thanks to Las Casas. This gesture shows the state of mind of the first 'defender of the African slaves in America'.

23 Later he consulted the work of João de Barros *Decades of Asia*, which appeared in 1552, when he had already finished the *History of the Indies*. He named some of these authors in the *History of the Indies*, Book 1, ch. 24, p. 91b.

24 See Giménez Fernández, 1960, pp. 567-9.

25 All the works and arguments that he had used for the Indians he now applied to defend the illegitimacy of slavery.

26 *History of the Indies*, Book 3, ch. 102 (Las Casas, 1957-8, II, p. 417 [Translation: TC]). Ch. 129 (ibid., p. 487) refers to this fact.

face of slavery and of an argument, which shows this new situation, *the first modern philosophical justification of the illegitimacy and injustice of the institution of slavery* as economic structure and law.

Proof of this change in attitude is found in 11 chapters of Book 1 of the *History of the Indies*, chapters 17–27,²⁷ added by Las Casas in 1554.²⁸ The gravity of the theme remains evident, perhaps not for an unprepared reader, but certainly in the biography of Las Casas. In 1514 Las Casas changed his life, what in Christian terminology would be called a ‘conversion’,²⁹ and the ‘*Encomendero* priest’ became a fighter for justice. He read a text that was determinative in understanding the relation between the economic structures and the celebration of the Christian Eucharistic rite, which he quotes in chapter 17:³⁰

The robbing of the poor to offer sacrifice is to sacrifice the son in the presence of his father. The bread is the life of the poor, he who robs that commits homicide. He kills the neighbour who stops their way of life, he who does not pay the just salary sheds blood.³¹

Las Casas understood that the rite became idolatry, seeing the relation between the bread the Indians (and now African slaves) produced and what was offered in the Christian liturgy: the son (the Indian, now the African slave) was sacrificed in the presence of a ‘god’, but if that ‘god’ received a human sacrifice it was a fetish and the act idolatrous. In 1514 then he could not celebrate the liturgy. He told the governor Velázquez and began the struggle for Indian justice. Then in 1554 he applied the text to the African slave.

[123] Las Casas reaches the theoretical–philosophical theme of criticizing the legitimacy of slavery (appearing to be the first who does this in Western thinking, early Modernity). After describing the passages of the ‘Portuguese project’ in the Atlantic thanks to the works of Prince Henry, he reflects:

Among other insults, grave evils and detestable injustices, damages and scandals of the Portuguese in those discoveries [of Africa] for those times,

²⁷ There are two references to the injustice of slavery in Book 1 of the *History of the Indies*, chs. 136 and 150 (*ibid.*, I, pp. 366 and 398).

²⁸ There are many signs that these were a later addition. For example, these chapters do not have the summary that Las Casas put at the beginning of each previous chapter. The editors themselves write: ‘This and the following chapters, until xxvii, lack the Summary in the manuscript’ (Las Casas, 1957–8, I, 64a [Translation: TC]).

²⁹ Read the description of this dramatic moment in Dussel, 1993, pp. 185f.; also in 1982a, pp. 56–65.

³⁰ The Latin text is found in the *History of the Indies*, Book 3, ch. 79 (Las Casas, 1957–8, II, 356 b), written before and copied in Book 1, ch. 24 (I, 92 b).

³¹ Translation mine from the Greek (and recent texts found in Hebrew in Qumrán). In a rational, strict, economic way, using a symbolic narration, the position of *Ben Sira* (*Ecclesiastes*) coincides with the economic structure criticized by Marx in the time of the hegemony of capital (see Dussel, 1993, chs. 4–5).

against the innocent dwellers of those lands, with them were Moor or Indians, blacks or Arabs,³² was one who now we will call very distinguished [. . .] The fathers abandoned the sons, the husbands the wives, the mothers hid among the herbs and bushes. [The Portuguese] arrested 155 alive and killed many others [. . .] They were robbed and held up, captured, without having offended nor owning a thing in the world, without arms and in their peaceful and secure houses.³³

Las Casas describes at length the pains, injustices and tortures suffered by the captured Africans (with equal vehemence to that of the Indian). Next he begins his argument with: 'those who cry and suffer and raise their hands and eyes to heaven, being thus, *against natural law and all human reason*, deprived of their liberty and wives and sons, country and rest'.³⁴ Giving as an example a group of Africans who confronted the Portuguese, he writes:

[. . .] these were the first who the Portuguese *justly* killed, since the Portuguese had killed and captured with *injustice* all prior. No one *who has human reason, and much less learned*, will doubt those people had against the Portuguese *just war*.³⁵

Las Casas justifies the defensive war (the use of armed coercion in defence of their own rights) of the Africans against the Europeans, antecedent of the war against slavery, colonialism and globalization, against the so-called 'modernization', which Western culture feels obliged to universalize.

Using traditional modern syllogistic logic, he argues against the legitimacy of slavery, negating anticipatorily the arguments of Hobbes, Locke and so many others, showing three performative contradictions in the conduct and justification on the part of the Europeans who claim to be Christians:

[a] Here is another great blindness of Portugal [. . .] he who works to bring the infidels or Moors to the faith [Christian] [goes] to assault and rob those who live in their peaceful and secure houses³⁶ [. . .]; [b] the second, he is ordered to bring them to the faith, as if he were selling them such and such a commodity and it was no more than that,³⁷ [c] the third, having done such wicked, evil and horrible things, do not consider [. . .]

³² Las Casas universalizes the conclusions at which he has arrived with respect to the Indians, and applies them to all human beings, reaching an unprecedented 'critical-cultural universalism'.

³³ *History of the Indies*, ch. 24 (I, pp. 91–2 [Translation: TC]).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 94 (Translation: TC). For Francisco Suárez slavery was not a natural right (see *De legibus*, III, ch. 2, 4; Suárez, 1967, II, p. 198), but was not contrary to natural right with just causes.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. 25; p. 95 (Translation: TC).

³⁶ We have changed the order of the quote to shorten the text.

³⁷ It is interesting to see how Bartolomé shows that for the merchant (or the future capitalist) having a new Christian is like increasing the market for a 'religious good' (in the sense of Pierre Bordieu).

what will³⁸ to receive their preaching there could be, since they have given such good examples of Christendom [he expresses ironically].³⁹

[124] To these contradictions Las Casas adds another, which justified slavery only if it was fruit of a 'just war', as punishment or reparation for such a war. There is no 'just war' in this case. The war that the Portuguese practise is unjust, and any just war would be on the part of the Africans. None of the three causes of 'just war' applies in this case:

The first is if they challenge us and war against and harass Christendom [and it is not the case]. The second cause could be just our war against them, if they persecute or hinder maliciously our faith and Christian religion [and neither is this the case]. The third cause of the Christian people making just war against any infidels, could be for stopping us⁴⁰ from having our kingdoms and other goods unjustly [. . .] Never did they deprive us [of anything] as they lived so distant from the Moors who tire us,⁴¹ because the boundaries are Ethiopia [. . .] then with what reason or justice would one justify or excuse such evils and offenses, so many deaths and captures [. . .]?⁴²

For all this, it

is worth noting that against no infidel, be they Moor, Arab, Turk, Tartar or Indian or of any other kind, law or sect that there was,⁴³ *it is not possible nor is it licit for the Christian people to make war*, nor bother, nor aggravate with any damage to their person or thing [. . .] and the Christian is obliged to make restitution to those who they rob and damages that they made.⁴⁴

Slavery in this case is illegitimate.⁴⁵ From 'the year 1442 [. . .] all the ships that [Prince Henry] sent that brought many Moor slaves [. . .], and *thus I believe, truly*, that more offended than served God, because they defamed their faith and caused those infidels to hate the Christian religion'.⁴⁶

38 Or interest on the part of the Africans.

39 *Ibid.*, ch. 25; p. 95 (Translation: TC).

40 Having occupied, robbed.

41 Speaking of 'Moors', he says they are of 'brown' colour, 'blacks'. The Berbers of North Africa are brown, black and are 'the Moors who tire us', the Muslim Maghreb. The 'Moors' around Ethiopia are the Bantus from south of the Sahara.

42 *Ibid.*, ch. 25; pp. 95-7 (Translation: TC).

43 Here Las Casas has amplified his description, and to the Turk adds the Tartar and Asian and Indian. It is an incredibly full cultural universalist vision, greater even than that of Kant in *Perpetual Peace*.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 95 (Translation: TC).

45 A year later, in 1560, the bishop of Mexico Alonso de Montúfar (bishop from 1554 to 1572), in a letter to the king, writes that it is 'as unjust the capture of the blacks as that of the Indians' (*General Archive of the Indies of Seville*, Audience of Mexico 336, Montúfar volume [Translation: TC]).

46 *Ibid.*, ch. 24; pp. 90-1 (Translation: TC).

Las Casas did not consider only the Portuguese cause unjust, but the Spanish⁴⁷ too, since the Spanish 'who had long been capturing black slaves in Guinea, for *whom we paid good prices*, increased the trade by whatever means possible and the Africans themselves, seeing the demand, warred among themselves to sell slaves illicitly to the Portuguese. Thus, we are *guilty of the sins* committed by the Africans and the Portuguese, *not to mention our own sin of buying the slaves*.'⁴⁸

I hope that after considering these arguments the Afro-Latin-American, Caribbean and North American movements can also refer positively to Bartolomé de Las Casas, since he anticipated the modern critics of slavery.

In 1555 the University of Coimbra published, just after the change in the Las Casas' position, the work of Fernão Oliveira *The Art of War of at Sea*, where he refers to the 'inventors of a malignant commerce', which consists in 'buying and selling free and peaceful human beings, as they buy and sell animals', and where he condemns the 'aggression without cause against the Moors, the Jews or the gentiles, who want to be in peace with us [. . .]. To confiscate lands, hinder them cultivating themselves, capture their people [. . .] it is a manifest tyranny.'⁴⁹ In 1560 the book of Martín de Ledesma *Secunda Quarta*,⁵⁰ which criticizes the slave trade, also appeared also in the University of Coimbra.

Tomás Mercado (d.1575), a Dominican friar, in his *Compendium of Deals and Contracts* (written in Seville and published in 1569), in the penultimate chapter attacks the slave trade, although not slavery as an institution. Bernabé de Albornoz, who taught at the University of Mexico (first university in the continent with Lima),⁵¹ wrote *The Art of Contracts*, published in 1573 (seven years after Las Casas' death), where he argues that the war, the sale or the apparent 'salvation of the soul' (since some reasoned that the loss of empirical liberty was not comparable with the Christian salvation achieved as a member of a Christian society, even as a slave) are not sufficient reasons to justify slavery.

Luis de Molina (d.1600) is very meticulous in describing the sufferings of the slaves, observing the facts, but at the end he justifies slavery:

Weighing such reservations, Moline arrives at the practical conclusion that the owners of slaves, that is to say, principally the Spanish of the New World, can keep their slaves with calm conscience as there are no

47 We can apply this argument in our time to the question of drugs. If in Bolivia or in Colombia one produces coca, the greater responsibility belongs to who buys and consumes, the USA.

48 *Ibid.*, Book 3, ch. 129; II, p. 488 (Translation: Collard, p. 258).

49 Oliveira, 1983, pp. 23-5 (Translation: TC).

50 See an example in the National Library of Madrid, 472 (quoted in Blackburn, 1997, p. 125).

51 The plaque put on the statue of the founder of Harvard University says that this university, founded in 1636, was the first in America. In Massachusetts one does not study history!

final proofs of the injustice of their reduction to slavery, *which only will occur rarely*.⁵²

In the seventeenth century, Alonso de Sandoval's (d. 1652) *De instauranda aethiopia salute*, published in 1647,⁵³ sounds like José de Acosta's about the Indians. It is the first extensive work, written by a Jesuit who having dedicated his life to the slaves, and following the example of Pedro Claver in Cartagena of the Indies in the struggle against their maltreatment, nevertheless never put into question theoretically the institution of slavery.

In 1681 Francisco José de Jaca edits a *Resolution on the Freedom of Blacks* in which he makes a timid attack on the institution of slavery itself.⁵⁴

In Brazil, Antonio Viera amply justifies slavery within an apocalyptic vision, in which Portugal would be the great global empire, although he criticizes slavery's excesses.⁵⁵ He argues that the Bantu in Africa were in the 'hell' of paganism; in Brazilian slavery they reached Christian 'purgatory', to earn 'heaven' after death.

Slavery in the Liberal Bourgeois Interpretation: John Locke

[125] The Anglo-Saxon world opened itself later to the slave trade. It began with piracy. Francis Drake and many others, between 1585 and 1603, counting on up to 183 boats, which made 74 attacks. The exploitation of sugar in Barbados made the slave trade possible. It began with 50 individuals.⁵⁶ John Seldeu, in *Mare Clausum* (1653), justified commerce with a colonial world. Jeremy Taylor, with his *Ductor Dubitandum* (published in London in 1660), demonstrated that there is a natural right based in the Old Testament to the new lands discovered, and "Therefore to save my own life, I can kill another or twenty, or a hundred, or take from his hands to please myself."⁵⁷ John Vaughan or Thomas Hobbes thought similarly.

After the *Glorious Revolution*, the traditional vision of liberal thinking was expressed in the position of John Locke (1632–1704).⁵⁸ We assess it here because it constitutes an open chapter still, since even now political-philosophical arguments within the 'logic' of Locke are wielded, in particular in world politics and in international forums.⁵⁹ It is a particular application

52 *De Justitia et Jure*, disp. xxxvi, n. 1 (Translation: TC). Cf. Höffner, 1957, p. 475.

53 See Sandoval, 1987.

54 See López, 1982.

55 See Viera, 1907–09, XII, pp. 301–34.

56 Blackburn, 1997, pp. 235f.

57 Quoted in Blackburn, 1997, p. 249.

58 See Hinkelammert, 2000.

59 In the meeting of the United Nations on Racism (7 September 2001 in South Africa) the European Union did not easily accept slavery as a crime against humanity. The USA and Israel left the meeting in protest. In the Afghanistan war, 15 October 2001, one punishes an innocent people, guilty of hosting terrorists. The death of entire populations of peripheral countries is not entered into the books as equal (like the slaves) to the dominating nations. *Ad intra* (in the slave metropolises) are human beings; *ad extra* are barbarians, Indians, Africans, Asians, 'slaves by nature'.

of the 'logic of totality' with an exemplary tautological coherence, which allows one to justify, within the spirit of the English revolution of 1688, the 'slave trade' (and slavery as an institution), a *business* in which Locke had privately invested some of his assets. In the second of the *Two Treatises on Civil Government*, published in 1690, he addresses the theme. Opposed to the Anglican Church and the monarchic absolutism of the Tory party, he expresses in a secularized and aggressive way the new bourgeois position of the Whigs. The slave trade was booming. England competed with Portugal and especially with Holland. He makes a universal declaration about equality:

[The natural state is] a state also of equality [. . .] no one having more than another; [. . .] promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, [. . .] should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection.⁶⁰

In the face of this declaration slavery should be impossible. But it is not. How does Locke justify slavery? His argument starts from the demand of the conservation of one's own life and of the rest in the 'state of nature',⁶¹ from where he deduces that one has the right to punish those who do not fulfil natural law: 'has a right to punish the transgressors of that law. [. . . This] preserve[s] the innocent and restrain[s] offenders'.⁶² The transgressor, by not fulfilling the law, 'declares himself to live by another rule than that of common reason and equity [. . .] and so he becomes dangerous to mankind'.⁶³

The obvious question would be: how can the crime of the offender be determined and how can the judge 'preserve mankind in general' in the face of that crime?⁶⁴ The response of Locke, assuming we are in the state of nature, seems simple and evident: 'every man hath a right to punish the offender'.⁶⁵ The offender, by opposing natural law,⁶⁶ has no rights, since 'reason does not rule with him'. One moves from a state of nature (or the civil state) to a 'state of war', which for Hobbes is simultaneous. For Locke, though, the state of nature is not of war; one enters into the state of war when one opposes natural law or hates us unjustly:

One may destroy a man who [. . .] has discovered an enmity to his being,⁶⁷ for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because they are not

⁶⁰ *Two Treatises on Civil Government*, II, 4; Locke, 1976, 5; Eng. ed. 1960, p. 5.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, § 6; p. 6; pp. 6-7.

⁶² *Ibid.*, § 7; p. 7; p. 8.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, § 8; p. 8; pp. 8-9.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Who judges that someone has opposed natural law? Locke would respond: 'Anyone'.

⁶⁷ The pronouns, 'we' and 'I' are the subject who judges the guilty who arrogates the defence of humankind, who historically and in fact is the English liberal bourgeoisie.

under the ties of the common law of reason, have no other rule but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as a beast of prey. [. . .] So that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into a state of war with me [. . .] freedom being the foundation of all the rest.⁶⁸

[126] In the state of war, the state of nature does not rule, nor the civil or political state. It is precisely to overcome the state of war, and to have a judge with law that the civil or political society is born. That political judge has intra-statal authority. The nations return to the state of nature between them, because they 'want of a common judge with authority',⁶⁹ and each one is the only judge within his own conscience, and 'the appeal lies to God in Heaven'.⁷⁰ As slavery is established in an external relation between nations (for example, England with the African communities) there is no political supranational authority to clarify the conflict. Only the state of nature (or war) rules. The state of war is a state of exception à la Carl Schmitt, in which the Other, the dignity of the Alterity, is destructive. This negation of all right of the Other, which remains reaffirmed in the concept of 'despotic power', is what Locke had to prove, but he assumes it and so changes tautologically his argument.

Levinas understood this tautological totalitarian argument well, the foundation of Modernity (and of the conception of human rights among US liberals, not the fundamentalist conservatives, from the time of the promulgation of the Constitution until the Afghanistan and Iraq wars),⁷¹ when he writes in the Preface of *Totality and Infinity*:

The *state of war* suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives. [. . .] War is not only one of the ordeals – the greatest – of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means [. . .] is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason.⁷²

68 Ibid., § 16; p. 14; p. 16; § 17; p. 15; p. 16.

69 Ibid., § 19; p. 16; p. 18.

70 Ibid., § 20; p. 18; p. 19.

71 The USA has not approved the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights for this reason; its understanding of human rights assumes that the USA is the 'judge', last resort, who declares what is or is not defence or attack on a human right. No tribunal outside of the USA itself is accepted as reference. In the relation between states we meet in the 'state of nature', John Rawls, in *The Law of Peoples* (Rawls, 1999), is very careful to distinguish between a *law of people* and a *law of state*. States demanded an international law and start to construct an *International state*, at least international institutions and laws that will allow us to move the relations between states from the 'state of nature'. Rawls sees comfortably the reasonable state (of nature) where his own country (USA) is the subject of justice, the judge, who can define who is a *decent people* (p. 63). It is a completely tautological argument: the community of North American conservatives is the 'last resort' of all political judgements, including knowing when the conditions are given for 'just war' (pp. 89ff.). This continues the argument of Locke.

72 *Totalité et Infini*, Preface; Levinas, 1968, ix (Translation: Lingis, p. 21).

In the Levinasian ethic, and in my own *Ethics of Liberation*, the Other can never lose their rights, their dignity, and can never be an object, as Locke wants, of a 'despotic power', as he defines it. If a community judges, since 'anyone' has this natural right, following Locke, that the African has negated natural law or has taken up arms unjustly (following my particular criteria of justice) or simply 'hates me', the African loses all rights immediately and is an enemy (the *enemies* of Schmitt) against whom one can declare a 'just war'. If one is defeated, all depends on military technology, pure effect of 'instrumental reason'. S/he will be defined 'justly' as a slave. We analyse step by step the argumentative process in Locke's chapter 4, 'On slavery', and in other later sections.

He defines the universal principle, which he will demarcate to justify slavery. His strategy is to enunciate positively what he intends to negate as exception.⁷³

A man not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent enslave himself to anyone [. . .] He that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it.⁷⁴

He immediately introduces an exception to the rule:

Indeed, having by his fault *forfeited* his own life by some act⁷⁵ that deserves death,⁷⁶ he *to whom he has forfeited it*⁷⁷ may (when he has him

73 He argues similarly against the American indigenous: 'God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common' (op cit., § 34; Locke, 1976, p. 27; 1960, p. 29). And now the exception: 'yet there are still great tracts of land to be found, which the inhabitants thereof, not having joined with the rest of mankind [read: the English bourgeois liberal] in the consent of the use of their common money, lie waste' (ibid., § 45; p. 36; p. 39). To occupy these lands is not to usurp the right of anyone, since they were 'empty', 'uncultivated'.

74 Locke, 1976, § 23; p. 20; p. 21.

75 For Ginés de Sepúlveda the indigenous who struggles against the Spanish conquistador (in his/her own defence for Bartolomé de Las Casas) is guilty of rejecting being civilized. Kant in the definition of *Aufklärung* includes this 'self incurred immaturity' (*selbstverschuldete Unmündigkeit*) (see Dussel, 1995a, ch. 1). Locke says: *by his fault*. The victim is transformed first into the guilty, so the criminal (Locke and his slaveholders) is judged (inverting the question) to be the object of an aim of assassination by his/her victim. The victimizer reclaims his victim and makes him want to victimize. Locke, the English slaveholder, accuses the African slave of being obliged to fulfil the just task of being enslaved, and so will demand reparations for the costs that his victim has obliged him to accrue, as in the Iraq war unleashed by George W. Bush (from 2003).

76 Locke would have to prove that the poor innocent Bantu peasants trapped like animals and sold as 'commodities' merited pain. Bartolomé de Las Casas saw these questions with greater rational and logical clarity.

77 Locke said no one could 'lose the right to their life', because no one 'has' such right: how could one have 'right to life' if the life is the assumed basis of all rights? To have a 'right to life' one would have to be a subject of right prior to life itself, which is absurd. If one does not have 'right' or 'power' over their own life, one cannot lose what one never had. The intelligence of Locke seems to have remained obscured by his passion for justifying his personal (and country's) *business*: the slave trade.

in his power)⁷⁸ delay to take it, and make use of him⁷⁹ to his own service; and he does him no injury by it. For whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, 'tis in his power by resisting the will of his master to draw on himself the death he desires.^{80, 81}

This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else but the *state of war* continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive.⁸²

The reason given is not an ethical justification but the description of a factual situation: the power exercised by the technically stronger one in the art of military strategy. Modernity is always imposed over the Amerindians and the Africans (from the sixteenth century) simply and as a last resort through arms. But this cannot be accepted publicly in a European 'civilized' society as a sufficient reason. He has to give it a moral 'appearance'. Locke intends to find those reasons in tradition.

[127] Aristotle had distinguished between 'despotic power' (*despoteia*) and 'political power'.⁸³ Locke applies this distinction not in the state of nature or the political state but in the 'no man's land' (the Guantánamo of the Taliban prisoners) that is the state of war and, inverting the facts (since the Africans are the attacked and he describes them as aggressors), argues:

Despotic power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life whenever he pleases.⁸⁴ [. . .] The aggressor [. . .] having quitted reason, which God⁸⁵ hath given to be the rule betwixt

78 This assumes a theory of 'just war' and of the 'state of war' in which the conqueror would have 'the right to the life of the other'. But if the living human subject does not have right to his/her own life, they have even less right to a third. No one can have the 'right over another's life'. Locke affirms an absurdity through a tautological, totalitarian tradition, contrary to liberal dogma: 'freedom being the foundation of all the rest' (Locke, *Social Contract*, § 17; p. 15; p. 17).

79 Here Locke falls into a cynicism that surpasses that of Ginés de Sepúlveda. First, expressing a human person as what one 'has in one's power' – he makes a thing of Alterity, showing his ethical lowliness – and, second, he states that what is made with the 'thing' one 'owns' (not only using in work or as a sex object, but torturing it and nearly killing it by pure capriciousness). From where has this author taken that absolute ethical destitution of the Other?

80 Locke reaches incredible sadism, consoling the slave mercifully with suicide. Before such a brutal, bestial justice, the reader remains dumb, bewildered, silenced . . .

81 Locke, *Social Contract*, § 23, p. 20; pp. 21–2.

82 Locke, 1976, § 23, p. 20; p. 22.

83 Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2, 1255 b 16–17. Locke had to read a few lines after the definition of the 'slave by nature' this distinction: 'Republican government controls men who are by nature free, the master's authority men who are by nature slaves' (*ibid.*, 1255 b 17–18 [Translation: Rackham, p. 29]).

84 This definition is simply that of a pathological, irrational, sadistic, cynical power of incredible cruelty. How can one imagine a human being that could have the right to take the life of another for pure pleasure? This 'despotic power' is unjustifiable, not in a state of nature (no animal can fulfil this definition or the species would have quickly become extinct), from any ethical, strategic or instrumental point of view; he describes simply a tyrannical, irrational, totalitarian, self-destructive will.

85 One asks: what does 'God' add to the cynicism? He seems to use the divinity as protection to express a totalitarian pseudo-argument.

man and man, and the peaceable ways which that teaches,⁸⁶ and made use of force to compass his unjust ends upon another [. . .] And thus captives, taken in a *just and lawful war*, and such only, are subject to a despotical power [. . .] but is the state of war continued.⁸⁷ The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a *just war*, is perfectly despotical.⁸⁸

[128] For Locke, as with the relations between nations, one does not return simply to the state of nature (as for Hobbes or Hegel) but accedes to a state of permanent war. And, as Levinas said, 'the *state of war* suspends morality'. Slavery is a morally unjustifiable fact but one can prove its legitimacy within another logic, the state of war, the 'totalitarian logic' of Modernity whose syllogism is:

First, in the *state of nature* all are equal and free.

Second, if someone stops fulfilling the natural law s/he is transformed into an 'outlaw', into the 'enemy' that can be killed as a savage beast for being dangerous to the community. One cannot attribute to it equality and liberty. One moves to a *state of war*.

Third, the authoritative judge only exists in the *civil or political state*. In the relation between nations there is no judge or authority (because there is no global state). The only relation possible is what the *state of war* establishes.

Fourth, when any nation judges that another has attacked it or has treated it with injustice or hates it (cause indicated explicitly by Locke), that nation becomes the aggressor and it is judged to be the enemy of the nation, outside of law and right, and against it one can exercise a *just war*. Only God can judge the injustice or imprudence of this decision or practical judgement.

Fifth, the victor (the strongest or better armed), because of the right of victory, can enslave the defeated, because being outside of law and right one has '*despotic power*' over him or her, just and legitimate power. The goods of the defeated can compensate the losses of victor in this just war.

This argument produces a complete *inversion* of what happens in reality, and is purely *tautological* in its ethical and political sense. First, because the 'innocent' African peasant has been made a violent aggressor (inversion of empirical facts). Second, because the 'judge' (in the fourth moment), without authority or political power due to the non-existent global state (instead in a *state of war*), has legitimate despotic power over the defeated. Follow-

⁸⁶ As one has not fulfilled the established law he remains 'outside the law', and as one has not accepted the 'peaceful resources' they apply the resources violently. Although the poor African peasant had a state outside of the law and had not been peaceful (which is false, because it was within 'their customs' and they never attacked a single European), it could not lose its human rights; it could not be treated as a 'wild animal' who could be killed because 'it pleases' (the sadist).

⁸⁷ Locke, *Social Contract*, § 172; p. 132; pp. 146-7. See Hinkelammert, 2000.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, § 180; p. 138; p. 153. Locke will equally justify the conquest of America (§§ 145f.). The African slave is as negated as the American Indian in the political philosophy of the founder of modern liberal thinking. Liberty *ad intra*, colonial despotism *ad extra*. A double moral; a double politics.

ing this argument, each nation could consider any other as an 'outlaw' for not fulfilling its 'cultural' or ethnocentric interpretation of natural law or what one's own 'God established as law'. It is a radically self-referential tautology, without any criteria of universal exteriority; it is purely subjective, arbitrary, intra-cultural, dogmatic, totalitarian. This argument expresses the rationality of slave and colonial 'modern Reason'; it founded the conduct of the European metropolis toward the colonial world, and toward slavery in the Modern Age, until the present.⁸⁹ It is a radical exclusion of the dignity of Alterity; it is the negation of all law (natural, of nations or international) proper to the identity of the African enslaved against all reason.

We are still far from 1774, the year John Wesley published his *Thoughts on Slavery* from a Christian critical point of view, or when two years later Adam Smith himself defends the liberty of the slaves on the basis of purely bourgeois reasoning:

It appears, accordingly, from the experiences of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves.⁹⁰

The struggle of the slaves and the philosophical self-understanding of their emancipation are thus indicated in their origins.⁹¹

⁸⁹ In the Gulf War the USA had the help of the United Nations. In the Kosovo war, it only had the help of NATO. In the Afghanistan war, it acted from its own decision, 'as judge and jury', defining who is a terrorist and who is not, fulfilling the argument of Locke. The terrorists have lost their human rights and no longer merit tribunals where those demanded rights would be fulfilled. 'The state of war [that now is the permanent state of globalized politics under the military power] suspends morality', we quote Levinas. His words would also apply to Israel in December 2001, and we would discover, with great sadness and against the thinking of the great Jewish philosopher, that the argument of Locke is again used by the then prime minister A. Sharon, and most recently in the war on Lebanon (2006).

⁹⁰ *The Origin of the Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 8; Smith, 1984, p. 79 (English: p. 90).

⁹¹ See the valuable work of Paget Henry, 2000.

The Second 'Early Modernity'

The Christendoms of Northern Europe (1630–1789)

[129] We differentiate three Modernities (early, mature and late). In the first, we now situate a *second* moment. Post-Hispanic Modernity,¹ separated from the Mediterranean, with the strong influence of late feudalism, continental by not being connected with the African and Asian system, only Atlantic in the better of cases (when the modern Atlantic began to be born), separated from northern Europe (the 'heart of Europe' for Hegel in the beginning of the nineteenth century),² was in the sixteenth century the periphery of a non-hegemonic Europe of the recent 'world market', which had still not begun to unfold. In the sixteenth century, the political philosophy of these countries was less developed than those of Italy, Spain or Portugal. The theory of *consensus* of the communities (in the radical sense of Bartolomé de Las Casas who had experience of extra-European peoples), Hispanic kingdoms or nations that made a *pact* with the king elected by the 'kingdoms' (like those of Castile, Aragón, etc.), 'people' as the ultimate authority, suffered a setback in the mere legitimation of a weak state, and therefore absolute monarchies were advocated (see section [130]). Later, thanks to Dutch mercantilism [131–5], and British [136–44], the community of the 'bourgeois' or 'principals' within the cities (merchants, colonizers) began to control the political institutionalization of the state, achieving a hegemonic 'consensus', different from classical Rome or Athens, taking as example the more admired, extremely successful and stable republican system (interpreted as 'mixed'), fruit of the 'miracle of Venice'.

The discourse of political philosophy changed its paradigm completely, starting from the metaphysical solipsism or atomism of the individual (losing the community as first reference) and reunifying society through a 'pact', not that of Bartolomé de Las Casas nor of Francisco Suárez, although they continued to directly inspire. We are in a *second* early Modernity, which articulates a new discourse to legitimate the rising modern state *sensu stricto*.

¹ See Dussel, 1973b, pp. 75f.; 1998a, [39–44], pp. 6of.; [74–83], pp. 106f.

² Dussel, 1995a, ch. 1.

Overcoming feudalism assumed, paradoxically, that the rising bourgeoisie had to strengthen one feudal master over the others to unify political and military power and to be able to organize a more extensive market. A territory with frontiers protected by the state armies was necessary. China had this from the second century BCE, and Spain from 1476 with the alliance of Castile and Aragón. The commercial bourgeoisie struggled for the legitimation of a king in the face of the rest of the numerous feudal masters and other centrifugal forces (especially the ecclesial structures). All of the following allow northern Europe to emerge: the decline of Spain's exploitation of American silver (the impossibility of constituting a 'world-empire'), which produced a financial collapse, which obliged Charles V to abdicate, and in later decades, an agricultural stagnation, the crisis of conditions for a textile industry and other factors, which sketched a panorama of general Hispanic decline in the beginning of the seventeenth century,³ from 1620 at least:

Once the Habsburg dream of world-empire was over [. . .] the capitalist world-economy was an established system that became almost impossible to unbalance. It quickly reached an equilibrium point in its relations with other world systems: the Ottoman and Russian world-empires, the Indian Ocean proto-world-economy. Each of the states or potential states within the European world-economy was quickly in the race to bureaucratize, to raise a standing army, to homogenize its culture, to diversify its economic activities. By 1640, those in north-west Europe had succeeded in establishing themselves as the core states; Spain [. . .] northeastern Europe and Iberian America had become the periphery.⁴

We are still in a pre-industrial stage without north-western Europe having hegemony over the eastern oceans (still under Chinese and Hindustan hegemonic presence). It is a maturing 'early Modernity', creating the base for its future expansion.

The Absolute Monarchy: Jean Bodin

[130] Jean Bodin (1530–96), lawyer and professor of law at the University of Toulouse, wrote *The Six Books of the Commonwealth* to legitimate the monarchical order required by the rising mercantile bourgeoisie.⁵ He explains that 'a commonwealth may be defined as the rightly ordered government of a number of families, and of those things which are their common concern, by a sovereign power.'⁶ 'Commonwealth' is here identical to the political community, not a type of government, when it has 'sovereign

³ See Wallerstein, 1980, II, pp. 3–34.

⁴ Wallerstein, 1977, p. 26.

⁵ Bodin, 1993.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Book I, ch. 1; p. 57 (Translation: Tooley, p. 1).

THE SECOND 'EARLY MODERNITY'

power'. His vision is classical; he thinks that it is constituted by families.⁷ He also thinks that in its origin 'reason and common sense alike point to the conclusion that the origin and foundation of commonwealths was in force and violence',⁸ so 'the first generations of men were unacquainted with the sentiments of honour, and their highest endeavour was to kill, torture, rob, and enslave their fellows.'⁹ It is an anticipation of the Hobbesian theme of the origin of power, interpreted as negativity first. 'Citizenship' arises from here: 'Such being the origin of commonwealths, it is clear why a citizen is to be defined as a free subject who is dependent on the sovereignty of another.'¹⁰

The 'citizen' stops being a lawless subject and becomes a community of those who through natural reason or naturalized, or as freed slaves, are:

subjected to the single sovereign power (*la puissance souveraine*) of one or more rulers, . . . even if there is diversity of laws, language, customs, religion and race. [since . . .] the commonwealth can include a number of communes and provinces which all have different customs [. . .] so long as they are subject to the authority of a single sovereign, and the laws and ordinances made by it.¹¹

A territorial state has overcome the politics of a city, although it is imperial like Rome or an enormous mercantile system like Venice. The citizen is he who receives 'protection' from the 'sovereign lord or prince (*seigneurie souveraine*)'.¹²

For Bodin, sovereignty addresses only the monarch. Sovereignty is the source of politics:

Sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth which in Latin is termed *majestas* . . . The term needs careful definition, because although it is the distinguishing mark of any commonwealth, and an understanding of its nature fundamental to any treatment of politics, no jurist or political philosopher has in fact attempted to define it.¹³

7 Ibid., ch. 6; pp. 91f.

8 Ibid., p. 92 (Translation: Tooley, p. 19).

9 Ibid., p. 93 (Translation: Tooley, p. 19).

10 Ibid. (Translation: Tooley, p. 19).

11 Ibid., pp. 94-5 (Translation: Tooley, p. 20). Bodin is conscious of the different significance of the 'right of the bourgeois' (*droit des bourgeois*); (p. 95), belonging to the city ('the nobles called vile those who live in the city, because the ancient nobility lived in the countryside'; p. 96 [Translation: TC]). He is also conscious of the difference of the 'citizen' that designates a political aspect of belonging to the republic. Speaking of the difference of citizens, he quotes the example of Venice: '[. . .] such as the division into gentlemen, citizens, and proletariat in Venice' (p. 101 [Translation: Tooley, p. 22]).

12 Ibid., ch. 7; p. 103 (Translation: Tooley, p. 22).

13 Ibid., ch. 8; p. 111 (Translation: Tooley, p. 25).

Bodin is conscious of touching on a 'new' theme, which philosophy had not treated. In effect, the *potestas*, authority or power, is not identified with the modern concept of 'autonomy', which 'sovereignty' includes. To have sovereignty one has to have 'absolute power (*puissance absolue*)' permanently.¹⁴ 'It is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject.'¹⁵ And so:

If the prince is not bound by the laws of his predecessors, still less can he be bound by his own laws. One may be subject to laws made by another, but it is impossible to bind oneself in any matter which is the subject of one's own free exercise of will. As the law says, 'there can be no obligation in any matter which proceeds from the free will of the undertaker'. It follows of necessity that the king cannot be subject to his own laws.¹⁶

Bodin repeats again and again that the only sovereign power is the prince. Because 'a monarch in a kingdom is set apart from his subjects,'¹⁷ in the republic there are two parts: 'those that rule on the one hand, and those that are ruled on the other'.¹⁸ 'In the monarchy, each one [of the subjects] in particular and all the people as body have to swear to keep the law, and swear fidelity to the sovereign monarch, who only owes an oath to God.'¹⁹ 'If justice is the end of the law, the law the work of the Prince, [then . . .] the Prince [is] the image of God.'²⁰

It is a radical legitimation of the French monarchy. Bodin confronts Contrarini, who publishes his work about Venice, and indicates that Venice is not a mixed government, but aristocratic, because 'neither the Ten, nor the Senate, nor the Ministers of State, nor even the doge himself with the six ducal councillors have any authority save by commission, and depend on the good pleasure of the Great Council.'²¹ He writes:

The Venetian commonwealth (*l'état de Venise*) [. . .] is at present a true aristocracy [. . .] For of the fifty-nine thousand three hundred and forty-nine Venetians who were counted twenty years ago [. . .] it was only [these] four or five thousand gentlemen, young and old, who had a share in public life. [. . .] Sovereignty thus lies in a minority of the Venetians belonging to a particular group of noble families.²²

14 Ibid., pp. 118f.

15 Ibid., pp. 120.

16 Ibid., pp. 121 (Translation: Tooley, pp. 28-9).

17 Ibid., pp. 125 (Translation: Tooley, p. 32).

18 Ibid., pp. 126 (Translation: Tooley, p. 32).

19 Ibid. (Translation: TC).

20 Ibid., p. 137 (Translation: Tooley, p. 36).

21 Ibid., Book 2, ch. 1; p. 186 (Translation: Tooley, p. 54).

22 Ibid., p. 187 (Translation: Franklin, pp. 98-9).

For Bodin, it is an aristocratic state, since the last resort is the 'Greater Council'. On the contrary, 'France, then, is a pure monarchy',²³ and it is the type of state on which Bodin focuses. In effect, 'France, Spain, England, Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia and Muscovy are true monarchies whose authority is unquestionably their own, and now shared with any of their subjects'.²⁴ He leaves the ability to revolt against the King, since 'many of the jurists and theologians who have considered the question have concluded that it is justifiable to kill the tyrant'.²⁵ Bodin treats many other themes, but all tend to show the monarchy as the better of the types of republic.²⁶

The New Paradigm of the Discourse of the Foundation of Politics: Thomas Hobbes

[131] England, the island at the western extreme of the 'old system', which, being in the Atlantic, became the geopolitical 'centre' of the 'world-system', had an extremely weak monarchy. The conservatives, who opposed the radical reforms and millenarian sects in the civil war between 1642 and 1646, had to support the monarchical regime against the 'parliamentary' parties. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was one of these.²⁷ They mixed a 'civic humanism' with a dose of individualist Calvinism, together with the belief that England was the New Nation elected by God. They conceived the *Petition of Right* in 1628 (the powerless king had to concede to the parliament not to collect taxes without the mediation of parliament, recognize *Habeas corpus* and could not declare martial law in times of peace) as a concession to 'civil rights' unacceptable for the sovereignty of the king, in a position very like that of the tradition of Jean Bodin. When Charles I was decapitated in 1649, the chaos of the Civil War became a permanent negative state, full of insecurity.

We pause to examine a thinker who had great influence over Hobbes, Locke and many of their contemporaries, the Anglican Richard Hooker (1553–1600). English political philosophy will always be present. In his *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* he criticizes the Calvinist Puritan position, which negated the validity of human reason.²⁸ John Knox, founder of Presbyterianism, accepted only the Scriptures as sole source of political

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 189 (Translation: Franklin, p. 102).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. 5; p. 224 (Translation: Tooley, p. 67). He does not name China or the Mongol Empire of India, a Eurocentric vision, since those 'near' to Europe in the Middle East are described as from the 'Orient'.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 222 (Translation: Tooley, p. 66).

²⁶ 'It is clear that of the three types of commonwealth monarchy is the most excellent' (*ibid.*, Book 6, ch. 4; pp. 521f. [Translation: Tooley, pp. 199–200]).

²⁷ See Pocock, 1975, pp. 333f.; also Walzer, 1965; Schmitt, 1995; Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 433–59 (English: pp. 396–420); Wolin, 2001, pp. 257–306.

²⁸ See Hooker, 1977. Consult Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, pp. 387–97 (English: pp. 356–65).

or judicial argument. The Church was the guardian of the divine word and was above the state. Like the Huguenots in France, he justified tyrannicide. Hooker, on the contrary, an expert on the Church Fathers and medieval philosophy, and specializing in Thomas Aquinas and modern Spanish Scholasticism, thinks that, although the Scripture is a permanent light, it does not negate the light of human reason. In natural questions, reason can refer to great thinkers although they are not Christian. The human being is by nature social.²⁹ Political power pertains to the people and is entrusted to the government by consent and contract.³⁰ The types of government are not natural, and the participants have to decide between them as an arbitrary election.³¹ The political questions of the Church have to be resolved by the use of reason; there is no particular revelation.³² Although religion is useful for politics, one cannot use it, as Machiavelli suggests, with political ends, the position of Hobbes, more radical than the Italian. In the nations where Christians are a minority, separation of state and Church exists. But in the 'Christian Republics' they are as one substance having the same people, but they have to be different in functions,³³ as much in faith as in reason. He negates, like Wycliffe or Luther, the authority of the Pope. In both the Church and the state, authority has to be based in consent, consensus.³⁴ The New Testament does not know the concept of 'Christian Republic', but ancient Israel had a civil and ecclesiastic nation. He has a restricted vision of tolerance: heretics and Catholic papists can live in an Anglican state, since the human laws obligate only externally, but they may not be publicly dissident, so the stable and harmonious order of the state is maintained.³⁵ The differences with Hobbes are many.

In 1642, year of the death of Galileo, the birth of Isaac Newton and five years after the appearance of René Descartes' *Discourse on Method* in Amsterdam, *De Cive (The Citizen)* appears, the first fundamental political work of Hobbes. If the sixteenth century deconstructed the geopolitical vision of the 'old system', the first part of the seventeenth *formulated* the new model of Moderuity. In ontology Descartes *explicitly* formulates the new foundation, in astronomy Galileo (following the hypotheses of Kepler and Copernicus), in physics Newton. In politics, Hobbes is the first to formalize the new paradigm. He proposes a solipsistic model, based on passion more than reason – following the Franciscan voluntarism of Oxford and Cambridge and of Duns Scotus – where power proceeds from the strength of a human being in a 'state of nature' and not from the civility of the subject, since this allows the king to exercise power, restricting its use and remain-

29 *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, x, 1.

30 *Ibid.*, VIII, v, 9.

31 *Ibid.*, I, x, 5.

32 *Ibid.*, III, ix, 1-2.

33 *Ibid.*, VIII, I, 5.

34 *Ibid.*, VIII, I, 8.

35 *Ibid.*, VIII, vi, 5.

ing in some way defenceless, thanks to the contract based on the common interest of survival, which gives legitimacy over the new base to the state, civil institutions and political action. Hobbes initiates a modern tradition taken into account during the later centuries. He is enormously different from Machiavelli. Machiavelli presented a treatise about the new prudent (shrewd) strategy of political action; Hobbes, however, proposes a new *ontological foundation* of politics. And, against actual ordinary opinion, interpreting the state or political macro-structure in a secularized way, separating politics from religion, occupies the middle of his 1651 work, *Leviathan*, within a traditional treatment in his era, like Hooker. This shows also *more theologico* (as seen in the use of Christian Scripture in parts III and IV of the work) the convenience of a state, which exercises the power received from God over the Church (in this case Anglican) within the *model of Christendom*,³⁶ inaugurated in Byzantium by Constantine (in the fourth century) or by Theodosius a little later and structured judicially. It is the model of 'Christendom' practised in the sixteenth century, in Spain,³⁷ Portugal, France or Italy, or now Anglican (of England) or Lutheran (of Prussia after Luther, the Denmark of Kierkegaard, the Scandinavian countries, tsarist Russia). Hobbes worries about the weakness of the state, the English monarchy, which left a power vacuum and favoured chaos, the 'struggle of all against all'. To be able to *strengthen* the state it was necessary to give power equally to the Church; interpreters sometimes suggest mere secularization meant losing a strategic resource of political power:

I am next to handle [. . .] the Nature and Rights of a *Christian Commonwealth*.³⁸ [. . .] For the understanding of *Power Ecclesiasticall*, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our Saviour, into two parts; one before the Conversion of Kings, and men endued with Sovereign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion.³⁹

The primitive Church, before Christendom, was critical and so persecuted by the empire. But once there were Christian kings, the first in Armenia and Georgia, prior to Constantine, who planted the theme of a *Christian* 'justification' of the state, Christianity moved from having a critical-prophetic

³⁶ It is important to distinguish between 'Christianity' (as prophetic religion à la Kierkegaard against Hegel) and 'Christendom' (as culture, political system, ambiguous civilizing totality).

³⁷ The 'Hispanic' or 'Lusitanian' *patronato* constituted politically the Roman concession to the Spanish or Portuguese state an effective 'power' over the Church, to which Book I is dedicated, the *Summary of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies* (1681), which, as Jiménez Fernández in Seville said to me, was in reality 'canonical law'. Hobbes founded philosophically (and theologically) the right of the state over the Church in a much more decisive way, in long chapters of parts III ('On a Christian Commonwealth') and IV ('On the Kingdom of Darkness') of the *Leviathan*. For 'Christendom', as historical-political category, see Dussel, 1967, 1969b, 1978 and 1983.

³⁸ *Leviathan*, Part III, ch. 32, 1 (Hobbes, 1998, p. 305; E, 1937, p. 199).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 42, 1; p. 408; p. 266.

messianic vision of politics to being the foundation of the state itself, as Hegel explains.⁴⁰ The possibility that the Church will dominate the state (as in the Pontifical state in Italy) or that the state will manage the Church for its own benefit (as the model of 'Christendom' indicates) begins. Hobbes proposes:

In all Common-wealths of the Heathen, the Sovereigns have had the name of Pastors of the People [. . .] Therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their people [. . .] and consequently that it is by his authority, that all other Pastors are made.⁴¹ And therefore none but Kings can put into their Titles (a mark of their submission to God only) *Dei gratia Rex* [King by the grace of God], etc. Bishops ought to say in the beginning of their Mandates, *By the favour of the Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocese.*⁴²

Hobbes does not intend to explain the secularization of the state but to justify theologically (with Bible in hand and as believer) the existence of a 'Christian state', which Kierkegaard called *Christendom*, and which Marx ridiculed in his youthful articles about the practices of censure of the Lutheran Prussian emperor.⁴³ Hobbes proposes to give more power to a weak state like the English, criticized by the parliament or Catholic groups (persecuted by the kings in favour of Anglicanism), communities which our author opposed.

[132] Our philosopher does not accept a mixed conception of power.⁴⁴ In its place he justifies an absolute monarchy. The argument counts on new categories, showing great originality, and will become a tradition in Anglo-Saxon political philosophy.

He begins with the hypothesis of a 'state of nature', which secularizes the end *ex quo* of medieval political philosophy, which put as the major premise of all political argument the situation of the agent in the 'earthly paradise'

40 Question already studied in sections [30-34].

41 Ibid., ch. 42, 67-70; pp. 447-9; pp. 294

42 Ibid., ch. 42, 71; p. 450; p. 295.

43 See sections [35-36] above.

44 In 1642 the king (in the *Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament*) had to accept this mixed conception: 'In essence, he affirms that the government of England is deposited into three levels: the king, the lords and the commons, and that the happiness and the survival itself of the system depends on maintaining the equilibrium between the three' (Pocock, 1975, p. 361). The 'mixed' current finds its inspiration in Venice; Hobbes is against this 'distribution' of power. Philip Hunton, in his 1643 *A Treatise on Monarchy*, accepts that the government of the republic has to be 'mixed', like Venice. John Locke follows this tradition. This separation and limitation of the power of the diverse moments of the structure of the republic is opposed to tyranny (of the absolute monarchy defended by the rising bourgeoisie) and to the 'corruption' of the parliamentary bodies (representatives of the 'Chamber of Commons'). The enemy of liberty and virtue is 'corruption', which is attacked not by an ethic (as in the ancient tradition) but by an equilibrated *institutionality*.

(the ideal state) in the face of original sin (the empirical state).⁴⁵ Now, it is a 'hypothetical' (or historical) situation as starting point.⁴⁶

All men in the *state of nature* have a desire and will to hurt. [. . .] It was lawful for every man in the bare *state of nature, or before*⁴⁷ such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would [. . .] And this is that which is meant by that common saying, *nature hath given all to all*, from whence we understand likewise, that in the *state of nature*, profit is the measure of right.⁴⁸

'Nature' has originated human beings,⁴⁹ situating them in a 'state of nature', with a 'natural right' or *ius naturale* (that 'is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of [. . .] his own Life')⁵⁰ and under a 'natural law' or *lex naturalis* (that 'is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same').⁵¹ For Hobbes, the 'state of nature' has a peculiar content:

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that *condition* which is called Warre; [that is to say, is a 'state of war']; and such a warre, as is of every man⁵² [. . .] The nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in

45 Medieval political philosophy asked, *methodically*: would there be private property in the terrestrial paradise prior to original sin? Evidently not, because a being without defect would not need this institution. From the existence of sin this institution, a lesser evil, is necessary. Now, analogically, 'terrestrial paradise' (situation prior to the concrete historical order, empirical, object of reflection) is replaced by a hypothetical 'state of nature', that is related to a certain 'right' or 'natural law' prior to the positive law in a given empirical political order. Hobbes creates a 'methodology' in political philosophy that starts from hypothetical 'counter-factual' levels (what is *possible* logically can be *impossible* empirically), that allows him to think of possibilities. It is a 'negative regulative idea' or 'criteria of orientation'. In the Middle Ages it was said: 'Only God has perfect knowledge', *intellectus archetypus* Kant would say; omniscience. That premise is secularized when we express: 'Perfect knowledge is impossible.' In politics, 'all practical knowledge, that the decision always assumes, being imperfect, finite, empirical', has to have these and other limitations (first, the undecidability or uncertainty, the impossibility of absolute certainty in concrete empirical decisions). Political philosophy uses these methodological and categorically necessary mediations. Hobbes also used them creatively.

46 The chaotic English situation was in some way depicted in that 'state of nature', managed ambiguously as 'hypothesis'. It was an original historical state, a prototypical situation applicable to any chaotic situation or civil struggle (as that lived by England). I think that this 'state of nature' is a rhetorical resource of excellent capacity in the process of validating a hypothesis. It is an argumentative 'resource'.

47 This 'before' sends us to the 'before the original sin' of the medieval theoretical model, now secularized.

48 *De Cive*, ch. 1, 4; Hobbes, 2000, p. 58, pp. 61-2; 1949, pp. 25, 27-8).

49 *Leviathan*, Part I, ch. 13; Hobbes, 1998, p. 100; 1937, p. 63.

50 *Ibid.*, ch. 14, 1; p. 106; p. 66.

51 *Ibid.*, ch. 14, 3; p. 106; p. 66.

52 In *De Cive*, I, ch. 1, 12 (p. 63; p. 29) he writes: 'The natural state of men, *before* they

the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no *assurance* to the contrary.⁵³

Conservative thinking in general,⁵⁴ and our author in particular, starts from a negative or 'precarious reality'. He uses the 'principle of impossibility',⁵⁵ refuting the Presbyterians, Pietists and Parliamentarists, raising their positions to the absurd in a 'type' of 'ideal state', as Max Weber will call it. In the 'state of nature' the individual is entirely free, with all rights, without any ownership, such as sustained the social utopians of his era (anti-conservatives). Hobbes, starting from his premises, shows that the ideal situation becomes impossible, inverts itself: having all rights and liberties, being equally selfish, all struggle against all and the conservation of life becomes impossible. This 'greater evil' justifies the 'lesser evil' ('civil society' as he describes it in the *Leviathan*).

This 'state of war' produces 'mutual fear', but the new civil state 'frightens all'.⁵⁶ One moves from a state of greater generalized fear to a lesser institutionalized fear (the 'civil state'). The medieval 'earthly paradise' was a '*positive* regulative idea', because it was not a conservative regulative idea; meanwhile the 'state of nature' of Hobbes, on the contrary, is a '*negative* regulative idea' (a kind of hell *ex quo*). 'To leave' that hell was a 'minor cost'; the two sufferings had to be compared, calculated from the *later* state in reference to the greater pains of the previous *state*.⁵⁷

[133] First, each individual exercises, transfers or renounces power. Hobbes does not have as starting point the 'community'. Each human being is like a monad, which when moving can be attracted by other motions, crashing into others or repelled by others.⁵⁸ It is an atomistic 'physics' of moveable bodies in empty space, to which Galileo, Newton and other astronomers or physicists of their era make reference, that is applied to political discourse. Like bodies in motion, each individual enjoys an extreme original liberty:

entered into society, was a *mere war*, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men.'

53 *Leviathan*, I, ch. 13, 8; p. 102; p. 64.

54 See Hinkelammert, 1984, pp. 33f.

55 *Ibid.*, pp. 182-228.

56 *De Cive*, ch. 1, 13; p. 63; p. 29.

57 António Viera, like all conservatives, preached in Brazil that the innocent Bantu peasants were in 'hell' in Africa (since they were lost in paganism), and moved to a situation of 'lesser evil' in Brazil when they suffered slavery, as 'purgatory'. The 'civil state' of Hobbes was a 'purgatory', a better situation than the 'hell' of the chaotic and revolutionary struggles of the England of his era (seen from his conservative interpretation as the greater evil, and not as 'pains on the part' of the passage of the monarchy, the greater evil, until a better situation: the republic with a parliamentarian government).

58 See the neo-Stoicism that will become traditional: 'the Greeks have words to express the same ideas, *hormè y aphormè*' (*Leviathan*, ch. 6; p. 41). This chapter is summarily a small treatise on human sentiments or passions, as used by the utilitarians.

By Liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the *absence* of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft *take away*⁵⁹ part of a mans power to do what he would.⁶⁰

Hobbes starts, as in modern physics, from the principle of impossibility, as in the example of 'perpetual motion', which, unopposed by 'resistance' or 'impediments', could continue its momentum indefinitely. The human being is similarly moved by an immanent force, since it starts from an anthropology, which considers four dimensions.⁶¹ The motor moment of politics is the 'motion' of passion (within the Anglo-Saxon Franciscan Nominalist and Voluntarist tradition). Natural motion would be in perpetual movement, eternally, if there was not an 'impediment'. The central Hobbesian argument can be reduced to stopping 'resistance' or 'impediment' to the sovereign.

[134] On the other hand, even in the 'state of nature', language, which makes communication between individuals possible, exists: 'without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves'.⁶² But language is not a motor nor a 'power' of the human being; it does not move one toward political action or peace. The 'passions' are the motor, and they oppose each other. In the 'state of nature' it is impossible to conserve life, and the fear of losing it is general. It is necessary to overcome this original negative stage.

Second, all (less the sovereign, the king) have to move toward peace, but to achieve it they have to negate themselves:

Every man, ought to endeavour Peace [. . .] From this Fundamentall Law of Nature [. . .] is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall [. . .] *lay down* this right to all things [. . .] To *lay downe* a man's Right to any thing, is to *divest* himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same.⁶³

There does not have to be an 'impediment' for the other's exercise of political or civil power to be possible, by the restriction or renunciation of one's own natural right to exercise power. It is a negative moment, with

⁵⁹ Like the object in movement, which when there is no resistance continues in movement but when there is resistance, reduces its velocity until immobile.

⁶⁰ *Leviathan*, I, ch. 14, 2 (Hobbes, 1998, p. 106; 1937, p. 66). This assumes that 'the right of nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty *each man* hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life' (ibid.). See Wolin, 2001, pp. 266f.

⁶¹ 'The faculties of human nature may be reduced unto four kinds, bodily strength, experience, reason, passion' (*De Cive*, I, ch. 1; p. 53; p. 21).

⁶² *Leviathan*, ch. 4; p. 22; p. 12.

⁶³ Ibid., ch. 14, 4-6; pp. 106-7; p. 67. See also *De Cive*, I, ch. 2, 2-3; Hobbes, 2000, p. 68.

respect to the individual in the natural state. It is impossible to act as one, as we will see.

Third, the restriction that the individual imposes on him/herself appears as a *transfer*, when the renunciation is deposited in the will of an elected other, the sovereign (the king). It is not properly 'to transfer' (as positive act), but better a prohibiting, negating, restricting, impeding, not offering resistance, 'giving free way' to the natural will of the sovereign:

He that [. . .] passeth away his Right [. . .] by transferring; when he inrendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be Obliged, or Bound, *not to hinder* those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it.⁶⁴

The *perpetuum mobile* (only the king), following the *law of the conservation* of energy as basic category of thermodynamics, can now continue, in a 'state of nature', in movement.⁶⁵

In order for this to be possible a *fourth* moment is necessary: 'the mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call *Contract*'.⁶⁶ The pact that constitutes 'civil society' (or politics) opens a new space (the political field) where citizens do not exercise the antagonistic forces of the passions of natural individuals (in a different way to Foucault),⁶⁷ since the citizens or subjects (and they are such by denying their rights, disciplinedly and stochically) give up exercising their force, stop hindering the exercise of sovereign power, and in this consists the content of the contract; only the sovereign (the king) as 'political power' is permitted to exercise his liberty, and by this exercises it *despotically*. The contract has one condition: that one does not make the survival of the obedient citizens a game.⁶⁸ And in this consists the state:

Is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. And he that carryeth this Person, is called *Souveraigne*, and said to have *Souveraigne Power*; and every one besides, his Subject.⁶⁹

64 Ibid., ch. 14, 7; p. 108; pp. 67–8.

65 'Perpetual motion' is logically possible, but empirically impossible. Being impossible, it is nevertheless a fundamental postulate.

66 Ibid., ch. 14, 9; p. 109; p. 68.

67 For Foucault, 'power' plays in a field of forces where no one has absolute dominion, although relative, but contributed to by all the others. There is no immobilization of another's forces so one sole force exercises all its 'power'. It is something more complex.

68 The one who orders, orders ordering. Or, like Weber: power is the legitimate domination before obedient people. We will have to invert this modern definition of political power in a future architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*.

69 *Leviathan*, I, ch. 17, 13; p. 141; p. 90; *De Cive*, I, ch. 5, 11; p. 119.

When this happens voluntarily, 'this [. . .] may be called a Politicall Commonwealth or Commonwealth by *Institution*'.⁷⁰ And 'from this *Institution* of a Commonwealth are derived all the *Rights*, and *Facultyes* of him, or them, on whom the Sovereigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled'.⁷¹

The sovereign has all the rights and full liberty. Conservative Hobbes, thinking politically that the only guarantee of peace in England is the monarchy (against all 'parliamentarianism'), gives to the king, the sovereign, nothing less than the following rights:

The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Sovereign; and yet the Power to protect his Subjects be retained [. . .] If he transferre the *Militia*, he retains the Judicature in vain [. . .]; or if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of Spirits [. . .] A Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand.⁷²

Hobbes gives *all powers* to the monarchy, including the legislative, judicial and executive power, indivisibly. It is an absolute 'Power of Will', an 'I can' (the subject ontologically instituting all the moments in the political field), correlative to the Cartesian 'I think' (of the gnoseological ontological field), or to the 'I produce' (by the work and exchange of products in the economic field of the ontology of capital). The 'I, the King' (signature of all the 'royal certificates' of the Hispanic kings) has expanded to all Europe.

On the other hand, for Hobbes, and fifth, once the individual has been restricted voluntarily in the exercise of his/her own natural right to appear as a citizen or subject, all rights are irretrievable. The citizen remains without rights.⁷³ In the 'state by *acquisition*', where the colonies are found, a 'despotic power' is also exercised, where the situation of the subject is even more precarious.⁷⁴ In all ways, the liberty of the subject is framed fixedly

⁷⁰ Ibid., ch. 17, 15; p. 141; p. 90.

⁷¹ Ibid., ch. 18, 2; p. 142; p. 90.

⁷² Ibid., ch. 18, 16; p. 148; p. 95. Hobbes explains in 12 paragraphs (ch. 18; pp. 142-8); pp. 110-15) the complete list of the rights of the sovereign. He has the right to 'represent the person of all', of being obeyed by the (even dissenting) subject, of having accepted that in all acts of the sovereign nothing is unjust, that he can never be killed by rebellion (against tyrannicide), that he is judge of all cause, that he dictates all the laws including the institution of ownership (that the sovereign concedes but keeps the right to redistribute), the right to the judicature, the declaring of war and peace, electing advisers, ministers, magistrates and functionaries, compensating those worthy with honours. The Chinese emperor had fewer rights than the Hobbesian king, a true example of 'Western despotism'.

⁷³ It is like the 'without right' (*rechtslos*) of Hegel of the states dependent on the 'absolute state', the bearer of the Spirit of the World in that moment in universal history.

⁷⁴ Ibid., ch. 20, pp. 162f.; pp. 127f. 'Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call Despotically, from *despotes* [Greek], which signifieth a *Lord*, or *Master*; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant' (ibid., ch. 20, 10; p. 165; p. 106). Here Hobbes repeats again the 'dialectic of the master and slave', already expressed in the previous century critically by Bartolomé de Las Casas (see section [102]).

by the necessity which the sovereign, the king, arranges.⁷⁵ 'The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath praetermitted.'⁷⁶ It is a legalistic politics where the 'liberty of the sovereign' is the only absolute liberty, although with one restriction:

If the Sovereign command a man [. . .] to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, *without which he cannot live*; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.⁷⁷

Through having explained for the first time the origin of the state within a solipsistic conception of the subject, Hobbes passes to *level B* (of our 'architectonic') describing the fundamental *institutions* of the state. All is deduced from the absolute power of the sovereign, as in Bodin, the power of the 'publique ministers',⁷⁸ of the 'Counsell',⁷⁹ etc.

Hobbes explains his position in the face of 'the civil laws',⁸⁰ and concludes with the causes that 'Weaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth',⁸¹ the reason for having written the *Leviathan*. Hobbes describes the causes of the destruction of the state in the following way:

[The disease of a commonwealth] proceed[s] from the poison of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That *every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions* [. . .] Another repugnant doctrine [. . .] is, that *whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne* [. . .] A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth, is this, That *he that hath the Sovereign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes* [. . .] And as to Rebellion

⁷⁵ He is opposed to Duns Scotus when he says: 'In the Actions which men voluntarily doe; [. . .] (whose first link is the hand of God the first of all causes) proceed from necessity. [. . .] the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the *necessity* of doing that which God will' (ibid., ch. 21, 4; p. 172; p. 111). Duns Scotus differs from Hobbes because he thinks that God operates *freely, contingently* (not by *necessity*) and the human being equally works *freely, contingently*; divine providence does not proceed from natural *necessity* but from voluntary *contingency*. Hobbes is ontologically and politically more conservative than Duns Scotus.

⁷⁶ Ibid., ch. 21, 6; p. 173; p. 112.

⁷⁷ Ibid., ch. 21, 12; p. 177; p. 114. When we refer to the 'political principles' (*level C*), the 'material political principle' is occupied with the life of the citizen, to which Hobbes refers unconsciously but that inevitably had to be valid *implicitly* (as we will show in the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*).

⁷⁸ Ibid., ch. 23; pp. 197 f; pp. 155 f.

⁷⁹ Ibid., ch. 25; pp. 209 f.; pp. 126 f.

⁸⁰ Ibid., ch. 26; pp. 217 f.; pp. 134 f. Here he criticizes parliamentarianism. 'The use of Lawes [. . .] is not to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way' (ibid., ch. 30, 21; p. 285; p. 185). One can observe the paternalism of a conservative Hobbes. On the other hand, he is similar to Machiavelli in directing *fortune* through the secure channels of *virtù*.

⁸¹ Ibid., ch. 29; pp. 263 f.; pp. 170 f.

in particular against Monarchy; one of the most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories [. . .] So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanted nothing more than a strong Monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain *Tyrannophobia*, or fear of being strongly governed.⁸²

One important chapter, for our ends, is about 'the nutrition' of the inhabitants of a state,⁸³ because 'the Nutrition of a Common-wealth consisteth, in the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life',⁸⁴ and the sovereign is occupied with this aspect in a privileged way. With respect to the means of the reproduction of life 'the Introduction of Propriety [. . .] an effect of Common-wealth' is necessary.⁸⁵ For Hobbes, and for other reasons put forward by the Church Fathers, property is not a natural right but positive (of *ius gentium* for others) and relates to the state. The sovereign (who does not lose his natural right over the land) can redistribute it in cases of necessity (as in war).

Hobbes is situated in the 'world-system' that the Hispanic countries had opened more than a century and a half before, from a naïve mercantilist horizon, which Marx will criticize:

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it selfe; they have first this privilege, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of *all places*.⁸⁶

In this chapter he refers, in an inevitably Eurocentric way, to

Children of a Common-wealth, [who] are those we call *Plantations*, or *Colonies*; which are numbers of men sent out from the [European!] Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre.⁸⁷

Hobbes does not give any importance to the violence that 'eliminates' entire populations converting them into 'empty land'.

82 Ibid., ch. 21, 6f.; pp. 265f.; pp. 111f. One can understand the veneration of Hobbes by conservatives like Carl Schmitt (see the booklet about Hobbes; Schmitt, 1995) or Leo Strauss. It was a question of a totalitarianism *avant la lettre*.

83 Ibid., ch. 24; pp. 202f.; pp. 130f.

84 Ibid., ch. 24, 1; p. 202; p. 130.

85 Ibid., ch. 24, 5; p. 203; p. 131. 'From whence we may collect, that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign' (ch. 24, 7; p. 204; p. 131).

86 Ibid., ch. 24, 12; p. 207; p. 133.

87 Ibid., ch. 24, 14; p. 208; p. 134.

[135] After describing the origin and structure of the state, he moves to a strange chapter, 'On the Kingdome of God by Nature',⁸⁸ intending to be philosophical and using Christian Scripture as authority. This is confused with a positive *properly theological* discourse (a 'political theology'). In reality it is a political text, where the positive narrative of the sacred text is used to convince Anglican Christians about the right of the sovereign to exercise his power and to govern over the Church of England. The 'kingdom of God' is not the Church. God gives the sovereign supreme political power over the Church. His power, therefore, is equal, sacred, and Hobbes does not want 'his sovereign' to lack this quality for the English Christian believing, historical people:

From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word, *Rational*, and *Prophetique*, there may be attributed to God, a two-fold Kingdome, *Naturall*, and *Prophetique*: *Naturall*, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the natural Dictates of Right Reason; And *Prophetique*, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them [. . .] by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets.⁸⁹

England extends the promises of Israel. Hobbes explains a politics of the 'natural kingdom of God'. It is not a positive or theological conception, but rational; it is sacred but not holy; it is divine but not religious; it is the exercise of 'Gods Sovereignty, as grounded onely in Nature'.⁹⁰ The state invested with the sovereignty of God is the object of *public* veneration, meanwhile the religious is *private*. The state, for its part, venerates God in a *public* way. But Hobbes intends to speak of a 'Christian state',⁹¹ and here the Hobbesian discourse moves to the *positivity of the explicit theological discourse*, since he takes Christian Scriptures to prove his conclusions before a Christian people. We are in a modern Anglican 'regime of Christendom', where ambiguity becomes inevitable. Hobbes has fallen into all the uncertainties of a 'political theology', which will cross Modernity to the present.

This is very different from the political philosophy of the Hispanic period. Bartolomé de Las Casas, with an experience direct from the peripheral world, unthinkable for Bodin or Hobbes, accepts the existence of rights proper to the people separate from Europe, the *ius gentium* (not the European modern right), of the far off American provinces (a question negated in later English and North American philosophy), and in a blended doctrine of the pact shows that the decisions of the king, 'without having had consensus' ('consensus of the people': *consensus populi*), 'would be null'.⁹² The sover-

88 Ibid., ch. 31; p. 292; p. 189.

89 Ibid., ch. 31, 4; pp. 293-4; p. 190.

90 Ibid., ch. 31, 7; p. 295; p. 192.

91 See the third and fourth part of the *Leviathan* (Parts III-IV; pp. 305f.; pp. 199f.).

92 See the texts from Suárez in sections [117f.].

eign, by exercising power conditioned by a pact, in the face of communities, which do not lose their rights, has to continue taking them into account (since their kings continue being 'legitimate'). The conservatism of Hobbes collides at this point with the critical and universalist political philosophy of Las Casas.

Suárez, defending the *ius gentium*, does not leave unprotected the right of non-European nations. However, the seat of power is not directly individual, nor the unconscious community, but when 'the multitude [. . .] by a special will (*speciali voluntate*) or common consensus (*communi consensu*) is reunited in a political body'.⁹³ The communitarian actor is an autonomous political body by an act of reflection and second of 'wanting' to institute the body. He is opposed in many aspects to Hobbes, since he starts from a community and not an individual, from a community conscious of its possible development, which can effect a *second explicit* consensus, although not necessarily written; which transfers power (*translata potestate*) by contract to the king, but recovers it in the case of tyranny, 'because no one can be deprived of this'. That is to say, the king in the 'pact' accepts permanent right as a last resort of the 'kingdoms' or communities, and it remains conditional. It is not a despotic monarchy or the Hobbesian Leviathan. These differences have many possibilities for development in the present. In all ways, the Hispanic-Latin American political philosophy of the first early Modernity was not still *explicitly* conscious of the appearance of the singular subject as a decisive political actor. Hobbes marks an irreversible beginning.

Carl Schmitt, who sympathizes at all points with Hobbes (both conservative), returns to the author of the *Leviathan* to criticize the liberals and Jews (beginning with Spinoza, then Mendelssohn and Julius Stahl-Jolson),⁹⁴ who for Schmitt have split the private-interior from the public-exterior. He criticizes equally other positions of the left (which for Schmitt 'empty' the substantive foundations of the state) and indicates the convenience of the 'unity of the state' or of the 'original vitality' defended by Hobbes, in the management that the sovereign has to have at the religious level.⁹⁵ He reaffirms decidedly that 'resistance as a "right" is in Hobbes' absolute state

⁹³ See sections [113-15].

⁹⁴ 'He did his part in castrating a Leviathan that had been full of vitality' (*lebenskräftigen*), Schmitt, 1995, p. 110 (Translation: Schwab, p. 70); special trans., 1997, p. 134). Schmitt agrees with Hobbes on a 'strong' state. And writes that unfortunately 'the English people decided against such a state' (ibid., p. 119; p. 145 [Translation: Schwab, p. 79]). We will return to Carl Schmitt frequently in the future architectonic.

⁹⁵ Schmitt, 1995, pp. 21-3; 50-1. The correct interpretation by Schmitt on the religious question shows from the beginning, on the cover of the book, the great Leviathan with the sword [civil power] and the cross [ecclesiastic power] that represent, to the left, the strong navy, the gun, the laws of the political city; and, to the right, the Church, with sacred vestments, councils. We are far from the so-called secularization (Wolin, 2001, pp. 257f.).

in every respect identical to public law and as such⁹⁶ is factually and legally nonsensical and absurd.⁹⁷

The United Provinces around Amsterdam: Baruch Spinoza

[136] The originality of Spinoza (1632–77), a member of the ancient ‘Sephardic Jewish’⁹⁸ Espinosa family of the Monteros of Burgos,⁹⁹ constitutes a foundational moment of the *second* early Modernity, and continues the Hispanic philosophical problematic (the *first* early Modernity). Descartes and Spinoza continue the Hispanic discourse of Fonseca or Suárez, both in a critical way, more sceptical in Descartes’ case, more political–ontological and secularized in Spinoza’s case.

The emancipation of Spain from the United Provinces (proclaimed in Utrecht in 1579, but effective from 1609 to 1621) allowed Holland, specifically Amsterdam, a certain hegemony in the new ‘world-system’.¹⁰⁰ It is in that ‘century of gold’ (from 1630 to 1672, until the death of Jan de Witt) that Descartes writes in Amsterdam *Discourse on Method* and Spinoza struggles to open a path to a political philosophy of liberty, liberty in the face of the Jewish and Christian dogmatisms, which his demanding honest subjectivity needed (liberty as natural necessity) as a fish needs water. Only understanding the immense and existential pain of a Sephardic ‘marrano’, descended from those expelled from Spain at the beginning of Modernity, March 1492, can one understand the work of Spinoza. It was necessary to begin *absolutely* from a new starting point, to simply experience anew the joy of ‘happiness’ (*beatitudo*), in an ethical–political sense, although provisional.

A student for seven years in the synagogue school (*Keter Torah*), where he studied with Menasseh ben Israel, and an expert in Latin and philosophy thanks to Francisco van den Enden (an ex-Jesuit), Spinoza radically rethought his Jewish existence to eliminate all the fundamentals that could be affected by the *herem shamatta* (‘wiping out’, violent exclusion of the

96 Hobbes and Schmitt could never explain the case of the ‘new’ rights not considered in the constitution or the ‘foundation’ of a new state (post-colonial). Far from a ‘will’ (leader) that can establish the ‘state of exception’, is found the ‘will of a political community’ that can appear as ‘state of rebellion’ (as the people who with Washington or Hidalgo emancipate the colonies).

97 Schmitt, 1995, 4; p. 71; p. 95 (Translation: Schwab, p. 46).

98 Spain in Hebrew is ‘*Sefarad*’, so the ‘Spanish’ Jews are the ‘Sephardics’, in counter-position to the ‘Ashkenazis’ of eastern Europe. Spinoza wrote his defence against his ‘expulsion’ from the synagogue of Amsterdam in Spanish, the language of Burgos, his home region. In the synagogue of Amsterdam, one needed Hebrew and Spanish to study the Bible. Expelled from Spain in 1492 the family of Spinoza went to Vidigueira, near Beja, and then emigrated to Holland. His mother, Hannah Deborah, died when Spinoza was six years old. See Fraile, 1965–6, III, pp. 587f.

99 Portuguese spelling, M. Chaui (1999, I).

100 See Wallerstein, 1980, II, pp. 36–71.

Jewish community from Amsterdam in 1656.)¹⁰¹ He needed freedom to think; Spinoza put all his biographical–existential hope in this, to avoid the negation of life by suicide, as in the case of Uriel da Acosta.¹⁰² All this, nevertheless, was within a 'paradigm of conscience', of a solipsism or metaphysical individualism at the beginning of Modernity.¹⁰³ We take seriously Levinas' hypothesis:

Spinoza as theoretical crystallization of an absolute loss of identity: the Hispanic–Portuguese *marrano* who risks the foundations of the whole traditional conception of the consistency of the subject, to send his horizon of approach a theory of that desired imaginary. The theorization of the imaginary character of all subjective identity – which I will try to show as the key to the vault of the work of Spinoza, and, above all, clearly is from *Ethics* – has been lived in one's own flesh as a sharp experience by the tragic community of which Baruch was the culmination in being (and by being) expelled.¹⁰⁴

Not as 'absolute loss of identity' but as protest against the violence of dogmatism, Spinoza had to reconstruct the totality of philosophy to make that type of unjust judgement and devastation of the new judges of Judaism impossible (and the modern absolute monarchy, with its state intelligence apparatus: the Inquisition, suffered by its people in Spain and Portugal). The '*marrano* community' ('failing', 'collapsing')¹⁰⁵ endured thus an absolutely tragic life from March 1492. One could not be an 'old Christian' only a

¹⁰¹ In one of his works a young Baruch expresses that he had to find a certain degree of happiness (*laetitia*) that no one could question (a neo-Stoicism?): '[. . .] I decided to find if there did not exist a true good, communicable, capable of moving by itself only the mind without the competition of any other thing; if something existed, anyway, whose discovery and acquisition would produce in me the eternal enjoyment of a supreme and inextinguishable joy (*laetitia*)' (*De intellectu emandatione*, p. 5; quoted in Albiac, 1987 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁰² The expulsion of the community from Amsterdam, of Uriel (Gabriel) of Acosta (Albiac, 1987, pp. 185f.), author of *Exemplar humanae vitae*, and the doctor Juan del Prado (pp. 253f.) served the young Spinoza as very recent antecedents.

¹⁰³ Speaking of Moses, he says that he 'spoke with God face to face as a man may do with his fellow (that is, through the medium of their two bodies), then Christ communed with God mind to mind (*mens*)' (*Theological–Political Treatise*, ch. 1; Spinoza, 1985, p. 85 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 14]). Spinoza did not suspect that these Semitic categories (*panim-el-panim*: face to face) demanded new philosophical categories (for example, the 'nearness' of Lévinas), and so, with the Greek and Latin–Germanic categories mediating the Hellenized Islamic ones, the first was *substance* (*ousia*), he tackled the innovative production of the original categories of European Modernity, that today we have 'to deconstruct' again. As member of a Semitic tradition he missed the opportunity of discovering the 'philosophical assumptions' of the Jewish, Christian or Islamic existential experience (as Averroes, Maimonides or Thomas Aquinas themselves missed centuries before).

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Albiac, 1987, p. 52 (Translation: TC).

¹⁰⁵ Scornfully, the Hispanic Christians indicated that the '*converso*' was an ambiguous being, 'between the two'; s/he could never be wholly Christian because s/he remained 'half Jewish'. This was the more frightening and unjust situation (equally disadvantageous for Spain) in which the Jewish community lived after Titus expelled them from Jerusalem.

'New Christian'; one could not be an 'old Jew' when one tried to return to Judaism, only a 'new Jew'. They lived a schizophrenic 'double life', their subjectivity completely destroyed. It was necessary to ascend to the reconstruction of God; one had to think in another way.

[137] Starting from Descartes,¹⁰⁶ who for his part had followed Francisco Suárez,¹⁰⁷ Spinoza thinks in his first works of 'God as Nature' (*Deus sive Natura*, literally 'God or nature'), but from the *Theological-Political Treatise*, in his definitive era, he treats 'God as Substance' (*Deus sive Substantia*, literally 'God or substance'). In this he is separated from the traditions of the moment. He has the political courage to affirm a philosophy that tries to negate the dogmatisms. Philosophically, he defends the existence of a sole infinite 'substance'¹⁰⁸ with infinite 'attributes'¹⁰⁹ and infinite 'modes'.¹¹⁰ We know the attributes of the mind (thinking) and of the body (extension), which constitute the human being, a finite modal entity submitted to the laws of nature, being only a determined 'actual relation'.¹¹¹ For this reason, he will be accused of being a panentheist and atheist. It seems that he was neither one nor the other. His political intention was not purely theoretical but practical. He intends to defend the proposal of a God who can love and be loved and affirm to a certain *post mortem* individuality in a human 'eternal part of the soul'. First, the mind's intellectual love of God is the very love of God with which God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind¹¹² considered under the species of eternity.¹¹³

106 Descartes starts from 'substance', her 'attributes' and her 'modes'. First, substance is 'a thing that exists in such a way that it does not have necessity but of itself to exist' (*Les principes de la Philosophie*, I, 51; Descartes, 1953, p. 194 [Translation: TC]). The attributes are how a substance is distinguished from others and characterized (*ibid.*, p. 51). The substance of the soul has the attribute of thinking and the body that of extension (*ibid.*, p. 52). The 'modes' modify the attributes; thus the mind in its thinking can have understanding, memory, imagination, will or senses.

107 Suárez in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (published in 1597, the year of Descartes' birth) indicated that the 'being' has 'attributes' (*Disp. Metaph.* 3, about the 'Being in general'; treating the 'attributes' of God as 'infinite being' in the *Disp. Metaph.*, 30) and these immanent determinations or 'modes'.

108 *Ethics* I, def. 3 (Spinoza, 1958, 11 [Translation: Boyle, p. 3]).

109 *Ibid.*, def. 4; p. 11 (Translation: Boyle, p. 3).

110 *Ibid.*, def. 5; p. 11 (Translation: Boyle, p. 3).

111 We will focus on our theme, without following the extensive deductive argument of Spinoza.

112 This is a central theme that shows us that the sixteenth-century was already modern. In this Spinozist expression one sees Suárez, and through him Descartes, and Spinoza. Suárez affirms that the active intellect does not remain determined by the sensitive facts but constructs the 'objective concept' (*Disp. Metaph.*, IV, 2, 1: *phantasma* [. . .] *cum sit materiale non potest cooperari ad actum spiritualem*). One finds a certain 'inuiteness' of subjectivity that will be developed later in the *Meditations* of Descartes (see Gilson, 1951, pp. 301.). This will permit the affirmation of the existence of God from the interior experience of the soul: *signatum est super nos lumen vultus Dei* [is engraved in us (in the soul) the light of the face of God] (as the famous Psalm says) that will be developed as a neo-Stoic movement until Malebranche. The sixteenth century is beneath the seventeenth.

113 *Ethics* V, prop. XXXVI; Spinoza, 1958, 266 (Translation: Boyle, p. 218). At the beginning of the *Theological-Political Treatise* he quotes 1 John 4.13: 'By this we know that

This 'third kind' of knowledge has gone unnoticed by many commentators.¹¹⁴ Second, if it is true that 'the mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while the body endures',¹¹⁵ nevertheless 'the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the human body, but *something* of it remains, which is eternal.'¹¹⁶

One aspect of Spinoza was rediscovered by the romantics, in particular Goethe. The other Spinoza returns at the end of the twentieth century, as part of a philosophical movement of Italian and French Marxists (and before them and for different motives among the Soviets), who repudiating the dialectic returned to Spinoza to find in him a materialist ontology, which could be a new philosophical basis after the crisis of Althusserianism;¹¹⁷ a return, which wanted to save Marx from all Hegelian influence. We will not address this aspect.

On the contrary, I think that Spinoza was found historically in the face of the necessity to effect a process of philosophical-historical critique, which has been exhausted now. Now paradoxically, it is necessary to tackle a path of reconstruction. Spinoza had to open a *path of liberty*, which necessitated political democracy, which assumed a de-fetishization of the biblical polit-

we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit'; that references another Johannine text: 'that they may all be one. As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in us [. . .] and have loved them even as you have loved me [. . .] because you loved me before the foundation of the world' (John 17.21-4). The *conatus* culminates in Spinoza as love (Deleuze, 1999, p. 305: 'Identity of Being and Happiness, of Substance and Happiness, of God and Happiness'). Note this text of the Sufi movement of Islamic Spain in a famous writing of Ibn'Arabi: 'The third class of illumination is the illumination of the devotion that procures the knowledge of God in things [. . .] One cannot know God in things any more than through the manifestation of the things and the disappearance of its statute [of the thing]. Who achieves devotion sees God in things [. . .]. The greater illumination in this field is that the vision of God is the vision of the world itself [. . .]' (*al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya* II; Ibn 'Arabi, 1911, pp. 507-8; quoted in Addas, 1996, p. 144 [Translation: TC]).

114 See Deleuze, 1999, p. 300. The 'third kind' is 'love of God' (*Ethics* V, prop. XXXII-XXXVII [Translation: Boyle, pp. 216-19]).

115 *Ethics*, V, prop. XXI; p. 259 (Translation: Boyle, p. 212).

116 *Ibid.*, prop. XXIII (Translation: Boyle, p. 212). He continues: 'This *something*, which pertains to the essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal' (*ibid.*, 260 [Translation: Boyle, p. 213]). 'Hence it follows that *the part of the mind* which remains, of whatever size it is, is more perfect than the rest. For *the eternal part of the mind* is the intellect [. . .] but that part which we have shown to perish is the imagination' (*ibid.*, V, prop. XL; p. 270 [Translation: Boyle, p. 221]). Spinoza is ready but does not speak of immortality; he indicates the persistence of an eternal part of the mind, now of the singular (that the Hellenists never defended). This dualism contradicts the symbolic narrative of the 'unity' of the 'flesh' (*basar* in Hebrew, *sárx* in Greek) of the 'resurrection', richer ethical-politically than the body-mind dualism, also mythical: it is an aspect that Spinoza did not adequately 'philosophize' from his own Hebrew tradition; a Hellenocentrism.

117 See Negri, 2000 and 1993; Deleuze, 1999 (orig., 1970) and 2001 (orig., 1968); Balibar, 1985; etc. Negri writes: 'The [Spinozist] ethic is the key that opens our path and determines the discriminations, a not-dialectic key. The falsity of the dialectic is that one key opens all the doors - on the contrary, the [Spinozist] ethic is an adequate key for the singularity' (2000, p. 32 [Translation: TC]). From the end of the 1970s, I began a reinterpretation of Marxism that without negating the dialectic could subsume it in an 'analectic' affirmative movement, from the Other as exteriority, as positivity, from Schelling. Another try at overcoming the Stalinist dogmatism.

ical-dogmatic interpretation of Christendom and of Judaeandom,¹¹⁸ not of Judaism, if one uses the analogy. Today, it is necessary to *return to the origin* to rediscover the *cultural* importance of the symbolic narrative of 'sacred' texts (biblical, Taoist, Vedantic, Koranic, the *Book of the Dead*, Bantú myths, Tupinambas, etc.) as a theme of a *strictly philosophical* critical hermeneutic work, which Levinas has helped us with in the Semitic tradition (which was impossible for Spinoza), but which not even he clearly saw,¹¹⁹ and so it remains captured in a certain political philosophy within the horizon of a Zionism or narrow 'Davidic messianism'.¹²⁰ Among others, Michel Henry,¹²¹ J. Habermas,¹²² Alain Badiou,¹²³ Slavoj Žižek,¹²⁴ Franz Hinkelammert,¹²⁵ and, in his way, although contrastingly, Gianni Vattimo today have

118 I propose this neologism, by analogy with the Kierkegaardian concept of 'Christendom', in the face of the confusion of the Jewish 'religion' with a Zionist 'cultural' and 'political' project, today more ambiguous and dangerous than in the time of Spinoza, when the actions of the State of Israel are seen in relation to the Palestinians. I remember that in my stay in Israel, in the 1950s and 1960s, a Palestinian said to me: 'We are the Jews of Israel!' Spinoza writes: 'With the Hebrews [. . .] kings most decidedly held the right over religion' (*Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 19; p. 410 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 227-8]). This is what Hobbes proposes (but in Anglican Christianity). It is not for Spinoza because then it was a theocracy (Judaeandom *avant la lettre*). In the present, it is around a new hermeneutic of the *Koran* where Islamic fundamentalism will be overcome, without destroying the great tradition of Arabic philosophy.

119 Levinas is not conscious of having produced new philosophical categories that have little to do with Plato or Descartes, to whom he makes continuous reference, like the idea of 'infinity' in Descartes where nothing refers to Alterity; or the reference to the idea of 'good' in Plato whose content is absolutely different from the 'metaphysical desire' that leans toward the goodness of the Other.

120 Levinas has many prejudices against Spinoza. He tells us that 'Spinoza exerted an influence on this history of ideas that was decisive and anti-Jewish. [. . .] Within the history of ideas, he subordinated the truth of Judaism to the revelation of the New Testament. [. . .] Henceforth we cannot ignore the harmful role Spinoza played in the decomposition of the Jewish intelligentsia [. . .] How many Jewish intellectuals detached from all religious belief do not regard the figure of Jesus as fulfilling the teaching of the prophets? [. . .] Thanks to the rationalism patronized by Spinoza, Christianity is surreptitiously triumphing' (*Le cas Spinoza*, in Levinas, 1976, pp. 144-5 [Translation: Hand, pp. 107-8]). Levinas shows, assuming in this almost the position of a Zionist Judaism, that 'the great certainty of our history [is that] ultimately [. . .] preserved a nation to love and the opportunity to build a state' (p. 147 [Translation: Hand, p. 110]). From this comes the position of Ben Gurion of wanting to claim the person of Spinoza as more efficient than 'the [Christian] missionaries installed in Israel' (ibid. [Translation: Hand, p. 110]). It is paradoxical that Levinas does not discover the difference of what he tries. In Spinoza, philosophy is liberated from the anti-prophetic dogmatism of the synagogue of his era and of his city (replica of the Catholic Inquisition that his people suffered in Spain and Portugal); in Levinas is discovered, however, the philosophical structures of the Semitic experience.

121 See Henry, 2000.

122 See Habermas, 2001.

123 Badiou, 1999.

124 See Žižek, 2000.

125 Hinkelammert, 1998. He writes: 'I consider [in this work] the Gospel of John a text that speaks about reality [. . .] Texts like the Gospel of John have been immunized, by being labelled theological texts. They were limited to discussion in the faculties of theology [. . .] under the pretext that for the high sciences – science of history, of philosophy, of the social sciences, etc. – they have no relevance. [Nevertheless, these texts] shape a categorical mark that channels all later history to today and is present today still through all the so-called secularizations [. . .] They believe seriously that the faculties define reality [. . .] and feel they

tackled this reconstructive path.¹²⁶ Spinoza is situated at the beginning of the secularization of Modernity (since in the *first* Hispanic Modernity it was impossible to take a deconstructive path).

[138] The first thesis of the *Theological–Political Treatise* – an important step in the modern definition of politics, published anonymously in 1670 because of the political danger of its proposal – is a lure of liberty for philosophy in the face of the dogmatic apparatus of the despotic, conservative state:

[In this *Treatise* I am claiming that] [. . .] this freedom [of judgement] can be granted without detriment to public peace or to the right of civil authorities, and should be so granted, and cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and grave harm to the entire commonwealth.¹²⁷

The critical possibility of philosophy and democracy as its condition of possibility are two sides of the same coin. To be able to permit such liberty Spinoza has to deconstruct not only the idea of God but also the repressive and dogmatic Judaeo-Christian interpretation of the sacred text, which hinders freedom of thought. For Spinoza, the symbolic biblical narrative fulfils a respectable function, being a product of the 'imagination' of the prophets (as al-Farabi had already explained). The philosophical demands expressed in the Old and even in the New Testament have to be discovered. For it our philosopher, Benedictus (in Latin, which for Spinoza was the philosophical language), starts exactly where we left Hobbes in his reflections: first, (a) on the 'Christian state', and, second, (b) political philosophy starting from subjectivity driven by 'passions' (giving priority to the affective or motivational level of subjectivity).

To be able to effect a philosophical exegesis of the biblical text, one has to 'separate philosophy from theology'.¹²⁸ Because, paradoxically, regarding the Jews and the Christians 'I do not see that they have taught anything more than the speculations of Aristotelians or Platonists, and they have made Scripture conform to these so as to avoid appearing to be the followers of heathens. It was not enough for them to share the delusions of the Greeks: they have sought to represent the prophets as sharing in these same delusions.'¹²⁹

have a right to claim it as *worse for reality* when it does not fit into the schematic of their faculties.' (pp. 11–12 [Translation: TC]).

¹²⁶ See Vattimo, 1998.

¹²⁷ At the beginning of the *Theological–Political Treatise* (Spinoza, 2003, 60 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 7]).

¹²⁸ *Theological–Political Treatise*, ch. 16 (Spinoza, 2003, p. 334 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 179]). He says: 'In addition, they multiplied religious dogmas to such an extent and confused them with so much philosophy that the supreme interpreter of religion had to be a consummate philosopher and theologian' (ibid., ch. 19; p. 227 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 118]). The excellent position of Ibn Rush (Averroes) followed by Thomas Aquinas had given way to a confusion in Christendom (and Judaeandom).

¹²⁹ *Theological–Political Treatise*, Preface; ed. cit., p. 67 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 5). Spinoza seems to be unaware that he does not show the Semitic originality of the categories

He tries a critique of theological Hellenocentrism, but he cannot carry it out. When he defines what is a prophet he uses Eurocentric philosophical categories: 'A prophet is one who interprets Gods revelations to those *who cannot attain to certain knowledge of the matters revealed*'.¹³⁰ The 'certain' and 'natural' knowledge is philosophically modern.¹³¹ The prophet perceives 'God's revelations with the aid of the imaginative faculty',¹³² but 'the imaginative faculty [is] fleeting and inconstant',¹³³ so 'hence it follows that prophecy cannot of itself carry certainty, because, as I have shown, it depended solely on the imagination'.¹³⁴ As they were 'not secure' one needed as proof 'some sign'.¹³⁵ The 'certainty' of the prophets was not '*mathematical*' but 'only moral',¹³⁶ and 'in this respect, then, prophecy is inferior to natural knowledge'.¹³⁷ The argument of Spinoza starts from the distinction that, on the one hand, it is 'the masses', which need imaginary representations, whose proof are the miracles,¹³⁸ and, on the other, it is the philosophical rationality, which God will manifest in nature, as divine law, which is natural law.¹³⁹ Always coherent with his ontology, he concludes:

Should anyone be disposed to argue that the Jews [. . .] have been chosen by God unto eternity, I shall not oppose him [. . .] whereas in respect of understanding and true virtue there is no distinction between one nation and another.¹⁴⁰

The 'masses' need ceremonies and symbolic narratives,¹⁴¹ because more believe when there are novelties than when all happens habitually. Spinoza, however, demands to discover the divine in the 'natural', the ordinary, the rational.

of the thinking about the prophets. Spinoza himself is too Eurocentric, Latin-Germanic, modern.

130 Ibid., ch. 1; p. 75 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 9).

131 Similar to Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, religion is the environment of the representation prior to the 'absolute knowledge' of philosophy. Spinoza explains, from his philosophical conception, that the '*natural knowledge*' (from God or from the *natura naturans* in the *natura naturata*) is identical by its content to the prophetic, although not in its expression nor destination (ibid., pp. 77-8 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 20]).

132 Ibid., p. 94 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 20).

133 Ibid., p. 95 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 21).

134 Ibid., ch. 2; pp. 97-98 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 23).

135 Ibid., p. 98 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 23). Spinoza cannot situate his argument within the pragmatic, the logic of the relations of intersubjective interpretation, of the certainty of 'believing in the word of the Other'. He observes this from an analytical propositional logic.

136 Ibid., p. 98 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 23).

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid., ch. 6; pp. 170f. (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 72-87).

139 Ibid., ch. 4; pp. 136f. (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 49-59).

140 Ibid., ch. 3; pp. 134-5 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 48). Spinoza's universalism collided with those dogmatisms.

141 Ibid., ch. 5; pp. 152f. (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 60-71).

After that, he shows the manipulation of 'the interpretation of Scripture',¹⁴² To avoid manipulation one has to know Scripture in Hebrew, one has to know the history, the context of each book, its principal argument, etc. Spinoza gives a true lesson in hermeneutics, which Schleiermacher will tackle later in his *Hermeneutics*. Blending more than he had imagined, Spinoza criticizes Maimonides in that 'every passage of Scripture admits of various [. . .] meanings' we can admit something when 'there is nothing in that passage that is not in agreement with reason, or is contrary to reason'.¹⁴³ Spinoza takes this position as 'harmful, unprofitable and absurd',¹⁴⁴ because all text has a historical-hermeneutical sense, whose reference is the sense that it was given at that time (that of the prophets) 'the common people [. . . who] understood the language of the prophets and the apostles'.¹⁴⁵ The difficulty is found with respect 'to the actual masses', but in this case 'the common people are on the same footing as the learned'.¹⁴⁶ He gives many examples in the Scriptures,¹⁴⁷ and analyses them with surprising currency (centuries ahead in many hermeneutical aspects). But even more provocative and profound are the following chapters, in particular XIV, in which he concludes that 'worship of God and obedience to him consists solely in justice and charity, or love towards one's neighbour'; and inverting the Anselmian inversion,¹⁴⁸ declares that 'God forgives repentant sinners [. . .] from the mercy and grace whereby he directs all things'.¹⁴⁹ He concludes that one has to separate philosophy from theology. To philosophy correspond 'universally valid axioms, and must be constructed by studying Nature alone'; however, faith is 'based on history and language, and must be derived only from Scripture'.¹⁵⁰

[139] The argument is concentrated in a political moment because there is no philosophy without liberty and it is necessary then 'to enquire what are the limits of this freedom of thought, and of saying what one thinks, in a well-conducted state'.¹⁵¹ As for Aristotle, 'the intellectual love of God' being the ultimate end, the *pólis* is a condition of possibility of the *beata vita*. We reach political philosophy, since when Spinoza had to live, martyred by the religious authority, he was not 'secure' at the political level. Amsterdam was the new Venice (the University of Padua in Marsilius' time), but with contradictions, sects, fragments and parts in perpetual competition.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, ch. 7; pp. 193f. (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 88–107).

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 215 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 103).

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 219 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 106). It is the theory of the 'two truths' of Averroes.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 218 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 104).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 8f.; pp. 222f. (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 108f.).

¹⁴⁸ See that already explained in sections [57f.] (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 167).

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 14; p. 316 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 167).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 318 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 169). It would be interesting to address the hermeneutical doctrine of Spinoza, but it is too far from our path.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 16; p. 334 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 179).

Spinoza belonged to a hypothetical 'liberty party',¹⁵² and so was weak, insecure and always exposed to critiques. Although the United Provinces were an environment of greater liberty in Europe, they were still exposed to 'excessive authority and [to the] egoism of [Calvinist] preachers'.¹⁵³ The noble family of Orange-Nassau, counts of the country, traditionally exercised military power. The 'Regents', the richest bourgeois (among them the owners of the West and East Indies Company), administered the cities. Both groups had directed the struggle of independence against Spain. Public finances were in the hands of the 'general states' of the Provinces, under the hegemony of a 'Grand Pensionary'. Between 1650 and 1654, Jan de Witt was elected 'Grand Pensionary' and the party of the Republic takes power. Spinoza had in Witt an important supporter (weakened before his assassination). Among the religious groups, Orthodox Calvinists defended 'double obedience' and did not accept the power of the state over the Church. The country people and the small bourgeoisie supported this position and were the majority of the 'multitude'. The family of Orange-Nassau also acted with the Calvinist Church. The democratic position of Spinoza was an open minority.

Chapters XVI to XX of the *Theological-Political Treatise* are the first mature exposition of the foundation of politics in Spinoza.¹⁵⁴ We see his libertarian intentions and the reductions of political philosophy of early Modernity. We refer to some essential theses.

For Spinoza, the level of 'natural necessities', of 'natural law', of the 'state of nature', is the starting point:

By the right and established order of Nature (*institutum naturae*) I mean simply the rules governing the nature of every individual thing, according to which we conceive it as naturally determined to exist and to act in a definite way.¹⁵⁵

The content of these expressions is very different from that of Hobbes. 'Nature' is a moment of the *Natura naturata*, a finite modal expression of God, which works by necessity. Thus:

For example, fish are determined by nature to swim, and the big ones eat the smaller ones. Thus it is by sovereign natural right that fish inhabit water, and the big ones eat the smaller ones.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² See 'Le parti de la liberté', in Balibar, 1985, pp. 11f.

¹⁵³ It was the peak; poor Spinoza! Persecuted by the Hispanic Catholics as 'marrano Jew', persecuted by the new Jewish inquisitors in the synagogue of Amsterdam, now he had to confront the orthodoxy of Calvinism. See the 'Letter to Enrique Oldenberg', in *Complete Correspondence*, Letter XXX (Spinoza, 1988, p. 100 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 844]).

¹⁵⁴ The definitive synthesis will be explained in the *Political Treatise*, unfinished at his death.

¹⁵⁵ *Theological-Political Treatise*, ch. 16; p. 334 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 179).

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

THE SECOND 'EARLY MODERNITY'

'Natural' is what each being is, not what one has to be, but what simply 'can' be:

It is certain that Nature, taken in the absolute sense, has the sovereign right to do all that she can do; that is, Nature's right is co-extensive with her *power* [. . .] But since the universal power of Nature as a whole is nothing but the power of all individual things taken together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do all that it *can* do; i.e. the right of the individual is co-extensive with its determinate power. [From where] it follows that each individual has the sovereign right to do this, that is, [. . .] to exist and to act as it naturally determined. And here I do not acknowledge any distinction between men and any other individuals of Nature.¹⁵⁷

It follows: 'the natural right of every man is determined not by sound reason, but by his desire and his power.'¹⁵⁸ 'Sound reason' is not natural and, as in Stoicism, manages desire.¹⁵⁹ Thus, in the 'state of nature' human beings '[. . .] have to live and preserve themselves as far as in them lies, namely, by the urging of appetite alone, for Nature has given them nothing else and has denied them the actualised power to live *according to sound reason*'.¹⁶⁰

For Spinoza the human being under the sole natural laws, in the first place and solipsistically, is determined, as he will explain in *Ethic*, to work necessarily under the impulses of the 'endeavour after self-preservation' (*conatus esse conservandi*),¹⁶¹ which acts while *one can* (while in one's *power* to do so).¹⁶² The large fish 'can' technically (by having a larger mouth than the size of the small fish) eat the little. But it is not free to do something else; it is a necessary compulsion.¹⁶³ The appetites or passions are strictly egoist (tending toward solipsism): each one fancies their own concrete survival. The appetites do not have universality because neither have any rational component. All natural human beings 'have to live and preserve themselves as far as in them lies, namely, by the urging of appetite alone'.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 334–5 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 179).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 336 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 180).

¹⁵⁹ For Epicurus, 'the natural right' (*fúseos dikaion*) (*Diógenes Laercio*, X, xxi; Epicurus, 1968, pp. 122–3) corresponds to the 'natural tendencies (*fusikôn epithumiôn*)' (*ibid.*, p. xxx).

¹⁶⁰ *Theological–Political Treatise*, (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 180).

¹⁶¹ *Ethics* IV, prop. XX–XXII (Spinoza, 1958, pp. 190–1 [Translation: Boyle, pp. 195–7]). 'No virtue can be conceived as prior to this' (*ibid.*).

¹⁶² It is a practical 'ability to be fact', moment eminently owned by strategic reason. It is a 'being able to work' technically (not a 'having to work' normatively).

¹⁶³ Remember that for Epicurus some 'tendencies (*epithumiôn*) are natural and necessary (*fusikai kai anankaiai*)' (1968, p. xxix).

¹⁶⁴ *Theological–Political Treatise*, ch. 16; p. 336 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 180).

[140] Spinoza starts from a 'model', taking inspiration in part from Hobbes but much more from the daily life of Amsterdam, with its competitive market as *modus vivendi*, in which materially human nature was conceived as empirically individual and with appetites or passions (affections), which in that state of nature are ruled by the principle of the struggle for self-preservation (survival of the fittest: the one more *able*).¹⁶⁵ Inevitably this 'reduction' to the 'material' plane will produce the basis of modern politics. We pose two questions:

(a) The first is multiple: How are these *formal models* born? What was their theoretical function? In what consists their reductive fallacy? The centre of life of those bourgeois citizens (in the splendour of Amsterdam, coming from humble medieval hamlets, situated strategically within the Germanic fiefs) was the 'market'; a space of reference with the church or the municipality, as *institution* (not natural) of the exchange of agricultural and artisanal products. The cities were the place where the fiefs could get instruments or utensils, which they themselves could not produce. The medieval *civitas* was the space of commerce, distribution and exchange of products, and, even before, of technical artisanal production (metallurgy, blacksmithing, production of weapons, carpentry, mills, textiles, jewellery, etc.). In the 'market' each one had to defend him/herself to survive, to 'conserve him/herself'. There was a 'state of competition' (*Konkurrenz* in German), which defeated the least productive, the least efficient to get a better quality in their commodities and products at the lower price.

The 'market' – which in Adam Smith will reach its classic formulation as possible theoretical reconciliation of the ethical contradiction par excellence: how to overcome the dilemma between the egoism of 'competition' and the 'virtue' or ethical demands of life in community – is the starting point. It is the first moment of a movement in the 'circle' (see Figure 8.1, arrow *a*). The 'market' as the location of the 'bourgeois' or citizen human sociality (from *Bürger* in German, and from there French *bourgeois*, if *Burg* in German is 'castle' or 'city', and 'citizen' [from *civitas*]) is the 'reality' from where one starts to formulate theoretically an *ad hoc* utopian model. The hypothetical formalism of the initial model of modern political philosophy is based on the formal economic experience of the market elevated to the status of *human universal reality itself*, 'prior' to the existence of the political community.

(b) The second question investigates what permitted Spinoza to assume the affective, compulsive, not merely solipsistic constitution, since he intends only the conservation of the individual aggressively confronting all the rest, negating, for example, the specific impulses of the animals (in particular mammals) and, anticipantly and deeply, the 'Dionysian compulsions' of Nietzsche or the 'desire of Alterity' of Levinas, to name some of his oppo-

¹⁶⁵ For 'contents', see the theme in chapter 1 of Dussel, 1998a, [56f.].

nents. Why did he not discover the natural common instinct so evident in all animal species or the societies called 'primitive'?

The 'state of nature' as solipsism, *which one has to negate* in neo-stoicism to reach rational, civil or political life, proceeds equally from the situation of 'competition', which the bourgeois found in the market (prior to being a member of the city: the 'consumer' prior to the 'citizen') in that survival contemplated exclusively its egoist permanence by the search for its own interest over utility or common good.¹⁶⁶

Spinoza frequently repeats that in the state of nature there is a 'force (*conatus*) of persisting in existing',¹⁶⁷ that is, exactly, the moment of the tendency to the production and reproduction of human life. However, as we will see, in an architectonic in elaboration, the reproduction of human life is still always cultural and rational, and following reproductive compulsions also human. The reductivist conception of life, of affectivity as solipsistic, leaves to one side the material sphere, which will remain absent in the current of modern political philosophy.

[141] Spinoza does not integrate sufficiently the *material sphere*, which passes through Hobbes and finishes in Kant,¹⁶⁸ that is the foundation of political action as political. With Spinoza (and for the moderns, from Machiavelli to John Rawls), the 'reduction' of what we will call the *material sphere of politics* will determine an inadequate comprehension of the demands of the production, reproduction and development of human life, which would have to be dialectically articulated in the affective, rational and communitarian levels as moments of politics, which act normatively with the claim of universality.¹⁶⁹ Starting with an individual human being, solipsistic, naturally egoist, aggressive in the struggle for one's exclusive survival, we have all the assumptions to establish another type of reduction in the *formal sphere of politics*, equally limiting. A reductive vision of the material sphere produces equally formal distortions in the procedural, discursive or consensual political level.

Given the insecure fearful situation, with hostilities, hatred and wrath in the 'state of nature', it is necessary to overcome it with a rational 'civil state' which permits the fulfilment of the natural drive (*conatus esse conservandi*) but now from the political order. The 'civil state', (arrow *b* of Figure 8.1) is based on the impossibility of survival in the mere 'state of nature'. The 'civil state' assumes a 'pact' (arrow *b*). This hypothetical model, as pro-


¹⁶⁶ In my doctoral thesis I intended to demonstrate that the classic pre-modern concept of 'common good' included naively a material level richer than the modern formal 'common interest' or 'utility' (Dussel, 1959).

¹⁶⁷ See *Ethics*, IV, Prop. III: 'The force (*conatus*) with which man persists in existing' (Spinoza, 1958, p. 178 [Translation: Boyle, p. 146]).

¹⁶⁸ See Dussel, 1998a, ch. 1.

¹⁶⁹ I call it the 'universal material principle' of ethics, of politics. Spinoza shows the importance of the drive but it remains relegated to a second plane under the control and dominion of reason. The neo-Epicureanism is excessively rationalist. There is no adequate co-determination of the material affectivity and rational management of human life.

Figure 8.1 Material and formal level: natural and civil state in Spinoza



Explanation: The existing *market* (starting point) determines (arrow *a*) the hypothetical–utopian construction of an *ad hoc* model A (level 1), which permits the hypothetical–utopian model B (arrow *B*) (level 2) based in a consensual pact (*b*); it is ‘useful’, permits the functioning of the market (*c*). It is a tautological ‘circle’ but not ‘explicative’.

positional to overcome ‘state of nature’, will be the theoretical–political model of Modernity, lacking from its contractuality the original natural *communitarian* intersubjectivity. One can see clearly the difference from the ‘state of nature’ of Hobbes. For Hobbes, the ‘state of nature’ is of war, military war, political war in a chaotic England. The ‘civil state’ is a despotic monarch, which, although authoritarian, would be better than the previous chaos. For Spinoza, the ‘state of nature’ is not as violent as for Hobbes. It is the egoism of the impulses of the market, but without a strategic rationalization it becomes banditry, fear, insecurity.¹⁷⁰ The ‘civil state’ ensures the market is more ‘useful’, rationalizes the mercantile relations. Amsterdam is not medieval England. So one can understand when Spinoza writes:

The life of men without mutual assistance must necessarily be most *wretched*¹⁷¹ and must lack the cultivation of reason [. . .] They had to bind themselves by the most stringent *pledges* to be guided in all matters only by the dictates of reason¹⁷² [. . .] and to keep appetite in check¹⁷³ in so far as it tends to another’s hurt.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ In *Ethics*, IV, prop. V, he writes: ‘The force and increase of any passion, and its persistence in existing, are not defined by the power whereby we endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own’ (p. 179 [Translation: Boyle, p. 148]).

¹⁷¹ It is an economic problem, not military as in Hobbes.

¹⁷² Here one moves to the level of explicit conscious consensuality.

¹⁷³ Having affirmed the importance of what is affective or compelling, at the end the neo-Epicurean imposes a reason that *negates* the impulsive material level.

¹⁷⁴ *Theological–Political Treatise*, p. 338 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 181).

This 'pact' is not natural; it is the fruit of an act following the solipsistic paradigm of the conscience, of explicit 'election'.¹⁷⁵ The motive of the 'pact' is the *greater utility* of the pact-makers, and so it lasts as long as the reasons to effect it. All natural normativity remains discarded; even in politics all moral normativity will be negated, since it grants an absolute primacy to instrumental reason:

We may thus conclude that the validity¹⁷⁶ of an agreement rests on *its utility*, without which the agreement automatically becomes null and void.¹⁷⁷ [. . .] This contract will remain in force for as long as its *basis* – namely, the consideration of danger or advantage – persists; for nobody makes a contract, or is bound to abide by an agreement, except through hope of some good or apprehension of some evil. If the *basis* is removed, the agreement becomes void of itself.¹⁷⁸

The fruit of the supreme 'pact' is the state, which fulfils positively the impulse to egoistic natural survival, which, put in danger, is fully developed by reason in a 'civil state' where 'peace' and 'security' permit fulfilling in a greater way the *conatus esse conservandi*:

Furthermore, there is nobody who does not desire to live *in safety*¹⁷⁹ free from fear, as far as is possible. [. . .] It will become quite clear to us that, in order to achieve *a secure and good life*, men had necessarily to unite in one body. They therefore arranged that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership, and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of the individual.¹⁸⁰

[142] Spinoza (like Lacan or Žižek) thinks that Paul of Tarsus (a Christian who suffered expulsion from the synagogue like Spinoza) enunciated the theme when he wrote: 'The law [the *civil state*] causes sin.'¹⁸¹ Without the

175 'That which in his belief is the greater or lesser' (ibid.).

176 Normativity is imposed with the strength of freely agreed consensus. Here, even that moral 'strength' (to express ourselves as Habermas) is negated.

177 *Theological–Political Treatise*, p. 339 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 182). We see that the pact does not have intrinsic normativity but pure external convenience, pure demand of instrumental or strategic reason (neither material nor discursive reason).

178 Ibid., pp. 345–6 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 186).

179 This is the 'security' as 'happiness' affirmed by the utilitarians hated by Nietzsche and criticized by Levinas (see my *Ethics of Liberation*, §§ 4.3–4.4; Dussel, 1998).

180 *Theological–Political Treatise*, p. 337 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 181).

181 We have shown already (against Lacan, Žižek and Spinoza) that the Pauline text indicates another question. Without 'law' Paul would not have persecuted anyone (like Stephen, the Christian martyr). Through the 'law', one persecuted the Christians, as dogmatic assignment of the synagogue. Through the 'law', one committed the 'sin' of killing innocents. It was necessary to overcome the 'law' of death reaching a new 'law' of love of the Other; 'freedom before the law' was necessary.

'civil state' there is no good or evil,¹⁸² because in the 'state of nature' there are appetites, strength to conserve oneself, but not good or evil. Starting from the consensual 'pact', good or evil consists in fulfilling (or not) the consensual, putting 'strength' or natural 'power' under the empire of reason. One abandons attributing some strength, power, natural right or normativity to the consensuality of the pact, which now is raised over the undefended solipsistic individual as an all-embracing Power of Will.¹⁸³

Such a community's right is called a democracy, which can therefore be defined as a united body of men which corporately possesses sovereign right over everything in its power.¹⁸⁴ Hence it follows that the sovereign power is bound by no law,¹⁸⁵ and all must obey it in all matters.¹⁸⁶

For Spinoza, the citizen, who by 'making a pact' has abandoned all rights of the 'state of nature', remains without normative or civil possibility of dissent before the supreme or absolute will of power of the state.¹⁸⁷ One reaches quickly and unexpectedly an extreme doctrine of political consensualism (is this latent Carl Schmitt?): 'An *enemy* is one who lives *outside the state*,¹⁸⁸ on such terms that neither as an ally nor as a subject does he

182 In the civil or political state, the law of the community *decides* what is good and what evil, to distinguish properly between good and evil (*Theological-Political Treatise*, pp. 335–6 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 182–3], on Romans 7.7). There is a formal consensualist understanding of politics. Said good or evil is particular, limited within the horizon of each state. It is true that 'we call that good or evil which is useful or the contrary for our preservation' (*Ethics*, IV, prop. 8; ed. cit., p. 181); but the 'useful' only can choose strategic reason as its end (and the state is the end of all practical ends), and not the appetites, which struggling irrationally to conserve themselves, end by leaning human beings toward killing one another, supreme inefficacy and inutility.

183 K.-O. Apel, starting from Peirce, founds intersubjective consensuality in the *indefinite community* or the presupposed transcendently a priori, 'community' of recognized argumentations as equals and by this foundation of normativity. However, in the solipsistic model and within the paradigm of the moderns (Hobbes to Hume) the community as presupposed is negated and is made an *effect* of the explicit and positive conscious act of formal consensuality; it is a formalist contractualism. The pragmatic or normative consensuality of Apel goes much further than the instrumental utilitarian consensuality of Spinoza.

184 Here, the criterion of the ability to be fact annuls the principle of ethical operability. Not all that *can be* is normative; neither can all that is decided normatively be effected. Only that which is normatively decided (following the material and normative formal-discursive principles) and can be a fact has normativity (see *Ethics of Liberation*, ch. 3, the 'ethical ability to be fact'; in this *Politics of Liberation*, §§ 22, 27, etc.). The USA *can* technically drop atomic bombs, but does not *have to*. The normative principles (the empirical 'having to be') 'frames' the instrumental action (the 'being able to do'), so it is politically able to be a fact.

185 From our point of view even 'sovereign power' is framed (and obliged) by the material and formal-discursive principles: the normative principles constitute sovereignty as legitimate political sovereignty (material and formally), and not merely instrumentally useful (by its strategic ability to be a fact).

186 Spinoza, 2003, p. 341 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 183).

187 Each one 'transfers all the *power that he possesses* to the community, which will therefore alone retain the sovereign natural right over everything, that is, the supreme rule' (*ibid.*).

188 Is the marginal, the foreigner, the Other not maybe in the 'exteriority' of the state?

recognize its sovereignty. For it is not hatred but the state's right that makes a man an enemy.¹⁸⁹

The supreme power of the state will be subdued with 'liberty' which gets utility out of the pact; but the dominated, who does not get utility will have to submit 'through fear of the ultimate penalty'.¹⁹⁰ The 'civil state' will have the monopoly on legitimate coercion, and the citizen will have lost all legitimacy in all possible dissent. The *conatus esse conservandi* of the 'civil state' (not 'of nature') ended up imposing the reproduction of the established political or *formal system* that judges as the supreme perversity the Dionysian praxis of transformation.¹⁹¹ It is a politics, which, revolutionary in Spinoza, today has become conservative, which arose in the struggle of the Dutch triumphant mercantile bourgeoisie that became in time Eurocentric and totalitarian:

It follows that, unless we wish to be enemies of the state and to act against reason which urges us to uphold the state with all our might, it is our duty to carry out all the orders of the sovereign power without exception, *even if those orders are quite irrational*.¹⁹²

[143] Contractual instrumental reason brings us now to irrationality (to have to accept the absurd). The 'civil state' would be a *self-regulated formal political system*, closed, without reference to an external reality: it would be fetishized. Only a full concept of *reason*, not solipsistic but *communitarian* (normative intersubjectivity), not formal-instrumental but *practical-material* (with universal claim of practical truth), not contractual but *discursive* (with claim of universal validity),¹⁹³ could allow one to overcome the contributions of modern bourgeois political philosophy, captured within a *reductive paradigm of the conscience* (pre-linguistic, pre-pragmatic, pre-discursive) and *instrumental of pure feasibility* (by the negation of practical-material

Will Spinoza not be negating *material* (economic, anti-bourgeois) dissent contradicting his intention to affirm political liberty at a theoretical level (the right to freely think or express oneself dissenting)? This will be the insoluble contradiction of modern liberal thinking (for example, Rawls).

189 *Theological-Political Treatise*, p. 346 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 187).

190 *Ibid.*, p. 183.

191 Of Nietzsche, or 'the metaphysical desire' of Levinas (see *Ethics of Liberation*, paragraphs suggested previously). In this sense Horkheimer criticizes the *conatus* of Spinoza.

192 *Ibid.*, pp. 61-2 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 183).

193 Because, when sovereign power becomes absurd, the anti-hegemonic discursive reason of the victims ('Semitic model' that Spinoza ignores) has to reserve its right to a critical and dissenting argument (thinking and saying what one thinks *critically*), not leaving the last resort to sovereign power, but in the rationality of the argument in favour of the oppressed. The acceptance of sovereign power has to start from and be founded in the acceptance of the better *critical* argument, which has for its part, to be 'the better', having necessary reference to the production, reproduction and development of human life in community (material or ethical moment) and, in its validity, the symmetrical recognition of the other affected debaters (formal discursive or moral moment), of the *victims*.

reason and the communitarian affirmation of the reproduction and development of human life, critical Dionysian drive, as desire of Alterity).¹⁹⁴

It seems that Spinoza has arrived at a dilemma. On the one hand, he has negated the material level of human existence (the material principle of the production, reproduction and development of the human life of each ethical-political subject in community, in the discarded 'state of nature') and has based political or 'civil' life exclusively in a non-normative strategic pact by mere utilitarian demand, in which the individual abandons a presupposed original egoism to lose their natural rights before the sovereign state. But, on the other hand, he limits this loss of natural rights:

For in a democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so completely that *thereafter he is not to be consulted*; he transfers it to the majority of the entire community of which he is part. [. . .] my main purpose is best served, which is to discuss the benefits of freedom in a commonwealth.¹⁹⁵

Spinoza wants to defend the freedom of thought and of expressing publicly what he thinks. The central theme of the book (maybe of all Spinoza's intellectual life) is explained in chapter 20: 'It is shown that in a free commonwealth every man *may think as he pleases, and say what he thinks*.'¹⁹⁶ The political sphere should ground this right (negated through the Inquisition of his family, the synagogue when he was expelled and by the Calvinist fundamentalist republicans against the citizen and philosopher, who struggle for freedom of thought), which from 1672 and the assassination of Jan de Witt, became more problematic. Freedom of thought was repressed in the United Provinces.

Nevertheless, defending freedom of thought and expression, Spinoza falls into a certain contradiction, because, on the one hand, he affirms the autonomy of the religious communities opposed to the model of Christendom, which does not permit such autonomy. But, on the other hand, the development of a democratic state, which defines the individual subjects as members who participate in the pact of a society under the dictates of laws and reason and have to give *all right* to the sovereign power of the state over the religious communities, would negate again public freedom of the religious conscience.

¹⁹⁴ Means-end instrumentally efficient reason à la Max Weber.

¹⁹⁵ *Theological Political Treatise*, p. 344 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 185).

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 412 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 230). It is strange that the Stalinist state exalted Spinoza as materialist and atheist, but did not read texts like: 'the most tyrannical government will be one where the individual is denied the freedom to express and to communicate to others what he thinks' (*ibid.*, ch. 20; p. 414 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 231]). And in the face of the new institutions of intelligence directed against the North American citizen or the destructive wars against so-called 'terrorists' organized by George W. Bush, one should read: 'The basis of the state [is] that its ultimate purpose is *not to exercise dominion nor restrain men by fear* [. . .] but [. . .] to free very man from fear so that he may live in security' (*ibid.*, pp. 414-15 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 231]).

It is a conservative vision (opposed roundly to all rebellion as 'treason',¹⁹⁷ understandable in a moment of creation of a still weak democratic state), which does not find a space to integrate one's own experience of the 'Semitic model' of critical rationality, which Walter Benjamin would define as the messianic eruption in the 'now-time' (*Jetzt-Zeit*). The trauma of the religious dogmatism suffered did not permit him to discover that the individualist despotism of the modern state was being born. Like Hobbes, he defends 'Caesaro-Papism': 'Only those who hold the sovereign power have an overall right and that all law is dependent on their decision alone, I intended not only civil but religious law.'¹⁹⁸

The *Summary of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies*, which organized the institutions of colonial Latin America, withdrew in Book I all reference to the *patronato*, the integral ecclesial structure under the power of the Hispanic king.¹⁹⁹ The colonial Christendom of the Iberian Indies was the model to imitate. Following Hobbes: 'the kingdom of God is where justice and charity have the force of law and command [. . . but] God has no special kingdom [directly] over men save through the medium of those who hold the sovereignty [. . . in a democracy]',²⁰⁰ he leaves to the religious communities their critical-political strength, since 'devotion to one's country is the highest form of devotion, which can be shown',²⁰¹ which flows in an ambiguous conservatism:

Hence it follows that any act of piety towards one's neighbour must be impious if it results in harm to the commonwealth as a whole, and any impious act committed against him must be accounted pious if it is done for the sake of the preservation of the commonwealth.²⁰²

If one takes this statement seriously, Washington, Joan of Arc or the parish priest of Dolores, Miguel Hidalgo, would have to be judged as impious. Spinoza is naïve in the face of the possible despotism of a political Totality with a legitimate monopoly on coercion, and takes from prophecy its critical sense.²⁰³ Spinoza, against Marx, speaks of the 'Christian state':

197 *Ibid.*, p. 346 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 187).

198 *Ibid.*, p. 396 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 219).

199 See Dussel, 1967. The example to be overcome is that of Ambrosius, bishop of Milan, who imposed strong punishments on the Emperor Theodosius for the massacres of Thessalonica. For Spinoza, excommunication (that he suffered from the synagogue) is a right of the state. The states founded by Moses and ruled by the kings (Saul, David, Solomon, etc.) are the example to follow.

200 *Theological-Philosophical Treatise*, pp. 397-9 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, pp. 219).

201 *Ibid.*, p. 402 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 222).

202 *Ibid.* One can see Spinoza's admiration for Machiavelli.

203 Since in the end the 'prophets' are not socio-political critics like Hermann Cohen or W. Benjamin or in the philosophy of liberation. The prophets for Spinoza receive revelation ('[. . .] whether we consider religion to be revealed by natural light or by prophecy' (*ibid.*, p. 401 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 220])). In a politics of liberation, for example, the prophets can be those who criticize the political Totality established when this produces victims, poor, oppressed, negative effects of the fetishization or divinization of the state.

'whereas the Hebrews, to the best of my knowledge, [in the case of Moses or David] never entertained any doubt about it'.²⁰⁴

[144] Following the *Treatise on the Passions of the Soul* of Descartes²⁰⁵ and the explanation of the political level of Hobbes and Machiavelli, Spinoza begins his anthropological-political discourse at the level of 'affections'²⁰⁶ (theme developed in his later works until 1572, Jan de Witt's assassination). The *conatus* as affective tendency is fundamentally a moment of the 'state of nature'.²⁰⁷ In a neo-Stoic position Spinoza shows that the affective life is subsumed 'by reason' in the political or 'civil state', which permits life in society in view of 'utility'. The pact is an act founded in said utility; so although the sovereign orders something irrational to be fulfilled one has to fulfil it.²⁰⁸ There is no intrinsic normativity in political life, although good and evil, what is just and unjust, and human liberty exist there,²⁰⁹ far from mere necessity united to the 'servitude' of affections.²¹⁰ We will inspire ourselves in Spinoza to develop an 'ontology of the Will':

This 'Semitic' position, like that of Levinas in part, is not captured by Spinoza, explicitly obsessed against the inquisitorial dogmatism that he has suffered from the religious communities. But today we, in a colonial world, who have suffered democratic Holland, parliamentary England, the liberty of the French Revolution, etc., we are a little more sceptical about the modern state. Spinoza writes: 'No one has the right and power to exercise control over it [the state], to choose its ministers, to determine and establish the foundations of the church and its doctrine, to pass judgment on morality [. . .] to excommunicate or to accept into the church, and to provide for the poor' (ibid., p. 406 [Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 225]). It was like leaving the sheep in the care of a wolf: a mercantile, capitalist and colonial state watching over the poor!

204 Ibid., p. 409 (Translation: Shirley, 1998, p. 227).

205 Descartes wrote a treatise about *Les passions de l'âme* (Descartes, 1953, pp. 691f.).

206 The neurological study of the emotions and feelings is important – in centuries past impossible – like that of Damasio in his work *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain* (2003), in particular, the analysis of the cognitive moment of feelings, since one can observe clearly the 'passage' of the emotions through the neo-cortical 'maps' to return to limbic regions, or of feelings. Maybe the *ego cogito*, understood not as 'thinking' (*penser, denken*), but as 'I am conscious, I feel that I am thinking' (without other content than the 'act of thinking' itself, reflexively), one can analyse as a *feeling*: 'I am feeling that I drink, that I enjoy, that I am with you'. It is reference to a 'state of the body' (and the 'thinking' is felt equally as a 'state of the body', as when we say: 'I cannot think, my head hurts'; or 'Now if I can think, I am really happy'). It is 'self-consciousness' or reflection on emotions ('I feel joyful when I think . . .') that is cognitively articulated with cerebral 'maps'. In the case of Descartes, the being able to link 'thinking' with existence, with 'being', has to assume self-consciousness or the 'feeling' that 'I am thinking', or I would not have from the act of thinking any possibility of preaching of my own existence (from my corporality). 'I feel' that I am thinking, for this my thinking (made now object) links to my being: assumes my existence. Pure thinking without reflexivity cannot be preached. The rationalism would have been subverted.

207 Part III of *Ethics* is 'Concerning the origin and nature of the emotions' (Spinoza, 1958, pp. 102f. [Translation: Boyle, pp. 83–140]).

208 In this sense the pact lacks normativity: 'If a man who is guided by reason has sometimes to do, by order of the commonwealth, what he knows to be contrary to reason, this penalty is far outweighed by the good he derives from the civil order itself' (*Political Treatise*, ch. III, 6; Spinoza, 1985, p. 159 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 691]).

209 'Just as sin and obedience, taken in the strict sense, can be conceived only in a state, the same is true of justice and injustice.' (*Political Treatise*, ch. II, 23; p. 155 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 689]).

210 Part IV of *Ethics* is 'On human servitude, or the strength of the emotions' (ibid., 172f.).

THE SECOND 'EARLY MODERNITY'

Philosophers look upon the passions by which we are assailed as vices, into which men fall through their own fault. [. . .] The fact is that they conceive men not as they are, but as they would like them to be. [. . .] So I have regarded human passions such as love, hate, anger, envy, pride, pity and other agitations of the mind not as vices of human nature but as properties.²¹¹

The security of the state cannot depend only on sentiments, but also on the institutions constituted by reason for utility. The natural power of the human being, even being a moment of the power of God, nevertheless cannot remain at the tendency to conserve the being if men 'are led by blind desire more than by reason';²¹² they have to adopt 'laws [. . . that have been] established in accordance with the dictates of reason'.²¹³ The sentiments do have a relevant political function:

A free people is led more by hope than by fear, while a subjugated people is led more by fear than by hope; the former seeks to engage in living,²¹⁴ the latter simply to avoid death. The former, I say, seeks to live for itself, the latter is forced to belong to a conqueror; hence we say that the latter is a slave, the former is free.²¹⁵

Like later modern philosophers, Spinoza, losing the view of the *ius gentium*, defines despotically the external relation between states:

Therefore if one commonwealth chooses to make war on another and to go to all lengths to render the other subject to its right, it may by right attempt to do so, since to wage war it is enough to have the will to do so.²¹⁶

[Translation: Boyle, pp. 141–97]). In Spinoza paradoxically, as a last resort, reason plays a more humanizing function than affections themselves (or the *conatus*), since 'servitude' is the inevitable destiny of those affections, meanwhile 'liberty' and the 'civil state' is a possibility of the 'power of understanding' (theme of Part V of *Ethics*: 'Concerning the power of the intellect or human freedom'; *ibid.*, pp. 242f. [Translation: Boyle, pp. 198–223]). At the end rationalism triumphs, as in the Stoics (or Aristotle): 'Hereby he concludes that there is no mind so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire absolute power of its passions' (p. 243 [Translation: Boyle, p. 199]).

²¹¹ *Political Treatise*, ch. I, 1–4; pp. 141–3 (Translation: Shirley, 2002, pp. 680–1).

²¹² *Ibid.*, ch. II, 4; p. 146 (Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 683).

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 21; p. 154 (Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 688).

²¹⁴ Spinoza exclaims beautifully: 'A free man thinks of nothing less than death, and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life' (*Ethics*, IV, prop. LXVII; p. 227 [Translation: Boyle, p. 188]).

²¹⁵ *Political Treatise*, V, 6; p. 173 (Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 700). We can understand why the people of the United States since 11 September 2001 have been the toy of fear, able to restrict freedom with the intelligence apparatus directed at watching citizens. Fear replaces hope; slavery occupies the place of liberty.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 13; p. 163 (Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 694).

Spinoza distrusted the multitude, after the assassination of Jan de Witt.²¹⁷ He affirms a habitual machismo²¹⁸ and defends nevertheless public common property²¹⁹ and many other measures,²²⁰ that we cannot explain in this already lengthy section on the great '*marrano*' thinker.²²¹

Philosophical Justification of the First Bourgeois Revolution: John Locke

[145] It is known that John Locke (1632–1704) proposes in a novel way the model of treating the themes of political philosophy starting also from two states: the state of nature and the civil state. Unlike others, he proposes (a) a pact, which creates the consensus, which constitutes a political community (what we will call the *potentia*) starting from the individual. The political community (b) organizes through a new pact a system of *potestas* whose final reference is the parliament as democratic regime, for which the absolute monarchy of the Hobbesian type would be situated in the mere 'state of nature'. Locke has already a clear awareness of the separation of the legislative and executive power, under the primacy of the first, and comes to a position of radical secularization very different from that of Hobbes or Spinoza. We will not refer to these well-known aspects. We want to give another version of the Lockean position.

Always struggling against France, England slowly displaced the United Provinces of the European commercial hegemony.²²² A new moment began: the *third* early Modernity, where the bourgeoisie, for the first time and

217 'For if the common people could practise restraint and suspend judgement on matters insufficiently known . . . it would surely be more fit to rule than to be ruled [. . .] All grown haughty with rule, terrorise unless they are frightened' (ibid., ch. VII, 27; p. 206 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 720]).

218 'Now if women were naturally the equal of men and were equally endowed with strength of mind and ability – qualities wherein human power and consequently human right consists – [. . .] some instances where both sexes ruled on equal terms [would be found]' (ibid., ch. XI, 3; p. 261 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 753]). He excludes women from the democratic regime.

219 'The fields and the soil and, if possible, the houses as well should be public property, that is, should belong to the sovereign' (ibid., ch. VII, 8; p. 194 Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 703]).

220 For example, the monarch's close relatives did not marry (a little like the eunuchs in the Chinese empire, in this case for commercial reasons, for Spinoza for political reasons) (ibid., ch. VI, 14; p. 180).

221 We see, for example, that, always Sephardic, he uses the kingdom of Aragón as example with respect to imposing on the monarch limitations in the exercise of power ('[. . .] I refer to the state of the Aragónese, whose singular loyalty to their kings was matched by the steadfastness with which they preserved unbroken the constitution of their kingdom' (ibid., VII, 29; p. 207 [Translation: Shirley, 2002, p. 721])). It is this type of contract to which F. Suárez refers. On the other hand, Spinoza shows the importance of Venice and Genoa as exemplary modern aristocracies (ch. VIII, 3; p. 213).

222 See Wallerstein, 1980, II, pp. 89. 'The political unit of France was about four times that of England in size and population' (ibid., p. 81 [Spanish: p. 342]). England 'was faced by a hostile power [France] far more formidable than Spain or Holland had ever been' (Wilson, 1965, p. 282; quoted in Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 246 [Spanish: p. 343]).

through the English Revolution, took hegemonic control of the directing of the state. The question is: is the fundamental determination of class (a) the power held by the bourgeoisie by *owning* the rising capital (an *economic* determination) or (b) the power to *direct the state* in order to fulfil the ends of the bourgeois class (a *political* determination)? It seems that the appropriate question is the second (against standard Marxism).

One sign of this stage was the change of name of the Dutch colonies from New Holland, and from its most important city New Amsterdam, to New England and New York respectively. The Hispanic Jews, who had fled to Holland and who had been installed in the American colonies of Curaçao or New Amsterdam, were now the most ancient community of Wall Street, prior to the new Anglo colonists who arrived in the seventeenth century.

Wallerstein, describing the second half of the seventeenth century, says that in 'a first period (1651-89), [. . .] Dutch hegemony was successfully challenged by the English and the French, who by 1672 came to feel that the Dutch state was no longer the unquestioned giant it had been [. . .] The accession of William and Mary to the throne of England seems, therefore, a reasonable breaking point. It follows then that the period of 1689 to 1763 is chosen because it bounds a time of unbroken Anglo-French rivalry',²²³ which will end in 1813 definitively in favour of England.

The English bourgeois Revolution, at its strictly political level, culminated in 1688. The Revolution gave the *Whigs*, the party of Lord Shaftesbury who John Locke always collaborated with, definitive hegemony over the *Tories*, who had attacked their doctrine of the divine authority of kings with the overthrow of James II (who 'abdicated' to save face). The new king had to admit the *Declaration of Rights*, later to be adopted as the *Bill of Rights*, by which England adopted a mixed government with an extremely weakened monarchy and a parliament with a *House of Lords* and another *House of Commons*, the latter exercising the real government.

A new extremely original moment in the history of types of government began, fruit of the first modern bourgeois political revolution. The new structure of the state took as its example the Venetian system, not the Florentine. The Venetian author Donato Giannotti had argued in favour of the type of mixed government of Venice for similar reasons to Polybius. But it was the work of Gasparo Contarini, *De magistratibus et Republic Venetorum*, translated into English and published in London in 1599 by Lewes Lewkenor under the title *The Commonwealth and Government of Venice*,²²⁴ which received great approbation and influenced later happenings. 'England is an island'²²⁵ like Venice, and would also have its destiny in the sea, in exterior commerce, depending on the patricians or the mercantile class who possess privately a commercial fleet, supported by the public war

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 245 (Spanish: p. 342).

²²⁴ See Pocock, 1975, pp. 320f.

²²⁵ 'England ist eine Insel', writes Carl Schmitt (1993, p. 90).

armada.²²⁶ Venice was an antecedent. On 21 June 1642, before the Civil War began, Charles I anticipated the events and effected a declaration, proposing a system of mixed government in the *His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament*, where he accepted that in England there are three classes: the king, the nobles (*Lords*) and the bourgeois or citizens (*Commons*), and where all depends on the equilibrium between them.²²⁷ This all becomes institutions and customs from 1689.

John Locke had an uncommon knowledge of the continental European situation. He had been in Germany in 1665 and 1666 after the death of his father (here, among others, his Leibniz works); he stayed in France for four years from 1674 as a persecuted politician after the fall of the Whigs (where he met many philosophers, writing about Malebranche among others); and finally, he lived for six years in Amsterdam, from 1683 to 1689, a few years after the death of Spinoza whose political works he read and whose influence is seen not only in his fundamentally political–philosophical distinctions ('state of nature' and 'civil' already present in Hobbes, 'civil contract', freedom of thought and speech, etc.), but especially in his *Epistle on Tolerance*. He published his principal works at almost 70 years old (after 1689), maybe due to being very active in political life in his country, or having the public authority and liberty to do so without being repressed (a liberty that Baruch Spinoza never had). Spinoza was a critic; Locke, however, expressed the foundation of the new historical power bloc in England; he was the philosopher of power.

Locke's argument has the extraordinary virtue of justifying the work of the new English state, fruit of the first triumphant political bourgeois revolution of Modernity.²²⁸ In this, Locke is an example of a philosopher attentive and committed with his time. The long historical process beginning with the Phoenician cities and continued in Greece, Byzantium and Venice, reaches its end in a 'mixed' government, which has in the parliament (in particular in the *House of Commons*) the central and liberal-democratic institutional moment of government.²²⁹ John Locke will publish his *Two Treatises on Civil Government* as justification of the new type of regime just two years after the events of 1688.

²²⁶ England is affirmed apocalyptically as a nation elected by God, the same as Venice, who venerated the evangelist Saint Mark. This type of political–religious self-interpretation, like Spain and Portugal, manipulated the European nations (Pocock, 1975, pp. 340f.). Constantine having been born in York, the English felt authorized to think they were destined to continue the Roman Empire. It is a lengthy *national apocalypticism*. From there will be born with Cromwell the *Western Design* (the divine design that the English Empire had to be directed toward the west and 'conquer America and the Caribbean'); millenarian spirit that will be originated later in apocalyptic communities in the USA, and even the fundamentalism of the right: *In God we trust*.

²²⁷ Pocock, 1975, pp. 361f.

²²⁸ See my soon to be published paper: 'Permanent state of war and cynical reason', read in occasion of the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, presented at the Congress of LASA in Dallas (March 2003).

²²⁹ With all the limitations that we will indicate.

[146] On the one hand, the political philosophy of Locke is differentiated clearly from that of Hobbes and Spinoza, and signifies an unquestionable advance in the history of Modernity. But, on the other, he explains an argument where rhetorically he subtly *inverts* the sense of the question in each case. If the greater premise indicates that 'all human beings are by nature equal' and have 'all goods in common' (as affirmed the more ancient tradition, Hooker himself or the opponents of Locke), he will prove exactly the opposite. Even in the state of nature (in the second moment) there are inevitable inequalities and private property; once established, this economic institution has to be included in the 'state of nature'.

The phrase '*all* human beings are by natural equal' will be valid only for those who participate in the *Commonwealth*, since it is effective exclusively for the men who are virtuous owners (excluding women, African slaves, American Indians, Asians, salaried English workers, etc.). His final conclusion is that, even for England, one cannot include 'all' those who do not have property or who sell their labour for wages (since this poverty proves that they do not have either discipline or sufficient virtue to be explicit or perfect active members in the 'civil state').

The 'civil state' will guarantee the fulfilment of the demands of natural (and divine) law through the institution of positive law and of a judge who can treat conflicts equitably and defend rights. This finality, and the argument justifying it, *is inverted* and hides a shameful structural semantic content: rising capitalism. For this reason, Locke will be converted into the great philosopher of Western liberalism, which is today in crisis. He expressed himself rhetorically, although the result is immoral and contradictory,²³⁰ in a 'convincing' way, which no one had dared to do publicly, like Ginés de Sepúlveda in Spain. We read the texts of Locke step by step to discover his argument, which subtly creates this successful semantic 'inversion'.

But we are harmed by one aspect left aside: the English decision to construct a commercial empire through building a strong navy to dominate the seas, after the destruction of the Spanish Armada (1588) and not as France, who organized a land-based army.

Like Venice, England is an island (keeping the proportions). It has to 'go out' from the island and expand itself through the seas and open ports for commerce, like Tyre, Carthage, Ephesus, Athens, Byzantium, which had maritime colonies abroad (although it was not a modern colonial system like the United Kingdom). First, one had to justify philosophically such expansion. We have seen how Locke treated the question of slavery (sections [125-8]), on which the slave trade is based (an essential aspect of imperial mercantile expansion, in this case expansion to Africa, in the Africa-America-Europe 'triangular' exchange). There is another aspect to the expansion, which demands another justification of the exercise of power *ad extra*, to America first, which allows the little kingdom of England to

230 Non-owners cannot rebel and have to obey a political order against their interests.

convert herself into a hegemonic empire at least until 1945. We analyse the argumentative process of chapter XVI 'On conquest'.

Locke knows that the origin of the wealth of England comes from the action of pirates because it began its colonial expansion much later than the Iberian powers and it could not but rob others' wealth. This is the prestigious origin of the English Empire! As the rhetorical starting point (one enunciates first what one wants to refute),²³¹ he begins by declaring piracy unauthorized starting from a greater premise or universal principle, when he affirms:

Conquest is as far from setting up any government as demolishing a house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without consent of the people, can never erect a new one.²³²

Next, he proposes:

That the aggressor [. . .] can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think that robbers and *pirates* have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master.²³³

Locke gives the reasons, which do not justify the conquest. He makes these declarations just and acceptable to all, and passes to explain the possibility of an exception, which *will invert* the greater premise. So although 'God gave the world to men in common',²³⁴

Yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found which, the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind [read: the modern European bourgeois] in the consent of *the use of the common money, lie waste*.²³⁵ There being more land than the inhabitants possess and *make use of*,²³⁶ *any one* has liberty to make use of the waste.²³⁷

²³¹ He will first refute the right of pirates to appropriate others' riches, but through a subtle premise he inverts the greater sense and comes to the opposite conclusion.

²³² Ibid., § 175; p. 134; Eng. ed., 148.

²³³ Ibid., § 176; pp. 134-5; p. 149.

²³⁴ Ibid., § 34; p. 27; p. 29. Further: 'Governments can originally have no other rise [. . .] nor polities be founded on anything but the consent of the people' (ibid., § 175; p. 134; p. 148).

²³⁵ Ibid., § 45; p. 36; p. 39. The appearance of 'money' opens a second moment in the 'state of nature' for Locke, to which American 'savages' have not acceded. The 'nature' of nomadic peoples or cultivators with small villages, not properly agricultural, is considered 'uncultured'. How could they judge the 'farmers' *sensu stricto* as the Incas, Aztecs, Mayas and such others?

²³⁶ As if all people were farmers, and he who judges the type of 'capacity' is European (naïve Eurocentrism, whose content is evident for all Europeans).

²³⁷ Ibid., § 184; p. 143; p. 157.

This minor premise *inverts* everything expressed aesthetically before. Now, the conquest does not usurp the right of anyone in occupying those lands, since they were 'empty', uncultivated, badly used according to the providential desire of God. Of course *the criterion* of the efficient occupation and the technical use of the lands is that of Locke, the 'ground zero', which sees without being seen (that of the West, mercantile capitalist, colonialist, racist, patriarchal etc.). When there is no human judge who can judge (because in the state of war it is a relation between *peoples*, as in the case of John Rawls, without a judge between the states), 'and he that appeals to heaven must be *sure* he has right on his side',²³⁸ being himself (J. Locke, the English or European person) the final judge. It is evident that the 'American savages' will defend themselves, and with arms. We are thus in a third 'state', which for Hobbes was the 'state of nature' itself, which Spinoza never proposed and which Locke intelligently determines as a 'state of war'. In the 'state of war' the enemy is so because he negates human reason and the law of God.²³⁹ Of course, the 'human reason' is European, and the 'law' is of a European God (a cultural autism, which transforms the argument into a tautology). The European who struggles against the Indians is obliged to realize a just war:

Supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom. [. . .] 'that I say is *purely despotical*.'²⁴⁰ [The conqueror] has an absolute power over the lives of those, who by an unjust war have forfeited them.²⁴¹

[147] Generously and with (cynical) intention of universality Locke indicates that 'he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions'.²⁴² He begins, as always, with an extremely honest greater premise, acceptable by all (which he will end by negating). To work justly, continues Locke, the conquistador has to 'repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own [the conquistador's] right',²⁴³ since it is a just war. It is a title of reparation and so one can appropriate the goods of the conquered. Locke has a more subtle argumentative strategy than Ginés de

238 Ibid., § 176; p. 136; p. 150. The 'very Christian' Locke calls on God as his help (like the authors of the Iraq war of 2003), and remits his justice. If only he could know the 'English' God in the 'final judgement', at the end of history! Meanwhile, in *all* history (*sic*), the empire decides . . . in name of *its* God. What God?, Feuerbach would have the right to ask: Would God not be merely the projection 'to infinity' of the subjectivity of the governing of the Empire? Would it not be pure fetishism, divinization of the dominating imperial political power? Can anyone be 'sure that right is on their side'?

239 See section [125f.].

240 He writes: 'The conquerer, if he have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all that actually aided and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his damage and cost' (ibid., § 196; p. 148; p. 164).

241 Ibid., § 178; p. 137; p. 152.

242 Ibid., § 180; p. 138; p. 153.

243 Ibid., § 182; p. 140; p. 155.

Sepúlveda (although identical in its content), and from the indigenous side (apparently) grants them the quality of liberty and natural equality, to later introduce a minor premise, which *inverts* the former:

The right of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war, not to their estates, *but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war.*²⁴⁴

Neither ownership nor the robbing of the neighbour are negated, one simply has a right to 'charge a debt'. Ginés de Sepúlveda was cynical, but kept a certain naïveté; he was not sufficiently modern. In the twenty-first century, following the same tradition, the argumentative strategy consists in not speaking of robbing the oil of Iraq, but in indicating the propagation of democracy and liberty in the Middle East as the first intention.

A tautological conclusion is given and it is immunized against all criticism. The actor him/herself defines who is the enemy to later give an account of the 'justice' of his/her war against said enemy. Finally, since it is a 'just war' the exercise of the power of domination is despotic; one has full right over the life of the defeated (if one has negated the traditional sense of the *ius gentium*, gave right to other peoples), and, in addition, one determines quantitatively the debt that the defeated has contracted, the expenses of their own conquest.²⁴⁵ Bartolomé de Las Casas refuted rationally and ethically these tautologies a century and a half before. The assumed arguments *hide* the fact that one has exercised the power of the strongest, of the better equipped technically in military strategy and art. Modernity imposed itself over the Amerindians and the Africans (from the sixteenth century), simply and as a last resort, through the violence of arms. But this cannot be accepted easily by the moral conscience of the citizen of the 'civilization'. It is, then, necessary to give 'reasons'. Locke gave those 'reasons' with a weak plausibility, but sufficient for a European moral conscience inclined to not apply in this case many demands, to accept them without major critique, since they were necessary for colonial expansion. *A certain objectivity* with moral 'appearance' had to be given to the illegitimate actions of Modernity. Locke is the rhetorician who finds those 'reasons' within the Western tradition.

Ad intra, the tautological argumentative strategy will provide more results, and will be taken as the *philosophical foundation of the bourgeois political revolution*.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 140-1; pp. 155-6.

²⁴⁵ As in 2003, the USA is not appropriating nor robbing the Iraqi oil, but using it to pay the costs of the reconstruction (of the destruction that the North Americans themselves caused in their 'just war' to defend the USA from Iraqi 'danger'). Like Locke, the USA or George W. Bush know that an 'international judge' would be uncomfortable. So they simply negate it (from there its politics of weakening the United Nations and the International Court), cynicism from the seventeenth century to the twenty-first, in the same geopolitical and imperial Anglo-Saxon tradition.

Harrington was one of the first who discovered the relation between the political structures and the changes happening in England in the economic-social environment in his work *Ocean*.²⁴⁶ Locke starts from the same hypothesis but gives it a more coherent rationality and greater acceptability: the model of the separation between a 'state of nature' (the material level as a last resort economic) and a 'civil state' (the political level of the state). The latter has to *guarantee from the political institutions* a certain valid state of things in the natural economic level, which he calls now a 'state of nature', not Hobbes' 'state of war', nor Spinoza's pre-institutional, pre-legal, pre-ethical 'state of nature'. And the differences are perfectly explicable. Hobbes' 'state of nature' is the post-feudal chaos, which demands in the eyes of the great conservative an absolute monarchy, as the civil 'order', as a Leviathan. For Spinoza, the 'state of nature' resolved ontological questions of the human being, the finite mode of infinite substance, within the necessity of the natural and divine law where the pure *conatus* or inclination to permanence has not been divided between good and evil, and where liberty is only conceived in reference to the law, the 'civil state' or obedience, in the defence of the liberty of thinking and speaking what one thinks. Locke does not find in the immediate *past* the chaos of war but the 'Glorious Revolution' (the 'state of nature' as war does not interest him, and so he proposes the 'state of war' as a 'third state' *post-civil* expanded *outside* the rising empire), neither does he have *in the present* ontological-theological problems like Spinoza. His philosophy is secular (a novelty), bourgeois in economics, individualist in subjectivity, realistic in politics, and follows an argumentative strategy of total rhetorical efficacy.²⁴⁷ We have seen how he proceeds in the case of conquest or slavery:²⁴⁸ *all are equally free and owners ... but at the end of the argument* he has justified that the millions of Indians have been conquered legitimately, their lands occupied, and the millions of African countrymen and women enslaved justly.

[148] We now examine Locke's central political theme, the distinction between a 'state of nature' and a 'civil state', categories constructed to not show (in this consists fetishism) *something that is hidden behind what one shows* (the ontological foundation), thanks to the ambiguity. The 'political order' visible for Locke serves to *not make visible* the presupposed 'economic order'. The economic order will be treated through themes proper to the 'natural state'. Thus, the political themes of equality and the majority as mechanism of decision, greater premise, have to be *inverted* at two levels. At a fundamental level, neither are all citizens equal in ownership nor are they equal in reference to the possibility of being elected and electing the members of parliament. This subtle *hiding* ('the Being loves to be hidden', says the ontology of the domination) is always present in the rhetorical-

²⁴⁶ See Harrington, 1771, in MacPherson, 2005, pp. 160-93.

²⁴⁷ If with Aristotle we accept that rhetoric 'does not have by proposition the persuading without seeing in each case what is apt to persuade' (*Ret. A*, 5; 1355b).

²⁴⁸ See section [125f.] above.

argumentative strategy of Locke. In this strategy rests his genius, his celebrity and the acceptability of what liberalism enjoys from its origin until the twenty-first century. We see how he proceeds.

The major premise (which Locke intends to refute) is enunciated first at a political level:

[The state of nature is] a *state also of equality*. [We have been] born to all the same advantages of nature. [. . . We] should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection.²⁴⁹

Beautiful expression, as are all the greater premises of Locke! At an economic-political level, he expresses it *consecratingly*:

God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason²⁵⁰ to make use of it to the best advantage of life²⁵¹ and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. [. . .] The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his.²⁵²

One is tempted to say: *Amen!* He continues:

This equality of men by nature the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men.²⁵³

This is the starting point accepted by all, as much in medieval Europe as in the Puritan world; it is the major premise. It is also the 'state of nature' in a *first* moment. In a *second* moment of the 'state of nature' one moves to the economic field:

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a *property in his own person*. [. . .] *The labour of his body and the work of his hands* we may say are properly his.²⁵⁴

One can say metaphorically that someone 'possesses' their person, but it is not possible to accept that expression, neither with respect to the body ('I have' a body) nor work ('I possess' my work). It is the fruit of dualism, in particular Cartesian (and also empiricist or Spinozist), that the 'mind' or

249 Quoted already: *Second Treatise*, ch. 2, § 4; p. 5; (English: p. 5).

250 Still different from Hobbes and Spinoza for distinct reasons.

251 This expression, as in almost all other modern authors, is the final and strict content of the 'material' political principle, explicitly enunciated but not conscious of its political, ecological and economic sense.

252 *Second Treatise*, ch. VI, § 25; Locke, 1976, 22-3; 1960, 23.

253 *Ibid.*, ch. II, § 5; p. 5.

254 *Ibid.*, ch. V, § 26; p. 23; p. 24.

the subject can 'possess' as a *thing* the person, body or work. An *Ur-Subjekt* (an original subject 'prior' to the 'empirical subject') acts as 'possessor' of the subject itself, until infinity.²⁵⁵ These are dangerous senseless metaphors. The subject does not possess the subject nor the person; much less as its 'owner'. The subject presupposes or affirms its subjectivity, its existence in its inalienable dignity (un-sellable) and cannot exercise any economic act over itself. All alienating objectification is negation of the ethical dignity of subjectivity (from prostitution to paying a salary for the 'value of the work'). That 'reification' of the person, body or work is, exactly, the central defective moment of anthropology, ethics, and by it of the economy, of Modernity; of Locke. Marx correctly indicates that 'work does not have value', because it is 'the creative source of value'.²⁵⁶ Locke's argument treats equality, semantically, the 'possessing' of the 'person', the 'effort of the body' and the 'work'. The 'effect' of the labour of the corporal person can in effect be 'possessed', because it is 'something' and not 'someone' or a moment indivisible from 'someone'. The modern political economy, and Locke evidently, 'fetishizes' to subjectivity the person him/herself, corporality and work in order that, alienated, it can be 'sold' and justifies that the wage is a moment of the 'state of nature'.²⁵⁷ We do not accept the first part of the formulation of Locke. Second, with respect to 'effect', one has ownership, since the effect objectified as the product is what cuts out the 'common' possession of the universe itself. First, by the work itself of obtaining what satisfies and consuming it: 'work adds to those products [effects] something more than what Nature had put'.²⁵⁸ He concludes in a *second* 'state of nature':

[Each human being] equally with any other man [. . .] hath by nature a power not only to preserve his *property*, that is, his life, liberty, and estate²⁵⁹ [. . .], but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others.²⁶⁰

One has to negate the equality of the major premise in a minor premise, which justifies the difference of ownership.

[149] That ownership, by being about goods, which occupied a physical place (and necessitated great deposits) or were corruptible (like the manna

²⁵⁵ Which in the order of knowledge would be the person that sees the representation of the brain, and thus to infinity.

²⁵⁶ See Dussel, 1990.

²⁵⁷ Adam Smith will say: 'As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people' (*Of the Origin of the Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 6; Smith, 1984, p. 47 [English: p. 54]). For Smith, this possibility was a second 'state of nature' that one does not have to 'explain' but take as an obvious starting point.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ Life and liberty are not 'had', or 'possessed', or have 'value'. They have 'dignity' and are preached from subjectivity. One does not 'have' life: one is living; one does not 'have' liberty: one is a free being. The *Estates* themselves can be 'possessed'.

²⁶⁰ Locke, *Second Treatise*, ch. VII, § 87; p. 64; p. 71 (English: p. 50).

of Moses in the desert), put necessarily strict limits on ownership. At the beginning the non-accumulable goods were few because one had to work for them personally, or they had to be used in a private way, or they were only being consumed by the family. Meanwhile the invention of money (silver, gold, etc.), thanks to the discovery of a non-corruptible commodity, scarce and so highly valued (for the amount of work to extract it from the mines), permitted the large-scale accumulation of wealth. Locke indicates that there is a first passion and the 'desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things,²⁶¹ which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man'.²⁶² In addition, and most importantly, in this 'anxiety' (the greed criticized by ethics) for unnecessary goods 'he invaded his neighbour's share, for he had no right further than his use called for any of them and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life'.²⁶³

This seems to be an injustice, but Locke does not follow it, although Hume will reflect on it. He does not understand that the value of use is not the value of exchange where the existence of money permits this injustice, and where Aristotle had been opposed to the '*crematistica*', the art of increasing money from money (which for him, but not for Locke, was unnatural), the 'economy', the art of increasing wealth, which was not directed toward the service of life.²⁶⁴ For our bourgeois philosopher 'the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it,²⁶⁵ introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to them'.²⁶⁶ So for Locke in the 'state of nature' one had money, great properties (and entire populations in poverty) and had a system of wages by which a human being could 'own' the work of another human being. He writes:

Thus the grass *my horse* has bit, the turfs *my servant*²⁶⁷ has cut, and the ore I have digged in any place where I have a right to them in common

²⁶¹ Here Locke falls into the fetishism of thinking that products have an intrinsic 'economic value' (as if they were physical properties), and shows his error without noting it.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, ch. V, § 37; p. 30; p. 32 (English: p. 23). He correctly indicates that the 'value' [of use] is measured relative to 'necessity' (the necessary is 'the useful'), to *human life*. So the 'value' is not intrinsic but *relative* to human *necessities*. However, this is not economic value.

²⁶³ *Ibid.* Locke has given reasons that cannot be refuted and he is not occupied with refuting them; he simply ignores them, because taking them seriously one could not follow his argument. If it is true that 'value depends uniquely on utility', one cannot affirm it later as the 'finality' of the state (established to protect ownership and not human life).

²⁶⁴ See Aristotle *Politics*, I, ch. I, 9-12; 1256 b 40-1259 a 35. At this point one sees the difference between a slaveholding philosopher (Aristotle) and another capitalist (Locke): one scorns wealth proceeding from money, the other bases the possibility of the *infinite* accumulation of wealth on money.

²⁶⁵ The 'agreement' is not what constitutes value. It is only what chooses this and not another commodity as the 'general equivalent' of the measure of the exchange value of all other commodities. Locke was confused here.

²⁶⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, § 36, p. 30; p. 32 (English: p. 22).

²⁶⁷ The horse pasture is as much my property as the fodder mown by the servant. Two possessed things: the horse and the work of another. The human being can be alienated from his work, possessed.

with others, become my property [. . .] The labour that was mine [that of my servant], removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.²⁶⁸

Finally, in the 'state of nature' there were political regimes like the monarchy because they did not have an institution, which served as judge between the monarch and the people. Locke's 'state of nature' is extremely ambiguous. It is an ad hoc category, describing things prior to the bourgeois state but it has *inverted* the situation. Human beings are not equal nor do they possess in common the goods of the earth. Private property differentiates them, 'by nature', like Aristotle's 'slave of nature'. Fetishizing the dominating systems 'naturalizes' historical institutions (like property). The 'economic order' (rising capitalism) remains situated in the natural order, which the state will have 'to negotiate'. The central thesis of liberalism is found and will always try to hide the economic system (a system or historical institution far from 'nature') as a theme situated a priori in the political system. Its invisibility is its hidden omnipotence.

[150] The argumentative strategy reaches the moment of the transition to the 'civil state', a metaphor for the political order, which triumphed in 1688, which begins with the following question:

If man in the *state of nature* be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions,²⁶⁹ equal to the greatest and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?²⁷⁰

Against Filmer, who thought that the 'other power', the power of the state, was necessarily monarchic and proceeded from Adam by divine mandate, Locke shows that it proceeds from the consensus of individuals who constitute a bourgeois society, which pursues a well-defined finality: being converted into a 'political community'. This finality is expressed many times in different ways, absolutely and clearly:

²⁶⁸ *Second Treatise* ch. V, § 28, p. 24; pp. 25-6 (English: p. 18). This 'mark' that nature carries will end by destroying it.

²⁶⁹ Those who 'have' goods, who are the minority. Locke forgets (unintentionally?) the majority who have nothing.

²⁷⁰ *Second Treatise* ch. IX, § 123; p. 93; pp. 104-105 (English: p. 73). It is possible to form the question in another way: Is it not very convenient to make a contract between the owners in order that the non-owners (who are the danger, since they 'envy' the owners' possession of goods) are obliged to respect others' property? The advantage to the owners and the inutility of such a contract for the non-owners is evident. But that question would avoid the *concealment* that Locke finds in his ambiguous questions. The mistaken decodification permits the *concealment* of what one cannot enunciate in public because it would sound cynical.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men's²⁷¹ uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the *preservation of their property*; to which in the state of nature there are many things *wanting*.²⁷²

In a feudal monarchic state (still Locke's state of nature) bourgeois ownership does not have full defence. In order for 'defence of property' (private bourgeois) to be possible one has to establish 'a law',²⁷³ 'a known and indifferent judge'²⁷⁴ and 'power'²⁷⁵ to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution'.²⁷⁶ The guilty par excellence are those who rob, who question others' property, and these only have to be 'those who do not have property', the wage workers, the poor. The political institutional structure organizes itself to defend a minority against the empirical majority: the non-owners.

If one has a little critical conscience, what follows for a conclusion is clear: the reasons those who have property (in order to be protected from those who do not have it) enter into the 'civil state':

Men [owners] when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature,²⁷⁷ into the hands of the society,²⁷⁸ to be so far disposed of by the legislative²⁷⁹ as the good of the society shall require [. . .] to preserve himself, his liberty and *property*.²⁸⁰

Once all have handed over their natural rights,²⁸¹ minus the right 'to destroy one's own life nor to seize from another person [. . .] *property*'²⁸²

271 'The men' (excluding women) includes only 'the owners', because those who do not have goods do not need to be united to protect the ownership 'of their goods'. In this different 'extension' (as the logicians indicate about the content of a concept) is found the manoeuvring of the hidden argumentative strategy of true deceit. 'The possessing men' are full, active recognized members of the political community; the non-owners are not.

272 *Second Treatise* ch. IX; § 124; pp. 93-4; p. 105 (English: p. 73). In a natural state there is no judge, nor punishment for those who contravene laws, no police who 'defend' owners from the supreme danger: the non-owners, the poor, always un-said in the concealing argument!

273 *Ibid.*, § 125 p. 94; p. 105 (English: pp. 74-5).

274 *Ibid.* As one could see, his 'impartiality' will be intrinsically partial, since it will have to defend the ownership of those who have against those who do not, having left the assumption that what is just would be that all were owners (if it is the 'natural right'). It is a 'positive right' that passes as 'natural'.

275 Hegel will call this in his *Rechtsphilosophie* (§§ 231-49) 'the police' (*Polizei*).

276 Locke, *Second Treatise*, § 126; p. 94; p. 106 (English: p. 74).

277 They were not equals in the state of nature, because the owners and the non-owners were two unequal types of men. The 'civil state', which will organize institutionally, will be the guarantee of that 'inequality'. Rousseau saw it clearly.

278 The non-owners are not part of the 'bourgeois society' politically speaking. So as sheep, they submit the care of their flock to the wolf.

279 The non-owning people cannot elect or be elected to parliament.

280 *Second Treatise*, § 131; p. 96; p. 108 (English: p. 75).

281 Not only the bourgeois community of owners but also the non-owners.

282 Here, the right to property is prior and superior to all civil or political right, it is the absolute priority of what is economically natural (bourgeois capitalism) over the state.

(and because with regard to the goods possessed 'nobody hath a right to their substance, or any part of it, from them'),²⁸³ or '[a] any number of men have [b] so consented to make one community or government, [c] they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, [d] wherein the majority [e] have the right to act and conclude the rest'.²⁸⁴

The argumentative strategy plays with a continually different semantic 'extension' of the concept, and through that ambiguity forms mistaken conclusions. Observe (and for this we added letters to the text) that in [a] it can be all the inhabitants of a territory (including those without property), meanwhile in [b] the community or the government organized only the owners (at least, only they can be elected); in [c] the 'political body', which would be c.1, in the case that all were inhabitants [with respect to a]; and c.2 if they were only the owners [with respect to b]. The majority [d] can be a majority of all inhabitants [d.1 with respect to a], which is not the case; or the majority of those who elect and who are elected as government [d.2 with respect to b], the minority with respect to a; or the majority in the government or the parliament. The conclusion is ambiguous [e]. If e.1 were all inhabitants it would be true; meanwhile e.2 would be false if it refers to those who participated (the owners). The *concealing* consists in what *obliges* all to fulfil what the minority decided. This concealing is the argumentative strategy of Locke. Those who elect those who govern [c.2] are 'obligated' legitimately²⁸⁵ to what is agreed to by the majority of the community or of the Parliament (d.2), and are the owners (e.2). But are those who cannot elect or be elected 'obligated' (d.1) (the non-owners or wage workers of c.1), the empirical majority of the country?

In a critical political philosophy it cannot be concluded that said consensuses or laws 'oblige' those who do not participate, who cannot elect their representatives in the government or parliament. Here one finds the formalist 'political fallacy' of Locke (and of later liberalism): one makes 'all' (e.2) the bourgeois owners through 'all' the 'subjects' or inhabitants (e.1) obliged to obey the pact (which they did not decide). He writes:

[All] must be with his *own*²⁸⁶ consent,²⁸⁷ i.e., the consent of the majority,²⁸⁸ giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them.²⁸⁹

[151] Locke reports the ambiguity and intends to clear up the question:

[...] his own consent, it is to be considered what shall be understood to be *sufficient* declaration of a man's consent [...]. There is a common

283 *Second Treatise*, § 138; p. 106; pp. 117–18 (English: p. 82).

284 *Ibid.*, ch. VIII, § 95; p. 73; p. 81 (English: p. 56).

285 See the concept of the 'legitimate' at the end of § 99 (p. 75; p. 83 [English: p. 58]).

286 Of 'all the subjects' or of 'all the owners'?

287 This is the greater premise of Locke that all accept as evident.

288 Here the ambiguity begins: the majority of all the inhabitants or only the owners?

289 *Second Treatise*, ch. IX, § 140; p. 108; p. 120 (English: p. 83).

distinction of an *express* and *tacit* consent [. . .] an *express* consent of any man entering into any society makes him a *perfect* member of that society [. . .] The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a *tacit* consent [. . .] I say, that every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth thereby give his *tacit* consent.²⁹⁰

Foreigners are not subjects of the state, but neither are those who do not have property (like the wage workers or those who have sold their properties) *perfect* members or by *express* consent:

Since the government has a *direct* jurisdiction only over the land [. . .] so that whenever the owner [. . .] will by donation, sale or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth.²⁹¹

The rural and urban wage workers (institution found in the state of nature) and also the small peasant owners (who produce less than the large landowners), the *majority* of the society, will remain excluded from the political community, in its *full* and *express* sense. They have to be 'obedient subjects' of laws, which oblige them to respect the property of others under the police coercion of the state. These are the Lockean 'class differentials in natural rights'.²⁹²

Locke is a revolutionary; he justifies the first triumphant bourgeois-political revolution of history. In chapter XIX of the *Second Treatise* he explains his reasons:

For when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power; [. . .] the same will happen. The people are generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them.²⁹³

In many places, one can see his conservative position ('but that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature'),²⁹⁴ but comes to the difficult problem of the use of arms in rebellion and explains:

[We say] how to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and

290 *Ibid.*, ch. VIII, § 119; p. 91; p. 101 (English: pp. 70-1).

291 *Ibid.*, § 121; p. 92; p. 103 (English: pp. 71-2).

292 MacPherson, 2005, pp. 194-262.

293 *Second Treatise*, ch. XIX, § 224; p. 170; p. 187 (English: p. 130).

294 *Ibid.*, § 233; p. 177; p. 196 (English: p. 136).

THE SECOND 'EARLY MODERNITY'

force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance. [. . .] This is as ridiculous a way of resisting as Juvenal thought it of fighting: *ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum*²⁹⁵ [. . .] He, therefore, who may resist, must be allowed to strike.²⁹⁶

The revolutionary Locke is attributed greater semantic contents than those he himself thought, like when Aristotle said that the 'human was the living being who inhabited the city' *Greek* (a completely Hellenocentric and particularist definition), and the text is re-read and understood as a universal definition of the 'political animal' as humanity, without noting the Hellenocentrism.

In the same way if 'people' means all the inhabitants of a state's territory, the following text seems revolutionary:

The *people* have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or place it in a new form, or new hands as they think good.²⁹⁷

Those 'people' did not include the wage earning citizens, ancient slaves, inhabitants of the colonies, women, etc.; these will have to struggle for their recognition for two centuries to transform themselves into actors, in movements of the colonies, of civil or political society. Then the liberal *concealment* will have disappeared.

²⁹⁵ 'While you hit, I only receive punches.'

²⁹⁶ *Second Treatise*, § 235; p. 178; p. 197 (English: pp. 136–7). ('He, therefore, who may resist must be allowed to strike'). Read carefully the end of Locke's *Treatise* that, considered from the perspective of the Iraqi patriotic resistance against the North American military occupation begun in 2003, could be labelled 'terrorist'.

²⁹⁷ End of the *Second Treatise*, § 243; p. 186; p. 206 (English: p. 143).

Part 3

**Political Discourse in
'Mature Modernity'**

'Mature Modernity' in the United Kingdom and France

[152] We take on a historical period of enormous importance in the structure of the world-system. The Industrial Revolution, in large part by chance, produced an acceleration in the technical-instrumental level of the greatest consequences. In Great Britain (England and Scotland principally), and slowly in France and throughout Europe, a civilization unfolded, which, at the end of the eighteenth century, excluded for the first time the Yangtze Valley in China and Hindustan. This gave Europe a global hegemony (economic, military, political and cultural). The Enlightenment (*Aufklärung, les Lumières*) produced a political philosophy that only with Hegel reached its definitive, deeply distorted and Eurocentric 'splendour'.

The New World Geopolitical Structure

As fruit of a very particular mirage, the European Enlightenment culture, ideology and philosophy produced a triple 'theoretical-interpretive *making*' of history, a construction of the dominant object, whose validity is converted into a theme that has to be deconstructed to allow free access to the global reality in which we live.

The Enlightenment 'manufactured' (a multiple ideological and epistemological *making*) three 'representations' that *hid, made invisible* for more than two centuries the global reality of the periphery of the world-system (and even the image that the metropolitan 'centre' had of itself). First was the *making* of 'Orientalism' defined by Edward Said.¹ Second was the 'Occidentalism', suggested by Fernando Coronil. This was the birth of the Eurocentrism of the whole culture, but being the first hegemonic world culture earned a very particular and special content: it is Eurocentrism.² Third, it 'manufactured' a geographic region with a derogatory-historical sense: the 'south of Europe', a place where there *was* a 'central' culture (in Greece that of the classical Greeks, in Italy that of the Roman Empire, in Spain the recent but already defeated Austrian Empire), but the Spirit of Hegel still did

1 See Said, 1978 and 1993.

2 From the Arab world, the work of Amin, 1989.

not settle over that 'other' Europe: 'Africa begins in the Pyrenees', exclaimed de Pauw, expressing well the state of the question.³ These 'makings' made Latin America 'invisible' until today. If Spain is Africa, what will Latin America be? Eurocentric Occidentalism was the final ontological horizon of all European-North American political philosophy from the end of the eighteenth century until the twenty-first. The war in Iraq was one expression, with the Occidentalist Eurocentric vision of Samuel Huntington.⁴

The Industrial Revolution was not only a technological-economic event, but also cultural and political and so was of enormous philosophical influence.⁵ It has slowly been clarifying its historical origin in the last decade.⁶ A recent work of Kenneth Pomeranz supplies new material for reflection in line with our initial hypotheses and those of A. G. Frank.⁷ It is a suggestive comparison of two regions of the world at the end of the eighteenth century: the Yangtze Valley and Great Britain.⁸ This investigation comes to a *new* and *disconcerting* conclusion with respect to why Great Britain got carried away with the Industrial Revolution and not China:

That it did not [happen] was the result of important and sharp discontinuities, based on both fossil fuels [carbon] and access to New World resources [food], which, taken together, obviated the need to manage land intensively.⁹

There was no crisis, as A. G. Frank assumed, and even less a technological, scientific or ethical superiority, as M. Weber proposed. Pomeranz destroys the arguments one by one, leaving us with a non-Eurocentric investigation. For example, in the Yangtze Valley one bought and sold land, agrarian private property; it was much more advanced in the agility of its privatization than England.¹⁰ In China as in Europe the first and principal industry was textiles, but the majority of the population lived in the countryside.

³ First, Africa is insulted, as geography without any culture, and later Spain and Portugal and equally Italy and Greece, as people who have returned to a state of nature. See Dussel, 1995. Montesquieu speaks of 'southern Europe' as a category of degree of civilizing development (*The Spirit of the Laws*, IV, Book XXI, ch. 3; Montesquieu, 1995a, II, pp. 50-1 (Translation: Nugent, p. 332): 'Equilibrium is maintained by the laziness of the southern nations, and by the industry and activity which she has given to those in the North.')

⁴ See Huntington, 2001. In Huntington, 2004, he shows the 'American-centrism', which we referred to at a recent conference at the University of Washington in Seattle.

⁵ See 'The Industrialization of Europe', in Braudel, 1978, pp. 319f. The vision of Braudel is still 'Eurocentric'.

⁶ We began to explain the theme in sections [69-80].

⁷ Pomeranz, 2000.

⁸ The comparison is not easy, because in about 1750 between 31 and 37 million people lived in the Yangtze Valley, around the great city of Huangchau (or Guangzho) with 1.5 million inhabitants. Great Britain in 1800 had some 16 million inhabitants (Ribeiro, 1968, p. 123). In Asia, other regions had almost equal development, for example, the region of Kantô in Japan and Gujarat in India. Pomeranz chooses only the greater of these (the Yangtze).

⁹ Pomeranz, 2000, p. 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 194f.

So what permitted a good part of the agricultural population to transform themselves into urban wage workers? The process had begun in the most advanced regions. It was not, for Pomeranz, a new *ethos* that produced capitalism,¹¹ but an *ecological* disequilibrium that no one had taken into account. In the Yangtze Valley, there was incipient capitalist production, but the rural people not only could not integrate themselves into industrial production, but wage workers had to reintegrate themselves into agricultural production. Because of the destructive use of their land (entropy of fertility by over-exploitation) and deforestation from the cutting down of the already meagre forests, they had to labour even more than before in the fields to produce food for all the population.¹² However, Great Britain could free peasants through the massive use of *coal*, which the Chinese had discovered but could not exploit in such quantity, and cheap food and other *resources coming from the American colonies*, a colonial system, which China never organized due to the extent of its territory. The demographic explosion, which brought a first industrialization, produced in its regression more mouths to feed and a disastrous ecological crisis in the countryside like the one already extant throughout China in the early 1800s.

As Hegel already said, when the first industrialization produced over-population, Great Britain could send its 'people' to the colonies.¹³ China could not do the same and had to feed the masses from the exhausted agricultural production.¹⁴ The regression of the Yangtze Valley was so violent that in 1750 it had 20 per cent of the population of China, and in 1850 only 9 per cent. It had been transformed into an agricultural region.¹⁵

These new historical discoveries are of great philosophical influence and show the importance of the colonial periphery in the origin of the Industrial Revolution and of chance, for example, having more coal than other regions.¹⁶

So European hegemony was not 500 years old,¹⁷ but only 200, when China and Hindustan regressed from a proto-industrialism to an agrarian and industrially underdeveloped society.¹⁸

Darcy Ribeiro explains that with the Neolithic agricultural revolution humanity expanded from 20 to 650 million inhabitants (approximately in

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 109f.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 225f. In 1753, 45 per cent of the Guandong provinces were covered with forests; in 1853 24 per cent (p. 230).

¹³ Between 1800 and 1950, 21 million people emigrated from Great Britain to the colonies (Ribeiro, 1968, p. 124).

¹⁴ Pomeranz, 2000, pp. 264f. The numbers make one think. Great Britain extracted from the colonies 263 million pounds of cotton; if to this are added other products, the silver and the gold, the extracted coal, they would have needed 23 million acres of agricultural land and 15 million acres of forest, a greater extent than all the land and the forests existing in Great Britain (pp. 275-6). In addition, everything had a lower price in the colonies.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

¹⁶ Once it accumulated military strength it would obtain by violence and domination what others have 'below ground', as in the Iraq War.

¹⁷ Against the hypothesis of Blaut, 1993.

¹⁸ See Amin, 1974, pp. 57f.

1750).¹⁹ With the Industrial Revolution humanity doubled by 1850, and reached 6,000 million in the year 2000. This revolution is not simultaneous but diachronic: it began in approximately 1750 in Great Britain, around 1800 in France, in 1850 in Holland, USA and Germany, 1900 in Japan,²⁰ and 1930 in Latin America.²¹

Only now do we move to the era of European domination over the world-system, 200 years ago.²²

Anglo-Saxon Political Philosophy. The Method of 'Derivation' by Impossibility: David Hume

[153] Presbyterian (Calvinist) Scotland produced the first great economists. Around the universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow and the great ports like Manchester flourished a political philosophy intimately linked to the triumph of the bourgeoisie, of mercantile and industrial capitalism.

David Hume's (1711-76) philosophy is difficult to interpret, especially his political philosophy.²³ I think this is because his world horizon has not been understood. His starting point is the same as Locke's, but radicalized, given its enormous critical capacity. I say the same as Locke because, at the end, the central question of his reflection is *property*: the fundamental reference of the Scottish bourgeois existence, now in slow transit from mercantilism (the problem of money in Locke) to industry (the question of the 'division of labour', essential for industrial capitalist production).²⁴ This explains his affirmation that 'a Government may endure for several ages, though the balance of power, and the balance of property do not coincide.'²⁵ Hume expresses clearly:

But where the original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to an order of men, who possess a large share of the property, it is easy for them to stretch their authority, and bring the balance of power

¹⁹ Ribeiro, 1968, pp. 119f. Ribeiro indicates that the first element of the Industrial Revolution is the utilization 'of coal fuel [. . .] Thus from 1860-1930 the global production of coal passes from 132 to 1,454 million tons' (pp. 221-2 [Translation: TC]). See Frank, 1998, p. 168.

²⁰ Ribeiro, 1968, p. 126.

²¹ We have written three works about industrial capitalism: Dussel, 1985a, 1988, 1990.

²² See Wallerstein, 1989, III, pp. 1-53.

²³ 'Hume's theory is presented as a challenge to the very existence of political philosophy' (Hill, 'David Hume', in Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, p. 590 [English: pp. 535-58]). 'In the face of his political writings, whose moderated tendency seems at first glance little congruent with the revolutionary content of his theory of knowledge, perplexity has prevailed' (Colomer, 'Preliminary study', in Hume, 1994, p. 143 [Translation: TC]).

²⁴ Hume exclaims: 'Compare the situation of Great Britain at present, with what it was two centuries ago [when Spain hegemonized *early* Modernity]. All the arts both of agriculture and manufactures were then extremely rude and imperfect' ('Of the jealousy of trade', in Hume, 1994, p. 143 [English: p. 150]).

²⁵ 'Of the first principles of government', in Hume, 1994, p. 23 (English: p. 18).

to coincide with that of property. This has been the case with the House of Commons in England.²⁶

Hume is clearly conscious of the type of politics of which he is speaking: the state in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

From a philosophical point of view, in the studies on Hume's thinking, to have an overall vision one would have to articulate the theoretical level of 'understanding' and the 'principle of causality'²⁷ with the practical level of 'moral' philosophy, and the 'principle of justice',²⁸ mediating the theory of the 'passions'.²⁹ We have not found anything of this in the well-known Anglo-Saxon commentators, so we will take inspiration from the recent interpretation of F. Hinkelammert, which is totally coherent and novel.³⁰

Hume's economic-political argument (his ontology of 'thinking' has meaning for his theory of passions, and these allow one to discover the theme of the 'moral that in the last resort is a politics') begins from a certain conception of subjectivity that will have 'justice' as a fundamental reference. For Hume, justice is what makes *feasible* industrial bourgeois society.

In general, the analytical commentators (George Moore and his successors) have lost the view of this concrete historical context. In Book I the theme of the law of causality is discussed; in Book III the laws of justice. These last are artificial laws, but absolutely necessary for survival. They are derived from the natural necessities of the human being. The laws are not a direct effect of the passions, but are a mode of guiding them.³¹ All this is understandable if one affirms, in agreement with Locke but developing his hypothesis further, that human nature has at the centre the market as the necessary condition of human life, which needs as its essential mediation the 'secure stabilization of property'. Property is not a merely passive expression (as possession of goods that are turned over to the market, within the mercantilists), but an effect of an activity (from the Industrial Revolution) that demands organizing the *conditions of the production* of goods by the market:

By the *conjunction of forces*, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability encreases: And by *mutual succour* we are less expos'd to fortune and accidents. 'Tis by this additional *force, ability, and security*, that society becomes advantageous.³²

²⁶ Ibid. It is the first industrial bourgeois political revolution. Mercantile oligarchies could have great power in the Phoenician and Greek cities, or in Venice, but not like the industrial bourgeoisie.

²⁷ Book I of the *Treatise of Human Nature* (Hume, 1998, pp. 15f.; 1968, I, pp. 11f. [English: pp. 7-178]).

²⁸ Book III (pp. 295f.; II, pp. 165f. [English: pp. 291-395]).

²⁹ Book II (pp. 183f.; II, pp. 3f. [English: pp. 179-290]).

³⁰ Hinkelammert, 2003.

³¹ *Treatise*, Book III, part II, sect. 1, 'Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?' (Hume, 1998, p. 308 [English: pp. 307-11]).

³² Ibid., sect. II; p. 313; II, pp. 191-2 (English: p. 312).

Justice is the assumption of this force, ability, security and increase in property; the possibility of obedience and the obligation to fulfil promises. It is the foundation of the morality of the market that is *derived* (it is a moment of a dialectical method) from judgements of fact (advantageous for society). It starts from judgements of fact; it is elevated to the totality of experience 'the totality of all cases',³³ and from this morality is derived. It proceeds as follows: with 'limited means' and difficulty in 'satisfying needs'³⁴ – *judgements* made about the natural order – 'only society is able to repair these defects' (egoism, self-interest to the detriment of others, etc.) – in consideration of the common goods – but for this there must be a social organization which only the 'laws of justice' can produce³⁵ – derivation of the need for morality:

After this convention, concerning *abstinence*³⁶ from the possessions of others, is enter'd into, and every one has acquir'd a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of *property, right, or obligation*. The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former.³⁷

In contrast to twentieth-century analytical tradition, Hume indicates that justice starts from an empirical level (it is not a 'value judgement' but a 'judgement of fact'), since 'this sense of justice is not founded in our ideas but in our impressions'.³⁸

[154] We will explain this now. First, in the cognitive order, we will show the diverse *dialectical* paths (a 1, b 1, etc.),³⁹ to, second, confront them with the paths of the moral order (a 2, b 2, etc.). Note the parallelism, discovered by Hinkelammert that gives unitary sense to all the work of Hume:

(a 1) In the first moment of the order of knowledge and in relation to real objects are received primary or original 'impressions',⁴⁰ perception without antecedents. These are impressions of sensation and reflection.

33 Ibid., Book I, part 1, sect. 6; p. 66; I, 90 (English: p. 16). He writes: 'The idea of cause and effect is deriv'd from *experience* [Hume emphasizes] which informs us, that such particular objects, *in all past instances*, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other' (ch. 3, sect. 6 p. 66; p. 92 [English: p. 63]).

34 Ibid., Book III, part 1, sect. 2; p. 312; II, 191 (English: p. 311).

35 Ibid., p. 316; p. 196 (English: p. 315).

36 This 'abstinence' is still fruit of knowing to direct the passions to limit other passions. Justice does not negate the passions but directs the 'alteration of its direction' (ibid., p. 317; p. 197 [English: p. 316]). This 'abstinence' is not like Hobbes where the subjects negate their right to act and only the sovereign exercises natural power (a political act); here, it is an economic 'abstinence' that restricts passion by appropriating it from the property of the other.

37 Ibid. (English: p. 315).

38 Ibid. (English: p. 319).

39 See the concept of 'dialectic' in Dussel, 1974c. The dialectical method applies not only to Plato and Aristotle, but Descartes and Kant, and Hegel and Marx. Popper would have to include Hume among the 'enemies' of 'open society', for using a 'holistic' method.

40 *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 1, sect. 1; p. 15; p. 11 (English: p. 7).

(b 1) Through reflection 'ideas' (secondary impressions) are formed that can produce through further reflection ideas of ideas,⁴¹ some ideas are simple and others complex. Understanding is active and can reflect on itself.

(c 1) But ideas are not disconnected from each other.⁴² 'Bonds of union' exist among them in the memory, and are those on which imagination relies.⁴³ The criteria of connection can be similarity, contiguousness or causality.⁴⁴ Hume shows with difficulty the origin of the idea of the relation of cause-effect or the principle of causality (the principle of organization of ideas and objects through the *relation* of cause-effect). This difficulty leads him to make a large methodological detour that was unperceived (not by Hinkelammert): 'The idea, then, of causation must be *deriv'd* from some *relation* among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover.'⁴⁵

Habitually the cause and effect are in 'constant connection',⁴⁶ but it does not mean that one has an idea of an impression of a '*necessary* connection', because the impression of its 'necessity' is impossible to have:⁴⁷ 'I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connection, and find the impression, or impressions',⁴⁸ I do not have direct experience of a 'necessity'. Although inductively we will reach infinity by

41 In cerebral neurology, in the 'neocortex' 'maps' of the external stimuli (sensations, impressions) are produced that are ordered or 'categorized perceptually' (maps of maps) and these are organized or 'categorized conceptually' (maps of these maps of second level, ideas). Trillions of relations of hundreds of millions of 'neuronal groups' (see Edelman, 1992, pp. 81f.), where each neuron can function in different 'maps' (Dussel, 1998a, § 1.1). A 'map' can have from 50 to 10,000 neurons. The 'passions' (which occupy Hume) are neuronal phenomena of very different structure. They are a moment of the 'limbic system'; so pain (a sensation, 'impression' for Hume) can fire a primary emotion (fear); this can be reflected as secondary emotion or feeling (worry about the fear), connected to the neocortical system (cognitive moment, of image, of 'maps': I know, image presented by memory, the feeling or content of the worry about fear in the face of pain). So the 'passions' have a moment where 'maps' intervene (the feeling that reacts before emotions, fired by sensations of pain). 'The immediate substrata of the feelings are the result of mappings of a myriad of aspects of the bodily states in the sensitive regions designed to receive signals from the body' (Damasio, 2003, p. 87). Hume did not imagine that the structure of the emotional system of the brain was millions of times more complex than his assumption. We will return in the architectonic part of politics to the theme of 'political feelings' (in relation to Nietzsche, Derrida or Žižek).

42 There are 'maps' and connections inter-'maps' constituting 'the whole of the cerebral cognitive system' a neurologist would say.

43 *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part. 1, sect. 4: 'On the connection or association of ideas' (pp. 20f.; pp. 19f. [English: pp. 12-14]).

44 Today it is called 'categorizing' the 'maps', the same as organizing the ideas. Each subjective brain organizes its 'maps' in a distinct way, but at the end they meet in very simple mechanisms, among those the ones described by Hume.

45 *Ibid.*, Book I, part 3, sect. 2; p. 58; p. 78 (English: pp. 52-3). 'To derive' *from* where and *to* where?

46 See Bunge, 1961, pp. 19f.

47 Part 3 of Book I of the *Treatise of Human Nature* is called 'Of knowledge and probability'. But probability as 'possibility' (as opposed to 'impossible'). It is the 'impossibility' of the idea or impression in relation to an object that would be a '*necessary* relation', or the 'necessity' as object, which is impossible.

48 *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sect. 2 pp. 59-60; p. 80 (English: p. 55).

direct experiences we would never have an impression of the 'necessity' of the relation between cause-effect.⁴⁹ Is there not then an explanation of how we have a manager of causality? Yes there is, but he has to 'leap to *another order*', to discover the 'infinite evil' of Hegel. He will not take into account 'each' experience but the world of the 'totality of the experience'.

(d 1) Hume proposes a method of derivation or inference (not analytical deduction) that is strictly dialectic (showing the impossibility of other possibilities).⁵⁰ Read carefully:

Reason⁵¹ can never show us the connexion of *one* object *with* another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation⁵² of their constant conjunction in *all past instances*. When the mind,⁵³ therefore, passes⁵⁴ from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief⁵⁵ of another, it is not determin'd by reason,⁵⁶ but by certain principles, which associate together⁵⁷ the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding,⁵⁸ we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas.⁵⁹

49 'From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, never will arise any new original idea such as that of a necessary connection' (ibid., sect. 6; p. 66; p. 91 [English: p. 62]). It is the 'infinite evil' of Hegel.

50 'To show' (from the Greek *deixis*: the index finger that indicates) is not 'to demonstrate' (*apo*: from; *apo-dictico*: what is shown 'from' the basis). What does not have basis (because it is the basis) cannot be demonstrated apodictically, but has to be shown deictically through the *impossibility* of the opposite. The dialectic *shows* the principles of science and knowledge (for which Hume searches). Science 'demonstrates' from principles 'shown' to be true without demonstration. We are at the level of 'showing' the principle of the organization of 'objective reality' as *objective*, not as *reality*.

51 In this strict sense is a finding of the 'limits' of 'reason', a 'critique' of reason.

52 For Kant, Hegel, Marx or Heidegger 'understanding' (in Hume the 'reason') means an ontic relation with an object; 'reason' (or 'comprehension' for Heidegger) means an *ontological* relation with experience and opening to the 'Totality' of the world of experience).

53 *Mind* replaces 'reason', another type of rationality (Kantian-Hegelian 'reason').

54 This 'to pass' is still the 'passing-over' (dialectical *über-geben* of Hegel).

55 In the corresponding section, he explained what 'belief' signified, since it is the type of rationality proper to 'knowing' the relation of causality between cause-effect as necessary connection.

56 That is to say, by a mere ontic relation, from a numerical object to another numerical object of experience, which is a new *type of relation (ontological)*.

57 *Together* can be translated by 'within itself', but we would like to give it a strong sense.

58 For Hume, there are at least five types of rationality: (1) ontic 'reason'; (2) ontological 'mind' of ideas in the imagination; (3) 'understanding' of objects; (4) 'conception' as production of a possible idea (not logically contradictory); (5) 'belief' that the ideas (in their totality or in each case) correspond to the existing objects (in their totality or in each case) (see ibid., sect. 7; pp. 69f.; pp. 96f., about 'belief' [English: pp. 65-9]). 'Belief' as a type of rationality reminds one of the 'faith' of Hegel in that 'representation' corresponds to the 'Idea' (in the philosophy of religion), or the 'faith' of Kant in which the 'representation' corresponds to the *noumenon* (rational faith). See Dussel, 1973b, pp. 110f. There we explain the sense of 'rational faith' in Kant: for this, Kant writes 'To me it has been necessary to subsume knowledge (*Wissen*) to faith (*Glaube*)' (*KrV*, B XXIX-XXX [Translation: TC]).

59 *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sect. 6; p. 68; p. 94 (English: p. 64).

[155] The principle of causality is given in the 'mind', in the world as totality of ideas, not within the impressions, nor by means of understanding or reason. 'Belief' is the reference or what permits one to pass from that world of ideas to the world of objects (or impressions: the facts). What is it that forms the idea (and the principle) of causality in the mind? It is an act of the 'belief that forms the idea of cause-effect'; the idea of the mind corresponds 'to the existence of objects'.⁶⁰ What is believed is not unintelligible. 'Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive anything.'⁶¹ The believed world is possible and starts from experience, so it is believable. Within the many possible worlds there is one that really exists (and is believable). The question is to discover the factual and real world, which is not only possible but the empirical object of habitual daily experience. The activity of the mind that 'infers' something exists, although not knowable by impressions, leads to 'belief'. The belief has certain demands as conditions of its possibility. We do not believe simply all that is possible. To 'believe' one has to use certain rules to reach a certain degree of certainty ('degrees of belief and assurance'), which is not the empirical certainty of the impressions.⁶²

The 'inference of the mind' (where there is a '*necessary* connection' between objects presented as cause-effect) is effected by the passage from the existing 'totality of experience' to the remembered and imagined 'totality of ideas', being able to 'believe' that the second order (ideas) is referred to first (existing objects). This 'belief' can be considered seriously (as acceptable) if one discards the other '*possible* worlds' (logically) as impossible empirically (factually, and so not existing), as contradictory to that existing.

In the history of philosophy one has attributed the passage from the cause to the effect in many ways, situated in many *possible* worlds. The first possible world is a universe that is fruit of pure chance.⁶³ It would not have causality, since all effect is purely casual and appears to us as necessary. Another mode of a possible world is one organized by a divine agent. This was affirmed by the philosophical movement of the Mut'azilites,⁶⁴ who thought that there would be no physical-natural law, and that if things seemed to produce *constant* effects, in reality it was God who by an exact and explicit act of God's *constant* will created in each case the effect. Duns Scotus reflected on contingency and necessity within this thematic horizon.⁶⁵ Or causality is the fruit of innate ideas, or, as Leibniz thought, there is no

⁶⁰ Ibid., sect. 7; p. 69; p. 96 (English: p. 65). There is a difference between 'the simple conception of the existence of an object and the belief in it' (ibid.; p. 70; p. 96 [English: p. 65]). The 'conception' of the existence of an object can be referred only to an idea of that object as logically possible, as not contradictory. However, the belief in its existence is an affirmation that starts from experience and not only refers to its logical possibility, but to its empirical ability to be fact.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 70; p. 97 (English: p. 66).

⁶² Ibid., sect. 13, p. 100; p. 143 (English: p. 98).

⁶³ Ibid., sect. 11f.; pp. 89f.; pp. 126f. (English: pp. 86-9).

⁶⁴ See section [47].

⁶⁵ See sections [63-5].

cause-effect but the monads are programmed in anticipation by providential divine intelligence. There can be many interpretations of causality and in 'many *possible*' but not existing 'worlds' (*logically* possible because they are not contradictory by their pure semantic content in the abstract). What permits one to say that they do not exist that they are not factually real? The response of Hume is expressed in the 'inference of the mind'.

All begins by discarding the possible but not existing worlds, because one starts from examples or worlds without possible causality. One of those worlds is: 'Matter, say they, is in itself entirely unactive [. . .] but since these effects are evident to our senses [. . .] the Deity [. . .] by a *continu'd* exertion of omnipotence supports its existence [of the effects], and successively bestows on it all those motions.'⁶⁶

The constant connection between cause and effect, in this possible world from a voluntarist creationism, would then be constant divine omnipotence. The same can be said of a miracle, since hanging from the creative will, to create a habitual effect (in a constant way) or another new (miracle, once) are two free acts of divinity with equal content. This possibility is not logically contradictory; it is part of a 'possible world'. But it cannot be factually proven as existing. How can one distinguish the 'merely possible world' (logically) from the 'possible and really existing world' (factually)? When the demands of an acceptable 'belief' are fulfilled, with reference to past experiences, the 'inference of the mind' is produced from the principle of causality:

I shall only infer from them,⁶⁷ that since reason can never give rise to the idea of efficacy,⁶⁸ that idea must be deriv'd⁶⁹ from experience [as totality], and from some particular instances of this efficacy, which make their passage⁷⁰ into the mind by the common channels of sensation or reflection.⁷¹

This dialectical passage (derivation by inference, transition from one order to another) uses 'common channels' and with those 'belief' is acquired, an acceptability to which can be offered confidence (having justified faith) in the existence of the causality among objects. Those 'channels' are custom, habit, repetition of all the memorized past and present experiences, the

⁶⁶ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sect. 14; p. 109; p. 157 (English: p. 107).

⁶⁷ The two propositions are: (1) reason by itself only can give place to an original idea, and (2) a cause is needed for all beginning of existence.

⁶⁸ The 'efficacy' by which the cause places the effect.

⁶⁹ 'Derivation' is not deduction; neither is 'inference' induction. Derivation infers, passes from the order of objects, impressions or totality of experience to the order of the ideas. It is 'inclusion' in the order of the ideas from a moment of 'another' order.

⁷⁰ It is the dialectic of *Übergeben*: from the order of experience, impressions of understanding, to the order of the ideas of the mind for reflection.

⁷¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sect. 14, p. 108; pp. 155-6 (English: p. 106).

unsurprising in daily life, what does not contradict the *habitual* expectation of the appearance of an effect:

The *necessary* connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustom'd⁷² union. [. . .] Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies.⁷³

(e 1) Once we know what the idea of causality is that moves in the totality of the world from the ideas of our mind that make reference to habitual objects of experience, we can explain knowledge. To know is to apply the principle of causality to ideas (and 'to believe', referred to the objects) as organizational criteria of all objects. We cannot know what is not part of those relations of contiguity, similarity or causality. For this, 'the memory, the senses, and understanding, are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination',⁷⁴ because the principle of causality, as inference of the mind, allows one to reason and 'convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects',⁷⁵ allows us to know them. It allows one to formulate laws of nature.

[156] In the practical order (from passions and morality), we will have to tackle a similar deconstructive path from appearances to reach the organizing principle of morality, a political, economic-political principle:

(a 2) All starts from the 'original impressions' of the senses, like pain or pleasure.⁷⁶

(b 2) Passions are secondary impressions or reflection on the primary; emotions are similar. Passions have causes and objects. A systematic exposition on passions occupies Book II of the *Treatise*.

(c 2) Passions, like ideas, can be presented in a chaotic situation, contradictory and some of them are frankly destructive to the human being. Thus as there is an ordering theoretical principle of ideas (and of objects), the 'principle of causality' (contiguity and similarity), will there exist something similar in the practical-moral order that organizes the world of passions? If, in the cognitive order, the result is the knowing of objects, in

⁷² In this section XIV Hume reiterates that 'we believe' in 'relation as necessary' by 'frequent repetition', 'the mind is determined by custom', 'the inclination that the custom produces on passing from an object to the idea of its usual accompanying', 'repetition does not discover anything in the objects, but only has influence over the mind'.

⁷³ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, part 3, sect. 14, p. 113; pp. 183-4 (English: pp. 111-12).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, part 4, sect. 7; p. 172; vol. I, p. 251 (English: p. 173). The imagination makes present the totality of the ideas as memorized. It is the 'world' in the ontological sense that the principle of causality organizes.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, part 1, sect. 1f.; pp. 183f.; vol. II, pp. 3f. (English: pp. 181-2).

the practical-moral order it will be the effective permanence in existence, *the conservation of human life*. This practical principle cannot be of the order of reason or understanding, because reason cannot move in any way to passions and motivate action; it is a cold production of images.⁷⁷ The 'derivation' of this principle has to start from 'moral sense'.⁷⁸

It is even more necessary than the theoretical connective principle. From not having 'association or cunction' of the ideas follows no knowledge; but from not having order within the passions, from not having a principle or an ordering virtue of the order of action *the extinction of the species, of human life* itself can occur:⁷⁹

This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society [. . .] So that, upon the whole, we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of society, to be greater or less, according to those we encounter in regulating and restraining this passion.⁸⁰

The destructive natural passion has to be directed then 'artificially', detoured. As reason cannot direct the passions, it is necessary to control it and oppose another passion, proposing to the passion images, ideas that permit it to move to other objectives. A moral motivation is necessary (a virtue that persuades passion, that motivates it), a moral principle that organizes passions to human ends. How can one discover that organizing principle that permits the gentle and secure reproduction of human life?: because for the human being it becomes impossible to live in the continual worry of the savage and pre-social condition.

(d 2) Here, as with the principle of causality, Hume uses a dialectic method which 'will derive' the fundamental moral principle for the impossibility of many (logically) possible worlds, from social organizations that do not respond to the demands of the 'totality of existing experience' (of a rising industrial bourgeois society), and where the principle that one wants 'to derive' would not be necessary. The morality 'derived' by Hume will be

⁷⁷ 'Morals [. . .] cannot be deriv'd from reason' (ibid., Book III, part 1, sect. 1; p. 296; p. 167 [English: p. 294]). 'Derivation' is not analytical but dialectic, starting from the totality of the world of passionate experience. It is a 'derivation' from the order of passions, where reason has a secondary function, but has some role: as for Spinoza, proposing images, ideas or objects (objectives) to passions.

⁷⁸ Ibid., sect. 2; p. 304; p. 178 (English: p. 302). That principle is not a principle of value or a judgement of value (a question that cannot exist for Hume). If it had to be defined in those terms we have to say that the practical, moral or political principle starts from a 'judgement of fact': if there is no order within the passions the human being would be destroyed. In other words, if the moral principle is not respected the human species will not survive. It is a judgement of fact.

⁷⁹ The 'idea' in the cognitive order occupies the architectonic place of 'virtue' in the practical order. There is an idea or principle of causality that will have virtue or a principle of justice.

⁸⁰ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, part 2, sect. 2; p. 317; p. 197 (English: p. 316).

the morality demanded by the real world of capitalism; it will be an ethic of the market (but not yet mercantilist as for Locke).

[157] There are many possible worlds. The first that Hume analyses is the (logically) possible world of the 'state of nature':⁸¹

The state of nature [. . .] is to be regarded as mere fiction, not unlike that of the *golden age*, which poets have invented; only with this difference, that the former is describ'd as full of war [Hobbes . . .], whereas the latter is pointed out to us, as the most charming and peaceable condition, that can possibly be imagin'd.⁸²

It is a (logically) 'possible' world in which justice is not necessary (in the state of nature it is not necessary if one does not want to live). In that 'charming condition' property is not necessary. But we remember that those worlds are not empirically possible, are not real, never have been the object of experience. The possibility of non-ownership in that case does not prove anything. Hume is not a sceptic; he is a critical realist with a dialectical method.

One of those possible worlds could be a society without principle of causality, where by a miracle could be produced goods or wealth. The founder of Christianity was tempted to 'convert the stones into bread'.⁸³ If this 'miracle' were empirically possible the critical-messianic task of that prophet would not be necessary, or it would be impossible; because he would come to criticize the rich in favour of the poor in the real world (where miracles are not the structure of said reality). If stones could be converted into bread habitually the economy would disappear, because abundance would lose the ethical sense of injustice, and by this the critique. In such a world the passions would not be opposed and there would be peace and security. The greed of goods would not be felt, because one would have only what one desires. But that (logically) possible world is (empirically) impossible. It was, methodologically, the world of 'the earthly paradise *before* the sin of Adam and Eve', from where the Jewish, Islamic and primitive Christian thinkers reasoned.⁸⁴ In paradise one would not need any property. For this

⁸¹ Today it would be to criticize the fiction of the 'original situation' of Rawls or the 'perfect community of communication' of Apel.

⁸² *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, part 2, sect. 2; p. 318; p. 198 (English: p. 317).

⁸³ *Matthew* 4.3. It is the example that Hinkelammert continuously brings from a world where justice or injustice are not possible, because it is an empirically impossible world of extreme abundance.

⁸⁴ For the fathers of the Church, who supported in the monastery the 'community of goods', the problematic that *before* original sin all was in common (a possible world, but not the actual empirical real) and that *after* original sin private property was necessary (in the real world) was an impossible dialectic derivation. They concluded that by 'natural right' all had common access to the goods of the earth, and only by *ius gentium* had private property. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Vatican theorists adopted the 'modern' conception of property and affirmed that property was a 'natural right'. The fathers of the Church (against Hellenist and Roman ownership), Hume (in favour of capitalist ownership as necessary) and Marx (against capitalist property judged from human life) were in agreement that

reason, the monks did not have property to emulate the 'state of perfection' and avoid passions, motives of conflict in the community.

Another not factual possible world, similar to the previous, would be a world without scarcity:

Let us suppose that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse *abundance* of all *external* conveniences, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want.⁸⁵

As there is no possible dispute no restriction of property is necessary, it would be common without any restriction, so justice would be unnecessary.

That world being impossible, 'tis [. . .] from [. . .] the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives [the necessity of] its origin'.⁸⁶ 'Justice' is necessary because the real world as totality of experience would be impossible, would be destroyed. Because each one wants the few existing goods for him/herself excluding the rest, interminable conflicts are produced. Justice is *necessary* so one is not destroyed and the real world is 'possible' (empirically and not only logically). 'Necessity' is not an idea that has at base a cognitive sensorial impression (neither as '*necessary* connection'), although an affective impression. Causality (cognitive level) and justice (practical) are 'derived' dialectically from the fact that without them the existence of the world of experience is not *possible* (as 'known-being' and as 'practised-being'). Contemporary analytical thinking has not been able to discover these transcendental 'holistic' moments of the method of Hume. Hume, together with Marx, is still a thinker of the future.

Another possible world would consist if the human being would exist infinitely. If we had infinite time we could await a future moment to have possession of all goods. Within the Buddhists poverty as virtue and scorn of property are justified by the belief in metempsychosis or reincarnation in a future life in other bodies; neither the inheritance that one wants to insure the near relatives (for one's own interest) nor ownership of goods would make sense.

But those possible worlds (logically or exceptionally) without property are not the 'existing real world', and the intending produces the chaos of passions, hell in place of paradise. From the impossibility (empirical-factual) of

the property is 'derived', because it is not natural, but it is necessary (for Hume as capitalist, for Marx as strategically planned), meanwhile the Vatican had lost the historic sense of the question (and was as capitalist as Locke or Smith).

⁸⁵ *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, sect. III; Hume, 1968, 37 (Translation: Beauchamp, p. 11).

⁸⁶ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, part 2, sect. 2; p. 319; p. 200 (English: p. 318). In place of 'derive' the Spanish translator says 'produce'. He thus destroys the sense of the text. It is a dialectic 'derivation', as in the case of the principle of causality.

other possible worlds (logically, because in abstract they are not contradictory) 'is derived' (dialectical-transcendental 'derivation') the pertinence of a morality that starts from the experience (not of judgements of value) of making the real world secure and peaceful. This 'derivation' of the moral has not been discovered by the commentators on Hume.⁸⁷

[158] The principle of the practical order is the 'principle of justice' (analogous to the principle of causality in the order of knowledge). And is in addition a virtue, as a moment of *morality* that can *motivate* to action.⁸⁸

In the real world, as totality of the experience, 'as the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so the instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief impediment',⁸⁹ united with the existence of 'necessities' ('food [. . .] cloaths and lodging').⁹⁰ This determines a situation where the passions undo its destructive possibility. 'Tis by [the organization of] society alone he is able to supply his defects',⁹¹ since property can be established permanently and the division of labour promoted (permitting greater skill in the specialization of functions). These solutions are 'not deriv'd from nature, but from *artifice*'.⁹² This assumes a practical principle:

Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant⁹³ possession is establish'd by the laws of society that is by the laws of justice. [. . .] A man's property is some object related to him.⁹⁴ This relation [of ownership] is not natural, but moral, and founded on justice.⁹⁵

87 In *Ethics of Liberation* (Dussel, 1998a, chs. 4f.) I 'derive' a *critical* ethic from the 'impossibility' of a 'perfect' order or action. An 'imperfect' order produces 'inevitably', as universal contingency, negative effects in the short or long term. To take responsibly these 'negative' effects *founds* (derives) a critical ethic, deconstructive. This would signify a use of the method of derivation of Hume.

88 '[. . .] morality [. . .] has influence over the passions' (*Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, part 1 sect. 1; p. 296; p. 166 [English: p. 294]).

89 *Ibid.*, part 2, sect. 2; p. 314; p. 193 (English p. 313).

90 *Ibid.*, p. 313; p. 191 (English: p. 312). The demands of the *Book of the Dead* of ancient Egypt (ch. 124), Matthew 25 of early Christianity, and newly present in the prologue of Engels' *The Origin of the Family*.

91 *Ibid.*

92 *Ibid.*, p. 315; p. 194 (English: p. 314).

93 Here Hume uses the same word, *constant*, which is worth as much for the 'constant connection' (it is not 'necessary': the causality) as for the 'constant possession' (it is not the 'necessary' basis: justice).

94 The Spanish translator says 'with her', a relation of possession with 'justice'. But the text says *to him*, with the owner. The constant relation of the owner and that appropriated (as of cause and effect) cannot have an impression with respect to its 'appropriateness' (the necessity of the 'necessary' connection of cause-effect), but is discovered from the horizon of justice. This is an 'inference of the mind' or justice, as moral human fact (in the order of passions and not of cognitive impressions, of the physical properties of the objects or as natural order), a 'social relation' (as Marx and Hume would say).

95 *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, part 2, sect. 2; p. 316; p. 196 (English: p. 315). 'Tis very preposterous, therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully comprehending the nature of justice' (*ibid.*).

The virtue of justice as the motive of passions or moment of morality as an idea of justice, or as organizing principle of human practical-social existence, is the ontological foundation of the existing empirical order, where passions are brought together and become constructive; private passions are articulated to the public (overcoming the antinomy of Mandeville). Life is now possible:

'Twas therefore a concern for our own, and the publick interest, which made us establish the laws of justice [. . .] This sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions [. . .] arise from artifice and human conventions.⁹⁶

It is an argument directed to the foundation of *institutions*. From the necessity of survival and from the danger of instability without institutions are 'derived' 'three fundamental laws':

that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. 'Tis on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend.⁹⁷

(e 2) Once we know how the principle of justice operates in organizing real society to guarantee survival, we can discover a fallacy in Hume. If it is true that one has 'derived' the 'principle of justice' and necessity of ownership (and of institutions in general), derivation alone indicates its 'necessity' but not its concrete historical content. From the impossibility of a world as totality without ownership one cannot 'derive' ownership of *capitalist type*. The derivation is not necessary, nor is the market system for private ownership of industrial capitalism; and so it is not the only mode of ownership possible. One idealizes it and fetishizes it. Hinkelammert shows that one does not speak of 'criteria of specification of the institutions'; from the derivation of the necessity of organizing institutions, such as ownership, there is a leap forward to 'these institutions, *here and now*'. Here begins a debate, not abstract through the application of a principle of impossibility of the non-factual possible worlds, but concretely of the convenience of this or that institution. It is to fetishize the existing world to write:

No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property, and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains *little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and concord*.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 319; p. 201 (English: p. 319).

⁹⁷ Ibid., sect. 6; p. 339; p. 228 (English: p. 337).

⁹⁸ Ibid., sect. 2; p. 316; pp. 196-7 (English: pp. 315-16).

The great critic, quickly, idealizes the existing bourgeois world in rising industrial Great Britain, and does not note the *impossibility* of a *perfect* fulfilment of any system that the principle of justice can organize.

Hume explains an architectonic parallelism within the theoretical and economic-political moral level.

On the one hand, from the world of real objects, by inference of the mind that shows the non-factuality of the merely possible worlds (by not bringing into agreement the totality of experience), a principle of causality is discovered that orders ideas and objects, to make possible knowledge of, or the explication of the objects by the cause-effect relation. Second, from the world of passions (frequently destructive and contradictory), by inference of the mind and starting from the non-factual impossibility of practically possible worlds, is derived the necessity of limiting and directing the passions, to construct positively the existing society, thanks to the principle of justice, which through the division of labour organizes industrial production and which founds the necessity of ownership and other institutions essential for survival. Marx will criticize the immediate derivation of capitalism as the only or greatest society possible, since in its crisis the world reproduction of human life (of humanity as all) is made *impossible* (Marx, like Hume, utilizes the same 'principle of impossibility') in a more concrete level of historical existence (a level which Hume does not discover in his insufficient scepticism),⁹⁹ by the proportional growth of poverty and the short-term extinction of the planet's non-renewable goods, destroyed to maintain or raising the rate of profit of capital.

From Ethics to Political Economy: Adam Smith

[159] Adam Smith (1723-90) was born in Kirkcaldy, Scotland.¹⁰⁰ Having studied at the University of Glasgow under Francis Hutcheson, he went to Oxford, and in 1748 he gave a series of lectures in Edinburgh. In 1751 he became professor of logic and later of ethics at the University of Glasgow, of which he was rector from 1787 until his death. We may divide his life into two parts. In the first, he published *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1751). In 1764 he left for France. In the second part of his life, during three years in France he read the physiocrats and other economists and then dedicated 12 years to writing *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). It is the foundation of modern economic science, torn from moral philosophy.¹⁰¹ He later returned to Edinburgh with his father to

⁹⁹ I say 'not sufficient' because he does not doubt the universal efficacy of capitalist private property. One had to be sceptical of it.

¹⁰⁰ In my three works about Marx (Dussel, 1985a, 1988 and 1990) there are continuous references to A. Smith, in particular, the second of them, chs 3-6.

¹⁰¹ See Dussel, 1998a [82].

become customs commissioner, a post in which he could practise the system he had justified theoretically.¹⁰²

The political philosophy of Smith is woven around a neo-Stoic idea,¹⁰³ an optimistic position in the face of the 'admirable' aesthetic effects of the Industrial Revolution as civilizing and ethical process, of 'universal harmony' (not only of the cosmos with its natural laws, but equally of human nature and society) directed by an 'invisible hand' (Jupiter for the Romans, which Smith makes reference to) of 'Providence' (or 'Destiny') that would produce effects that overcame the limited capacity of human knowledge, a 'harmony' that was realized empirically *in the market* 'unintentionally' on the backs of the actors. He continued the thinking of Locke (on money and property) and Hume (on the division of labour) through his teacher Hutcheson and not without the influence of Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) with respect to being able to reconcile the passions and individual vices with the growth of the 'wealth of nations', the fundamental theme of Smith, although he modified all the previous theses with great originality, and took much more into account than anyone the economic phenomenon at its fundamental ontological level.

Hume had 'derived' the necessity of the division of labour and ownership by the impossibility of non-factual possible worlds. Smith, however, postulates a perfect world (which for Hume would be logically possible, factually impossible) behind the empirical world, that due to *our finiteness we do not know*.¹⁰⁴ That postulated harmonious world is real and manifests itself inside the consciousness of an 'impartial spectator', and in the objective world of the market as an apparently chaotic order 'ordered' by the 'invisible hand' of God.

When Smith assumed the professorship of ethics in 1752, he divided the material into four parts: moral theology, ethics, jurisprudence and government.¹⁰⁵ *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* corresponds to the second part. The third and fourth part were unknown until the publication of student notes of his classes in 1896.¹⁰⁶ Smith divided the course of 1763-4 into four parts: justice, government (fourth part of the ancient systematization), income and military defence. The three final parts of this treatment,

102 *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, chs 2-5 (Smith, 1984, pp. 399f. [English: pp. 474f.])

103 See sections [28] and [30-31].

104 We are still in the Kantian problematic, which Kant discovered in his reading of Hume and Smith historically. He owes to the empiricists (not such in reality) the discovery of his dialectical method. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is a 'critique' or definition of the 'limits' of knowing; one has to know what cannot be known, but what is postulated as real (the *noumenon*, for example).


105 See Gutiérrez, 1998, pp. 29f. We will take into account this work, which I directed as a master's thesis, in which he works with the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. On finishing *The Theory* . . . he writes: 'I shall in another discourse endeavor to give an account of the general principles of law and government, [. . .] not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law' (end of the work; Smith, 1997, p. 595 [English: p. 342]).

106 Smith, 1978.

although modified, were published later under the title of *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*.¹⁰⁷

[160] *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* has one main aim: to observe the subject of passions, the actor and to whom they are directed, the patient, from the position of the 'third': the 'impartial spectator',¹⁰⁸ the panoptic 'point zero', who sees omnisciently without being seen (the Stoic *Prónoia*) and puts into the conscience of each actor an 'impartial spectator' (the individual *daímon*: in C2 of Figure 9.1), with the claim of universality (and would have thus the 'transcendental spectator').¹⁰⁹

Figure 9.1 Moments of the model of Adam Smith in his ethics



What permits one to accede from the actor (C1) to the other subject or object of one's own passion (C3) is a passionate moment, affective, sentimental, 'sympathy': 'By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation (C3), we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body.'¹¹⁰ 'Sympathy' is a sentiment that unites us to others and constitutes the foundation of 'harmony in society',¹¹¹ as the proper dominion of justice.¹¹² Assuming the affections of the other (above all when they are negative, as pain or sadness) is considered by the 'spectator' as worth 'approbation', in particular when they express 'social passions' that domi-

107 'Justice' occupies Books I and II of *Wealth of Nations*; the 'government' occupies Books III and IV; the 'incomes', V; military defence, Part I of ch. I of Book V.

108 We have insisted in other places on the presence of the 'eye' of Osiris, the Egyptian god of the 'final judgement' in the great hall of Ma'at (see Dussel, 1998a, [5] and [405], and above (section [7])). He crosses Semitic and Hellenic-Roman (Stoic also), Islamic, medieval and modern European thinking. It is the 'moral conscience' as the interior 'vision' that judges and the 'voice' that recriminates or gives satisfaction for fulfilment.

109 Another way of situating modern subjectivity from Descartes, as Kant's *Ich denke* or later Husserl's *Ur-Ich*.

110 'Of Sympathy', in *The Theory* . . . I, sect. I, ch. 1 (Smith, 1997, p. 50 [English: p. 9]).

111 *Ibid.*, ch. IV; p. 22: 'the harmony of society'.

112 The 'Treatise of Justice' of 'Ethics' (Book V of *Nicomachean Ethics*) will split off at this moment the modern 'political economy'.

nate the 'egoistic passions'.¹¹³ What 'approves' or 'disapproves' is an impartial spectator who knows that justice is more important than benevolence, because social harmony depends on an acceptable social judgment by all about our conduct. We need a judge:

When I endeavor to examine my own conduct [. . .] it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons, and that *I*, the examiner and judge, represent a different character¹¹⁴ from that other *I*, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator [*C*₂]¹¹⁵ [. . .] The second is the agent [*C*₁].¹¹⁶

Smith speaks of three distinct levels in each of which are installed 'tribunals':

But though man has, in this manner, been rendered the *immediate judge* of mankind,¹¹⁷ he has been rendered so only in the first instance [*B*]; and an appeal lies from his sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of their own consciences, to that of the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator, to that of the man within the breast [*C*₂] [. . .] The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the desire of actual praise, and in the aversion to the actual blame [of *C*₃]. The jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether in the desire of praise-worthiness, and the aversion to blame-worthiness. [When there is a contraction between both tribunals . . .] the only effectual consolation of humbled and afflicted man lies in an appeal to a still higher tribunal, to that of the all-seeing Judge of the world [*A*], whose eyes can never be deceived.¹¹⁸

Paradoxically, the neo-Stoic Smith counts on practical reason as moral conscience (the empirical 'tribunal' in our breast), to resist the weakness (not the inutility) of benevolence (positive) and love of self (negative):

It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not the feeble spark of benevolence which Nature¹¹⁹ has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus

¹¹³ Ibid., sect. II, ch. V; p. 106 (English: p. 40): 'Of the Selfish Passions'. Smith is separated clearly from Mandeville.

¹¹⁴ It is the Stoic *daimon*: *C*₂.

¹¹⁵ This is the 'empirical spectator'.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., III, ch. I; p. 231 (English: p. 113).

¹¹⁷ Ambiguously, in Smith, this 'tribunal' (*B*) is, on the one hand, the empirical public justice (*B*₂) as totality of conduct of someone (as public opinion or the justice of an established tribunal); on the other hand, it is glimpsed as a transcendental level (the 'tribunal of history'), human, as horizon of universal claim; and, in a third sense, a properly 'transcendental' spectator, quasi-Kantian.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., ch. 2; pp. 251–2; (English: pp. 130–1). The presence of the 'eye' ('whose look never could be deceived') of Osiris is evident. Smith writes: 'this demigod within the breast' (ibid.).

¹¹⁹ Neo-Stoic 'Nature' is as much level *A* as *B*, articulated with *C*, of Figure 9.1. 'Benevolence' is a properly moral sentiment, in *C*₁.

capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love.¹²⁰ [. . .] It is reason, principle, conscience,¹²¹ the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.¹²²

This internal tribunal has criteria, 'general rules',¹²³ that are fruit of proper experiences, of nature and the history of a society. There are rules of morality that allow one 'to subject the force of passion', and in particular 'self-love', that awaken the 'sense of responsibility':

Upon the tolerable observance of these duties, depends the very existence of human society,¹²⁴ which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence for those important rules of conduct.¹²⁵

It is a 'derivation' of the existence of social *institutions*, but the condition of possibility is not 'justice' as for Hume, but the impartial observer that makes possible the discovery of general rules, the sense of responsibility and virtues that order the moral passions (positively) and the leftover (negatively, restricting them) until the concordance 'with the harmonious movement of the system',¹²⁶ and even when this is not fulfilled (considering the objection of Bernard de Mandeville,¹²⁷ the private virtues, egoism for example, can produce public goods) he concludes that in all ways 'social harmony' cannot be destroyed:

[The rich] consume little more than the poor [. . .] in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity [. . .] They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life [. . .] and thus without intending it,¹²⁸ without knowing it, advance the interest of the society [. . .] The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order [. . .] frequently serves to recommend those *institutions*, which tend to promote the public welfare.¹²⁹

This central text of *neo-Stoic optimism* (as 'love of the [valid] system': rising industrial capitalism) will be transformed into the ethical-mythical (ontological) basis of the 'classical economy', which has a strictly ethical formulation. There is a theory of knowledge at the base of the argument:

120 It is simply a sentiment (in C1) not moral, but natural.

121 It is the impartial spectator 'in the breast' (in C1).

122 Ibid., ch. 3; p. 260 (English: p. 137).

123 Ibid., chs 4.8-12; pp. 291-2 (English: pp. 159-61).

124 A similar 'derivation' to that of Hume.

125 Ibid., ch. 5.2; p. 299 (English: p. 163).

126 Ibid., IV, ch. 1.9; p. 331 (English: p. 183).

127 Here against his teacher Hutcheson.

128 The 'un-intentionality' of fulfilling an order that overcomes the explicit knowledge of the agent (C2).

129 Ibid., ch. 1.10 p. 333 (English: pp. 184-5); ch. 1.11; p. 185.

'So *partial* are the views of mankind [. . .] If we *saw ourselves* in the light in which others [. . .] would *see us* if they *knew all*;¹³⁰ if we were that omniscient, the general rules, principles, virtues, institutions, market (that fixes prices) . . . would not be necessary. But as this is impossible, one derives the *necessity* of all this.

[161] Starting from the same discourse, the professor of ethics in Glasgow published another book, in 1776, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations*. Now, he takes more into account Hume's 'logic of derivation'. The really existing economic order (the 'uniform and harmonious movement of the system'), and its corresponding wealth, is *empirically possible*, is thanks to the division of labour, to property and the fulfilment of contracts, which has to be guaranteed through the *institution of the market*, under the exercise of the power of the state. An omniscient actor would not need political economy or the division of labour or the other institutions. Being finite or 'partial' human knowledge counts on a 'principle',¹³¹ which in ethics was 'sympathy', which explains the factual possibility of the valid structure of the economic order, and that, having as starting point the passion that tends toward one's 'own interest' (not the same as egoism), produces national wealth. That 'principle' is beneath the division of labour itself:

It is the *necessary*, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature [. . .] to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another [. . .] consequence of the faculties of reason and speech [. . .] As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labor.¹³²

The totality of all the exchanges that presuppose communication,¹³³ the possibility of making real that 'disposition' (exchange), is what one calls the

¹³⁰ Ibid., III, ch. 4.5; p. 158; ch. 4.6; pp. 159–60; p. 291 (English: pp. 158–9). 'Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of much importance, altogether without a remedy' (ibid., ch. 4.7). We can form 'general rules' or the 'invisible hand' works so order prevails. Germán Gutiérrez writes: 'It is at this point where Smith stops distinguishing the empirical sphere of justice (empirical spectators, who in the last resort are the valid morality) [our B₂ of the diagram] from the transcendental sphere of judgment (that is, judgment of a transcendental subject that judges from a point of view impossible in the empirical sphere, but is a condition of this: the point of view of the present and future totality' [B₁] (Gutiérrez, 1998, p. 86), which would open *directly* the Kantian interpretation of the practical *transcendental* subject.

¹³¹ The 'principle of justice' was Hume's condition for the possibility of civil society.

¹³² *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 2; Smith, 1984, p. 17 (English: pp. 17 and 19).

¹³³ Smith explains that among animals one cannot have exchange because there is no possibility of language. The 'market' is before anything an 'exchange' of words, a dialogue, altercation, struggle, argument about the 'price' of the product, and is based in a previous 'agreement': the consensus on the price (that assumes the value) of the product constituted now in goods.

'market', prior even to the exchange of money. Clearly under this inclination to exchange there is still a fundamental *conatus* (as Spinoza would say), which can be seen in 'the uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition'.¹³⁴ So if the sentiment of sympathy permitted one ethically to put oneself in place of the other; and equally the impartial spectator mediated between the 'actor' and the 'patient', in the same way now the 'principle of exchange' or the *market* allows the giving to the other what s/he needs in order to be able to obtain what the 'producer' possesses (which on her part s/he needs): 'Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want.'¹³⁵

The general rules of ethics are transformed into the general rules of the market or the capitalist economy, which will occupy the place of sympathy (between C2 and C3), and of the 'principle of the impartial observer' (level B2 of Figure 9.1). The relation of the 'actor-spectator' (C1-2) (with *passions* and *sympathy*) with the 'other as patient' (C3) is transformed now, into a more concrete and *material* ('contained') level, in a 'worker' (C1) (with *necessities* under the *principle of exchange*) who by the 'partiality' of his/her knowledge cannot be a 'spectator' with (intentional) knowledge (C2), before other 'producers' (C3). From this 'principle' (the market) is 'derived' the need for the 'division of labour' and of 'fixing' 'ownership' (some are owners of money and others of labour),¹³⁶ because one cannot exchange without *different* products (fruit of the division of labour) and without product owners one cannot change owners (in which consists the exchange of goods: the purchase by which the product becomes mine; and the sale by which my product becomes theirs). Ethics is transformed into economy and, surreptitiously, into the ethic of the market:¹³⁷ into the ethical-mythical (and ontological) basis of the market. This is because ethics is what guarantees ownership and the obligation of fulfilling the responsibility

¹³⁴ Ibid., Book II, ch. 3; p. 310 (English: p. 364); p. 443.

¹³⁵ Ibid., Book I, ch. 2; p. 17; p. 119 (English: p. 18). The text continues: '[...] the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, [...] like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and [even against] the absurd prescriptions of the doctor' (Book II, ch. 3; English: p. 364). We see the utopia of the Enlightenment, which like Diderot exalts 'progress', the modern infinite optimism of indefinite growth, which will continue, and in which it is impossible to diagnose, ecological and social destruction of the earth and humanity. The utopia of a naturally harmonious market is based on this other utopia.

¹³⁶ Being 'possessor' of the work that can be sold is a metaphor, and taken seriously is an accessory and immoral metaphor: one cannot 'sell' the body that labours. In addition, s/he who has riches or poverty is as a 'second state of nature' for Smith, which J.-J. Rousseau will refute.

¹³⁷ In an ethics that is a 'condition of possibility' of existence itself and of the functioning of the market. If an actor (the disadvantaged) will not accept with discipline (ethically) the other's ownership of money and his/her own poverty, the allocation of the worse job in the division of labour, or if one does not fulfil the contract... the market could not *factually* exist.

of differentiated occupations. The neo-Stoic 'metaphors' will be taken as rational principles by the later scientific economy.¹³⁸

[162] It is not through an exclusive and later influence of Mandeville, but through the transformation of the type of relation (from *ethics* with sympathy to *economics* in the market), so now, not in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith can write:

Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence *only*.¹³⁹ He will be more likely to prevail¹⁴⁰ if he can interest their self-love¹⁴¹ in his favor, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them [. . .] We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.¹⁴²

He does not say that the origin of exchange is egoism, nor does he reject benevolence as moral sentiment or as motive of exchange. He indicates that in the relations of the market *in addition* to benevolence one has to manage self-love, the interest in the 'conservation of being' (as Spinoza would say), because this interest (not perverted) moves with greater force to those who exchange (and produce goods for exchange). I do not want to suggest that Smith avoids a metaphysical possessive individualism (he affirms it clearly), but he makes it sufficiently complex, and not as simplistic, deformed and apologetic, as Mandeville proposed,¹⁴³ or that the liberal or later neoliberal economy will state. From there comes the coherence within *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*:

As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct

¹³⁸ That the market is a harmonious system and tends to equilibrium is the fruit of the dogmatic transformation *from a metaphor*, to all not empirically seen (which I call with Ricœur, against Ricœur, 'ethical-mythical'), *is a (so-called) judgement of fact* accepted as a 'rational principle'. We have seen how this metaphor originated in the ethical work of Smith.

¹³⁹ He does not discard the passion of benevolence but leaves the exclusivity.

¹⁴⁰ It is not the exclusive cause but is the most 'secure'.

¹⁴¹ Not identical to 'egoism'.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 17; pp. 118–19.

¹⁴³ Neither was Mandeville as cynical as he is frequently presented, since he was opposed to a traditional ethic of the virtues of the society linked to the landowning oligarchic horizon (that because it was not yet valid was shown each time more as pure hypocrisy) and he intended to justify the emergence of a creative and influential minority properly mercantile. This new class needed a new ethic, which Mandeville sketches, but which he does not base adequately. Smith, from the industrial world that assumes mercantile interests and through the 'market' (as theoretical mediation) solves the Mandevillean dilemma: one can have 'self-love and self-interest' (not properly corruption), and through the division of labour of the market, production of national public wealth that benefits all, in the argument of Smith.

that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual *necessarily* labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to [consciously and explicitly] promote the public interest, *nor knows* how much he is promoting it [. . .]¹⁴⁴ He is in this, as in many other cases, led by an *invisible hand* to promote an end which *was no part of his intention*. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it *was no part of it*.¹⁴⁵ By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.¹⁴⁶

The owner of industrial capital does not have to worry about *not knowing* the *total* functioning of the market. That knowledge is *impossible* and unnecessary. The market functions with 'harmony' carried by providence as if an expert in watchmaking made a watch. He who checks the time trusts the watchmaker. One does not have to worry. One has to do with a responsible moral conscience what one has to do as responsibility (and what the 'impartial spectator' within the breast suggests or recriminates), in the field where one can have knowledge (such as the division of labour, fulfilment due to innovative action, respect of property and contract, etc.). The rest functions 'automatically'. But Smith, equally (and this interests us in this *Politics of Liberation*), installs a politics in a way much more architectonized than in the cases of Hobbes, Locke or Hume. For Smith, *political economy* is an *economy* of neo-Stoic optimism of the market, when he affirms (a belief, in the Humean sense) that it produces as result a harmonic equilibrium, but it is equally an *economic* politics (a theory about the economic aspect of *politics*), and in this case what *is not known* (*because it overcomes the limits of knowing and intending it is impossible*) is the political actor, leader, state. It is not the economic actor as owner of capital; it is the sovereign and her/his representatives:

The statesman, who *should attempt to direct* private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume *an authority* which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person,¹⁴⁷ but to no council or senate¹⁴⁸ whatever, and which would no-where be *so dangerous* as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.¹⁴⁹

A theory about the limits of the knowledge of complex objects, like the market, produces very clear political effects. The liberty of the citizen does

144 It is an unintentional directing.

145 For him, it is not a 'corruption' as Mandeville accepts provocatively (who in reality has a conception of corruption that could be accepted in a critical position).

146 *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, ch. 2; p. 402 [English: pp. 477-8].

147 In the case of the Hobbesian monarchy.

148 Including British parliamentarianism.

149 *Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, ch. 2 (English: p. 478).

not have to be limited by the irresponsible unnecessary intervention of the leader, who moves further from his/her cognitive capacities and by this from his/her rights (and responsibilities) as leader:

Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice,¹⁵⁰ is left *perfectly free* to pursue his own interest [. . .] The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty [. . .] for the proper performance of which *no human wisdom or knowledge* could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society.¹⁵¹

One can observe clearly that Smith proposes a *critique of economic reason* (with respect to knowing *the limits* of economic knowledge in the face of the complexity of the market-object), from which one 'derives' a *critique of political reason*, with respect to fixing limits in its exercise, knowing that if it goes beyond said limits it is transformed into a foolish, irrational, strategically *impossible* action. The principle of *impossibility* fixes a 'frame' (as Rosa Luxemburg would say) to strategic action and political institutions. It is a question of a fundamental material principle: the political has to stay in total autonomy to the harmonious logic of the market. The economy is independent thus from politics. One does not have to 'put a hand in' where the 'invisible hand' has its kingdom. What is clear is that, in all ways, Smith settles it so politics (the state) intervenes *indirectly* in the structures of the market. Books IV (about the intervention of the state in the politics of customs: of imports, exports, colonies, etc.) and V (of the costs of the republic, such as that accrued for the organization of the government, military defence, the apparatus of justice, public works, etc., and their corresponding types of collection or taxes, including the problem of public debt) of *An Inquiry into the Nature . . .* shape a complete treatise about the economic aspect of *politics*, much more detailed than that of other European philosophers of his era (similar to the work of Huang Tsung-hsi, who had treated these themes within the problematic in China a century before).¹⁵²

[163] This state not only protects property, but now also assures the conditions that make possible the promotion and growth of national wealth. It is a state at the service of the bourgeoisie. We observe thus the classic conception of the European modern bourgeois state, in the moment of the beginning of *mature Modernity*, which with the modifications that the growing planetary circumstances introduce will be valid until the twenty-first century. This state, at the same time and in a hidden manner, has always an authoritarian conception of power (to make parliamentarianism governable), which one sees in the following text:

¹⁵⁰ Remember the 'principle of justice' of Hume.

¹⁵¹ *Wealth of Nations*, vol. 2, Book IV, ch. 9; p. 612 (English: p. 208).

¹⁵² See section [76].

Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by *the principal people* of the country,¹⁵³ is endangered by *popular discontent*; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed [. . .] To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by *the natural aristocracy* of the country, but by *a well-regulated standing army*, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrance's can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them.¹⁵⁴

That the state is armed still does not address Machiavelli's warnings in the face of the disaster of Savonarola. It is a systematic use of the army not only against external enemies, but also against 'popular discontent' as internal enemy. From this political horizon one has to read the economic theory of Smith that explains some fundamental intuitions that will not lose validity even now within the tradition of the classical and neoliberal economy.

The process of founding in Smith passes from the more abstract to the more concrete. It starts (a) from the 'principle' of the tendency toward 'the natural progress of things to their bettering'. One derives (b) the principle of the 'tendency to exchange' or the impossibility of not organizing the institution of the *market*. From that one passes (c) to the necessity 'of the division of labour'. Finally, (d) one reaches work itself, an activity driven to the fulfilment of human necessities ordered to the reproduction of life. We see now the third moment in the order of foundation:

The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the *division of labour*.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ The popular majorities are worth less politically than the 'principal sectors of the country' who necessarily have to be the owners.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, Book V, ch. 1, part 1; p. 627 (English: p. 229).

¹⁵⁵ *Wealth of Nations*, vol. 1, Book I, ch. 1; p. 7; p. 110 (English: p. 7). Smith could be taking inspiration from *The Fable of the Bees* of Mandeville, in the 'Sixth Dialogue' (Mandeville, 1997, pp. 582f. [Translation: Kaye, pp. 266–357]), where the central thesis is that 'by dexterous management turn private vices [can be converted] into publick benefits' (p. 583 [Translation: Kaye, p. 319]). He criticizes Smith's teacher Hutcheson (p. 603 [Translation: Kaye, pp. 345–6]), but states a Smithean thesis: 'The Wisdom I speak of, is not the Offspring of a fine Understanding, or intense Thinking, but of sound and deliberate Judgment, acquired from a long Experience in Business, and a Multiplicity of Observations' (p. 585 [Translation: Kaye, p. 322]). It is the *unintentional* from which Smith will benefit. On the other hand, Mandeville suggests the theme that I will treat immediately: 'the Order, [O]economy, and the very Existence of the Civil Society [. . .] is entirely built upon the Variety of our Wants [. . .] To expect, that others should serve us for nothing, is unreasonable; therefore all Commerce that Men can have together, must be a continual bartering of one thing for another [. . .] Money obviates and takes away all those Difficulties by being an acceptable Reward for all the Services Men can do to one another' (pp. 605–6 [Translation: Kaye, p. 349]). Mandeville, like Marx, has inverted the order of the foundation.

Smith tells us that 'this division of labour [. . .] is not originally the effect of any human wisdom',¹⁵⁶ but derives from the market as tendency to exchange, and is raised in the face of the extension of the market¹⁵⁷ and the existence of money.¹⁵⁸ To speak of the 'price' of the commodity, for the first time, touches on the work and the effect of ownership and the division of labour, with respect to the greater or lesser possession of goods:

Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries [. . .] of human life. [. . .] He must be rich or poor according to the quantity of labour which he can command [. . .] The value of any commodity, therefore, [. . .] is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command [. . .].¹⁵⁹ Labor, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities.¹⁶⁰

He applies now to the political economy the classic categories of the 'state of nature' and the 'civil state', but modifying them and applying them to the new epistemic environment:

In that *early and rude state* of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land [. . .],¹⁶¹ in this state of things, the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer [. . .] As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons,¹⁶² some of them will naturally employ it in setting to work¹⁶³ industrious people.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁶ *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 2; p. 16; p. 117 (English: p. 17).

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 4. We see that he synthesizes all that reached by Locke and Hume.

¹⁵⁹ Following Aristotle he will write: 'The word *value*, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called "value in use;" the other, "value in exchange"' (*ibid.*, ch. 4; p. 30; p. 131 [English: p. 32]). This classic distinction will be studied by D. Ricardo, adding a proper development of the possibility of contemplating the Industrial Revolution in its splendour, principally in section 4 of chapter 1 of *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817): '[The] principle [. . .] that the exchangeable value of the commodities produced would be in proportion to the labour bestowed on their production' (Ricardo, 1959, pp. 18f.; [English: 1977, pp. 18f.]). Marx will stand out for his greater precision in the theoretical level of the critique of these concepts, showing the contradictions of this important school in relation to 'value-value'.

¹⁶⁰ *Wealth of Nations*, ch. 5; p. 31; p. 133 (English: p. 34). He says: 'Labor alone never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared' (Ricardo, 1959, pp. 10-11; pp. 139-40).

¹⁶¹ It is an economic 'state of nature'. The formula is repeated at the beginning of ch. 8: 'In that original state'.

¹⁶² This fact that has to be 'explained' in political economy is taken as a 'second' *state of nature*. It is a quasi-natural 'fact'. Critical thinking will show how 'it is not a fact' but the result of a 'historical' process that one has to *explain* scientifically. In this subtle difference between 'fact' or 'historical result' is the whole question of the economy.

¹⁶³ It is not the 'worker' who *gives* the work, but the capitalist who buys it (but never gives it, because buys it from the other). In German the one who 'gives the work' (*Arbeitgeber*) is the business person. The sense of the question has been inverted completely.

¹⁶⁴ *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 6; p. 47; pp. 150-1 (English: pp. 53-4).

[164] One buys the labour and pays the worker a salary of what remains from a double subtraction: one 'takes away' from the total value produced in the commodity, first, the 'rent' of the owner of the land, and the 'profit' of the owner of capital.¹⁶⁵ For Smith, the total of the 'natural price' of the commodity is equal to the salary + rent + profit.¹⁶⁶

For Smith, the order of the foundation comes from the tendency to progress and from the market to the division of labour and from this to the fulfilment of necessity through the sale of commodities differentiated by that division of labour. The humanity of the worker does not count. He does not start from the fact that if the division of labour depends on the demands of the diverse moments of the process of production, the products that are transformed into commodities first have to satisfy the necessities of the producer. The theme of 'necessities' is practically invisible.¹⁶⁷ In the treatment of salary, the subsistence of the worker is indicated as a limit that 'must at least be sufficient to maintain him'.¹⁶⁸ It becomes a question of the 'lowest [salary] which is consistent with common humanity',¹⁶⁹ because if the worker cannot reproduce her/his life, s/he dies. Smith speaks to us also of poverty, since it is not suitable for the reproduction of the new generations:

The tender plant is produced, but in so cold a soil, and so several a climate, soon withers and dies. It is not uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has borne twenty children not to have two alive [. . .] In some places one half the children born die before they are four years of age [. . .] This great mortality, however, will everywhere be found chiefly among the children of the common people [. . .] In foundling hospitals, and among the children brought up by parish charities, the mortality is still greater than among those of the common people.¹⁷⁰

Smith continues with a description that, if it were not the effect of the rising capitalism in eighteenth-century Great Britain, we would say was a macabre story. Shouldn't this massive *negative effect* put into question the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 64; p. 168 (English: p. 57).

¹⁶⁶ 'The natural price [. . . is] wages, profit, and rent' (ibid., ch. 7; p. 61; pp. 165–6 [English: p. 63]). Karl Marx will analyse in very diverse ways these fallacies that reside at the base of all bourgeois political economy (from Smith to Ricardo, Malthus, Marshal, Jevons, Keynes . . . to Milton Friedman or Hayek). See my works (Dussel, 1985a, 1988 and 1990), in which in numerous sections we refer fully to all those aspects of Smith's work.

¹⁶⁷ It appears indirectly in the question of salary that one would have to pay as much as is necessary to reproduce the life of the worker. 'The subsistence of the worker, or the real price of work [. . .] changes according to the circumstances' (*Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 5; p. 36; p. 138 [English: p. 40]). Marx will show that the 'price of labour' is an empty concept, because labour does not have value, being 'the creative source of all value' (Dussel, 1990, ch. 9 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁶⁸ *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, ch. 8; p. 67; p. 171 (English: p. 76).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. (English: p. 77).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 77; p. 181 (English: pp. 88–9).

neo-Stoic optimism of Smith, of the 'uniform and harmonious movement of the system'?¹⁷¹ Smith has a particular blindness for the *negative* effects of capitalism. The political task of the civil state could never solve these non-harmonious 'effects' because they overcome the possibility of finite human knowledge. Smith has to call on morality because then he can exhort one to endure in 'this life' the negative effects, as Kant will later explain in the same way:

That there is a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, where every man will be ranked with those who, in the moral and intellectual qualities are really his equals; where the owner of those humble talents and virtues which, from being depressed by fortune had, in this life, no opportunity of displaying themselves [. . .] will be placed upon a level, and sometimes above those who, in this world, had enjoyed the highest reputation.¹⁷²

As in the case of Locke and Kant, it is a 'theology of resignation' for the poor, in whom it is instilled that the rich possess the earth but they will be better off because they will achieve . . . heaven.

The Continental Bourgeois Revolution in France. A Modern Deconstruction of Modernity: Jean-Jacques Rousseau

[165] France, four times more populous than Great Britain in the sixteenth century, and with four times as much territory, had a social composition with a greater rural component. The Industrial Revolution did not have equal proportional weight as in Great Britain. The industrial owning bourgeoisie would never realize a revolution clearly in their favour. 'Bonapartism' indicates the ambiguity of a historical bloc in which the bourgeoisie have to share power with classes or sections of the pre-bourgeois or anti-bourgeois class. The rural sector (landowners and small free peasantry), inheritance of the more developed feudalism in Europe, has greater weight, the same as the nobility. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) comes from the

¹⁷¹ With respect to slavery, and with Locke, Smith has the audacity to say: 'Though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave [. . .] That destined for performing the same office with regard to the free man, is managed by the free man himself [from the depth of subsistence]. The disorders which generally prevail in the œconomy of the rich [slaveowner], naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former [slave]: The *strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor* as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter [free man]' (ibid., pp. 78-9; pp. 183-4 [English: p. 90]). The cynicism here is to speak of 'frugality' as an expression that signifies the misery of the eighteenth-century English worker, which shows us the prison that constitutes the 'bourgeois horizon' of the interpretation of reality. These were the *moral* reasons given to justify the liberation of the slaves: they are too expensive. These were the reasons taken into account and not those of Bartolomé de Las Casas in the sixteenth century or of John Wesley in the eighteenth.

¹⁷² Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, III, ch. 2; pp. 253-4 (English: p. 132).

Scythians, Germans, Spartans and 'Rome, in those times of its poverty and unenlightenment',¹⁷⁹ for being decided, strong, virtuous people.¹⁸⁰ He takes as example Socrates who makes a eulogy to ignorance against the Sophists. He puts in the mouth of the teacher of Plato the critique of rationalist pride: "None of us – neither the sophists, poets, orators, artists, nor I – know what is truth, goodness, and beauty".¹⁸¹ The sciences are fiction and originate in vices (Rousseau also read Mandeville):

Astronomy was born from superstition; eloquence from ambition, hatred, flattery, and falsehood; geometry from avarice; physics from vain curiosity; all of them, even moral philosophy, stem from human pride. Thus the sciences and arts owe their birth to our vices.¹⁸²

'Luxury rarely appears without the sciences and arts.'¹⁸³ And anticipating and exalting the strong and warrior virtues of Nietzsche, he explains that 'the monarchy of Cyrus was conquered by thirty thousand men, led by a prince poorer than the lowest Persian Satrap, and the Scythians, the most destitute of all nations, were able to resist the most powerful monarchs of the universe.'¹⁸⁴ It is a glorification of simplicity, of poverty (of the Franks and Saxons, who liberated the Gauls and England from the Romans). With the comforts 'military virtues fade'.¹⁸⁵ 'We have physicists, geometers, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians, painters; we no longer have citizens.'¹⁸⁶ In its irony, certainly ambiguous, but still anticipatory of many *negative* effects of Modernity, he launches a prayer to God from his childhood:

Almighty God, you who hold all souls in your hands, deliver us from the *enlightenment* and deadly arts of our forefathers,¹⁸⁷ give us back ignorance, innocence and poverty, [because] the advancement of the sciences

¹⁷⁹ *Discourse*, I, p. 208 (Translation: Dunn, p. 52).

¹⁸⁰ There is a certain Nietzschean foretaste in his position.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, *Discourse*, I, p. 210 (Translation: Dunn, p. 54): 'Socrate, faisant l'éloge de l'ignorance!' 'Socrates extolling ignorance!' (*ibid.*, p. 211 [Translation: Dunn, p. 54]). The Socrates of Nietzsche is a rationalist and that of Rousseau an anti-rationalist.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, II, 214 (Translation: Dunn, p. 56). The text is similar to that of Tatian (*Discourse against the Greeks*, 170 CE) when he writes: 'From the Babylonians [they took] astronomy, from the Persians magic, geometry from the Egyptians, the knowledge of the alphabet from the Phoenicians [. . .]' (see the texts in Dussel, 1998a [20], and [33] [Translation: TC]). Rousseau seems to self-interpret as an early Christian, of the time of the gospel (not of the later bureaucratic Church), in the face of the corruption of the Roman Empire or of the Europe that needs a revolution (that of 1789, in which certainly Rousseau did not pass through very well, although he anticipated it with his deconstructive works).

¹⁸³ *Discourse*, II, p. 216 (Translation: Dunn, p. 58).

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217 (Translation: Dunn, p. 58).

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 220 (Translation: Dunn, p. 60). 'The defeated princes and nobles of Italy took far greater enjoyment in pursuing the subtleties of knowledge than in practicing the martial arts' (*ibid.*).

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 223 (Translation: Dunn, p. 63).

¹⁸⁷ In clear allusion to the Enlightenment.

and the arts has contributed nothing to our true happiness, [. . .] it has corrupted morality.¹⁸⁸

[166] Starting from the fundamental theses themselves, five years later he published *Discourse on 'the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind'*.¹⁸⁹ Now he passed clearly to the political level, and met with Hobbes, Locke and Hume (he lived in Hume's house in Great Britain, but it ended on bad terms as with Diderot). We will begin where we left our reflections at the end of Smith's exposition.¹⁹⁰ For the Scottish ethicist–economist, poverty is an insignificant *negative* effect. For Rousseau it is practically the starting point.

Our thinking will not treat 'the natural or physical inequality', evident and without necessity of greater explication, but the 'moral or political' inequality, which for Locke or Smith are moments of a second 'state of nature' (when there is property, money and *stock* accumulation), 'starting point', 'facts' of experience.¹⁹¹ For Rousseau (as for Marx or the politics of liberation) they are a problematic object, *effect* of the historical processes. Rousseau, due to the influence of all his generation (maybe of the 1748 work of Montesquieu), does not define as 'natural facts' what is a 'historical' moment: inequality 'consists in the different privileges, which some men enjoy, to the prejudice of others, such as that of being richer, more honoured, more powerful, and even that of exacting obedience from them'.¹⁹²

The English philosophers soar to a 'state of nature', where they speak of 'oppression, desires, and pride [without noting that they] have transferred to the state of nature the ideas picked up from the bosom of [actual, civil] society'.¹⁹³ By this, 'Hobbes would have it that man is naturally void of fear, and intent only upon attacking and fighting',¹⁹⁴ since in the beginning one had to be timid and shy of savage beasts, in between the great continuous dangers. But thanks to organization and weapons they quickly became secure, as we see within 'the Caribs of Venezuela'.¹⁹⁵ Their enemies were illnesses. 'Savage man' (*l'homme sauvage*) thanks to his intelligence and passions in the slow production of language (that marvellous institu-

188 *Discourse*, II, p. 226 (Translation: Dunn, p. 65). 'A Bacon, a Descartes and a Newton, those tutors of humanity, had none themselves' (p. 227 [Translation: Dunn, p. 66]).

189 *Ibid.*, 233–66 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 69–148).

190 See section [164].

191 *Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind*, p. 252 (Translation: Dunn, p. 87).

192 *Ibid.*

193 *Ibid.*, p. 253 (Translation: Dunn, p. 88). The 'state of nature' is the result of subtracting qualities from the 'civil state', but what happens is that the procedure is absurd. In *Thesis* 17.1–3 of Dussel, 1998a (pp. 625f.), in the origin of the human species there was not libido, liberty, language or self-consciousness initially because instinct still has not left a place for 'institutions', culture, ethical and political demands.

194 *Ibid.*, I, 258 (Translation: Dunn, p. 91).

195 *Ibid.*, 259 (Translation: Dunn, p. 92).

tion),¹⁹⁶ made enormous progress. But we cannot '[conclude] with Hobbes, that man, as having no idea of goodness, must be naturally bad; that he is vicious because he does not know what virtue is; [. . .] Hobbes [. . .] should say that the state of nature, being that in which the care of our own preservation interferences least with the preservation of others, was consequently the most favourable to peace, and the most suitable to mankind',¹⁹⁷ because 'it is neither the development of the understanding, nor the curb of the law, but the calmness of their passions and their ignorance of vice that hinder them from doing ill.'¹⁹⁸ In fact, the commiseration must be so much the more energetic, the more intimately the *animal, which beholds* any kind of distress,¹⁹⁹ identifies himself with the animal labouring under it. Now it is evident that this identification must have been infinitely more perfect in the state of nature, than in the state of reason.²⁰⁰ Arguing and giving numerous examples, Rousseau intends to prove that 'savage man' has a moral simplicity more profound than the depraved civilized or 'civil man' from the Egyptians and Greeks to Modernity.

'Man's first [. . .] care [is] that of preserving it [his existence].'²⁰¹ The earth handed over the goods for the 'assistance he required',²⁰² instinct prompted him to make use of them. Hunger and other appetites made him at different times experience difference modes of existence²⁰³ and slowly are developed customs and the arts, improving one's language, becoming sedentary, but 'according to the axiom of the wise Locke, where there is no property, there can be no injury',²⁰⁴ but certainly there were moral institutions before this, since there were customs, traditions and punishments. 'It is iron and corn,²⁰⁵ which have civilized men, and ruined mankind.'²⁰⁶ Once the human being developed, and had property, one could speak of 'self-interested love':

Competition and rivalry on the one hand, and an opposition of interests on the other, and always a secret desire of profiting at the expense of

196 Rousseau's description about the origin of language as historical process is famous (*ibid.*, 270f. [Translation: Dunn, pp. 101f.]).

197 *Ibid.*, 279 (Translation: Dunn, p. 105).

198 *Ibid.*, 280 (Translation: Dunn, p. 106).

199 Is it Smith's theme in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*?

200 *Discourse*, 282 (Translation: Dunn, p. 107).

201 *Ibid.*, II, p. 293 (Translation: Dunn, p. 114).

202 Rousseau begins with the 'subject' of 'necessities' (ethical-anthropological vision), meanwhile Smith starts from the 'market' (and from 'capital'), from where is derived the 'division of labour' in view of 'rent', 'profit' and 'salary' mediating 'money' (bourgeois-economic vision).

203 *Ibid.*

204 *Ibid.*, p. 300 (Translation: Dunn, p. 119).

205 The inevitable Eurocentrism, not noting that the farming of rice avoids using draught animals, does not need the plough and has various harvests per year, being more productive as China and Hindustan discovered.

206 *Discourse*, p. 302 (Translation: Dunn, p. 120). All this has had greater influence, for Rousseau than mere ownership. He shows how agriculture had to be previous to private property because one had to have possession of *something* common to be able to divide it to the exclusion of outsiders (p. 304 [Translation: Dunn, p. 122]).

others. Such were the *first effects* of property, and the inseparable attendants of nascent inequality.²⁰⁷

The political philosophy of Rousseau, different from the Anglo-Saxon thinkers studied, becomes a critique of capitalism, although ambiguous (because he turns to the past), from the valid order of mature Modernity. The 'state of war' of Hobbes (as nature) or of Locke (as a 'third' state) is made permanent:

The new state of society became the most horrible *state of war*: Mankind thus debased and harassed, and no longer able to retrace its steps, or renounce the fatal acquisitions it had made,²⁰⁸ [. . .] The rich in particular must have soon perceived how much they suffered by a perpetual war [. . .] Destitute of valid reasons to justify, and sufficient forces to defend himself; [. . .] 'Let us unite,' said he, 'to secure the weak from oppression [. . .] and secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him: Let us form rules of justice and of peace [. . .] by submitting alike the powerful and the weak to the observance of mutual duties.'²⁰⁹

[167] For Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke and Hume 'invented specious arguments to bring them over to his purpose',²¹⁰ and 'the soberest judged it requisite to sacrifice one part of their liberty to insure the rest':

Such was, or must have been the origin of society and of law, which gave new fetters to the weak and new power to the rich; irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, fixed forever the laws of property and inequality; changed an artful usurpation into an irrevocable right; [. . .] subjected the rest of mankind to perpetual labour, servitude, and misery.²¹¹

These strong words from Rousseau seemed foolish to many in his era, but now sound like an *objective* diagnosis of the poverty of the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Our critic inverts the argument of the classics of liberalism. Even the 'right of conquest', proposed by Locke, is not a right but establishes 'the conquerer and the conquered ever remaining with respect to each other in a *state of war*'.²¹² There is an absolute limit to the institutions, even of those organized to dominate the poor, the weak: 'the right of property being of mere human convention and institution, every man may dispose as he pleases of what he possesses: but the

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 307 (Translation: Dunn, p. 123).

²⁰⁸ Similar to the critique of M. Horkheimer of the Enlightenment (Dussel, 1998a, [236]).

²⁰⁹ Rousseau, *Social Contract*, pp. 308–9 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 123–5).

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 309 (Translation: Dunn, p. 125).

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 310 (Translation: Dunn, p. 125).

²¹² Ibid., p. 312 (Translation: Dunn, p. 126).

case is otherwise with regard to the essential gifts of nature, such as life and liberty.²¹³

As all human institutions, all contracts are revocable.²¹⁴ This is necessary to make clear because inequality being progressive, it is necessary in each era to struggle against it specifically:

By pursuing the *progress of inequality* in these different revolutions, we shall discover that the establishment of laws and of the right of property was the first term of it; the institution of magistrates the second; and the third and last the changing of legal into arbitrary power; [. . .] until new revolutions entirely dissolve the government, or bring it back nearer to its legal constitution.²¹⁵

Quickly the method of Rousseau's critical political philosophy begins to be clarified. The historical systems, as institutional totalities, 'fix' degrees, each time more developed, of 'inequalities', that having been the fruit of a past 'revolution', mature diachronically until with an inevitable institutional entropy a new 'revolution' will be necessary. What horrifies Rousseau, and later Freud and Foucault for different reasons, is the 'disciplinary' or 'repressive' part of institutionalization. We will treat the theme in the second *level (B)* of a future political architectonic, not yet situated in the level of strategic action but with the *inevitable* institutional frames (although misleading) of political life.

It will be necessary to define clearly the categorical components of this *logic* with the precision that can be reached in an architectonic of the *Politics of Liberation*. Rousseau is one of the philosophers, who show us the path we are looking for. 'Those vices, which render social institutions necessary, are the same which render the abuse of such institutions *unavoidable*', to which an *undetermined* actor, *not institutionalized*, is opposed *in the beginning* and without inequality still – is what we will call the *potentia*.²¹⁶ The progressive growth of inequality (in the 'progress' conceived by Modernity) is the growth of possible oppression:

Savage man [. . .] sighs for nothing but repose and liberty [. . .] Civilized man, on the other hand, is always in motion, perpetually sweating and toiling, and racking his brains to find out occupations still more laborious: he continues a drudge to his last minute, [. . .] or renounces life to acquire immortality. He [is] proud of his slavery [. . .] What a spectacle must the painful and envied labors of a European minister of state form in the eyes of a[n indigenous] Caribbean!²¹⁷

²¹³ Ibid., p. 318 (Translation: Dunn, p. 130).

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 320 (Translation: Dunn, p. 133).

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 323 (Translation: Dunn, p. 133).

²¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 329–30 (Translation: Dunn, p. 137).

[168] Seven years later Rousseau published *On the Social Contract or Principles of the Political Right*.²¹⁸ It is a question of applying all that has been gained to an architectonic vision of the problematic of political philosophy that continues along the same path as before. Our author seems to find a dilemma. Having criticized the institutions or the civil state to its *impossibility*, if he does not want to produce intolerable *negative* effects, how could he now make reference to the institutions or the civil state to base his *possibility*? The great critic remains halfway there, although we will tackle this path decidedly in the critical part of this *Politics of Liberation*. The way he intends to overcome the dilemma will be the central thread of our re-reading of that known text. From the beginning the dilemma is planted:

Man is born free, and yet we see him everywhere in chains²¹⁹ [. . .] [a] as long as a people is compelled to obey, and does obey, it does well; [b] but, that, as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and does shake it off, it does even better: for, if men recover their freedom by virtue of the same right by which it was taken away, either they are justified in taking it back, or there was no justification for depriving them of it.²²⁰

Conservative political philosophy cannot justify the established order that the citizen can put in question (as Hobbes, Kant or Kelsen later). Rousseau is clear about this possibility. If the social pact (*pacte social*) is realized through the 'conservation' of life and if society does not fulfil that end, the citizen can rescind it:

[a] The *social order* is a sacred right which serves as a *foundation* for all the others. [b] this right, however, does not come from nature. It is therefore based on conventions.²²¹

Rousseau does not explain the discourse of *critical* political philosophy taking into consideration these two aspects explicitly indicated.²²² He would have to analyse [a] first, the 'social order' that 'one has to obey', the (ontological) base or foundation of all the rest. But [b] second, as the order 'does not come from nature' or one can throw it off as a 'yoke', he would have to analyse the conditions of the transformation (the 'throwing off of the yoke'). He does not reach the significance hoped for in Book I.

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 49–197 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 149–254).

²¹⁹ This is still the dilemma: how to respect one's liberty and nevertheless create *necessary* institutions that make one lose that liberty?

²²⁰ Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book I, ch. 1; p. 50 (Translation: Dunn, p. 156).

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² In a *Politics of Liberation* those two moments will have to be the theme of the *First Part* [a] ('The political ontological order') and of the *Second part* [b] ('Deconstruction and liberation').

He tries first to found the 'valid order', which he will put into question when possible but from the past (from the savage nature of humanity).²²³

Grotius, Hobbes and Aristotle before are mistaken in thinking that humankind was directed always by 'masters' over slaves or over herds of beasts.²²⁴ The exercise of pure force does not have long-term continuity, and for it to be able to be fact 'transform[s] power into right, and obedience into duty'.²²⁵ Against Locke, explicitly, he demonstrates that there is no right to have slaves,²²⁶ nor 'right of conquest'.²²⁷ In the beginning there are not solitary individuals; there are 'aggregations' or spontaneous communities. To understand the birth of 'an association, [. . .] public property [. . . or] body politic',²²⁸ he refers back to a 'first convention', by which 'a people [. . . is] a people [. . .], the real *foundation* of society'.²²⁹ It is obvious that, for Rousseau as for Suárez, while the 'pacts' 'perhaps never been formally enunciated, are everywhere the same, everywhere *tacitly* accepted and recognized, until, the social pact being violated, each man returns to his original rights and takes back his natural liberty'.²³⁰

Rousseau formulates the problem correctly when he says that 'men reaching a point when the impediments that endangered their survival in the state of nature prevailed by their resistance over the forces each individual could use to survive in that state'.²³¹ Even the central formula of his politics is stated correctly:

Find a *form of association* that may defend and protect with the whole force [of society]²³² the person and the property²³³ of every associate, and by which each, joining together with all, *may obey only himself, and remain as free as before*.²³⁴

223 There are two possible critiques. From the beginning, the 'time of innocence' or paradise (Rousseau), or from the future, the fruit of historical transformation (Marx). A politics of liberation will assume this second position.

224 *Social Contract*, ch. 2.

225 *Ibid.*, ch. 3; p. 53 (Translation: Dunn, p. 158).

226 Rousseau critiques Locke's and Grotius' theories about slavery. No one can be surrendered as slave, nor can anyone arrogate the right to have slaves. In addition, 'this supposed right of slaying the vanquished in no way results from the state of war' (*ibid.*, ch. 4, p. 56 [Translation: Dunn, p. 60]).

227 'With regard to the right of conquest, it has no other foundation than the law of the strongest' (*ibid.*, p. 58 [Translation: Dunn, p. 161]).

228 *Ibid.*, ch. 5, p. 59 (Translation: Dunn, p. 162).

229 *Ibid.*, p. 60 (Translation: Dunn, p. 162). I would like to give the 'foundation' all its ontological sense, as we will see in the architectonic part of a *Politics of Liberation*.

230 *Ibid.*, ch. 6; p. 61 (Translation: Dunn, p. 163).

231 *Ibid.*, p. 60 (Translation: Dunn, p. 163).

232 The 'modern' in his proposal.

233 He is careful to say 'property', since even the poor have goods, although few.

234 *Social Contract*, p. 61 (Translation: Dunn, p. 163). Rousseau calls this liberty not 'natural liberty', but 'conventional liberty' (*ibid.*). So in the pact the citizen is free, 'not as before' (in the natural state), but 'in another way'. Rousseau loses his precision sometimes.

The following act demands 'the total alienation of each associate, and all his rights, to the whole community [. . .] The alienation being made without any reserve'.²³⁵ Here Rousseau was carried by the formulas in vogue. In reality, there is no need for a 'total alienation', and even less of 'all their rights', and the solution contributed by the category of a 'political-discursive community'²³⁶ formulates much better what Rousseau intends (but cannot make explicit). This shows us the ambiguity into which he falls, because it hinders the path to a possible future critique. With 'total' alienation there is no possible recuperation; and if the alienation is not total one has to indicate the conditions (as Suárez, among others formulated). Again, a certain imprecision appears in the following proposal:

Each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the *general will* (*volonté générale*); and as one body we all receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.²³⁷

It is not Hobbes, nor it is Locke; it is a *material* aspect (as *Will*) of politics that we hope to be able to work in the architectonic part with some precision. In a few lines he explains to us the categories he proposes to analyse:

This *act of association* produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives from this same act its unity, its common *self*, its life, and its will. This public person [. . .] used to be called a 'city', and is now called 'republic' or 'body politic.' When it is passive, it is called by its members 'State' and, 'sovereign' when it is active, 'power' When it is compared to similar bodies. With regard to the associates, they take collectively the name of 'people', and are called individually 'citizens', inasmuch as they are subjected to the laws of the State.²³⁸

This is a true panorama complete with fundamental categories of political philosophy, which we cannot explain here in detail, but which we will use in

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ We will treat the question in the future architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*. In the 'political-discursive community' the members are always free as possible participants, and remain always free (do not surrender any right) as a possible minority, as judges of the process (in future decisions, for example, in the election of representatives), and even in the right of repealing or modifying the laws or decisions of the executive, and to effect a rebellion or revolution. We will call this situation the 'state of rebellion' (far from the 'state of exception') in Chapter 11.

²³⁷ The mistake is that, with respect to Rousseau's critical discourse itself, no one can put their person in common, as in the case of the 'sacred prostitution' of the young girls offered to the gods. The person is the last resort, can fulfil public functions, but is not a 'setting in common'. The 'general will' itself either is formulated discursively or is transformed into a totalizing and infallible fetish ('it cannot err'). Here Rousseau indicates aspects of material importance ambiguously.

²³⁸ *Social Contract*, p. 62 (Translation: Dunn, p. 164).

our architectonic part. We will examine some central texts to show the sense and critical limitations of Rousseau.

[169] One good formulation of Rousseau was the 'general Will' because a consensus that is institutionalized in a pact is situated in the level of practical, discursive intelligence. However, to speak of 'will' is to refer to a material level, to power and to political motivations. For Rousseau the 'general Will' has to be considered diachronically. In its fullness, and reflecting its definition, 'the more that harmony reigns in the assemblies, that is, the more the voting approaches unanimity, the more also is the general will predominant'.²³⁹

As long as a certain number of men consider themselves to be a single body, they have but one will, which relates to the common security and to the general welfare. In such a case the forces of the State are vigorous and simple, and its principles are clear and luminous; it has no confused and conflicting interests; the common good is everywhere plainly clear [. . .] Peace, union, and equality are foes to political subtleties. [. . .] A State thus governed needs very few laws.²⁴⁰

Here Rousseau almost reaches the moment in which the community, as power in itself, still undetermined, is not the institutionalized power. On the other hand, he describes at the same time the classic eras, when 'the State is established consent lies in residence; to dwell in the territory is to submit to the sovereignty'.²⁴¹

Meanwhile, when 'the State is weakened, when private interests begin to make themselves felt [. . .], unanimity no longer reigns in the voting; the general will is no longer the will of all [. . .] Finally, when a state is on the verge of ruin.'²⁴² Rousseau asks: 'Does it follow from this that the general will is destroyed or corrupted?'²⁴³ To which he responds unexpectedly: 'No: it is always constant, unalterable, and pure.'²⁴⁴ This response does not address the question of undifferentiated original power, because in this case the general Will would have to be transformed into a counter-factual ideal, into power in itself without a possible internal fissure.

²³⁹ Ibid., IV, ch. 2; p. 151 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 228–9). We will call this undetermined moment of the political community as power in itself *potentia* (difference from *potestas*, the determined, institutionalized power).

²⁴⁰ Ibid., ch. 1; p. 148 (Translation: Dunn, p. 227). Further on he proposes to us another description with some similar determinations: 'If the State or polity is but a moral person, the life of which consists in the union of its members [. . .], it needs a *universal and coercive force* to move and organize every part in the manner most appropriate for the whole' (ibid., II, ch. 4; p. 74 [Translation: Dunn, p. 173]). That 'force' is the 'general will', which J. Derrida will try to describe in *Politics of Friendship* (Derrida, 1994).

²⁴¹ *Social Contract*, IV, ch. 2; p. 252 (Translation: Dunn, p. 229).

²⁴² Ibid., ch. 1; pp. 149–50 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 227–8).

²⁴³ Ibid. (Translation: Dunn, p. 228).

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

Diachronically, the general Will could lose its way. This is when the general Will enters into crisis and another type of 'unanimity [. . . when] the citizens, fallen into slavery, have no longer either liberty or will appears'.²⁴⁵ It is the fundamental corruption.

For Rousseau, the social pact founds the general Will; or, inversely, the general Will appears empirically as the original social pact.

I would say, the general Will is the concordance of the particular wills when they are united effectively around a political cause that constitutes them as a political entity, as an agent with an empirically verifiable moral personality (the *potentia*). This will when sovereign 'is inalienable, it is indivisible'.²⁴⁶ This general Will is power as the ontological basis, which moves effectively to the social order to work communitarianly toward an end or a common good.²⁴⁷ The particularity is subsumed (not negated) in what is universal to the community. Nevertheless, the Will could enter into crisis not by dissolving in the particularity, but in affirming fetishistically as Totality without Alterity, as the Nation over 'inferior' nations, as the Metropolis over 'colonies', as the *potestas* over the *potentia*. He will have to explain in what sense we would be able to state that it has a 'union [. . .] perfect as it can be',²⁴⁸ an incorruptibility that is maintained 'constant, inalterable, and pure',²⁴⁹ or that 'the general will is always right', with the claim that 'the people are never corrupted'.²⁵⁰ That general Will is actualized by a 'reciprocal engagement': 'as a member of the State toward the sovereign'.²⁵¹ His place of exercise is 'the public deliberations, which can bind all the subjects to the sovereign'.²⁵² The general Will of the political body is the sovereign, and one cannot 'have any obligatory fundamental law' prior to this Will.

The general Will is an

agreement of the collective body with each of its members; a lawful agreement, because it has the social contract as its foundation; equitable, because it is common to all; useful, because it can have no other object

245 Ibid., ch. 2; p. 151 (Translation: Dunn, p. 229).

246 Ibid., Book II, ch. 2; p. 71 (Translation: Dunn, p. 171).

247 In a future work we will make the *potentia* the starting point of the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*.

248 *Social Contract*, Book I, ch. 6; p. 61 (Translation: Dunn, p. 163).

249 Text cited further up.

250 Ibid., Book II, ch. 3; p. 73 (Translation: Dunn, p. 172). 'The people are never corrupted, though often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil' (ibid.). One would have to have firmer criteria to judge a people, in particular when one is the 'dominator of the world' (as Hegel will say). Today (2003) there are polls that indicate that some citizens of the United States would permit an attack on Iran, after Iraq. What happens when the people of the empire (Roman, English or North American) 'are confused'? A certain populist optimism can become terrifying. Unfortunately the people can err, and so we need to clarify certain 'principles' that even the dominating people have to observe. For this reason, an International Criminal Court has been instituted, where in particular the dominating peoples and their directors can be accused of crimes against humanity.

251 Ibid., Book I, ch. 7; pp. 62-3 (Translation: Dunn, p. 165).

252 Ibid., p. 63 (Translation: Dunn, p. 165).

than the general welfare; and stable, because it has the public force and the supreme power as a guarantee.²⁵³

The 'particular will' or 'particular interest' can be opposed to the 'general Will' as 'naturally independent', but they are subsumed in 'the moral person which constitutes the state as an abstract being',²⁵⁴ which is 'the civil state [. . .] substituting in his behavior justice for instinct, and by imbuing his actions with a moral quality they previously lacked'.²⁵⁵ Rousseau repeats that 'the civil state [adds] moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for the impulse of mere appetite is *slavery*, while obedience to a self-prescribed law is freedom'.²⁵⁶ In the same way, 'every man has a right to risk his own life in order to preserve it',²⁵⁷ although he does not distinguish clearly between the 'criminal' opposed to institutions who is transformed into the 'enemy' of legality and the 'rebel' who, although he appears as a 'traitor to his country', is struggling for a just cause and can be the hero of the future country.²⁵⁸

[170] Rousseau treats a theme absent in many of the authors that precede him: the 'people'. Few peoples were examples of vigour and virtue, 'such was Sparta in the time of Lycurgus, such was Rome after the Tarquins, and such among us moderns were Holland and Switzerland after the expulsion of their tyrants'.²⁵⁹ In addition, with difficulty, people live 'twice' that classic time.²⁶⁰ Rousseau is thinking about something similar to the 'spirit of the nations' of Montesquieu or Hegel's 'ethical life' (*Sittlichkeit*). It is the *ethos* or political and *cultural character* of a community that he is expressing:

It is not always easy to discern when a people is mature, and if the time is rushed, the labour is aborvive. One nation is governable from its origin, another is not so at the end of ten centuries. The Russians will never be really governed, because they have been governed too early. Peter [the Great] had an imitative genius; he had not the true genius that creates and produces anything from nothing [. . .] He wished to produce at once Germans or Englishmen, when he should have begun by making Russians.²⁶¹

253 Ibid., Book II, ch. 4; p. 77 (Translation: Dunn, p. 175).

254 Ibid., Book I, ch. 7; p. 64 (Translation: Dunn, p. 166).

255 Ibid., ch. 8; p. 65 (Translation: Dunn, p. 166). 'Only when the voice of duty prevails over physical impulse, and law prevails over appetite does man [. . .] understand that he must act according to other principles, and must consult his reason before listening to his inclinations [. . .] What man loses because of the social contract is his *natural* liberty and an unlimited right to anything that tempts him and that he can attain; what he gains is civil liberty and property in all that he possesses [. . .], civil liberty, which is limited by the general will' (ibid., pp. 65-6 [Translation: Dunn, pp. 166-7]).

256 Ibid., p. 66 (Translation: Dunn, p. 167).

257 Ibid., Book II, ch. 5; p. 78 (Translation: Dunn, p. 176).

258 Ibid., p. 79 (Translation: Dunn, p. 177).

259 Ibid., Book II, ch. 8; p. 89 (Translation: Dunn, p. 184).

260 Hegel read this text attentively.

261 Ibid., p. 90 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 184-5). Rousseau touches a central aspect of the

A people cannot be too great or small,²⁶² and one has to keep a proportion between population and territory.²⁶³ All this constitutes a complex structure of 'quality of the soil, in its degree of fertility', 'the influence of climate', 'constitutions of the inhabitants', 'fecundity' in the birth rate, etc., all those 'already united by some bond of interest, origin, or convention, but [...] [have] not yet borne the real yoke of laws' constitute the people that will dictate their laws.²⁶⁴

Rousseau remembers that all people or political bodies perish some day: 'If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to endure forever?'²⁶⁵ The critic Rousseau remembers an old adage: 'The body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die from its birth, and contains in itself the causes of its own destruction. But both may have a more or less robust constitution [...]. The best constituted will come to an end, but later than another, unless some unforeseen accident brings about its premature destruction.'²⁶⁶

The corruption of the political body, for Rousseau, is an internal tension, because 'as the private will incessantly acts against the general will, so the government makes a continual effort against the [popular] sovereignty'.²⁶⁷ For Rousseau the danger proceeds from the same governmental institution that presses the sovereign, the people, by which the original pact is violated. The dissolution of the state, by extinction of the general Will, is anarchy or *ochlocracy*²⁶⁸ (another manner of demagogy), oligarchy, tyranny or despotism. This brings Rousseau to propose a certain type of direct democracy, because a corrupted state would only have the legislative Power, the heart (the brain) of the political body. With the state dissolved, the legislative Power is situated as general Will prior to the laws, as 'a convention of the people'²⁶⁹.

The 'assembling people', who in some way presage the 'democratic-discursive community', had to have four conditions:

peripheral or colonial people. This could be said of the great Latin American politicians from the beginning of the nineteenth century, with exceptions that we will indicate (Chapter 11, 'The Impossible National Sovereignty').

²⁶² *Ibid.*, ch. 9; p. 91 (Translation: Dunn, p. 185). Rousseau does not suggest that the 'size' is related to the technical capacity of each historical moment. The Persian, Hellenic and Chinese empires were the largest that the horse allowed. The Spanish Empire had the caravel; the English Empire, the steamer; the American Empire, aviation, satellites and electronics.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, ch. 10; pp. 93f. (Translation: Dunn, pp. 187-9).

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 96 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 187-8).

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, III, ch. 11; p. 133 (Translation: Dunn, p. 216).

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 134 (Translation: Dunn, p. 217).

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 10; p. 131 (Translation: Dunn, p. 214).

²⁶⁸ In Greek *laos* signifies *people* in its positive sense, worthy; *okhlós* (multitude) has a pejorative sense.

²⁶⁹ *Social Contract*, ch. 12; p. 135 (Translation: Dunn, p. 218). Rousseau anticipates the critics: '*Le peuple assemblé, dira-t-on, quelle chimère*'. He continues: 'It is a fantasy today; but it was not so two thousand years ago. Have men changed their nature?' (*ibid.*). Rousseau is thinking of Geneva, but knows that a 'city' is not still the sufficient horizon of a political body, meanwhile France was, but direct democracy in the Athenian way was impossible. Will he not have to invent another type of direct participation of the citizen? Was this Rousseau's suggestion?

It is not sufficient for the assembled people to have, at one point in time, determined the constitution of the State [. . .] It is not sufficient for them to have established a permanent government, or have once for all provided for the election of magistrates. Besides the extraordinary assemblies which unforeseen events may require, it is necessary to have regular and periodic ones that nothing can cancel or postpone.²⁷⁰

Rousseau is thinking of the 'Roman elections',²⁷¹ the political organization of Calvinist Geneva and, although he never names it, of Venice (with its *Maggiore Consiglio*). For our author, 'as soon as the people are lawfully assembled as a sovereign body, the whole jurisdiction of the government ceases, the executive power is suspended, and the person of the lowliest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate.'²⁷² That it could not be a fact in the territorial states, like England or France, showed the difficulty of the Rousseauian utopia, although I think that he accepts that empirical impossibility in his time, but thinks it possible in the long term. We see the importance of consensuality in action, valid, to continually create institutional possibilities at all levels (from the base, municipal, departmental or provincial community, to the particular state). The general Will is the horizon from which can be understood the 'assembled people' (*la peuple assemblée*), and 'suffrage'²⁷³ as a concrete instrument of the exercise of consensuality (*ante factum, in factum and post factum*). The problem of 'representation'²⁷⁴ is treated by Rousseau as a mediation in the absence of the 'people *assemblée*' that fixes the perfect limit, although unattainable, which enables criticism or transforming of the moment in which other factors move people further away from consensuality. Corruption is a 'stopping' of the representative institutions that 'are moved further away' from the base and constitute themselves as self-referential.

Rousseau is searching for a theoretical-practical and political criteria to re-launch the 'valid order' around the concept of the general Will. He fails, nevertheless, to discover the negated Alterity ('category'): the colonies, the slaves of Haiti, the poor like wage workers of capital, women and other excluded actors. Through this, he glimpsed the negatives like poverty in his earlier work (1750-5), but he did not know how to architectonize it sufficiently in his politics. He begins a critical tradition that provides the first steps.

270 Ibid., ch. 13; p. 136 (Translation: Dunn, pp. 218-19).

271 Ibid., Book IV, ch. 4f.; pp. 156f. (Translation: Dunn, pp. 232-40).

272 Ibid., Book III, ch. 14; p. 138 (Translation: Dunn, p. 220).

273 Ibid., Book IV, ch. 2; pp. 151f. (Translation: Dunn, pp. 228-31).

274 In Book III, ch. 15: 'Deputies or Representatives' (pp. 139f. [Translation: Dunn, pp. 220-3]), or ch. 17: 'The Institution of Government' (pp. 144f. [Translation: Dunn, pp. 224-5]), he addresses this question superficially.

‘Mature Modernity’ in the German Enlightenment

Political Philosophy and the State

[171] The Baltic Sea was a geopolitical space which from the fall of the Carolingian Holy Roman Empire was a shining light thanks to the expansion of the Vikings and Normans from Norway or Denmark. Through the Hanseatic League or Hanse it united numerous ports and cities commercially. Königsberg, one of the Hanseatic cities, a Prussian world in the middle of the Slavic culture, continued being a commercial society, which entered into industrial capitalism late. So Kant or Fichte were not as much on the side of the bourgeoisie as the English thinkers. In fact, in fundamental aspects they were opposed to it. This is unlike Hegel, who signified the philosophical expression of optimistic, triumphant industrial capitalism, conscious of having reached the European-world hegemony of the *world-system*.

Politics as Guarantee of Morality: Immanuel Kant

As expression still of a Pietist commercial oligarchy, Kant (1724–1804) is concerned with politics as the full realization of the moral–practical subject, to create the conditions, which a historical progress with an ethical sense anticipates, to establish a ‘state of peace’ (in the state, in confederations of states and in a cosmopolitan sense), which starts as a ‘rule of law’ as legality (which protects private property), assuring and providing an environment enabling the fulfilment of morality from the principle of freedom and the promotion of the happiness of others.

This complex position remains in politics as a second plan (formal mediation of the law in reference to the moral fullness) and, although he intends to recover the *material* aspect (by the ‘doctrine of virtue’ and ‘happiness’), he will be *formalist*, since politics will be developed only as ‘doctrine of law’¹

¹ Contemporary neo-Kantianism, from J. Rawls until J. Habermas (and more in this last), ends by being a ‘philosophy of law’ and does not have sufficient categories nor problematic horizon to plant a complete ‘political philosophy’ of which the law is a part, as we will see in the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*.

or 'responsibility for virtue'. He has a certain blindness to material problems, such as political economy, assuming mercantile capitalism without any critical conscience – knowing of the existence of industrial capitalism for Hume and Smith, but not developing the theme from a Prussian experience, which is still underdeveloped in this way. He has a reductive concept of the *material* aspect of ethics.

We have described in other works the stages of the thinking of Kant.² Four have to be considered:

- 1 the rationalist stage (under the influence of Wolff and Leibniz, whose thesis will remain as a substratum, which will cross all the later stages and will be reborn strongly in the fourth);
- 2 the stage that experiences empiricist influence (with the attentive reading of Hume, Smith, and when he discovers Rousseau with enthusiasm,³ from 1764);
- 3 the critical stage (the Kantian moment par excellence from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781, to the *Critique of Practical Reason*); and
- 4 the final stage, which begins with the *Critique of Judgement* (1790), when Kant develops the intermediate environment, between practical and theoretical pure reason and that properly empirical, and completes the problematic of the *faculty of reflexive justice*, which aims to recover the *material* aspect of his practical philosophy in a context of universal history.⁴ It is this final stage that interests us now.

In this stage of the *final Kant*, our philosopher writes, among others, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793), *Perpetual Peace* (1795), *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) and *The Conflict of the Facul-*

² See Dussel, 1973b, pp. 75–118 (in that work we do not address explicitly the fourth stage of Kant's thinking); 1974c, pp. 37f.; 1998a, § 2.1 (here I referred more to the pre-critical Kant and to the first steps of the critical-transcendental Kant). I referred to the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* in Dussel, 1984, pp. 54f.

³ Kant was very attentive to European production. In 1762, the 14 years of great French production (from *The Spirit of the Laws* to *On the Social Contract*) conclude. In 1764 Kant meditates especially on *On the Inequality between Men* and the *Second Discourse*, see sections [165–6]. Kant thought that Rousseau was the Newton of morality; nevertheless, he could not develop a politics in the sense of Rousseau. At the political level, Kant is a conservative.

⁴ He never abandoned it. His *Lectures on Ethics* (1775–91; see the introduction of R. Rodríguez Aramayo, in Kant, 1988, pp. 7–34) continue explaining themes of a substantive ethic. Kant writes: 'So far, then, as anyone destroys his body, and thereby takes his own life, he has employed his choice to destroy the power of choosing itself; but in that case, free choice is in conflict with itself. [. . .] Life is supposedly being used to bring about lifelessness, but that is a self-contradiction' (*Lectures on Ethics*, 369; Kant, 1988, p. 188 [Translation: Heath, p. 144]). Here one can see the definitive dualism of Kant: the human being is body and soul. However, 'we have' a body from an autonomous, free, previous 'I': 'If freedom is the condition of life it cannot be employed to abolish life, since then it destroys and abolishes itself' (ibid.). We have demonstrated largely in our *Ethics of Liberation* that *one does not have* a body, but *one is corporal*. The brain is not 'had' by any extra-cerebral subject. Liberty is not a 'condition' of the body nor of life but is a mental 'function' of the brain, of the living human body. Life, the human living corporality, is the absolute 'condition' of liberty. This 'dualism' remains in the 'final' Kant, producing unsurpassable reductivisms of grave consequences for politics.

ties (1798).⁵ The problematic remains situated within the horizon of the advances effected by Kant in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790)⁶ that, against what until recently was interpreted as work of the 'old' Kant, today is considered the authentic architectonic end of a Kant in the fullness of speculative capacity and as the spring of the 'system' from which will emerge the future generations of 'German Idealism' and the 'Hegelian Left'. We pass quickly through the central theses of the third *Critique*.

Kant had anticipated this with a small work, *On the Use of the Teleological Principle in Philosophy*,⁷ in which his theses are presaged. In the Preface of the *Critique of Judgement* he writes:

But now comes *judgment* (*Urteilkraft*), which, in the order of our cognitive faculties,⁸ forms a middle term between understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*). Has it also got independent *a priori* principles? [And] are they constitutive, or are they merely regulative [? . . .] This is the topic to which the present *Critique* is devoted.⁹

As Hume showed that the 'principle of causality' organized the objects of the experience (together with those of closeness and similarity), not being derived from it, now Kant develops an analogous problematic from the 'principle of finality' (or teleological), which one must see in nature, in particular with the living beings (called by Kant 'organized beings'), and in the human environment, taking into account the concept of freedom (teleological-historical causality par excellence). For this, 'the faculty of judging' has 'a principle peculiar to itself upon which laws are sought', being 'merely subjective *a priori*', and although 'it has no field of objects (*Feld der Gegenstände*) appropriate to it',¹⁰ it can have some type of ground (*Boden*) in which 'this very principle alone may be valid':¹¹

Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular (*das Besondere*) as contained in the universal (*das Allgemeine*).¹² If the universal (the

5 In this last in particular, 'The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Law' and 'Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?' (Kant, 1999, 8f.; 1968, IX, 35 ff.). About the Kantian philosophy of history there are two small works in 1784 (*Ideas for a universal history in a cosmopolitan vision*) and 1786 (*Conjectures about the origin of the universal history*) and a polemical review critical of the work of Herder (1785). See about the political philosophy of Kant: Apel, 1997; Kersting, 1995; Williams, 1996; Riley, 1983; Arendt, 1982; Höffe, 1986. About the context, Parry, 1975.

6 See Dussel, 1984, pp. 54f.; Delbos, 1969, pp. 409-80.

7 Kant, 1968, VIII, 138-170 [Translation: TC].

8 In the first case one speaks of *Kraft* (power or faculty), here of *Vermögen* (capacity or faculty).

9 B v, A v (Kant, 1961, 8; Kant, 1968, VIII, 238 (Translation: Meredith, p. 4)). For Aristotle that faculty had been a *lógos poietikós*, between the *lógos theoretikós* and the *praktikós*. But this is different. The 'application' of the universal to the particular (*Anwendung, applicatio*) is not valued in this case. Kant opens and develops a new problematic field from some aspects of Hume.

10 He is not empirically objective.

11 *Ibid.*, Introduction, iii; B xxii, A xxii; p. 17; p. 249 (Translation: Meredith, p. 15).

12 'To think' (*denken*) is not the same as 'to know' (*kennen*).

rule, the principle, or law,) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it *is determined*. [. . .] If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgment is simply *reflective (reflektierend)*.¹³

[172] It is reflective because in the faculty of judging, 'all that is intended is that, no matter what is the order and disposition of nature in respect of its universal laws, we must investigate its empirical laws throughout on that principle and the maxims founded thereon, because only so far as that principle applies can we make any headway in the employment of our understanding in experience, or gain knowledge.'¹⁴ The faculty of judging allows the human being to organize the totality of the experience of nature (and of the moral world by the final causality of liberty) as a unit, thanks to the subjective principle a priori; so the 'principle of finality (*Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit*) [. . .] is a transcendental principle';¹⁵ a condition of possibility and not empirical fact.

We are not at the level of the theoretical knowledge of a given fact but one conceives 'the object itself (its form or real existence) as an *effect*'; it 'is thought *to be possible* only through a concept of it, there we imagine an end. The representation of the *effect* is here the determining ground of its cause and takes the lead of it.'¹⁶ In the natural environment, 'the universal idea of nature, as the complex of objects of sense, gives us no reason whatever for assuming that things of nature serve one another as means to ends',¹⁷ because we do not find finality in it. 'We are right, however, in applying the teleological estimate, at least *problematically*, to the investigation of nature',¹⁸ and especially among the living beings (plants and animals) it is necessary.¹⁹ Thus, we can have 'the idea of aggregate nature as a system following the rule of ends'.²⁰

Following Kant's argument, the human being is part of nature but 'now we have in the world beings of but one kind whose class is teleological, or

13 Ibid., iv; B xxvi, A xxiv; p. 20; p. 251 (Translation: Meredith, p. 18). Kant explains: 'The reflective judgment which is compelled to ascend (*aufzusteigen*) from the particular in nature to the universal, stands, therefore, in need of a principle. This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to establish just the unity (*Einheit*) of all empirical principles under higher, though likewise empirical, principles. [. . .] Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgment can only give as a law from and to itself' (ibid., B xxvii, A xxv; p. 20; p. 252 [Translation: Meredith, pp. 18-19]). One sees clearly the influence of Hume. This text is utilized by Marx when he speaks of method in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse* (see Dussel, 1985a, pp. 48f.).

14 Ibid., v; B xxxviii, A xxxvi; p. 27; p. 260 (Translation: Meredith, p. 26).

15 Ibid., B xxix, A xxvii; p. 22; p. 254 (Translation: Meredith, p. 20).

16 Ibid., I, Book I, I, § 10; B 33, A 33; p. 59; p. 298 (Translation: Meredith, p. 61).

17 Ibid., II, § 61; p. 203; p. 459 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 3).

18 Ibid., B 269, A 265; p. 204; p. 470 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 4).

19 See *ibid.*, § 66, B 296, A 292; p. 220; p. 488 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 24).

20 Ibid., § 67, B 300, A 297; p. 223; p. 491 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 28). He adds: 'the principle [of finality] of reason is one which is competent for reason to use as a merely subjective principle, that is as a maxim' (ibid., p. 223; p. 492 [Translation: Meredith, II, p. 28]).

directed to ends, and which at the same time are beings of such a character that the law according to which they have to determine ends for themselves is represented by them themselves as unconditioned and not dependent on anything in nature, but as necessary in itself'.²¹ Now we introduce our theme:

The being of this kind is man, but man regarded as *noumenon*. He is the only natural creature whose peculiar objective characterization is nevertheless such as to enable us to recognize in him a super-sensible faculty – his freedom – and to perceive both the law of the causality and the object of freedom which that faculty is able to set before itself as the highest end (*höchsten Zweck*) – the supreme good in the world. [. . .] Man, considered as moral agent [. . .] only in him as the individual being to whom the moral law applies, do we find unconditional legislation in respect of ends. This legislation, therefore, is what alone qualifies him to be a final end (*Endzweck*) to which entire nature is teleologically subordinated.²²

Kant has reached something similar to an ontological–natural foundation of politics. If the human being is the culmination of natural reality, its proper end would be something like the ultimate finality of the universe:

The former end of nature would be the *happiness* of man (*Glückseligkeit*), the latter his *culture* (*Kultur*).²³ [To] attain this its real end is the existence of a constitution so regulating the mutual relations of men that the abuse of freedom by individuals striving one against another is opposed by a lawful authority (*Gewalt*) centered in a whole, called a *civil society* (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). For it is only in such a constitution that the greatest development (*Entwicklung*) of natural tendencies can take place.²⁴

²¹ *Ibid.*, II, Appendix, § 84, B 398, A 393; p. 280; p. 558 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 99).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 281; p. 559 (Translation: Meredith, II, pp. 99–100).

²³ *Ibid.*, § 83, B 388, A 384; p. 277; p. 551 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 92). Kant reflects on Rousseau, when he writes: 'Skill can hardly be developed in the human race otherwise than by means of inequality among men [he is thinking about the 'division of labour']. For the majority [. . .] provide the necessaries of life [. . .] But with the advance of this culture [. . .] misfortunes increase equally on both sides. With the lower classes they arise by force of domination from without, with the upper from seeds of discontent within. Yet this splendid misery is connected with the development of natural tendencies in the human race' (*ibid.*, B 393, A 388; p. 277; p. 554 [Translation: Meredith, II, pp. 95–6]). Kant justifies the sufferings of some for the progress of humanity. He does not accept Rousseau's pessimism; he thinks that although there is a 'preponderance of evil', 'fine arts and the sciences, if they do not make a man morally (*sittlich*) better, yet, [. . .] by introducing polish and refinement into society, make him civilized (*gesittet*)' (*ibid.*, B 395, A 391; pp. 278–9; p. 556 [Translation: Meredith, II, p. 97]). He corrects Rousseau. On the other hand, if one has made a critique of the 'Eurocentrism' in Kant's thinking, here would be the place to repeat it.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 277; p. 555 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 96).

Kant has realized an extraordinary theoretical voyage and has reached port. It is still a bit further to go to frame his project of political philosophy:

In addition to this we should also need a *cosmopolitan* whole (*weltbürgerliches Ganzes*) – had men but the ingenuity to discover such a constitution and the wisdom voluntarily to submit themselves to its constraint. It would be a system of all states (*ein System aller Staaten*) that are in danger of acting injuriously to one another.²⁵

Kant knows the difficulty of a ‘postulate’ of practical reason, of this ‘project’ (*Entwurf*). He is conscious that those ends (the organization of civil society and perpetual peace through ‘a system of all states’) are not objects of ‘knowing’, but have a ‘subjective’ constitution and are objects of ‘rational faith’:

Objects that must be thought *a priori*, either as consequences or as grounds, if pure practical reason is to be used as duty commands, but which are transcendent for the theoretical use of reason, are mere *matters of faith* (*Glaubenssachen*). [. . .] If the supreme principle of all moral laws is a postulate (*Postulat*), this involves the possibility of its supreme Object, and, consequently, the condition under which we are able to conceive such possibility, being also postulated.²⁶

From this problematic horizon, we consider now *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, a text that continues with the treated themes, although from another point of view. We want to begin with the rescue of the material aspect of ethics:

Morality requires absolutely no material (*materialen*) determining ground of free choice [. . .] Bnt, although for its own behalf morality does not

25 Ibid., B 394, A 389; p. 278; p. 555 (Translation: Meredith, II, p. 96).

26 Ibid., § 91, B 460, A 454; p. 316; p. 601 (Translation: Meredith, II, pp. 142–4). We have explained elsewhere ‘faith’ in the philosophy of Kant (Dussel, 1973b, p. 108, ‘Philosophical knowledge and faith’, in *KrV* and *KpV*), which in the 1980s earned me the accusation of ‘fideistic’ from a colleague not versed in these questions. Kant explains: ‘Faith (*Glaube*) [. . .] is the moral attitude of reason in its assurance of the truth of what is beyond the reach of theoretical knowledge. It is the steadfast principle of the mind, therefore, according to which the truth (*Fürwahrhalten*) of what must necessarily be presupposed as the condition of the supreme final end (*Möglichkeit des höchsten moralischen Endzwecks*) being possible is assumed as true in consideration of the fact that we are under an obligation to pursue that end – and assumed notwithstanding that we have no insight into its possibility, though likewise none into its impossibility. Faith [. . .] is a confidence of attaining a purpose the furthering of which is a duty, but whose achievement is a thing of which we are unable to perceive the possibility or, consequently, the possibility of what we alone conceive to be its conditions [. . .] above all in matters of history’ (ibid., B 462, A 457; pp. 317–18; p. 603 [Translation: Meredith, II, pp. 145–6]). The text continues and merits a thorough reading. Kant writes a notable chapter on the ‘Critique of utopian reason’, to speak like Hinkelammert, within the reductionisms that we have to criticize. We should also remember Hume’s concept of *belief*.

need the representation of the end (*Zweckvorstellung*) which would have to precede the determination of the will, it may well be that it has a *necessary reference* to such an end, not as the ground (*Grund*) of its maxims but as a necessary consequence (*notwendigen Folgen*) accepted in conformity to them.²⁷

[173] He adds:

Assume a human being who honors the moral law, and who allows himself to think [. . .] what sort of world he would *create* (*erschaffen*), were this in his power, under the guidance of practical reason – a world within which, moreover he would place himself as a member.²⁸

One is the horizon of the 'founding', of the formal universal level; the other is that of the 'application' (*Anwendung*), when the universal law of the categorical imperative has to integrate itself (reflecting or searching in the 'particular maxim' for the *universality* of law) in the future action (the practical object, which synthesizes practical reason or will). In this second case of *application* of universal law by the 'faculty of judging' he moves from the horizon of mere will to the arbitrary: he has to make the case that it should carry it out *concretely* as a *means* to an *end*. To speak of a concrete maxim, means or end, is to have moved from the *formal* level of law to the *material* level of teleology, nature and history. Here we find the force of the final Kant.

For Kant, in the more *formal* sense of the validity of his morality, one has to create a world in which morality is 'insured', 'guaranteed', 'facilitated'. For example, in the *state of war* morality is practically difficult; in the *state of peace* are favourable conditions for its exercise. To create that 'world' is a 'responsibility of virtue', in whose environment is found also politics, and around politics one struggles to establish peace in a *material* demand, in the sense of trying virtues with a view to an end, toward realizing in universal history the 'supreme good' (which includes the perfection and happiness of the rest and a cosmopolitan *state of peace*, of all of humanity). That intent

²⁷ *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, prologue to the 1st ed., BA V; Kant, 1969, 20 (Translation: Wood, pp. 33–4); 1968, VII, 650. 'For in the absence of all reference to an end *no determination of the will* can take place in human beings at all, since no such determination can occur without an effect [. . .]' '[. . .] a power of choice which does not [thus] add to a contemplated action the thought of either an objectively or subjectively determined object (which it has or should have), instructed indeed as to *how* to operate but not as to the *whither*, [. . .] for only in this way can an objective practical reality be given to the combination, which we simply cannot do without, of the purposiveness [deriving] from freedom and the purposiveness of nature' (ibid. [Translation: Wood, pp. 34–5]). This relation of liberty with nature links, on the other hand, a philosophy of history (teleology of liberty) with a philosophy of nature (from a teleological principle of causality).

²⁸ Ibid., p. 21; pp. 651–2 (Translation: Wood, p. 35). 'That world' would be the full realization of 'the idea of a highest good in the world' (ibid. [Translation: Wood, p. 34]). To work toward the 'kingdom of God' *in this world* is the watchword of Lutheran Pietism similar to Kant.

is a responsibility imposed on the will and as an Idea is a *postulate* of practical reason.²⁹

Still confronting the crisis of his second stage against empiricism, Kant sketches his theory of the 'two kingdoms', a dualism that he will never overcome:

The immaterial substances [the quasi-Leibnician souls] [. . . can] be immediately united among themselves; they are capable of constituting a great whole (*ein großes Ganzes*) that can be called *the immaterial world* (*mundus intelligibilis*).³⁰

The Idea of a *moral world* has objective reality, not referring to an object of an intelligible intuition, but [. . .] as object of pure reason in its practical use, and in a *corpus mysticum* of the rational beings that it has in it.³¹

This 'world of ends' or 'community of spirits' (not empirical and in a certain way not corporal for Kant) is transcendental: the will is assumed but not known empirically, in the way of the 'inference of the mind' or the 'principle of justice' in Hume. In Kant it has to be situated in the cognitive transcendental level, in the environment demanded as a 'postulate' for the possibility of the practical application of the will:

Of all the Ideas of speculative reason, freedom is the only one of which we know (*wissen*) the possibility *a priori*, although without intellecting it, because it is the condition of moral law that we know (*wissen*). But of the Ideas of God or immortality [or of a Kingdom of Ends, Kingdom of God or Ethical Community] [. . .] we cannot hold that we know (*erkennen*) them and intellect them, their reality, not even their possibility. And nevertheless they are the *conditions of application* (*Bedingungen der Anwendung*) of the morally determined will for the object given *a priori* (the supreme good [*das höchste Gut*]).³²

29 'The regulative idea of the theoretical reconstruction of history corresponds to a postulate of practical reason' (Apel, 1997, p. 84).

30 *Träume eines Geistersehers*, A 30 (Kant, 1968, II, 937 [Translation: TC]). That world was under 'the rule of general will (*allgemeinen Willens*)' (a reference to Rousseau), a perfect 'community' (*Gemeinschaft*) of thinking characters. They are members of a 'Kingdom of the Spirits' (*ibid.*, A 42-3, and 47-8; pp. 943 and 946). Kant is inspired by Leibniz, and the 'rationalist' (and dualist) themes will remain in Kant. Leibniz writes in his *Monadologie*: '(84) *C'est ce qui fait que les Esprits sont capable d'entrer dans une Manière de Société avec Dieu* [. . .] (85) *D'ou il est aisé de conclure, que l'assemblage de tous les Esprits doit composer la Cité de Dieu, c'est à dire le plus parfait état que soit possible* [. . .] *Cette Cité de Dieu, cette Monarchie Véritablement Universelle, est un Monde Morale dans le Monde Naturel* [. . . *Existe*] *une Harmonie parfait entre* [les] *deux Regnes* [. . .], *l'un* [el natural] *des causes efficientes, l'autre* [el moral] *des finales*' (Leibniz, 1967, pp. 38-9). See also *Principes de la nature* . . . (Leibniz, 1967, p. 73). About Leibniz see Chevallier, 1933, and Leibniz, 2001.

31 *KrV*, B 836, A 808; Kant, 1968, IV, 679 (Translation: TC).

32 *KpV*, A 4-5; Kant, 1968, VI, 108 (Translation: TC). Kant explains: 'The moral law

In the 'application' of the moral principle for the constitution of a 'good' action a *content* is necessary, an end. *How* the action works is its moral validity or judicial legality; *what* is worked is a concrete end according to the principle of finality. Without an end there is no action; the practical-moral full 'object' would not be given. And the end of all ends or 'the object of a pure practical reason' is the Idea of a 'supreme good'.³³ Kant intends to show its necessity, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, postulating its possibility *after* death, for which he had to show the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul.³⁴ It is possible, and more important, to postulate its possibility in the full realization of universal history, a postulate *in the long run*, which moves deeply the Pietist optimism of Kant and allows him to not think of the political in frontal manner, direct, but through the detour of the moral, not noting, nevertheless, its deepest material conditions. However, Kant does not conceive explicitly his politics as a mere guarantee for the reproduction of capitalism (evident in Locke, Hume or Smith):

Once human nature has attained to its full destiny and highest possible perfection –,³⁵ that will be the kingdom of God on earth, and inner conscience, justice and equity will then hold sway, rather than the power of authority. This is the destined final end, and the highest moral perfection, to which the human race can attain, and for which, after the lapse of many centuries, we may still have hope.³⁶

[174] All historical moral improvement is as an *anticipation*, and an *approximation*, of that 'kingdom of ends' – which Marx will call a 'realm of freedom', but in reference to the material level of labour and political economy. In Kant this 'kingdom' gains a very particular architectonic *place*. In his work of 1793, *Religion*, he explains his definitive position. His starting point, like the Anglo-Saxons, is a 'state of nature', but from a moral problematic. Given that in the human being there is a 'propensity' (*Hange*,

is the only motive determined by pure will. But as it is purely *formal* [. . .], as determinative motive it *makes an abstraction of all material*, and consequently, of all objects of desire' (ibid., A 197; p. 237 [Translation: TC]).

³³ *KpV*, A 197; p. 237 (Translation: TC). 'And this is indeed only the idea of an object that unites within itself the formal condition of *all such ends* as we *ought* to have (duty) with everything which is conditional upon *ends we have* and which conforms to duty (happiness proportioned to its observance), that is, the idea of a highest good *in this world*' (*Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Preface to the First Edition; Kant, 1969, 21; 1968, VII, 651 [Translation: Wood, p. 34]).

³⁴ The theme of Book II of *Critique* (*KpV*, pp. 234f.).

³⁵ This is a postulate, and at the same time a utopia that will pass to Marx.

³⁶ *Lectures on Ethics*, end; Kant, 1988, 303 (Translation: Heath, p. 222). 'The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection, so far as it is accomplished through human freedom, whereby man, in that case, is capable of the greatest happiness' (ibid., 301 [Translation: Heath, p. 220]). We are in the *material* level that is articulated with the *formal* (human liberty). The interpretation of Peirce, assuming a cosmic teleology and an *indefinite community*, is not then a dishevelled hermeneutic of Kant's thinking.

propensio)³⁷ toward 'maxims of the power of choice contrary to the law',³⁸ when customs are made 'the vices of culture and civilization'³⁹ (in the sense of Rousseau), evil consists in what 'reverses (*umkehrt*) the moral order of the incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. He indeed incorporates the moral law into those maxims, together with the law of self-love; [. . .] he makes the incentive of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law.⁴⁰ Action can be the same, but 'reversal of incentives' (*Umkehrung der Triebfedern*) is the 'radical' evil (*radical Böse*).⁴¹ In the 'state of nature' this evil reigns. A 'revolution in the disposition' (*Wiederherstellung*) is necessary, creating the force that straightens out the 'depravity'.⁴² Kant proposes new theoretical distinctions from those still traditional in political philosophy.

First, the 'state of nature' is split into two moments. There is a 'juridical state of nature' (*juridischer Naturzustand*) and another 'ethical':⁴³ 'Just as the *juridical state of nature* is one of war of every human being against every other, so too is the *ethical state of nature* (*ethische*) one in which the good principle, which resides in each human being, is incessantly attacked by the evil which is found in him.'⁴⁴

For Kant, humanity has the responsibility of working in view of 'common goal of goodness'.⁴⁵ The reasons to pass from the state of nature to the civil state given by Hobbes, Locke or Hume are not sufficient for Kant. In the juridical civil state [2.b of Figure 10.1], the ethical state of nature [1.a] can remain. Kant gives moral reasons, not of survival (which would be *material*), but of the ethical progress of subjectivity. We observe how one *transitions* from an ethical state of nature [1.a2] to an ethical civil society [2.a]:

An association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue, ruled by this idea, can be called an *ethical* [association 2.a] and, so far as these laws are public, an *ethico-civil* (in contrast to a *juridico-civil*) society (*ethisch-bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), or an *ethical community*.⁴⁶ It [ethics] can exist

37 *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Part One, II (Kant, 1969, 37 [Translation: Wood, p. 52]; 1968, VII, p. 675).

38 *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Part One, III; p. 42 [Translation: Wood, p. 56]; p. 680.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 43 (Translation: Wood, p. 57); p. 582.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 46 (Translation: Wood, p. 59); p. 685.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 47 (Translation: Wood, p. 59); p. 686.

42 *Ibid.*, General remark to Part I; p. 54 (Translation: Wood, pp. 65-73); p. 695.

43 *Ibid.*, Part Three, II; p. 97 (Translation: Wood, p. 108); p. 755.

44 *Ibid.*, 'Now just as the rightful [. . .] i.e. the *juridical state of nature*, is opposed to the first, so is the *ethical state of nature distinguished* from the second [. . .] In an already existing political community [2.b of Figure 10.1] all the political citizens are, as such, still in the *ethical state of nature* [. . .] for it would be a contradiction [. . .] for the political community to compel its citizens to enter into an ethical community' (*ibid.*, Part Three, II; p. 96 [Translation: Wood, p. 107]; pp. 753-4). The ethical level of the *KpV* was not judicial-institutional, here it can be.

45 *Ibid.*, Part Three, II; p. 98 (Translation: Wood, p. 108); p. 756.

46 *Friedenszustand*. This level is that of the 'Postulates' of *practical reason*. It could even

'MATURE MODERNITY' IN THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Figure 10.1 Architectonic of ethics, politics and the law

1. State of nature	2. Civil state	3. State of peace ⁴⁷
1.a. Ethical state of nature ⁴⁸	2.a. Ethical civil society, Ethical community ⁴⁹	3.a. Kingdom of God
1.b. Juridical state of nature ⁵²	2.b. Juridical civil society ⁵⁰ (Republic) b.1. Public law ⁵³ b.2. Law of man ⁵⁴ (Confed.) ⁵⁵ b.3. Cosmopolitan law ⁵⁶ (Cosmopolitan state) ⁵⁷	3.b. Perpetual peace ⁵¹

in the midst of a *political community*⁵⁸ [2.b] and even be made up of all the members⁵⁹ [. . .] There is nevertheless a certain analogy between the two [2.a and 2.b of Figure 10.1], when considered in general as two communities, and with respect to this analogy the ethical community may also be called an *ethical state*, that is a *kingdom* of virtue [. . .] even though we cannot subjectively ever hope of the good will of human beings which these will work harmoniously toward this end.⁶⁰

he said that it is an Idea, if 'Idea is the concept of a perfection that still does not exist in experience.'

⁴⁷ Also, it is 'attacked by evil.' See § 61 of *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

⁴⁸ Also, it can be called 'Ethical state' (*ethischer Staat*), 'Kingdom of virtue' (*Reich der Tugend*) or 'Ethical civil state'; it is found at the level of internal 'morality' (*Moralität*).

⁴⁹ 'Political community', 'civil state of law'; it is at the level of external, 'public' 'legality' (*Legalität*).

⁵⁰ As a universal juridical constitution. It is not properly an Idea; it is a utopia, a postulate of political practical reason. The 'Kingdom of Liberty' of Marx (no work, all time is free for cultural creation) is also a postulate of economic-practical reason, not as ultimate finality of a philosophy of law (as in Kant), but as a postulate situated in the *material* level of politics (of political economy or, better, of economic politics). We will have to articulate these two aspects without discarding either.

⁵¹ Also as a natural 'state of war' ('state of war' that is equally in 'juridical civil society', but as 'war among states').

⁵² Kant will use the following expressions (also those in the following notes): *Jus civitatis*, *öffentliches Recht* or *Staatsrecht*.

⁵³ *Jus gentium* or *Völkerrecht*: law of man or international law.

⁵⁴ What can be an 'association of states' or 'peoples' (*Völkerbund*), 'confederation' (*Föderation*) or 'alliance' (*Verbündung*).

⁵⁵ *Jus cosmopolitanum*; a 'cosmopolitan law' (*Völkerrecht*), with a 'permanent congress' (*Staatskongress*).

⁵⁶ A 'state of nations' (*Völkerstaat*); a 'republic of freely associated peoples' (*Republik freier verbündeter Völker*); a 'world state' (*Weltstaat*).

⁵⁷ Kant writes: *ein ethisches gemeines Wesen*, an expression that will be used by Hegel, Feuerbach and the young Marx in the *Manuscripts* of 1844.

⁵⁸ The 'political community' is a z.b. 'juridical civil society'.

⁵⁹ Would be the case of the caliphate of Baghdad, where all were Muslims (except some tolerated Jews or Christians).

⁶⁰ *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Part Three, Introduction; p. 95 (Translation: Wood, p. 106); pp. 752-3. Kant gives a much more elaborated 'theory' than the

[175] This strange, complex and underutilized text of Kant shows us the difficulty of situating the *place* of politics in his architectonic. Kant opens the field for a moralizing, communitarian action, we could say (something like non-governmental organizations in our days).⁶¹ He thinks with these categories, for example:

A *juridico-civil* (political) *state* is the relation of human beings to each other inasmuch as they stand together (*gemeinschaftlich*) under *public juridical laws* (which are all coercive laws). An *ethico-civil* state is one in which they are united under laws without being coerced, which is under *laws of virtue* alone.⁶² [. . .] In such a[n ethical] community all the laws are exclusively designed to promote the *morality* (*Moralität*) of actions (which is something *internal*, and hence cannot be subject to public human laws) whereas these public laws (and in this they constitute a juridical [political] community) are on the contrary directed to the *legality* (*Legalität*) of actions.⁶³

Kant distinguishes a legal (2.b) level of the 'public state'⁶⁴ from an 'interior' level of the conscience as morality, which is not necessarily solipsistic (2.a). In *Perpetual Peace* certain aspects are clarified:

A *state of peace*⁶⁵ among men who live side by side is not the *natural state* (*status naturalis*), which is rather to be described as a *state of war*: [. . .] although there is not perhaps always actual open hostility. [. . .] Thus the state of peace must be *established* (*gestiftet*).⁶⁶

In a certain way it is like a utopia (but later we will distinguish 'postulate' from 'utopia'), due to its historical and juridical difficulty. Kant situates it as

'Christian state' of Hobbes that was a practically theocratic Christendom (where the king was the supreme pontiff or God's representative on earth). Kant constructs a vision of greater autonomy of both 'communities', which Hegel will confuse in the 'Germanic-Prussian Christendom' (although he has England as a political-constitutional ideal).

61 'Non-governmental' indicates that they are not situated in the level of legality of the political society, but of the demands of morality, and nevertheless are intersubjective (civil society). It would be something like associations situated in 'civil society' (in its actual sense; a concept that does not exist in Kant but that he sketched sufficiently, and with greater clarity than Hegel). The 'civil society' of Hegel is not similar to the concept itself.

62 Kant refers not only to the religious communities (the churches), but to all type of 'invisible churches', like ethical communities that are committed to struggle for a just life. It can be the university itself, spiritual movements, artists, even critical political parties. Hegel will write to his friends Schelling and Hölderlin that 'reason and liberty will be always our solution, and our meeting point with the *invisible church*' (letter of January 1795; Hegel, 1955, 18 [Translation: TC]).

63 *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Part Three, I; p. 95 (Translation: Wood, pp. 106-7); p. 753; *ibid.*, Part Three, III; p. 99 (Translation: Wood, p. 109); p. 757.

64 Badly translated as 'publicity' (an action of propaganda in graphic communication in the market). One has to translate this as 'public state' of the act, agreement, etc.

65 This new state (*Friedenszustand*) is later the civil state. It is a novelty in political philosophy.

66 *Perpetual Peace*, II, BA 18 (Kant, 1966, 50; Kant, 1968, IX, 203 [Translation: Smith, p. 117-18]).

a far off point, *in the long run*, but not an absolute factual *impossibility*, to which we can *move closer* (words that Marx will use explicitly), following the course of a line, which is not asymptotic,⁶⁷ because one day it will touch the other line, although it 'will be many centuries':⁶⁸

If it is our *duty* to realise a state of public right, if at the same time there are good grounds (*gegründete*)⁶⁹ for hope that this ideal may be realised, although only by an approximation advancing *ad infinitum*⁷⁰ (*unendliche fortschreitenden Annäherung*), then perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of peace, which have been 'in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.⁷¹

For Kant, then, perpetual peace (about which Leibniz and Rousseau had already explained their positions) is a postulate where the ethical community (and in some way the 'kingdom of God' [3.a]) and juridical civil society (2.b.3) are brought together 'in history' (the motto of Pietism), which in some way complemented (or improved) the argument of reconciliation 'after this life' (the *highest good*: as coincidence of happiness and virtue of the *Critique of Practical Reason*). Now the reconciliation would be realized 'historically', in the long term, as assurance of morality (as full fulfilment of *nature*, in its teleological sense and of the formal validity of the act in its transcendental sense) thanks to a world legality (3.b) which would have eliminated the *state of war* on the planet through the organization of a *cosmopolitan state*. Formally, in the *Critique of practical reason*, the maxim would have to be universalized (an abstract, transcendental universality). Now, *materially*, the maxim has to be universalized within the states (a concrete, cosmopolitan universality).

For Kant, humanity has to keep growing morally (level 2.a of Figure 10.1) and politically. For this, he proposes that all states would become 'republics' in their civil constitution, because it is the most participative state, pursu-

67 With respect to an infinitely distant point there is no possibility of an empirical reconciliation. In this case, the distance to the other end is always infinite. So one cannot be at an infinite distance, but, as Kant will say, it will last maybe 'many centuries'. It is a 'postulate' that he thought logically and empirically possible. Although we do not reach it in our short lives, one has the ethical *responsibility* of *always* intending to. Kant proposed that it was *empirically* possible.

68 Already cited, from *Lectures on Ethics*, end; Kant, 1988, 303 (Translation: Heath, p. 222).

69 The 'grounds' open us to the environment of a 'rational faith' anew, whose sense we have explained further up.

70 In the sense of 'undefined'.

71 *Ibid.*, end; B 112; p. 123; p. 251 (Translation: Smith, p. 196).

ing liberty and autonomy.⁷² In addition, 'the law of nations' (*Völkerrecht*) (2.b.2) has to give the juridical frame of a 'Federation (*Föderalismus*) of free states',⁷³ thanks to which, slowly, we would reach 'the rights of men, as citizens of the world' (*Weltbürgerrecht*).⁷⁴ Kant effects some incursions into the level of instrumental reason, and correctly (and as we have tried in our interpretation of world history), since he considers the domestication of the horse and the invention of iron as instruments, which permitted the growth of communications. He shows here an unfounded hope in alluding to the benefits of a high degree of internationalization, a product of mercantilism: 'the first articles of commerce (*Handelsverkehrs*) between different peoples [. . .] were sought far and near. In this way the people would be at first brought into *peaceful relation* with one another.'⁷⁵

In addition to commerce, an experience that Kant understands by being a member of a true commercial civilization like the Hanseatic League, is nature, which compels the human being to effect 'what man [. . .] ought to do and yet fails to do, he will do [. . .] by the compulsion of nature'.⁷⁶ Because if one does not overcome the *state of war* and does not institute a *state of peace*, the state is weakened in the long term and is destroyed by the other states (argument situated in the first level: 2.b.1). Second, a greater 'guarantee' (*Garantie*) of progress is achieved through 'the idea of the right of the nations' (*Völkerrecht*) because international peace (2.b.2) is reached, a maximum realization of security. Only if a world state is organized would the guarantee be complete because thanks to a 'right of world citizenship' (*Weltbürgerrecht*) (2.b.3) the law with its coercive character would also protect those who had not been defended 'against [the] violence and war' of the most powerful states.⁷⁷

Kant views the possibility of perpetual peace with a certain hope: 'of all the forces which lie at the command of the state, the *power of money* (*Geldmacht*) is probably the most reliable. Hence states find themselves compelled – not, it is true, exactly from motives of morality – to further the noble end of peace' in 'the commercial spirit'.⁷⁸ Although this cannot be

72 Kant explains that one does not have to confuse 'the republican with the democratic constitution' (ibid., BA 25; p. 55; p. 206 [Translation: Smith, p. 124]).

73 Ibid., BA 30; p. 58; p. 208 (Translation: Smith, p. 128).

74 Ibid., BA 40; p. 66; p. 213 (Translation: Smith, p. 137). Thanks to the work of Hardt and Negri (2000), we are discussing this theme again but in a 'closer' way, seeing the factual possibility of a world institutionalization. The politics of the USA from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has slowed the task and has brought the empire to a dangerous isolationism (see Spiro, 2000, pp. 9–15). Nevertheless, the recent 'European Constitution' (9 July 2003) indicates a hopeful 'approximation' along the line 'dreamt' by Kant.

75 Ibid., BA 55; p. 79; p. 221 (Translation: Smith, p. 149).

76 Ibid., BA 59; p. 82; p. 223 (Translation: Smith, p. 152).

77 Ibid., B 66, A, 65; p. 86; p. 226 (Translation: Smith, p. 157).

78 Ibid (Translation: Smith, p. 157). In an excellent thesis Luis Jorge Álvarez (1999) shows that the commercial optimism of Kant has not understood that the market, with its frontiers and its monopolies, is the principal objective of the wars. Kant falls here into a naïveté of attributing to 'mercantilism' a globalizing capacity, which it will fulfil but through a colonial and imperial 'state of war' of the worst consequences.

the first motive because it is merely 'material', he will have to appeal to the 'formal' (transcendental) demand:

Without doubt, the latter determining principle of action must stand first; [...] whereas the former is obligatory only if we assume the empirical conditions of the end set before us, [...] and if this *end* – as, for example, the end of perpetual peace⁷⁹ – should be also a duty, this same duty must necessarily have been deduced from the formal principle governing the maxims which guide external action. Now: [...] the problems of constitutional, international and cosmopolitan law are mere technical problems (*problema technicum*).⁸⁰ The second or formal principle, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral politician (*moralischen Politikers*) who regards it as a moral problem (*problema morale*), differs widely from the other principle in its methods of bringing about perpetual peace, which we desire not only as a material good, but also as a *state* of things resulting from our recognition of the precepts of duty.⁸¹

[176] Kant seems to fall into a moralist utopia, giving priority to morality over legality (and coercion); but lacking at first the coercive juridical institutions, it does not seem that one could reach the intended universality.

This leads him to replant the relation of 'politics with morals',⁸² as contradiction between efficacy and justice, which he treats in three levels (the state, the relation between states and the cosmopolitan order). The first level he treats around two themes. First, an act can be moral and political only when it fulfils 'the claim of right' (*Rechtsanspruch*) by having the 'faculty of public-being' (*Publizität*). Second, all 'revolution' is unjust because one cannot announce 'publicly' his/her intention, since the proscribed action is subversive and for that clandestine, and so never could be just.⁸³

We arrive thus at the central work of Kant's fourth era: *The Metaphysics of Morals*. From there we can extract his definitive 'political philosophy',

79 Perpetual peace can be reached merely as a (material) end of convenience, happiness, or as a state reached by duty from the universality of the (formal) law. Only when it is formally intended with *morality*, for Kant, does it coincide with the kingdom of God (3.b with 3.a).

80 Newly the trilogy: 2.b.1: *Staatsrecht*; 2.b.2: *Völkerrecht*; 2.b.3: *Weltbürgerrecht*.

81 *Ibid.*, B 89, A 83; p. 106; p. 239 (Translation: Smith, pp. 175–6).

82 *Ibid.*, B 99f., A 93f.; p. 113; pp. 244f. (Translation: Smith, p. 184).

83 If 'the publicness' of the action is the essential note of that 'politically just'. Here Kant shows that respect for the legal order, concrete universality, makes all radical transformation of the law impossible, which defends to the death a conservatism that falls into contradiction: 'The wrongfulness of revolution is quite obvious from the fact that *openly* to acknowledge maxims which justify this step would make attainment of the end at which they aim impossible' (B 103, A 97; pp. 116–17; p. 246 [Translation: Smith, p. 187]). If anticipatorily, *one makes public* the rebellion one could not effect it. But a paradoxical example is if there is a rebellion and the leader is deposed, this would be dismissed as an unjust rebellion. Nevertheless, the citizen must 'refrain from inciting rebellion with a view to regaining his lost sovereignty' (*ibid.*, p. 117; p. 246 [Translation: Smith, p. 188]). For Kant the only criterion of legitimacy is that of 'the valid law *inasmuch valid*'; he does not have clarity around its basis. In some way, he falls into a positivist and conservative formalism.

since it is a moment of the 'metaphysics of *that ethical*', 'of that practical' (*Sitten*),⁸⁴ and is related to the 'metaphysics of nature'.⁸⁵ Within the meanings that Kant will give to the term 'metaphysical' we can affirm that there is an a priori legitimate and necessary science, an a priori knowledge, by pure concepts, of an object. The objects are of two types: physical (part of nature) or practical (part of the environment of a rational will), nevertheless they are not *noumenal* knowledge. It is a second part of the architectonic of Kant. In a first moment (*level A.1*), he treats the transcendental foundation of the validity of theoretical knowledge (the *Critique of Pure Reason*) (A.1.a) and of moral action (the *Critique of Practical Reason*) (A.1.b). The *passage* to the second moment is effected by the *search* from the particular in reference to the universal, thanks to the faculty of *reflective* judging of the *Critique of Judgment*. In a second moment (*level A.2*), the knowledge of nature is possible thanks to the teleological principle (A.2.a), and (A.2.b) the principle of liberty in virtuous motivation and legality to justify the environment of their objects: legal action and virtuous action (the practical future object), which need to integrate ends because there are no actions without *content*, a determined end ('kingdom of ends', which constitute a final *material* horizon, which was not necessary in the first moment (*level A.1*), occupied only with the transcendental *foundation*). It is the *justification* of the ethical validity of right and virtue.⁸⁶ Kant displays a positive discourse, not merely critical or negative.⁸⁷

The critique of *practical reason was to be followed* by a system, the metaphysics of morals, which falls into *metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of right* (A.2.b.α) [. . .] in the application of these principles to cases (*Anwendung*)⁸⁸ and the principles of the doctrine of virtue (A.2.b.β), the

84 To translate *Sitten* simply as 'customs' gives too much of a cultural sense to the concept. Meanwhile the translation as 'ethical life' from the Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* keeps more closely to the German signification. That 'moral' is for Kant that referring to 'morality' (*Moralität*), meanwhile 'that ethical' has relation to the 'material' aspects (see Dussel, 1998a, *Thesis 4*, [404]). Kant calls his 'notes' from class about this theme *Philosophia practica universalis* (Kant, 1988). Similar to *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Introduction, iv; AB 18; Kant, 1968, VII, 326; 1988; 26), Kant again uses the terminology of his *Lectures on Ethics* (*Philosophia practica universalis*).

85 See the *Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature* (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*) (Kant, 1968, VIII, 9ff.), from 1786.

86 It is 'justified' from 'fundamental' principles. See Habermas, 1999.

87 This does not mean that Kant has overcome his radical dualism: between body/soul, between sensibility/reason, and between the inferior feelings/superior faculties of desire. For his part, the will (*Willkür*), as faculty of particular maxims, when it is determined by reason, is *free will*; it is found in the order of justification, of pure *material* (that searches for its own perfection or another's happiness), and has the capacity 'of producing the object through action' (*ibid.*). The will, for its part, is the superior faculty of desire, rational, from which proceed the moral or juridical laws in their universality and that permit a *formal*, transcendental foundation. 'The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground [. . .] lies within the subject's reason is called the *will*' (*Metaphysics of Morals*, Introduction, I; AB 5; p. 317; p. 16 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 13]). If the *Critique of Practical Reason* has as basic reference will, *Metaphysics of Morals* refers principally to choice.

88 This would be a second *level B* of strict and final application.

system itself cannot be expected, but only approximation (*Annäherung*) to it.⁸⁹

The metaphysical principles of the moral horizon, or laws of freedom, when 'directed merely to *external* actions and their conformity to law they are called *juridical* laws [the *legality* (*Legalität*)],⁹⁰ but if they also require that they (the laws) themselves be the determining grounds (*Bestimmungsgründe*) of actions, they are *ethical* laws (*ethisch*) [. . .] its [an action's] morality (*Moralität*).⁹¹ All this is developed in an abstract level from pure concepts, which are not with 'the natural drives (*Triebe*) for food, sex, rest [. . .], for honor'.⁹²

We see then that a certain dualism is established in the practical environment.⁹³ Since the *external* or objective concordance with the law is separated from the *subjective* or moral *motivation*: 'Duties in accordance with rightful *lawgiving can be only external* duties [meanwhile] *ethical* lawgiving, while it also makes *internal* actions duties, does not exclude *external* actions.'⁹⁴

[177] The law assumes an external action, in relation to the will of the other (not with their desires), and abstracts from the *material* (no matter the end) and only asks for the *form*. Kant begins the exposition of *The Metaphysics of Morals* with the following:

Any action is *right* if it can coexist [. . .] or if on its [particular] maxim the *freedom of choice* (*Freiheit der Willkür*) of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law.⁹⁵

One starts from the *particular* maxim of action, and through the reflective power of judging, one verifies whether in the action the legal subject's freedom is not opposed to the freedom of others, that is, with reference to the *common* law for all the members of the community. So, if someone is opposed by their action to the freedom of the other, it is an obstacle to his/her freedom. 'To resist' (*Widerstand*) the obstacle (negation of the negation) is to keep the other in freedom. 'Coercion (*Zwang*) that is opposed to this (*Hindernisses*) (as a *hindering of a hindrance to freedom*) is consistent with

89 *Metaphysics of Morals*, Prologue, AB III-IV; p. 309; pp. 5-6 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 3).

90 'A law, which represents an action that is to be done as *objectively* necessary, that is, which makes the action a duty (*Pflicht*)' (*ibid.*, Introduction, ii; AB 14; p. 323; p. 23 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 20).

91 *Ibid.*, i; AB 6; p. 318; p. 17 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 14).

92 *Ibid.*, ii; AB 10; p. 320; p. 19 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 9).

93 Remember Figure 10.1, juridical levels 1.b and 2.b (juridical civil society), with respect to levels 1.a and 2.a ethical (ethical community).

94 *Ibid.*, iii; AB 15; p. 324; p. 24 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 21).

95 *Ibid.*, Introduction to the *Doctrine of Right*, § C; A 33, B 34; p. 337; p. 39 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 24). It is not found in the level of will but of choice (faculty of particular maxims).

freedom [. . .] it is right.⁹⁶ This coercion will be a general determination of right, which Kant divides into private and public. The private right, first part of the *Doctrine of Right*, is centred almost exclusively in the question of the 'right to private property' – following the tradition from Hobbes and Locke, but not deriving it like Hume; Hegel will follow his steps through a radical conceptual transformation. Kant thinks from the conditions of the European modern bourgeoisie. The first practical determination of subjectivity will be that 'rightfully mine' (*Rechtlich-Meine*).⁹⁷ The fundamental aspect is not the possession but the use of the thing; the being empowered to use it to the exclusion of third parties, as 'juridical possession', which starts from a 'common possession', restricted: 'This *original* community (*ursprüngliche Gemeinschaft*)⁹⁸ [. . .] is an idea that has *objective* (rightfully practical) reality. This kind of community must be sharply distinguished from a *primitive community* (*communio primaeva*), which is a fiction.'⁹⁹

In the state of nature is a common will which can attribute to someone ownership (by distributive choice) in a provisional way. Meanwhile 'the condition of being under a general external (which is public) lawgiving accompanied with power is the civil condition. So only in a civil condition can something external be mine or yours.'¹⁰⁰ Kant thus passes from the private to the public, from the *state of nature* to the *civil state*, but, at the same time, he opens a third space: the horizon of the *state of peace* as ultimate guarantee and assurance of the prior state; it is a transcendental order of postulates. Ownership, for its part, is a 'relation of a person to persons, all of whom are *bound* with regard to the use of the thing, by the *will* of the first person, insofar as his will conforms with the axiom of outer freedom, with the *postulate* of his capacity to use external objects of choice, and with the *lawgiving* of the will of all thought as united *a priori*'.¹⁰¹ Kant does not give to work the attribution of being which can grant the title of the possession of the thing or its fruits.¹⁰²

96 *Ibid.*, § 8; AB 73; p. 365; p. 69 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 25).

97 *Ibid.*, I, 1, § 1; AB 55; p. 353; p. 55 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 42). He writes: 'a rightful condition is that relation of human beings among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to *enjoy* his rights, and the formal condition under which this is possible in accordance with the idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice (*öffentliche Gerechtigkeit*)' (*ibid.*, § 41, A 156, B 155; p. 423; pp. 135–6 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, pp. 84–5]).

98 This concept is very close to what Marx will use (Dussel, 1993).

99 I. Kant, *op. cit.*, § 6; AV 65; p. 359; p. 63 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 40).

100 *Ibid.*, § 8; AB 73; p. 365; p. 69 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 45).

101 *Ibid.*, § 17; AB 94; p. 380; p. 86 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 55).

102 *Ibid.* This formalism will keep him from understanding the importance of the political economy to which Locke, Hume or Smith give greater relevance. It is the blindness in the face of the *material* level (life, corporality, feelings, necessities, labour . . .). In the text about 'What is money?' (*ibid.*, § 31; AB 122; pp. 400f.; pp. 110f.), Kant demonstrates that he has read A. Smith, but does not deepen the question. He writes: 'The price (*pretium*) of a thing is the judgment of the public (*öffentliches Urteil*) about its *value* (*valor*) in portion to that which serves as the universal means to represent reciprocal exchange of *industry* its circulation' (*ibid.*, AB 126; p. 403; p. 113 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 70]). The Hanseatic citizen is more interested in mercantilism than in industrial revolution.

Only in the *Second Part* of the *Doctrine of Right* do we reach our theme. For Kant, as for the formalists (Apel, Habermas, in minor measure for Rawls, etc.), *politics* is reduced in the end to a philosophy of right; there is nothing of *material* politics, *strategic* politics, or the *ordo amoris* (as Max Scheler would say).

The 'transition (*Übergang*)¹⁰³ from what is mine or yours in a *state of nature* to what is mine or yours in a rightful condition generally' is the point of rupture toward politics.¹⁰⁴ Ownership continues being the key to the vault of the Kantian philosophy of right. Kant treats the theme in three horizons: the state 'for a people' (*für ein Volk*) (2.b.1 of the previous diagram), 'for a multitude of peoples' (*für eine Menge von Völkern*) (2.b.2), or for all people, 'since the earth's surface is not unlimited (*grenzelos*)' (2.b.3).¹⁰⁵ Kant has a world sense of politics and law (anticipatingly against Hegel); he indicates:¹⁰⁶

So if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful condition (*rechtlichen Zustandes*), the framework of all the others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse.¹⁰⁷

[178] One has a responsibility and must defend the postulate of the practical reason of 'perpetual peace', in the long term, because the greater evil is 'to attack one another'.¹⁰⁸ The *civil state* is the result of avoiding this 'human evilness'. Kant is interested in the capacity of legal coercion,¹⁰⁹ to 'be secure (*sicher*) against violence (*Gewalttätigkeit*) from one another'.¹¹⁰ This does not mean that Hobbes was right because the *state of nature* is not a 'state of injustice [. . .]', but it would still be a state *devoid of justice* (*status iustitia vacuus*), in which [remembering the impartial observer of Smith] when rights are *in dispute* (*ius controversum*), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force'.¹¹¹ We reach a central description:

¹⁰³ This concept of *Übergang* (to pass over, pass through) will be in Hegel and Marx the dialectical moment par excellence: the 'passage' from being to the essence (Hegel), from money to capital (Marx).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., § 41; A 155; B 154; p. 422; p. 135 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 85). §§ 43-9 are central to the political philosophy of Kant and in relation to his predecessors and successors.

¹⁰⁵ See *ibid.*, § 43, A 161-2, B 191-2; p. 429; pp. 139-40 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 89).

¹⁰⁶ It is not strange that the true North American Republican, like Fukuyama (1992), is helped by Hegel but not Kant.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., § 43 end (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 89).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., § 44; A 163, B 193; p. 430; p. 140 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 89).

¹⁰⁹ Kant is a realist in politics. He believes in the advantage of the 'civil state', because it is 'subject itself to a public lawful external coercion (*öffentlichen gesetzlichen äußeren Zwange*)' (*ibid.* [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 90]).

¹¹⁰ Ibid (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 90).

¹¹¹ Ibid., A 164; B 194; pp. 430-1; p. 141 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 90). So it is

A *state (civitas)* is a union of a multitude (*Menge*)¹¹² of human beings under laws of right (*Rechtsgesetzen*). [. . . It is] *the state in idea*, as it ought to be (*sein soll*) in accordance with pure principles of right [. . .] Every state contains three *authorities* within it, that is, the general united will (*allgemein Willen*) consists of one triple person (*dreifache Person*).^{113, 114}

All the powers rest at the end on 'the concurring and united will of all (*allgemein vereinigte Volkswille*) [since] only the general united will of the people, can be legislative'.¹¹⁵ The 'members' of the civil society are the 'citizens' (*Staatsbürger*), who have 'lawful freedom', 'civil equality' and 'civil independence' (*bürgerlichen Selbständigkeit*); those able to be 'active or passive' include those who are excluded (as passive citizens) women, servants, wage workers, who by this 'lack civil personality [. . . or] civil independence'.¹¹⁶ Further, 'a people cannot offer any resistance [. . .] which would be consistent with right, since a *rightful condition* is possible only by submission to its [of the authority] general legislative will. There is, therefore, no right to *sedition (seditio)*, still less to *rebellion (rebellio)*, and least of all is there a right against the head of state as an individual person (the monarch)'.¹¹⁷

A change in a (defective) constitution [. . .] can therefore be carried out only through *reform* by the sovereign itself, but not by the people,¹¹⁸ and therefore not by *revolution* [. . .] Once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which

the argument of Locke; but Kant, against Locke, thinks that the competent judge has to institute it legally within all the nations. Locke, philosopher of a budding empire, justifies slavery, the conquest of America and the expansion by wars (just?) through the lack of international judge. Kant, however, from the Prussian perspective, which is only a half power without imperial intentions, tries 'to secure' the independence of the German people in the face of the great powers (France and the United Kingdom) institutionalizing the international judge. These are distinct political philosophies from distinct strategic-political perspectives. Locke gives reasons for the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon empires; meanwhile Kant gives his own to show the necessity of juridical international relations. Kant has to be seriously considered in the constitution of a political liberation philosophy of the peripheral, post-colonial peoples.

¹¹² He is inspired by Spinoza and Rousseau; Antonio Negri is too.

¹¹³ Here Kant judges with words, since the terms used speak of the theological 'Trinity', referring to the legislative sovereign power, the executive power and the judicial power. 'Like the three propositions in a practical syllogism: the major premise, which contains the *law* of that will; the minor premise, which contains the *command* to behave in accordance with the law, that is, the principle of subsumption (*Subsumtion*) under the law; and the conclusion, which contains the *verdict* (sentence)' (*ibid.*, A 166-9, B 196; pp. 431-2; pp. 142-3 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 91]).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, § 45; A 165, B 195; p. 431; p. 142 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, pp. 90-1).

¹¹⁵ This term of long tradition in political philosophy – *gesetzgebend* – is translated correctly as 'legislative', but in a more literal way it is he who constitutes or 'of the law'.

¹¹⁶ All the lexicographic indications are found in § 46 (*ibid.*, A 166-9, B 196-9; pp. 432-4; pp. 143-5 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 92]).

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, General observations, A; A 176, B 206; p. 439; p. 151 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 96).

¹¹⁸ Against Rousseau, a split between the sovereign and the people has been produced.

it began and has been implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens.¹¹⁹

Kant does not note that he commits a contradiction: he either supports an oligarchic republic or falls simply into a legalist positivism. I believe that his conservative position is based in the second possibility. Kant thinks of a republican state with a legislative power (like the extended Roman senate) as last resort. This is seen clearly in that 'a people' have 'active' citizens who elect and are elected in the legislative body, and other 'passive' citizens who do not elect nor are elected (only obey by duty and cannot revolt), as a 'blacksmith in India, who goes into people's houses to work on iron with his hammer, anvil, and bellows, as compared with the European carpenter or blacksmith who can put the products of his work up as goods for sale to the public'.¹²⁰ The second is an 'active' citizen, and the first only 'passive', although both 'make up a people'.¹²¹ This 'people' cannot rebel; only the legislative power has right, because it is the sovereign, to *reform*. It is an essential question for a *Politics of Liberation*.

Kant posits with much greater precision than Hobbes the problem of the relation of the Church with civil society, giving it not an authority over the Church (as in Hobbes), but a '*negative* right to prevent [. . .] an influence on the *visible* public commonwealth that might be prejudicial to public peace'.¹²²

[179] Kant will not discover the proper statute of the metropolitan states or European colonialists. He treats them all as equal, and does not think about the rising (although still colonial) states.

There is a 'passage' to a new development of the philosophy of law, analysing 'on relation with regard to rights of a citizen to his native land and to foreign countries'.¹²³ Taking inspiration from Leibniz, Kant posits teleologically and historically a postulate against the supreme evil of war: a *state of peace* among the nations. As an 'original contract' (*ursprünglichen Vertrages*) is postulated, one's 'spirit' obliges the 'constituting power' (*konstituierenden Gewalt*) 'to change the kind of government gradually and

¹¹⁹ Ibid., A 178-80, B 209-10; pp. 442-3; pp. 153-4 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 98).

¹²⁰ Ibid., § 46; A 168, B 18; p. 433; p. 144 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 92). It is an excellent empirical description pertaining to a pre-capitalist or properly capitalist productive system. But the subsuming of living labour within capital would not be motive for so grave a political differentiation. The conservative Eurocentrism of Kant is evident, and his blindness to the material level keeps him from taking seriously political economy as a structure necessary for the determination of political categories and law.

¹²¹ Ibid. (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 92). The category 'people' allows him to include in the 'civil state' 'active' and 'passive' citizens. Kant keeps ambiguously the name of the oligarchic community of 'active' citizens (which in Greece was, with other determinations, *démós*). It was a republic with a 'restricted' democracy: a republican oligarchy.

¹²² Ibid., Observations, C; A 190, B 220; p. 448; pp. 160-1 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 102).

¹²³ See *ibid.*, § 50; A 207f., B 237f.; pp. 460ff.; pp. 174ff. (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 110).

continually¹²⁴ so that it harmonizes [. . .] with the only [. . .] pure republic [. . .] which makes *freedom* the principle and [. . .] only *provisional* right within it'.¹²⁵ Empirical reality has to be managed as a *provisional* effect, meanwhile the postulate of *perpetual peace* is not realized historically and the merely 'passive' citizen would have to accept it until s/he can be 'active', since 'the united people does not merely *represent* the sovereign: it is the sovereign itself'.¹²⁶

Since 'in the *state of nature* among states, the *right to go to war* [. . .] is the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute its right against another state, namely by its own *force*',¹²⁷ the only way of eradicating war, and for the same reasons that one 'passed' from the *state of nature* to the *civil state*, now is in the international level. But since each 'state is judge in its own case' a *state of peace* seems impossible.¹²⁸ Here Kant shows his greatness and establishes a chapter of the critique of utopian reason:

So *perpetual peace* [. . .] is indeed an unachievable idea. Still, the political principles (*politische Grundsätze*) directed toward *perpetual peace*, of entering into such alliances of states, which serve for continual *approximation* (*Annäherung*) to it, are not unachievable. Instead, since continual *approximation* to it is a task based on duty and therefore on the right of human beings and of states, this can certainly be achieved.¹²⁹

Kant still thinks of a permanent 'congress of states', with 'a federation [. . .] which is based on a constitution'.¹³⁰ It would be, as Carl Schmitt will explain, a positivized *ius gentium europium*.¹³¹ But in Kant there is a world, final regulative Idea:

This rational idea of a *peaceful* [. . .] thoroughgoing community of all nations on the earth (*Gemeinschaft aller Völker auf Erden*) [. . .] is not a philanthropic (ethical) principle but a principle *having to do with rights*.

124 This formulation (*allmählich und kontinuierlich*) is important in critical political philosophy.

125 *Ibid.*, § 52; A 213, B 242; p. 464; pp. 178–9 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 112).

126 *Ibid.*, p. 464; p. 179 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 113). He continues: 'For in it (the people) is originally found the supreme authority from which all rights of individuals as mere subjects [. . .] must be derived' (*ibid.*).

127 *Ibid.*, § 56; A 220, B 250; p. 469; p. 185 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 116).

128 *Ibid.*, § 60; A 226, B 256; p. 473; p. 189 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 119).

129 *Ibid.*, § 61; A, 228, B 258; p. 474; pp. 190–1 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 119). Formally, for Kant, in the environment of the law the empirical alliances were anticipated ideally and imposed a duty to try to establish the 'kingdom of God' over the land as *perpetual peace*. For Marx, it was *materially* (in political economy, by its content). Production 'always continues being a *kingdom of necessity*. Far away, the development of human strengths begins, considered as *an end in itself* [Kantian teleological-historical principle], the *true kingdom of liberty* that only can flourish with that kingdom of necessity as its base. The reduction of the working day is the basic condition' (*Capital*, I, Part III, ch. 7; MEW XXV, 828; trans. Cast., Mexico, 1975, t. III/8, 1,044 [Translation: TC]). In both, the end is 'far' from the empirical horizon. In my debates with K.-O. Apel I have addressed these questions.

130 *Ibid.*, § 61 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 120).

131 Schmitt, 1979.

Nature has enclosed them all together within determined limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a *globus terraqueus*).¹³²

It seems that Kant advances to our era of globalization and shows a certain claustrophobia by being imprisoned in a limited earthly space. It is true that the *ius cosmopolitanum* is the right of 'an inhabitant of the earth (*weltbürgerliche*) [. . .] to make this attempt [. . .] (the possible union of all nations) (*Vereinigung aller Völker*)',¹³³ whose anticipatory effective half is the 'physical *interaction (commercium)* [. . .] of *offering to engage in commerce (Verkehr)* with any other',¹³⁴ an illusion of a commercial culture.

Before concluding this part we have a methodological reflection. If the negation or affirmation of the empirical existence of something cannot be proven, not even its real possibility, 'he can still ask whether he has any *interest* in assuming one or the other (as an hypothesis), [. . .] from a practical point of view [. . .] to achieve a certain end [. . .] what would be made our duty in this case is not the *assumption (suppositio)* that this end (*Zwecks*) can be realized [. . . because] what is incumbent upon us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with the idea of that end [. . .] as long as its impossibility (*Unmöglichkeit*) cannot be demonstrated either'.¹³⁵ We are then confronted with a statement like the 'principle of impossibility' of Hinkelammert. Kant is saying that *perpetual peace* (intended end) has 'logical' possibility, but 'empirical' impossibility with respect to its perfect historical realization. Nevertheless, there is an 'empirical' possibility of its partial accomplishment if one tries it:¹³⁶

We must act as if (*als ob*)¹³⁷ it [perpetual peace] is something real, though perhaps it is not [. . .] and if [. . . it] remains a pious wish, still we are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working incessantly towards it. For this is our duty [. . .] Establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes [. . .] the entire final end (*ganzen Endzweck*) of the doctrine of right [. . .]; for the *condition of peace* is the only condition in

¹³² Kant, op. cit., § 62; A 229, B 259; p. 475; p. 192 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 121).

¹³³ Ibid., § 62; A 230; B 260; p. 476; p. 193 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 121).

¹³⁴ Ibid (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 121).

¹³⁵ Ibid., Conclusion, A 232-3, B 263-4; pp. 477-8; pp. 194-5 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 123).

¹³⁶ See Dussel, 1998, § 3.4, about the 'principle of ability to be fact'. Popper wanted to demonstrate the impossibility of perfect planning (logically possible but empirically impossible) but imperfect possible planning by approximation (as Kant indicates) went unnoticed. Perfect *perpetual peace* is impossible; *historical peace* as imperfect approximation is possible and is a *responsibility* to try.

¹³⁷ This is the famous 'as if' of Bloch and some other neo-Kantians, essential in utopian reason. Eduardo Galeani, Uruguayan poet, was asked in a conversation: 'What do impossible utopias serve for? To continue walking in their direction.' Saramago critiqued the utopia, confusing it with the 'transcendental illusion' (of Hinkelammert), with the intention of realizing effectively and empirically (which is impossible) the postulate (logically possible). The postulate that orients action is nevertheless empirically impossible of being totally realized.

which what is mine and what is yours. [It is a] continual approximation (*Annäherung*) to the highest political good (*höchsten politischen Gut*).¹³⁸

[180] Note that we have arrived at a complex 'material' destination of *ends and goods*. If the *Critique of Practical Reason* ended treating the theme of the 'supreme good' in general, here we have touched the Kantian *end of politics*: 'the highest political good', *perpetual peace*. The politician, for Kant, is the one who against all hopelessness struggles through responsibility in the attainment of this 'highest political good'. It is the statesmen, the great politicians, not those (theoretical and practical) Machiavellians whom we come across continually.

In the second part, Kant continues the exposition of his 'system of rational knowledge from concepts', his *metaphysics*, but not what 'has to do only with the *formal condition* of choice',¹³⁹ which is the law, but to 'any end (the matter of choice)',¹⁴⁰ which is the doctrine of virtue. In effect, 'virtue signifies a moral strength (*Stärke*) of the will [. . .] in fulfilling his *duty*, a moral *constraint* through his own lawgiving reason'.¹⁴¹ 'Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural (*Naturneigungen*) *inclinations*'.¹⁴² Virtue then is that interior force that moves the will to act in conformity with the responsibility against the inclinations, and 'like anything *formal*, [. . .] based on a firm disposition, is merely one and the same. But, with respect to the *end* of actions [. . .] what one *ought* [. . .] there are many duties of virtue (*Tugendpflicht*).'¹⁴³ If the rights are objective, public, external, which coerce the external freedom of the others, the responsibilities are internal, subjective, which coerce internal freedom, and the virtues 'an aptitude [as] subjective perfection of *choice* [in] *subduing* (*zu zähmen*) *one's affects and dominating* (*zu beherrschen*) *one's passions*'.¹⁴⁴

When he begins to describe the 'duties to oneself', he shows the reductive sense of the narrow vision of the *material*. He *reduces* 'human life'¹⁴⁵ to mere life 'like an animal',¹⁴⁶ and the responsibility consists in conserving

138 Ibid., A 235, B 265; pp. 478–9; p. 195 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, pp. 123–4).

139 Explained *ibid.*, II, Prologue; A iii; p. 503; p. 223 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 141).

140 Ibid., A vii; p. 505; p. 225 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 141).

141 Ibid., Introduction, XIII; A 46; p. 537, p. 262 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 164).

142 Ibid., IX; A 28; p. 525; p. 248 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 156). Slavoj Žižek expresses correctly, in the face of the Puritan neo-Stoicism of Kant: 'The truth of Kant's ethical rigorism is the sadism of the Law [. . .] so that *following one's desire* overlaps with *doing one's duty*' ('Kant with (or against) Sade', in Žižek, 2000, p. 288).

143 Kant, *op. cit.*, IX; A 29–30; pp. 525–6; pp. 248–9 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 157).

144 Ibid., XIV, 50; p. 539; p. 265 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 166).

145 See Dussel, 1998a, ch. 1.

146 'The *first* [. . .] duty of a human being to himself as an animal being is to *preserve himself* (*Selbsterhaltung*) in his animal nature' (*ibid.*, I, B. I, ch. 1, § 5; A 70; p. 280 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 176]). The Kantian dualism destroys all possibility of an effective material ethic. He is speaking of 'life' but thinks that it is something like a mode of existence of the

the animal life as condition. Responsibility to oneself is 'one's own perfection'.¹⁴⁷ The fundamental responsibility with others is to watch for 'the happiness of others',¹⁴⁸ remembering that 'love [. . . being a] feeling [. . .] a *duty to love* is an absurdity'.¹⁴⁹

We want to refer to a work that had repercussions in the *Reform* of the German University of Jena and which von Humboldt in Berlin would tackle years later: *The Conflict of the Faculties*. We will address the conflict between the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Law. The question that he intends to resolve is 'is the human race constantly progressing?'.¹⁵⁰ After opposing various positions, he concludes that there are strong moments in history (Walter Benjamin would call them 'messianic eruptions' of the *Jetzt-Zeit*); he is referring to the French Revolution of 1789 (some ten years before this):

It is simply the mode of thinking (*Denkungsart*) of the spectators which reveals itself *publicly* (*öffentlich*) in this game of great revolutions [. . .] The revolution of a gifted people [. . .] finds in the hearts of all spectators [. . .] a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm [. . .] the right, that a nation must not be hindered in providing itself with a civil constitution [. . .] republican.¹⁵¹

This revolution creates the expectation of 'the whole scope of all the peoples on the earth',¹⁵² because it has a moral element, since 'enlighten-

physical body, which does not touch the soul, subjectivity. From here all the Kantian fallacies are followed (and of the neo-Kantians, neo-contractualists: Rawls, Apel, Habermas, etc.) in his ethics and politics. He does not note that the 'life' of the human being does not have any of the animal: it is all human, until the last genetic chain, genome, cell or neuron. Anthropological dualism destroys his politics. And this remains evidenced when, explaining the theme of suicide, he says that suicide is 'to annihilate the subject of morality' (*ibid.*, § 6; p. 555; p. 282 [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 177]). If life is an animal quality of the body, murder of the body would leave subjectivity (the soul) in liberty, as Socrates thought.

147 *Ibid.*, Introduction, VIII; A 34; p. 522; p. 244 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 150). He returns to that explained in his rationalist stage (with a naïve metaphysical sense). Kant uses some (better than in the *Metaphysics of Morals*) of his *Lectures on Ethics*: 'Duties towards the body in regard to life' and 'The Suicide' (1988, pp. 187f.).

148 *Ibid.*, A 27; p. 524; p. 247 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 155).

149 *Ibid.*, X, c; A 40; p. 533; p. 257 (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 161). Kant indicates that one can have love, 'benevolence [. . .] as conduct, can be subject to a law of duty' (*ibid.* [Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 161]) One can love out of respect for responsibility. I believe that Žižek is right: the categorical imperative obliges not to love: it is the castration of desire, in particular of sexual desire, which indicates aspects of an incredible masochism in his *Lectures on Ethics* (Kant, 1988, pp. 203f.: 'Since the sexual impulse is not an inclination that one human has for another, *qua* human, but an inclination for their sex, it is therefore a *principium* of the debasement of humanity'). [Translation: Heath, p. 156]. They are irritating sado-masochistic texts. Baumgarten wrote: '*peccata ex libidine intemperantia*' (*Philosophical Ethics* [1763], § 275, p. 174).

150 *The Conflict of the Faculties*, II, 6; A 132 (Kant, 1968, IX, 351; 1999, 8–9).

151 *Ibid.*, A 143–5; pp. 357–8; pp. 108–9 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, p. 153).

152 *Ibid.*, 7; A 151; p. 362; p. 112 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, p. 161).

ment¹⁵³ of the masses is the public (*öffentliche*) instruction of the people in its duties and rights',¹⁵⁴ so that 'the citizens obedient to the law, besides being united, ought also to be legislative'.¹⁵⁵ Progress is 'not an ever-growing quantity of morality with regard to intention, but an increase of the effects of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motives',¹⁵⁶ a greater state of law, which tends toward a cosmopolitan society, where one is 'compelled to render the greatest obstacle to morality [: war]'.¹⁵⁷

The pacifism of Kant is almost two centuries ahead of its time in defining political progress as public legality with the possibility of external coercion, which assures the moral realization of the human being.

The State, a 'Transitory' Moment in History: J. G. Fichte and F. G. Schelling

[181] When Kant still had not begun the 'fourth era' of his thinking (*Critique of Judgment* in 1790) Karl L. Reinhold, former student of the Jesuits, had begun in 1786 the discussion about Kantian philosophy, with which opens the glorious stage of Jena (a city in Thuringia in the centre of Germany) with his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*,¹⁵⁸ the appearance and disappearance of the 'systems' revolving dizzily.¹⁵⁹ Kant had anticipated in a book of 1783, the *Prolegomena of a Future Metaphysics*,¹⁶⁰ 'after the attack, which Hume directed' against metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,¹⁶¹ 'which needed metaphysics to develop a *system* according to a secure plan'.¹⁶² That metaphysics had to display a discourse for a priori concepts as much from

153 Kant uses the word *Volksaufklärung* in the sense of the 'Enlightenment' as popular philosophical cultural movement of Modernity.

154 *Ibid.*, 8, A 152; p. 362; p. 114 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, p. 161).

155 *Ibid.*, A 155; p. 364; p. 116 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, pp. 163-5).

156 *Ibid.*, 9, A 157; p. 365; p. 117 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, p. 165).

157 *Ibid.*, 10, A 160; p. 367; p. 119 (Translation: Gregor, 1979, p. 169).

158 See Hartmann, 1960, I, pp. 19f.

159 Retaining for our purposes the following: 1787: Jacobi, *David Hume on Faith*; 1794: Fichte, *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge*; 1795: Schelling, *On the I as the Principle of Philosophy*; 1799: Schleiermacher, *On Religion*; 1800: Hegel, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy*; 1803: Krause, *Foundation of Natural Law*; 1807: Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*; 1809: von Humboldt founds the University of Berlin; 1812-16: Hegel, *Logic*; 1817: Hegel, *Encyclopedia*; 1821: Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*. Randall Collins (1998, p. 618) calls this moment 'The German University Revolution': 'The philosophical issues of the last 200 years [of mature modernity] have been generated by the expansionary dynamic of that system' (*ibid.*). The Prussians base their expansion on the imposition of obligatory military service and massive education of the people.

160 Kant, 1968, V, III f.

161 *Op. cit.*, Preface; A 7; p. 115; 1968, p. 41 (Translation: TC). In this Preface Kant wrote that 'Hume awoke from a dogmatic dream' (*ibid.*, A 13; p. 118; p. 45 [Translation: TC]).

162 *Ibid.*, A 15; p. 119; p. 47 [Translation: TC]. Marx will say something similar with respect to the critique of political economy, whose task treats the 'general critique of all the systems of the categories of economy' (*Manuscripts from 1861-1863*; Marx and Engels, 1975 [MEGA], sec. II, vol. III, p. 1,385).

nature¹⁶³ as from the moral environment or from the state.¹⁶⁴ The debate (of Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte and those who follow) consists in proving how the system that Kant was developing (until 1804, the year of his death) is *continued and systematized*, and frequently does not enter still in the disputes of his followers, absorbed in their own development 'far' from Kant. Jacobi, returning to Spinoza, affirms the possibility of knowledge, or better the belief (rational faith) in the reality of the 'thing itself'.

However, Johann G. Fichte (1762–1814), radicalizing the Kantian critique, finds in the presupposition of the 'I think' the Kantian *system* in power.¹⁶⁵

I do not ignore that Kant did not establish such a *system* [. . .] Nevertheless I am equally certain that Kant thought about such a *system*; all that he explained effectively are fragments or results of this *system*.¹⁶⁶

Fichte starts from what Kant had called 'transcendental apperception', or reference to the subject (the I) of all acts of subjectivity, in what is first an 'I practice, the acting produces the object' (*Tathandlung*),¹⁶⁷ in contrast to the simple 'fact' or given thing (*Tatsache*). Fichte develops the *system*, in its first period, as a practical (not theoretical) system.¹⁶⁸ One year after Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, Fichte published *The System of Doctrine of the Customs*,¹⁶⁹ where new proposals are glimpsed,¹⁷⁰ in particular that

163 In the *Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature* (Kant, 1968, VIII, 7f.) he studies four parts: the phoronomy (the pure movement of a material, thing, in space), dynamics (the material that moves with a force), mechanics (the quantitative relation of things within themselves) and phenomenology (the material that moves and becomes object of experience). A little later, far from the principle of causality, Kant describes the 'principle of finality'. All this would correspond to the metaphysics of the sciences and nature.

164 The principal work of Kant in this respect is the *Metaphysics of Morals*, whose Prologue begins with the following words: 'The critique of *practical* reason was to be followed by a *system*, [. . .] the counterpart of the metaphysical first principles of *natural science*, [in order to make] intuitive the form which the *system* will take in both these parts' (Translation: Gregor, 1996, p. 3).

165 See Dussel, 1974b, pp. 43f.

166 Second Introduction to the *Doctrine of Science* (1797), 6; Fichte, 1971, I, p. 478 (Translation: TC).

167 *Basis of all the Doctrine of Science* (1794), I, § 1; Fichte, 1971, I, pp. 92f.

168 In 1796, one year before Kant's work, Fichte published, *The Basis of Natural Law Following the Principles of the Doctrine of Science* (Fichte, 1971, III, pp. 1–385), which one should study. Fichte uses a 'deductive' method of the law of the already stated principles. He concludes with two appendices on the 'Law of People' (*Völkerrecht*) and 'the Law of World Citizenship' (*Weltbürgerrechte*, §§ 1–24; Fichte, 1971, III, pp. 369–85). In 1813 Fichte wrote a *Doctrine of the State, or about the Relation between the Original State (Urstaates) and the Kingdom of Reason* (Fichte, 1971, IV, pp. 367–600).

169 *Sittenlehre* could also be translated as 'doctrine of ethics', of the moral or practical: 'Sittenlehre is practical philosophy', writes Fichte (op. cit., Introduction, p. 3; Fichte, 1971, IV, p. 2). 'Metaphysics' is not spoken of, as in Kant, but 'System'. The first point to treat is the 'Deduction of the Principle of Ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*)' (ibid., 13), where one sees his position on 'recognition' (pp. 3f.). See Honeeth, 1992, pp. 29f.; 1997, pp. 26f.).

170 For example: 'On the formal conditions of the morality of our actions' (pp. 157f.); 'On the matter of practical laws' (pp. 206ff.); etc.

the 'community' is the group of subjects, who 'recognize' (*anerkennen*) each other mutually. Fichte starts then from intersubjectivity, criticizing the solipsistic Cartesian *ego cogito*. This aspect interests us particularly.

Kant had discovered in the birth of the modern state the *state of war*. To overcome that *state* civil society is formed; but it remains in a *state of war* with other states; it is necessary to overcome this *state* to struggle to install a *global perpetual peace*. He wants to say that the *particular* state does not exile evil from the earth. The *particular* state is not the final expression of rationality, nor is it a guarantee as a last resort of morality. Fichte initiates a new tradition: the critique of the modern state, since he radicalizes the negative judgement of the state from a 'philosophy of freedom', which looks with evil eyes on the external coercion of the *material* structures, which are clearly economic.¹⁷¹ Fichte does not forget human evil, without accepting it as an irrevocable destiny but as a political demand to search for critical institutional solutions:

The fundamental principle of Machiavellian politics, and we affirm without shame is also ours, the principle of any coherent theory of the state is contained in the words of Machiavelli (*Discorsi*, L. 1. Ch. 3): 'Who founds a republic (or in general a state) and dictates laws, must assume that all human beings are evil.'¹⁷²

[182] Fichte does not want to suggest that one continues in a *state of nature*, but an inevitable violence remains in the *civil state*, in which the social order is designated. In his review of the work of Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, Fichte indicates that disorder and violence are inevitable, and in certain cases can even produce some positive and advantageous effects, to a certain limit of that tolerable.¹⁷³ The state does not resolve in an exact way the state of violence, and injustice can be produced even with the laws, which are an insufficient exterior *formal* expression: 'The law is only *formal*, in the sense that everyone should limit their freedom, but is it not *material*, up to what point should it be limited? That limit must be agreed (*vereinigen*).'¹⁷⁴

The accord assumes material contents about the determination and distribution of property, for example. If the *material* foundation of the accord is unjust the law will not be sustained in the long term, although the order is

¹⁷¹ The young Fichte published *A Contribution to the Rectification of the Judgement of the Public about the French Revolution* (1783), where he clearly expresses, against Kant: 'a people has the right to transform (*verändern*) their Constitution' (Fichte, 1971, VI, p. 50 [Translation: TC]). Fichte shows an enthusiastic and reasoned supporting of the revolution that has installed a republic in place of a monarchy. These 240 pages are important for the theme that occupies us.

¹⁷² 'Intellectual and moral character of the writer Machiavelli' (1807), in Fichte, 1971, XI, p. 401 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷³ See Fichte, 1971, VIII, pp. 433-6.

¹⁷⁴ Review cited, p. 432 (Translation: TC).

'legally just'. When there is opposition to the law, the law wounded someone, suffering a negative effect, and so it seems advantageous to risk losing by rebelling, calculating that what is lost is less than what the law has harmed. The 'law of coercion' (*Zwangrecht*)¹⁷⁵ has a limit: the accord of the majority, of the popular will, in 'recognizing' (*anzuerkennen*) the importance of the 'collective voice' (*Sammlung der Stimmen*),¹⁷⁶ which expresses material interests. Fichte proposes that the law has a reference to a *materiality* of historical relations. 'A state of exploitation and repression, Maesschalck comments, cannot get the *material* foundation of a just *formal* constitution. This will always produce inequality.'¹⁷⁷ But although there is injustice one would have it in an acceptable degree. This acceptability lasts until one has a model, in another state, which permits a greater possibility for the freedom of consenting to the goods. Material justice is a criterion of *longevity*, *long term* for the political order. The juridical institution of the state assumes a struggle, in reference to popular consensus. Political action, then, has two frontiers: one, delimited by the improving of the material situation of the people, who have not only to protect property but to distribute it following a 'contract of association'; another, by the fulfilment and development of the rational demands of the state. But, against Kant and the English philosophers, property is not the condition of citizenship; citizenship is the condition of ownership. In his work *The Closed Commercial State*, Fichte criticizes the mercantilism and the free exchange of the market, reserving for the state external commerce to not distort the internal market.

A novelty is produced and an inversion of greater consequences. Although property is necessary (deduced dialectically as by Hume), nevertheless it is limited from a rational Idea of the state. The Fichte family was from a village of artisans occupied in textile tasks, which exported products to England. But the Industrial Revolution of the British Isles produced a deep crisis in his birth region. Fichte notes the necessity of 'closing' the frontiers of the less 'developed' countries (Germany with respect to Great Britain) and to protect imports and exports with a 'rational' intervention of the state in the market. Germauy was a 'backward' country, but not properly 'exploited' colonial or post-colonial.¹⁷⁸ In addition, as years passed, he saw the evolution of the French Revolution and the installation of Fichte in Berlin (coming from Jena) and passes to give more concrete advice to the prince with respect to the destiny of Prussia:

A certain number of humans submitted to the same laws and to the same highest coercive power from a legal state. But if this quantity of human

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Maesschalck, 1991, p. 123 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷⁸ The 'populisms' from between wars or post-war (from 1930 and 1945) in Latin America propose Fichte's solution. Perón created an Institute of Exports (the IAPI) of Argentinean wheat and meat to England and Europe. He was criticized as a communist; he was simply the protector of the post-colonial 'national capital' in a neocolonial stage of 'dependence'.

beings is limited now to the *domestic* activity of mutual trade [. . .] and *production for each other*, and anyone who is not submitted to the same legislation and coercive power is excluded from participation in those relations, then [is] formed a *closed commercial state*, like our *closed legal state*.¹⁷⁹

Against Anglo-Saxon political philosophy, Fichte defines the economic *material* order as another level of the political and does not exclude it from the political field, since it is mutually determined by the juridical structure and the coercion of the state. The market is not, as it was for Smith or Kant, an indifferent world horizon.¹⁸⁰ It is determined within the horizon of a *particular* state. Marx will follow his steps.

Fichte, as few political philosophers, has clarity about the *material* level of politics:

The end of all human activity is to live (*leben zu können*); all those who nature brought to life have this same right, this possibility of living (*Möglichkeit zu leben*).¹⁸¹ For this, one has to divide [property] among all in such a way that *everyone has sufficient means to subsist*. Live and let live! (*Leben und leben lassen!*) [. . .] Therefore, the division [of rights] has to be done so that *all can live without danger*.¹⁸²

[183] Fichte explains the *material principle* of politics explicitly: it is the *content* of all politics, far from the Kantian formalism and the bourgeois complicity of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy. On the one hand, he discovers that philosophy itself responds to *material* demands since 'commercial interests (*Handelsinteresse*) give rise to political concepts (*politische Begriffe*), which cannot be more adventurous, and, against Kant, from these concepts originate wars'.¹⁸³ For this reason, Fichte thinks that it is necessary to leave a so-called self-organized market à la Adam Smith; one has to be liberated 'from commercial anarchy (*Handelsanarchie*) [to pass] to the organization of trade through reason (*vernunftmässigen*)'.¹⁸⁴ The *rational* state does not demand only a juridical order but an 'economic order'. For this reason, he describes some elements of the material order of the

179 *The Closed Commercial State* (1800), Initial declaration; Fichte, 1971, III, p. 388; 1991, p. 3 (Translation: TC).

180 In the traditional interpretation, not in ours.

181 Fichte does not assign an original right to being alive, but those still living ('that nature brought to life') have the right to 'be able to live' or 'possibility' of continuing living.

182 *Ibid.*, B. I, ch. 1, II; p. 402; p. 19 (Translation: TC).

183 *Ibid.*, B. II, ch. 6; p. 468; p. 107 (Translation: TC). Kant believed optimistically that 'commerce' would be the vehicle of perpetual peace (we do not forget that Königsberg was part of the Hanseatic League), meanwhile Fichte shows that commerce is the origin of many wars (speaks the son of artisans in crisis in 'peripheral' Germany). Fichte has defined what an 'ideology' is in a critical sense.

184 *Ibid.*, B. III, ch. 1; p. 476; p. 116 (Translation: TC). The project of Marx is already clearly sketched.

reproduction of life: The two principal sectors of activity by which human beings *maintain their life* (*sein Leben*) and make it agreeable, are [a] that of obtaining the products of nature (*Naturprodukte*) and [b] that of the further development of them.¹⁸⁵ Following this, the principal *division of the free activity*¹⁸⁶ would coincide with the division of these two occupations [. . .] From now, it would become a *class* (*Stände*).¹⁸⁷

Fichte imagines that these two classes have to make a pact: one (the *producers* [*Produzenten*]) obtains the raw material, the other (the *artisans* [*Künstler*]) makes the products. The state has to regulate these pacts. The third class is the merchants.¹⁸⁸ Fichte does not leave the free market to reach a harmonious utopia, but expresses:

The state is obliged to secure, by law and coercion, for all citizens the situation that results from a balance of trade. One cannot achieve this if any person who has not submitted to this law influences this equilibrium. So, one has to eliminate completely the possibility of this influence. One has to prohibit their subjects from, and make impossible, all exchange with foreigners.¹⁸⁹

Fichte knows very well that the more developed countries, like Great Britain, Holland or France, having begun the Industrial Revolution, proclaim free trade to take advantage of and to destroy the possibility of the revolution occurring in other countries. Fichte understands that it is necessary to protect the market itself from unequal competition, and this is a fundamental *political* problem. The state determines and is the origin of positive ownership; ownership is not prior to the state. 'The foundation of all right of ownership lies in the right of excluding another from some free activity, and by no means in the exclusive possession of objects.'¹⁹⁰

Although deeply Eurocentric,¹⁹¹ he shows how history teaches us that regarding the market anarchically produces devastating negative effects, since it harms the poor population:

The true result of this economy [is that] men emigrate and search under other skies for resources against poverty (*Armut*) [. . .] they cannot continue buying products and die in poverty [. . .] The true *victims* of improv-

185 They are the two first 'classes' of Hegel.

186 It is the 'division of labour'.

187 *Ibid.*, I, ch. 2, I; p. 403 (Translation: TC); p. 21 (Translation: TC).

188 'These three classes cited constitute the fundamental components (*Grundbestandteile*) of the Nation' (*ibid.*, p. 405; p. 24). One has to add the class of 'the members of government' (the 'universal class' of Hegel: bureaucracy) and professors and military personnel, who 'only exist and count because of the first' (*ibid.*). Here, he plants the theme of 'unproductive labour'.

189 *Ibid.*, ch. 2, vi; p. 419; p. 41 (Translation: TC).

190 *Ibid.*, ch. 7; p. 444; p. 74 (Translation: TC).

191 Book II about *Contemporary History* [. . .] *in the actual real States* (*ibid.*, pp. 448f.; pp. 79f.) is only a narrative within the horizon of Western culture.

erishment (*Opfer der Verarmung*) of the states have died; maybe their parents or grandparents have already died:¹⁹² because they do not exist, no one can ask why they do not have anything.¹⁹³

Politics, as the action directed 'by an existing state (*bestehenden*) to the situation demanded by reason (*von der Vernunft*)', has to be a politics of the organization of production, its diversification, help in its technical development, legal support of distribution and the control of the state of relations with other states. All has to be implanted 'little by little',¹⁹⁴ but there are certain things that will have to be suppressed although it costs, because 'it is understood very well that it is difficult to be deprived suddenly of Chinese tea'.¹⁹⁵

The *real* (and *rational*) state has for Fichte a *critical-political* responsibility of managing the *material* level of the life of citizens, and not leaving them open to the fiction of the equilibrium of the market under the invisible hand, in reality, the anarchy of the so-called free exchange, of the neo-Stoic gods.

Once the states have controlled their market they will be able to establish pacts at a world level: 'when this system is universalized and *perpetual peace* has been established among the people, no state on the whole surface of the earth (*Erdbodens*) [. . .] will be able to exercise oppression (*Unterdrückung*) and dominate others.'¹⁹⁶

Fichte subsumes the Kantian postulate of the *state of peace* but complexifies it, including the economic *material* level, attributing to the state a responsibility (certainly not 'liberal') of a truly rational control of the economy. The critique of the state, a transitory institution in history, has begun.¹⁹⁷

192 It seems that Fichte presaged the responsibility for 'future generations'.

193 *Ibid.*, ch. 7; p. 444; p. 74 (Translation: TC).

194 *Ibid.*, III, ch. 2; p. 476; p. 120.

195 In 1800, China begins to be eclipsed. It is hard 'not having any fur in winter [. . .] but why must the fur be sable or silk clothing [again from China!] if the country does not produce sable or silk?' (*ibid.*, p. 476; p. 101 [Translation: TC]). How much more advisable would this be today in the underdeveloped, peripheral and post-colonial countries! Their elites are willing to destroy their own people for the sake of 'Chinese tea' and 'silk clothes', and in addition despise them from the perspective of a refined Euro- or North American-centric culture.

196 *Ibid.*, ch. 8; pp. 512-13; p. 163 (Translation: TC).

197 *Characters of the Contemporary Age* (1804) (Fichte, 1971, VII, pp. 1-257). It is the beginning of the critique of Modernity, the Enlightenment, which has to be taken in to account in our actual discussions. 'It is the era of the Enlightenment to which Fichte feels entirely in extreme *opposition*. His characterization of the Enlightenment as a provoked disorder is strong, but right. N. Hartmann says: [. . .] She cannot see the life of reason as a unitary whole in the life of the human being, because she does not consider the last as a whole, *as human life* [. . .] The highest is self-conservation, one's own well-being, self-interest [. . .] One can only aspire to the useful, comfortable, cheap [. . .] Religion is humbled serving to support the authority of the despots [Hobbes]; God is converted into an accomplice of human utility [Kant?]' (Hartmann, 1960, I, 153 [Translation: TC]).

[184] For F. G. Schelling (1775–1854),¹⁹⁸ the companion of Hegel and Hölderlin in the Lutheran seminary of Tübingen, Kant and Fichte have forgotten nothing less than nature. In his first work, *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1798), he writes:

The dynamic organization of the universe is deduced, but not the structure itself. Every organization assumes the evolution of the universe from an original moment, a disintegration of that moment into new moments. The basis in nature of this infinite disintegration has to have been constituted in nature by an original duality, and that disjunction (*Entzweiung*) has to have emerged from an original identity.¹⁹⁹

The universe as nature is the Absolute, which evolutionarily becomes *conscious* (the I), later *self-conscious* (the self-knowing of the I), which subsumes the not-I, making from the *self-consciousness* (the absolute principle of the dialectic). The self-consciousness is a knowing oneself, a wanting oneself and a producing oneself; in the original nature still *un-conscious*; but when it acquires *consciousness* in the human species, it reaches the degree of reason and choice, whose supreme reconciliation of freedom and necessity is realized in art, the expression of the productive consciousness.

In the field of politics, Schelling covers various stages. In the first, around the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800),²⁰⁰ 'Schelling states clearly the principle of revolution in history: as a political order offends the people, they will rebel and produce the birth of a more just constitution.'²⁰¹ History keeps constructing itself through the recognition of the liberties of a community of action. It is a dynamic structure.

In the period of identity (1801–6), Schelling deepens the idea of a free society, as the temperament of the artist who adds his/her creation to the poetry of the world. It would be maintained in a Kantian horizon, where the republican order and perpetual peace could be 'achieved by all the species, and this means precisely only through history'.²⁰² Only the presence of a 'god' gave sense to the apparently chaotic fragments, where each one 'plays its role' in history, without knowing the full libretto.

In a third stage (1807–21), from *Stuttgart Private Lectures* (1810), including *Weltalter* (1811–15), he continues developing a social aesthetic, which separates itself from Lessing and Schiller, submitting to the state to fulfil a properly cultural function, from where the critical instance of the economy is exercised. He will criticize Fichte's project of the *closed commercial state*,

198 See Schelling, who we discovered from 1969 to understand the 'overcoming' of Hegel by the post-Hegelians: Dussel, 1974c, pp. 54f., 116f.; 1998, [213]; 1990, ch. 9.2–9.3, pp. 361f. (with bibliography); also Habermas, 1963, pp. 172f.; Hartmann, 1960, I, pp. 166f.; Maesschalck, 1991, pp. 127f.; etc.

199 Op. cit., III, v; Schelling, 1959, III, p. 261 (Translation: TC).

200 Schelling, 1959, II, pp. 327f.

201 Maesschalck, 1991, p. 127 (Translation: TC).

202 Schelling, 1959, II, p. 591 (Translation: TC).

as too economic. He exercises a critique of the modern state, which does not allow itself to be structured toward the service of culture. The state, which would have to be the bearer of the romantic ideal of Hölderlin on meeting the 'shared country' is precipitated in a mere commercial state at the service of the bourgeoisie. The state is a sign of the death of reason. Civil society is the place of the manifestation of the split, not yet with nature, but between human beings:

We know how much effort has been made, especially after the French revolution and the doctrine of Kant, to show the possibility of reconciling [a] the existence of free beings [plurality] [b] with the unity [of the state], that is to say, how [b] a state that was [a] *the highest condition of possible freedom* between individuals would be possible. But this is impossible. Because either the force [centripetal force of freedom] is withdrawn from the power of the state, or is submitted, and then it is despotism [. . .] My opinion is that the state *as such* will not be able to find true and absolute unity, since all states are only *attempts* at finding it.²⁰³

Split from God, human beings fall into apostasy; they have lost the original unity with nature and humanity; they are in a permanent *state of war*, express brute force, where violence is always the last resort. The state aims to return to unity through obedience and coercion, but destroys freedom: 'The state, therefore, precisely to reestablish it [the unity of humanity], is a consequence of the curse on humanity.'²⁰⁴ The unity, which the law tried to install among human beings is transformed into repression. To conserve unity it appeals to elevated, moral ideals, but contradicts them, in such a way that 'all unity that arises in a state is always only precarious and passing.'²⁰⁵ The only hope would be 'to progressively liberate [the state] itself from the power that it blinds it [. . .] and transform it into intelligence'.²⁰⁶ For the moment, it is a 'sign of the death of reason'. One would have to overcome its repressive force. Schelling thinks that it is necessary to find a political form of spiritual, moral or superior unity.

In his final philosophy (1821-53), as for example in *Rational Philosophy* (1845-53), he continues with the theme of the necessity of negating the transference of freedom from the individual to the state, a pure situation of a visible emptying. On the contrary, it is necessary to fill the state through 'culture', an attitude, a democratic spirit, as critical instance of *all form of institution*. In this case the state would be a space of freedom.

From all his immediate antecedents, from Kant to Fichte, Schelling is the one who has the most precise consciousness of the immanent danger

203 Ibid., IV, p. 354 (Translation TC).

204 Ibid., p. 353 (Translation: TC).

205 Ibid. (quoted in part from Habermas, 1963) (Translation: TC).

206 Ibid., p. 356 (Translation: TC).

of the structure of the modern state. 'The state is resistant to historical progress.'²⁰⁷

The Metropolitan, Colonial and Rational State: G. W. F. Hegel

[185] To understand the political thinking of Hegel (1770–1831) is crucial for a historical reconstruction of political philosophy.²⁰⁸ For Hegel, like no other philosopher, the world hegemony of *mature Modernity*, thanks to the Industrial Revolution, allowed Europe to experience for the first time being the 'centre' of planetary history. Never before had it been so! Hegel had a sharp philosophical–historical instinct and captured this *recent* experience of European supremacy. He was the first Eurocentric philosopher to celebrate with optimism the hypothesis that 'world history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history',²⁰⁹ and, repeats, 'Europe is the centre and end of the Old World'.²¹⁰ In addition, 'southern Europe' has stopped 'carrying' (*Träger*) the Spirit, a function, which touches in that final stage of history only at the 'heart of Europe', the German–Anglo-Saxon Europe of the north.²¹¹ These pseudo-scientific 'inventions' in history permit Hegel to reconstruct world history projecting hegemonic Europe, after the Industrial Revolution (an event not yet 50 years old), to the origin of Greek culture and Judaeo-Christianity (both phenomena outside their purely 'eastern' context) with the aim of world-historical explication.²¹² In the same way, his political ontology is the mature expression of the 'Enlightenment', and also in a certain way of 'Romanticism' (a synthesis of an unlimited confidence in Reason, against the Kant of the 'boundaries of reason', which Søren Kierkegaard ironically will judge as the infinite disproportion that makes 'an incursion into the *comic*').²¹³ The political reflection of Hegel did not overcome the *particular* state,²¹⁴ since far from its horizon it returns

207 Maesschalck, 1991, p. 129 (Translation: TC).

208 We have treated the theme in other works: for example, Dussel, 1974c, a book dedicated to Hegel (in particular from his youth to *Logic*); Dussel, 1973, § 62, IV, pp. 49f. (we will take this text and bring it up to date); *ibid.*, § 68, V, pp. 34f. (in particular *Philosophy of Religion*); Dussel, 1995, ch. 1 (his *Philosophy of History*). See Habermas, 1963, in particular, p. 148 (ST: pp. 141f.); Höslé, 1987, II, pp. 412f.; Hassner, 'Hegel', in Strauss and Cropsey, 1994, 811f. [ET: 732–60]; Pinkard, 2000; etc.

209 *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, second edition (1830), C, c; Hegel, 1955, 167 (Translation: Nisbet, p. 197).

210 *Ibid.*, p. 235 (Translation: Nisbet, p. 191); p. 201.

211 'Germany, France, Denmark, and Scandinavia, is the heart of Europe (*das Herz Europas*)' (*ibid.*, p. 240; p. 205 [Translation: Nisbet, p. 195]).

212 Hegel thinks that 'the Mediterranean, is the focus of the whole of world history' (*ibid.*, p. 210; p. 181 [Translation: Nisbet, p. 171]), not noting that the Indian Ocean, the sea of China and the caravans through the steppes of Turkestan that united Byzantium with China, had as much or greater importance. The classic 'myth' (Graeco–Roman) of the romantics dazzles his vision of world history (see Bernal, 1987, I).

213 See *Post-scriptum aux Miettes Philosophiques* (Kierkegaard, 1949, p. 82).

214 In the *Politics of Liberation* we will never refer to the 'nation' state, because there have been very few (maybe the USA, if we except the autochthonous 'nations': the indigenous). The modern territorial state is *particular* (formed frequently by many 'nations', as in the case

inevitably to the *state of nature* as totality.²¹⁵ The particular states are found in a permanent *state of war* with respect to the other states, without glimpsing (either as postulate, utopia or project) the overcoming of war as the only external relation within the particular states. On the contrary, war is the climax of the state and of virtue. The warrior is the human prototype.²¹⁶

It is not easy to find in Modernity a philosopher who has expressed in such a finished way the *dominating totality of the modern state* as Hegel. Thus as in our work *Toward an Ethic of Latin American Liberation*²¹⁷ we have to occupy ourselves with Freud in the erotic, the prototypic author, or Rousseau in the pedagogical,²¹⁸ we have to occupy ourselves in the politics of Hegel, who will culminate his career as professor in the Prussian University of Berlin.

The works of his final era are important to us: from the *Encyclopedia* (1817) to his *Philosophy of Right* (1821) and his *University Lectures* (1818–31),²¹⁹ although the works of his youth do not have to be thrown away, since we find there the pre-history of his mature politics. Thus in *The Jena System* we can already see the future themes that will occupy his

of France, Germany, Spain, India or Mexico); it can be *confederate* (as initially in the European Union) or *world* (as future possibility) in the Kantian sense.

215 It is the 'state of war' of Locke.

216 See *Philosophy of Right*, § 325 (Hegel, 1971, VI, 494).

217 See Dussel, 1973, III.

218 Ibid.

219 For our ends the most important work is *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*Rechtsphilosophie*, published in 1821, that we cite as *Philosophy of Right*). Thanks to Karl-Heinz Ilting (Hegel, 1973), new perspectives are opened to the political philosophy of Hegel. With respect to the political works of his youth, see Rosenzweig, 1920; Lukacs, 1954; Habermas, 1963, in particular 'Critique of Hegel of the French Revolution' and 'Political Writings of Hegel' (pp. 128–71); Marcuse, 1967, pp. 51f. For a bibliography of the 'political' question in Hegel see Riedel, 1970, pp. 93–9 (chronological bibliography, from 1833 to 1970). The works to consult about the question of the state in Hegel are: Weil, 1950; Ritter, 1957; Hook, 1963. In general, Marcuse and Ilting want to recover the revolutionary or progressive liberal image of Hegel. For our part we will not be able to adhere to the Prussian and monarchic vision of Hegel: we will retain the vision of the modern European state, essentially dominator of the periphery and basis of the liberal state of said periphery. The political writings of Hegel were chronologically: 'Die Vertraulichen Briefe über das vormalige Staatsrechtliche Verhältnis des Wadtlandes zur Stadt Bern' (1798); 'Über die neuesten inneren Verhältnisse Württembergs, besonders über die Gebrechen der Magistratsverfassung' (1798); 'Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches' (The Constitution of Germany) (1799); 'Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts' (1802); *System der Sittlichkeit* (1802), 3 ('Die Staatsverfassung'); *Jenaer Realphilosophia* (1805–6) (B, II, III) see Dussel, 1973a, II, 221, note 290; *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), which in section BB (The spirit) treats three themes: A. *The true spirit*, or ancient society and its dissolution, B. *The objectified spirit*, or the genesis of bourgeois society, Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, C. *The spirit certain of itself* or Germany under Napoleonic dominion: the Hegelian utopia, as the supreme political conciliation; 'Rechtslehre' (*Das Recht, Die Staatsgesellschaft*) in the writings of Nuremberg (1810); and a little earlier in *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, §§ 181–202 (1808); after the 'Beurteilung der im Druck erschienenen Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der Landstände des Königreichs Württemberg in den Jahren 1815 und 1816'; later come the works named earlier in the text, and in April 1831, his final political work: 'Über die englische Reformbill'. On 18 February, Gregory XVI, with the naming of the residential bishops of Mexico, recognized the independence of the new Latin American *neocolonial* states, thus ending our 'wars of Independence' that Hegel already had integrated in his reflection.

attention until his death.²²⁰ In 'The philosophy of spirit', in *Jena*, in section II of the 'actual Spirit', he treats the theme of the 'immediate recognition' (question worked by A. Honneth), where the 'contract' allows one to situate the problem of 'crime and punishment',²²¹ to move to the section about 'the coercive law'; law, which is 'the mediation of the person with himself in his immediate existence – [. . .] resting entirely on [his being in] community with others (*Gemeinschaft mit den Andern*), hence the absolute necessity of the same'.²²² 'The individual (*einzelne*) is transcended, subsumed (*aufgehoben*)' in the whole:

The singular counts as possessing property. The universal [element] is the substance of the contract, i. e., this very existence, this validation of the shared will. The singular is person, his security – [is] justice, the power which sustains him as pure being, *the power of his life* (*die Macht seines Lebens*), *the power over his life* (*über sein Leben*), as over the maintenance of his subsisting existence (*subsistierenden Daseins*).²²³

Life is the central theme of the young Hegel, which remains discretely absent in his mature works, but he never stops finding essential moments to remind us that the movement of the being is his/her life. Before the death of those who appear as representatives of the first community (the death of the progenitors in the family) 'the state (*Staat*) is the existence (*Daseyn*), the power of right'.²²⁴ The form of the state is the law, which reaches maximum universality and objectivity in the Constitution.²²⁵ Only the constitutional state reaches its fullness:

Thus this Spirit is the *absolute power* (*absolute Macht*) everywhere, which lives in itself (*in sich selbst lebt*) and now *must give itself* this view of itself as such, i.e., to make itself its own end (*Zweck*). As force (*Gewalt*), it is only the singular who is the end, [. . .]; the Spirit's self-preservation, however, is the *organization of its life* (*Organisation seines Lebens*), the spirit of a people (*der Geist eines Volkes*), a spirit that intends itself.²²⁶

220 See Hegel, 1969.

221 Hegel, 1969, pp. 213f.; pp. 182f.

222 Ibid., p. 226; p. 193 (Translation: Rauch, pp. 132–3).

223 Ibid. (Translation: Rauch, p. 133). These texts merited a special commentary. Hegel overcomes the liberal individualism of Locke and suggests to us important elements for a political ontology. Law is the universalizing moment of the singular will. Marriage is its first communitarian existence (ibid., pp. 228f.; pp. 194f.).

224 Ibid., p. 232; p. 197 (Translation: Rauch, p. 141). Thus as the traditional community was based on the cult of the ancestors ('the Penates are inward gods, gods of the underworld': *Philosophy of Right*, § 257), the secularized modern society is based on the 'universal will', expressed in the law.

225 Ibid., III; pp. 242f.; pp. 208f.

226 Ibid. (Translation: Rauch, p. 151). A little later he speaks of the 'strata' or 'classes': the public class (bureaucracy), guilds, sages, military stratum. With respect to 'international treaties' they are a 'perpetual fraud' because they are maintained until one agrees not to fulfil them (pp. 253–62; pp. 217–25).

In these first writings we find the future Hegelian political philosophy. In *System of Ethical Life* (1802), we read: 'the people as an *organic totality* (*als organische Totalität*) is the absolute identity of all the specific characteristics of practical and ethical life.'²²⁷ This formulation indicates to us that the category of Totality is very early and *explicitly* formulated by Hegel, as the final horizon of understanding.²²⁸ The political remains defined within an *organic, living Totality*. These final notions, without room for doubt, are owed to Plato and Aristotle,²²⁹ among others, but starting from the experience of modern subjectivity.

[186] The starting point of Hegelian politics is the *being in itself*. The existence in itself of politics is 'free will' or 'the free spirit',²³⁰ it is the pure practical existence without any determination still (by this the *nothing* is political still). Modern practical subjectivity begins its long path, its unfolding. With this starting point sketched, one can understand Hegel's vision of modern European political philosophy of the Enlightenment and its dominating reason.²³¹ In effect, 'free will' in its origin is not but 'negative freedom',²³² subjectivity and not substantiality as practical principle of the political world, but *from whom* concretely and historically has one received

²²⁷ *System of Ethical Life* (Hegel, 1967, p. 56 [Translation: Harris, p. 145]). The 'not-different' is 'identity' (*die Form der Identität*, *ibid.*) In this way 'ethical life as system [. . . contains] the exigency of war [. . .]. This war is [. . .] of peoples against peoples, and therefore hatred itself is undifferentiated, free from all personalities' (pp. 56–9 [Translation: Harris, pp. 148–9]).

²²⁸ In a later writing he says, 'the science of the state is the explication of the organization that a people (*Volk*) has when it is an organic totality and in itself living' (*Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, 1808, § 195; Hegel, 1971, IV, p. 63 [Translation: TC]).

²²⁹ Occupying himself with Plato in the lectures on *Geschichte der Philosophie* he ends the exposition with a commentary on the *Republic*: 'Plato shows the reality of the Spirit [. . .] in its highest truth, as the organization of a state' (I, I, 3, A, 3; Hegel, 1971, XIX, p. 106 [Translation: TC]); and further on explains that the ethical substance of the spirit 'is systematized in a living and organic Totality . . .' (*ibid.*, p. 108 [Translation: TC]). For his part, in the section on Aristotle's *Politics* he indicates that politics is 'the organization and realization of the practical spirit, its realization and substance is the state' (*ibid.*, B, 3, b; p. 225 [Translation: TC]); the state is that 'prior (*prius*) to the family' as all is prior to the part (*ibid.*, p. 226).

²³⁰ Overcoming the 'theoretical spirit' or the Kantian understanding and mere reason (*Encyclopedia*, III, I, C, a, §§ 445–68; X, pp. 240f.), Hegel plants the question of the 'practical Spirit' or the will (*ibid.*, §§ 469–80, pp. 288f.), which are brought together and are overcome in the 'free spirit' (*ibid.*, §§ 481–2; pp. 300ff.). See this anthropological question in Fetscher, 1970, pp. 200f. This problematic has been explicitly taken from Rousseau (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, II, 2, C, 3, c; Hegel, 1971, XX, pp. 306–7) and Kant (*ibid.*, III, III, B; p. 369). It is the theme of the *Introduction* to the *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 1–29 (VII, pp. 29–83).

²³¹ On the other hand, the critique of Horkheimer and Adorno (1969, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*) seems insufficient in a world horizon. If 'the Enlightenment [. . .] has pursued always the end of stopping the fear of men and converting them into masters (*Herren*)' (p. 7 [Translation: TC]), in this the authors see the economic aspect (man–nature) of this domination, but the imperial (centre–periphery) political sense escapes them, which is what interests us in the post-colonial world.

²³² *Philosophy of Right*, § 5; p. 50 (Translation: Knox, p. 22). This signifies that the will in its beginning is pure indetermination, opening, infinity, abstract negativity. See *ibid.* § 5–22: 'This will is not mere potentiality, capacity, potency (*potentia*), but the infinite in actuality (*infinitum actu*), since the concept's existence (*Dasein*) or its objective externality

this experience of subjectivity? 'Entire continents, Africa and the East [and of course Latin America, although not named], have not taken this idea, but neither have the Greeks and Romans.'²³³ The geopolitical intention of Hegel is explicit: 'The world has received this idea from Christianity.'²³⁴ For Hegel the *realization* of Christianity (in reality of 'Christendom', Kierkegaard would say) is a function of the German people through the revolution of the Enlightenment.²³⁵ 'Free will', original ontological horizon and founding of the totality of politics, is that of the European *ego*, imperial, dominating and conquering subjectivity from the fifteenth century. What is that which limits, determines the 'absolutely free will, at the stage when its concept is abstract, when it has the determinate character of immediacy?'.²³⁶ For the ontological *ego* without limits, of the modern European, for the original constituting subjectivity, the first relation that can fill it with content is the economic relation: human being-nature.²³⁷ In its origin, for capitalist individualism, 'I am myself an *immediate* singular'.²³⁸ It is the Lockean 'state of nature'. That abstract singularity is filled with content by abstract determinations. Existence as the totality of the undetermined modern subjectivity is presented as being-there (*Dasein*), thanks to the 'right'.²³⁹ That is to say, for Hegel, and for Europe first mercantile and later industrial and imperial (to the actual transnationals), the first practical relation of the human being

is inwardness itself' (§ 22; p. 74 [Translation: Knox, p. 30].) See *Encyclopedia*, § 483; p. 303 (Translation: TC): 'free will is first and immediately in itself'.

²³³ *Encyclopedia*, § 482; p. 301 (Translation: TC).

²³⁴ *Ibid.* (Translation: TC). Of course, Christianity is understood to be a cultural product of the West, not noting that it is a product of Asia (name of the Roman province of Turkey itself and adjacent territories).

²³⁵ The contribution of Christianity is, for Hegel, 'religion with respect to, the man who knows, as his essence, his own relation with the absolute Spirit' (*ibid.*, p. 302 [Translation: TC]). This reference of the finite man to the Absolute as his essence is, as act, *worship*, love, perfect *devotion*, certain affirmation of that not intuited, faith (see *Philosophie der Religion* I, C: *Der Kultus*; Hegel, 1971, XVI, pp. 202ff.) that is fulfilled only in Christianity, in the 'kingdom of the Spirit' (*ibid.*, III, III; XVII, pp. 299f.), but in *reality* is only thanks to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment as 'free will' appears fully in the world as 'absolute knowing', far from religion: 'In the *thinking* (*Denken*) it is the present self, its content [. . .]. It is absolute liberty (*die absolute Freiheit*) through that which the pure I is, as the pure light, at the end in its own home (*bei sich*)' (final chapter of *Philosophie der Geschichte*, 'The Enlightenment and revolution'; XII, p. 520 [Translation: TC]).

²³⁶ *Encyclopedia*, § 488; p. 306 (Translation: TC); *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 29-41; pp. 80-102.

²³⁷ See the sense of the *economy* in the *ontology* (human being-nature relation) and in the *meta-physic* (totality-Alterity relation): cf. Dussel, 1973, § 27; II, 74-80; in addition §§ 45, 51 and 57 from vol. III.

²³⁸ '[. . .] unmittelbar Einzelner' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 47; p. 110 [Translation: Knox, p. 43]).

²³⁹ See *Encyclopedia*, III, II, A, §§ 488-502; *Philosophy of Right* I, §§ 34-104. He says to us: 'The existing reality of the free will is Right (*Recht*) which must not be taken in the limited sense of *jurisprudence*, but in a comprehensive sense embracing all existing determinations of freedom' (*Encyclopedia*, § 486; X, p. 304 [Translation: Mueller, p. 235]). The 'being in itself' is the undetermined liberty as ontological horizon; right determines liberty as *being*: as 'this' liberty (cf. *Philosophy of Right*, § 29; VII, p. 80).

is with 'a thing *ab extra*',²⁴⁰ with anything as object of possible possession in private property.

For this, in the *possession* of something 'a person has [. . .] the right of putting his will into any and every thing',²⁴¹ and with that 'I am alive in this bodily organism which is my external existence'.²⁴² By the possession 'of something' the subject abandons being a mere undetermined subjectivity, absolute, and is developed as possessor of 'a thing' (objective genitive). It is the first determination of the European bourgeois colonizer, dominator of the Indian, African and Asian in their effort for riches. Thus wrote friar Tomas de Ortiz from Santa Marta in the sixteenth century:

In this land there is more damage than they have said, because one thing is heard and another seen [. . .]. I see what the god and the administration teaches and preaches to them is: *Give me gold, give me gold* [. . .] and then taking brands burns their houses. This did the governor felling each town.²⁴³

The *possession* of the thing (and its abstract universal) is the first determination of the bourgeois subject. Pure possession (*Besitz*) derives from the private property (*Eigentum*) 'of the thing' (subjective genitive), 'thereby making it [the thing] his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will'.²⁴⁴ The European modern *ego* constitutes as a moment of its world, as a being which determines the totality of the planet, of its territories occupied by the conquest, of the goods accumulated in the 'centre', of the Indians, Mestizos, Africans, Asians, 'barbarians'. 'Taking possession' (*Besitznahme*)²⁴⁵ begins with the corporal act of 'taking-the-thing' and is consumed in the 'making'²⁴⁶ or exterior and autonomous constitution of a product,²⁴⁷ in which the worker is objectified (alienated). The product can now be sold (be alienated)²⁴⁸ for use, for consumption, having been fruit of the work of the worker.²⁴⁹

240 *Encyclopedia*, § 490; p. 307; *Philosophy of Right*, § 47; p. 110 (Translation: Knox, p. 42).

241 *Encyclopedia*, § 492; p. 307 (Translation: Knox, p. 41).

242 *Encyclopedia*, § 490 (Translation: Knox, p. 43).

243 General Archive of the Indies (Seville), Justice I, 112, Book 2, quoted by Friede, 1956 (Translation: TC).

244 *Philosophy of Right*, § 44; p. 106 (Translation: Knox, p. 41). The 'thing' previously exterior is now an 'accident of will'. Pedro Mir speaks of the North American conquest saying: 'In all the land/ arose the great door of opportunity/ and all the world had access to the word / mine' (in 'Counter-song to Walt Whitman', in *Travel to the Crowd*; Mir, 1972, p. 45 [Translation: TC]).

245 *Philosophy of Right*, § 54; p. 119 (Translation: Knox, p. 46).

246 *Ibid.*, §§ 55-6; pp. 119-22.

247 It is 'an independent externality (*eine für sich bestehende Äußerlichkeit*)' (*ibid.*, § 56 [Translation: Knox, p. 47]).

248 *Ibid.*, §§ 65-70; pp. 140-52. The essence of the Hegelian doctrine of 'alienation' (*Entäußerung*) is as much 'sale' of the product as 'loss' of the substance itself of the producer who was objectified (§ 67).

249 *Ibid.*, §§ 59-64; pp. 128-140.

The individuality of private possession is overcome by the bourgeois *contract* of the business partners.²⁵⁰ The Hobbesian 'contract' of preponderantly political and warrior character is translated into the purely economic, commercial, bourgeois level.

The *ego* is not only from Descartes, nor even from Kant as *I practise*, but equally from Adam Smith (an *ego cogito*, but equally an *ego oeconomicus*).

The objectivity of the right in its essence, 'right of ownership', obliges someone, the finite and particular, European,²⁵¹ *subject* to what is good or bad in so far as it negates its isolated, abstract particularity to affirm the contract. The 'morality' of the act is affirmation of the modern ethical subjectivity. When the objectivity of the European modern right is lived not as obligation or responsibility, but as 'second nature', as habit, by the *ethos*, we pass to the reconciliation of the abstract objectivity of the right with the moral subjectivity of the obligation overcome in the customs of the *bourgeois ethic*, imperial, dominator, conqueror and possessor *ethos*.²⁵²

The immediate or first moment of this *ethos* is the bourgeois family. 'Through the private property of the family as a person [. . .] the diverse members who constitute it are found in relation to this private property as profit, work and prediction, acquiring thus a common interest (*sittliches*).'²⁵³

[187] The family is a functional part of a whole, which does not acquire sufficient unity: *bourgeois civil society* or the liberal state.²⁵⁴ We move to the theme of Hegelian politics that will have greater importance in later political philosophy.

Bourgeois or *civil society*, the laissez-faire liberal state prior to the Napoleonic Restoration, has too many contradictions in its breast and does not achieve adequate unity. Its 'substance becomes a simple [abstract] universal

250 The 'contract' (*Vertrag*) (*ibid.*, §§ 72-81; pp. 155-172). See *Encyclopedia*, §§ 493-5; pp. 308-9). Criminal violence, as overcoming the mere contract of possession, is for Hegel the 'passage' from the objective right (human being-thing relation) to subjective morality (law-obligation-moral *subject* relation); 'passage' from the *objective right* to the Kantian *responsibility* that obliges *subjectively*. See Dussel, 1973b, III, §§ 11-14, pp. 75f.): the original crime is the attack against the private property of another.

251 'This *subjective* or *moral* liberty is principally what is called liberty in the European sense (*europäischen*)' (*Encyclopedia*, III, II, B, § 503; p. 312 [Translation: TC]).

252 Cf. Dussel, 1973b, III, § 11, pp. 76-9, and ch. IV, § 16, pp. 119-126; and in particular Dussel, 1973a, V, § 28; II, p. 81, note 220 (p. 216).

253 *Encyclopedia*, § 520; p. 320 (Translation: TC). *Ethos* (*Sittlichkeit*) is acquired in the family. The family is the first 'subject' of the bourgeois *ethos*. Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, III, I, §§ 158-81. Here appears machismo: 'The family as a legal entity in relation to others must be represented by the husband as its head' (§ 171; p. 324 [Translation: Knox, p. 116]).

254 Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 182-257; pp. 339-98; *Encyclopedia*, §§ 523-34; pp. 321-30. 'Civil Society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) [is] an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality [constituted] by their needs, by the legal system - the means to security of person and property - and by an *external* organization for attaining their particular and common interests. [It is] this *external state* (*äußerlicher Staat*)' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 157; p. 306 [Translation: Knox, p. 110]). For Hegel the *formal* or *exterior* is ontic, determined, fixed, abstract, which still has to be assumed in the *concrete, interior, ontological, that overcome, dialectic*.

correlation, mediation, within the autonomous extremes and their particular interests [opposed]; the totality of those relations [. . .] is the state as [*bourgeois*] *civil society* or as *exterior state*.²⁵⁵

For a politics such as we are elaborating, the different levels that Hegel proposes are essential. We will call them *spheres* differentiated from the institutional order in the future architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*.

First, he distinguishes:

(a) *A material sphere*: 'the system of needs' (§§ 189–208). A reader of Adam Smith from when he was a tutor in Berne, Hegel describes the economic question with much greater precision than his German predecessors. One could make a detailed analysis. Marx certainly drank from this fountain and discovered the importance of political economy for the strategic-political struggle. 'Need' determines the economy. Hegel describes this theme clearly when he proposes what he calls 'the system of needs (*das System der Bedürfnisse*)' not as simply solipsistic, independent and fixed necessities, but as an organic group of desires.²⁵⁶ 'Political economy (*Staatsökonomie*) [. . .] affords the interesting spectacle (as in Smith, Say and Ricardo) of thought working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the outset and extracting there from the simple principles of the thing (*die einfachen Prinzipien der Sache*), the Understanding effective in the thing and directing it.'²⁵⁷

The epistemological level of political economy is defined not as a mere 'chaotic representation (*eine chaotische Vorstellung*) of the totality, but of a rich totality (*Totalität*) with multiple determinations [. . .], therefore, as unity of multiplicity (*Einheit des Mannigfaltigen*)'.²⁵⁸

For Hegel civil society is structured in a systematic way by 'class-divisions'.²⁵⁹ Hegel provides a definition of 'class':

The infinitely complex, criss-cross, movements of reciprocal production and exchange, and the equally infinite multiplicity of means therein employed, become crystallized, owing to the universality inherent in their *content*, and *distinguished* into general groups. As a result, the entire complex is built up into *particular systems* of needs, means, and types of labour relative to these needs, modes of satisfaction and of theoretical and practical education, i.e. into systems, to one or other of which individuals are assigned – in other words, into *class-divisions*.²⁶⁰

255 *Encyclopedia*, § 523; p. 321 (Translation: TC). 'The external state, the state based on need, the state as the Understanding envisages it' (not of Reason) *Philosophy of Right*, § 183; p. 340 [Translation: Knox, p. 123].

256 *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 189f.; pp. 346f. (Translation: Knox, p. 126).

257 *Ibid.*, § 189; pp. 346–7 (Translation: Knox, pp. 126–7).

258 Dussel, 1985a, p. 50 (Translation: TC).

259 *Philosophy of Right*, § 201; p. 354 (Translation: Knox, pp. 130).

260 *Ibid.*, § 201; p. 354 (Translation: Knox, pp. 130–1).

Classes are not only division of labour, but equally differentiation of the modes of consumption, culture and ethical life.

(b) *A formal sphere*: 'the administration of justice' (§§ 209–29). Hegel touches on the themes, which Kant explains in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, but brings together the pure legality and morality in a concept of ethical life where the path opens to the horizon of the right, the law, the exercise of justice, which we will take into account in our architectonic.

(c) *A strategic sphere*: feasibility (§§ 230–56). The institutions in charge of carrying out political action even as coercion on the part of a state, which is only *exterior*, which creates a certain unity, since the law is respected more by fear than by conviction; this last happens only in the case of the absolute or fully realized state.

As bourgeois or *civil society*, the liberal state is only *external* and does not overcome its contradictions, and so a plurality irresolvable and opposed to diverse *ethos* exists, the classes in battle. It is a divided state, 'atomistic'. Contradictions are seen in the level of the relation between need–satisfaction, division of labour and products or commodities, social classes (the three essential classes). For Hegel the totality of the juridical or legal order of the liberal state is a 'formal right [. . .], positive [. . .], with an *exterior* obligatory nature',²⁶¹ and given the security of private property or of the interest of each one. The liberal state is blind with respect to the totality of the system.²⁶²

The liberal state or civil (bourgeois) society is halfway there: it defends individual rights and liberties, within a certain abstract universality. This mistake demands, as necessary logic and inevitable result, a *police* state, which has the power as *control* and *external* dominion over, not as internal conviction of its singular members. The essential contradiction is:

When civil [bourgeois] society is in a state of unimpeded activity, it is engaged in expanding internally in population and industry. The *amassing of wealth* (*Anhäufung der Reichtümer*) is intensified by generalizing (a) the linkage of men by their needs, and (b) the methods of preparing and distributing the means to satisfy these needs, because it is from this double process of generalization that the largest profits are derived. That is one side of the picture. The other side is the subdivision and restriction of particular jobs. This results in the *dependence* (*Abhängigkeit*) and *distress of the class tied to [manual] work of that sort*, and these again entail inability to feel and enjoy the broader freedoms and especially the intellectual benefits of civil society.²⁶³

²⁶¹ *Encyclopedia*, §§ 529–30; pp. 324–6 (Translation: TC).

²⁶² The liberal state is found immersed in 'the blind necessity of the system of necessities that has not been elevated to the *consciousness* of universality nor has been put into action starting from this consciousness' (*Encyclopedia*, § 532; p. 328 [Translation: TC]).

²⁶³ *Philosophy of Right*, § 243; p. 389 (Translation: Knox, pp. 149–50).

[188] Hegel has clearly anticipated the principal contradiction of capitalism! He wants to say that the industrial system in the liberal capitalist state produces 'a large mass (*Masse*) of people [that] falls below a certain subsistence level [. . .] [and] there is a consequent loss of the sense of right and wrong, of honest and the self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort, the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers (*Pöbels*)',²⁶⁴ but 'when the masses begin to decline into poverty, (a) the burden of maintaining them at their ordinary standard of living might be directly laid on the wealthier classes (*reicheren Klasse*) [. . . or] other public sources of wealth (e.g. from the endowments of rich hospitals, monasteries, and other foundations). In either case, however, the needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, and this would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual independence and self-respect in its individual members.'²⁶⁵ To bourgeois society the opposition between rich classes, each time richer, and poor classes, each time poorer, is essential.

What is the Hegelian European solution to this contradiction? The response is clear and indicative: first, 'control by the police [*'s . . . (polizeiliche Vorsorge)*] primary purpose is to actualize and maintain the universal contained with the particularity of civil society'.²⁶⁶ When those without property or the masses (the *Lumpen*) launch themselves against the rich, it is necessary to conserve the order, since 'inasmuch as it is still the particular will, [. . .] the universal authority [is necessary] an *external organization* [. . .] by which security is ensured'.²⁶⁷ The 'executive force of the police' is exercised against 'offences against property or personality'.²⁶⁸

The other solution consists, in contrast to 'Scotland [which left] the poor to their fate and instruct[ed] them to beg in the streets',²⁶⁹ in the exportation of surplus population, of poor and of products to the colonies:

This inner dialectic of [bourgeois] civil society thus drives it – or at any rate drives a specific civil society – to push beyond its own limits and seek

²⁶⁴ Ibid., § 244; p. 389 (Translation: Knox, p. 150).

²⁶⁵ Ibid., § 245; p. 390 (Translation: Knox, p. 150). This key text, which announces the essence of the doctrine of Marx, continues thus: 'As an alternative, they might be given subsistence indirectly through being given work [. . .] In this event the volume of production would be increased, but the evil consists precisely in an excess of production and in the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are themselves also producers, and thus it is simply intensified [. . .]. It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough, i.e. its own resources are insufficient to check excessive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble' (ibid. [Translation: Knox, p. 150]).

²⁶⁶ Ibid., § 249; p. 393 (Translation: Knox, p. 152).

²⁶⁷ Ibid., § 231; p. 382 (Translation: Knox, p. 146). For Hegel, critic of the liberal state, the *order* that can ensure this state is 'external', 'contingent', unstable. It is not the absolute state. The civil state, legal for Kant, contained external coercion.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., § 230; p. 382 (Translation: Knox, p. 146); see §§ 230–3. The liberal state of bourgeois society falls in 'the relations between external existents, [. . .] the infinite of the Understanding.' (the 'evil infinity') (ibid., § 234 [Translation: Knox, p. 146]).

²⁶⁹ Ibid., § 245; pp. 390–1 (Translation: Knox, p. 150).

markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has over-produced, or else generally backward in industry.²⁷⁰

It is not only an exporter of the poor, but an extender of territory:

This far-flung connecting link affords the means for the colonizing activity (*Kolonisation*), sporadic or systematic, to which the mature [bourgeois] civil society is driven and by which it supplies to a part of its population a return to life on the family basis in a new land and so also supplies itself with a new demand and field for its industry.²⁷¹

For Hegel, as for Locke, the contradiction in the European liberal state is overcome by the conquest and colonization of the 'periphery'. Further, Hegel considers the opportunity of founding the liberal state in the colonies, which will have to be independent from the metropolis. This 'exportation' of population from the liberal state to the colonies is as a condition of the possibility of the constitution of the absolute state, the modern European state, having overcome the contradictions of the external state of the bourgeois liberal society.

Hegel refers to the 'peripheral' world, which is '*physically* immature', but he considers the United States of North America, prototype of the post-colonial state at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of which he says:²⁷²

'England is conscious that America is more useful (*nützlicher*) as free than as dependent.'²⁷³ 'The liberation (*Befreiung*) of the colonies is shown to be of greater benefit for the metropolis, as the liberation of slaves is more beneficial for the master.'²⁷⁴

[189] Hegel had to effect a double negation in his politics. First, *within* European civil society, he *negated* the reality of the people. 'The Many (*die Vielen, hoi polloi*), as units, a congenial interpretation of people' (*Volk*), constitutes certainly a group, but only as a conglomerate, 'a formless mass

²⁷⁰ Ibid., § 246; p. 391 (Translation: Knox, p. 151).

²⁷¹ Ibid., § 248; p. 392 (Translation: Knox, pp. 151-2). For Hegel, the miserable conditions of British capitalism lost the 'family principle', recovered in the colonies (with the *Pilgrims*, for example). Hegel does not think about the much more atrocious destruction of the indigenous family.

²⁷² *Philosophie der Geschichte*, Introduction. The new world; Hegel, 1971, XII, p. 107.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 114 (Translation: TC). The Hegelian veneration for the French Revolution, although it never disappeared, inclined over time toward the efficacy of the Napoleonic Restoration and the English Revolution. His final political work about the English Reform Bill (1831) shows us a Hegel fearful that the English imperial state would again fall into the contradictions of the liberal particular state of the French Revolution (weakened by 'Bonapartism').

²⁷⁴ *Philosophy of Right*, § 248, *Zusatz*; p. 393 (Translation: TC).

whose commotion and activity could therefore only be elementary, irrational (*vernunftlos*), barbarous, and frightful. When we hear speakers on the constitution expatiating about the "people" – this unorganized collection – we know from the start that we have nothing to expect but generalities and perverse declamations.²⁷⁵ In the political totality there is one part that does not possess organization that is irrational, unreal. The internal domination remains well expressed, when he says that "if "people" means a particular section of the citizens, then it means precisely that section which does *not* know (*nicht weiß*) what it wills. To know what one wills [. . .] is the fruit of profound apprehension and insight, precisely the things which are *not* popular."²⁷⁶

This people, in its vulgar, negative and derogatory sense is constituted for Hegel by the classes of farmers and industrial workers who look objectively at their labour force as alienable objects.

Second, Hegel negates the peripheral peoples. The political totality of the 'centre' negates the *existence* of peoples *exterior* to European frontiers. As 'it is the absolute right [. . .] the right of heroes to found states',²⁷⁷ 'the same consideration justifies civilized nations in regarding and treating as barbarians those who lag behind them in institutions which are the *essential moments of the state*,²⁷⁸ [. . .] conscious that the rights of barbarians are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy only as a formality.'²⁷⁹ *This right over all right* is what leads the European modern metropolitan state to have colonies. Hegel shows clearly the colonial pact that the European empires imposed on their periphery even in the post-colonial era. The citizen or singular members of the English Empire, for example, in addition to being known as members of an exploited worker class enjoy the benefits of the transference of surplus value from the periphery to the centre. They are, when similar (when metropolitan industrial workers), a 'worker aristocracy'. Their struggles within the capital will be blurred by a struggle for the domination over colonies. An English soldier, who could be before and after his military service a worker in Manchester, does not stop 'knowing' the

275 Ibid., § 303; pp. 473–4 (Translation: Knox, p. 198). In a text of true Aristotelian inspiration he says: 'The phrase "the Many" denotes empirical universality more strictly than "All" [. . .]. If it is said to be obvious that this "all" prima facie excludes at least children, women, &c., then it is surely still more obvious that the quite definite word "all" should not be used when something quite indefinite (*Unbestimmtes*) is meant' (ibid., § 301; p. 469 [Translation: Knox, p. 195]).

276 Ibid., p. 469 (Translation: Knox, p. 196). For Hegel, to leave the rationality to a sector of the state is to negate *reality*, it is the not-being of the political Totality; it is the masses; it is the 'people' in the actual Latin American sense.

277 Ibid., § 350; p. 507 (Translation: Knox, p. 219). This *Heroenrecht* is exactly the *Übermensch* of Nietzsche. The state is founded by 'heroes' and not by a political community of equals.

278 (Translation: Knox, p. 219) This 'substantial (*substantiellen*) moment of the state' is the political *being* par excellence; as for Aristotle humanity had only to live in the *polis*. 'Humanity' depends on the ability 'to know what the absolute will, Reason, wills' (*an und für sich seiende Wille, die Vernunft*) (ibid., § 301; p. 469 [Translation: Knox, p. 196]).

279 Ibid., § 351; pp. 507–8 (Translation: Knox, p. 219).

dignity of being a member of the empire and of enjoying the booty seized in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

It seems then that for Hegel the 'passage' from bourgeois civil society to the organic state is realized thanks to colonialism, thanks to the bourgeois society of the 'centre' becoming a metropolis; it overcomes its internal contradictions situating them *outside* of its national horizon.

Our critique of Hegelian politics would be situated from *colonial difference*, and *further*, in this aspect, than the critique of Marx or Rosenzweig, because these only recognize in the Hegelian state the totality of the political system at the service of private property, of capitalism, or Western culture, and although they are extremely critical of the liberal state or the Prussian monarchy, it is not seen that the state is the prototype of a dominating state: (a) with *internal* domination (over the 'people' and impoverished masses), and (b) *external* domination (over the colonies or neocolonies).

This assumes, on the other hand, that the 'civil' or 'bourgeois society' in Hegel does not play an internal role as a moment of the political whole in relation to the state (like A. Gramsci's 'civil society', or the sense in which we will describe in the architectonic of a politics of liberation), but it would be a stage in the evolution of the state. Following my interpretation, the 'bourgeois liberal society' of Hegel would be a stage *in the 'development' of the concept of the state*, and when similar, would be another type of state, the *external state*.²⁸⁰

On the other hand, the liberal state criticized in Europe (or 'bourgeois society'), will be the type of state that Europe intends to implant in its emancipated neocolonies. In Latin America, 'civil or 'bourgeois society' (late and dependent) will respond to the definition of an 'external organization' (*äußerliche*),²⁸¹ an 'external state'.²⁸²

The neocolonial state, as the Constitution of Argentina indicates, intends in its national project the 'securing of the benefits of freedom [. . .] for all the inhabitants *of the world* that want to live on Argentinean soil'.²⁸³ It is clear that only overcrowding will impoverish Europe, ensuring the purposes set out above by Hegel. The Hegelian absolute state, then, would be dominator inside (intra-statally) and outside (international, imperial or colonially).

[190] Hegel has an extraordinary political perspicacity, since he thought correctly that a post-colonial era had been initiated, in which through

²⁸⁰ Hegel notes that one does not have to confuse 'the state with bourgeois society', since the 'state's relation to the individual is quite different [. . .] since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 258, explanation; Hegel, 1971, VII, p. 399 [Translation: Knox, p. 156]). In the 'exterior state' or 'bourgeois society', on the contrary, intending 'the protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association. [In this case] membership of the state is something optional' (ibid. [Translation: Knox, p. 156]).

²⁸¹ Ibid., § 157; p. 306 (Translation: Knox, p. 110).

²⁸² Ibid., § 183; p. 340; *den äußeren Staat* (Translation: Knox, p. 123).

²⁸³ Preamble to the *Constitution of the Argentine Nation* (1853) (Zamora, 1958, p. 29 [Translation: TC]).

national emancipation the colonies would come to be neocolonial states more profitable for Europe than the ancient colonies. Thus the North American Union was only a 'civil society', which had organized a state with 'a republican constitution',²⁸⁴ which had as its end 'to protect private property (*Eigentum*) [. . .], and to favour the particular individual with reference to lucre and profit; it is the preponderance of private interest, which attends to the common only with the object of obtaining a particular satisfaction'.²⁸⁵ In this post-colonial state, 'in North America, which refers to the political, the common end still is not firmly established for itself and there is not the necessity [as in Europe] for a stable order, since a *real state* and a real statal leader originate *only* when there are differences of social classes, and when wealth and poverty create nobles and a situation occurs where a great multitude cannot satisfy their needs according to the accustomed way'.²⁸⁶ In Europe 'one passes' dialectically from *civil society* to the *absolute state*, meanwhile the post-colonial states suffer the contradiction of the existence of future riches yet become poorer, and so states remain exterior to themselves, in this civil society, but never reach the level of the 'organic state'.²⁸⁷ The peripheral states cannot have colonies and remain submerged in contradictions.

Therefore, the police state, which controls from a relative universality (the project of the enriched class imposed on the Totality of society, on the miserable classes), overcomes its contradictions in the absolute European state. What the commentators, and even the critics (including Marx), forget to indicate is that their internal contradictions are overcome because the conflict has been exported to the post-colonial 'emancipated' states of the periphery. In addition, the existence of the European metropolitan state (the hegemonic British in the nineteenth century, like the Spanish in the sixteenth century, and the North American in the twentieth century) could happen only through the existence of the dependent post-colonial state. Hegel indicated this, but without clear consciousness of the effects; neither will the utopian socialists nor the post-Hegelians see it. This is the task of the critique of political philosophy, situated consciously in a world horizon and from the periphery.

²⁸⁴ *Philosophie der Geschichte* (Hegel, 1971, XII, 111 [Translation: TC]).

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 112 (Translation: TC). He said: 'In North America we see prosperity, as much through a growth of industry and population as through citizen organization and a solid liberty' (*ibid.*, p. 111 [Translation: TC]).

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113 (Translation: TC).

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 114. Hegel says: 'if [one] even had forest (to colonize) in Germany, the French Revolution would not have taken place' (*ibid.*, p. 113 [Translation: TC]). In North America, for Hegel, is not produced a 'similar tension, as it has opened, incessantly and in high degree, the path of colonization' (*ibid.* [Translation: TC]). The genius of Hegel is to glimpse the absolute state in North America: 'North America can be compared with Europe only in the case of the immense space in which the state is found occupied, and the group of its individuals are contained in its frontiers' (*ibid.* [Translation: TC]); the conclusion is that North American imperialism will appear: first, by the occupation of the Mexican territories (Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, New Mexico, California, etc.) from 1848, and later through the expansion in the Caribbean and the Pacific from 1898.

[191] Finally, Hegel moves to treat the fully developed state, organic, internal, metropolitan, imperial. He gives us a clear definition of this exclusively European metropolitan state.²⁸⁸ If the liberal state was blind, the 'state [properly said] is the self-conscious ethical substance';²⁸⁹

The state is the reality²⁹⁰ of the [. . .] ethical mind *qua* the substantial will (*substantielle Wille*) manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it.²⁹¹ The state exists immediately (*unmittelbare*) in custom, immediately in singular self-consciousness,²⁹² knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment toward the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its *substantive freedom* (*substantielle Freiheit*).²⁹³

The internal constitution of the 'modern state'²⁹⁴ is defined by Hegel as a Totality (*Totalität*).²⁹⁵ The Totality of the fully developed *particular* state is for Hegel (as for Aristotle) the ultimately unsurpassable political structure, the maximum, of all possible organization. Therefore there are only *external* relations between the states, and in those external relations one returns inevitably to the *state of nature* – an actual or potential permanent *state of war*. It is an enormous regression with respect to the point reached by Kant,

²⁸⁸ See *Philosophy of Right*, III, III, §§ 257; pp. 398–512; *Encyclopedia*, III, II, C, c, §§ 535–52; pp. 330–65; and *Philosophie der Geschichte*, since 'universal history can only speak of the peoples who have constituted a state (*Staat*)' (*Introduction*, XII, p. 56 [Translation: TC]), remembering that 'the state is the ethical totality (*sittliche Ganze*)' (*ibid.*, p. 55 [Translation: TC]).

²⁸⁹ *Encyclopedia*, § 535; p. 330 (Translation: TC); see *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 259; p. 398–406. The essential character of the modern *ethos* of the state is the 'knowing', the walking rationally, 'self-regulating', 'planning'. Marx read Hegel carefully. The bourgeois society and family find their exact *unity*. On the other hand, there is the 'ethical mind *qua* the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 257; p. 398 [Translation: Knox, p. 155]); the absolute state is far from the mere accidental and voluntary contract, of individual options that 'destroy the absolutely divine principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute authority' (*ibid.*, § 258; p. 400 [Translation: Knox, p. 157]). The objective Spirit is a moment of the absolute Spirit and the state is equally divinized, a question that is treated with some detail in the relation of the state and religion (*ibid.*, § 270; pp. 415f.).

²⁹⁰ 'Reality' (*Wirklichkeit*) in *Logic* is the third moment: the existence of the *Dasein* appears in the 'world' as *phenomenon*, and shows itself as substance in the order of causality as *real*.

²⁹¹ In the metropolitan modern state, humanity earns self-consciousness from its own being and history.

²⁹² The 'singular' (*Einzelne*) is the individual as 'mediation' of the 'immediate' realization of the state. This 'instrumentality' of the 'singular' will be strongly criticized by Kierkegaard, Stirner and others.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, § 257; p. 398 (Translation: Knox, 155).

²⁹⁴ *Philosophy of Right*, § 260; p. 407: '[. . .] *der modernen Staaten* [. . .]'. The state is supported subjectively in 'political sentiment, patriotism' (*ibid.*, §§ 267–9), and has as end 'the universal interest' (§ 270) and by form the Constitution, that is 'the organization of the state and the self-related process of its organic life' (§ 271; p. 431 [Translation: Knox, p. 174]).

²⁹⁵ For example: 'the living Totality (*die lebendige Totalität*)' (*Encyclopedia*, § 541; p. 336); '[. . .] as organic totality (*als organischer Totalität*)' (*ibid.*, § 542; p. 338), etc.

Fichte or Schelling. His solidarity with the Prussian monarchy is evident. The international relation between the states has, on the contrary, for a politics of liberation the greater importance, because it will enable us to differentiate our position from the political ontology of Hegel.

The states being sovereign and only being able to have purely formal or external relations,²⁹⁶ 'therefore, exists a continual struggle between them [. . .]. As they are in a *state of nature*,²⁹⁷ they act in accordance with violence, sustaining and procuring their right through their own power, having to necessarily start *war*.'²⁹⁸

From the perspective of the metropolitan 'centre', there is no responsibility for the development of the 'periphery', it is simply exploited as a booty of war or filled with its own European poor. It is not strange that von Clausewitz, the great German theorist of the era, writes that

[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to War relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses.²⁹⁹

Hegel gives the imperial war its political ontological foundation.

The metropolitan European modern capitalist states having overcome their internal contradictions (having exported them to the colonies) will be occupied with the new peripheral 'liberal' states in order to 'be the missionaries of *civilization* in all the world'.³⁰⁰ It is a disinterested, sublime, spiritual end.

We must not forget that the state is 'the *absolute* power on earth',³⁰¹ and when it is a European modern state (principally the British, the Austro-Hungarian or German Prussian Empire) it is transformed into the bearer of the world history of the 'universal Spirit'.³⁰² As 'universal' it has an external

²⁹⁶ Questions treated in *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 321 end, and *Encyclopedia*, §§ 545–52.

²⁹⁷ War is for Hobbes a moment in the 'state of nature', but for Locke the 'state of war' (as we have seen) is a posteriori to the 'civil state', as is the case in Hegel.

²⁹⁸ *Philosophische Propädeutik*, 8, § 31; in *Nürnberg und Heidelberger Schriften* (1808–17); Hegel, 1971, IV, p. 250 (Translation: TC).

²⁹⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Of War*, 1, 24; Clausewitz, 1999, p. 24 (Translation: Howard, p. 99). See in Dussel, 1973a, § 66, the sense of the war of liberation in the 'periphery'.

³⁰⁰ '[. . .] die Missionarien der *Zivilisation* in der ganzen Welt' (*Philosophie der Geschichte*, end; Hegel, 1971, XII, p. 538 [Translation: TC]).

³⁰¹ *Philosophy of Right*, § 331; p. 498: 'Die absolute Macht auf Erden' (Translation: Knox, p. 212).

³⁰² The 'particular spirits' of each people 'are the unconscious tools and organs' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 344; p. 505 [Translation: Knox, p. 217]) of the universal Spirit, because only the law of the universal Spirit is absolute and without limits, and therefore is sacred: 'the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its right – and its right is the highest right of all – over these [and those of other people] in the 'history of the world, [that mind is] the *world's court of judgment*' (ibid., § 340; p. 503 [Translation: Knox, p. 216]). More even than Kierkegaard (who was situated in the existential level but not political–military), we can conclude that Hegel, from the perspective of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the twenty-first century,

relation with the other 'particular' spirits of other nations. And as the relation between the states is defined as a return to the 'state of nature', it does not count on 'a universal will with constitutional powers over them [. . .] There is no Praetor to judge between states.'³⁰³ Therefore, 'if states disagree [. . .] the matter can only be settled by *war*',³⁰⁴ and in war, inevitably, the strongest win. Hegel concludes:

Against the absolute will (*absolute Willen*) [of the absolute state] the will of the spirit of other particular peoples does not have a right (*rechtlos*); the people in question is the *dominator* of the world (*weltbeherrschende*).³⁰⁵

This ontology of world domination justifies the conquering expansion of the European modern metropolises. The Spanish occupied the Indian kingdoms for a sublime motive: evangelization; the North Americans occupied Texas, New Mexico, Sonora and California thanks to the affirmation of an intention in their favour given by a providential god: *Manifest Destiny*. All oppression has its ideological foundation, but all begins when the Other is situated as not-being; and in reducing them to servitude one aims even to hand over the 'gift' of *civilization*, of *being*. For Hegel, the mediation for such a great task is always war, which for Kant was the supreme evil. First, 'peoples unwilling or afraid to tolerate sovereignty at home [of the state of war] have been subjugated from abroad; [. . .] their freedom has died from the fear of dying.'³⁰⁶

In contrast to the conquered people arise in the empires 'the strata [social class] of courage (*Stand der Tapferkeit*)', the warrior (who Nietzsche will exalt as Indo-European and anti-Semitic) affirms that 'the singularity of the state is the substantial tie between state and all its members and so is a universal duty.'³⁰⁷ What is this but the apology of Napoleon, dominator

justifies the 'universal statal terrorism'. The 'state of law' is valued only intra-statally, but returns *ad extra* in a brutal *state of war* (in the Lockean sense, that is more perverse than the Hobbesian).

303 *Ibid.*, § 333; pp. 499–500 (Translation: Knox, p. 213). For Locke, since there is no judge, a 'state of war' is established among states. This position approximates that of Hegel, and George W. Bush, who does not accept an International Criminal Court, to reserve the right to permanent 'preventative war'.

304 *Ibid.*, § 334; p. 500 (Translation: Knox, p. 334).

305 *Encyclopedia*, § 550; pp. 352–3 (Translation: TC). 'This nation is dominant (*das herrschende*) in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike. In contrast with this its absolute right of being the vehicle of this present stage in the world mind's development, the minds of the other nations are without rights (*rechtlos*)' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 347; p. 506 [Translation: Knox, pp. 217–18]).

306 *Philosophy of Right*, § 324; p. 493 (Translation: Knox, p. 210). This 'state of war' (*Zustand des Krieges*) (*Encyclopedia*, § 545; p. 346) is a 'meeting put in play with respect to the autonomy of the state' (*ibid.*, § 547; p. 346 [Translation: TC]), and 'War has the higher significance' (*Philosophy of Right*, § 324; p. 492 [Translation: Knox, p. 210]), because it is opposed to 'their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions' (*ibid.*, 493 [Translation: Knox, p. 210]); it causes people to see themselves in each one of the members in danger of death as 'an organic [. . .] whole' (*ibid.* Translation: Knox, p. 210). Long live death!

307 *Philosophy of Right*, § 325 (Translation: Knox, p. 210).

of Europe, of Cortés and Pizarro, conquerors and oppressors of Mexicans and Incas, of the *marines* who disembark in Santo Domingo or in Iraq? Is not the *Übermensch* of Nietzsche perhaps the final replica of the Hegelian hero? Is not Hitler his extension, in an interpretation beginning from a racist option? A liberating interpretation of Hegel is possible, but all the political-interpretive categories have to be redefined critically. This is the task of a *Politics of Liberation*.

Politics in the Thinking of Karl Marx

[192] Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–83) was the son of a member of the Prussian state bureaucracy. Although of Jewish origin, his father was baptized Lutheran to be able to maintain his position of work. Under his influence Karl Heinrich had to study law in Berlin, although later he dedicated himself first to philosophy and then to economics.

The theme of politics is central to his thought. We address the ‘political question’ – and not only the problem of the state – in the thinking of the great nineteenth-century critic.

Let us begin with the description of this theme given by István Mészáros,³⁰⁸ a famous Hungarian student of G. Lukács. At the beginning of his work *Beyond Capital* the Marxist thinker quotes from the final page of Marx’s *The Poverty of Philosophy*:

The working class will substitute, in the course of its development, for the old order of civil³⁰⁹ society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will no longer be *political power* [*politische Gewalt*]³¹⁰ properly speaking, since political power is simply the official form of the antagonism in civil society.³¹¹

Mészáros argues throughout his (immense) work that Marx defended theoretically, increasingly as the years passed, an ‘uncompromising *negativity* towards politics’,³¹² due to

³⁰⁸ Mészáros, 2006.

³⁰⁹ ‘Bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ means both ‘bourgeois society’ (through its Germanic etymology) and ‘civil society’ (through its Latin etymology), but these have completely different connotations. To write the word ‘bourgeois’ is to have a more critical semantic sense; ‘civil’ has a more neutral meaning.

³¹⁰ One should distinguish between ‘power’ (*Macht*) and ‘violence’ or ‘coercion’ (*Gewalt*), since the English translation that Mészáros quotes *incorrectly* translates this as ‘power’ (Marx, 1975, CW, vol. 6, p. 212, cit. Mészáros, 2006, p. xxx), which gives it a semantic content that is not exactly what Marx is trying to express. It could be translated better as ‘coercion’ or ‘violence’ and not ‘power’.

³¹¹ Last page of *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847) (Marx, 1956, MEW, 4, p. 182 [Translation: Quelch, p. 190]).

³¹² Mészáros, 2006, p. 559 [Translation: p. 487].

[a] the contempt for the political constraints of 'the German misery'; [b] the critique of Hegel's conception of politics [. . .]; [c] the rejection of Proudhon and the anarchists; [d] and extreme doubts about the way the German working class's political movement was developing. Understandably, therefore, Marx's negative attitude could only harden, if anything, as time went by, instead of 'maturing'.³¹³

This interpretation is extremely serious, because of the later historical political ambiguities of 'real socialism' attributed first to Stalin, later to Lenin, and now, given the complexity of his position, to Marx himself (empirically interpreting the postulate),³¹⁴ as Mészáros proposes.

We should remember that Marx made biographically and diachronically three types of critiques. In his *first* younger period, he was occupied with the 'critique of religion',³¹⁵ since 'the criticism of religion is the premise (*Voraussetzung*) of all criticism'.³¹⁶ In 1842 he overcame this first problematic and as 'religion is the basis of the State',³¹⁷ moved into the *second* stage, that of the 'critique of politics',³¹⁸ since 'the criticism of *theology* is the criticism of *politics*'.³¹⁹ His *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*³²⁰ – to which we will devote some reflection starting from M. Abensour's hermeneutics – is the critical discovery of the theme of the state. But very soon, and moving to a *third* moment (from the beginning of 1844 in Paris), Marx reflected on the political organization par excellence: the state (in the merely *formal* horizon), assuming 'bourgeois (civil) society' (as *material* base). This allowed him to move from the 'critique of politics' to the 'critique of political economy' (a critique that he exercised from that moment until the end of his life). The loss of theoretical interest for the centrality of politics, of the state, occurred in those years. Marx never returned to politics as the main object of theoretical investigation or its inclusion in the strategic and practical commitment to the transformation of society (undertaken from the *social* environment not *political*), so:

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ That is to say, what for Marx was a *postulate* was interpreted naively as a future historical empirical moment or project or a moment. Marx was never very clear and left the door open to ambiguity.

³¹⁵ See Dussel, 1983, pp. 159–222 [Translation: TC].

³¹⁶ 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*', Introduction (Marx, 1956, 1, p. 378 [Translation: Tucker, p. 53]).

³¹⁷ Quoting a text of Hermes in 'Editorial n. 179 in the *Colonial Gazette*' in Marx, 1856, 1, p. 90 (Marx, 1982, 1, p. 224) [Translation: TC].

³¹⁸ See my work 'On the youth of Marx (1835–44), in Dussel, 1983, pp. 159ff; and in 'The Critique of Christendom and the Origin of the Question of Fetishism', in Dussel, 2007, pp. 38ff.

³¹⁹ Introduction to 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*', in Marx, 1956, 1, p. 379: 'Die Kritik des Himmels verwandelt sich damit in die Kritik der Erde [. . .], die Kritik der *Theologie* in die Kritik der *Politik*.'

³²⁰ The title of this work varies, since in the manuscripts of Marx there are two titles. We quote from MEW, 1, p. 201: *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*.

it is, therefore, by no means surprising that Marx never succeeded in sketching even the bare outlines of his theory of the state [. . .]. This is why the elaboration of a Marxist theory of the state [and of politics as such] – Mézáros tells us – is both possible and necessary today.³²¹

This would be the politics that Marx *did not write* (for its theoretical and practical assumptions), but which must be explained.

Mészáros quotes a text from 1844, where Marx exclaims:

Even radical and revolutionary politicians seek the root (*Grund*) of the evil not in the *essential nature* (*Wesen*) of the state,³²² but in a definite *state form*, which they wish to replace by a *different* state form. From the *political* point of view (*politischen Standpunkt*), the *state* and the *system of society* are not *two* different things.³²³ The state is the system of society (*Einrichtung der Gesellschaft*).³²⁴

And reflecting theoretically on politics, Marx adds

The mightier the state, and the *more political* therefore a country is, the less it is inclined to grasp the *general principle* of *social* maladies and to seek their basis in the *principle* [*Prinzip*] of the *state*, hence in the *present structure of society*. [. . .] The *political* mind is a *political* mind precisely because it thinks *within* the framework of politics³²⁵ [. . .]. The principle of politics is the *will* [*Wille*]³²⁶. The more one-sided and, therefore, the more perfected the *political* mind is, the more does it believe in the *omnipotence* of the will.^{327, 328}

From this purely *formal* interpretation of the Will

politics and *voluntarism* – writes Mézáros – are, thus, wedded together and the unreality of wishful political remedies emanates from the inher-

321 Mézáros, p. 564 [Translation: p. 491]. This is the work that we have proposed.

322 That is to say, Marx thought that the *basis* (or *essence* in a strictly Hegelian sense) of the state (of the *political field*) is the *social field*.

323 For the *Politics of Liberation* they are situated in two different fields.

324 'Critical Marginal notes on the article "The King of Prussia and social reform"' (1844), in MEW, 1, p. 401; CW, 3, p. 197.

325 Here Marx notes precisely the limitations of liberalism, which makes the *political field* completely autonomous from the socio-economic *field*. But in Marx the *political field* as the political evaporates for the sake of his social, material determination, according to the interpretation of Mézáros.

326 Marx is thinking of the beginning of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* (§ 34: "Der [. . .] freie Wille"; Hegel, 1970, 7, p. 92), but he did not imagine that the 'Will to live' (*Lebenswille*) (of Schopenhauer or such as we explain *materially* in this *Politics of Liberation* in sections [2f.] or in Dussel, 2006, *Thesis 2*) is the *material* moment par excellence (not *formal*) of the definition of political power: human life itself (as *potentia*).

327 Falling thus into a 'will to succeed' that does not consider material, economic, social objective determination.

328 Marx, *Introduction*; in Marx, 1956 (MEW), p. 402; CW, p. 199.

ent 'substitutionism' of politics as such: its necessary *modus operandi* which consists in substituting itself for the *social*. [. . .] For the question is, according to Marx, which one is the truly comprehensive category: the political or the social.³²⁹

Hence the retention of the prevalently negative definition of politics even in his latest writings [. . .]. The way Marx perceived it, the contradiction between the social and the political was irreconcilable.³³⁰

For Marx, then, free human action can be fully developed only after the *abolition* or the *dissolution*: (a) of the division of work (involving wage labour), (b) of capital, and (c) of the state (bourgeois or in general?).³³¹ Political action could intervene complementarily in social mobilization (this last being that materially essential), because the state could not be abolished itself (or through direct action as Bakunin or orthodox anarchism tried). And, in addition, once the revolution is completed (that is to say, in the post-revolutionary situation), the abolition of politics will occur:

Revolution in general – the *overthrow* of the existing power (*der Umsturz der bestehenden Gewalt*) and *dissolution* (*Auflösung*) of the old relationships – is a *political act* (*politischer Akt*). But *socialism*³³² cannot be realised without *revolution*. It needs this *political act* insofar as it needs *destruction* and *dissolution*.³³³ But where its *organising activity* (*organisierende Tätigkeit*)³³⁴ begins, where its *proper object*, its *soul*, comes to the fore – there socialism throws off the *political* cloak (*politische Hülle*).³³⁵

This was different from anarchism, as we have indicated. Marx agreed with this utopia of direct participation as far as *postulating* the dissolution of the state and representation (as the beginning of a new situation of the true history of humanity: socialist society), but differed in strategy and tactics. The strategic aim was socialism, and after the revolution politics would disappear; the dissolution of the state was a means; the tactic to achieve this end was essentially social mobilization, and timely political action in the revolutionary moment. Bakunin, however, proposed direct political means to abolish the state, ignoring economic critique and social action:

He [Bakunin] understands absolutely nothing of social revolution, only its political rhetoric; its economic conditions simply do not exist for him

³²⁹ Mészáros, p. 532 [Translation: p. 463].

³³⁰ Ibid., pp. 532–3 [Translation: p. 463].

³³¹ And the question might even be: Abolition of the state in general as empirical-historical project or as postulate?

³³² We are already in a 'post-revolutionary' situation, then.

³³³ One can understand the purely *negative* vision of politics.

³³⁴ That is to say, in the post-revolutionary creative and positive action.

³³⁵ Marx, *Introduction*; in Marx, 1956 (MEW), I, p. 409; CW, 3, p. 206.

[. . .] *Willpower*, not economic conditions, is the basis of his social revolution.³³⁶

Marx bets, in the long term, on the deep change of social metabolism, where 'the power of politics must be very limited in this respect'³³⁷ – notes Mészáros. One can then understand the conclusion of the Hungarian thinker: 'All these determinations and motivations combined, produced that negative definition of politics [in Marx] which we have seen.'³³⁸ And he leaves as a note the opening to a structure of full participation (economic in this case, but which we will propose also in the political field throughout this *critique* of politics) as a strategic solution:

In this sense the objective structural (in contrast to by itself unsustainable political/judicial) displacement of the personifications of capital through a system of genuine *self-management* is the key to a successful rebuilding of the inherited structures.³³⁹

This negativity toward the political, for example, allowed the October Revolution to pass from an anarchist moment (All power to the Soviets!) to mere socio-economic post-revolutionary *administration* from above, a vanguardism neither democratic nor really participative, inevitably despotic, a Central Committee (we are not referring to the liberal system) that politically (trying to negate empirical politics and not axiomatically) ends in bureaucratic administration. It is a serious political consequence of not knowing how to construct slowly the categories of the *political field*, as was done well in the *economic field*. The critique of Ernesto Laclau is understandable, but, in our case, not trying to accept the mistakes of the critique of European social democracy, against Marxist dogmatism in Kautsky's time, because ultimately they aimed to reinvent liberalism, starting from a *construction of new categories* specifically *political* like Marx made with economics, from the beginning beyond liberalism.

Now, we will further clarify the question, thanks to M. Abensour's study on politics in Marx,³⁴⁰ which focuses on two key moments of his intellectual life. The thesis of the French philosopher is well stated in the following lines:

Proper to *insurgent democracy*³⁴¹ [is not] to conceive of emancipation as a social victory (as a reconciled society) over politics [Marx's posi-

³³⁶ 'Notes on Bakunin's Book *Statehood and Anarchy*' (December 1874 – January 1875; CW, vol. 24, p. 518). Marx explains: 'A radical social revolution is bound up with definite historical conditions of economic development' (ibid.).

³³⁷ Mészáros, p. 542 [Translation: p. 471].

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 556 [Translation: p. 484].

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 569 [Translation: p. 495].

³⁴⁰ Abensour, 2004.

³⁴¹ This is Abensour's proposal.

tion], including the disappearance of politics, but in causing this form of democracy to emerge, permanently, as a political community *against* the State.³⁴² The opposition of the social and the political is substituted for that of the political and the state [. . .]. The State is not the last word in politics.³⁴³

In the summer of 1843 (during the 'critique of politics') we find a Marx who was still trying to regenerate the political. In contrast, in 1870 (now well advanced in his 'critique of political economy'), he was definitely sceptical of that possibility – and it is this *negative* position that a good part of later Marxism will inherit, always mixed with a deep complexity and ambiguity, since the Communist Party was inevitably an institution of the *political field*, as well as management, as *administration* of the post-revolutionary state necessarily involved constant *political* actions (adulterated by that ambiguity).

There is then (a) a constellation of texts from 1842 to the 'crisis of 1843',³⁴⁴ and from there (b) another group of texts when the critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* begins in 1843–4 – including among other works *The Jewish Question*. In the first texts (a), he does not even begin the critique of politics, but with the emancipation of politics from theology, from the Christian state. In a second moment (b), in contrast, 'The law of gravitation of the State is not sought in itself, but on the side of the material conditions of life, of bourgeois (civil) society, from the aspect of the economic structure of society.'³⁴⁵ The reflection of Marx centres then on comparing §§182–256 on bourgeois (civil) society (referred to but not discussed) to §§257–320 on the state³⁴⁶ (which he discusses at length). Marx will move from conceiving of the state as an organic totality that expresses the rational conduct of the human being, 'a metaphysics of subjectivity',³⁴⁷ to a crisis sceptical of the political as such, 'denouncing political revolution in favor of a more radical form of revolution'.³⁴⁸ Marx reflects:

It is not *radical* revolution, *universal human* emancipation, which is a Utopian dream for Germany, but rather a partial *merely* political revolu-

³⁴² This, somewhat anarchist, contradiction suggested by Abensour is unnecessary and ambiguous, as we will see.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 19 [Translation: TC]. For our part, as is evident after all that was explained, it is not a question of raising the community against the state in general (but against the despotic, totalitarian, fetishized state), but of creating *a new state*, beyond Modernity, liberalism and anarchism (although starting from the *truth* of this last and developing in a participative democracy while articulating its representative dimension, redefined).

³⁴⁴ Abensour, 2004, pp. 37ff.

³⁴⁵ Abensour, 2004, p. 77 [Translation: TC].

³⁴⁶ Marx's manuscript does not seem to be complete, since he only discusses §§ 261–313. Marx writes only 'The domestic political right'. Pertaining to the post-colonial world, 'The external political right' (§§ 321–60) interests us particularly as we have discussed in sections [188–191].

³⁴⁷ Abensour, 2004, p. 62 [Translation: TC].

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67 [Translation: TC].

tion which leaves the pillars of the building standing. What is the basis of a partial merely political revolution? Simply this: a *section of civil society* emancipates itself and attains universal domination.³⁴⁹

Radical revolution is not 'merely political', which is 'partial', since it leaves open economic, social, *material* domination, which is what he discovers as essential and which is described in the Hegelian *Philosophy of Right* in the chapter on 'Bourgeois (civil) society', and not in the strictly political of the 'state'. Marx discovers the opposition between them: 'By means of deputies the "state" – an entity alien and ulterior to the *essence* of civil society – asserts itself over against civil society.'³⁵⁰ It will be necessary, in contrast, to show how civil society plays a decisive role in this relationship, and not as in Hegel where the state, the political, dominates the bourgeois (the material). At the same time, 'He has presupposed the *separation* of civil society and the political state [. . . but] he wants *no* separation of *civil and political life* (*politischen Lebens*). He forgets that what is in question is a relationship of reflection, and makes the civil estates as such political estates.'³⁵¹ Now, he considers civil society as the *material* moment to be differentiated from the strictly *political* of the state.

Moving one step further, he begins to imagine the disappearance of the strictly political moment:

The French have recently interpreted this as meaning that in true democracy *the political state is annihilated* (*der politischen Staat untergehe*). This is correct insofar as the political state *qua* political state, as constitution, no longer passes for the whole.³⁵²

The overcoming of politics (and for this the state), in favour of the full realization of civil society is already the intuition of Marx.

In the *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* he had said that 'in democracy, the constitution, the law, the state itself, insofar as it is a political constitution, is only the selfdetermination of the people (*Selbstbestimmung des Volks*). [. . .] All forms of state have democracy *for* their truth',³⁵³ that is to say, democracy would be the full realization of the modern state. This is not opposed to the fact that for Marx the state empirically was a type of domination to be eliminated.

Together with Marx, Moses Hess adopted almost the same position in 1843, although his solution was inclined more toward a radical anarchism

³⁴⁹ *Introduction*, in Marx, 1956, 1, p. 388 (Marx, 1982, 1, p. 499 [Translation: Tucker, p. 62]).

³⁵⁰ 'A Contribution to the Critique . . .'; in Marx, 1956, 1, p. 252 (Marx, 1982, 1, 362). CW, 3, pp. 49–50, v. 3.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 276–7 (pp. 385–6) CW, 3, pp. 73–4.

³⁵² 'A Contribution to the Critique . . .'; in Marx, 1956, p. 48. CW, 3, p. 30.

³⁵³ *Op. cit.* in the text; in Marx, 1956, 1, p. 232 (Marx, 1982, 1, p. 344) [Translation: Tucker: p. 21]. That which we have called *Potestas*.

as negation of the state and politics. Inspired by Spinoza, Hess thought thus of being freed from all religious and political servitude. Marx thinks, for his part, also starting from Spinoza, that full democratic realization will be the overcoming of the state, as the full permanent self-instituting activity of the people standing with him.

In the final moment of a long journey, Marx returns to a political theme after the Paris Commune in 1870. Thus, in 1871 in *The Civil War in France*,³⁵⁴ and in 1875 in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*,³⁵⁵ Marx has reached his definitive position on our theme. Now he relies on a historical example that nevertheless presents complications. Abensour writes:

In this moment of Marx's analysis, it is legitimate to see in him a contradiction between the instrumental view of the State that he keeps professing and facing the idea of the neutrality of the apparatus of the State, to the point that the nature of the State will depend on the class that manages it and the most fertile and complex thesis of the State, which far from being neutral engendered a specific formalism with reference to domination, is separated from society.³⁵⁶

In the *Commune* Marx exalts the direct participation of the people, of the working class, as the driving subject of the state using rather than dissolving it. Marx writes:

The Paris Commune took the *management* of the revolution in its own hands [. . .]. The Commune was thus the true *representative* of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national *Government*.³⁵⁷

It was the 'first time'³⁵⁸ that the people, the working class in capitalist Modernity, directly participated in exercising political power. In Marx's eyes this was a new political experience, the invention of a form of an unknown politics of liberation, in which the modern state was transformed thanks to the exercise of 'true democracy', 'participative' democracy; a democracy against the state.

However, the question is complicated because there are different political times to be clarified. In a *first* moment, one finds the *pre-revolutionary* time in which through social struggle, articulated to politics as strategic action (of which the Commune is now an example that gives some authority to the Blanquism and anarchism of Bakunin) the revolutionary rupture should accelerate. In a *second* moment, the post-revolutionary, to eliminate the

354 Marx, 1956, 17, pp. 491-610.

355 Marx, 1956, 19, pp. 11-32.

356 Abensour, 2004, p. 139 [Translation: TC].

357 Marx, 1968, pp. 102-3 [Translation: 1920, pp. 80, 84].

358 *Ibid.*, p. 102 [Translation: 1920, p. 80].

rest of the bourgeois system requires 'a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship (revolutionäre Diktatur) of the proletariat*'.³⁵⁹ And from there one will have to ask:

What social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to the present functions of the [bourgeois pre-revolutionary] state? [. . .] Now the program does not deal with this nor with the future statehood of the communist society.³⁶⁰

One will then have a non-democratic state because of the demands of the 'transition'. So it is an imperfect state, whose 'defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society'.³⁶¹ We arrive thus, at a *third* moment, 'the higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of individuals under division of labour [. . .]; after labour has ceased to be a means of life and has become itself the primary necessity of life'.³⁶²

We have arrived at a suspicion advanced in this and other works for some time. The dissolution of the state and the overcoming of politics are in reality *postulates* that did not occupy the attention of Marx, he did not detail how one would have to behave differently in *pre-revolutionary* and *post-revolutionary* politics, since social action is not sufficient *before* the revolution (because *one has to complete* the political act of the revolution itself) and *after* the revolution a clear formulation of what the *dictatorship of the proletariat* would be necessary, since its ambiguous expression calls into question the political process of a participative democracy of the people (that should not deny adequate representation, in a critical political realism), and is the politics that today Evo Morales needs, for example, and for which Marx does not provide much help.

³⁵⁹ 'Critique of the Gotha Program', IV; in Marx, 1956, p. 28 (Marx, 1970, p. 38) [Translation: 2008, p. 39].

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38 [Translation: pp. 38-9].

³⁶¹ It seems that the 'first phase' is the moment of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and not a later moment. In this last case we would have *four* different times (and not only *three*). For Lenin 'in the first phase of communist society (generally called socialism) "bourgeois right" is *not* abolished in its entirety' (Lenin, 1956, vol. 7, p. 91 [Translation: Christman, p. 342].) In the 'higher phase of communist society', explains Lenin, '[comes] the complete withering away of the State' (*ibid.*, [Translation: Christman, p. 349]). But it is essential to remember, Lenin is clear that before the 'higher phase' we find ourselves empirically before 'the impossibility of "introducing" socialism, it is the higher stage or phase of communism which they have in mind, and which no one has ever promised, or has even thought of "introducing", because generally speaking, it cannot be "introduced"' (*ibid.*, p. 94, [Translation: Christman, p. 345]). It is a postulate or 'regulative idea' (like the *fourth* Kant): logically conceivable and empirically impossible, central to this *Politics of Liberation*, and we will see it still frequently in the *critical* part.

³⁶² *Op. cit.*, I; Marx, 1956, MEW 19, p. 20; Marx, 1970, p. 24 [Translation: 2008, pp. 26-7]. It would be economically the 'kingdom of freedom', that is to say, the demands of the economy would be overcome or subsumed in the creative world of cultural creation. (Have economics and politics been transformed into an aesthetic? We will think through this in our next work on *The Aesthetics of Liberation*.)

Engels tightens some of the conclusions of Marx's definitive position that at the end of pre-history (empirical history) or the beginning of true history (the transcendental time of the postulate or unattainable but regulative perfection) would be the dissolution of the state (as *postulated*) and the overcoming of capital (as *empirical fact*),³⁶³ a new moment in social relations. But this raises the ambiguity of the following formulation: 'the *administration* of things and management of production processes is substituted for the government of people [politics]'.³⁶⁴ Commenting on this text Antonio Campillo writes: 'replacing thus parental [familial] and political relations'.³⁶⁵ In this way, and as an example, the *administrative* (bureaucratic) management of the Russian political community during the *post-revolutionary transition*, as a great productive economic enterprise, was the empirical elimination (that had been postulated)³⁶⁶ of political management in Soviet real socialism. And in this way, instead of overcoming politics in general, the *representative* and *participative* democratic politics that it should have encouraged was eliminated, and in its place the managerial bureaucracy of the Central Committee was installed. Will it not be, unexpectedly, the result of the complex and very subtle position of Marx on the issue of the overcoming of politics and the state, replaced by a simplistic interpretation of a quasi-political anarchism that extolled the social or the economic forgetting the *participatory* democratic politics of the community, the 'self-determination of the *people (Volks)*' (as Marx liked writing) that will produce negative effects?

For our part, in this *Politics of Liberation*, we will have to continue analogously in politics what the epistemic constructive genius of Marx fulfilled methodically in the production of *critical* economic categories. What he did in the economy we will have to develop in politics, knowing that, through the ontological assumptions of his theory of history (and through the relative devaluing of the political field), this politics (ours) for Marx had maybe seemed improbable, but today we are constrained to develop it fully, since it is necessary not only from a theoretical point of view, as Mézaros indicates, but *principally for political reasons* (to collaborate theoretically

³⁶³ Note that the overcoming of the *bourgeois* state or *liberal* system and of *capital* or the capitalist system are moments of a necessary and *empirically realizable project* (they are not *postulates*). In the post-revolutionary situation there should be a *new* participative-representative democratic state and new cultural, economic and ecological systems, not only beyond capitalism but also beyond mere rationally planned socialism following the criteria of raising production through market criteria. Is socialism not a Cartesian rationalization, an extreme expression of the fetishized quantification of the mythical *progress* of European modernity? On the contrary, the radical dissolution of every state and politics is a *postulate*.

³⁶⁴ Engels in Marx and Engels, 1975, p. 87 [Translation: TC]. Economic management would occupy the place of politics.

³⁶⁵ Campillo, 2001, p. 73 [Translation: TC].

³⁶⁶ Hinkelammert calls the attempt to realize the 'transcendental concept' or the 'postulate' empirically the 'transcendental illusion'. Like the Chinese navy *guided* by the North Star (the postulate), he will aim to reach her *empirically* (which is empirically *impossible*).

post factum, as a rearguard, with the creative novel revolutionary political processes of the twenty-first century in Latin America and the world).

Nevertheless, in politics, Marx started primarily from a 'critique of religion' (knowing that 'religion is the foundation [*Grundlage*] of the state'³⁶⁷ for Hegel), since the modern states in Europe had a theological legitimation; they were states in the regime of Christendom,³⁶⁸ which arrogated the manifestation of God in history, and their authority originated in a divine design. Secularization was an export to destroy peripheral cultures (Taoist, Confucian, Vedanta, Buddhist, Islamic, etc.), whose imagination or vision of the world was still religious. *Ad extra* a secular state was proposed; *ad intra* the monarchies of northern Europe continued being Lutheran and the others Catholic. The European Constitution still has problems in the twenty-first century with its definition in the face of an Islamic Turkey. Was the modern state secular?

Marx will move from a religious critique of politics to an 'economic critique', to a material-economic critique of politics, which inaugurates a now highly relevant type of reflection, from which we take inspiration. We conclude the exposition of the political theories that we would call *classical* with Marx.³⁶⁹

Marx confronts the theme of religion from a political perspective, to which we have made reference at length in this history of this *Politics of Liberation*.³⁷⁰ It is the *critique of Christendom* from a material perspective, which in general has been badly interpreted by the traditional right and the left or standard Marxism. The political critique of religion is the starting point:³⁷¹

If we want to influence the people of our time [. . .] two facts are undeniable: on the one hand, religion, and then politics, constitute the themes that attract the principal interest of Germany.³⁷²

In the summer of 1843, on vacation in the health resort of Kreuznach, Marx wrote a long manuscript about political philosophy: *A Contribution*

³⁶⁷ Marx criticizes this expression of Hermes ('The Leading Article in No. 179 of the *Kölnische Zeitung*', in *Rheinische Zeitung*, 10 July 1842; Marx, 1956, MEW, I, 90; OF, I, 224), but in truth it is his own position at this stage of his thinking.

³⁶⁸ About this category that we have used for 40 years, see ch. V of part II: 'The Problem of Christendom' in Löwith, 1964, pp. 350f. Consider in particular 'Marx and the description of Christendom as an inverted world' (pp. 374f.).

³⁶⁹ Knowing that the exposition of political philosophy in Latin America, Asia or Africa is necessary, but because of its 'peripheral' situation it still has not received the epithet of 'classical', although in many cases it is in its regional environment. For example, the position of Simon Bolívar in Latin America can be called classical, and 'Bolívarism' has total currency and reappears as a postulate of current Latin American political philosophy (in a confederate organization of the states of the region, proposed by Bolívar in 1826 in the Congress of Panama). In addition, the later authors to Marx, European-North American, will have to be referenced in the architectonic exposition of a politics of liberation.

³⁷⁰ See sections [38], [44-45], [60], [135], [143], etc.

³⁷¹ See Dussel, 1993, pp. 27f.

³⁷² Letter to Ruge of September 1843 (in MEW, I, 344; OF, I, 458 [Translation: TC]).

to a *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*,³⁷³ where one can discover theses, which he will continue developing later in his conception of politics, a treatise, which he never wrote, unfortunately, in a systematic way like *Capital*. Months later he commented in the *Introduction* to this writing:

For Germany, the *criticism of religion* [of Hegel] is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is *the premise of all criticism*³⁷⁴ [. . .] The foundation of irreligious criticism is: *Man makes religion* [. . .] Religion [. . .] is the *opium* of the people [. . .] The *criticism of theology* [turns into] the *criticism of politics*.³⁷⁵

In what sense did the 'critique of theology' become a 'critique of politics'? In *The Jewish Question*, whose first part he wrote in Germany, prior to the discovery of the importance of the economy in Paris, he expresses his thinking with a clarity that has passed unnoticed by many. Against Bruno Bauer he explains:

The Jewish question presents itself differently according to the state in which the Jew resides. In Germany, where *there is no political state*, no state as such,³⁷⁶ the Jewish question is purely *theological* (*theologische*). The Jew finds himself in *religious* opposition to the state, which proclaims Christiauity as its foundation. This state is a theologian *ex professo*. [Political] criticism here is *criticism of theology* [. . .] however *critically* we may move therein.³⁷⁷

This is the current sense of a *political theology*: the critique of the religious foundations of the 'Christian state'. When George W. Bush launches a 'crusade'; when A. Sharon treats Muslims unjustly in the name of a *Jewish* state; when the Islamists of Iran declare the Koranic or *theocratic* state, we

373 Published unedited in 1927 (in WEB, I, 201-333; OF, I, 317-438).

374 This formulation we have commented on: § 69: 'Toward an atheist discourse of the whole system', in Dussel, 1973a, V, pp. 49f.; for a history of Christendoms and their critique: Dussel, 1983a, pp. 173f.: 'Christendoms' and 'The model of Christendom in America' (pp. 207f.). The founder of Christianity, Jesus of Nazareth, began his political-messianic action with the critique of the religion of Israel, of the temple, of the priestly caste. Centuries before Marx 'the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism'; over all if it is understood that he criticizes a religion 'of domination'. See Dussel, 1993, pp. 42f.

375 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', from December 1843 to January 1844 (MEW, I, 378-9; OF, I, 491 [Translation: Tucker, pp. 53-4]).

376 As Christendoms, the English state of Hobbes, the French of Bodin or the Spanish were not for Marx 'political states', secularized. For Marx, only 'the free States of North America' were the exception. How disillusioned he would have been in the face of the fundamentalism in the current North American Empire!

377 *The Jewish Question*, I (MEW, I, 351; OF, I, 467 [Translation: Tucker, p. 30]). Marx is opposed to Bruno Bauer, who thinks that the 'Jewish question' is resolved if the Jews abandon their religion. Marx shows that religion can be affirmed (can have a lively and vital existence without contradicting 'the perfection of the state' (ibid., p. 352; p. 468 [Translation: Tucker, p. 31]).

need a *critique of the ideology or theology* of the state. It is in the face of that modern state, still not secularized, that Marx writes a text not often cited:

The state which acknowledges the *Bible* as its *charter* and Christianity³⁷⁸ as its supreme rule must be assessed according to the words of the Bible; for even the language of the Bible is sacred [at least for the Christian]. Such a state [. . .] finds itself involved in a painful *contradiction* (*Widerspruch*)³⁷⁹ [. . .] when it is referred to those words of the Bible³⁸⁰ 'with which it does not conform and *cannot conform unless it wishes to dissolve itself entirely*.' [. . .] In its own consciousness the official *Christian* state is an 'ought' whose realization is *impossible*³⁸¹ [. . .] Criticism [of Marx or another] is, therefore, *entirely within one's rights* in forcing the state, which supports itself upon the Bible, into a total disorder of thought [. . .] in which the infamy of its *profane* ends (which religion tries to cover up) enter into an *insoluble conflict with the probity of its religious consciousness*.³⁸²

We have followed this observation of Marx in all our historical description of politics. The question does not rest in negating religion, but in secularizing politics (a theme, which at the beginning of the twenty-first century is far from having been reached, contemplating fundamentalisms of the Christian or Jewish right in the American Empire itself – without ignoring that of the Muslims or Hindus, these last confronting the Muslims of India in name of their nationalist religious tradition). Therefore:

The *contradiction* in which the adherent of a particular religion finds himself in relation to his citizenship³⁸³ is only *one aspect* of the universal *secular contradiction between the [Hegelian] political state and civil society*. [. . .] We do not say to the Jews, therefore, as does Bauer: you cannot be emancipated politically (*politisch emanzipiert*) without emancipating yourselves completely from Judaism.³⁸⁴ We say rather: it is because you can be emancipated politically, without renouncing Judaism completely and absolutely, that *political emancipation* itself is not *human* emancipation.³⁸⁵

378 'Christendom'.

379 The theoretical-political strategy of Marx, including *Capital*, shows this 'contradiction' and makes it insupportable for an honest Christian conscience, not the case of the convinced bourgeois, whose acceptance of this opposition (between political or economic system and the gospel) would assume the impossibility of its practical existence.

380 Similar to those explained in sections [35–38].

381 Marx's theme is to show this 'impossibility'.

382 *The Jewish Question*, p. 359; p. 474 (Translation: Tucker, p. 38). We have effected a commentary in detail in Dussel, 1993, pp. 137f.

383 As member of a political-institutional community.

384 And in that case would be emancipated human beings in the political state.

385 *The Jewish Question*, p. 361; p. 476 (Translation: Tucker, pp. 39–40).

[193] Marx had discovered that the critique of religion was necessary and first (coinciding in this with the founder of Christianity, who began his labour with a critique of the religion of the Jerusalemite temple and against the economic structure, which assumed sacrifices), because it left to the *Christian* state (Christendom) its theological aim, which hid under a religious mantle its secular domination. On secularizing the Hegelian Christian state, the organic state without contradiction, all human beings are not emancipated.³⁸⁶ The emancipation in the political field is not human emancipation; it is a part of the emancipation; it is a *field* of emancipation. The Jew can be integrated fully in the state without renouncing his/her religion, but by this one will not have been emancipated as a whole, because it is in bourgeois (or civil) society where other contradictions are hidden, which are not resolved by the Hegelian organic state. It is in the *materiality* of bourgeois society where Marx begins to discover slowly that the political critique has to unfold itself more deeply as critique of the economy:

[Modern] political emancipation is [. . .] the *dissolution* of the old society, upon which the sovereign power [. . .] rests. Political revolution is a revolution of civil society. What was the nature of the old society? It can be characterized in one word: *feudalism*. The old civil society had a *directly political* character; that is, the elements of civil life such as property, the family, and types of occupation had been raised, in the form of lordship, caste and guilds, to elements of political life (*Staatslebens*).³⁸⁷

Politically there was not 'separation' (*Trennung*), or secularization 'of the life of the people' (*Volksleben*). And Marx concludes:

The [modern] political revolution [. . .] *abolished* the *political character of civil society*. It dissolved civil society into its basic elements, on the one hand *individuals*, and on the other hand the *material (materiellen) and cultural elements* which formed the *life experience (Lebensinhalt)*³⁸⁸ and the civil situation³⁸⁹ of these individuals. [. . .] A *specific* activity and situation in life no longer had any but an individual significance. [. . .] Feudal society was dissolved into its basic element, *man*.³⁹⁰

386 What in Hegel is essentially Christian, therefore fetishized twice: by not being secularized and by not noting its contradiction with the irresolution of the conflicts not overcome by bourgeois (or civil) society, which Marx confronts.

387 *The Jewish Question*, p. 367; p. 481 (Translation: Tucker, p. 44).

388 Marx uses 'technically' (or philosophically in a strict way) the 'material' aspect of ethics, and now of politics. The 'material' in ethics refers to 'human life' in its physical-material and 'spiritual' or cultural demands (see Dussel, 1998a, chs. 1 and 4). The question is absolutely *essential* for the intention of this work.

389 Especially in Marx, the German word *bürgerlich* signifies 'civil', from 'bourgeois' (who lives in the 'city': *Burg* in German, the *cittadino*, 'citizen'), that is to say, 'bourgeois' or 'civil'. Marx uses a single word: *bürgerlich* (following the declensions of the adjective).

390 *The Jewish Question*, p. 368; p. 482 (Translation: Tucker, p. 45).

What the young Marx criticizes from a political point of view, paradoxically, is the *depoliticization* of civil (bourgeois) society in the face of the modern organic state, which keeps for itself all the human *politicity*.

Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received the liberty to own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of business; he received the liberty to engage in business. The *formation of the political state*, and the dissolution of civil society into independent *individuals* [. . .] are accomplished by *one and the same act*. Man as a member of civil society – *non-political (unpolitische)* man – necessarily appears as the *natural man*.³⁹¹

In a state prior to that of ‘civil society’ (in the Lockean sense) the level of the economic reproduction of life was concealed; it passed unnoticed. Marx, in his strictly political description, discovers that in that horizon of bourgeois society is found ‘the sphere of human needs, labour, private interests and civil law,³⁹² as the *basis of its own existence (Grundlage ihres Bestehens)*’.³⁹³ This level has been depoliticized and split from the political life of the state; the natural and concrete man is not still the abstract ‘citizen’. Modernity calls ‘political emancipation [. . .] a reduction (*Reduktion*) of man, on the one hand to a member of civil society, an *independent* and *egoistic* individual, and on the other hand, to a *citizen*, a moral person’.³⁹⁴ Marx refers to Locke, with his concept of the ‘state of nature’ (which includes aspects of the bourgeois society described by Hegel, in the level of ownership or of wages, for example) and of ‘civil state’ (the political state). We remember in our time John Rawls with his ‘two principles’: the first political, with equality (the properly political principle of equality); the second socio-economic, with inequality as starting point (the ‘social’ principle). Hannah Arendt, for her part, will depoliticize ‘the social’. Marx anticipated this move as follows:

Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man [of civil society] has absorbed *into himself* the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his [bourgeois] work, and in his [political] relationships, he has become a *species-being*; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*forces propres*) as *social powers* [in civil society] so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as *political power*.³⁹⁵

The precision and currency of these reflections is immense, and in fact are the fundamental hypotheses of a politics of liberation. The *material*

391 Ibid., p. 369; p. 483 (Translation: Tucker, pp. 45–6).

392 He refers to § 189–208 of the *Philosophy of Right* of Hegel.

393 *The Jewish Question*, p. 369; p. 483 (Translation: Tucker, p. 46).

394 Ibid., p. 370; p. 484 (Translation: Tucker, p. 46).

395 Ibid.

dimension of politics (human life, which takes into account the necessary conditions for its production, reproduction and public, communitarian, ecological, economic and cultural development) does not have to discard as 'social' the extra-political; nor does it have to consider politics as a last resort, devaluing the 'political field', making the economy the only relevant and final field of human reality. The solution is to articulate the economic and social material with the formal democratic, with the state's institutional ability to be fact, and with the other moments of the architectonic of 'the political'. Today this is more important than in Marx's era because it is a question of thousands of millions of citizens organized in post-colonial peripheral states, for whom the themes treated by Hegel under the rubric of 'civil society' (or 'bourgeois') are an unsurpassed moment (they cannot be surpassed easily effecting the passage to the organic, autonomous state, with self-determination) and whose contradictions are not in any way overcome in the Hegelian state, but are projected to the periphery.³⁹⁶

Already in Paris, and beginning the study of the economy suggested by the young Engels, Marx writes at the beginning of the second part of *On the Jewish Question*:

We will attempt to escape from the theological formulation of the question. For us, the question concerning the capacity of the Jew for emancipation is transformed into another question: what specific *social* element (*gesellschaftliche*)³⁹⁷ is it necessary to overcome in order to abolish Judaism? [. . .] An organization of society which would abolish the pre-conditions [. . .] of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible.³⁹⁸

Marx has passed from a theological critique of politics to a social or economic critique of the same. The social or economic critique does not devalue politics, but articulates it with greater complexity:

The contradiction which exists between the *effective political power* (*praktische politische Macht*) of the Jew and his political rights, is the contradiction between politics [the formal] and the *power of money* in general [the material]. Politics is in principle superior to the power of money, but in practice it has become its bondsman.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁶ Hegel thinks to send to the colonies the overpopulation and over-production of the metropolis, as a solution to overcome the contradiction established in civil society. Marx, rightly, and showing the essential level of the question that we accept thanks to his investigations, indicates that the contradiction is established also in the organic state, because it does not overcome the contradiction found in the essence of capital, the *material* structuring moment of the organic state, although *bidden* from the analysis of the classical liberal economy and philosophy.

³⁹⁷ It is not the merely material 'bourgeois' or 'social' element, but 'societal', in an ambiguous way.

³⁹⁸ *The Jewish Question*, p. 372; p. 485 (Translation: Tucker, p. 48).

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 374; p. 487 (Translation, Tucker, p. 50).

[194] Marx is referring to the indicated articulation of the material moment with the formal moment of politics. Jewish 'political power' proceeds from its economic force (material level), but at the formal level (of political rights) it does not have any of those rights (is simply tolerated). The social or economic level is found in the civil (or bourgeois) society, which has been depoliticized, and for this at the level of the political state (still not 'political society') the Jews are not citizens in the full sense. Their emancipation does not consist in renouncing their religion to form part as citizens of the political state, because even in that case, as members that support the contradictions of the economic, social, civil bourgeois society, they would not be fully emancipated humans.

Only a 'stratum', a 'class' of the civil society, depoliticized by liberalism, will earn full political conscience; only a class essentially dominated not only at the level of the state but specifically at the level of bourgeois society itself; only 'a class [. . .] which has *radical chains*, a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution (*Auflösung*) of all classes, a sphere of society which has a universal character',⁴⁰⁰ this specific 'victim' of the dominating system (of capital) in the negativity of his/her exteriority, only she can be the political actor' par excellence:

What constitutes the proletariat is not *naturally existing* poverty, but poverty *artificially produced* (*künstlich produzierte Armut*)⁴⁰¹ [. . .] When the proletariat announces the *dissolution of the existing social order*,⁴⁰² it only declares the *secret of its own existence*, for it is the *effective* dissolution of this order.⁴⁰³

Marx is interested especially in the theme of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, which refers to the organic state (§§ 257–320)⁴⁰⁴ in its internal constitution (not treating the aspect, which we have explained: 'Sovereignty *vis-à-vis* foreign states', § 321), since 'family and (bourgeois) civil society appear as the dark ground of nature (*dunkle Naturgrund*) from which the light of the state arises.'⁴⁰⁵ The 'dark ground' of bourgeois (civil) society is the

⁴⁰⁰ *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction*, 1843–1844 (MEW, I, 391; p. 501 [Translation: Tucker, p. 64]).

⁴⁰¹ We have shown in Dussel, 1998a, ch. 4 that the 'victim' suffers in his/her negative materiality (the pain of his/her corporality) the systemic effect of the established order. If the civilizing or cultural 'systems' try to move further away from pain and death (Freud thought), when they produce 'systematically' pain and death we are in the situation described now by Marx: 'artificially'.

⁴⁰² Marx is using a category. We call it 'Totality' or 'valid order', which corresponds to the first Totality or the Totality of Levinas (see Dussel, 1973a, II, 2).

⁴⁰³ *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction*, p. 391; p. 502 (Translation: Tucker, pp. 64–5).

⁴⁰⁴ The manuscript of the commentary entitled *Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (from March to August of 1843, prior to the *Introduction* already cited) (MEW, I, 203–333; OF, I, 319–438 [Translation: Tucker, pp. 16–25]) has lost the first pages and ends abruptly, as if Marx had tired of his commentary.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205; p. 321 (Translation: TC).

'material' basis 'of the state', which starts to realize itself.⁴⁰⁶ But Hegel is not conscious of the determining presence of this material basis; for him, 'the antithesis of state and civil society is thus fixed: the state does not reside in, but outside civil society. It affects it only through its "*representatives*", who are entrusted with '*managing the state* within these spheres'.⁴⁰⁷ Civil society has been depoliticized and the state exercises political domination over it. And this because Hegel 'confuses the state as the totality of a people's existence with the political state'.^{408, 409} This duality is structured 'so that, just as the Christians are equal in heaven, but unequal on earth, so the individual members of a nation are *equal* in the heaven of their *political world*,⁴¹⁰ but unequal in the earthly existence of *society*'.⁴¹¹

Marx also shows that it is in the movement from civil society to the state on a political level, '*formalism*',⁴¹² where one appoints committee members, in whom one must have confidence, and who are invested with a political character through the state's authorization. Meanwhile in the inverse movement of the state toward civil society one fulfils '*materialism*',⁴¹³ 'in which is referred to the interests' of this last; it is affirmed as a particular reality, which always has to be subjected to the universal will of the 'general interest'.

Marx begins to discover that within the state and civil society the Rhineland bourgeoisie only affirms the 'private interest' of egoistic property. This class, in which he had placed some hope, does not give of itself; does not have the freedom necessary to create a new world, and the modern state intends to subsume the contradiction of bourgeois society. The political problem does not rest now in merely reformulating the abstract political state, but in the transformation of the structures at the material level of bourgeois society. Marx abandons the bourgeoisie and discovers the 'proletariat'. The proletariat is dispossessed, under bourgeois society, is 'a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society'.⁴¹⁴ That is to say, the 'economic critique' of politics flows into the conclusion that the waged and impoverished class is dominated materially in bourgeois society and does not have political representation in the organic state. From the critique of the state *from civil society*, he passes to the critique of civil society itself and of the state, *from*

406 Ibid. (Translation: TC).

407 Ibid., p. 252; p. 362 (Translation: TC).

408 Marx always uses the formula: 'political state (*politische Staat*)', and not 'political society' (as later Gramsci).

409 Ibid., p. 282; p. 390 (Translation: TC).

410 As 'equality' in the formal level of the political rights in the 'first principle' of John Rawls.

411 Ibid., p. 283; p. 391 (Translation: TC). To complete the comparison, in the 'second principle' of Rawls, the *socio-economic* inequality shows us the 'reality' of liberalism, where the existence of the beneficers (the rich) and the worst situated (the poor) is justified.

412 Ibid., p. 329; p. 434 (Translation: Tucker, p. 23). He uses the term *formell*.

413 Ibid., *materiell*.

414 *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction*, in WEB, I, 391; OF, I, 501 (Translation: Tucker, p. 64).

the doubly dominated class (at the social-economic and political level). This demands, at the level of political strategy, which tries the transformation, the eruption of a new *political actor* slowly discerned, the proletariat, and not the Rhinelander bourgeoisie, which Marx had adhered to until that moment; the French Revolution was no longer relevant. From now on, the political struggle for the 'human world of democracy' will not be carried out solely at the *formal* level of politics, but also with the conscious and active intervention of a revolution at the *material* level of politics, of economics with *political* intention, and from a revolutionary political class.⁴¹⁵ It is the eruption of the 'liberative event',⁴¹⁶ 'revolutionary praxis',⁴¹⁷ from an original 'state of rebellion'. The proletarian masses, which had been considered by the intellectual critics as a passive material of historical change, as only the 'heart' (whose 'head' was philosophy),⁴¹⁸ become self-conscious actors in their own emancipation. Marx has matured his political position. For this, in the 1847 writing of the *Communist Manifesto*, a political diagnostic of the European situation from the 'victims' of the dominant system can be noted.

From the 'militancy' of a Marx immersed in the worker movements, among those who suffer the unintentional negative effects of the political-economic system, he tries to distinguish the critical worker politics of the 'socialists' (mostly intellectuals of the left) from the vanguard now called 'communist', in order to consolidate internationally in Europe those who work within the new parties of the masses of wage workers. These factions, groups or movements were called the 'communist party': today, the '*current of communist opinion*', which was generated in diverse unions and worker parties of Europe. In Brussels the *Kommunistisches Korrespondenzkomitee* was organized in 1846, in London the *Fraternal Democrats* was institutionalized in 1847, and in Paris the 'Communist League' in the same year. The new 'movement' had been slowly defining its political strategy, and Marx was determinative in the theoretical foundation of the *political* decisions taken. In political philosophy the *Manifesto* would be a *classic political text*, which still illuminates (for decades, centuries?) the history of humanity, because the class of wage workers that today is definitively globalized, together with other dominated or excluded human groups,⁴¹⁹ is more in

415 See Dussel, 1998, § 6.1, [341], pp. 500f.

416 We will explain this theme in the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*, modifying the content that Alain Badiou gives in his 'event'.

417 See Löwy, 1980 (Translation: Pearlman, pp. 90-104).

418 *Introduction* to 'Toward a critique . . .', in WEB, I, 391; p. 502.

419 The class of those wage workers is confused today with many other social sectors, not only with the peasants who have made great revolutions (as in China), but even with those scorned by Marx as 'the "dangerous class," the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society' (Marx, *Manifesto*, I; MEW, IV, 4; ed. Cast., 1967, p. 38 [Translation: Fowkes, p. 17]); the class of those wage workers who produce added value today constitutes a *part* (still not the relevant vanguard, and less in the 'central' countries of Europe or USA) of the 'social block of the oppressed': the people as 'transformative' reference (if not revolutionary). See Dussel, 1985c, the category 'people'.

absolute numbers and in relative oppression, and so this has even greater validity in the twenty-first century. The contradiction has passed from civil society before the state to the classes dominated in civil society against the bourgeoisie (the dominant class not only *materially* in said civil society, but dominating equally the political state as an instrument in its hands). From Hobbes, but definitively from J. Locke, we have seen 'private property', and a little later the 'division of labour', were the pivots around which was argued the necessity of 'passing' from the *state of nature* to the *civil state*. Marx explains critically what was stated from the beginning of Modernity (even from Ginés de Sepúlveda).

[195] Read with twenty-first-century eyes, he calls attention in the *Manifesto* to the planetary, worldwide, global sense:

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known [. . .]. Modern industry has established the world-market (*Weltmarkt*) [. . .] This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land.⁴²⁰

The intention of the text is *political*:

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding *political advance* of that class. [Nevertheless,] the executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.⁴²¹ [This does not negate that] the bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part [. . .] The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.⁴²²

In front of the bourgeoisie, and as a co-principle from its origin, the proletariat is in a state of contradiction. This 'opposition' is 'struggle', but it has to be understood that 'every class struggle is a *political* struggle'.⁴²³ The cen-

⁴²⁰ *Manifesto*, I; MEW, IV, 463; Spanish ed., 1967, pp. 28-9 (Translation: Fowkes, pp. 4-5).

⁴²¹ A 'bureaucracy' in the Hegelian sense, but not at the orders of the Prussian monarch.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, p. 464; pp. 29-30 (Translation: Fowkes, pp. 5-7). Today the hegemony of the mere managerial bourgeoisie, owner or hureaucracy of the micro-system in the national order has been replaced by the dominion of the *globalized private bureaucracy* (of the transnational corporations) and the *political bureaucracies* of the particular states (in particular the post-colonial governments), who fulfil their strategies. One has to 'translate' the text of Marx from the micro to the macro to discover its pertinence.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p. 471; p. 37 (Translation: Fowkes, p. 15). This *politischer Kampf* situated the 'militancy' of Marx, as a last resort, at the *strategic-political* level (which we will call *level A*).

tral political issue is that: 'This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves.'⁴²⁴

At the level of institutionalization (*level B* of the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*) the mere worker class can or cannot be organized into a 'social' level, as class. But, one step further, being institutionalized as a 'political party' (as 'movement of opinion' or 'faction' within the worker parties) is possible. That party will have to struggle politically against the bourgeoisie, from the impossibility of the bourgeoisie showing that 'certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence'.⁴²⁵ 'The modern labourer [. . .] instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class.'⁴²⁶ A century and a half later some new variables need to be included. The workers of the 'central' countries have been beneficiaries of the extraordinary gain and the transference of surplus value from the post-colonial countries, which has brought them (as Hegel thought) to accept their privileged conditions (since the national wealth is on average much higher than in the peripheral countries).⁴²⁷ Now greater contradiction is found within transnational capital (and its private bureaucracies) and the wage workers of the peripheral countries, and even more, the excluded masses of miserable unemployed (which are not even a 'class'), who begin to 'organize themselves' as *people* and who will be determinative for the political parties, which educate a new political bureaucracy of the post-colonial states.

The essential categorical clarifications of Marx have to *be developed* without losing their sense, radicalism or pertinence. We intend this in a future architectonic, which continues this history of a *Politics of Liberation*.

His economic investigations do not have as ultimate end 'science', but science at the service of a political commitment: the emancipation of the inevitably oppressed class, since it constitutes the 'essence' of capital: by the creation of surplus value, the 'valorization of value' (the basis or being of capital).

424 Ibid., p. 471; p. 37 (Translation: Fowkes, pp. 15-16).

425 Ibid., p. 473; p. 39 (Translation: Fowkes, p. 19).

426 Ibid., p. 473; pp. 39-40 (Translation: Fowkes, p. 19). In the final section of volume I of *Capital*, Marx formulates the 'law of accumulation', that is, within his definitive categorical horizon, the expression of what he wrote in 1847 'intuitively'. The economic investigations of Marx to define the 'causes' of the *negativity* of those exploited in the capital have as a last resort a *political intention* (see: 'The scientific program of investigation of Karl Marx', in Dussel, 2001a, pp. 279ff., and 'On the concept of critical science and ethics', *ibid.*, pp. 303f.). More concrete political-strategic works of analysis, like *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, will enable us to return to the *political* Marx of the moment. The theoretical work of Marx has a 'militant' political sense (and this is equally the proposal of the philosophy of liberation, ethics, politics, aesthetic . . .). Politics is the *prima philosophia*, we wrote in 1973 (Dussel, 1973a, II).

427 See Dussel, 1988, ch. 15; and my responses (Dussel, 1996, ch. 10) and those of Hinkelammert (1996, ch. 3) in the debate with K.-O. Apel (Apel and Dussel, 1992, pp. 147f. and 313f.).

In the Dependency of 'Mature Modernity'

Some Themes for a History of Politics in Latin America

[196] This section includes some themes under the general title of 'politics', some of which will be approached as history of politics and others as history of political philosophy or thought. Its ambiguity is intentional. The reflections that follow have to be taken as partial indications of a greater project, since first needs to be written, from an immense and scattered bibliography,¹ a history of *Latin American philosophical thinking* in general,² and, second, a history of regional *political philosophical thinking* in particular. I am interested to show, with some examples (to not lengthen this voluminous work further) the meaning of some *strong* moments in a political *liberation* philosophy.

In the history of Latin American politics, and of implicit or explicit political philosophy, there are three periods that, in my eyes, are of greater interest within the horizon of this specific project:

First is the critique of the conquest (explained in Chapter 6, sections [95f.]). It was the beginning of the 'anti-discourse' of Modernity, and the first chapter of a political liberation philosophy in the beginning of globalization, when one criticizes expressly the original negation practised by the annihilation of the Amerindian indigenous civilizations. There 'colonial Difference' is discovered and constituted, which determines all later Latin American culture, even the 'Creole' (white or mixed), which will not be able to be merely part of Western culture. The Latin American sexist and racist (internal and external) 'coloniality' gives a 'shade', a 'tone' that will determine all political life, differentiating it from European Modernity. *Colonial Modernity* (inaugurated in 1492) is the starting point for a Latin American politics of liberation.

Second are the emancipatory practices and theoretical production from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of metropolitan domination. The justification for independence and the creation of the Latin American states in their post-colonial era (from 1808) constitutes a politics of

¹ See the bibliography in Dussel, 1994, pp. 48–52.

² The work of Carlos Beorlegui *History of Philosophical Thinking in Latin America* (Beorlegui, 2004) is an excellent beginning that will have to be continued.

emancipation or explicit liberation (in praxis and theory), which has to be taken into account in a universal and particularly regional political philosophy. It was the *first Emancipation*, which had as a past great Neolithic civilizations (not the North American of New England) but was, however, hegemonized by the 'Creoles'. The social, racial and cultural complexity of the new Latin American states makes organization of the new political life difficult, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gave a great advantage to the USA, but it shows in the twenty-first century their capacity for more universal multicultural projects.

Third, starting from the long history of the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, is the post-colonial era, maturing a consciousness of the need to negate the burdensome (and in some way more dominant) structures of the post-colonial metropolises, which would consist of a *second Emancipation*, begun in 1959 with the Cuban Revolution, continued in 1979 with the Sandinista Revolution, and in 1994 with the Zapatista National Liberation Army. The history of a *Politics of Liberation* is written at this critical and culminating moment of historical struggle, when the post-colonial exploitation is becoming intolerable (for example, an unjust external debt, unjustifiable and irresponsible, strategically imposed through corruption and despotism by the *central* powers to the neocolonies and their educated elites) and becomes 'unpayable'. It is producing negative social effects that are seen in tumultuous expressions of unbearable suffering, as in Argentina with the massive explosion of 20–21 December 2001. It is a 'state of rebellion', which expresses a will prior to the Schmittian 'state of exception'. This work is situated as a theoretical expression that tries to justify this *second Emancipation* or the liberation underway in our continent (and in the whole post-colonial peripheral world).

In this chapter, we will try a partial, provisional, 'sketched' schematic by way of example of moments of a history that will have to be written in detail in the future.³ The importance of the theme is derived from the need to

3 For years, in the masters and doctorates of political philosophy of UAM–Iztapalapa and of the UNAM (in Mexico City), I have organized postgraduate seminars on this theme. I thank the participants for having given me the possibility of debating with them these themes. I hope to be able to publish the works of those seminars. The *History of Political-Philosophical Thinking in Latin America* I conceive as development of the themes attending to the following periodization (see Dussel, 1994, pp. 13–53):

First Era: *Politics in the Amerindian cultures:*

Period 1. Amerindian mythical and political philosophical thinking (to the conquest and present).

Second Era: *Politics in the State of the Indies in the first early Modernity:*

Period 2. Political philosophy in the face of the violence of the conquest (1492–1576).

Period 3. Political philosophy in the Baroque society (1553–1750).

Period 4. Colonial political philosophy in the face of the eruption of mature Modernity (1750–).

Third Era: *The permanent crisis of the new post-colonial political order:*

Period 5. Political philosophy of the first Emancipation (1808–21).

Period 6. Political philosophy between continuity and the liberal rupture (1821–70).

Period 7. The weakness of the post-colonial state in the face of imperialism (1870–1910).

Period 8. Political philosophy of the populism in the face of later Modernity (1910–54).

'locate' the starting point of the constructive discourse to develop the political architectonic written to think about the more urgent problems, which worry us as Latin Americans (although I have the aim of a globality, valid equally for Asia or Africa), an architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*. It is always necessary to move closer from the past to the present of our political continent, since that concretely determined post-colonial strategic *space* will enable us to avoid an inevitable Eurocentrism.⁴ Only taking into account the political development of that peripheral space can we construct creatively the theoretical categories of a global critical political philosophy (applicable to the 'centre' and to the 'post-colonial' periphery). We will cover political history through some situations, figures or relevant political texts prototypical of the stages of Latin American political experience, which like stones that protrude from the water of the stream allow us to cross it. It will be a rapid panorama from the middle of the eighteenth to the twenty-first century, which will serve as concrete reference for the questions that we will have to ask in the theoretical development of the architectonic part of political philosophy.

Latin America remained 'at the margin of history'⁵ in the same moment that China, Hindustan and the Ottoman Empire were excluded from 'modern civilization'. All the non-European cultures were 'overcome' in that moment by the Industrial Revolution, by *capitalism*, which accumulates growing relative surplus value, and which is developed by fortuitous and structural causes that incline the balance toward some regions as always in history, Great Britain and France at the beginning.⁶ The humanist mercan-

Period 9. Between dependency and liberation in the face of the North American Empire (1954-).

We will explain in this chapter some themes and political moments of philosophical thinking in this long history, in particular what corresponds to mature Modernity.

4 In the *Conclusions* to this historical part of a *Politics of Liberation* we will indicate summarily what we have been obliged to 'leave in the inkwell' of this long history, including the nineteenth century to the present, other regions of the globe and Europe itself, which for reasons of space we cannot approach not even superficially. We will make references, nevertheless, to many of the most recent events not included in this history in the future architectonic part.

5 Exact expression of Leopoldo Zea in his work *The Role of the Americas in History*, ch. VIII (Zea, 1957, pp. 174f.). Extracting this book from my library I read on the first page: 'Mainz 1963': in all my books I put place and date when I begin to read them; from that time to the present its reading has been a profound illumination for my philosophical project. If the thesis of a *History of Politics* that I propose has some novelty, it will be exactly in how I distance myself from Zea, but admitting many parts advanced by him. The history of Zea, in part, is still Hellenocentric and Eurocentric in its conception of 'Western culture' (like all those of his generation, from the master Jose Gaos to Edmund O'Gorman).

6 See pp. 69f. and pp. 152f. Zea thinks that Spain and Portugal are not 'modern'; that the Spanish and Russian 'marginality' are equivalent; that Modernity and Western culture have an ambiguous relation; that Europe can remain 'outside' of the West; that the USA is today the West; that Latin America was feudal in its colonial era and therefore had 'to enter' into Modernity; that Latin America being in part Western has the ideal of realizing it fully. These theses are very different from ours. They are: Spain is the first modern and hegemonic country of the first early Modernity, hegemonic in Europe by its opening to the Atlantic; Latin America, from 1492, begins to move further away from feudalism, like its colonies (see Serio Bagu, 1949); it was a periphery or 'modern' colony (although inevitably with some feudal

tilism of the *first* Luso-Hispanic early Modernity (including Spain, Portugal, Hispanic America and Brazil) 'loses' the possibility of participating in the *new* stage of the history of Modernity (from an *official* interpretation of history that industrial Europe imposes on the world), by misfortunes accumulated from the end of the fifteenth century. For this, *mature* Modernity (described in Chapters 9 and 10, sections [152-195]) situates 'southern Europe' and the American colonies 'outside' of history.⁷

Five Periods of Latin American Politics

[197] We will sketch some central events, thinkers and moments of a political history and of political philosophical thinking. It will be very short and only suggestive.

The 'State of the [Western] Indies': The Summary of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies (1681)

In 1474 Henry IV of Castile died. In 1469 he had contracted the secret marriage of Isabel of Castile and Fernando of Aragón. After many intrigues, and

elements), marked then by the 'colonial difference'; Russia was always peripheral until 1917, but never a colony; Spain begins to be 'southern Europe' with the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century; semi-marginal in a different way to Russia; Latin America from the sixteenth century is integrated in an Atlantic market in transition to capitalism or in its mercantile stage (the monetary moment); the USA is a culture of the 'western hemisphere' (development of Europe but not European: strictly Western), today in its imperial-militarist stage; Latin America would have to be integrated as a political unity (proposal sustained from Bolívar to Zea), but aiming to be articulated in a project to construct a trans-modern global polycentric culture (and not in the West). Porfirio Miranda, an exemplary Mexican philosopher, proposes, oppositely, to give way simply and frankly to the West. His proposal is: 'The thesis *all cultures are equally valid* is the greatest tranquilizer that can be offered to a mediocre culture, the greater protection of its mediocrity against the development of something superior [!]. And not only that. This thesis can serve as invulnerable shield to the current Chinese regime in its absolute contempt for human rights, as that contempt [!] pertains to its ancestral culture' (Miranda, 1996, p. 30 [Translation: TC]). After all that was explained in this history, any commentary is too much. Not only would there be in this expression an unjustifiable 'occidentalism', but an 'orientalism'.

7 The southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy Greece, etc.), from the eighteenth century, are 'marginal' but not colonial; meanwhile Latin America (and great regions of Asia and later Africa) will be 'peripheral' in a strict sense: 'colonial' or 'post-colonial', structurally exploited. China, Thailand, Japan and other Asian nations were never colonies, but were not left alone as 'peripheral' or merely 'underdeveloped' in some moment (with respect to the 'development' of the industrial capitalist European centre). To be 'colonial' creates *internal* political and social structures that are difficult to overcome through emancipation (the 'colonial mentality' of the Creole national elites and the political and economic structures take root deeply). In addition, it is different when the elites have a 'bourgeois spirit', like the colonies of New England, or when they only have a 'baroque spirit'. Political philosophy has to differentiate well the geopolitical and cultural environments of origin, to understand the difference signified by the concrete 'political strategy' and the consistency and structure of the gestating 'institutions'; we refer to those constituted from the 'colonial difference' (before emancipation) or 'post-colonial' (after Independence).

thanks to the strategy that Machiavelli admired in Fernando, the 'kingdom' of Castile elected Isabel as queen, under a *contractual pact* – the *auctoritas* and the *potestas* come 'from below' – with the groups of power (the 'below' is not a *people* of free citizens as in Venice or Florence) of the nobility of the ancient fiefs and the bourgeois of the cities. The same happened with Fernando in Aragón in 1479. Both founded the Holy Inquisition, an intelligence service or apparatus of the *modern* state, in 1478, naming Cardinal Cisneros to be in charge. In 1481 they launched the crusade against the Muslims of Granada. The Hispanic absolute monarchy had been born, and thus the modern state started its path toward the exterior when on 3 August 1492, after taking Granada and exiling the Jews (a shameful fact of the history of Spain), Christopher Columbus, a Genoan navigator, left to discover the routes to Asia through the tropical Atlantic, the foundational *strategic space* of Modernity.

The new Spanish state had the sovereign king, who always, even with Charles V, must sign a *pact* with all the kingdoms (Old Castile, Aragón, Cataluña, Galicia, Navarra, Andalucía, etc., and later with the kingdoms of the Indies), receiving from them the delegation of power, which could be rescinded by the kingdoms if the king were treasonous. This, quickly, organized Councils for the kingdoms, and also for the Indies. For example, the Royal Council of Castile was founded in 1480, the Supreme Council of Aragón in 1494, the Council of Navarra (controlled at the same time like the external colonies) in 1515, and the Council of the Indies organized in 1524, lasting until 1834. The Council had a president and learned advisers (*hearers*), specialists in law and theology, frequently bourgeois, university graduates, or clergymen.

Its immense archive – millions of documents organized in thousands of dossiers, which today can be consulted in the Palace of the Lonja in Seville – shows us the modern-bureaucratic complexity of that Council, through which passed all the problems and decisions of the king with respect to the Indies.

The king signed *royal documents*, concrete ordinances about specific problems that were summarized in 1681 under the title of *Summary of the Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies*. This volume was divided into eight books, each one dedicated to different institutions of the *State of the Indies*, which can be called, following the conceptualization of S. Kierkegaard, *Latin American Colonial Christendom*. The American territory was organized into different jurisdictions, which from the middle of the sixteenth century were the viceroyalties (of New Spain in Mexico [1535], Peru [1542], New Granada, and in 1776 the viceroyalty of the Plata in Buenos Aires; in Brazil in Bahia from 1640). There were regions with true independence, such as the general Captaincies of Santo Domingo (1511), Caracas, Guatemala, Quito and Chile. In all regions there were Audiencias, specifically juridical authority, but equally executive in some aspects, which were situated in Santo Domingo (1511), Mexico, Guadalajara, Guatemala, Lima, Cuzco,

Chile, Quito, Santa Fe of Bogota, Caracas, Panama, Los Charcas in Bolivia, Buenos Aires (1661). As authority of lesser rank, executive, they had governors in almost all the great cities; in them frequently were organized Creole town councils, with greater mayors, co-town councillors, town councillors and caciques. This political-civil structure had in parallel an ecclesial institutionalization with authorities at each rank. The great archbishops who corresponded jurisdictionally to the viceroalties were based in Santo Domingo (1546), Mexico, Lima, Quito, Santa Fe, La Plata; Guatemala in 1743, Brazil in Bahia in 1676, and Caracas and Havana in 1803. The archbishops were the second authority (included politics, since they occupied the place of the viceroy in his absence). There were in addition bishops (equivalent to Audiences or territories of governors), from the first founded in 1504 in Santo Domingo to the end of their first colonial institutionalization in 1620, with the founding of the bishops from Durango in the north and Buenos Aires to the south. The ecclesiastic town councils had equally great authority. The provincial councils or dioceses were the only legislative activity fulfilled in Latin America before emancipation.

Popular imagination gave ultimate authority to their religious beliefs and rites – prior to and after the conquest – for which frequently an archbishop had more authority before the people than the viceroy himself. Even in economic questions or of limits between communities, the ecclesiastical entities frequently had greater importance than civil politics themselves, since the parishes (of each bishop) had a daily presence in even the furthest village or hamlet of indigenous or country people. There were parishes of Spanish, Creoles and Mestizos and ‘doctrines’ for the Indian villages (for example, the Franciscan or Jesuit Reductions, which organized politically and economically hundreds or thousands of indigenous, respecting their rights and achieving an exemplary economic and cultural development). The limits of the Latin American post-colonial states were more determined by parish relations than by those stipulated in the civil structures. The birth, baptism, marriage and death of all inhabitants were recorded in the parishes from the beginning of the sixteenth century, which permitted censuses, payment of tithes, taxes, etc.

The extraction of wealth was structural and gigantic, in proportion to what was produced.⁸ The gold and silver were mostly taken to the Peninsula and the king demanded strict accounting. The ‘learned city’ – fortress of the presence of the white (Spanish or Creole), Baroque culture, which counted on tens of centres of university education for its elites, and ecclesiastic, economic or military professionals – was dispersed in an indigenous rural continent.

Power was exercised absolutely by the king and his bureaucracy, and with the Bourbons increased intolerably. In the eighteenth century, with the Bourbon presence, the quartermasters general, a type of governor who

⁸ Wallerstein, 1980.

exercised an indiscriminate administrative–bureaucratic power, turned the ancient 'provinces' into authentic 'colonies'. The state was really a super-structure of domination that was slowly criticized principally by Creoles and Mestizos, together with continuous uprisings and rebellions of the indigenous communities. The political conscience of autonomy in the face of the metropolis was raised from the Baroque culture that was secretly constructing metaphors of the longed-for liberty. Thus, the myth of 'Quetzalcóatl–Guadalupe',⁹ of indigenous origin but equally appropriated by the Creoles and Mestizos, is a good example of how 'national conscience' originated in the future post-colonial states. Octavio Paz writes in an idyllic way, forgetting all the domination and pain that weighed over the indigenous majority, numerous African slaves, impoverished Spanish, Creoles and Mestizos, but remembering the positivity of a culture with identity:

From the second half of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century New Spain was a stable, peaceful, and prosperous society. There were epidemics, attacks by pirates, shortages of maize, risings of nomadic Indians in the North, but New Spain also knew abundance, peace, and frequently good government. Not that all the viceroys were good, although some were, but because the system was, in effect, one of a balance of powers. The authority of the state was limited by that of the church. The viceroy's power was balanced by that of the Audience, while the archbishop's power was countered by that of the religious orders. Although the masses exercised only an indirect influence in this hierarchical system, the division of powers and the plurality of jurisdictions obliged the government to seek a sort of public consensus.¹⁰

This cultural, economic and political totality, poly-faceted and changing, is what we have called in our historical works the 'Christendom of the West Indies', which would have to include the Philippines, Angola and Mozambique, until well into the eighteenth century. *Christendom*, born with Constantine in fourth-century Constantinople, spread into a *colonial* space, outside of European limits and trans-Atlantic. That political/religious/economic close association would always permeate the mentality of this geopolitical continent. The liberals and the left intended to secularize rapidly, ignoring the millenarian burden of popular imagination; within this one should *know how to learn* more than try to utilize. One task for the next political generations is fulfilling the demands of a 'sociology of the absences':¹¹ absence of knowledge of popular imagination (on the part of the symbolism of the white, Eurocentric, dominant, 'learned', frequently 'leftist'¹² elites).

⁹ See Lafaye, 1977.

¹⁰ Cited Lafaye, 1977, p. 21 (Translation: Keen, p. xviii).

¹¹ See Sousa, 1995.

¹² I do not negate the importance of the 'leftists', I negate only their lazy and indolent

Colonial political thinking in the face of the eruption of 'mature Modernity' (from 1750)

[198] Latin America was organized, halfway through the eighteenth century, from the north by the viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico, which included a good part of US territory: Texas, New Mexico, California to the northern limits with Russian Alaska in the region of Vancouver, Louisiana with the basins of the Mississippi–Missouri, later donated to the French monarchy, and Florida), to the viceroyalty of the Plata River (to the Falkland Islands and Tierra del Fuego, discovered by the Chinese in 1422, and later by the Spanish) in the south. That enormous political–cultural continent entered into a process that culminated with the emancipation from its colonial state. The causes of that process are endogenous, responding to the external challenges. Hispanic–American *political theories* (Luso–Spanish and American) justified the armed struggle for Independence. Influences were received from the central-European Enlightenment, in particular in the political organization after emancipation (which in great part failed), but always mediated by the long and strong tradition of the Creole Baroque and the 'Hispanicized' Enlightenment in the Iberian peninsula¹³ and in America. The arguments that found the emancipatory event will have a regional physiognomy, not purely Eurocentric. Mistaking this hermeneutical aspect has been habitual in the history of Latin American political thinking (which has seen Latin American politics as a pure 'application' of those central-European philosophical discoveries, lacking clarity to glimpse the Latin American, historically situated, concrete arguments).

As with the English Revolution of the seventeenth century (1688) or the French of 1789, the Latin American emancipating Revolution (which has different cycles)¹⁴ emerged as a foundational 'event' of a specific Creole

'vanguardism' (in the terminology of Boaventura de Sousa Santos) in the face of popular knowledge.

13 The Spanish 'Catholic Enlightenment'. See Sarrailh, 1974. Figures like Benito Jeronimo Feijoo or Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744–1811) filled this Hispanic century. For reasons of space we have to exclude Brazil and Maranao, Portuguese colonies that merit extensive study, which always formed part of Latin America.

14 At least 'five emancipatory cycles' are clearly discernible: 1. Hidalgo cycle; the Mexican–Central American emancipating process that occupies this geography (1808–21; this final date corresponds with the naming of the Emperor Augustin Iturbide). 2. Bolívar cycle; originating in Venezuela, it expands to Colombia and Ecuador and culminates in Bolivia (1808–24, with the victory of Ayacucho). 3. San Martín cycle; from the Plata River, Tucuman and Mendoza, to Chile and Peru (1809–16; this final date corresponds to the definitive declaration of independence from Spain, before the convocation of Cortes of Cadiz). 4. Brazilian cycle; in a territory much less than the whole of Brazil, near the coasts and the length of the Amazon river (1808–21, period beginning with Joao until the settling of Pedro I, beginning of the Empire of Brazil). 5. Caribbean cycle; it begins with the Emancipation of Haiti (1804; the first in Latin America), continues with other emancipatory processes (1898: Cuba and Puerto Rico) and whose decolonization still has not ended in some islands. In addition, not only are the Spanish and Portuguese colonialisms present in the Caribbean, but equally the English, French, Dutch and Danish, which shows a maximum of complexity: it is the 'American Mediterranean'.

generation.¹⁵ It is perhaps the most generalized political continental event (since some revolutions that penetrated more deeply in the twentieth century did not have universal acceptance or concrete implementation). The historical circumstances that conditioned such an 'event' that produced a rupture in the political biography of the majority of the inhabitants of the continent, and of all the institutions that have functioned for three centuries, will determine the later destiny of the particular states born from those struggles and the changes of the following 200 years through the present. The inconclusive crisis of Emancipation (the *first*, of the beginning of the nineteenth century), like a deep wound, has not fully healed, and in a certain way predetermines the demanded *second* Emancipation (hopefully in the twenty-first century).

With the eruption of the pro-French dynasty of the Bourbons in Spain, and in particular with Charles III (from 1753), a rupture is produced in the Latin American colonial world. The Bourbonic Enlightenment has a new project of a colonial monopoly, implanting a new bureaucracy of 'governors', who confront cultural, political and economically the Creole Baroque elite, the indigenous communities, the Church rooted for 300 years, the critical nuclei of intellectuals, the powerful brotherhoods and associations (which organized a proto-civil society), other inherited Hapsburg institutions and in general the tradition of 'Baroque culture' (which will not easily accept Enlightenment and Neoclassicism), whose leaders were educated in the great universities of Lima, Mexico or Chuquisaca, or in the numerous Jesuit university colleges,¹⁶ which were equally in contact with the 'communist' experience, or of the strict 'community of goods' of the famous Reductions (who defended their rights with well-armed and organized armies), among those the Guaraní in the south and the Californians in the north.¹⁷

¹⁵ We adopt here the political category of 'event' (*evenement*), inspiring ourselves partially in Alain Badiou (1988), which we will explain in the future architectonic.

¹⁶ See, for Mexico, Moreno, 1966; for Peru the second part on the Enlightenment (1750-1830) in Salazar Bondy, 1967; for the Plata River, see Furlong, 1952, ch. 7 of part I, pp. 143f.; for a general vision, see Picón-Salas, 1965, chs 8-9, pp. 175f. (ET: 1962, pp. 129-75); in addition, consult for Chile, Hanisch Espindola, 1963, pp. 54f.; for Brazil, Cruz Costa, 1957, pp. 21f.; for Cuba, Vitier, 1948, for the end of the eighteenth century, pp. 49f.; in general, Manfredo Kempff Mercado, 1958, pp. 70f.; and for a bibliography not forgetting W. Redmond, 1972, p. 11 (Translation: TC), who says: 'Ninety percent of the works - of the bibliography of 1,154 titles - explain modernized scholastic philosophy' and '75% of the cited works pertain to the eighteenth century - only 17% to the sixteenth and 8% to the seventeenth - the forgotten century.' More important than discovering European modern influences is 'to examine the scholastic movement itself' (p. 11), a question that has been neglected by liberal Jacobinism. The bibliographic indications can be seen in Dussel, 1994, pp. 48f.

¹⁷ A first unedited chapter of the *history of modern socialism* is still being written, since the precursors and inspirers of the European utopian socialists themselves (like Mably, Morelli, etc.) were exiled Jesuits (exiled from Brazil in 1759 and from Hispanic America in 1767) who gave the possibility of imagining a communist society thanks to the numerous stories (pamphlets, books, relations, testimonies, etc.) of the experience of communities with absolute community of goods (without any private property), which were organized not only within Guaraní nations, but also in many other indigenous nations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, California, Brazil, etc. The Jesuits wrote hundreds of works in different lan-

The Jesuits were situated in the two poles of resistance to colonial society (together with the Creole oligarchy and the indigenous popular bases) in the face of the new project of Bourbonic colonial exploitation. Jesuit humanism, structured intellectually in the colonial world of *early Modernity* (Baroque and mercantile, but in no way feudal or medieval) was opposed to *mature Modernity* (the proto-industrial bourgeois Enlightenment; as aim in the Hispanic world).¹⁸ The expulsion of the Jesuits (first in Brazil in 1759 on the part of Pombal, some 500 members, and from Hispanic America in 1767, some 2,000) signified a strong blow against the emancipatory efforts of the Creoles and the capacity of the possible future development (technological and scientific, almost exclusively in hands of this modern order, strongly implanted in the centre of Europe, but equally in Africa and Asia, through the Portuguese Empire).

[199] Discomfort grew in the colonial world and the Bourbonic project put the Latin American colonies in a situation of extreme exploitation. It raised the popular response of the indigenous with their great rebellions, by hundreds, to that of Túpac Amaru, and, united to them, the Creoles, who began to be conscious of the longed-for commercial, cultural and political autonomy. In addition, the influence of the Spanish Enlightenment, as that of Jovellanos, had an impact in America, an 'American Enlightenment', for example, Benito Diaz of Gamarra or Francisco X. Alegre, to mention only Mexico.

The new generation that raised itself against Spanish dependence thought from its context, and therefore was opposed first to authoritarian education; it imagined a new type of education. But what signified the new education, which was expressed in Rousseau's *Emile*? What does it mean to educate men for a new social state? In Latin America there were other interests than in France because in France the new education intended justly to create a subject suitable for industrial capitalism, while in Latin America they would be subjects suitable to emancipate from Spain. Latin American Enlightenment itself earned a concrete historical sense, sometimes contradictory to the European, because, paradoxically, the Bourbons, impregnated with the philosophical thinking of the bourgeois Enlightenment, had their opponents in Latin America.

In the *Elementa Recentioris Philosophiae*, from 1774, Benito Diaz of Gamarra says that one has to leave to one side 'those eternal exercises, arguments, semantic disputes of the universal, existence, reason, substantial forms, union and all the compounds, and 600 works of this kind, with which the clever ones are truly tormented and bored'. It is the end of Scholasticism

guages (from Russian and Polish to German or French, Italian or Dutch) showing the beauty, art (especially endowed with music), ethical perfection, of high civilization of the political and agricultural-religious society of the communities of the Reductions. The myth of the *bon sauvage* and of the 'primitive communist community' of goods originates in this experience of the Reductions, not only Jesuit but equally Franciscan, of colonial Latin America.

¹⁸ See the end of section [119].

and the beginning of a critique of an order that, on the one hand, the Bourbons want to impose. 'But I fear – Diaz de Gamarra says – that nothing will make them sharper for the study of knowledge.' What is necessary? A new type of education.

Carlos of Sigüenza and Gongora (1645–1700) or Rafael Campoy are the beginning of an emancipatory political philosophy. In the eighteenth century nationality begins to experiment in another way. And so the origins of a history hidden by the European conquistadors are discovered. Now one intends to reconstruct the memory of the cultures prior to the Spanish invasion: the history of the Mexicans, the history of the Incas. The affirmation of Difference arises. It produces the first critique of Eurocentrism.

Francisco Xavier Clavijero (1731–87)¹⁹ entered the Society of Jesus in 1748 and studied in the college of Tepozotlan;²⁰ he later became professor of physics and philosophy in Puebla, Valladolid and Guadalajara. The Jesuits had numerous colleges in Mexico. Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla studied where Jose Borda taught in his third and fourth year. Clavijero had to leave Mexico at age 35, going into exile in Bologna, where he began to write in 1770 *The History of Mexico*, the year in which the king prohibited people from speaking any language except Spanish in Mexico – the Jesuits obliged all those who participated in the Reductions to master the indigenous languages. Against this measure, in exile in Bologna, he translated prayers into three indigenous languages and wrote a Nahuatl grammar. Clavijero used the works of Carlos de Sigüenza y Gongora and of other Jesuits of his era. He affirmed that Amerindian culture is comparable to the great classical cultures of humanity (Egyptian, Greek or Roman). Racially it was not inferior.²¹ Indigenous cultural value is affirmed with respect to the cultures that the Europeans accepted as their origins.

Clavijero tries to respond to critics of the European Enlightenment (in the constitution of 'orientalism', 'occidentalism' and scorn for the 'south'). He finds Cornelius de Pauw, who in his work *A General History of the Americans*, printed in 1771, and Comte de Buffon, who in his *Natural History*, affirmed the bestiality of the American indigenous. Clavijero, contemporary of Kant, has a vision of global history 'from below'. In sharp contrast to Hegel (born in those years), he has a critical attitude toward Eurocentrism:

Our world, that you call New because for three centuries it was not known by you, is as ancient as your world, and our animals are contemporary with yours. [And if you do not admit that] . . . your ostriches [are

¹⁹ See Batllori, 1966.

²⁰ Its church is the most splendid testimony of Baroque art in all the world, including Ecuador and Peru, Rome and Bavaria.

²¹ He appreciates equally mixed race, when he writes, for moral and political reasons: 'It is not to be doubted that it would have been a wiser policy for the Spaniards, if, instead of bringing women from Europe, and slaves from Africa, to Mexico, they had endeavored to form by marriages, between the Mexicans and themselves, one single individual nation' *Ancient History of Mexico*, Book VII, Disert. 13; Clavijero, 1945, p. 213 (Translation: TC).

odd] because they do not get along with onrs, then onrs cannot be said to be odd because they do not get along with yours.²²

Clavijero compares always the Aztecs, Incas and other Amerindian cultures with the Egyptians, Greeks or Romans. He breaks the Eurocentric outline and has a critical conscience that shows a *political-ideological rupture* that as a 'foundational event' begins a new historical moment.

In the middle of exile, he does not write the history of Creole Mexico but of Aztec Mexico, because that is *negated* in the illustrated European historiography:

I protest [against] Pauw and all Europe:²³ the minds of the Mexicans are not inferior to those of the Europeans; they are capable of all the sciences, even the most abstract, and if their education will be cared for seriously, if as children they are brought up in schools, under good teachers and protected and encouraged with awards, there would be seen among the Americans, philosophers, mathematicians and theologians who could compete with the most famous of Europe. But it is very difficult, that is not to say impossible, to make progress in the sciences in a miserable life, subservient to continuous discomforts. One who contemplates the [actual] state of Greece could not be persuaded that there had been the great men we know, if one was not assured by their immortal works and by the consent of the centuries. The obstacles the Greeks have overcome to learn are not comparable with those that Americans have always had and still have.²⁴

Clavijero, unexpectedly and because of his exile, which obliges him to leave a completely new Hispanic American environment, having lived with Nahuas and Mixtecas, suddenly finds himself in Europe. Confronting what *is said* with a 'scientific' tone about 'his world', he rebels against the 'Eurocentric' attitude that surrounds him. If the European is stronger than some indigenous, 'like the Swiss are stronger than the Italians, we do not believe

²² Clavijero, 1945, p. 168 (Translation: TC). It seems infantile, but the Europeans believed that the mountains, the rivers, the plants and the animals, in addition to the humans and their cultures . . . were all more primitive and barbarian in America. See the work of Gerbi, 1978, abundant in incredible descriptions of naive Eurocentrism since they have submerged 'nature in history' (ibid., 15), and have put Europe as the centre and the culmination of *all* history.

²³ Here is expressed the 'anti-Eurocentric' consciousness of Clavijero.

²⁴ *Ancient history of Mexico*, IV: 'Physical constitution of the Mexicans' (Clavijero, 1945, p. 259 [Translation: TC]). Ridiculing the judgements of Pauw, Clavijero writes: 'Pauw, who from Berlin has seen such things in America that its own inhabitants do not see, will have found in some French author the way of knowing what we cannot nor want to ascertain' (ibid., p. 260 [Translation: TC]). The irony is not directed only against the so-called 'scientificity' of the German but equally against the French. Clavijero is a Creole mentally emancipated from Eurocentrism, the condition of all other intellectual emancipation.

for this that the Italians have degenerated nor less accuse the climate of Italy for this.²⁵

Clavijero effects a very meticulous description of the heroic acts in the construction of the Aztec Empire, of their intelligence, techniques, virtues, military strategy, and the way they ended by falling into the hands of the conquistadors, who are not praised but criticized for their duplicity, for their lies and frauds. The Creole is on the side of the indigenous not the Europeans. He takes up the Amerindian cause in favour of the emancipatory cause of the Creoles. It is a novel political moment.

[200] Two years before the birth of Clavijero, in 1727, in Veracruz itself, Francisco Xavier Alegre was born, who died in exile in Italy in 1788. He was another Jesuit of the group that started from 'colonial difference'. Studying Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes, but fundamentally starting from the critiques of Bartolomé de Las Casas against Gines de Sepulveda, he refuted the argument that justified the dominion of Spain over Hispanic America:

They think that some that are born, [the sharpest and most perspicacious, with] the right of ordering and others, [the thick and slow, with] the necessity of obeying [. . .] in the sense that Euripides said (in *Ifigenia*) that the Greeks had to rule the barbarians [. . .] Bartolome de Las Casas and Domingo de Soto eminently refuted Ginés de Sepúlveda [. . .] Now: for the men to suffer some diminution of the *natural freedom that all equally get*, it is necessary to have their consent – express, tacit or interpreted.²⁶

F. X. Alegre had a wide knowledge of political philosophy, but managed the arguments sometimes against the cited authors, and certainly with other ends (of proving the injustice of the colonial world). It is the expression of a decolonizing philosophical thinking, with great currency:

Men [. . .] at the beginning in mobs without any pact or contract – as we read in Plato's *Protagoras* – caused mutual injuries and damages in a common war of all against all, that Hobbes called *almost natural* [. . .] And in this sense I think Horatio said correctly (*I Sat.*, 3): *It is necessary to confess that laws were born from the fear of injustice*. Because if it were not for fear of enemies the city would not have been unified [. . .] Therefore Grotius says that men were united into civil society, not by express mandate of God – that nowhere has been found – [. . .] For the conservation of civil society civil authority was introduced and established [. . .] the whole empire, therefore, of any species that is, had its origin in a convention or *pact among men*. Because no kingdom – as Pufendorf said well – was born of war or of mere violence, although many have grown with wars.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Rubio, 1979, p. 268 (Translation: TC).

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 270–1 (Translation: TC).

One can observe the degree of modern philosophical knowledge of these Latin American Creole thinkers. They blend, in a new theme (anti-colonial), with classic Graeco-Latin, English, French, German authors, and those of Spain or Latin America (like Las Casas). The argument is directed to proving a new thesis: the American provinces, with its non-existent consent, can negate the subjection to the Spanish Empire. This is the position of Francisco Suarez, which these Jesuits had studied deeply.²⁸

It is not strange, then, that the exiled Jesuits spread their political ideas in Europe and originated the project of Latin American emancipation. Francisco de Miranda (1750–1816),²⁹ the first precursor of the emancipation of all Latin America (*Colombia*, 'from the Mississippi to Patagonia'),³⁰ had, among other inspiration, the Jesuits Juan Jose Godoy³¹ and, in particular, Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzman,³² whose documents he found in London in 1798, thanks to Rufus King (in charge of North American affairs in that city).

*The political thinking of the 'first Emancipation' (from 1808):
three conceptions of sovereignty*

[201] H. Arendt,³³ analysing the political revolutions of the USA and France, indicates that the first, not mixing the 'social problem' with the

²⁸ See sections [117–18].

²⁹ See Bohorquez, 1998, pp. 131f. Miranda is an admirable historical personage. Son of a Spaniard, born in Venezuela, military career, Creole, rebels in Spain; he participated as a soldier in Caribbean campaigns (Cuba, Pensacola, etc.); already expelled from the Spanish army (1783) he went to the USA, where he presented a project of Latin American emancipation that President Samuel Adams did not want to accept, although it was already in Congress. A little later, in 1790, he was in London trying a similar project. Disappointed, he participated directly in the French Revolution (with arms in the streets of Paris in 1792). He moved to Moscow, where the tsarina named him a member of the Russian army (with the aim that the Alaskan territories are not limited by Spain, in the region of Vancouver), in the name of which Miranda returned to England, but failed anew. Finally, in 1806, he organized the campaign of Coro (Venezuela), which was repelled. In 1810, he disembarked for a second time in La Guaira, and presented the constitution of the 'First Republic' in Venezuela. Miranda wanted a unified government of all Latin America under an executive power with two Incas (the same idea as Jose de San Martín in El Plata), regionally organized and in the way of a federation, open to African-Americans. He was too far ahead of his time. In 1812, he was named dictator and general of the First Republic, which failed quickly. Roscio himself, Bello and Bolívar all agreed on his arrest. Miranda died in prison at the hands of his compatriots! Admiring the British political model, the precursor always dreamed of the political unity of a Latin American confederation, a dream that S. Bolívar inherited. The USA, evidently, will never approve that project, even now.

³⁰ 'Plan of the government of 1790' (Robertson, 1929, pp. 102–3).

³¹ In 1781, this Jesuit who had worked in Chile, Tucuman, Peru and Patagonia presented in London a project for England to help to organize an expedition to liberate that South American region. He died imprisoned in Cadiz in 1787.

³² This Jesuit, exiled in Italy from 1768, originally from Arequipa, began in 1781 to ask England to support the rebellion of Túpac Amaru. In London he wrote the famous *Lettre aux Espagnols-Américains* (1784), in which he justified the American emancipation.

³³ Arendt, 1965.

public-political space of the revolution, installed a regime of liberty. Meanwhile the French Revolution that articulated the social interests of the *sans-coulottes* and peasants failed. We will criticize the position of Arendt in a future work in progress, but for now we address her analysis introducing a third term: the Latin American emancipating Revolution (which the Eurocentrism of Arendt does not treat). In this last case, the complexity is even greater than in France. If the French Revolution, called 'Bonapartist' by traditional Marxism, incorporates the oppressed strata of bourgeois society (marginal and peasant), in Hispanic colonial America the section of the Creole revolutionary class (whites born in America like the North Americans) had to confront the principal strategic enemy, the economic-military system and the Spanish population (as the North Americans had to oppose the English), counting on the collaboration of the Mestizos, indigenous or free African-Latin Americans, to shape an emancipating front (the white North Americans did not need to mobilize the African slaves in their favour). This assumed a greater complexity in the composition of the emancipating group. Unlike in France, the Creole elite feared fundamentally those popular sectors (Mestizo, indigenous and African-Latin American), who they will always dominate racially, socially and economically, and will be inclined to ally with the metropolitan powers in the post-colonial state (with England, France or the USA), not ever achieving a real emancipation. This will determine the political history of Latin America during the nineteenth, twentieth and part of the twenty-first centuries, until we realize the second Emancipation to which we are committed – a question that we will address in sections [229ff.].

In effect, from 1808,³⁴ when Napoleon, to stop besieging England, plans to occupy Portugal and invade Spain, a new political moment opens: that of the only Latin American continental political revolution until the present.

To justify the revolutionary will (which demanded the use of weapons to reach free commerce or the right to a constitution of independent states), the emancipators had to keep formulating political-strategic theories folded to the facts, without later theoretical aims. Some had been professors of colleges, universities or seminaries, others were intellectuals of the Creole oligarchy. All were launched toward emancipating politics formulating arguments that founded the struggle, as in the case of Friar Servando de Mier in Mexico, Mariano Moreno in El Plata, Juan German Roscio or Simon Bolívar in Great Colombia, educated within examples of Hispanic American thought. One can discover the political philosophy (implicit or explicit) of their actions and thoughts. They were actors who knew the traditional categories, who could construct a foundational discourse. Discourse emerged from praxis. Everyone had to justify the right of rebellion against Spanish and Portuguese despotism – even in Brazil, although it had

³⁴ The emancipating process ended on 9 December 1824 with the victory of Jose Antonio Sucre in Ayacucho against the royalist army in Peru. See 'The ideas of the independent movement', in Werz, 1995, pp. 37f.

a distinct history within the environment of Lusitanian domination – and, later, would have to base its right to the exercise of independent power. Their narrative was strictly a *Politics of Liberation* – which has inspired us frequently.³⁵ To justify the action of such past heroes is, at the same time, to formulate arguments to found the action of present heroes – E. Zapata, C. A. Sandino, F. Castro, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara or S. Allende; the Sandinistas, Zapatistas, Landless Movement or the ‘Piqueteros’, etc.

Friar Servando de Mier took a different position to Clavijero. Criticizing the European in his so-called superiority with respect to the great Amerindian cultures and so not only defending the Americans but, important to politics, conscious of the need for emancipation, following an ancient American tradition,³⁶ now Friar Servando argued that Latin American Creole culture did not owe the Spanish what they thought. If the Spanish right of colonial dominion based itself in the *publicly defensible* justification (because the pure search for wealth cannot be enunciated with the claim of justice) of the obligation to propagate Christianity in America, then, if *the presence of Christianity in America were prior to the Spanish*, all intent of legitimation of the presence of the Iberians in America was tongue-tied.

The Creoles from the beginning of the seventeenth century gave credit to a tradition that indicated that the apostle Thomas, in the first century of the Christian era, passing through India (from there the Christian vestiges in the region of Kerala, Cochin), had reached America. Gregorio Garcia had written a work, *Preaching the Gospel in the New World*, published in Baeza in 1625,³⁷ where he ‘proved’ with abundant testimonies from Brazil, El Plata, Peru, etc., the presence of the apostle Thomas.³⁸ If the Spanish had

35 When asked about the legitimacy of the armed struggle of a people, I frequently counter with a paradigmatic example. General J. de San Martín, invading from the Andes the Captaincy of Chile in the hands of the Spanish, needed cannons for his army. As he had to cross the Andes at more than 4,000 metres high, he asked a Franciscan brother, Friar Luis Beltran, to forge the cannons in the Valley of Uspallata, at the top, to descend with those heavy cannons to Santiago. The friar picked up the bells of the churches of the province of Cuyo and with these produced the cannons of liberty. San Martín and Friar Luis Beltran are heroes in Argentina. Camilo Torres was a guerrilla priest, but did not construct his weapons with ‘church bells’. In this, Friar Luis Beltran was in a much more complex ethical situation. Could he use or not use weapons (and make weapons) in the struggles for the liberation of the people? Are not the Iraqis who took up arms against the North American and English invaders in 2005 equally heroes? Political philosophy has to respond to these questions. *History is magistra vitae.*

36 See Lafaye, 1977, where he shows that the tradition of the apostle Thomas in America is very ancient from El Plata to Mexico. See also Villoro, 1987, pp. 137f.

37 Quoted in Lafaye, 1977, p. 260. The same G. Garcia wrote a prior work: *Origin of the Indians of the New World and West Indies* (Valencia, 1607), where he indicates that ‘the gospel was preached in these parts in the time of the apostles’ (*Preface* [Translation: TC]).

38 Quetzalcóatl signifies the ‘divine’ (the Quezal, his feather) ‘duality’ (*coatl* is the twin, the equal); symbolic name of *Ome Teotl* (divine Duo or Duality). If ‘Thomas’ came from Greek and signifies the ‘divided’ (the atom is that not divided), it means the same as *coatl*. The reasons are numerous and tested. Menasseh Ben Israel, a Jewish theologian in Amsterdam at the time of Spinoza, had written a work, *Origin of the Americans, this is, the hope of Israel* in 1650, when Jewish communities colonized the island of Curaçao, showing that the indigenous of Venezuela were part of the lost tribes of Israel. Inspired by a Dominican,

received the gospel through the apostle James (for Friar Servando de Mier very improbable, and today proved impossible), then the Latin Americans could receive it from Thomas, also an apostle. Nothing was owed to the Iberians. They had a similar dignity to them.

Friar Servando Teresa de Mier lost his doctorate, was prohibited from teaching and was defrocked as a priest (imprisoned at the fort of San Jan de Ulua in Veracruz) for the sermon that he had given in the cathedral of Mexico, in the presence of the archbishop and the viceroy, on 12 December 1794, the Festival of the Virgin of Guadalupe.³⁹ Archbishops Haro and Nunez banished him to Spain, where he was imprisoned in the Franciscan convent of San Pablo of Burgos.⁴⁰ His argument, seeking better evidence, more plausible and with stronger reasons, postponed, however, the presence of Thomas in America. In the sermon of 1794, Mier claimed that the appearance of the Virgin on the *cloak* of the Indian Juan Diego, when he presented himself to Bishop Zumarraga, was a pious legend.⁴¹ According to the Dominican, the cloak belonged to Saint Thomas of Mylapore (not to the apostle Saint Thomas), who had evangelized Mexico in about the sixth century. [. . .] Without denying the miraculous tradition of Guadalupe,⁴² Mier thus snatched away from the Spaniards all its benefits [of evangelization] claiming that the arrival of the virgin [through Thomas] had preceded their coming by ten centuries.⁴³ It was necessary to separate the conversion to Christianity of the Americans (a positive fact for the Spanish and Creoles, but not for the Amerindians) from the conquest (a shameful fact for all Americans, origin of the 'colonial difference' that had to be negated). Friar Servando said that the Europeans saw 'that in all [this] was a coalition of the Creoles to *equal themselves* with the Indians [and] *remove the Glory* of having brought the gospel, and deny the papal bull of the donation of the Indies, and undermine thus by its foundations *the right of the king over*

Manuel Duarte, Siguenza y Gongora compiled papers and wrote a small work about the theme (Lafaye, 1977, pp. 265-71 [Translation: Leonard, pp. 188-9]).

39 The Virgin venerated by Indians and Creoles against the devotion of the Spanish to the Virgin of Remedios, who had saved Hernan Cortes in the 'Sad Night' ('sad' for the Spanish) when they were attacked by the Aztecs. Struggle of virgins, struggle of classes!

40 In 1801 he escaped to France. On three occasions he returned to Spain and fled from prison, the last still in the hands of the French. In 1811 he went to London and on 15 May 1816 left from Liverpool with an expedition to liberate America. In 1817 he fell anew into the hands of the Spanish and this time was stopped at San Juan de Ulua. He avoided the Inquisition at Havana, and from there fled to the USA. In 1822, he returned to emancipated Mexico. Contrary to Iturbide, he was incarcerated by his compatriots, fleeing in 1823. He signed the Constitutive Act of the Mexican Federation in 1824 and died in the Presidential Palace in 1827.

41 As was also the story of apostle James preaching the gospel in Spain, and specifically in Santiago de Compostela. If the American reasons were questionable, no less were the Spanish.

42 The tradition indicated that Thomas (in relation to Quetzalcoatl) had preached the existence of the virgin of Guadalupe (present for the Creoles in the traditions of the Coatlicue and the Tonanzintla).

43 Lafaye, 1977, p. 272 (Translation: Leonard, p. 193).

all.⁴⁴ Friar Servando, finding everywhere 'signs' of that primitive evangelization, argues:

The Devil and the idolatrous prophets are [. . .] the continual resource of the Spanish writers to evade the testimonies that, at each step, have found the evangelical preaching [of Thomas in America before the conquest].⁴⁵

As we see, Friar Servando fulfils Marx's thought, that if 'the religion is the basis of the state' (and it was also in the Christendom of the Indies),⁴⁶ then 'the beginning of all [political] critique is the critique of religion' – as the founder of Christianity had demonstrated centuries before criticizing the religion of the temple of Jerusalem, in this case with proper reasons, understandable and firm for the Latin American rising self-consciousness. Spain becomes an equal, not a judge, mother, nor original country: it is a sister. Political emancipation is now possible from a new Creole imagination, from the new utopian political horizon.

[202] In the same way Juan German Roscio (1763–1821), doctor in canonical and civil law, who was vice-president of the Greater Colombian Republic in Venezuela, wrote a juridical–theological work under the title *The Triumph of Freedom over Despotism* (published in Philadelphia in 1811), a theological justification of liberation – in the inverse sense to Hobbes and Schmitt – fully committed to the process of emancipation,⁴⁷ from the question of whether a Christian can take up arms against a Catholic king, against the social order of Christendom. In the *Prologue* to the named work Roscio writes:

Unfortunately and by virtue of a terrible system of government [Bourbonic], they [the ideas that sustained tyranny] were fodder for the classrooms of theology and jurisprudence that I frequented in the career of my studies. I longed for a work that refuted those errors [. . .] I could not believe that since the idol of tyranny built its empire on the abuse of the Scriptures,⁴⁸ there had stopped being challengers armed with healthy intelligence. [. . .] The excellence of the gospel's morality was sufficient

44 De Mier, 1922, II, p. iv (Translation: TC). See O'Gorman, 1945; Villoro, 1967.

45 De Mier, 1922, II, p. xiv (Translation: TC).

46 Toribio de Mogrovejo, archbishop of Lima (Translation: TC; see Dussel, 1967, 1983, I/1, pp. 205–716: 'American Christendom'). Latin America is the *only* colonial Christendom (from Armenia or Georgia, to the Coptic, Byzantine, Latin-Roman or Russo-Moscovian), but it is not 'colonial'. It is the 'colonial *difference*' that defines the 'Christendom of the Indies' (Western, because from the Middle East to the Far East there was no Christendom, neither central, nor colonial; maybe with the sole exception of the Philippines, a participant in Latin American coloniality through the Pacific until the beginning of the nineteenth century).

47 It is found in vol. I of Roscio, 1953 (Translation: TC). See in ed. of Richard, 1981, pp. 187–218.

48 Hobbes uses Scripture (explained in section [131]) as the basis for the authority of the king. Roscio will effect a refutation of the Hobbesian argument from Latin American colonial emancipation.

for me to know that some uses and customs such as those of the absolute and despotic monarchy, could not be reconciled with Christianity.⁴⁹

Against the Jacobinism, present equally in Latin America until now, Roscio is an example of a theological critique of politics:

So constant has been the stubbornness of theologians in wanting to bring together two irreconcilable things:⁵⁰ Christianity and despotism; some philosophers of the past century attributed to religion some vices that she condemned, vices belonging to the stubborn defenders of the absolute monarchy and outrageously attributed to our relations with the supreme being.⁵¹

That magnificent and still relevant work of Roscio merits an attentive interpretation in all its details. First, he shows that at the political level Scripture – as he always calls it – can commit errors (as committed in astronomy or physics), but it should always 'recognize and confess the majesty and power of the people'.⁵² In his *Manifiesto* of 1811 he writes:

Governments do not have, nor have had nor last without the utility and happiness of humankind [. . .] their authority derives from the will of the people, led and sustained by the providence of God, who leaves our actions to free will: God's omnipotence does not intervene in favour of this or that form of government. [. . .] And the Christian people of Venezuela will be in a worse condition, declared free of the government of Spain after 300 years of captivity and humiliations and injuries, they cannot do what the God of Israel who they adore, once allowed God's people⁵³ without indignation or arguing in their favour. God's divine finger is our moral compass, and our resolution remains subject to God's eternal judgements.⁵⁴

Our Venezuelan hero argues against the monarchy and in favour of the republic:

The republican government was first, because it conforms better to the nature of man. Before the flood and much later the republics were conserved, and neither monarchies nor aristocracies were known [. . .].⁵⁵

49 Roscio, 1953, Prologue; I, p. 8 (Translation: TC).

50 During the visit of Pope John Paul II to Nicaragua an immense poster was placed in the Plaza of the Revolution: 'Between Christianity and revolution there is no contradiction' – remembering again the position explained by Roscio.

51 Ibid., p. 20 (Translation: TC).

52 Ibid., p. 45 (Translation: TC).

53 It is a rereading of Exodus and an analogous application of the liberation of the slaves from Egypt.

54 In *Works*; Roscio, 1953, II, pp. 78–80 (Translation: TC).

55 Ibid., p. 87 (Translation: TC).

Our thinker covers the history of Israel to arrive at the founder of Christianity:

The promised Messiah comes to the world [. . .] Jesus Christ, whose character was that of liberator and redeemer, could not approve the usurping by the Roman emperors and the rest of the oppressors of the era. The doctrine of Jesus Christ was a declaration of the rights of the person and of the peoples.⁵⁶ In its decay the primitive spirit of Christendom fell further and further into excess, wealth, honours and worldly privileges. Evangelical poverty disappeared and the sowing of the seeds of the new power began.⁵⁷ Ojalá that it was not propagated in the later centuries!⁵⁸

It is clearly impossible to find in the books of the new law one iota that contradicts the dogma of national sovereignty. [. . .] All popular movement or of those capable of saving the people from oppression, whatever title is applied, will be meritorious and glorious.⁵⁹

Referring to Thomas Aquinas he writes that, 'this saint taught that the destruction of tyranny and of those who govern tyrannically was permissible, and even obligatory. Guided by reason, by Scripture, by the tradition of all free peoples, he wrote what the most sage and virtuous men of all the ages of the civilized world have written.'⁶⁰

These arguments were from a Latin American tradition that was based in a critical-theological tradition of the rereading of Scripture that had deep roots in popular imagination, a narrative of the patriots without which emancipation would not have been possible – a tradition in general hidden by a liberal and Jacobin tradition in the political interpretation of our history until now.

[203] It is philosophically pertinent to refer to the political-juridical arguments in the crisis of emancipation. There were three ways of basing sovereignty. The first, had as origin the people, but it was only the community of Creoles organized around town councils (excluding the indigenous or slave population). The second, had as origin God, who gave sovereignty to the king of Spain, although he was a prisoner – this was the position assumed by the Spanish in the Indies. The third thought that sovereignty was popular, including the indigenous and slaves, in addition to the Creoles and Mestizos. We see those three political positions, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; a resolution has still not occurred.

Through the disagreements between Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, Napoleon gained power in Spain, and puts the royal family in a safe place. This presented a completely new situation – a *state of exception*, C. Schmitt

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 93 (Translation: TC).

⁵⁷ He effects here a critique like Kierkegaard, Marx or the Latin American theology of liberation.

⁵⁸ *The Triumph of Freedom*; vol. I, p. 322 (Translation: TC).

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 163–4.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 412 (Translation: TC).

would say. Distinct measures were adopted in the face of this. In Mexico, the viceroy Iturrigaray called together the town council of Mexico City – the highest Creole civil authority. The ecclesiastic town council was the authority of the Church with representation of the 'lower clergy' (Creole). In August and September of 1808 they were called to resolve the problem of authority, given the lack of a legitimate king. The Duke of Berg named by Napoleon, in the interpretation of Juan F. Azcarate, did not have any right to take any political decision:

This ill-fated abdication [of the king] is involuntary, forced and done in the moment of conflict, [the new appointment] is of no effect [since it has been effected] against the very respectable rights of the [Mexican] nation. The stripping of the most precious royal privilege is present. No one can be named sovereign *without his consent* and the universal [agreement] of all the [American] people.⁶¹

As we have seen, the principles already stated by Bartolomé de Las Casas and Francisco Suarez are present,⁶² since the king receives his authority from the 'kingdoms' by a pact. The 'viceroyalties' were considered by the Creoles 'kingdoms' (from Mexico to the Plata), and in each one of them similar controversies arose.

For its part, the First True licentiate was even clearer. In a session of the Audience of Mexico on 12 September 1808, they spoke of the existence of a 'state of nature' and the necessity of a civil state by a 'right of conservation'. The monarchical regime, which is not natural but agreed, is the fruit of 'a social pact among the sovereign (the king) and the vassal (the 'kingdoms')'. But 'the crisis in which we are actually found is of a truly *extraordinary interregnum* according to the language of the politicians',⁶³ that is to say, 'the republic is without its governing prince'. Through all this:

[o]ne acquires the right of ruling in the *elective sovereignty* only as the elected person and in the *inherited* his family; this right expiring in the first case with the person, and in the second with the family. From here when the person elected dies, it [the interregnum] is called *ordinary*, and when the ruling family is extinguished, it is called *extraordinary*.⁶⁴

Following Johann Gottlieb Heinecke,⁶⁵ who Primo Verdad cites explicitly, '*the people* in these moments of *extraordinary* interdict recover sovereignty,

⁶¹ 'Act of the Town Council' (Azcarate, 1910, I, p. 481 [Translation: TC]; López Molina, 2002).

⁶² See sections [105] and [117–18].

⁶³ All the quotes are from the 'Posthumous memory of the representative of the Town Council' (Verdad, 1910, II, p. 153 [Translation: TC]).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157 (Translation: TC) (López Molina, 2002).

⁶⁵ Well-known German philosopher (Juan Teofilo Heineccius; see Heineccius, 1837), *ius naturalis* who followed in this point the position of F. Suárez.

it becomes theirs, naturally flows back, and is transmitted to the people trusted to return it to its owner.⁶⁶ He had to clarify who the 'people' were. For Primo Verdad the 'people' were represented by the town council of exclusively Creole composition, founded in Villarrica de la Veracruz, since it had been the first institution created in the colonial era (prior to the Royal Audience or Royal Accord), which left the Spanish outside the game (and in a certain way the indigenous – and the slaves – although it showed the possibility of them being equally integrated in the body of representatives of the 'kingdom')⁶⁷:

Two are legitimate authorities that we recognize, the first is of our sovereign [the king, prisoner], and the second of the Town Councils approved and confirmed by them [. . .] The second is infallible by being *of the people* and being free not having recognized another foreign sovereign [that imposed by Napoleon . . .] who has shown *tacitly* or *expressly* his will and tributes.⁶⁸

Not everyone thought this way. Melchor de Talamantes, although he accepted that 'the nation *recovers immediately its legislative power* like all the rest of the privileges and rights of the Crown',⁶⁹ when the royal family is absent, nevertheless defined the 'people' exclusively as the 'civil body' of 'learned and powerful' Creoles, and excluded the 'popular sovereignty' the '*lowest* people', Creoles and illiterate Indians ('rigorous popular sovereignty'):

The lowest people, in no truly cultured nation enjoy this right of citizenship, because their rusticness, ignorance, rudeness, indigence, and the necessary dependence on learned and powerful men, make them unworthy of such an excellent quality, that true freedom demands, incompatible with ignorance and begging.⁷⁰

The line was definitively drawn. The Creoles will struggle to maintain the wall that separates the people from the Mestizos, indigenous or impoverished. Not being able to base their delegated exercise of power (*potestas*) on the power of the people (*potentia*), it will always be weak and not regenerated from below. It will depend on the powerful 'from outside' (perpetual neocoloniality).

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 153 (Translation: TC).

⁶⁷ He wrote: 'it will be therefore just that they [the Indians] have equal representation in the general assembly, and if congresspeople are proportional to the persons they represent, and of their number, the Indians form a growing part, clearly needing to treble, relative to other bodies [. . .] Then will be forgotten the hated names of Indians, Mestizos, ladinos that are so deadly' (ibid., p. 162 [Translation: TC]).

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 143 (Translation: TC).

⁶⁹ 'National Congress of the Kingdom of New Spain' (Genaro Garcia, 1910, VII, p. 373 [Translation: TC]; quoted in López Molina, 2002).

⁷⁰ 'Preparatory declaration of Father Talamantes' (ibid., p. 242 [Translation: TC]).

The learned Creole political philosophy was informed by what happened in central Europe, but their arguments were those of the Hispanic-American tradition, from a juridical and political memory proceeding from the customs installed in Castile from the time of Alfonso the Sage, justified philosophically by F. Suárez, and that erupted in the nineteenth century to found the aim of the Creoles of exercising power from the town councils.

The Spanish residents in Mexico, called *gachupine*, however, thought that the king received his authority from God directly and not from a pact with the 'kingdoms'. So the Creoles did not have any right to exercise power. They continued exercising power in name of the king, prisoner of Napoleon. And, on 15 September 1808 there was a '*coup d'état*' and they put in prison the viceroy (and later sent him to Spain). They incarcerated the Creole patriots, some of whom died in prison. So the second conception of sovereignty justified the actions of coercion on the part of the Iberian residents in Mexico. The argument of the Spanish was:

The people in no way have the right to change the constitution once established; and the contrary cases are delinquent punishable infractions. If the people had such discretion, what would be the fate of public authority, the security of the people who carry it out, with how much happiness would the malevolent try and succeed in their iniquity in the shadow of the popular voice?⁷¹

[204] A third sense of sovereignty is possible. Given the worsening of the contradictions (since the Iberian usurpers had to confront a severe drought, which produced hunger and generalized economic crisis), some understood that the emancipation had not been reached with arguments. The praxis of liberation had to occur, the foundational 'event'. Therefore, paradoxically in Mexico, the clerics ('lower clergy': Creole) headed the actions, since they were situated strategically in a position of great authority in the struggle for 'hegemony' within the 'historical bloc in [colonial] power'. In a second faction, against the remainder, were the Spanish bureaucrats, military personnel or people from the Peninsula who benefitted from the monopoly of the market. In another faction were the Creole civilians, the businessmen or the intellectuals of the 'learned city'. In a fourth faction, the lower people, impoverished Creoles, Mestizos, indigenous, slaves, etc. One had to appeal to this fourth stratum to launch an *armed war* against the tyranny that the *gachupine* had installed unjustly.

The priest of Dolores, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla (1753-1811) and Jose Maria Morelos (1765-1815), priest of Nocupetaro and student of the former in Valladolid (today Morelia), moved within the new strategic horizon. In praxis he would prove that sovereignty had as last resort the *people* them-

⁷¹ 'Explanations of the taxes', in Hernandez and Davalos, 1977, p. 672 (Translation: TC), quoted in Ruiz Méndez, 2002.

selves (and was not situated in the community of the Spanish nor exclusively in the Creole sector). This will be carried without the support of these two sectors of the dominant class; the Hidalguen popular uprising ends by failing, the third pole triumphing in the long run (the aim of sovereignty of the Creoles, a minority who become dominant).

It was not difficult for a priest to hegemonize the process. The clergy had authority over oppressed people, with some 5,000 members in Mexico, 12,000 in Latin America.⁷² Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla was not only an intellectual,⁷³ who for his independent ideas was removed from the rectorate of the college of Valladolid and ended up imprisoned in the far off parish of Dolores, but he also participated in the formation of an army, directing the armed struggle itself. For this, two years after the *coup d'état* of the Spanish residents in Mexico, 16 September 1810 Hidalgo raised a cry of Emancipation. Forming a massive army he demands bringing together the indigenous and giving freedom to the slaves. It is decreed, having as a flag an image of the Virgin of Guadalupe:

I order the judges and justices [. . .] that immediately they proceed to collected the tax of the due incomes today, for the renters of the lands pertaining to the communities of the natives, to [. . .] be given up to the related natives the lands for their cultivation [. . .] That all the owners of slaves will have to give them liberty within the end of ten days under pain of death [. . .] Given in the city of Guadalajara, 6 December 1810.⁷⁴

Sovereignty is found in the oppressed and excluded people. An alliance is produced between sectors of the lower clergy, a minority of Creoles disgusted with the domination, and the fourth faction, of the Indians, slaves and many subaltern 'castes', who were the fundamental objective of the politics of M. Hidalgo.

For his part, J. M. Morelos, whose first 25 followers were from his own parish, organized his army better and had greater strategic capacity, making possible the declaration of the Congress of Chilpancingo on 6 November 1813:

The Congress of Anahuac [. . .] declares solemnly, in the presence of God, moderating arbiter of the empires and author of the society that is given

⁷² See this process in Dussel, 1967, ch. 3. The participation of the Church in the Emancipation is a fact known but not justly valued. If it is true that the bureaucratic and military structure of power was 'catholic', so was the emancipating process. It is necessary to re-read the works that founded those political events to admire its currency. The conservative and liberal traditions distorted the sense of the events. The vision of those oppressed has not been expressed sufficiently.

⁷³ At age 9, an orphan, Francisco Javier entered a Jesuit college, where he studied until 1767, when one of his teachers, whom he always admired, was expelled. He continued to study philosophy and theology in the College of San Nicolas and in 1790 was made rector of the college.

⁷⁴ Romero, 1977, p. 44 (Translation: TC).

and taken away [. . . that it] has recovered the exercise of its sovereignty, usurped, that such a concept is broken for ever and dissolves dependence on the Spanish throne.⁷⁵

Morelos understands that power consists in the will of affirmation: 'the enslaved people are free the moment they want to be',⁷⁶ therefore he re-reads the millenarian text from the concrete political situation:

This oppressed people, like the Israelites, who worked for the pharaoh, tired of suffering, raised their hands to the sky, made heard their clamors before the Eternal throne, and taking pity on their misfortunes, God's mouth opened and decreed before the court of the seraphims that Anahuac was free.⁷⁷

Morelos always speaks from popular imagination. Moses is a figure of reference and equally Judas Maccabaeus, the guerrilla who opposed the Seleucids,⁷⁸ under the power of the 'God of hosts'.⁷⁹ All the patriots of his generation were justified in raising arms against the king of Spain:

It is lawful to reconquer a kingdom, and for an obedient kingdom it is lawful to not obey the king when he is burdensome in his laws that are intolerable, as those that from day to day the damned *gachupine* arbiters are increasing in this kingdom [. . .]. Finally, my countrymen, it is prescribed law in common law and the law of men, to destroy the known enemy. If the *gachupine* do not put down their arms nor subject themselves to the government of the Sovereign and Supreme National Junta of America, we will finish them, destroy them, exterminate them, without sheathing our swords until we are free.⁸⁰

We will speak further on about the vehemence of the creative 'event' of a new political order. The Hispanic hegemony has lost the consensus of the colonists; without consensus it has become domination; before domination the liberative actor, illegal and illegitimately recognized (or affirmed in his/her own *constituent* Congresses), launches a political process that this *Politics of Liberation* will try to justify philosophically. That intermediate time, between the beginning of the hostilities until its end (1807–22 in Mexico), is the dying age of creative chaos. In it the exercise of normative principles of politics, which we will explain in the architectonic of a *Politics of Liberation*, is necessary more than ever, because the strategic-political action does

75 Lemoine Villicana, 1965, Document 136, p. 424 (Translation: TC).

76 'Proclamation of Cuautla', in Lemoine Villicana, 1965, Doc. 22, p. 190 (Translation: TC).

77 'Letter to the bishop of Oaxaca', 25 November 1812 (ibid., Doc. 43, p. 231 [Translation: TC]).

78 See 'Proclamation' of 1 December 1811 (ibid., Doc. 18, p. 186).

79 Ibid., Doc. 44, p. 233.

80 23 February 1811 and 8 February 1812 (ibid., Docs. 24 and 22, pp. 196 and 193 [Translation: TC]).

not have the legal system and the new institutional order as legitimating reference. The legitimacy of political action refers to the community itself, to the *people* as creative actors in the new order, justified self-referentially.

[205] Two heroes of the emancipation stand out. First, the soldier, the military professional Jose de San Martín (1778–1850), born in Yapeyu, a village within the ancient Jesuit Reductions, who was influenced from his Creole childhood by libertarian doctrines. He fulfilled *the military stage* of independence from el Plata, through Chile, triumphing in Peru. Having fulfilled the military exploits (like Moses who after leaving Egypt glimpsed the ‘Promised Land’ on the other side of the River Jordan), he handed over command to Simon Bolívar (1783–1830). Having fulfilled equally from Caracas to Bogota and Guayaquil the struggle against the Spanish, he felt called to finish *the political work* begun (as Joshua who crossing Jordan tackled the organization of the new country from the fall of Jericho). But Bolívar failed in this organizational–political task – a task that San Martín saw as fratricidal and impossible, and so in the meeting of Guayaquil on 27 July 1822 chose not to tackle it.

Maybe none of the political actors reached the stature (and the tremendous failure) of *The Liberator* – investiture, which he receives on 7 August 1813, when he enters triumphantly into Caracas. Simon Bolívar, a Mantuano Creole conservative,⁸¹ carried out his strategy in his first stage of the liberating wars counting on an urban army. He was strongly defeated by Boves and Monteverde. He learned his lesson. Like Darius, who formed his army with the auxiliary plebeians of his Persian noble soldiers, and defeated the Medes, he incorporated, like M. Hidalgo, ‘the lower classes of the population – the groups of people of colour, who distrust the patriots’.⁸² The cause of the Creoles brought together all the oppressed sectors. Nevertheless, Bolívar knew the division of the different groups of Creoles, who struggled for their own interests. ‘Unity’ became his obsession. He wrote from Jamaica in 1815:

I say to you what can get us to expel the Spanish and *found a free government*: is *unity*, certainly; but this *union* will not arrive as a divine miracle but by perceptible effects and well directed forces. America is finding itself [. . .], isolated in the middle of the universe, without diplomatic relations nor military assistance [. . .] When success is not assured, when the state is weak, and when the businesses are foreign, all men hesitate, opinions are divided, passions are agitated and enemies can triumph easily.⁸³

That sector, divided internally, which tried to propose a hegemonic project, had an uncertain socio-historical, cultural, economic or political definition at the end:

81 Only the principal citizens of the colonial society could take ‘command’.

82 Graciela Soriano, ‘Introduction’ (Bolívar, 1990, p. 26 [Translation: TC]).

83 ‘Letter from Jamaica’, in Bolívar, 2005, p. 100 (Translation: TC).

It is difficult to present the fate of the New World, to establish political principles, and almost prophesy the nature of the government that will be adopted [. . .] I consider the actual state of America to be like when the Roman Empire collapsed and each division formed a political system, according to their interests and situation or the particular ambition of some leaders, families or corporations.⁸⁴

He explains, doubtful:

But *we*, who retain only vestiges of what once was, and *are neither Indians nor Europeans*, but a species in between the legitimate owners of the country [the Indians] and the Spanish usurpers: in short *we*, being Americans by birth and our laws European, have to argue these to the people of the country [the Indians] and maintain ourselves against the invasion of the invaders [Spanish]; thus we are in the most extraordinary and complicated case; nevertheless it is a kind of divination to indicate what will be the outcome of the *political line that America follows*.⁸⁵

Bolívar was conscious of exercising a power delegated by a *people* who support him (the *potestas* is founded in the *potentia*); he was conscious that they would have to take decisions for the future that were generationally definitive. But the uncertainty is complete, and sufficient consensus is not found in the sector that begins to arrogate the exclusive exercise of that power (*potestas*). The split between that sector (the Creoles, pretentious and divided) and the *people* (who are the fount of the regeneration of power as *potentia*) determined the following two centuries of Latin American history. And this because the Creoles could never practise the exercise of power:

We were vexed by behaviour that, in addition to depriving us of our rights, left us in a kind of permanent infancy with respect to public transactions [. . .] We were, as just explained, absorbed and thus absent from the universal story of *the science of Government and administration of the state*. Never were we viceroys, nor governors, except in extraordinary cases.⁸⁶

And among many reflections of importance for a future Latin American political philosophy he expressed painfully:

The events of *terra firma* proved to us that *the perfectly representative institutions* are not adequate for our character, customs and actual intelligence. [. . .] But will *we* be able to maintain proper balance in the difficult burden of a republic? Can one conceive of a recently unchained people

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 90 (Translation: TC). The global-historical vision of such a great statesman shows us his profound understanding of the political moment.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 90–1 (Translation: TC).

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 92 (Translation: TC).


POLITICS OF LIBERATION

launching into the sphere of freedom, without, as Icarus, melting their wings and falling into the abyss? Although I aspire to the *perfection of the government of my country*, I cannot persuade myself that the New World should be for the moment ruled by a great republic,⁸⁷ *as it is impossible*, I dare not want it, and less do I want a universal monarchy of America, because this project, without being useful, *is also impossible*.⁸⁸

The political–military generation of independence has fulfilled its task. Now the more difficult foundation of the institutions of the new political order will come.

Finally to clarify my hypothesis, I want to propose a fourth diagram, simplified, from some postulates about these themes:

Figure 11.1 Simplified representation of some political–ideological positions in the last two post-colonial centuries in Latin America



87 It was the dream of unity for the whole Hispanic–American continent.

88 Ibid., pp. 94–5 (Translation: TC).

89 Here L. Alamán and A. Bello are situated.

90 J. M. L. Mora, F. Bilbao, J. B. Alberdi, D. F. Sarmiento and V. Lastarria would be in this tradition.

91 The letters A and B of the figure indicate the two principal protagonists of this drama, a theme only glimpsed under the duality of the liberals and conservatives, but never well situated in history, since it lacks the third end (B). 'The division of Mexico into two, one developed and the other underdeveloped, is scientific and corresponds to the socio- and economic reality [. . .] At the same time, there is a distinct level, there is *another Mexico* [Figure 11.1: B]. [. . .] For me the expression *the other Mexico* evokes a reality composed of different levels and that alternatively furls and unfurls, hide and reveals' (Paz, 1990, pp. 109–11 [Translation: TC]).

92 This would be the *feminine* moment in the interpretation of the younger Octavio Paz (Paz, *Labyrinth of Solitude*, 1959 [Translation: Kemp, p. 1985] and 1990): The Indian, 'embraced the Christian religion as a mother. She was the womb, a resting place, a return to origins, like all mothers; but at the same time she was a devouring mouth, a woman who

Political thinking in the face of the creation of the new institutions (1824-70): failure of a Creole neocolonial hegemony

[206] After the war of independence, the triumphant Creole oligarchy never filled in the distance to the rationally scorned and dominated popular sectors. The indigenous masses, ancient African slaves, mulattos and Afro-Indians, Mestizos and impoverished immigrants constituted a people of the poor excluded from real citizenship. In this consisted the Achilles heel of the new political project.

The Creoles searched for external help to contain the popular revolt from below. They articulated a Latin American peripheral semi-dependency on metropolitan Anglo-Saxon industrial capitalism. Industrial capitalism accumulates relative surplus value; its advantage is found in the industrial process, and like Spain that transferred to Europe only American gold and silver; only 'money'.

On the other hand, in Latin America some Creole leaders tried to implant the Industrial Revolution from the first part of the nineteenth century (like Lucas Alamán), or from the second part of that century, as J. B. Alberdi projected, but without noting that they did not have (either within or in the external metropolis) the conditions that this assumed. The industrial bourgeois class held power in Latin America well into the twentieth century, with 'populism' (from 1910 in the more developed Latin American countries, and only clearly from 1930). For Latin America, a colony of early Modern pre-industrial countries like Spain and Portugal, the nineteenth century was an era of deep frustrations. One will speak of the technical revolution (the positivist ideology, from Mexico to Brazil or Argentina), but will not be included in the social class or the political elite that will be able to carry it out – maybe only Paraguay, when the poorly labelled 'dictator Francia' created those material conditions, and for this England relentlessly destroyed him with the unjust war of the 'Triple Alliance'.

The men of this generation, José María Luis Mora (1794-1850), Lucas Alamán (1792-1853), Andrés Bello (1781-1865), Francisco Bilbao (1823-65), Juan Baurista Alberdi (1810-84), Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1810-88), debated between affirming the colonial-Hispanic tradition or

punished and mutilated them: a terrifying mother' (Paz, 1959, ch. 6, p. 115) [Translation: Kemp, pp. 127-8]. There are two feminines. 'The Virgin is the consolation of the poor, the shield of the weak, the help of the oppressed [. . .] In contrast to Guadalupe, who is the Virgin Mother, the *Chingada* is the violated mother' (ibid., ch. 4; p. 77 [Translation: Kemp, p. 85]). Independence (1810) and the Revolution (1910) are the irruption of the creative mother. 'The Reform movement is the great rupture with the mother' (ibid., p. 79 [Translation: Kemp, p. 88]). This determines the two irreconcilable worlds. 'We have been expelled from the centre of the world and are condemned to search for it through jungles [like Alex Carpentier] and deserts [against Sarmiento] or in the underground mazes of the labyrinth' (ibid., ch. 9, p. 188 [Translation: Kemp, p. 209]) – the creative mother. The war of Independence 'is not [only] a rebellion of the local aristocracy against the metropolis, but [also] of the *people* against the former' (ibid., ch. 6, p. 111 [Translation: Kemp, p. 123]). The first triumph, the second are still defeated.

repudiating it violently in the name of the new technical civilization hege-
monized by the Anglo-Saxons (England, the USA and in some way Jacobin
France). It was the passage from the military stage to a properly economic
moment. J. B. Alberdi explained the question with extreme lucidity:

Two essentially different periods comprise the constitutional history of
our South America: one that begins in 1810 and concludes with the war
of Independence against Spain, and another that dates from this era and
ends now [1852].⁹³

In the first period 'the evil of America was defined as its dependence on
a conquering European government; it looked consequently for the reme-
dy of evil in the separation from the influence of Europe',⁹⁴ from whose
spirit arose the 'contemporary constitutions of San Martín, of Bolívar and
O'Higgins, his illustrious inspirers'.⁹⁵ Alberdi argues:

In that period, in which democracy and independence were the consti-
tutional purpose, wealth, material progress, trade, population, industry,
all *economic interests*, were incidental, secondary benefits, interests of
second order, poorly known and poorly studied, and rarely paid attention
to, of course.⁹⁶

Alberdi shows how the Argentine Constitution of 1826 was conscious of
not being original and imitated the other constitutions of the moment, since
it thought that 'with constitutions [something new] cannot be created'.⁹⁷
He belonged to the generation that conceived the Argentine project, which
would fail emphatically a century later, and he thought critically:

The Congress was wrong not to strive for originality. *The unoriginal
constitution is bad*, because it should be the expression of a particular
combination of facts, men and things, it should provide essentially the
originality that represents that combination in the country being consti-
tuted.⁹⁸

The so-called originality was limited by the narrow horizon of the two
political-ideological protagonists who organized the political field in the
Latin American nineteenth century (at least in the traditional hermeneutic
that has to be overcome today): (a) those who tried a *self-centred develop-
ment*, although with rupture in certain levels and continuity in others, atten-
tive to the external Anglo-Saxon danger, called poorly 'conservatives' (and
in other aspects 'federalists'), like Lucas Alamán; and (b) those who naively

93 Alberdi, 2003, II, p. 56 (Translation: TC).

94 Ibid., p. 57 (Translation: TC).

95 Ibid., p. 58 (Translation: TC).

96 Ibid. (Translation: TC).

97 Ibid., III, p. 64 (Translation: TC).

98 Ibid. (Translation: TC).

projected the *dependent development* of the independent countries thinking that the opening to industrial powers (the USA and England) would open the door to 'progress', the 'liberal' tradition, which in its political-juridical aspect could have as example J. M. L. Mora; in its economic-constitutional aspect, J. B. Alberdi; or in its political-cultural, D. F. Sarmiento. It was evident that the popular faction, the oppressed and excluded people, were not taken into account in any of these aspects: they were absent from the history of this century, or were denigrated as the 'barbarian' fruit of the harmful era of Hispanic colonialism (at least in the 'traditional' liberal-conservative interpretation).

The actors of this era (those badly named conservatives or liberals) could not overcome some of their own limiting naïveté of the newness of their responsibility. First, the 'liberals' ignored the imperial will of the metropolitan Anglo-Saxon powers (who invested in their capitals or installed railways to obtain profits, to exploit and not help the neocolonies, since it was an imperialism with a façade of civilizing development). Second, the 'conservatives' did not note the weakness that would create the anarchic internal division of the Creole leaders themselves (who from a federal chaos reached a unitary establishment with an iron centre and a periphery in the political field of the state itself, in the organization of the territory and in its economic structures). Third, both protagonists were incapable of being able to actually and symmetrically integrate the sectors of the majority (an incapacity that was the inheritance of the struggle for emancipation), which were equally excluded from the determinative institutional political structures (that permitted the existence of a despotic oligarchy with a façade of democracy).

Next is a Creole, Lucas Alamán, who, being born at the end of the eighteenth century (1792), studied natural, mining and agricultural sciences in France, Germany and England (between 1814 and 1820), having first studied in the college that the Jesuits founded in Guanajuato in 1732 – his teacher of mathematics being the scientist Rafael Davalos, who sold cannons to Hidalgo, for which the royalist general Callejas had him assassinated. Friar Servando de Mier, in his flight from France to London, was accompanied by the young Alamán. When he returned to Mexico in 1820, he founded a school of agriculture in Celaya and another of business in Mexico. As secretary of state in 1823 he took many measures in favour of the development of mining. In 1826 he installed the first textile industrial business in Guanajuato. Industrialization became his obsession:

Our population is not yet so abundant that there are more than enough men for the factories. However, they do not have to be neglected for this reason, but rather one should establish producers of goods for general consumption, which also are the easiest to plan.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ 'Memory of the Secretary of State', in *Diverse Documents*, I (Alamán, 1945, p. 206 [Translation: TC]; quoted by Pardo Olaguez, 1991).

The expert on economy and technology writes:

The ordinary fabrics of cotton, linen and wool, needed to cover the majority of the population, have to be encouraged stimulating national or foreign capitalists to establish factories with the necessary machinery, so the goods are moderately priced, which never will occur without this help.¹⁰⁰

For this he had to found the Bank of Avio (to loan to those who needed to buy the machines for industry), which he opened in July 1830, and its funds were obtained from 'the fifth part of the taxes earned through the introduction of cotton cloth'.¹⁰¹ The industrial imports would pay for the possibility of productive independence for the country. Alamán had a clear understanding of the material sphere of politics (in the face of liberal idealism):

Agriculture should be seen not only in relation to products for domestic consumption, but also for those that try international trade [Alamán knows the economic terminology of the moment and affirms the domestic market in relation to the international]. From this point of view, it is properly a branch of commerce and as such it is more important for us, when in our skill area it is the only thing, with mining, that can give us a means of exchange for goods we receive from abroad.¹⁰²

In 1849 he planned to found bilingual schools for the indigenous, since when it was disputed in the Courts he had defended that the indigenous should be educated in their languages.¹⁰³ In 1850 he proposed the direct election of the president of the Republic. Before the English minister George Canning, and before the members of the North American diplomacy, Alamán, when he worked as the secretary for external relations, he demanded a respect of equal parts – which led to his being relieved of his post. Alamán struggled for Mexico to have a navy and a fleet for external commerce; the USA pressured against this, and Alamán had to resign in 1824. Alamán foresaw the North American expansion into the north of Mexico. He demanded fixed boundaries; he did not want a path from Missouri to the Mexican city of Santa Fé in New Mexico to be constructed. The great patriot suffered because his life's work, the defence of Mexico as an autonomous and industrial state, had been destroyed:

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., in suggesting that it is necessary to transform 'slave manufacturing into a factory' (ibid., p. 283 [Translation: TC]), he is not 'conservative'. Alamán criticized 'the fundamental principle of modern society', 'egoism', since it 'cannot be the base of any political institution' (Alamán, 1969, V, p. 576 [Translation: TC]), as this *Politics of Liberation* thinks, and against the 'liberal' position.

¹⁰¹ Valadés, 1938, p. 288 (Translation: TC).

¹⁰² 'Memory of the Secretary of State' (Alamán, 1945, p. 204 [Translation: TC]).

¹⁰³ See Valadés, 1938, p. 118.

Seeing in such a few years this immense loss of territory; this ruin of property, leaving a grave debt; this annihilation of a fine and valiant army [. . .] and contemplating a nation that has come from childhood to decrepitude without having enjoyed more than a glimpse of the vigour of youth [. . .] it seems that one would have reason to recognize with the great Bolívar that independence was bought at the cost of all the goods that America enjoyed, and to give this history the same title that the venerable bishop Las Casas gave to his general history of the Indies: *History of the Destruction of the Indies*.¹⁰⁴

For Alamán, the liberals were foreign-facing 'lawyers',¹⁰⁵ and could not be inserted into the continuity of 'those tendencies shown in the course of time [. . .] flattering them and favouring them in a lasting and *popular way*'.¹⁰⁶ Neither could they encourage the unity of 'the newly formed States in *our America* [. . .]. Having the same origin, bound by the same interests, threatened by the same dangers, their fate should be one. [This unity] will be the base of the true pact of the family that will be all Americans united defending their independence and freedom, and to promote trade and mutual interests.'¹⁰⁷ All this is said in the moment in which Simon Bolívar planned the Congress of Panama. Summarizing, against the opinion of the interpretative tradition, Lucas Alamán gave decisive importance to the material sphere in politics (agriculture, mining, the economy in general), but within a vision of the defence of national wealth against the growing military and economic power of the area to the north. Their work was never concretized; their task was a failure, and the Eurocentrism (American-centrism) of the elite triumphed definitively.

There were also other sectors that, from the economic sphere, protected the internal market. A tailor, Ambrosio López, organized in 1847 the 'Society of Artisans' in Bogota, assigned in principle to the struggle against the import of foreign commodities. The action of these artisans is inscribed within a liberal institutional framework. But on 25 September 1850 the 'Society of the Republic' and the 'Radical Faction' were created. The poor artisans confronted the liberal republicans. These artisans attempted an industrial proto-revolution and struggled against imports; they never gained power and never had a philosophy articulated to their interests. They failed. In their place was the opening to the foreign markets.

[207] For his part, J. M. Luis Mora, who until 1820 dedicated himself as a priest to theology, had studied in the college of San Ildefonso (where the expelled Jesuits were venerated), became a journalist at the *Political and Literary Weekly* of Mexico City. He was arrested by A. Iturbide. Constitu-

104 Alamán, 1969, V, p. 566 (Translation: TC); quoted by Pardo Olaguez, 1991.

105 Ibid., p. 554.

106 Ibid., p. 582 ([Translation: TC]; Pardo Olaguez).

107 *Statement read on the 9th of November, 1823 in Congress* (quoted by Méndez Reyes, 1996, p. 130 [Translation: TC]).

ent congressman of the State of Mexico in 1823, he showed his interest in federalism, municipal governments, the creation of the judicial system and electoral law. He belonged to the Scottish Lodge (created in 1815, near England). His greater political activity developed between 1827 and 1830. He participated in the decision of limiting the influence of the Church in the institutions of the country (secularization of the missions, suspension of tithes, lay education), but equally he confronted the power of the army (dissolution of the bodies that had rebelled). He defended the free press, private property of landowners, generalization of public education, and the formation of museums and libraries. As a liberal Creole he became a federal congressman in 1833. On 6 December 1834 he left for exile in Paris, where he died in 1850.

Mora influenced the creation of institutions after the fall of the empire of Iturbide with his liberal posture. His influence was ideological, opening new theoretical panoramas. The organization of the *new* state was the most grave immediate task. Therefore he worked for a republic (against a monarchy) with a representative system, which would have to possess:

The limitation of public power and its distribution among the three principal branches, periodic popular elections, freedom of opinion, the press, and industry, the inviolability of ownership, the right of deciding taxes by the representatives of the nations and the responsibility of the public functionaries.¹⁰⁸

Mora was conscious that it is necessary to found stable governments. Unfortunately the representation was purely formal, given the oligarchic habits of the past (the Creoles never will intend to eradicate this).

For Mora the legitimacy of the government depended on conviction, on public discussion and the observance of the laws. But, again, he thought always of the participants of the 'learned city': what about the great masses of illiterate Mestizos, the indigenous, the impoverished? It seems that it was absent, invisible, an absolute exclusion. Mora fell, inevitably, into a certain idealism of the unrealizable:

So things, then, remain in perfect equilibrium and the beautiful system does not decline into the monster of anarchy; if the government lacks vigour to effectively fulfil the laws, it needs to be substituted by the conviction of all citizens, of the importance and indispensable necessity of fidelity and the punctual observance of their responsibilities. This is the *virtue* that animates the Republic, it is the broad base and the conserving principle of its existence.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ *Philosophical essay about our constitutional revolution*, in Mora, 1994b, p. 471 (Translation: TC).

¹⁰⁹ 'Discourse on the necessity and importance of the observance of the laws', in Mora, 1994c, p. 281 (Translation: TC); quoted in Brito Dominguez, 2001.

The political proposals do not first consider their ability to be fact. In the historical reality, there is no possibility of implementing these normative instructions, especially when one thinks that 'misery and scarcity foment and anti-social vices are a very strong temptation for all, like robbery, lack of faith in the agreements and promises, and over all the tendency to alter the public order'.¹¹⁰

These needed classes can be, for the liberals, easy pasture for demagogues – anticipating the argument of H. Arendt against the intrusion of 'the social' in 'the political'. A certain moralist sense of 'virtue' – prior to Machiavelli or Mandeville – moves Mora to trust more in that than in the material conditions that could avoid a fall into 'anti-social vices'. J. B. Alberdi would provide better reasons. The conclusion of Mora, in good Creole tradition, is that only the owners participate in citizenship ('if their occupation brings them the quota of profit considered enough, they can and must enjoy the right of citizenship').¹¹¹ The impoverished masses, the indigenous, the former slaves are not citizens. It is an exclusion that will weigh heavily in all political history to the present, and, so, the *liberal* Mora is converted into a great *conservative*.

Juan B. Alberdi (born in 1810) discovered the importance of having a state plan devoted to economic conditions. His diagnosis, fruit of a dualist, racist and Eurocentric (in history) interpretation – which he shared with D. F. Sarmiento against L. Alamán, who has a more complex and adequate vision of history – was inspired by the ideology of the 'progress' of Enlightenment. Spain is a medieval and backward people (following without knowing it the 'constitution of southern Europe'¹¹²), likewise, the Latin American colonial world; this world is present in the interior of the country, in the masses of Mestizos, indigenous, 'gauchos'. The Argentinian territory is an immense 'desert', uninhabited (or with barbarian inhabitants who one has to expel), and starting from a certain Darwinism *avant la lettre*, Alberdi writes following the argument of Locke:¹¹³

We are, then, in the face of the demands of a law, which reclaims for civilization the soil that we maintain as a desert through our backwardness. This law of expansion of humankind is inevitably realized through the

¹¹⁰ 'Discourse on the necessity of fixing the right of citizenship', in Mora, 1994d, p. 391 (Translation: TC).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 393 (Translation: TC).

¹¹² See section [152]; (Translation: TC). The Enlightenment 'produced' 'orientalism' (criticized by E. Said) and 'occidentalism'. Alberdi and Sarmiento are 'repeaters' of these three ideological 'productions' that distort reality, in particular of the post-colonial world itself that both intellectuals thought to interpret suitably to transform it. And transformed it, despite Argentina itself!

¹¹³ See section [146]. Passing through the argument of Hegel who, following Aristotle, counsels the sending of the leftover population to the colonies. Now they will be neo- or post-colonial dependants, Alberdi being the 'Trojan horse' or the organic intellectual of the English Empire of the moment.

peaceful means of civilization or the conquest of the sword.¹¹⁴ What never occurs is an ancient or more populous nation drowning from overpopulation, in a world that lacking inhabitants and abounding in wealth.¹¹⁵

National territory is opened to the empire or those who will take it by force. From this greater premise, the project of the nation (and of the 1853 Constitution) for Alberdi will be to populate that desert with the more industrious population of the moment. One would then have the possibility of making a plan to tentatively return the invitation directed explicitly to the industrious English and Nordic population to immigrate to Argentina, where 'to govern is to populate', like the USA to the north:

North America through the liberalism of its colonial system always attracted populations to its soil in great quantity, even before independence; but we, inheritors of a system so essentially exclusive, need a politics that strongly encourages the exterior.¹¹⁶

Studying the constitutions of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay, he shows that in these countries it is almost impossible to immigrate because it is extremely difficult to acquire citizenship, private property, wealth, and finally, to enter productively into the country. The opposite happens with the Constitution of California (Alberdi is writing in 1852, four years after the separation of this region from Mexico), which 'forms the *people of California* from all who live there, so that they enjoy rights, including civil liberty, personal security, the inviolability of property, of communication and roles, of home, movement, work, etc.'¹¹⁷

Alberdi does not speak of the indigenous and Mexicans who remain trapped at the margins of the new state, nor does he think to include the Araucans of Patagonia, the indigenous of the north and north-east of Argentina, etc., in the *Argentine people*. The people were a concept constituted from the 'best' of the population in that territory and with the new immigrants from the north of Europe: the 'heart of Europe' for Hegel, the 'heart of civilized humanity' for Alberdi and Sarmiento. The naïveté borders on paroxysm:

All the civilization of our soil is European; America itself is a European discovery¹¹⁸ [. . .] Today, under independence, the indigenous do not represent nor make up the world in our civil and political society [. . .] In America all that is not European is barbaric: there is no more division

114 The biological-racist determinism of the moment.

115 *Foundations*, Introduction (Alberdi, 2003, p. 52 [Translation: TC]).

116 *Ibid.*, II, p. 60 (Translation: TC).

117 *Ibid.*, XI, p. 82 (Translation: TC).

118 'A navigating Genoan brought it to light, and a sovereign of Spain promoted its discovery, Cortes, Pizarro, Mendoza, Valdivia, who were not born in America' (from the cited text [Translation: TC]).

than this: 1) the indigenous, that is to say, the savage, 2) the European, that is to say us, those who have been born in America and speak Spanish.¹¹⁹

The Creole elite would flaunt the exercise of power (as *potestas*), would lose the basis of their strength and regeneration (the *potentia*) and little by little would have to count on 'external power' to dominate the internal situation. This failure was constructed over previous failures. In 1810 we hated the Europeans (Spain); now Alberdi says that we have to respect them, invite them to tackle our 'desert' to work it.¹²⁰

An expression of the fundamental and modern necessities of the country, she [the Constitution] has to be commercial, industrial and economic, in place of military and warrior, as the first era of our emancipation began [. . .] [Military] glory is the plague of our poor South America [. . .] The new politics has to glorify industrial triumphs, ennoble work, surround with honour the business of colonization, navigation and industry, replace the customs of the people, like moral encouragement, military vainglory with the honour of work, the enthusiasm of the warrior with the industrial enthusiasm that distinguishes free countries from the English race [. . .] The actual glory of the USA is to fill the deserts of the West.¹²¹

[208] For his part, D. F. Sarmiento, born a year after Alberdi in San Juan province,¹²² expresses the civilization–barbarian dualism with a clarity that

119 Ibid., XIV, pp. 93–5 (Translation: TC). 'This antagonism [between savages and Europeans still] does not exist; the savage is defeated, in America there is no dominion nor mastery. We, Europeans of race and civilization, we are the owners of America' (ibid., p. 96 [Translation: TC]). Only the Creole, the 'us' of Bolívar, is considered: he has excluded the indigenous, Mestizos, 'gauchos', impoverished . . . the people 'beneath'.

120 'Thus we have seen Bolívar up to 1826 provoke leagues to restrain Europe, that meant nothing [!], and General San Martín applauding in 1844 the resistance of Rosas to accidental claims of some European States' (ibid., p. 99 [Translation: TC]).

121 Ibid., XXXIV, p. 217 (Translation: TC). How many unfinished truths! The industrialist vision, more attentive to the metropolitan powers (not as naïve about the 'kindness' of the Anglo-Saxon) of L. Alamán, was more critically realist.

122 I have to say that on reading *Facundo* and *Memories of the Province* I remember my 'village' of origin. Mendoza, where I was born, is the twin city of San Juan. When Sarmiento describes the similarity of the steppes to the east of the Andes (from Jujuy to Mendoza) with Palestine (where I lived for two years), he speaks of the inhabitants that are 'taciturn, grave, and sly aspect, Arab-like, riding on donkeys, and sometimes dressed in goatskins, like the hermit of Engedi [where] the population eats only wild honey and carob beans, as John the Baptist ate locusts in the desert' (*Facundo*, II; Sarmiento, 1963, p. 87 [Translation: Ross, p. 104]). I worked and lived for several weeks in the Engedi *kibbutz* in Israel near the Dead Sea, which Sarmiento confuses with the region of Qumran (which is further north), where Bautista was. One sees his 'orientalism' (all that 'oriental' is barbarian for Sarmiento, who was not touched as I was visiting and living from Morocco to Mindanao in the Philippines and admiring the 'Arab' splendour: ignorance of the 'know-it-all' Sarmiento, Marx would say), his brutal 'racism', appropriate to his era; his pedantic 'Eurocentrism', and his infinite scorn for the indigenous, provincial Mestizo, Pampean 'gauchesco', the people beneath. In his story, he includes some lines about my Mendoza (*Facundo*, VII, pp. 157f. [Translation: Ross, pp. 167f.]).

is either immensely naïve or cynical (appropriate to the superficial culture of the self-taught, who wrote masterfully in Spanish). He writes, irate as always:

The man of the city wears European dress, lives a civilized life [. . .] There are laws, ideas of progress, means of instruction, some municipal organization, a regular government, etc. Leaving the city district, everything changes in aspect. The man of the country wears other dress, which I will call American, since it is common to all peoples; his way of life is different [. . .] two peoples strange to one another. [. . .] The primitive life of the settlers, the eminently barbaric and unchanging life, the life of Abraham which is that of today's Bedouin, looms large in the Argentine countryside.¹²³

The contrasting cultural dualism goes on:

The Republic was courted by two unitarist forces: one coming out of Buenos Aires, supported by the liberals of the interior; another coming out of the countryside, supported by the caudillos who had by then succeeded in dominating the cities. One, civilized, constitutional, European; the other barbarous, arbitrary, American.¹²⁴

Sarmiento was the Argentine ambassador in Washington and president of the Republic from 1868 (elected in his absence), whose campaign was taken care of by B. Mitre (who subordinated the confederation of provinces to the port of Buenos Aires). He coincided with Alberdi in his political and economic liberalism; in the critique of the Middle Ages, the colonial era as feudal by the anti-civilizing intervention of Spain and its Catholicism; in a true social romanticism; in his admiration for the USA and his English and French Eurocentrism; and above all, by his social, cultural and political dualist vision of the white, urban (the 'learned city') Creole elite and the *people* of Mestizos, indigenous, racially of 'dark' colour (who will be called '*cabecitas negras*', the Chilean '*rotos*', the Mexican '*nacos*', etc.), bound for physical extermination. The 'conquest of the desert' (that of J. M. Rosas in

¹²³ Ibid., I, p. 32 (Translation: Ross, p. 53). 'In the Argentine Republic we see at the same time two different societies on the same soil: one still nascent, which, with no knowledge of things over its head, repeats the naïve, popular work of the Middle Ages; another which, with no regard for things beneath its feet, tries to attain the latest results of European civilization' (ibid., p. 51 [Translation: Ross, p. 70]). One can see the ignorance of trying to understand the memory of a people to transform it from one's own history. It is a 'blank slate'. Note how the 'popular' is united with the 'Middle Ages' (understood from the Eurocentric Modernity) as pre-modern. It is a philosophy of global history that will be imposed to the present in Argentina, and in parts of Latin America from other similar intellectuals.

¹²⁴ Ibid., III, p. 113 (Translation: Ross, p. 127). He expresses: 'But there is still something more that revealed form than on the spirit of the pastoral, Arab, Tartar force that was going to destroy the cities' (ibid., p. 117 [Translation: Ross, p. 131]). His anti-Muslim orientalism is impressive, appropriate for the French thinking of the era.

1833, and J. A. Roca in 1879), which led to the genocide of the indigenous who occupied Patagonia (which was neither empty nor deserted), was not only approved but recommended by both political thinkers. 'Progress' is an undiscussed ideology, the necessary fruit of technology, industry, capitalism and the European 'race'. Here is an example of their 'racism'. To denigrate Facundo Quiroga, Sarmiento, whose face showed the presence of African and Mestizo influence, that is to say, he was an Afro-Indian, which certainly formed part of the magnetism of this undiscussed thinker,¹²⁵ writes:

When he arrived in San Juan, the principal men of the city – the magistrates [. . .] the priests [. . .] went out to meet him [. . .] Facundo passed by without looking at them [. . .] until they got to the middle of an alfalfa pasture, lodgings that the shepherd general, this modern Hykso, preferred to the decorated buildings of the city. A *black woman* (!) who had been his childhood servant [his wet nurse]¹²⁶ appeared to see her Facundo; he sat her at his side, conversed affectionately with her, while the priests and notables of the city stood there with no one talking to them.¹²⁷

This anecdote shows many things. First, the racism of Sarmiento – who would never have given such a place to a woman *of her race* – but, against the intention of the author, shows the *popular* authentic anti-racist sensibility of the aforementioned terrible leader.¹²⁸

Both statisticians defined a 'plan for the nation' of Argentina for the second part of the nineteenth century through the twenty-first century. That project has failed, and the causes are plain. The 'state of rebellion' of the people shows the necessity of organizing the political system with the participation of the oppressed and excluded.

Andrés Bello (who died in 1865) had a more positive interpretation of Spain – against V. Lastarria, who criticized Spain acerbically in *Investigations of the Social Influence of the Conquest and Colonial System of the Spanish in Chile*, written in 1844, when Sarmiento was in Santiago, inspired in part by his work and criticizing Bello, based on a measured historical investigation (which neither Lastarria nor Sarmiento possessed to the same degree). Bello, like Alamán, remembered all the impressive colonial art, the literary works and the emancipation itself that a degraded people cannot achieve. The conservative position included in its breast the possibility of recovering the valorization of the popular culture, which was at least five

¹²⁵ Sarmiento laughs frequently at the grotesque figure of Facundo, but does not note that when he wears a dress coat and sombrero, the same critique could be made of his own pretentious presence – which, it has to be recognized, was the European fashion, the fashion of the Creole oligarchy of the era.

¹²⁶ Facundo was part of the Creole oligarchy because a simple 'gaucho' would not have had an Afro-Latin American wet nurse to raise him.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, IV, p. 124 [Translation: Ross, p. 137].

¹²⁸ In an excellent recent publication, E. Laclau (2005) cannot, with the reductive categories of the author, distinguish between *populist* and *popular* reason (see section [37]).

centuries old, but the conservatives, nevertheless, could not value this sufficiently. Negating the past, Lastarria and the liberals definitively negated the possibility of a recuperation of that popular culture. Paradoxically, the *popular* had to appeal to the interpretation that values positively the indigenous and slave cultures, the colonial era, of a *people* of culturally oppressed and excluded faces.

Francisco Bilbao, who was born in Chile in 1823, wrote in 1862 in *America in Danger*, a direct critique against Catholicism, identified with Spain, which was considered the cause of much evil, together with the monarchy and theocracy; meanwhile republicanism would be the possibility of liberty. He opposed the 'democratic republic' and 'despotism' of the traditional Latin American, popular tradition. In *Chilean Sociability* he wrote that those who led the emancipation were powerless to organize the beliefs logically related to political liberty and so it accepted religion with the people, and this was its error. He thought that the revolution of independence was thoughtful in its leaders, but spontaneous in the people. The people, who had only felt political exaltation, saw political liberty as an isolated event: the people remained old-fashioned. Again we see the 'backward people'-'learned Creole' bipolarity that will function as the inevitable ideological invisible horizon of many Creole protagonists of the era.

The new failure of the post-colonial state in the face of imperialism (1870-1930)

[209] With the *Porfiriato* in Mexico (1876-1911), with the government of J. A. Roca in Argentina (from 1880) and the Republic in Brazil (1889),¹²⁹ among many others, a moment of stability occurs that configures the slow and precarious national unity of the Latin American states, *in external dependence* that coincides with the control of the global market by 'imperialism', in the technical sense which J. A. Hobson will define – and which Lenin will clarify:¹³⁰

This transformation from competition [in the prior stage] to monopoly constitutes one of the most important phenomena [. . .] of the capitalist economy of the current time [1917], and we need to study it in detail.¹³¹

The metropolises (England, France or the USA) proclaim in the peripheral world the ideology of progress, industrialization and liberty: liberty so that their capitals can invest monopolistically in the Latin American countries.

¹²⁹ See Halperin Donghi, 1969, pp. 280-354; Kaplan, 1983, ch. 5, pp. 171f.

¹³⁰ From Hobson *Imperialism*, 1972 [1902]; and from Lenin 'Imperialism, superior phase of capitalism' (Lenin, 1961, I, pp. 689-798). See Dussel, 1998a, pp. 313-15.

¹³¹ Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 384 (Translation: TC). Germany increased its exports to Argentina by 143 per cent between 1889 and 1908 (totalling 147 million Marks) (p. 486).

A gigantic accumulation occurs in the 'centre', along with an impoverishment of the old colonies. This shows the naïveté of the intellectuals of Latin America in this period.

The theme nevertheless was definitively formulated theoretically in the history of Latin American thinking around 1968, 'dependency theory', which expressed a fact whose empirical development accelerated from 1880 in the era of positivist¹³² philosophy and of the organization of de facto oligarchic governments (not democratic), which created the conditions for the possibility of the penetration of capitalism from the metropolises into the internal structure of the territories (railways, ports and naval companies), of the populations (foreign-facing ideology that plays with the identity of 'progress = technology = capitalism = positive thinking = imitating the European or North American model'), politics of the states (that politically plays the role of a transmission belt between the empire and the exploited people and their plundered natural resources). I dedicated the 1980s to this theme; see those works for the study of the categorical framework.¹³³ With regard to that philosophical thinking, Leopoldo Zea writes correctly:

After scholasticism no other philosophical movement has gained the importance that positivism has had in Hispanic America. [...] The Hispanic Americans regarded positivism as a redeeming philosophical doctrine. They looked upon it as the instrument most suitable for attaining their full intellectual freedom and with it a *new order* which was to have repercussions in political and social fields.¹³⁴

It was the triumph of liberalism, which for the liberals signified: 'free' trade (without noting that only the empire could exercise that liberty); opening doors for 'freedom' J. Bentham revealed: destroyed the weak unprotected possible national industrialization. L. Zea notes:

Soon, however, a mute discontent was felt in many social spheres [...] Education was not reaching all the social classes. Comfort was not enjoyed

¹³² For this and all themes of this section, we recommend Beorlegui, 2004, pp. 245-436.

¹³³ My three volumes of commentaries on the four essays of *Capital* of Marx (see Dussel, 1985a, 1988 and 1990) try to clarify a sole theoretical issue: the transference of surplus value from the rising (neocolonial), peripheral globally, national capitals to the central national capitals more developed in their organic composition. The phase of imperialism (from 1870) grows this extraction of peripheral surplus value immensely. Our 'peripheral' intellectuals (for example, the positivists and liberals) formulate enthusiastically the thesis that imperialism needs. As Sartre would say, they (the imperialists) yell: 'progress', and in some Latin American corner, with an echo, someone repeated: '... gress', and 'Order and work', and the Brazilian positivists sang: '... ork'. Agustín Cueva and other excellent colleagues criticized 'dependency theory' (see Dussel, 1988, ch. XV), but ignored the categories that Marx constructed to think about the theme. The first necessary category was that of 'competition' between capitals, not only between singular capitals or branches, but between nations.

¹³⁴ *The Latin American Mind*, V; Zea, 1965, I, pp. 62-3 (Translation: Abbott and Dunham, p. 26).

by all members of society. Soon great social differences would appear. Oligarchies arose that monopolized public affairs for the benefit of individual economic interests. [. . .] The *bourgeoisie* in Hispanic America was but a tool in the service of the great European and North American *bourgeoisie* which had been its model.¹³⁵

In the 'historical bloc of (neocolonial) power', and from the origin of the phenomenon of imperialism (monopolization and concentration of the productive and financial capital in the metropolitan centre of the system, with expansion throughout the colonial or post-colonial peripheral world at the end of the nineteenth century), the positivism is ideologically 'hegemonic', although it coexists with traditional philosophies, conservative, and others such as Krausism and spiritualism.¹³⁶ The century of free trade capitalism and of weak dependency on the part of Latin America (1750-1870) would be followed now by the century of strong dependence, effectively articulated (1870-1959)¹³⁷ - with internal periods, phases and crises.

The 'New Order' could not be fulfilled between 1880 and 1930: an independent capitalism in Latin America (with the possible exception of Paraguay, under the direction of the so-called 'dictator' Francia, whose early development was destroyed through the 'war of Paraguay' in 1870, through the cowardice of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, who made impossible the first project of self-centred capitalist development in the Jesuit Reductions' regions). It is the *dependency* of expansive imperialism, with its railways, steamers, banks and the extraction of raw materials in exchange for industrial goods. England is the new empire and the Latin American metropolis. The USA had true hegemony in the Caribbean and Pacific (Puerto Rico, Cuba, Santo Domingo and the Philippines suffered the frequent control of the new state). The North American presence affected Mexico, which suffered separation from Louisiana, and then in 1848 lost Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California.

Among the intellectuals of this era can be named the Brazilians Raimundo Teixeira Mendes (1855-1927), Luís Pereira Barreto (1840-1923) and Miguel Lemos (1854-1916), the Mexican Gabino Barreda (1818-81), the Argentines Carlos Octavio Bunge (1874-1918) and José Ingenieros (1877-1925), and the Chilean José Victorino Lastra. Almost all were influenced philosophically by A. Comte, although others politically by H. Spencer. A. Korn (1860-1936) writes in his work *Generation of '80*: 'They received with sympathy the agnostic and evolutionist doctrine of Spencer. They professed the individualist tendencies of English liberalism. Absorbed by European culture, they did not value the strengths invented by the Argentinian

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 71 (Translation: Abbott and Dunham, p. 34).

¹³⁶ Soler, 1959; Zea, 1949. About Krausism and spiritualism, see the excellent works of Arturo Roig (1969, 1972).

¹³⁷ See Cardoso and Pérez Brignoli, 1979, vol. II.

mind.¹³⁸ Like the prior generation, they were profoundly racist and did not believe in the possibilities of the simple, Mestizo, indigenous and former slave peoples.

The Latin American left, the social-democracy of J. B. Justo or the Communist parties from 1919, emerged from the tradition of the liberal or positivist sectors and developed an ideology around positivism. 'Positivism' signified a critique of the conservative oligarchies, and in this it was right; but, at the same time, it was the philosophy and ideology articulated with the process of the organization of dependency that still weighs heavily now. Its admiration for the Anglo-Saxons, for their technology – in reality for the 'buying' of products and not for the establishment of productive capital – was an open door for pillaging dependency.

Imperialism necessitated an ideology that permitted its expansion. Positivism was that ideology, for it had difficulty in understanding things popular, national, Hispanic, traditionally religious, colonial, indigenous, 'barbaric'.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, things had not improved. The ideal of those who had launched the organization of the new states had again failed.

The Impossible National Sovereignty: Latin American Populism (1910–59) (Analysis of the Political Discourse)

[210] In Mexico, for example, the peasant revolution (1910) anticipated and prepared the bourgeois exercise of power.¹³⁹ The weakening of the landowning oligarchy of the estates left the path free for the birth of the national bourgeoisie. It is the phenomenon called 'populism', and it signifies the appearance of a historical bloc in power hegemonized by the bourgeoisie of the peripheral countries in apparent alliance with the rising worker class. It is the case of H. Yrigoyen in 1918 in Argentina (and Perón from 1946), Vargas in 1930 in Brazil and others like L. Cárdenas in Mexico in 1934, etc. The weakening of the metropolis by the inter-bourgeois wars (from 1914 to 1945, badly named 'world wars') permits a certain flourishing of peripheral industrial national production.

To this phenomenon are due the populisms in India with the Congress Party, in Egypt with A. Nasser, in Indochina with Sukarno, anticipated maybe by Kemal Atatürk in Turkey; the strengthening of a national market; the necessity and possibility of a true protectionism in national industry

¹³⁸ 'Philosophical influences in national evolution' (Korn, in *Works*, III, 1938–40, p. 27 [Translation: TC]).

¹³⁹ In this work, part of the conclusions of the seminar on *Political categories* that we organized from 1976 in the Center of Latin American Studies (UNAM) Mexico is presented. The sociological categories utilized are those of the era (a Marxism critical of an Althusserian classism that opened itself slowly to new possibilities). It shows the aim of not discarding categories that are extremely fecund but difficult to analyse philosophically, like that of 'people'.

with import substitution, produce a 'return to origins' – pre-European or at least of the pre-Anglo-Saxon colonial stage; neocolonial in Mexico, 'historical revisionism' in Argentina, the return to Hindu customs in India, etc.

In this movement of a 'return to what is ours' and a stage of more serious philosophical professionalization have to be situated the 'founders' or the 'second normalization'. The first was the scientific and very serious university philosophy of the Hispanic American colonial era. Within this are thinkers as disparate as Alexander Korn (1849–1945), José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), Fariás Brito (1862–1917), José Enrique Rodó (1871–1917), Deustúa, etc. The national bourgeoisie was anti-imperialist. It was becoming conscious of the American, as José Gaos would teach masterfully to his disciples, although (and maybe because) he came from Spain (not England), like García Vacca in Venezuela. It is necessary to confront Europe, the French, not to imitate them; to return to the beginning. The theme of the indigenous is new. Manuel González Prada (1848–1918) served as a precursor when he wrote about 'Our Indians' in *Times of Struggle* (Lima, 1908). Haya de la Torre himself, founder of the American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA), would be one of the distinguished 'populist' political thinkers of this generation. With Aimé Césaire, or later with Franz Fanon (1925–61), the theme of the African would recover its central place in the reinterpretation of the Latin American past, that of the plantations.

In all ways, that anti-positivist generation, spiritualist at times, influenced by Ortega y Gasset (who lived through a phenomenon similar to that of an Anglo-Saxon anti-imperialism in the Spain of the Generation of '98), always used 'ambiguous' categories. The 'cosmic root' of a Vasconcelos, is it not in the philosophical plan: the reproduction of the inter-class national project of L. Cárdenas, who reunites the peasants, workers and bourgeois? The ambiguity of the populist thinker is articulated as the neocolonial 'organic intellectual' of the rising peripheral national bourgeoisie.

The populist 'failure of hope', when the USA has dominated the totality of the capitalist system without opposition (approximately ten years after the last war, around 1955), the failure of an independent national capitalism, the fall of Vargas in 1954 (by suicide, not resisting the pressures of the North American ambassador in Rio), Perón in Argentina in 1955, Rojas Pinilla and Pérez Jiménez in 1957 and Batista (who maybe cannot be considered populist) in 1959, is the end of this period and the path to a new era, a new period.

The history of Latin American thinking is inevitably developed around *texts*. Texts edited or unedited, texts that recognize oral traditions or political discourses, but texts. Therefore, the history of Latin American thinking demands a clear concept of the idea of the text and a 'theoretical framework' to be able to *interpret* said texts. In these short lines, we intend to occupy ourselves with some hypotheses, elements, suspicions, about what could be in the future a theoretical framework of the interpretation or analysis of the text of Latin American thought, from which its history can be explained.

A hypothesis to analyse the 'text' of political discourse

[211] We have said that there are many texts, from that published by the philosopher (colonial or of the neocolonial era) or the essayist, be it political, literary or scientific, to the manifesto, pamphlet, folio, joint article or oral discourse. We have chosen only this last, in its political level, in a situation of a discourse before a gathered people who demand practically dialogue and in the populist stage of our Latin American history.

Having enclosed the horizon of our analysis, since it is a simple test, we will occupy ourselves with the discourse that the populist leader declares before the congregated people. His statute is very precise, very particular, and therefore we cannot universalize the provisional conclusion we reach.

(a) Antecedents

By way of a simple example, we refer only to three authors.

(a.1) Vladimir Propp

In his work the *Morphology of the Folktale*¹⁴⁰ he explains that his method consists of discovering the structure of the Russian folktale 'according to the functions of the characters'. This permits him to analyse the constant, stable, functional elements that are also limited. If we indicate with a code each one of the diachronic moments of the story (i: initial situation; t1: transgression of the prohibition; W: decision of the hero, etc.), we are able to formulate the sequence of each story, study the variables with others and arrive at the theory of its morphology. Thus, the story *The Swans* formulates itself in the following way:¹⁴¹

$$p^1 a^1 t^1 X W \uparrow < [D^1 H^1 \text{neg}]^3 > R^4 E^1 \downarrow [P^1 D^1 H^1 Z^9 = S^4]^3 \\ d^7 H^7 Z^9 Z^6$$

When deciphered it means: from a prohibition (p^1), through absence of the parents (a^1), is produced a transgression (t^1), that brings harm (X), which persuades the hero (W) and demands his departure (\uparrow). The paths are divided (<); on the one hand a test is imposed (D^1) that causes the submission of the hero (H^1) with negative actions (neg); on the other hand, there is the powerlessness of the donor (d^7) with conceded favours (H^7) obtained by an assistant (Z^9) spontaneously (Z^6). The return of the hero (\downarrow), with spatial displacement along a path (R^4) and the previous removal of harm through force (E^1), does not keep the hero from being persecuted, demolished (P^1),

¹⁴⁰ Propp, 1972, pp. 37f.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 71 (Translation: TC).

as a test (D^1), and although tested (H^1), obtains that attempted through an assistant (Z^9), salvation by flight and hiding (S^4).


This purely formal story, whose content is the traditional Russian story of *The Swans*, permits Propp to discover the structure, message and code of these texts.

(a.2) Algirdas Greimas

In his work *On Meaning* he continues the study discovering new constants, but in particular better defining the 'function of the hero', always within a reformist situation, since 'the story, whose dynamic consists in establishing a new order', always ends by restoring it in the name of the ancestral tradition.¹⁴² His originality consists in showing the complexity of oppositions that are structured around six actants (abstract or possible actors), ordered in three levels:

D ¹ (donor)	vs	D ² (addressee)
S (subject-hero)	vs	O (object-valour)
A (assistants)	vs	E (enemy-traitor)

The function of the actants, isotopic, is developed in an always similar narrative programme, although with secondary variations, reaching a model of possible transformations. The diachronic success of the hero, for example, follows the following programme:



This sequence could be formulated thus:

$$\text{Real} = F \text{ trans } [S \rightarrow O (S \cap O)]$$

Greimas shows the subject lacking or not coincident with the object ($S \cap O = \emptyset$) through a function of transformation (F trans) the subject reaches the desired object (O), and possesses it ($S \cap O$).¹⁴³

If the pairs of oppositions are interrelated, a minimal model appears that in some way is reproduced in all mythical stories.

¹⁴² Greimas, 1973, pp. 219-316.

¹⁴³ Greimas, 1973b, pp. 20f.

(a.3) *Gilberto Giménez*

A thesis defended at the Sorbonne, *Chalma, Santuaire de l'Anahuac, analyse ethnosociologique d'un sanctuaire rural*,¹⁴⁴ utilizes the previous distinctions to construct a theoretical framework that permits it to discover the sense of the mythical practices of the peasant Latin American people of the Toluca valley. The contribution of Giménez consists in knowing to choose within the 31 possible models of Propp and Greimas the most adequate for the interpretation of our reality, which would be the following:¹⁴⁵

donor	object	addressee
A ³	A ²	A ⁴
assistant	subject	enemy
A ⁵	A ¹	A ⁶

Each actant (A) can be exercised by one or more actors; and vice versa, various actants can be exercised by an actor. In the case of the mythical popular Latin American peasant, the situation is the following:

[a] The hero-donor gives to the addressee the object that s/he needs: $A^3 \rightarrow A^2 \rightarrow A^4$, or in the symbols of Greimas: $D^1 \rightarrow O \rightarrow D^2$.

The patron saint, the 'Cross of Chalma', gives the goods of subsistence (health, good harvest, help on the way, etc.) to the devoted people. The reception of the object is passive, tragic, patient, resigned.

[b] The subject does not reach the object itself except through the mediating action of the hero-donor:



This impossibility of reaching the object (in particular in farming, where all depends 'on the sky': rain water, frosts, sun, etc.) defines the activity of the subject exclusively as a worshipful attitude: the worship given to the hero-donor.

[c] In addition, there is the identity of the subject-addressee, but in a different sense: the relation $S \rightarrow D^1$ is worshipfully active; the relation $O \rightarrow D^2$ is powerlessly passive.

[d] One can still indicate the importance of the relation established between the subject and the hero-donor and the assistant or enemy powers (the 'soul' of a deceased person can be transformed from assistant-friend into an enemy).

¹⁴⁴ Giménez, 1976.


¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 192f.

(b) A possible model to situate populist political discourse

Now one can understand the foundation of the following suspicion: the situation of populism, of transition from a liberal-traditional society to another of the development of a new historical situation (at the ideological-cultural level as much as the economic-political) demands an active symbolic function that allows a transition from a mythical rural or marginal world to the rationality of modern society (capitalist or socialist). We suspect that the populist 'leader', with his/her particular capacity of symbolic creativity, assumes a function already known by the mythical conscience, from there the familiarity and comprehensibility with what can be connected with the rural or marginal masses.

(b.1) Proposal of a possible model

[212] We think that the mythical hero-donor, the actant D^1 , is represented by the 'populist leader' character, an object of trust, loyalty and recognition on the part of the subject, rural or marginal masses or initially industrial workers. His position is analogous to the traditional mythical one. The model would be the following:



D^1 : the hero-donor, now the political leader (Vargas, Perón, etc.);
 S : the peasant, the marginal, the 'people' (in a 'populist' sense);
 O : the intended object, present (for example, 'social justice') or utopian ('the new state' of Vargas);
 D^2 : the people themselves as the addressee of O ;
 A : the forces, powers, allied groups, friends, assistants;
 E : the enemy, the traitors.

We analyse this model, focusing on the relations relevant to our ends, in political discourse the populist leader in dialogic presence with the 'people'.

(b.2) *The actant D1*

In populist political discourse the hero-donor is the leader, who pronounces the word before the people ($D' \rightarrow S$). But his/her word has power because it proceeds from the hero proven in the struggle, the test, decisive, victorious, for which s/he has been glorified and recognized. Is the 'qualifying test' of Juan Perón his triumph of 17 October 1945, or the 'triumphal entrance' of José María Velasco Ibarra in the Mexican revolution as consecrating struggle from where Lázaro Cárdenas will be able to emerge? The hero has passed from the anonymity of daily life to the recognition of his glory. Why has s/he been able to occupy that privileged place?

Because the mythical-popular awareness demands a mediator in the relation $S \rightarrow O$. The hero-donor has, in the Freudian father-child-mother triangle, the dominating function of the father: the *imago patris*. 'I am a father, but with many children and without resources. I am a father without having anything to give.' A father who does not have anything to give neither by will, nor by acts among the living, but has a heart to love the Country.¹⁴⁶

The 'does not have anything to give' is a rhetorical formula, because in reality 'the Government is only three months old, Ecuadorian people, people of Quito, but in these three months I promise that I have worked in all Ecuador. I have worked in the Mejía National Institute, making schools in Quito, in all parts plans of action are raised, plans are carried out for the development of Azuay province [. . .]. We do this for the cartwrights, the hagglers, housing, electrification, little by little the biological and economic progress of each one of the inhabitants of Ecuador.'¹⁴⁷

The hero-donor is conscious of and has obligation to fertilize history, promoting the donation of the 'object' to his people, the addressee; his paternal attitude is always present:

It is our responsibility to guarantee the life of the peasant [. . .]. And following the lines expressed we put into the peasants' hands the necessary instruments so that you can defend yourselves from the aggressions of which you are victim.¹⁴⁸

In another way: 'We have struggled without rest to impose social justice to overcome misery through abundance.'¹⁴⁹ The hero-father-fertilizer has a character with dominant components of sadism, 'obsessional, hoarding (anal), father centred, unloving, and isolated',¹⁵⁰ who demands as counterpart the passivity of the addressee. He is the donor, creator. He is that

¹⁴⁶ Velasco Ibarra, 1961, I, p. 211 (Translation: TC). Discourse declared before the students 28 November 1960.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 210-12 (Translation: TC).

¹⁴⁸ Cárdenas, 1936, pp. 16-17 (Translation: TC).

¹⁴⁹ Perón, 1973, p. 39 (Translation: TC), in the 'Message from General Perón to the Argentines in the year 2000'.

¹⁵⁰ Fromm, 1973, pp. 306-7 [English: p. 234].

appropriate to the character of the *Führer* of European fascism, whose version in the periphery will be populism (and not Brazilian or Chilean neo-fascism). Perón was acclaimed as 'Macho!', and they called him 'Father of the Country!'

b.3) The actants S and D₂; the actor 'people'

The actant D¹ is defined from and by its relation with S. It is S who in his/her lack, negativity, necessity, demands a hero-donor. It is S who invests in someone, in the function D¹, to be able to symbolically re-establish the disturbed order. But, in this case, S is D², as addressee of the action of the hero-donor. S-D² is the 'people', who constitute the multitudinous act itself, as the *location* of the discourse of the populist political leader.

The negativity, the state of necessity of S, is discovered frequently in the terms that express it: 'rabble' Velasco Ibarra called the people, 'wretched' Perón called them. The negativity is situated at the level of value (the *sans culottes*): 'Noble people of Quito',¹⁵¹ 'Rio Grande people! Brazilians of all corners of the Country',¹⁵²

S is the 'people': spectator, active participant in the symbolic dramatization of the fiesta, addressee of the persecuted 'object'. The ambiguity of this concept – not scorned but of diverse semantic statutes – lets it mean also D². The people are all: all the classes, Nation, Country . . . It is said that 'the people is the protagonist of history', but in fact one demands trust and passivity in the obtaining of the 'object' ('Workers of Brazil [. . .] What are the aspirations of the working masses, what are their interests? And I say to you: order and work! [*prolonged clapping*]').¹⁵³

(b.4) The relation D₁ ↔ S: the fiesta

The physical presence of the leader and his/her people in the multitudinous act, where the dramatic act of the symbolic dialogue between people-mediator is realized, has greater importance: 'Far from incubating a servile spirit, in these popular congresses, courts, to which the representatives of the masses have access, it is spoken freely that you have rights.'¹⁵⁴

The people abandon the location of *negativity*, impotence, necessity: the profane, daily: the house, the neighbourhood, the factory, the field. On the contrary, the manifestation is the location, the sacred space of *positivity*, plenitude ('Powerful Argentina!', yelled the multitude), symbolic fertilization of the castrated son. 'The sacred is the space of plenitude and power,

¹⁵¹ Velasco Ibarra, op. cit., p. 210 (Translation: TC).

¹⁵² Vargas, 1938, V, p. 133, from the discourse of 7 January 1938 in Rio Grande (Translation: TC).

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 203 (Translation: TC), from the discourse of 1 May 1938, Labour Day, in Rio.

¹⁵⁴ Cárdenas, op. cit., p. 18 (Translation: TC).

it is not abstract, but in relation to the availability and communication of the values of subsistence.¹⁵⁵ The marginalized, oppressed, dispossessed, live ritually their triumph. The hero-donor is the priest.

The leader knows to make theatrical the rite of the real presence of $D^1 - S$, where the reached 'object', the fulfilled utopia, is anticipated . . . at least for an instant that puts negative daily life within parenthesis: 'Workers of Sao Paulo: How long I waited for a moment like this! [. . .] Paulista people! The *fiesta is ended*. Continue your course! Toward the new destinies of Brazil.'¹⁵⁶

And the fiesta ended . . . now, begins the work in the dark, anonymous negativity . . .

(b.5) Relation $S \leftrightarrow D^1$: trust, loyalty, consensus

The people, the masses, invest in the hero who has struggled, who has earned his recognized, publicly affirmed glory. Without this official consecration he cannot exercise his donor function, cannot struggle against enemies nor ask solidarity from his helpers or friends:

I knew that I counted on you and sensed, from afar, the corroded underground of solidarity, which came to my ears. Now, personally, I see how it is vibrant and smooth.¹⁵⁷

But the peasant class that has given us the honour of being treasurers of their trust knows that we do not intend more than to better serve them.¹⁵⁸

The people help me, the armed forces of the Country help me, and with the help of the people, with the help of the armed forces [. . .].¹⁵⁹

'Day of loyalty', faith in the leader, trust in his/her action, help, solidarity, consensus. It is the basis of the authority of the Mediator, the Father. His real authority is moral; neither despotic nor objective: it is symbolic, necessary for the mentality in transition from the marginalized man (between the traditional and capitalist mode of production, between the countryside and the city, between. . .).

(b.6) Relation $D^1 \rightarrow S$: the message

[213] The discourse of the leader is situated in the level that in the matrix of a model of communication would be formalized thus:


¹⁵⁵ Giménez, op. cit., p. 217 (Translation: TC).

¹⁵⁶ Vargas, op. cit., p. 311: discourse to workers in Sao Paulo, 23 July 1938 (Translation: TC).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 325 (Translation: TC).

¹⁵⁸ Cárdenas, op. cit., p. 18 (Translation: TC).

¹⁵⁹ Velasco Ibarra, op. cit., p. 212 (Translation: TC).



The leader (D^1) elaborates a message (M) following a certain code (c^1) that is communicated through a certain channel (b): the loudspeaker, for example. The people (D^2), passive addressee, hear the message and decode it (c^2) but with another code, since their referent (R^2) is different from that known by the leader (R^1). This active-functional structure will be very important for the properly ideological analysis of discourse (3): 'To you is directed the word [. . .]'.¹⁶⁰

We are analysing the *word* of the leader in political discourse itself. The oral word, spoken rhetorically before the multitude, and not *written* (text by analogy, *discourse* in the strict sense), is a privileged moment in the exercise of populist political power. It is not something secondary, expressive, enclosed; it is something essential, constitutive: it is presently acting out the power of the effective word. One executes what one pronounces, like that 'yes' pronounced in a marriage contracted before witnesses – to mention an example suggested by J. L. Austin. It is an axiological discourse but also symbolic, and is far from mere political writing.¹⁶¹ If it is true that it is a 'magical ritual language',¹⁶² and also of the advanced industrial society, it does not have the characteristic of being 'closed' and merely tautological. On the contrary, it is analogous to the creativity and defiant colloquial humour of popular language, although each word of the discourse opens a well-defined semantic field comprehensible to the 'initiated' and referencing to daily life in all its negativity.

A first point is the 'organization of the message', which the orator improvises. In the selection and combination the ideological statute of the text can be analysed.¹⁶³ A particular phenomenon is that of semantic deviation (where the leader directs the listening of R^2 toward his own R^1):

¹⁶⁰ Vargas, *op. cit.*, p. 253: discourse in Duro Preto, 10 July 1938 (Translation: TC).

¹⁶¹ Barthes, 1972, pp. 26–35 (Translation: Lavers, pp. 19–28).

¹⁶² Marcuse, 1969, p. 122.

¹⁶³ Verón, 1969, pp. 140–5.

The leader: 'We will put into the peasants' hands the instruments necessary for you to become capable of defending yourselves from the aggressions of which you are victims' (R¹)

The masses: Applause. You: 'It is the first point that we need, citizen president: weapons!' (R²).

The leader: 'The instructions are given already to the Chief of the Military Zone so from there will proceed the organization of all the peasants who are in a *difficult situation* [. . .]' (R¹)¹⁶⁴

The discourse has a logic, is organized, has a diachronic sequence. We can code each part, following established typologies, and define it in the way of Propp (a.1). One could then see the introductory moment (i), the central problematic (c) and the final result (f); his/her assistants would appear (A), her/his enemies (E), etc. This method would allow one to compare the structure of the discourses, discover the essential moments, and better define its fundamental structure. We will return to this theme (3).

(b.7) *The powers A and E*

The populist discourse never lacks the powers, real but symbolized mythically, of the allies, friends, and opponents, enemies and traitors (E), with their hierarchies, plans and tactics. The dramatization is a struggle, a war:

We find threats to your persons by the elements that your enemies organize in the shadow.¹⁶⁵ [. . .] Work of a generation of out-of-date politicians, military mercenaries at the service of imperialism and an oligarchy of troops and traitors [. . .].¹⁶⁶

Consider the emotional and adjectival content of the words (which can have a real content but now acquire an enormous symbolic connotation)!:

I know very well from where come the underground movements, ruinous and miserable, of people who dare in Ecuador as if the Country did not remember of their recent miseries [. . .].¹⁶⁷ [. . .] The enemies of the Country erected violence and factious hate as normal action . . . Getúlio Vargas says to us.

(b.8) *The desired 'object'*

The object is the referent of the message of the leader and that desired by the subject-addressee (R²). In the ambiguity of the message, its referent is

¹⁶⁴ Cárdenas, op. cit., p. 17 (Translation: TC).

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. (Translation: TC).

¹⁶⁶ Perón, op. cit., p. 36 (Translation: TC).

¹⁶⁷ Velasco Ibarra, op. cit., p. 210 (Translation: TC).

mistaken, all the political power of the populist discourse is risked and its capacity for ideological manipulation (the space, which makes possible the relative autonomy of the populist state and the conception of that state as *tribunal* of a conflictive society, resides here).

From their situation of profound negativity (lack of stable work of the marginalized population, the underemployed masses, the exploitation of the worker class by the rising bourgeoisie . . .), S – D² desires (the ‘libidinous economic’ Lyotard would say) goods or the immediate means of subsistence (work, security, better salary, house, assistance for his wife and children . . .) from a utopian horizon. It is the level of the utopian project where the populist leader can manage the popular referent (R²):

We have struggled without rest to impose social justice¹⁶⁸.

What are the aspirations of the worker masses, what are their interests? And I say to you: Order and work! (*prolonged applause*). [. . .] It is precisely, therefore, for the realization of this supreme ideal, that all walk united, in prodigious, heroic and vibrant ascension.¹⁶⁹

We do this for the cartwrights, the hagglers, housing, electrification, little by little the biological and economic progress of each one of the inhabitants of Ecuador:

Order and social justice can be differently interpreted. In its different signification, in its ambiguity resides the practical utility of its semantic extent. This allows one to demand sacrifice, work (necessary mediation of the capitalist national industrial project).¹⁷⁰

The ‘object’ (which for Freud would be the mother–wife) cannot be given immediately to the people. Through fidelity, loyalty and faith in the leader one will reach the desired ‘object’ (concrete: work; utopian: social justice). Trust is necessary. He will work for us! It is the hero–donor in whom the addresses hope, await his exploits, his works, his miracles, his paternal fecundity.

(c) *Political discourse as symbolic dramatization*

For the political act of the discourse to be seen, mutually acting presence of the hero–people, it is lived by all as a true symbolic dramatization, where the daily negativity is sublimated in the sacrality of the fullness of the fiesta.

¹⁶⁸ Perón, op. cit., p. 39 (Translation: TC).

¹⁶⁹ Vargas, op. cit., pp. 203–5 (Translation: TC): speech delivered 10 May 1938 in Rio, before the working class.

¹⁷⁰ Velasco Ibarra, op. cit., p. 212 (Translation: TC).

This dramatization is understood as a struggle. Enemies are defeated by the word of the hero with the *consensus* of S – D². The donation of O, the concrete and utopian desire, is pre-seen, pre-desired, anticipated in the public patriotic celebration. The massive presence of such witnesses gives to the act a unique reality, which contrasts with the darkness of the daily oppression. The discourse not only is not written, but also is not a profane text. The discourse is a truly liturgical text that is proclaimed, acclaimed. It is the glorification of the hero, with whom the masses identify, the son, since he actualizes their donor powers, miraculous. We pass now to the context of our text.

A hypothesis to analyse the political-economic 'context'

[214] We have indicated one model, within the many possible, to begin to analyse a certain type of political discourses. It is not a solution, but the indication of a methodological necessity. The analysis of the text demands, as a next act, the analysis of the denoted *context*. Now the social sciences have to come to our aid.

(a) Antecedents

As in the previous section, we will explain the work of some authors who help us to understand the question in the construction of interpretative categories of the Latin American social reality.

(a.1) Octavio Ianni

In his work *The Formation of the Populist State in Latin America*¹⁷¹ which continues some previous work,¹⁷² he explains a synthetic thesis about populism at the economic level (the capitalist project that sustains populism), social level (in the pact of classes hegemony is exercised by the national bourgeoisie), political level (the role of arbiter and relative autonomy of the populist state with its party of bureaucrats of the petty bourgeoisie) and ecological level (as a preponderantly urban phenomenon). The ideological level is not treated by Ianni, like Arnaldo Córdoba will do in his work *The Ideology of the Mexican revolution*,¹⁷³ although it was not the intention of his work. The work is a good minimal theoretical framework to begin the study of the theme.

171 Ianni, 1975. For populism, see the following works with good bibliographies: Ghita Ionescu y Gellner, 1970; Weffort, 1967, 1976; Dix, 1975; Niekerk, 1974; Kindersley, 1962; Venturi, 1960; Lenin, 1976; important are Córdoba, 1974, and Ribeiro, 1971, pp. 203f.

172 Germani, Di Tella and Ianni, 1973.

173 UNAM, Mexico, 1974.

(a.2) Nikos Poulantzas

From Enrope comes to our aid, to determine and deepen an interpretive theoretical framework, the work *Political Power and Social Classes in the Capitalist State*.¹⁷⁴ In effect, the distinctions of the author show his potential for our theme in the analysis of French Bonapartism (pre-history of populism in the periphery), because 'the deep ambiguity of Jacobinism is not due to its contradictory purity as the political ideology of the bourgeoisie but to the particular character of the bourgeois revolution in France.'¹⁷⁵ This character consists of that 'petty bourgeoisie and the plot-owning peasants, whose relations with the bourgeoisie pass through a spectrum, from antagonist contradiction to support or alliance, hinder, on the other hand, the French bourgeoisie's possibility of a stable alliance with the nobility, as seen in England and, later, in Prussia'.¹⁷⁶ In the dependent nations the 'internal bourgeoisie' hegemonizes the process, in alliance with the popular classes, but at the end as mediation 'of the contradictions of North American capital',¹⁷⁷ or simply of the centre (for the period prior to the end of the Second World War).

(a.3) Samir Amin

In his work *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism* he defines the theme that occupies us in the following way:

Nevertheless, a new industrial bourgeoisie was constituted in the wake of the dominant foreign capital, particularly during the First World War. [. . .] Limited in its development by the submission of Latin America to the requirements of free trade, this new industrial bourgeoisie attempted to challenge, partially at least, the power of the landowners and traders. To achieve this, it tried to win the support of the masses, and this gave Vargas' regime in Brazil, that of Perón in Argentina, and that of Cárdenas in Mexico their populist character. But this bourgeoisie also tried to ensure that this popular support could not turn against it; hence, it forbade the popular classes to organize freely outside its control.¹⁷⁸

This bourgeoisie is incipient, since, born at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it cannot be really competitive, as Hinkelammert teaches, it cannot accumulate sufficient capital or technology to establish the struggle with the central power of global, imperial and monopolistic capitalism. As the populist project is of capitalism, in a peripheral social formation it is doomed to

¹⁷⁴ Poulantzas, 1972 and 1976.

¹⁷⁵ Poulantzas, 1972, p. 228 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷⁶ Ribeiro, 1971, p. 25 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷⁷ Poulantzas, 1976 (Translation: TC).

¹⁷⁸ Amin, 1974, pp. 315-16 (Translation: Pearce, p. 297).

failure from the beginning. The interest of the thesis of Samir Amin lies in its analysing equally populism in Africa (as Nasser) and Asia (as Sukarno), and showing that in all cases a preponderance of agrarian capitalism has followed, a dependent capitalism limited by central capital, together with a growing organization of national bureaucracies that are confronting an also growing proletarianization, and with greater marginality, which does not hinder the birth of autonomous peripheral formations (like Brazil, Iran, South Africa, India).

(b) Populism and the global situation (1910-60)

[215] The phenomenon of populism is incomprehensible without situating well the global group that makes it possible.

(b.1) Re-accommodation of hegemony in the centre

The last to reach industrial revolution and the centre's capitalist project in the centre were the Kaiser's Germany and Japan and Italy. These countries started two wars in order to penetrate the central economy and have access to the colonial world hegemonized by England and later by France. The USA, for its part, did not try for participation, because it was a constitutive part from its independence, but for the hegemony of the capitalist world (its struggle veiled but persistent was then against England). From 1914 to 1945, centred on the crisis of 1929, a struggle for the reorganization of the structure of power of the centre developed, by its participation and hegemony, also with the separation of a good part of the centre through the Russian Revolution and later socialist revolutions (which will signify an important factor but in the post-populist stage).

The sympathy of the populist regimes for the fascist forces of the centre is totally understandable, because Hitler and Mussolini (and the emperor of Japan), like the populists of the periphery, had a common enemy: England and the rest of the industrialized powers that managed the hegemony of the centre. Both had an independent national capitalist project, hegemonized by the national bourgeoisies (think of Krupp) and with proletarian and rural support.

The struggle among the powers of the centre allowed the peripheral nations to open negotiations with the diverse forces in opposition. Geopolitically one could have supported Germany against England, or England against the USA, or the USA against England, according to the circumstances. Once the war of hegemonies ended and divided the world at Yalta in 1945 between the USA and Russia, the possibility of populism diminished until it disappeared almost definitively from 1960 (a time of strong control reorganized over the periphery). The 1964 *coup d'état* in Brazil indicates the new era for Latin America.

(b.2) The relaxing of the centre-periphery domination

Due to the struggle for the centre in the centre itself, there exists a possibility of relative autonomy in the peripheral nations that makes them think the hour of liberation has arrived. This is a false hope that only Russia will utilize conveniently at the beginning of the struggle and China at the end.

The conversion of the industry that produced goods for the capitalist global market for the periphery into the war industry from 1914 diminished the capacity of exports of the metropolises, and with that diminished the power of the buying faction (commercial oligarchy) of the colonies or neocolonies. On the other hand, the penury of the eras of war, post-war and pre-war allowed raw materials and exotic tropical products to achieve higher prices in the global market. The supplementary entrance of foreign currency permitted the birth or growth of a national light industry as substitution for imports. It is not strange that the peripheral countries registered a favourable balance of payments in 1945.

On the other hand, the colonies and neocolonies were allied to the central powers, or at least potentially allied, which kept imperialism from being presented with aggressive intentions and allowed, on the contrary, nationalist aspirations to be concretized by means such as the expropriation of the exploitation of the subsoil, the nationalization of exports (which produced a struggle against the landowning oligarchies of the countryside), etc.

It was an illusion to believe that the domination of the centre had ended definitively. The moment was not interpreted correctly as a temporary relaxation of domination due to transitory causes. If the situation had been understood adequately, the revolution would have had to radicalize. Not occurring then, the favourable moment disappeared for a long time and, it is possible, is occurring again in the crisis of central capitalism and may mature at the end of the present century.

(c) Populism and the situation of peripheral national social formation

[216] Regarding the phenomenon of populism, some authors begin with the Mexican rural (in reality pre-populist) revolution of 1910 against the Porfiriato, or with Irigoyen (1916-22 and 1928-30) in Argentina. Nevertheless, it appears alongside the 1929 crisis (although anticipated theoretically, for example, with Víctor Haya de la Torre in Peru who already in 1924, the year the Popular Revolutionary Alliance for America (APRA) was founded, clearly expressed the populist thesis).

(c.1) Protagonist principles

We think that the populist process has taken three eras, which can be defined by international and national moments:

The first populism. It has to be situated from the Mexican experience of Calle in 1924, and principally of Cárdenas (1934-40), and in similar others (for its pre-history and history and for its important rural population), like Peru, which although it began with the APRA in 1924, lasted until the government of Odría that began in 1948, like Ecuador with José María Velasco Ibarra (1934-70, lasting for five governments). After Mexico one has to consider the Brazil of Getúlio Vargas (1930-45 and 1951-4), which lasted until the *coup d'état* against Goulart (1964). Argentina experienced early Perónism (Juan Domingo Perón: 1946-55), a phenomenon lived in an analogous manner by the Southern Cone (in Uruguay, for example, with the ascension of Batallism in 1948 and especially with Luis Batlle Berres; Chile of the second Ibanez from 1952; the Bolivia of Paz Estenssoro between 1952 and 1956 and 1960 and 1964, like that of Siles Zuazo between 1956 and 1960).

The second populism. It was born later in countries with less of a worker class and in a moment in which the new expansion of imperialism in its technological-scientific phase had already started, although provisionally. From Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (assassinated in 1948) to Rojas Pinilla (1953-8) and the ANAPO in Colombia, Stroessner in Paraguay (from 1954) or Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela (1952-8), to the configuration of similar positions in the Caribbean countries (for example, Batista, who dominated the island of Cuba from 1933, but governed between 1940 and 1959) or of Central America (Arbenz, 1950-4). It is precisely against this last, through the coup of Castillo Armas (as a force of internal occupation, supported by paramilitary groups who assassinated the populist opposition *en masse*, directed by the CIA, the American army united with the United Fruit Company, coordinated by the *National Security Council*) that a new type of neo-fascist regime began, launched at the continental level from Brazil.

The third populism. This is recent and includes Torrijos in Panama, Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968 and following) and the return of Perónism in Argentina (1973-6). In Mexico, in some way, there is great continuity with diverse types of populisms (for example, that of Luis Echeverría would coincide partly with the third populism). Darcy Ribeiro calls this 'modernizing nationalism'.¹⁷⁹

The non-viability of populism, like autonomous or independent peripheral national capitalism, opens a path to a transitory developmentalism,¹⁸⁰ but definitely to a massive neo-fascist militarism of dependent capitalism or

¹⁷⁹ Ribeiro, 1971, p. 25.

¹⁸⁰ 'Developmentalism, a non-populist, technocratic ideology took over, marking also a step backward toward a compromise characterized by an appeal for external aid and association with foreign (now US) capital. The new bourgeoisie often came from the same families of great landowners and traders who were formerly dominant, in association with foreign capital. The steady progress of the dominant foreign capital and its ever growing technological monopoly indicate the submission of these national bourgeoisies' (Amin, *op. cit.*, p. 316 [Translation: Pearce, p. 298]); it is the case of Colombia from 1958 and Venezuela, Costa Rica, certain Mexican governments (1958-70), Frondism in Argentina (1958-62), etc.

to a still experimental socialism (which failed in Chile between 1970 and 1973, or triumphed in Cuba from 1959). But this is the task of future expositions about the resulting stages that we now study.

(c.2) Articulation of the modes of production of social formation in the populist moment

The populist moment of the Latin American peripheral social formations coincides with the passage of the domination of a mode of capitalist agrarian-landed estate capitalist production combined with a free trade hegemonized by a buying mercantile bourgeoisie, allied to a small urban world (artisans, small businesspeople, bureaucrats), in the time of the first imperialism from 1880, passage from this situation to the hegemony of foreign capitalist production, with a financial and technological monopoly in the actual phase of imperialism. The populist stage permits the relative hegemony of one mode of industrial capitalist production principally driven by an internal bourgeoisie (not properly 'national') over the agrarian-landed estate or dependent mercantilist. Nevertheless, as dependency will not disappear, and the countries need the foreign currencies from their agrarian exports, there will be a 'changing of the guard' (the conservative land-owning oligarchy will be exchanged for another of greater inspiration to dependent capitalist ideology). These modes of capitalist, agrarian-landed estate, mercantile and industrial production will release an internal struggle important for hegemony. In the populist period, political participation in the state will be greater on the part of the industrial group, but its victory will not be definitive.

Thus, the peripheral formation will live the contradiction of diverse modes of production, split. In the pre-industrial countries populism will acquire more despotic and incoherent physiognomies (as in the second populism of c.1). In those that have a long rural tradition (linked then to taxed-mission colonial systems, as in Mexico, Peru or Ecuador) they could not define revolution from industrialization (but from a later moment). Those who have a mode of slave production or small capitalist owners (as Brazil or Argentina) can define themselves from the beginning through the relative hegemony of the mode of industrial production. The question has to be studied regionally and following parameters clearly defined beforehand. For this, global analyses are not sufficient.

(c.3) Social classes in the populist moment

The contradiction of the diverse modes of production of peripheral formation determine the always changing plurality of social classes in struggle or momentarily fluctuating alliances following internal national or external imperial factors. The struggle of the classes changes frequently in the face of the populist regimes but no class acquires complete hegemony. It is in the

political space opened from that lack of hegemony that a place exists for the populist state and the leader. Here, more than in any civil society, Hegel would be right with respect to the internal contradiction of the bourgeois society.¹⁸¹

Each one of the modes of production and its internal splits allows us to analyse provisionally the classes in battle, in temporary, momentary or definitive alliance.

[a] On the one hand, we have the class faction that dominates the industrial world: the internal bourgeoisie. Allied momentarily (the internal bourgeoisie itself proposes the alliance) is the worker class. The momentary alliance is due to: (i) the need to strengthen its front in the struggle against the landowning faction and mercantile buyer; (ii) the need to distribute capital to grow the internal market. Therefore the worker class is the principal counterpart of the alliance. The CGT of Argentine Perónism and the CTM in Mexico fulfil this function. The later impossibility of this alliance (by not being able to distribute capital in raising of salaries) and the strengthening of the managing faction of foreign capital will determine the end of the first populism.

[b] On the other hand, we have the class faction that dominates the exporting agricultural world; the landowning oligarchy (old or new style). In this case, the rural class (waged or smallholder) is opposed to this oligarchy. On the other hand, this populism will launch itself toward the peasantry and against the landowning oligarchy to weaken it and permit surplus capital to be invested in national industrialization, or for the state to manage the agricultural exports.

[c] In third place is the faction that dominates the imports of manufactured goods: the buying mercantile oligarchy and the emerging managing faction of the foreign companies. The clientele formed from liberalism is allied to this group: the middle class, bureaucracies, services in general, always attracted by the cultural prestige of the centre. Populism has them as potential enemies, confronting the buying and managing group, it opens broadly the path of growing bureaucratization for the middle classes, which, on the other hand, will dominate the bureaucratic apparatus of the populist parties (in the progressive elements of nationalist calling).

[d] Finally, the marginal groups (including those under-employed who seem to be integrated in the worker class). This includes the groups that move from the countryside to the industrial mode of production – not properly classes – that arrive in the cities exiled by the modernizing expansion of agrarian capitalism and the disappearance of the traditional or historical mode of production. These groups, more than the miserable poor, are the principal clientele to which the populist political discourse is directed. The utopian 'object' (stable work, social justice, order) echoes in their ears as

¹⁸¹ *Rechtsphilosophie*, §§ 182–256.

that desired par excellence. Its massive support for the leader allies them with other classes, at least momentarily.

The marginalized are allied strategically with the leader, in a personal individual way. They are those who trust, believe, hope. As, on the other hand, the incipient industrial system cannot absorb them in their totality, and due to the demographic rise, through emigration from the countryside, they increase. Marginality is constituted not only in the bastion of populism, but in the 'problem' of later fascism (not in socialism, for example, where the total distribution of the surplus is a priori to the model).

Ideally, the bourgeois class in its national industrial faction would try to exercise a relative hegemony over the other factions, the worker classes being its principal ally, depending on how fully it accepts the alliance and hegemony. As it intends to hegemonize itself the struggle is transformed into a revolutionary one and contains a double destiny: either to produce a revolution (the only case for now in Latin America is Chile, which failed, since the Cuban revolution follows another direction) or to be demobilized totally (in neo-fascism). All the other classes are like assistant protagonists, allied, secondary in this fundamental bipolarity of populism.

(c.4) The populist state

One can now understand the relative autonomy of the populist state. The state, as *arbiter* or *tribunal* of class struggle or interests in absolute or relative opposition, plays the role of the 'exact balance, the mediator and judge of society', as Vincente Lombardo Toledano would say.

The populist state is a capitalist but peripheral state. This final note defines it in its essence; it is not something accidental. Being peripheral distinguishes populism from the fascism of Hitler or Mussolini; being capitalist distinguishes it from popular socialisms (like Cuba); being populist distinguishes it from formal liberal or developmentalist democracies.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly between the state and government. The state is the *place* or space with relative autonomy in the face of the dominating or hegemonic classes, which possess economic and ideological power, and from where political power is exercised. The government, on the contrary, is one of the state apparatuses (together with the army, police, education or means of communication, etc.), which exercises, through a bureaucracy, exclusive political power, although linked to the rest. The Latin American populist state, through the unstable and mutually tense contradiction of diverse classes and class factions, has greater political space, greater relative autonomy.

On the other hand, there is the democracy or the populist dictatorship. In reality these are two forms of government and not of state. The populist state can establish a government with a democratic form (through free elections, respecting in part the distinct powers always under the hegemony of the executive, etc.) as was the case of the first populism (since Vargas, Perón

or Cárdenas, Velasco Ibarra and many others, won the elections by real majorities). One can also establish a type of dictatorship (as frequently in the second round of these regimes, due to corruption and the fraying of a contradictory project: proposing a capitalist system with a popular base, or in the second populisms: à la Pérez Jiménez, for example).

Another characteristic is the unity or quasi identity within state-government-executive-union party. This is the backbone of the regime. The mediation between the government and the unions is realized in the party (place of participation of the industrial bourgeoisie but especially of the petty bourgeoisie that constitutes the bureaucracy properly said: of the government and party at the same time). In political discourse, in the fiesta of the political act, the leader comes into contact with the people, with the unions. It is the moment in which s/he acts without mediations. The leader can place the blame for the errors on the mediators between her/him and the people.

The army fulfils a fundamental function. The leader frequently is military. By his/her class extraction (petty bourgeoisie for the general), the army is part of the emerging, progressive nationalist bureaucracy.

Essentially the state controls and demobilizes the people once it has been given the government. Its function consists in governing in the name of and with the support of the people in favour of the national bourgeoisie.

The populist state survives while it has the alliance of the internal industrial bourgeoisie (hegemonic over the other dominant class factions) and the worker class. While it can, with the consent of the worker class, it controls the aims of the worker class in favour of the bourgeoisie. While this difficult equilibrium exists, the populist state is possible. The political discourse of the leader has to be situated within this context and constitute the central moment of the creation of said consent, trust, loyalty, faith . . . if not to the system at least to the person of the hero-donor, the Father, who cannot lie to others or him/herself.

(d) Populism and regional differences

[217] It is possible to design a typology of populisms. For historical, economic, political and ideological reasons, Latin America is susceptible to being divided into certain regions or areas, given that populisms do not have only national differences, but keep some regional similarities.

(d.1) Populism in 'nuclear America'

'Nuclear America' is the part of the continent where the great Neolithic cultures were born and grew, including the frontiers of the Aztec and Incan empires, and Mayan and Chibchan cultures. This brought about a flourishing colonial life, a particular way of tax-mission production (neither feudal nor capitalist), which permitted the survival of a numerous and well-

structured peasantry. This occurs in Mexico, Guatemala and part of Central America, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. In these countries populism includes, as essential, the rural areas. But, we have to distinguish between those that industrialized at the beginning of the twentieth century (Mexico, for example) from those that did not. These differences indicate distinctions within the populisms with active peasantry.

(d.2) Populism in the 'new nations'

Darcy Ribeiro denominates thus the countries in which the indigenous people were not sufficiently numerous. In reality, they are only planters (like the Caribe and the Tupí-Guaraní). This area of the Caribbean, Venezuela and part of Colombia, Brazil and part of Paraguay is equidistant from the area previously named and that discussed later. Through the modes of production, social classes and the moment of their industrialization, they have hybrid characteristics.

(d.3) Populism in the areas with strong European immigration

The Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, part of Paraguay and the South of Brazil) possesses a structure distinct from the first group. Having a low rural population and small owners, with a capitalist spirit, it began to industrialize in the second half of the nineteenth century and so has an incipient national bourgeoisie. The worker class has some class consciousness. It also has a high number of marginalized people from the end of the nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth century. All this defines, for example, Perónism as the prototype of a populism with a calling of an independent and national industrial capitalist project.

If the three populisms of greatest vigour and influence were those of Cárdenas, Vargas and Péron, each one matched the corresponding regional characteristics: that of the first including a vigorous peasant movement; that of the third defining itself almost exclusively from the each time more militant worker trade unionism; and that of the second as a more ambiguous hybrid form because it includes peasants and proletarians. This regionalization is necessary to introduce a methodical mediation between Latin American populism and each one of the nations in our cultural continent.

Ideological relation of the 'text' to its 'context'

[218] The meaning of the text, or its semantic statute, is what is decisive in an analysis for a history of Latin American thought; little or nothing would be gained with a textual analysis or a mere context studied if it does not confront it to discover its real, historical, ideological sense. We call textual analysis the discovery of the structure of the text from the text itself; con-

textual or ideological analysis, on the contrary, is the reference of the text to its practical, political function of legitimation, justification or concealment of the given reality. As a last resort, the ideological analysis defines the real sense of the text.

(a) *Antecedents*

We present in the first place two investigators of our theme in Latin America.

(a.1) *Armand Mattelart*

With Ariel Dorfman, he wrote *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*.¹⁸² The value of this type of ideological analysis is that it shows a way to interpret the daily goods of our means of communication. He affirms in conclusion:

In a society where one social class owns the means of the production of life, that same class is also the owner of the mode of producing ideas, feelings, intuitions, in a word, the meaning of the world. For the bourgeoisie, it is a question of inverting the real relation between base and superstructure: ideas produce wealth through the unique matter that remains clean: grey matter, and history becomes the history of ideas.¹⁸³

(a.2) *Eliseo Verón*

In his contribution, 'Ideology and mass communication: the semantization of political violence',¹⁸⁴ he shows that 'ideology is not a particular type of message, or one class of social discourse, but one of many levels of organization of the messages, from the point of view of their semantic properties'.¹⁸⁵ Any text is susceptible to an *ideological reading*. What is essential for the reading is not as much to confront the text as already constituted, but to take it back to the moment of its programming, in the selection and combination of its constitutive elements. The mechanism of constituting the text reveals to us the ideological statute of the message as 'a system of semantic rules'.¹⁸⁶ Its later reproduction through propaganda and consumption through the means of communication are moments derived from but not essential to its ideology. It is not a body of propositions, it is a system of semantic rules *to generate messages*.

¹⁸² Dorfman and Mattelart, 1972; see also Dorfman and Mattelart, 1974. For a basic overview see Danel, 1977.

¹⁸³ Dorfman and Mattelart, 1972, pp. 151-2 (Translation: TC).

¹⁸⁴ Verón, 1969, pp. 133ff.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 141 (Translation: TC).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. See also Silva, 1971.

(b) The ideological statute of populist discourse

We will indicate some assumptions and first steps for an ideological reading of political discourse.

Our ideological re-reading starts from D' and before the constituted discourse (M). In the *Memories* of Perón we read a story of his first multitudinous speech on 17 October 1945, after he was liberated from prison and stood on the balcony of the Presidential House:

When I gestured to ask them for silence, a clamor was raised in all the plaza. I did not know what to say [. . .]. I yelled: 'Muchachos, let's start by singing the National Anthem'. With this I gained ten minutes, more or less, to *harmonize some ideas and prepare a speech*.¹⁸⁷

It is a question of analysing the 'harmonize some ideas' and 'prepare the speech', that is to say, that a system of semantic rules is in play and is exercised to constitute the message.

(b.1) In whose name . . . ?

In whose name does the leader programme his/her speech? In whose name does the leader speak? Who speaks through the leader? Without doubt the government speaks, and through it the state. The one who speaks exercises power; but it is a power divided among diverse classes and factions. But, as we have seen, a hegemony of the national industrial bourgeoisie (in the name of whom s/he speaks) shared with the worker class (to whom s/he speaks) exists. Another group s/he speaks in the name of, implicitly, is the armed forces, 'support of the revolution', 'faithful interpreters of the interests of the people'. As Vargas says: 'Soldiers of Brazil: the moment of hesitation has passed. The hour is here of clear and direct action, useful realizations, fecund and creative work.'¹⁸⁸ Or as Perón explains: '[My speech] was given to my old colleagues of the cabinet',¹⁸⁹ who were all military.

The real significance of the speech will show us, finally, what forms part of the dominant ideology but with matrices and mistakes, managed skilfully, progressively, modernizingly. This will be discovered because the principal referent (R') will be the capitalist project, hegemonized by the industrial bourgeoisie. In conclusion, the populist discourse has as much 'relative autonomy' as the state itself; greater when it mobilizes the worker class, less when it has to be mobilized.


¹⁸⁷ In the *Excelsior* (Mexico), 18 January 1977, p. 11-A (Translation: TC).

¹⁸⁸ Op. cit.: discourse to the armed forces 18 December 1937, p. 116.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

(b.2) Meta-communication by selection

In this exposition we will refer, in an abstract or exemplary manner, simplifying the theme pedagogically, to the referent in the following terms (cf. above, where $R^1 - R^2$ is O):



One word of the discourse (M), for example 'justice', is selected, chosen, to be uttered before the audience ($D^2 - S$). As this word has a precise significance (R^2) in the history of worker struggles, for example, it is selected as competent to function in the discourse of a given moment. All the elements of the discourse pertain to the field y or z . For now we focus on y (where $R^1 \cap R^2$). The selection of these elements is the process of semantization, where a categorical network of codification, which could be described in detail signifies a certain hiding. All themes x are excluded from the speech, because they would be strange to the audience, but they appear in speeches directed to business people, military personnel, etc. The selecting of the different moments of the message is already a meta-communication: a communication that not only communicates something but connotes much more. The leader, thus, 'prepares the discourse'.

(b.3) Semantic displacement

[219] If one has to use an element of field z , one produces, through concealment, the 'stripping of the sense' of z displacing its meaning to y , field of coincidence.

In a fragment of the discourse indicated further up ('We will put in the peasants' hands the instruments') the peasantry speak of 'weapons' (z in R^2) and the leader speaks of the 'army' (y of R^1). Therefore the speech contains numerous words whose significance is ambiguous; broad categories that permit, like the night, that 'all cats are dark'. The displacement from z to y is a developing process of the ideological discourse that is used more, and that constitutes essentially the populist discourse in its own statute.

(b.4) Meta-communication through combination

In addition to selecting and displacing the referent semantically, the discourse is ideological through the syntactic codification of the elements. It is

not the ordering of AB over BA. Having eight elements (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) is not the same as enunciating A, B, C, rather than H, G, F. Combinations of substitution can be established that combine the selection with its syntactic position (since A, B, C is not C, B, A). A second level communication is effected by the different positioning of the chosen elements in the discourse.

These three mechanisms, among others, are present in the ideological codification of the message, responding to class interests, political and economic pressures, to the management of the political 'space' on which depends the survival of the populist regime. In this sense, the difference to the neo-fascist political discourse (effected by radio or television but not before multitudes) or socialist (as that of Fidel Castro) is shown. In those last two cases the referents either are identical ($R^1 = R^2$) or are excluded ($R^1 \cap R^2 = \emptyset$, there is no position of $R^1 \cap R^2$, this is neo-fascism before the worker or marginal class).

(b.5) The ambiguity of populist discourse

The notion of 'ambiguity' shows the semantic mobility of the message; the 'dirty' play with the referent. Here, we have to introduce a new term: the utopian referent (which can be straightened into RU^1 – referent of the dominating classes or power – and RU^2 – utopian referent of the worker, peasant or marginal classes-). Perón's term 'social justice' or Vargas's the 'new state' launch the discourse toward a utopian referent. Against Mannheim, we speak of ideological utopias, those formulated by the dominating classes (or factions), to include ambiguously many petitions and demands of the oppressed classes. The bourgeoisie proclaimed utopianly: 'Liberty, fraternity, equality'. From that utopian horizon the demand z can be displaced from the popular protest toward y . This 'utopian horizon of ideology is shared by the dominant and dominated classes, although for the first that horizon functions as legitimating reference of its privileges, and for the second it operates as explanation of its actual subordinated condition and as guarantee of the expectation of a final satisfaction of present unsatisfied aspirations'.¹⁹⁰

In general the space of coincidences (y) is found in certain axiological generalizations of abstract social interests, positive and innocent in appearance, whose function is to substitute symbolically and illusorily for the real dissatisfaction of the oppressed classes. A reading with ideal diagrams of reality replaces a realist, objective reading that invokes negativity through its name.

¹⁹⁰ Puente Ojea, 1974 (Translation: TC).

(b.6) The fiesta and the ambiguous decodification

The multitudinous expression, the presence of the leader and his/her people, is the *place* of the semantic 'management' par excellence. The fervour, the yell, the paroxysm of touching utopia creates a situation that impacts the leader him/herself: 'I confess – Perón says – that going onto the balcony really impressed on me the multitude [. . .]. In moments like that it seemed that there was an external inspiring force [. . .].'¹⁹¹

The semantic universe of the discourse in action allows the clouding of the decodification. It is a transfer from the multitude into the leader; accepted, as if there was a slight need, that the semantic content *z* is drawn into *y*. The process of decodification is skilfully numbed. The song, the acclamation, the chorus, the posters, the fiesta permits this ambiguity, this mistake.

Nevertheless, the speech achieved its aim. It got trust, faith in the process, loyalty in the future dark days. Its symbolic–priestly function, hero–donor and mediator of the desired object is actualized in this semantic universe.

(c) Some ideological populist themes

[220] We call such ideological themes moments of the message that can be referred as much to R^1 as to R^2 , loaded with an axiological connotation that obstructs its meaning. If in the populist act, the word 'colleagues' was used in place of 'friends', the discourse would completely lose its significance, its sense. On the contrary in the Marxist text, the 'rhetoric and emphasis of the elocution' is essential.¹⁹²

(c.1) People

The category 'people' is essential for populism. Nevertheless, it is not exclusive to populism, since it is used profusely and precisely by Castro in Cuba, Mao Tse-tung in China and Sekou Toure in Ghana. 'People' is a category that can have different senses, as we have shown elsewhere.¹⁹³ Being a dialectic category it has meaning in opposed notions: 'people' is the nation in the face of the aggressive foreign power; 'people' are the oppressed classes against the dominant classes in the nation; 'people' are the youth in the face of the bureaucracies, etc. Its significant richness can be skilfully used by populism to manoeuvre semantically. This does not impair the category, necessary in the politics of peripheral countries, but demands it be used with care.

In general populism, even the third populism (when it is said that 'the Argentine people will return to being, the day after tomorrow [with the election of 11 March 1973], the protagonists of their history'),¹⁹⁴ puts

191 *Memory*, quoted above (Translation: TC).

192 Barthes, 1972 [Translation: TC].

193 Dussel, 1974c.

194 Cámpora, 1973, p. 68 (Translation: TC).

the people as the interlocutor of discourse. People can be the nation (R¹) or the oppressed class (R²), and, for example, for the Perónist youth, it was the vanguard (as the 'Red Guard' of the Chinese cultural revolution: R³), so when the leader says 'the people', each one decodifies in her/his way. The populist utility of the word 'people' consists of its diverse meanings; the different referents allow one to play with the masses, dominating classes, youth. Each one understands what she/he wants to understand, but, at base, they interpret concretely different realities.

But understand well, although analogous in its meanings (since 'people' as a last resort defines an oppressed human group however different, as bearer of one's own history, which is what we have defined in our *Ética* as exteriority or Alterity),¹⁹⁵ the category 'people' cannot be discarded out of hand. The category 'people' is not opposed to the category 'social class'. It is broader and permits a broader momentary analysis. It can have a populist use (that plays with ambiguity against the people) or a univocal interpretation (that makes explicit in each case its opposite and indicates the category as nation, class, non-bureaucratized youth, etc).

It would be extremely interesting to examine the relation of the ambiguity of the populist categories to the philosophy of those eras. Thus in Nazi Germany Heidegger speaks of the ambiguous 'being', which, as Levinas shows, is neutral, omni-understanding: praxis can be based here. It is not difficult since from 1933 he is occupied with meditating about Nietzsche and his 'will to power'. In the same way Carlos Astrada with his *Gaicho Myth*,¹⁹⁶ although he interprets the gaicho Martín Fierro as proletarian and the Viejo (Old Man) Vizcach as the oligarchy, he falls into analogical categories with Buddhist *karma* and 'the gaicho experience of destiny'—ambiguous categories although valuable by their intent. The same can be said of the 'cosmic root' of A. Vasconcelos, which includes all of it and at the same time conceals it. Our liberation philosophy, contemporaneous with the third populism, had categories whose ambiguity allowed them to be identified, in the face of the clarity of the crisis, persecutors and persecuted.¹⁹⁷ The category of Totality, for example, is as ambiguous as people and one has to clarify univocally its analogous meaning.

(c.2) *The confronting and reconciliation of classes*

Already in 1924 the APRA of Haya de la Torre had proposed a class alliance. In his work *The Anti-Imperialism of the APRA* he says that this is not a class party but a 'Front'.¹⁹⁸ Inter-classism is part of the populist ideology:

¹⁹⁵ Dussel, 1973a, I-II.

¹⁹⁶ Astrada, 1948.

¹⁹⁷ For example, in Casalla (1974 [Translation: TC]) the ambiguity can be seen from the practical options assumed from the Perónist right in the final period of the government of 'Isabelita'.

¹⁹⁸ Haya de la Torre, 1936, pp. 63f.

We need the collaboration of both spontaneous effort and common work for the harmony, cooperation and conviviality of all social classes (*prolonged applause*). The 10th November movement can be considered, in certain respects, as a readjustment of the spheres of Brazilian life (clapping).¹⁹⁹

The word 'control' terrifies businessmen; but this project does not have to frighten the suitable industrialists. *It is in their interest!* And in the interest of all. There would be no strikes, or factory closures, because the mixed assembly would know at all times what one industry may be granted or not. At the same time, among employers and employees would be formed gradually, in place of the present antagonism, a sense of community, in which yours and mine are blended [. . .].²⁰⁰

'Class struggle' is not ignored as in liberalism or repressed as in the later militarist neo-fascism. It is skilfully conducted within the independent national capitalist project hegemonized by 'the suitable manufacturers' as Calle says, by the national industrial bourgeoisie (although it will not be sufficiently suitable to defeat international imperial capitalism).

It has two different referents. When the leader speaks of 'classes', 'worker class', 'peasant class', it is to display its meaning within an 'alliance of classes'.

Philosophically speaking there are certain categories that, abstractly or ambiguously, permit their populist use. For example, when we explained in *Ética* the position of exteriority of the Other, the fact that one's alienation is one's murder in the Totality,²⁰¹ it can be interpreted that the Other is an oppressor class against which it is impossible to fight. That populist use does not invalidate the category but shows that with its analogous meaning it can be used in a concealed way. The discourse needs to acquire greater univocal clarity in its political unfolding: praxis demands theoretical correction. Academic philosophies (from phenomenology, diverse ontologies, philosophy of science, different levels of logic, etc.) are breeding grounds for populism, and even for fascism; but this is another theme.

(c.3) *Distributed ownership and political participation*

Populism will never put into question private property, but as it cannot defend it in a direct and evident way to the masses, it takes a semantic detour: it extends to all the population the greatest amount of property possible. Due to this, different populist agrarian reforms have either produced the non-economic smallholding or the distribution of lands of little produc-

¹⁹⁹ Vargas, op. cit., p. 205 (Translation: TC): speech delivered 10 May 1938.

²⁰⁰ Chaverri Matamoros, *The True Calle*, p. 334 (Translation: TC); quoted by Córdoba, 1974, p. 319.

²⁰¹ Dussel, 1973a, III, § I.

tivity. The large landed estates did not diminish; in some cases they passed from the conservative oligarchy to new elites with an exporting capitalist mentality. A new oligarchic power was born against the industrial bourgeoisies, but the spirit of the bond with the empire was not defeated.

The lack of control and dominion over the productive means (technology, capital and raw material) deprived the dominated classes of true political participation. The worker and peasant unions constitute in great measure the apparatus of the government (together with the party), through which the leader mobilizes them against their eventual enemies, but structurally it demobilizes them before the project of national industrialization itself. The popular classes are mediators of a project but not the principal agents. S – D² continues being passive with regard to the construction of its object (O).

(c.4) *Order, work and social justice*

The utopian project of the populist regime is national liberation, through 'political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice' (the three values exalted by Perónism, for example). To achieve this utopia, within a capitalist project, the productive work of the masses and order and peace are necessary to be able to patiently produce an accumulation sufficient for national development:

Order and work! (*prolonged clapping*). In the first place, order, because in disorder nothing is constructed [. . .]. Work only can be developed in an ordered environment. For this, the Minimum Wage Law, that brings guarantees to the worker, was necessary [. . .].²⁰²

In its essence, acceptance of the capitalist industrial project is demanded, and a counter-proposal is promised: minimum wage, social security, etc. The marginalized, the worker exploited by a liberalism without control or limit accepts delightedly this reformist pact. But it is presented as a revolutionary success of the worker class (R²), being in reality a necessity of the capitalist system itself (R¹) which needs a greater market, in the Keynesian doctrine, for its own products. There is again a semantic management. For its part, the great ideal of 'social justice', some, the oppressed, understand as a new order whose hegemony will be exercised; others, the new national bourgeoisie, understand it as a capitalist industrial order where they will slowly get a distribution of wealth through a wage that will be sharing the general development of the society as totality. The RU splits: RU¹ is capitalist; RU² is popular, but both remain within the ambiguous notion of 'social justice'. There is a new environment for semantic management in the moment of the programming of the message.

²⁰² Vargas, 1938, V, p. 203 (Translation: TC).


There are many more ideological themes, but this is sufficient for the ends of this section, in which we have wanted only to take one example, among others, to propose some hypotheses to open a methodological path in the history of thinking.

Synchrony, diachrony and liberation

[221] Now we would like to propose some conclusions and considerations that could be taken and continued.

(a) Synchrony and diachrony

The analysis proposed so far has been principally synchronic. A text [211-13] is situated in its context [214-17], both being effected by the relation to an ideological analysis of the text [218-20]. All this is at one moment. But the history of thinking is a progression, process, diachronic succession.



The history of thinking is occupied with diverse texts ($T^1, T^2 \dots$) situated in diverse contexts ($C^1, C^2 \dots$), but principally of the ideological evolution of them ($d^1, d^2 \dots$). It will be necessary to begin little by little the analysis of the most significant texts of a context (for example, literary, philosophical, political, etc.) in the diverse stages of Latin American history. From that work will be born an ideological history, quintessence of the situated thinking, in which the situated meaning of the text is of more interest than the content itself: when it justifies or hides reality, when it critiques or mobilizes it. It is a historical-ideological reading that will discover the organization of the message with its particular semantic properties.

(b) Philosophy and liberation

The statute of philosophy, not simply as written text but as critical discourse, has to be situated in its real context, in the practices of the historical agents and in the philosopher him/herself as agent of a particular practice. If

the philosophy is defined from an academic-university practice, its discourse will be necessarily ideological, concealed, justifying the domination. Therefore, for example, the philosophy of the 'founders' was ideological.

On the contrary, a philosophy that aims to be critical and self-conscious of its own limitations will have to relate to the historical and real practices of the oppressed classes, the people in its strict sense. The thought that arises from those practices constitutes the philosopher her/himself as an ambiguous reality; the philosopher, nevertheless, not only will think said practices, but really and personally will collaborate with them; the personal practice will be integrated with that of the people. Having all this as condition would be to speak of a Latin American liberation philosophy; a philosophy of the organic intellectual linked to non-ideological praxis. I say non-ideological because it is critical of the status quo. The practice of liberation of the oppressed people, then, is the condition of possibility from which a philosophical thinker can become a liberator. This demands a rigorous method (we have called it an analectic method in *Method for a Philosophy of Liberation*), which now needs important and new distinctions to mature its critical-interpretive capacity.

Liberation philosophy would be the moment in the history of Latin American thought where the text responds to a revolutionary, actual or possible context, the continental revolution that Bolívar dreamed but that will only be possible in the future. The thinker that takes charge of this historical continental liberation will be able to take account of the present reality, as the political thinking of the beginning of the nineteenth century took account of the neocolonial national emancipation.

An Argentine Political Decade (1966–76) and the Origin of Liberation Philosophy

[222] Some people believe that it is possible to critique a philosophical perspective from another philosophical perspective. It is an *idealistic* critique although sometimes with a Marxist aim, since it does not start from concrete-historical *praxis* to discover the *real* sense of a thought, from the reality that gave it origin. Frequently, it is believed to be Marx criticizing Bruno Bauer, being, in truth, Bruno Bauer who criticizes philosophy *from philosophy*, ideology *from ideology*, an idea *from an idea*, a book *from another book*, without clarifying the social or economic structures that determine, never absolutely, the rising and development of all philosophical movement. This happens equally in Latin America and also with liberation philosophy,²⁰³ emerging in Argentina, at the end of the 1970s, in the face

²⁰³ About liberation philosophy, see N. Werz, 'American philosophy and liberation philosophy', in Werz, 1995, pp. 153–231; and C. Beorlegui, 'The generation of the 70s. The philosophies of liberation', in Beorlegui, 2004, pp. 661–791; and in this same work the author explains the dialogue of liberation philosophy with postmodernity, post-coloniality and Latin American inter-culturalism.

of the development, crisis and extinction of its national source; it had to be articulated with other Latin American movements like those that developed in Central America and the Caribbean. The history of Latin American philosophy has done little in the way of an economic-political social historical analysis, to study from there the explicit expression of philosophical movements.²⁰⁴

The Argentine history of the last century (from 1880) is crossed by the hegemony of a social group that originated in 'the conquest of the desert' carried out by Julio A. Roca that coincides with the expansion of 'imperialism', understood in its technical sense.²⁰⁵ The 'green pampas', humid, fertile, almost one million square kilometres, was seized violently from the Indians – various ethnicities that became nomadic with the horse, the Araucans being the principal group. From these exploits Martín Fierro speaks to us, as if from the perspective of a Mestizo seeing the Indian as the enemy – and this still is the *negation* of our first Argentine history. In the end the Mestizo is an invader and the primitive inhabitants were eliminated like animals; one was even paid – in the later expansion of agrarian capitalism into Patagonia – some shillings for the 'head of an Indian'. Photos of an 'Indian hunter' are known, with rifle in one hand and a severed head held by his/her hair in the other, with a foot on the fallen corpse of the inhabitant of the pampas. A very arrogant portrait has been painted.

Over the assassination of the inhabitants of the pampas was born the agrarian bourgeoisie that was linked immediately, through exports of cereals and meat, to the English Empire. From 1880 to 1930 the 'Argentine miracle' was produced and its decadence has not ended. The last half-century (1930–80) culminated, paradoxically, with the Falklands War. The English Empire itself, which 'founded' modern Argentina and which permitted the

204 'The philosophy of liberation in Argentina. Eruption of a new philosophical generation', in Dussel, 1983, pp. 47–56, report in the I National Colloquium of Mexican Philosophy in Morelia in 1975, not intended to assign a technical mark to the words 'eruption' and 'generation' (as H. Cerutti does, 1983, pp. 31f.). Our explicit intent was to indicate that 'the philosophical discourse is not abstract or independent from human existence. We have to see the *conditions* exercised in the philosophical discourse itself that transform it frequently into an *ideological* justification' (Dussel, 1983, p. 49 [Translation: TC]).

205 The 'popular sketch' of Lenin, *Imperialism: superior phase of capitalism* (Lenin, 1961, I, pp. 690–798), which took an exclusively economic position; meanwhile John Hobson, *Imperialism* (Hobson, 1972), had indicated a colonial political level (pp. 133f.), which will be later debated also by Fritz Stenberg, *Imperialism* (Stenberg, 1979, from the original German of 1926), where the question of wages is addressed. The work of Lenin is fundamental for the 'question of dependency' and even for our theme of Argentina: 'England and Germany in the course of the last 25 years has invested in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay approximately 4 million dollars; as result of this they enjoy 146% of all trade from these three countries' (Lenin, 1961, I, p. 746 [Translation: TC]). Later Lenin says: 'South America, and above all Argentina, has such financial dependence on London that it almost has to be qualified as an English commercial colony. The capital invested by England in Argentina, with the information supplied in 1909 by the Austro-Hungarian consul in Buenos Aires, increased to 8,750 million francs. It is not difficult to imagine the strong ties that this assures financial capital . . . from England with the *bourgeoisie* of Argentina' (ibid., p. 762 [Translation: TC]). Excellent definition of 'imperialism', p. 764.

existence of a professional army, descending from the exterminators of the Indian with J. A. Roca in the 1880s, was knocked down by 'its mother country'. In reality, the USA is the new metropolis, so it will not be difficult to reinterpret the facts to continue fulfilling the task of internal occupation – the only function that has occupied the professional Argentine army for a century: popular repression in favour of the agrarian bourgeoisie – having lapses of populist exception. Populism (the Radical Civic Union in its four stages: that of Alem, Yrigoyen, Balbín or Alfonsín, with a developmentalist heresy or Frondizism; from Perónism, with the first governments of Perón from 1946 to 1955 or the third from 1973 to 1976), although the liberals or developmentalists regret it, has been the only historical movement opposed to the agrarian bourgeoisie, succumbing always in the face of this historical faction of the dominant class (and frequently hegemonic). Populism, both radical and Perónist, has been the best of the weak, peripheral, underdeveloped capitalism in Argentina: nationalist, petty bourgeois (in the radical case) and worker class (in Perónism). Nevertheless, both, in the end, are within a project of peripheral *capitalism* with aims of autonomy. Autonomy was always shown to be impossible within the capitalist project that neither radicalism nor Perónism questioned, and they always succumbed in the face of the dominant class articulated with capitalism and the global market: the *exporting* class faction of the agricultural production of the humid pampas. It is not strange that liberation philosophy flourished outside of the humid pampas: born in Mendoza, in the mountain ranges, and firmly present in Neuquén, Río IV, Salta, Córdoba and other universities of the interior, but also in Santa Fe, Bahía Blanca and reached Buenos Aires in the 'Academic Weeks' of San Miguel from 1969, which started with 150 participants and in 1974 reached 800, already Latin American with the presence of Salazar Bondy, Schwartzman, Leopoldo Zea, etc.

One cannot ignore the movement that was produced in Latin America. From 1967 I was chosen to be professor of IPLA in Quito, which allowed me to cross Latin America more than 20 times (between 1967 and 1975). The philosophy of liberation responded to the global situation of Latin American praxis and to the theories and questions gestating in our region.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ I returned to Argentina in August 1966, after ten years in Europe and in the Middle East, including two years in Palestine, where I discovered practically and theoretically the question of the 'poor' – *pauper*, Marx would say – and of the 'Indian'. Cf. Dussel, 1969a; Dussel, 1965; and the autobiographical writing which Leopoldo Zea asked of me, 'Latin American liberation and philosophy' (Zea, 1977, pp. 83–91, also in Dussel, 1983, pp. 7–20). Cerutti ridicules the question of the 'poor' (1983, p. 264: 'mystifications'); he certainly does not know the position of Marx in that respect (from whom he thinks he takes inspiration), when in the *Grundrisse* he indicates that all wage workers are virtually poor (in Latin Marx writes: *virtualiter pauper*) (Dussel, 1985a). In *Capital*, in the chapter about 'primitive accumulation', he touches on this theme. For example, we read: '*Pauper ubique jacet* (the poor in all parts is subjugated), cried Queen Elizabeth, after a journey through England. In the forty-third year of her reign the nation was obliged to recognize pauperism officially by the introduction of a poor rate' (L. I, ch. 24 [English: p. 675]; Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1979, t. 1/3; MEW, XXIII, 749).

Some historical assumptions

[223] From 1880 (and even from 1853 Mitrist and later Sarmientino) until 1930 no government began from a 'military coup'. This does not mean that the military was weak, but that the Argentine 'model' of agro-exportation to London had been adapted, balanced the circumstantial crises perfectly with the demands of the capitalist global market. England needed cheap food (meats, cereals, etc.) to augment the acquisitive value of wages, and thanks to that increase the working hours (surplus value, therefore). Argentina helped English capital diminishing the time needed for the industrial worker to cover her/his subsistence:

From 1869 to 1914 its international commerce increases ten times in value, its exports almost triple from 1900-1910. Argentina occupies second place behind the USA in the western hemisphere for external trade and is third in the world ahead of forty countries (including Germany and Great Britain) for the value per capita of its imports.²⁰⁷

In 1969 51 per cent of the surface of the pampan region was exploited by the private capital of 13,000 people physically or juridically (32 per cent was in the hands of 4,000 people with settlements of more than 2,500 hectares, 1.6 per cent of the owners).²⁰⁸ That 'agrarian bourgeoisie' controlled Argentine power for a century, and although it entered into crisis periodically it used that crisis frequently for its benefit, and 'wealth is concentrated in the hands of the enterprising minority that intends starting from 1880 to introduce *European* civilization into the land of the *querandies* and *ranqueles*.'²⁰⁹ It is evident that the remaining population (petty bourgeoisie, rising worker class, peasants, marginalized, etc., as many Creoles as immigrants) were accustomed, thanks to the enormous extension and pampan productivity, to a consumption (of imported goods) many times above the degree of development of its own productive forces. This created a popular mass accustomed to a much higher standard of living (food in particular, clothing, home, etc.) than other peoples of Latin America or the Third World.

This agro-exporting structure of abundance created a tendency that seems to have regulated Argentine existence in the last century. Farming exports gave the great agrarian bourgeoisie foreign currency (until the end of the Second 'World' War), pounds sterling and dollars. From 1880 the distribution of foreign currency was the blood of the Argentine economic system: the imports of the rising industrial bourgeoisie and the consumption of the wage workers. When the model entered into crisis, from 1930, an overvalued peso reduced the deposits of the exporting farming sector and

²⁰⁷ 'Military hegemony, state and social domination', in Rouquie, 1982, 13 (Translation: TC).

²⁰⁸ 'Power and crisis of the Argentine agrarian bourgeoisie', in Sidicaro, 1982, p. 52.

²⁰⁹ Rouquie, 1982, p. 36 (Translation: TC).

subsidized the industrial sector and popular consumption (radical politics and principally Perónist). A devalued peso raised the deposits of the exporting sector and contracted national industrialization and popular consumption (which raised the stock of meat and cereals for export: periodic politics of the military coups). Populist parties (Krausist legalist in radicalism and worker union in Perónism) were articulated in the nationalist strengthening of industry (new industrial bourgeoisie) and of the creation of a strong internal market (increase in wages, consumption, which through the 'small circuit' allowed the greatest productivity of the national industry). Nevertheless, neither radicalism (legalist) nor Perónism (worker) produced a profound and irreversible change in the power of the agrarian bourgeoisie.

In effect, government of Julio A. Roca (1880-6) to the foundation in 1891 of the Radical Civic Union (UCR), the socialist worker party (PSO) of Juan B. Justo, the FORA (which was born from the FOA, older anarchist union) and the achievement of the Sáenz Peña (n. 8871) law of 1912 brought Hipólito Yrigoyen to power (1916-22). The real popular movements (the peasant protests of the 'Alcorta uprising' in 1912 or the 'Tragic Week' of January 1919 or the founding of the communist party in the period 1918-1921) did not - as did the Mexican revolution of 1910 - seize the power of the great agrarian bourgeoisie linked to English imperialism.

The overthrow of the second government of Yrigoyen (1928-1930), which began the 'Infamous decade' with the first military *coup d'état* of the twentieth century in Argentina under the command of José F. Uriburu (1930), and as an equal consequence of the global crisis of capitalism in 1929, allowed the exercise of (military) hegemony by the agrarian bourgeoisie.

The positivist thinking²¹⁰ and the anti-positivist reaction in Argentine philosophy²¹¹ should be situated in this context (from 1880 to 1930).

210 Since the work of Ricaurte Soler *Argentine Positivism* (Soler, 1959), the theme has not been deepened by a historical materialist method (cf. some works in the previous chapter). Argentine 'positivism' is the philosophy articulated, paradoxically, with imperialism. It is the 'centre' (Gramsci) of the 'ideological formation' of liberalism open to the independence of the expansive moment of imperialism (the same in Latin America). It is the ideal of Sarmiento: 'One hundred thousand per year would make in ten years a million industrious Europeans disseminated throughout the Republic, teaching us to work, exploiting new riches, and enriching the country with their property; and with a million *civilized* [sic: European] men, civil war is impossible' (Sarmiento, 1963, p. 250 [Translation: Ross, p. 250]). Those Europeans are still today the great Argentine agrarian bourgeoisie that 'exploited' the country - as Sarmiento wanted - for themselves, for England and the USA - rather than to enrich the country - as the great man dreamed illusorily. See Farre, 1958, pp. 55f. About positivism see Caturelli, 1971, pp. 46f.

211 The anti-positivism, from Korn or Alberini (from the populist-liberal government of Yrigoyen) to Carlos Astrada (in time of populist Perónism from 1946), signifies in some way the link to the 'nationalism' of the industrial bourgeoisie. The transition from Kantianism (positivist and anti-positivist) to the Heideggerian ontology is fulfilled. One can speak of the spirit of the people as proletarianized (Astrada) or of oligarchic tradition (of the first De Anquín), and from an anti-imperial ambiguous movement (like Perónism). See our article 'The Philosophy of Liberation in Argentina: Eruption of a New Philosophical Generation', ed. cit., p. 58). My position is critical in the face of Perónism (in 1975), which Cerutti ignores systematically, because it would destroy his fundamental thesis. I wrote there: 'Perónism

'Argentine ideology' (thinking of the 'German ideology' of Marx) will have to give an account of this problematic step by step from Alberdi, passing through liberalism, Krausism, positivism, to Korn and Alberini. As we have indicated in our article 'The Philosophy of Liberation in Argentina: Eruption of a New Philosophical Generation'²¹² Francisco Romero, military in origin and formation, held the professorship of philosophy in Buenos Aires at the time of two military coups (in 1930 and 1955), which signified the beginning of the power of the great Argentine agrarian bourgeoisie. 'A few wise words', but for people to understand we need many more words. In Morelia (1975), in the first National Colloquium of Mexican Philosophy, Miró Quesada and many others were opposed to my interpretation of linking the agrarian bourgeoisie with Francisco Romero. Mario Bungue was a student of the great Buenos Airean philosopher.

The abstract thinking, initially phenomenological, of Romero does not essentially contradict the nationalism of the right of thinkers like Leopoldo Lugones who in 1923 had a conference on 'Action' in the Coliseo theatre,²¹³ where 'the danger of democracy' was shown, which coincided with the Spanish Francoism of the era. At base both are capitalist, one free trade and the other national-protectionist. Their common enemy is socialism.

The second *coup d'état* that the GOU accomplished on 4 June 1943 gave birth to Perónism. It was the stage, which went from 17 October 1945, when Eva Perón appeared, until the elections of 24 February, in which Perón defeated the Democratic Unity (including the Argentine PC, which came from the Stalinist Front doctrine and the alliance with the allies during the war, falling into historical error),²¹⁴ until the founding of the IAPI in May 1946, which gave control of all the exports of meat and cereal to the

itself possesses in its breast a fundamental ambiguity . . .' (ibid. [Translation: TC]). Cf. Caturelli, 1971, pp. 152f.

212 The article cited in the previous note also said: 'Romero [. . .] responds, without noting it, to the interests that the military force defends with arms: the cattle-raising oligarchy of the Plata' (p. 57 [Translation: TC]). See 'Francisco Romero' (Dussel, 1970, pp. 79-86). This position was not accepted by the 'liberal' tradition within the Latin Americanists.

213 Buchrucker, 1982, p. 59 (Translation: TC): 'Die politische Entwicklung Argentiniens und die Geburt des Nationalismus'.

214 Cerutti (1983, pp. 35, 235-64, etc.) indicates my 'anti-Marxism' at the beginning of the 1970s. Anti-Marxism was the explanation for 'anti-dogmatism', present in some Marxisms (like Althusserianism, Stalinism, that of the official Argentine PC, etc.), and that would be in agreement with my position on that era today also. Cerutti seems to ignore the history of Argentine Marxism; he does not understand (but confuses different horizons with the Argentine, for example, Mexican or Ecuadorian) the 'real' sense of the question. In what other way could someone think, who came from critical thinking, and who tried to be linked with the popular groups around hegemonic 'Argentine Marxism'? Only after returning later to Marxism, thanks to attitudes such as those of José Aricó (who worked in Córdoba), have I been able to correct my judgement (from 1976), but not from the Althusserian position of Santos or Cerutti. About Latin American Marxism, see M. Lowy, 1980; Alexander, 1957; Cole, 1959; the articles of José Aricó in the *Story of Marxism*, 1982, IV, pp. 307-30; Goldenberg, 1971; 'Meeting of Christians and Marxists in Latin America' (Dussel, 1982b, pp. 19-36). A tactical anti-Marxism (anti-dogmatic) came to be a Marxist thinking, clear, classist and popular.

state, a fundamental restriction of the management of the foreign currency of the agrarian bourgeoisie, which would end by destroying Perón.

In December 1947 the Perónist party was founded. It was co-opted into the CGT, until the expulsion and the assassination of the leader Cipriano Reyes in September 1948. On 11 November 1951 Perón got 61 per cent of the votes in his second election. On 26 July 1952 Evita died. On 16 September 1955 the third military coup occurred, now the 'liberating Revolution' under Lonardi – new triumph of the agrarian bourgeoisie against the incipient industrial bourgeoisie that hegemonized the process within Perónist populism. The Argentine Rural Society (SRA) triumphed one time more over industrial capitalism and popular consumption (against the GCE: General Economic Confederation, and the CGT).

The Argentine army mediated the interests of other classes (itself of petty bourgeois origin). It moved from an 'integrated nationalism' in 1930 to a 'populist nationalism' in 1945.²¹⁵

Philosophically, populist Argentina (1946–55) had its thinkers, some of them truly important, marked by the determinations, never absolute, of the time.²¹⁶

The Argentine economic crisis of 1951–2, the triumph of the USA over England, thanks to two wars, the implantation of its hegemony in global capitalism and the beginning of its expansion in Latin America from 1954 (suicide of Vargas in Brazil, *coup d'état* against Arbenz in Guatemala orchestrated by the CIA, etc.) signalled the end of populism in our dependent sub-continent.

The fall of Perónism in 1955 constituted a 'Liberal Restoration', the beginning of the articulation of the dependency of 'developmentalism', the expansion of transnational capitalism (by the internationalization of the productive capital of the centre). Philosophically Francisco Romero returns to the university; it is the faraway beginning of logical positivism or the Anglo-Saxon philosophy in vogue in the USA, England and Europe. The government of Frondizi in 1957, its overthrow by the fourth military coup of 1962, its replacement by the traditional radicalism of Illía and its overthrow again by the fifth military coup in 1966 are the final milestones of an era.

²¹⁵ Rouquié, 1982, pp. 9f.

²¹⁶ Carlos Astrada and Nimio de Anquín belong to this group; both had scholarships to Germany, three years before the revolution of the 1930s (Argentina). The first studied with Heidegger in Freiburg and the second with Cassirer in Hamburg. Both had a splendid philosophical formation; both assume an ontological position (both are Cordovans, and will have a much deeper philosophical 'talent' than F. Romero, for example).

*First phase: the Onganiato (1966-9). Preparations*²¹⁷

[224] The agrarian bourgeoisie returned to power thanks to Krieger Vasena, but it was not in the same situation as the 1930s:

At the start of the thirties 25% of wheat, 65% of maize and 38% of beef internationally traded came from Argentina. In the middle of the 70s, those percentages had descended to 4% for wheat, 12% for maize and 30% for beef.²¹⁸

The agrarian bourgeoisie, a progressive and dynamic elite at the end of the nineteenth century, was now a traditional oligarchy, technically behind, ideologically liberal, neo-conservative, dependent on North American financial capital. This great agricultural bourgeoisie, maybe more merchants and financiers than properly cattle raisers – the Anchorena, Santamariana, Devoto, Bulirich, Lanusse, Mihanovich, Martínez de Hoz, dynasties of large landed estate owners – were linked to other class factions or different classes, maintaining hegemony but lacking total domination through its loss of directive capability, but it maintained its power of invalidating its momentary enemies.

The Onganía coup of 28 June 1966 was applauded by the Argentine Rural Society (SRA), General Economic Confederation (CGE), Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) and, finally, by all the dominant class factions. The SRA celebrated its first century of existence, having been founded in 1866.

After some nationalist symptoms of the Salimei ministry, Krieger Vasena, of the group ADELA (Atlantic Community Group for the Development of Latin America), systematically destroyed the 'impediments' to free competition. His economic politics was applauded by the World Bank and the IMF. The level of wages was depressed and money and foreign technology were invested (the transnationals raised their presence in the national market).

Abundant borrowing allowed the increase of foreign currency. The law of 31 August 1966 put the unions up against the wall; it prohibited strikes and in the case of labour conflicts they were obliged to resort to tribunals, which favoured the management's intransigence (law 16,936).

Under the hegemony of the agrarian bourgeoisie (SRA), the traditional industrial bourgeoisie (UIA) was subordinated without the ability to expand. The new industrial bourgeoisie (CGE) supported the government but did not become hegemonic because its dependency on transnational expansion cast a shadow. The industrial wage workers suffered a strong repression. When Raimundo Ongaro, an honest leader of Catholic origins and a democrat

²¹⁷ Cf. Rouquié, 1982, II, pp. 99-223; Luna, 1972, pp. 187f.; Acuna, 1984 (See the bibliography), pp. 196f.; Roth, 1981; O'Donnell, 1983; Rok, 1978; Di Tella, 1983; Lannusse, 1977; Kandel and Monteverde, 1976; Landi, 1978; Miguens, 1981, etc.

²¹⁸ Sidicaro, 1982, p. 63 (Translation: TC).

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

Figure 11.2 Schematic simplification of class factions and the institutions that represent them

Dominant classes (Sector I)	Great agrarian bourgeoisie (SRA, 1866)			ACIEL, 1958
	Other agricultural sectors (FAA, etc.)	New industrial bourgeoisie (CGE, 1952)	Traditional industrial bourgeoisie (UIA, 1987)	
Dominant classes (Sector II)	Urban wage workers (CGT, 1948)			
	Rural wage workers			
Petty bourgeoisie (Sector III)	Professionals, small business owners, middlemen, students, university graduates, etc. (who hold cultural hegemony)			

Cf. Villareal, 1978. In 1914, 41 per cent of the population already belonged to sector III.

became the secretary general of the CGT, the government made an alliance with the bureaucratic 'old guard'. The worker movement was split: on the one hand, the authentic CGT of the Argentines (with Ongaro) and, on the other, the CGT of Azopardo (with the bureaucracy that would make a play for power). This event is important in order to understand the internal division of Perónism and the position of liberation philosophy.

In the National University of the Northeast, where I was professor from 1966 to 1967,²¹⁹ the student movements began (petty bourgeoisie that were against the *Onganiato*). Their influence reached Córdoba. On 15 May 1969 a student died, assassinated by the police in Corrientes. On 29 May 1969, the 'Cordobazo' exploded. The 'popular country' – as Juan C. Portantiero called it – again showed its opposition to an anti-national model, of dependency and domination (highly beneficial for the agrarian bourgeoisie and reason for the decrease in popular consumption).

Second phase: crisis of the model (1969–73). Constitution

[225] From the 'Cordobazo' to the elections of 11 March 1973, where Campora achieved an absolute majority as candidate of the FREJULI (Justice

²¹⁹ There I maintained ('Culture, Latin American culture, and national culture': Dussel, 1968, pp. 7–40) a position that is opposed to the 'appeasement' of the *Onganiato*. This praxis opposed me immediately to the hegemonic groups in Mendoza (where Pérez Guillot, of Mendocan origin, became minister of education of Onganía). It signified an 'option for the poor', which, although abstract, was perfectly determinable with the 'right' as its concrete enemy (who in the Faculty of Philosophy of Mendoza were the professors Comadrán, Zuleta, Martínez, Campoy, etc.).

Front of Liberation), were the four years in which liberation philosophy was born, which even in these circumstances did not stop relating to Latin America and the global situation. In 1966 the 'Cultural Revolution' occurred in China in which the youth played a fundamental role, which only many years later would be known in its real political sense. In May 1968, students shook Paris. In Latin America, the student movements of that year and the following were notable and the 'Cordobazo' has to be situated within this context. From 1959, with the influence of the Cuban revolution, there was a resurgence of guerrilla groups, with the intent of accelerating the revolution. The death of 'Che' Guevara in Bolivia and of Camilo Torres in Colombia made 'Foquismo' a model to imitate.

From 1966 'dependency theory' offered its diagnosis of 'development', showing its fallacy.²²⁰ The Catholic Church itself, first in the Second Vatican Council of 1965 and fundamentally from the Medellín conference (1968), gave signs of deep renewal. Philosophically there was the Frankfurt School, thanks to the presence of H. Marcuse in the North American movements against the war of Vietnam, and in Germany and France, which allowed *the politicization* of ontology.²²¹ At the same time, a group of young philosophers reunited in Calamuchita (Córdoba). There we discovered Emmanuel Levinas, who permitted us to take a fundamental metaphysical path: criticizing ontology, thanks to the category of 'exteriority', and from 'the Other' or the 'poor', we can begin a Latin American political philosophy of liberation.²²²

220 See 'On the development of sociology and political science in Latin America' (Werz, 1995, pp. 105–52), where the lines of the new epistemology are shown. It spans from Gino Germani to CEPAL with Raúl Prebisch, and from there to 'dependency theory'. The reflections about the origin of political theory in those decades are interesting (pp. 135f.: 'Toward a brief history of political science in Latin America', where he reviews M. Kaplan, Norbert Lechner, L. Maira, William O'Donnell – with his model of 'Authoritarian bureaucratic state', Pablo González Casanova, René Zavaleta Mercado, Marcos Roitman, etc).

221 The transition from an abstract Heideggerian position to one more concrete and political can be seen in 'The Other as the political face' (Dussel, 1973a, I, pp. 144f.). All this happened in 1970. In a meeting of sociologists in 1969 in Buenos Aires the sociology of liberation was spoken of, where I immediately thought of the possibility of an ethic of liberation. This theme was born in December 1969, before reading the work of Salazar Bondy. In that year Leopoldo Zea invited me to give a conference in the Faculty of Philosophy of UNAM about the Latin American reality that I analysed from a Husserlian categorization (from the category *Lebenswelt*), showing Europe as dominator and Latin America as dominated (there is a part record in UNAM that can be consulted), something Zea told me months before Salazar Bondy had sustained similar concepts.

222 All this erupted publicly in the 2nd National Congress of Philosophy of Córdoba (1971), where I read my paper 'Metaphysics of the subject and liberation': 'The metaphysics of the subject – which Heidegger tries to overcome – is historically concretized, practically and politically in a dialectic of domination – here can be observed the anti-Heideggerian critique. Philosophy comes to redeem a historical role in the process of liberation' (Dussel, 1973c, pp. 87–9 [Translation: TC]). There I cited A. Salazar Bondy (p. 88), but, in my and Salazar Bondy's work, it was not explicitly a 'liberation philosophy', but only the question of the un-authenticity of our philosophy. See these chronological questions in the prologue of Dussel, 1979.

What is decisive in this moment, is to ask: with which social group was the philosophy of liberation articulated originally? It is accused of being an ideological expression of Perónism,²²³ academic philosophy, petty bourgeois, populist – clearly ‘populist’ of all the unimaginable classes: from right and left, abstract and concrete, etc.²²⁴

The ascension of the ‘Camporist’ Perónism – and later of Perónism with Perón – ‘he confronted during his administration all the businesses sectors of Argentine society’,²²⁵ with the exception of certain groups of the industrial bourgeoisie within the CGE – the minister Gelbart represented their interests.

Internally, nevertheless, Perónism had four frequently antagonistic sectors: the new and dynamic industrial bourgeoisie (confronting the great exporting agrarian bourgeoisie), the political sector (conservative and nationalist by its ideology), the worker union with or without bureaucratic structures (like the CGT–Azopardo that had allied with the military) and the Perónist youth (who later would later be divided in groups of the left like ‘Tendency’, among them the Montoneros, and on the right, like ‘Loyalty’, etc.). The most active sector between 1969 and 1973, that allowed the accelerating military crisis and demanded the handing over of the government to the winners of 11 March, was the Perónist youth who from 23 September 1973, but especially from 24 March 1976, was the principal target of the massacre of the ‘dirty war’.

On 18 June 1969 a military specialist in intelligence, Levington, relieved Onganía. On 16 June, the body of Aramburu was discovered, kidnapped by the Montenero guerrilla group, recently created – it originated within the Catholic Action groups of Buenos Aires and was related to a known priest. Perónism with the Balbinist radicalism and three other small parties formed a front in 1971: ‘The hour of the people’. On 26 March, Alejandro Lanusse assumed the presidency, since the government of his predecessor had become erratic. They quickly announced democratic elections for March 1973. In July 1971, the prohibitions on forming political parties ended. A climate of freedom occurred. In 1970 Allende had won the elections in Chile. A

223 H. Cerutti relates explicitly to the ‘Perónist’ (1983, pp. 48, 197 [Translation: TC]: ‘[. . .] Identified with Perónist doctrine and with political failure his discourse was exhausted, although it can be refloated without authenticity and a sustained base’) and with ‘populists’ (op. cit., in all the work). About populism, see Lenin, 1976; Aleksandrovna, 1978; the excellent work of the editor Fernandes, 1982; Ianni, 1975; Weffort and Quijano, 1976; Ipola, 1982; Altman, Miranda and Wincur, 1983. The works of José Aricó (1980), in particular on the collection of letters of Marx with Danielson (from 1868), begin to show a new image of Marx, after volume I of *Capital*, in relation to the question of ‘Russian populism’. The simplifications of our critic H. Cerutti (that using the category ‘people’ is populist) do not make sense.

224 For H. Cerutti there are ‘populists’ of ‘concrete’ ambiguity (p. 205); of ‘abstract ambiguity’ (p. 211); another ‘historicist’; of course a ‘critical’ group (p. 218, in which is found the author: Cerutti); of ‘ethicist self-image’; another ‘stagist’ (where one would include in populism Stalin or Mao themselves); ‘naïve populisms’ (and as counterpart ‘authentic’, including me, p. 39); etc.

225 Sidicaro, 1982, p. 79 (Translation: TC).

liberating wind blew through Latin America, although temporary, because the storm clouds of national security, until then only present in Brazil from 1964, were not too extensive, but in three years they would bury Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina itself in the torrents.

For his part, from Spain, Perón only counted on the CGT of the Argentines of Ongaro (from March 1968), meanwhile Vandor (of the metallurgists) had opened relations with Onganía. But to recover the government, Perón would be helped especially by the youth, whom he would then betray. Félix Luna writes:

The image of Perón flourishes also in student or intellectual sectors where Perón has converted himself, through a surprising process, into a symbol of national liberation, revolution and change . . . Perón radicalized his language and gave a tacit support to the extreme sectors of justicialism . . . But language seems insufficient to confer on this old soldier of 77 the signification of a Mao or a Guevara that the youth intend to give him.²²⁶

If liberation philosophy had been exclusively Argentine, it would not have been able to stop committing certain 'Bonapartist' errors, which the youth committed. But its link with other Latin American movements kept it from falling into the simplifications of which it is accused; these critics, from simplified dogma and by having been 'outside' the battle, could not judge from praxis itself.

Meanwhile, the petty conservative intellectual bourgeoisie of the right had exhausted its discourse. A new justification for opposing the military dictatorship arose. In addition, 'to the extent that the agrarian bourgeoisie lost its capacity for *cultural innovation* a growing distancing from that part of the intermediate sectors dedicated to activities of intellectual type was established.'²²⁷ On the other hand, the Church having been one of the fundamental supports of the great bourgeoisie and the army, the practices of the 'Priests of the Third World', who from 1968 had been a political vanguard in the face of a fearful country, and of certain groups of Perónist youth signified a crucial ideological fracture by their effects on the situation. The discovery of the revolutionary potential of *popular religiosity*, a purely Argentine element in the Latin American context and linked to the critique of 'populism' within the theological currents,²²⁸ allowed it to be situated

²²⁶ Luna, 1972, pp. 215-16 (Translation: TC).

²²⁷ Sidicaro, 1982, p. 76 (Translation: TC).

²²⁸ Cf. Büntig, 1969 (where I participated in writing volumes 4 and 5). One of the preferred themes of my critic (Cerutti, 1983, pp. 35, 38, 39, 40, 42; *ancilla theologiae*, pp. 66, 67, 211, 283, etc.) is to refer to a naïve position, simplistic and obstinately 'clerical'. He assigns to me ideologically a 'fideism' and a 'deism' in that 'God' (difficultly named the 'Absolute' with that Indo-European name in my works) coincides with the super-category that his Althusserianism needs to critique me later - as the idealistic basis and starting point of my ideological construction. The absolute Other that is hoped for (the messianic Bloch of *Principle of Hope*) and that mobilizes the oppressed in Egypt is ironically transformed into a caricatured mask. See Dussel, 1973a, V: 'The atheism of Marx and the prophets'.

with the anti-military popular movement and with the return of Perón in a critical, creative manner.

The impossibility of traditional Marxism, including its Althusserian renewal, to intervene actively in this moment (together with the errors of the Trotskyist extreme, the ERP and others) allowed a generalized distrust among the dogmatists.²²⁹

This explains the multiple references of liberation philosophy to youth (opposed to the gerontocracies and bureaucracies) as constituting the people, as many union members had been handed over to the military, and the working class, in fact, were sometimes unable to be present and could not open a concrete and aggressive struggle in the return of Perón. It was the impoverished petty bourgeoisie that 'opted' for the oppressed classes, which played its role freely. One must understand this moment precisely (1971-3) or one will misunderstand what is said in many works.²³⁰ Nevertheless, liberation philosophy never played the role of a supporting ideology. On the contrary, it functioned strategically as a *critique*. A critique with 'spontaneity', philosophy was interpreted as a word that criticized the meaning of praxis from a true exteriority, understood as 'elitism'.²³¹ In the same way, the 'periodicity', first the bourgeois revolution and the fulfilment of their tasks, and later the socialist revolution,²³² was maybe the maximum

229 Liberation philosophy was not a simple application of already known categories to the Perónist moment. In a moment of great popular enthusiasm and of deep mobilization was the arduous constitution of the necessary categories and from the methodical horizons that the group possessed. From there come the different aspects, ambiguous, that gestated, but also their validity (1972-5) and their possibilities. The anti-Marxist declarations (noted by Cerutti, 1983, pp. 35, 36, 255, 278, etc.), which have to be interpreted with an anti-dogmatic will, were critiqued from the beginning of the 1970s by Hugo Assmann and Osvaldo Ardiles.

230 From this era proceed *Latin America: Dependency and Liberation* (Dussel, 1973c), *Toward an Ethics of Latin American Liberation* (vols 1, 2 and 3), *Method for a Philosophy of Liberation*, in addition actions such as the Academic Weeks of the University of El Salvador (from 1969 to 1972, edited in the journal *Stromata*, Buenos Aires) and other related works such as *Popular Culture and Philosophy of Liberation* (Buenos Aires: García Cambreiro, 1975) or *Toward a Philosophy of Latin American Liberation* (Buenos Aires: Bonum, 1973). The 'youth' we referred to were not alongside Marcuse of the European or North American movements of 1968, but with the critical current of the left and with revolutionary aims within Perónism (the 'Perónist youth'). I aimed to think about a place for these 'youth' in philosophical discourse, risking my life, since the attempted bombing that I suffered in 1973 was related to the link with the 'youth', which the perpetrators of that terrorist action imagined.

231 Cerutti (1983, pp. 37, 194f.) does not note that 'elitism' is, perhaps, vanguardism (better Leninist), since in Perónism a 'spontaneity' was visible that demanded truth for the popular movement, negating the possibility of adopting an articulated but critical position. This 'criticality', which permits philosophy to be separated from political-supportive ideology, is what some critic dislikes: if we adopt a critical position, we are 'elitist'; if we articulate the popular, we are 'populist'. We are always in error.

232 It is interesting to note that the political position of the Latin American communist parties from 1935, following the orders of Stalin, of forming fronts with the social-democratic liberal democracies, and even with the populists, responds in part to a mechanistic, dogmatic theoretical position to believe that the 'tasks' of capitalism necessarily precede the socialist revolution. But it is naïve to think, like Cerutti, that the 'periodicity' is necessarily populist (1983, pp. 36f.).

of critical conscience possible within the popular movement in those years, which spoke of socialism as last resort (it will never be the Perónism of the CGE, of the unionist bureaucracy or the 'political' sector). For our critics the exhaustion of Perónism meant the end of liberation philosophy,²³³ and so this philosophical current also disappeared, but it has kept growing in countries, works and clarity. Two things were confused: the *concrete* and *historical* conditions, which gave rise to liberation philosophy (Argentina from 1969), do not determine absolutely either the constitution of its categories or the growing structure of its discourse.

This would arise within the 'climate' of the return of Perónism (a neopopulism with enormous contradictions, from whose ambiguities, justly, appeared a *critical* philosophical thinking, although the criticism was initially minimal), which permitted, as Salazar Bondy saw clearly in Buenos Aires in 1973,²³⁴ the question of liberation, not only in the Argentine context, but equally in Latin America and later in Africa and Asia.²³⁵ Above all, it could carry the weight of groups who had never committed to a popular and revolutionary line, not proceeding from liberal nor traditional Marxist sectors, toward the mill of the great revolution of the 'second Emancipation'. This is the characteristic of liberation philosophy that has not been understood by certain critics.

Second is that the historical origin of a philosophical discourse, the categories and logic itself have relative importance, autonomy, and for this it is valid, pertinent, to other Latin American situations, and in general for the 'Latin American revolution' that is only beginning.

It is not only a concrete *application* of Marxism. It was born not to concretize a philosophical discourse (in part, the intent of Althusserianism in Latin America), but as the concrete demand of a praxis of liberation, although ambiguous (that of the youth and of the more committed worker

233 'The populist sector was identified with the discourse, the Perónist doctrine, and with the political failure its discourse was exhausted', says the text already cited, and it continues, 'although it can be refloated with inauthenticity and without a sustainable base' (1983, p. 197 [Translation: TC]).

234 Salazar Bondy indicated: 'It is interesting what people like Dussel are doing, who are trying to restate the traditional problematic through a new lens' (1973, p. 397 [Translation: TC]). Cerutti could have shown how, starting from a truly 'traditional' Heideggerian phenomenological thinking, a path began that continues today. Explaining it diachronically and from his context (a type of Argentine ideology in the style of Marx), he made a synchronic critique (better 'a-chronic', where he blends works of different times, with distinct meanings, atemporally, like the critique of the New Testament of Bruno Bauer), shuffling the cards and causing obscurity. 'As always', says Marx in the *Grundrisse*, 'Proudhon knows that the bells are tolling, but he does not know where' (Translation: TC). One has to critique populism, but does not know how. In that meeting in Buenos Aires in 1973, Leopoldo Zea in 'The Latin American philosophy as philosophy of liberation' (1973, pp. 399-413 [Translation: TC]), said: 'for his part, Enrique Dussel, has stated a similar need, and, as Salazar Bondy [. . .]' (p. 406 [Translation: TC]); 'Salazar Bondy, Dussel, Fanon, as they struggle and have struggled for a liberation philosophy [. . .]' (p. 408 [Translation: TC]).

235 While I was giving a series of lectures in Manila in August 1983, a student of philosophy brought me their degree work on liberation philosophy, inspired by my English works (which are few).

movement, like that of Ongaro and the Perónism 'of the base' and others), but *including* the solution that will become clarified with time. The *theoretical* discourse was not primary but secondary. The *praxis* was primary, and was thought about with the existing categories (traditional, phenomenological, existential, Hegelian, of the Frankfurt School, etc.).

The categories could have been improved, streamlined (and certainly the serious and direct access to Marx has been a fundamental moment, but by practical and not dogmatic demand), having reality as reference. If 'people' was a reality in political discourse, in daily reality there was no question of scorning it as ambiguous, reactionary, populist, petty bourgeois. It was a question of clarifying it, making it more precise. It is possible that the first attempts (making 'class' an abstract category and managed as a *unique category* through dogmatics, through our critics) were not sufficient. But instead of bringing back the issue to an academic, abstract, theoretic simplification ('class' is the only adequate category and 'people' is always populist, etc.),²³⁶ it was necessary 'to constitute' the category people.

Third phase: 'Camporist Perónism' (11 March – 23 September 1973). Developments

[226] Until the triumph of Héctor Cámpora in the 11 March elections, firmly supported, and with full participation in the government, by youth, the people (90 per cent) had struggled unanimously against the military (supported by the interests of the agrarian bourgeoisie, other bourgeois factions and transnational interests in Argentina). Liberation philosophy held in its breast certain contradictions that had not been clarified in the praxis linked to the concrete political question of the 'return of Perónism' after 18 years of persecution and exclusions, from 1955 to 1973.

The 'Camporist period' was very brief, and equally brief was the moment of a presence of liberation philosophy in the Argentine national universities. Paradoxically, its presence coincided with that of the Perónist youth (expressed in the demonstrations through the slogan 'The socialist country', in front of the bureaucracy that would keep acquiring power – which had been allied with the military – and which shouted: 'the Perónist country'). Liberation philosophy was identified with youth, although objectively it could not be described as their theory. It had made a path together with

²³⁶ 'The people as the subject of philosophizing seem clearly to be an alternative to the Marxist concept of social class [. . .] The national revolution overcomes colonialism and the social revolution comes after, no one knows when' (Cerutti, 1983, p. 264 [Translation: TC]). Today we have still to construct concretely the category 'people', without contradicting or negating, at an *abstract* level, the category 'class' (Dussel, 1985a, ch. 18). For this it was necessary to not abandon either the term 'class' or 'people'. Cerutti, however, in the name of class (Althusserian), believes in negating any possibility of the people. In some moment, before '*tercerismo*' (Cerutti, 1983, p. 86) this is evident to me (see my work on '*tercerismo*' in *Idoc-Internacional*, Rome).

them. For its part, it had discovered many themes. Its praxis had inspired them. But its meaning transcends them.

In all ways the persecution of youth was growing. Perón, who had been supported by the youth in his return to government, began slowly to transfer his support to the more bureaucratic unionism (the Union of Metal Workers, which a little later Rucci would direct, successor of Vandor and his tactics).

When Perón returned to Argentina on 20 June, the paramilitaries of López Rega slaughtered some youth. A few days later, in the Academic Week of San Miguel, before the presidency of Salazar Bondy and L. Zea, I declared:

In 1968, four hundred Mexican university youth were assassinated. Octavio Paz, in the small book *Postdata*, says that on 'October 2, 1968 the student movement ended. An era of Mexican history also ended . . .'. The government returned to prior periods of history: aggression is synonymous with regression.²³⁷

The reference to Tlatelolco was symbolic. The youth assassinated years before in Mexico were now being assassinated in the Argentine political moment. On 12 July, they renounced Cámpora and his team, the most critical and maybe the only thing that could deepen the revolution. In 1974, the provinces whose governors supported the youth (Buenos Aires, Córdoba and later Mendoza) were entered. We were accused of having been 'in power'.²³⁸ In fact, we were not. We were openly struggling against the dictatorship, and when we could begin to reformulate the philosophical studies,²³⁹ we were again in opposition: opposition to the Perónism of the right, ideologically conservative (the 'political' sector) or bureaucratically forming part of the mafias (with assassinations, bombings, etc.), or to the groups of López Rega. Eliseo Verón and Silvia Sigal, using in part my categories, for analysis in their work 'Perón: political discourse and ideology', indicate:

The problem is simplified: it is the *word* of the Other, but simply the *existence* of the Other. From this it follows that political violence – that Perón himself carried out against the youth – is nothing other than an extreme example of the same problem: in effect, the safest way to have the *last word* is to reduce the enemy to silence.²⁴⁰

237 'Imperial culture, Enlightenment culture and liberation of popular culture' (Dussel, 1973d, 72–73 [Translation: TC]). The slaughter of Ezeiza was on 20 June. I spoke those words on 15 August. On 2 October 1973 (five years exactly after Tlatelolco) they put a bomb in my house. I said: 'One must be very careful, because it will not be that one has to adopt a critical philosophical attitude to see clearly what happens [. . .] Philosophy is rationality historical and new, it should know to risk itself for the poor [. . .]' (ibid., p. 73 [Translation: TC]). If this is Perónist thinking, populist, acritical . . .

238 For my part, I never occupied any administrative post in the university. I was never tenured (temporary). Thus they fired me in March 1975.

239 See my articles 'Philosophy, hegemonic apparatuses and exile' (Dussel, 1983, pp. 99–115) and 'Reform of the Plan of Studies of the Career of Philosophy' (Dussel, 1975b).

240 Verón and Sigal, 1982, pp. 203–4 (Translation: TC).

For our part, we insist that the *word* (read as protest, poetry, culture, work, etc.) that had to be 'taken as true' and believed was that of the 'poor', of the 'people', and not that of a leader (as it was). This 'fundamentally critical position', to the 'hierarchical' demand of Perón who demanded that his word was the only word, could never be interpreted as non-populist by our critics.²⁴¹

After 20 June 1973 (the slaughter of Ezeiza) the die was cast as far as I was concerned, and the liberation philosophy that I practised became each time more critical of the Perónism of the right. Read volumes III, IV and V of *Toward an Ethics of Latin American Liberation* from this perspective to see the fixing of my position. Later, due to exile far from Argentina, my discourse became unintelligible (because each country in Latin America has its *own* discourse). The readers remained in Argentina, and were persecuted, tortured, assassinated, or those who could read the works did not know the concrete momentary context from where it had originated. In addition, a historical change had occurred:

Many children of fervent anti-Perónists who in 1955 had lived through the *liberation*²⁴² now formed part of the crowds celebrating the election victory of March 1973 [. . .] It was a generation gap [. . .] But also this involved a process of change in mentality in broad sectors of the middle class [. . .] These youth, coinciding in many of their proposals with the more politicized sectors of workers, constituted what became known as the Perónist left and collided with the groups devoted to traditional Perónism [. . .] It was an important new phenomenon in Argentine society, where the youth of the middle class—especially university—had constituted almost always the clientele of the traditional left, the worker class *remaining isolated*.²⁴³

It is this fact that escapes the critics of liberation philosophy that it was linked to the people, to the working class, historically, concretely. On the contrary, more dogmatic groups, although seemingly more 'purist', were isolated and could not think about praxis in its everyday vitality.

Fourth phase: 'Metallurgist Perónism' (23 September 1973 – 1 July 1974). Persecutions

[227] On 23 September Perón was elected president for the third time. Two days later José Rucci, General Secretary of the UOM, leader of the bureau-

²⁴¹ It is clear that one has to believe the people and not the leader. The criteria for 'hearing the voice of the people' is a fundamental political question (Dussel, 1973a, IV, where I explain these questions in a text that I wrote in 1974 that Cerutti ignores).

²⁴² I was a student who rose against Perón in 1954–5 (founder and secretary general of the University Federation of the West). I was imprisoned for participation in demonstrations, strikes and student meetings in Mendoza.

²⁴³ Maceyra Campora, 1983, pp. 28–30 (Translation: TC).

cratic Perónist unionism, was assassinated. On 2 October, a bomb exploded in my house, placed by the 'Commando Rucci', for 'poisoning the minds of youth with Marxist doctrine' (written in a pamphlet next to the bomb). The expulsion of the 'infiltrators' from Perónism had begun. I was neither Perónist (nor an infiltrator) nor Marxist (better, still, the only Hegelian of the Latin American anti-Hegelian left). This *practical fact* is of no interest to my critics, as it is anecdotal and personal. It is a sign of the *real* and historical *sense* of liberation philosophy. For 'authentic' populism, our thinking was the principal enemy. It was an *internal* enemy, not in the breast of the party, but in the breast of the people, of the revolutionary movement. Because it started from traditional thinking, because it was inscribed within a popular history, liberation philosophy appeared infinitely more critical than abstract dogmatic Marxisms. To call this thinking, made the object of an assault, 'a new reactionary and idealist mystification' is, at least, unjust, if not objectively wrong and not only insulting but injurious and slanderous for the person him/herself.²⁴⁴

The facts of this shift in the political position of Perón, from the support of youth to right-wing unionism, are as follows. On 12 October, Perón took power for the third time. On 1 May 1974 almost 50,000 youth left the Plaza de Mayo. The Perónist Youth (JP) yelled at Perón: 'What's up, General, the popular government is full of gorillas!', with the rhythm of mass chants. Perón, who 'never liked to tolerate dissent, visibly upset, responded violently: Stupid, beardless . . .'. The JP militants withdrew from the plaza.²⁴⁵

Liberation philosophy became the opposition. 'From the Ministry of Social Welfare, José López Rega imposes repressive action co-ordinated with the police and civil armed groups.'²⁴⁶ The more authentic and revolutionary worker unionism, like that of Salamanca and Tosco in Córdoba or that of Ongaro in Buenos Aires, was equally broken up.

From a strictly economic point of view there had not been a fundamental change: the struggle was established at the political and ideological level. The minister of economics Gelbart covered that portfolio until the death of Perón. With Law 20538 the agrarian bourgeoisie was kept in line, which was the hope of their moment. The CGE had true hegemony. The inter-classist

244 Cerutti, 1983, p. 293. I have information about the possibility that the rightist elements of orthodox Perónism executed the attack (maybe from the Metallurgist Union UOM; see Torres, 1983). These unions eliminated the revolutionary branches (for example, of Salamanca and Tosco in Córdoba), murdered their own bases of the left and became the backbone not only of the Perónist right but of the later military governments until 1983 (Azaretto, 1983). Note that the 'Commando Rucci', named after the murdered general secretary of the CCT (the most fascist group in unionism), of the UOM, was the one to whom was attributed the attack on me.

245 Maceyra Cámpora, 1983, p. 109 (Translation: TC).

246 Torres, 1983, pp. 67f. (Translation: TC). It was in these moments when the group 'I, P. Loyalty' achieved notoriety (a rightist group of Perónist youth, which Cerutti suffered in Salta, explaining the vehemence of his critique; not only did I never take part in all those rightist movements but I suffered, much more than Cerutti, and long before him, the outburst of irrationality and violence).

'social pact', properly populist, was controlled by the union bureaucracy and the new industrial bourgeoisie. This was seen, at the end of the Gelbart administration, through 'a gradual overvaluing of money, a substantial rise in imports and a great loss of reserves',²⁴⁷ measures that helped national industrial capital and worker consumption.

Fifth phase: the 'Rasputinist adventure' (1 July 1974 – 24 March 1976). Anti-hegemonic thinking

Perón died on 1 July. Immediately, López Rega ascended to power. The agrarian law that limited the action of the SRA was declared 'not Perónist' because it committed a crime against ownership.

Supporting union bureaucracy, the government promulgated a law of work contracts, which produced 'the elimination of rebellious unionism':

Between August and September 1974 the principal independent unions, or those led by dissidents, were eliminated. That was the fate of the mechanics' union of Córdoba, directed by René Salamanca; the graphic union, led by Raimundo Ongaro in Buenos Aires; the electricians' in Córdoba, directed by Agustín Tosco – soon after he was assassinated; Guillán lost his position as leader of the telephonists.²⁴⁸

In August 1974, Ivanissevich was named minister of education; he began the universities' fascist and anachronic leaning to the right. Rodolfo Puiggrós had to resign as rector of the University of Buenos Aires; he was re-employed by Solauo Lima, through the later interregnum of Laguzzi, whose son was assassinated in a famous attack, succeeding Ottalagano in September. The far right of 'powerful Argentina' began the physical annihilation of all critical intelligentsia, until October 1983. Irrational violence was unleashed: in July Mor Roig was assassinated; Rodolfo Ortega Peña, historian and deputy of the JP fell; Silvio Frondizi was executed by the 'AAA', etc. The stage of terror began, saddest in all the history of the Argentine Republic, compared with which the history of Rosas recounted by the liberals is a pale and naïve memory.

Meanwhile, I wrote in 1973 'Latin American erotics' and 'pedagogy' of liberation, and in 1974 'politics' (volume IV of *Ethics*). The sadness and pain tainted my mind. Nevertheless, other Latin American horizons encouraged me . . . but each time less: the fall of Torres in Bolivia, democracy in Uruguay and on 11 September 1973 of Allende in Chile. One dark night we were surrounded and we understood that we were coming to the end of an era. The classes I had taught in the National University of Cuyo until November 1974 were my last in Argentina. The assassinations came nearer;

²⁴⁷ Di Tella, 1983, pp. 200 (Translation: TC).

²⁴⁸ Maceyra Cámpora, 1983, pp. 119–20 (Translation: TC).

the bombs were heard each night. One friend was shot; another wounded; a student died beaten . . . Susana Bermejillo . . . The 'Salta group', with which I could not have much contact, it is true, lived these contradictions in a bitter and violent way.

The Perónist group 'Loyalty', some of whose members had cultivated liberation philosophy, confronted other positions. In those terrible months of intellectual, moral and armed terrorism, some began to try to find the explanation of large misdeeds in internal differences in Perónism, where the right assassinated its left in an exaggerated 'witch hunt'. For my part, I left in December 1974 for Europe and returned in March 1975. On the 31st of that month I was expelled from the University of Mendoza, together with 16 other colleagues of 32 in the Department of Philosophy.

Fifty per cent of the students were equally excluded. How? Simply: in the doorway of the university were two 'mafiosos' with weapons. The new authorities gave an entrance ticket to the faculty to students who were loyal. The other students could not enter the faculty and were excluded *de facto* by the armed forces. Barbarism had invaded all.

'Outside' the university, guarded and sentenced to death by anonymous lists, I remained semi-hidden until May 1975. During that time I wrote volume V of *Toward a Latin American Ethics of Liberation*. Chapter 10 was 'the archaeological', the theme of the Absolute, of fetishism. After exile began, where I learned anew to sleep in peace without fear that they would come to kidnap me, to assassinate me . . . as some others, like my professor of philosophy, in my student days, Mauricio López . . .

On 24 March 1976 the military would accomplish their sixth *coup d'état*, ten years after Onganía.

Growth, maturation, precision

[228] Liberation philosophy had been foretold:

Liberation philosophy is arriving to its final possibilities. It is difficult to get more focused and fertile perspectives than those that were in prior years a true rebirth in Latin American thought. In the measure to which this philosophy – given its intrinsic dynamism – tries to become incarnate it will increasingly enter into conflict with sociology, history, and political organizations themselves.²⁴⁹

On the contrary, liberation philosophy has grown slowly during these years. If it is true that it began at the end of the 1960s, it *explicitly* became present in the 2nd National Congress of the Philosophy of Argentina (1971),²⁵⁰ where the original group was created, like Oswaldo Ardiles, Juan

249 Hernández Alvarado, 1976, p. 399 (Translation: TC).

250 My essay 'Metaphysics of the subject and liberation' (Dussel, 1971, pp. 27–32).

C. Scannone, etc., and grew principally from the Academic Weeks of Salvador from 1971.²⁵¹ This from 1973, with the presence of Salazar Bondy and Leopoldo Zea,²⁵² provided a Latin American perspective to the event.

When the persecution and exile (1974–6) of many occurred, and others were forced to remain silent by internal repression, liberation philosophy emigrated with them.

There were meetings of liberation philosophy in the Autonomous University of Toluca (1976) and in Puebla (Mexico), seminars in Chihuahua (Mexico), and it was present in the First Congress of Central American Philosophy Professors (Tegucigalpa) in 1978. In Colombia little by little arose an international group in Saint Thomas Aquinas University, root of the Latin American Philosophy Congresses. The first of these was celebrated in 1980, with 700 participants. Leopoldo Zea, Hugo Assmann and many others attended those Congresses. The 2nd Congress of Bogota was about the 'History of Philosophy in Latin America' (1982). The third was about 'Latin American philosophy and culture' (1984). Around these congresses was born the Association of the Philosophy of Liberation (AFYL), with representation in almost all Latin American countries and a North American section with almost 40 members, which had a round table in the Global Congress of Philosophy in Montreal in 1983. They also had papers in the Pan-American Congress of Philosophy in Caracas and a round table in the Pan-American Congresses of Tallahassee (Florida, USA). There have been papers on the theme in almost all philosophical congresses in very diverse countries.

Simultaneously texts translated into Portuguese and English have appeared.²⁵³ In 1973 I had the opportunity of giving lectures in the Faculty of

²⁵¹ With the report of Hugo Assmann and others 'Toward a dialectical foundation of Latin American philosophy' (Assmann, 1971, pp. 3–55). On rereading page 42 of this essay, I understand that in those years we had not been able to expound – as I can today – the question of Alterity in the thinking of Marx (Dussel, 1985a).

²⁵² Leopoldo Zea entered for the first time into the problematic of liberation with his report 'Latin American philosophy as philosophy of liberation' in August 1973 in San Miguel (Zea, 1973, pp. 399–423). In a trip through Mexico in 1971 an exposition spoken on the radio of UNAM about 'Latin American philosophy as thinking liberative praxis' was engraved in my mind. Speaking with Zea, I debated the theme in 1976. Zea weaves the theme into his work *The Latin American Mind* (Zea, 1976), in chapter V of part II (pp. 409f., in particular pp. 520–6). Maybe because of this Francisco Miro Quesada in *Project and Realization of Latin American Philosophizing* (1981) considers Zea the 'pioneer of liberation philosophy' (dedication on p. 7). Salazar Bondy, in his work *Is There a Philosophy in Our America?* (1969), does not speak explicitly of liberation philosophy. In my report in Córdoba, I cite Salazar Bondy to show that philosophy had been inauthentic and that one had to 'cancel it out' (words of Salazar Bondy, p. 131) and that historically there was 'still a possibility of liberation' (p. 133). I think it was in Córdoba, August 1971, where Latin American liberation philosophy was spoken about for the first time. Salazar Bondy still does not employ the term 'liberation philosophy' and is conscious of this, as expressed in 1973 in the Academic Week of El Salvador.

²⁵³ Edições Loyola, of Sao Paulo, has published seven volumes on the theme (1980–4) and critiques have appeared in diverse journals. In 1985 *Philosophy of Liberation* (Orbis Books, New York) (Dussel, 1977a) was published, which facilitated the knowledge of the theme in English-speaking Africa and Asia.

Philosophy at the University of Dakar, and can confirm an immediate receptivity to the theme. In the University of Cairo, Professor Mourad Wahba and other professors of philosophy were interested in organizing a dialogue between philosophers of the Third World about the philosophical question of liberation, which still has not happened. Professor William Reese, of the State University of New York in Albany, wrote a work on 'Analytic and Liberation Philosophy' that opens a dialogue on the question.

In numerous Latin American universities (Quito, Río de Janeiro, Maracaibo, La Paz, Medellín, etc.) there have been lectures, series and even seminars and courses about liberation philosophy. There are numerous theses at bachelor's, master's and doctorate level about themes in liberation philosophy (not only in Latin America, but also in the USA, Germany, Italy, etc.).²⁵⁴

The critiques appeared quickly. From its birth in Argentina some of its ambiguities were already noted.²⁵⁵ Alberto Parisi's book *Philosophy and Dialectics* was the first to approach liberation philosophy critically, indicating the ambiguity of its themes placed at an extremely abstract level.²⁵⁶ Alipio Díaz Casalis, in a thesis about the pedagogical problem in liberation philosophy, noted already the possible populist deviation.²⁵⁷

In reality, liberation philosophy had just been born. It was only ten years old. Like the process of Latin American (and Third World) historical liberation it only now seems to be entering into a situation of confronting a growing domination, liberation philosophy will be more current as the praxis of liberation develops itself through extension, through nations, and depth, in the radicalism of its revolutionary projects.

It is not only growth. It is *maturation*. The polemic about the lack of knowledge of Marx, although frequently one forgets erotics (Freud), the pedagogical in relation to Paulo Freire, and many other urgent themes of liberation and about certain populist 'ambiguities' shows the degree of maturation being reached. From 1976, I began to analyse the question of 'populism'. In the Seminar on Latin American political philosophy that I co-ordinate in the College of Latin American Studies (at master's and doctorate level), in the Faculty of Philosophy of UNAM (Mexico), since 1976, the first theme approached is: 'The ideological statute of populist political discourse',²⁵⁸ conscious of having to clarify the question. In my work *The Theoretical Production of Marx: A Commentary on Grundrisse* and in those that followed in the 1980s some concepts and fundamental categories of liberation philosophy were clarified. The polemic was extremely useful

²⁵⁴ Consult the web page of AFYL (www.afyl.org) for activities from those years to the present.

²⁵⁵ For example, *Stromata* 1-2 (1971), p. 42, where Osvaldo Ardiles still notes an insufficient management of Marx.

²⁵⁶ Edicol, 1979, 'Discussion about analectics' (pp. 43f.).

²⁵⁷ Díaz Casalis, 1979, pp. 136f.: 'Confronting Marx'.

²⁵⁸ Published as sections [210-21] of this volume (previously published in *Ideas and Values* [Bogotá] 30 [1977], pp. 35-69).

because it allowed us to re-read Marx in the light of our Latin American problematic.

In all ways this maturation would have to be extended not only to the environment of politics or economics, but also to that of erotics,²⁵⁹ pedagogy, fetishism, etc. A logic of liberation philosophy is well sketched in the majestic pages of Franz Hinkelammert in *Critique of Utopian Reason*, and in the chapter in which he criticizes Karl Popper, but not only with his critique of the 'Popperian theory of planning, competition and institutionalization',²⁶⁰ from *Open Society and its Enemies*, but especially with his critique of *Logic of Scientific Investigation*:

The full meaning of a project of liberation demands the empirical sciences be placed at the service of reality not at the service of far-reaching dreams. [It is necessary] to claim reality for the empirical sciences (as Popper understands), political action (anti-utopian), and the entire society (dominating), in a project of liberation in its full sense that entails a critique of the empirical sciences in their reference to far-reaching dreams.²⁶¹

With time it is reaching greater clarity. The critiques – be they negative or positive, aggressive or constructive, slanderous or sympathetic – have demanded that clarity. I consider that it is at the political, social and economic level, where Latin American reality is determined through the agonizing crisis of our 'second Emancipation', that clarification is most necessary. Therefore, the question of 'class' and 'people', of 'popular culture' will continue at the centre of the debate, and it is at this level where the clarifications have advanced more thanks to the Latin American 're-reading' of Marx.²⁶²

The next years will give us new routes opening to the praxis of our Latin American people, and liberation philosophy will have to follow that concrete, historical always changing praxis attentively . . . Because it is *Reality* that has to be *thought* and *changed*.

The 'Decolonizing Turn' from the People to the 'Second Emancipation' (1959–)

[229] In this section we want only to situate briefly the locations of the debate.²⁶³ In Latin America the left in general, and in particular Marxist,

²⁵⁹ Dussel, 1977b and 1977a, 3.2.

²⁶⁰ Hinkelammert, 1984, pp. 160f. (Translation: TC).

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 202–3 (Translation: TC). The conclusions of Hinkelammert entail, at least, the attentive reading of pages 159–203 of his magnificent work.

²⁶² See Dussel, 1985a, 1988, 1990.

²⁶³ See my exposition 'From the final Marx to Latin America', in Dussel, 1990, pp. 238–93. It is first a description of the final manuscripts of Marx, especially the 'Russian question' (when Marx supports Russian populists against Plejanov and V. Zasluch), where he is against the position of Engels (and of the later Soviet Communist Party, which had judged Marx as 'populist'). From this perspective I treat the debate in Latin America from the end of

from a political perspective, moved from a clearly Eurocentric position, until, slowly, toward the end of the twentieth century, it began to discover the concrete, historical, oppressed and excluded *people*, constituting this as the principal reference of its political task.

Two extremes can be considered. The first is represented, for example, by the socialist positivist position of José Ingenieros (1877–1925),²⁶⁴ when he wrote in 1915 that in Argentina will live a race 'composed of 15 or 100 million whites, who in their hours of leisure will read the chronicles of the extinguished indigenous races, the histories of the mixed race gauchos who slowed the formation of the white race'.²⁶⁵ The second extreme, however, is shown in the figure of Juan B. Justo (1865–1928),²⁶⁶ who thought that 'the gaucho who lived with his existence threatened and incapable of adapting to the conditions of the era rebelled. Thus were born the civil wars of the 20s [1820] and subsequently, that were a true class struggle. The *Montonera* were *the people* of the countryside who rose up against the masters of the cities.'²⁶⁷

The precursors (pre-1959)

This *Politics of Liberation* relates, in that evolution, to *the encounter with the people* in all its complexity.²⁶⁸ Frequently, Latin American 'standard Marxism' (Marxism–Leninism, including Trotskyism from a strictly theoretical point of view, and postmodern neo-Marxism) has paid dearly for linking to popular currents, since it always in a somewhat dogmatic way considered 'worker class' to be a synonym of 'people'. It is a simplification of grave consequences. In the same way, 'the political' was reduced to frontist tactics at best, with a certain Machiavellian tinge – orchestration of possible allies, the 'fronts'. The necessary laws of the economy (in a positivist sense and not as Marx thought) scorned politics as a reformist action, with revolution the only possible political act. This kept all Latin American Communist parties from realizing effective politics with real consequences, keeping themselves

the nineteenth century. Consult the works of Werz, 1995; Débes Valdés, 2003; Löwy, 1980; Liss, 1984; Beorlegui, 2004; Fonet-Betancourt, 2001.

²⁶⁴ See Fonet-Betancourt, 2001, pp. 61f.

²⁶⁵ In 'The formation of the white race': *Journal of Philosophy* (Buenos Aires) I (1915), p. 22 (Translation: TC).

²⁶⁶ See Fonet-Betancourt, 2001, pp. 51–61.

²⁶⁷ See Dussel, 1994, p. 46 (Translation: TC).

²⁶⁸ I wrote in 1990: 'If *science* [...] signifies a critique of the whole system of the categories of political economy, their *institutions* [from Marx] in the *political level* [...] are constituted [I had to write 'are used'] from a leap in the dark: Marx had not reached the global market' (ibid., p. 269, note 84 [Translation: TC]). He had not written a *Critique of bourgeois political philosophy or theory*, from where all his concrete political analyses, so intelligent and guiding, cannot be considered justified from a 'scientific categorical framework'. It would be too much to try to develop that categorical framework (the object of a work in progress, and that will be an *architectonic* of the *Politics of Liberation*) like Marx had developed, but it is our proposition 'to add fuel to the fire' for the debate to finally achieve at least one task.

in opposition. For this reason, the current of J. D. Mariátegui, including later *'Farabundismo'* and other historical movements of different countries culminating in the Cuban Revolution, signified a greater understanding of the meaning of 'popular'. An enormous advance around the understanding of 'popular politics' was produced with Sandinismo (FSLN) with respect to popular culture and its religiosity, which could be interpreted positively) and even more with Zapatismo (and the EZLN, with a new conception of the ancestral indigenous cultures of the continent). For its part, the 'Bolivarian Revolution', in a way much less 'orthodox' than the Chilean Revolution of Salvador Allende in 1970s Chile, began a process of reaction against neoliberalism (together with governments with popular support like those of Néstor Kirchner, Tabaré Vázquez, Luiz Inacio 'Lula' in Brazil, and the growth of indigenous political movements in Ecuador and Bolivia – this last led by the figure of Evo Morales) and, finally, the initiative of the Workers Party of Porto Alegre of organizing the World Social Forums, which have begun to articulate thousands of new social movements across the globe. All this constitutes, together with the other type of traditions,²⁶⁹ the historical marrow of radical thinking in our political-cultural continent that is learning to articulate itself, not as vanguards, with the 100-year-old Latin American popular tradition, experiencing each time more aspects of the cultural complexity of 'those from below'. We have to refer to them.²⁷⁰

Juan B. Justo, who blended Spencerian biologism with Marx, whose theory of surplus value was for Justo 'a mere allegory', wrote: 'The Argentine people do not have glories: independence was a bourgeois glory, the people did not have any more part in her than serving the designees of the privileged class who directed the movement',²⁷¹ showing clearly that the first

269 It is possible to pick out movements of workers, students, young priests (some celebrated bishops) and masses inspired in the deep renewal of the majority of the Christian churches (from hegemonic Catholicism, to Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, etc.). Christian communities adopted the 'paradigm of *Exodus*' (thanks to Marxism in the social sciences) and organized hundreds of thousands of 'base communities' throughout the whole continent, justified theoretically with liberation theology, which permitted them to be actively committed in the vanguard of the revolutionary movements beginning in the 1960s. The Sandinista or Zapatista Revolution, for example, would have been impossible without the participation in its vanguard and masses of the revolutionary Christians (see the first steps of this process the work of S. Silva Gotay *The Christian Revolutionary Movement*, 1980; in addition *Theology of Liberation: A Panorama of its Development*, 1995; for the decidedly revolutionary commitment of Christians see my *From Medellín to Puebla: A Decade of Blood and Hope [1968–1979]*, 1979; finally my article 'Theology of Liberation and Marxism', in *Christianity and Society [Mexico]* 98 [1988], pp. 37–60).

270 I start from the historical vision of Marxism that I developed in other works: (1) The era of preparation (pre-1919). (2) Revolutionary Marxisms (1919–35). (3) The *Frentismo* stage and the anti-revolutionary *browderismo* (1935–). (4) The Cuban (1959), Sandinista (1979) and Zapatista (1994) revolutions. See Dussel, 1990, pp. 275–93; with broad bibliography, fruit of many semesters in UNAM, Mexico, of my seminar about the 'History of the philosophical thinking in Latin America'. One has to add to the bibliography Raul Fornet-Betancourt's *Transformation of Marxism: History of Marxism in Latin America* (2001; on my theoretical position in pp. 325–53), the first extensive philosophical interpretation of the 'reception' and 'creation' of Marxism in our continent.

271 *Naïve realism*, Buenos Aires, 1937. See Dussel, 1994, p. 46 (Translation: TC).

Emancipation occurred under the leadership of the Creole oligarchy, while the second will have to be driven by the people themselves.

For his part, José Martí (1853–95) has a special place in the struggles of Latin American liberation to the present, because he is found between the end of the wars of Independence from Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the confrontation against the colossus of the north, the American Empire, in the face of which the process of the 'second Independence' is concretized.²⁷² Martí had genius and knowledge (he was a great voyager through Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and stayed for 15 years in the USA: 'I have lived in the monster and I know its entrails',²⁷³ like a new Jonah), the experience of discovering in the struggle for the emancipation of colonial Cuba the massive fact of neocolonialism into which one after another of the Latin American countries from Mexico to Argentina fell. Only he glimpsed the new stage in which Latin America over the past century has become more dependent on the USA destroying its own economic and cultural resources to degrees that Martí himself may not have imagined.²⁷⁴

Confronting James Blaine, who spoke of *Our America* (all America for the USA), Martí counterposes *Nuestra America*, although he knows that the giant of the north has begun to weave a spider's web. In 1881, discussing the International Congress of Washington (which initiated *pan-Americanism* as a North American ideology of penetration into Latin America) he writes: 'It was that winter of anxiety, in which through ignorance or fanatical faith, fear or politeness, the Latin American people were reunited in Washington under the frightening eagle.'²⁷⁵ And Martí quotes a text from the *Sun* newspaper: 'We bought Alaska!, to notify the world that it is our determination to form a union of the north of the continent with the flag of stars floating from the glaciers to the Isthmus and from Ocean to Ocean.'²⁷⁶

Martí knew that the economic dependence, which Mexico had already structured through a recent commercial treaty, equally signified political dependence: this treaty, he thought, 'does not only concern Mexico, it concerns all Latin American peoples who trade with the USA. It is not the treaty in and of itself that attracts such a degree of attention; it is what comes from it: we speak of economic risks',²⁷⁷ of a new type of political colonialism. Martí launches a protest against the Eurocentrism of our foreign-focused, political elites:

Nationalist statesman must replace foreign statesmen. Let the world be grafted onto our republics, but the trunk must be our own. And let the

272 'The Washington Congress', in Martí, 1977, p. 152. About Martí, Manuel Ugarte and others, see Werz, 1995, pp. 77f.

273 'Letter of farewell to Manuel Mercado', in Martí, 1977, p. 322.

274 Beorlegui, 2004, pp. 332; Fonet-Betancourt, 2001, pp. 28f.

275 'Prologue to the *Versos sencillos*', in Martí, 1963, p. 143 (Translation: TC).

276 'The International Congress in Washington', in *ibid.*, p. 59 (Translation: TC).

277 'Commercial treaty', in Martí, 1977, p. 59 (Translation: TC).

vanquished pedant hold his tongue, for there are no lands in which a man may take greater pride than in our long-suffering American republics [. . .] We were a masquerader in English breeches, Parisian vest, North American jacket, and Spanish cap. The Indian hovered near us in silence, and went off to the hills to baptize his children. [. . .] We were nothing but epaulets and professors' gowns in countries that came into the world wearing hemp sandals and headbands.²⁷⁸

[230] If Martí was clear about the new domination that came from the north, from the USA, he still was not conscious of what capitalism signified, not knowing sufficiently the work of Marx. On the contrary, José Carlos Mariátegui (1895–1930),²⁷⁹ author of *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (1928), knows what capitalism signifies, but at the same time discovers the central Peruvian social problem from a critical materialist point of view. There is no 'worker class' in Peru (where the Industrial Revolution had not begun, and the bourgeoisie and the mining class were minorities before the landowning *cacique* class). Mariátegui, from a creative critical realism, is committed to a politics unfolded around the indigenous problem, to the Latin American popular in Peru – in Russia 'the peasant problem', which Lenin could not resolve, had been solved. His reflections about indigeneity allowed the dogmatic Marxists of his era to consider him a populist. Unfortunately, the Communist parties based in Latin America from 1919 were Eurocentric. For Mariátegui, however, Marxism was not the mere *application* of abstract categories to a historical concrete reality, but the reverse. The task consisted in constructing the necessary categories from concrete reality:

And do not say [. . .] that Marxism as praxis adheres to the facts and premises of economics studied and defined by Marx, because the theses and debates of all their congresses are a continual reappraisal of the economic and political problems, according to the *new aspects of reality*.²⁸⁰

For Mariátegui, Peru was an extremely conservative country, which had supported four centuries of exploitation of the Incan indigenous (which, for its part, was a socialist system to be taken into account). The conquest was a genocidal process from which Peru never had woken up. The colonial era, interpreted by Mariátegui as a feudal regime (which Sergio Bagú has shown was not historically), structured an economic–political system that was not for the Peruvian people, the indigenous communities. The same could be said of independence and the republic: Independence was another political

²⁷⁸ Martí, 1977, pp. 40–1.

²⁷⁹ Beorlegui, 2004, p. 332; Fernet-Betancourt, 2001, pp. 123–66. See 'The Marxism of Mariátegui as *Philosophy of Revolution*' (Dussel, 1995c).

²⁸⁰ *Defense of Marxism*, IX (Mariátegui, 1987, p. 77 [Translation: TC]).

act. It did not result in a radical transformation of the economic and social structure of Peru.²⁸¹

The coming of the republic does not substantially transform the country's economy. A simple change of classes occurs: a government of landowners, *encomenderos*, and native professionals succeeds the courtly government of the Spanish nobility. The *Mestizo* aristocracy seizes power, lacking either economic ideas or political vision. The movement for emancipation from the metropolis *passes unnoticed* by the country's four million Indians. Their state of servitude has continued *from the Conquest to our day*.²⁸²

The diagnosis is clear, critical, current. Marxism that relies on historical reality begins. For this reason, enthusiastic about the work of E. Valcárcel, *Storm in the Andes* (the birth of the 'new Indian', historical act), Mariátegui exclaims:

It is [the work of Valcarcel] somewhat evangelical, even apocalyptic. One will not find here the exact principles of the revolution that will restore the indigenous race to its place in the history of the nation. But here are its myths. And since the elevated spirit of George Sorel, reacting against the mediocre positivism that had infected the socialists of his era [and of ours, I add], discovered the perennial value of the Myth²⁸³ in the creation of great popular movements, we have known well that this is an aspect of the struggle we must not neglect or underestimate, *while being fully realistic*.²⁸⁴

Mariátegui knows what influences the *popular imagination*, in the *narrative history* of the memory of a people, their struggles, their heroes, their hopes. The rationalist and dogmatic left scorns that imagination, narratively religious, which the overestimation of an atheism negated, without realizing that one has to re-read that imagination, re-interpret, re-launch it to transform the members of that people into actors, as 'the slaves who were liberated in Egypt', the Exodus metaphor used by Túpac Amaru, the emancipators, Fidel Castro, the Sandinistas, Rigoberta Menchú and others.

²⁸¹ *Prologue to the Storm in the Andes* of E. Valcarcel, in Löwy, 1980, p. 100 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 28).

²⁸² 'The Indigenous Question in Latin America', in Löwy, 1980, p. 102 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 33).

²⁸³ 'History is made by men possessed and enlightened by a higher belief, a superhuman hope; other men are the anonymous chorus of the drama. The crisis of bourgeois civilization appeared in the moment this civilization verified its lack of a myth [. . .] Bourgeois civilization has fallen into skepticism [. . .] The people capable of victory were people capable of a massive myth' ('The man and the myth', in *World* [Lima], 16 January 1925 [Mariátegui, 1979, pp. 308-9; Translation: TC]).

²⁸⁴ *Prologue to the work of Valcárcel*, in Löwy, 1980, p. 101 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 33).

Like Martí, Mariátegui also speaks to us of the 'second independence':

The national bourgeoisies, who see cooperation with imperialism as their best source of profits, feel themselves secure enough not to be too greatly preoccupied with national sovereignty. The South American bourgeoisies [. . .] are not disposed to admit the necessity of struggling for their *second independence*.²⁸⁵

Here Mariátegui is extremely current:

The native aristocracy and bourgeoisie feel no solidarity with the people in possessing a common history and culture. In Peru, the white aristocrat and bourgeois *scorn the popular and the national*. They consider themselves white above all else. The petty-bourgeois *Mestizo* imitates their example. [. . .] Anti-imperialism [could] (perhaps) penetrate more easily among bourgeois elements. But this is for reasons related to capitalist expansion and development. Anti-imperialism thereby is raised to the level of a program, a political attitude, a movement that is valid in and of itself.²⁸⁶

In effect, the nationalist anti-imperialism (of the populism of G. Vargas, L. Cárdenas or J. D. Perón, and even of the APRA of Haya de la Torre in Peru) was hegemonized by the *post-colonial* national bourgeoisie (in the majority of the cases, the struggle of competition against the bourgeoisie at the *centre* of the global capitalist system). The 'bloc of oppressed classes', the people (the *plebs*), were allied momentarily, but not as the moment of the 'historical bloc in power'.²⁸⁷ That bourgeois anti-imperialist struggle is 'populist'; the anti-imperialist, anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist struggle is 'popular'.

For Mariátegui, therefore, the hegemonic popular sectors in Peru are the 'indigenous communities'. It is not strictly a classical classist struggle. It is a political, cultural, religious, ethnic and also economic struggle. Marxism has to be enriched with new categorical horizons:

The indigenous question, in the majority of cases, is identified with the land question. The ignorance, backwardness, and misery of the indigenous people are merely results of their subservience. The feudal *latifundio* maintains the exploitation and absolute domination of the indigenous masses by the landowning class. The Indians' struggle has invariably centred on the defense of their lands against dispossession and absorption

²⁸⁵ 'Anti-imperialist point of view' (1929), cit. by Löwy, 1980, p. 108 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 39).

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 109 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 39).

²⁸⁷ Mariátegui laments: 'We have the experience of Mexico, where the petty bourgeoisie has just allied with Yankee imperialism' (*ibid.* [Translation: Pearlman, p. 41]).

by the *gamonales*. Thus, there is an instinctive and profound indigenous demand: the demand for land. Giving an organized, systematic, and definite character to this demand is a task on which the union movement and our political propaganda must actively collaborate.²⁸⁸

It is a gigantic step of opening to Latin American popular reality, through which will travel the movements with realist, critical, historical politics.

In the following 20 years, important political events occurred in Latin America each year: El Salvador with 'Farabundism', Brazil with the National Liberation Alliance of Luis Carlos Prestes, the Popular Front in Chile at the end of the 1930s, the nationalist position of Vicente Lombardo Toledano in Mexico²⁸⁹ in contrast to the simplistic confusion, among others, of Vittorio Codovilla in Argentina, within Latin American populism (for example, Perónism) and Nazism or fascism.²⁹⁰ From a strictly categorical, scientific, Marxist point of view the work of Segio Bagú *The Economics of Colonial Society* (1949) signifies the most important epistemological rupture in the Latin American twentieth century (one will have to wait until 'dependency theory' in the 1970s to observe another theoretical moment of similar scope). We read:

Far from reviving the feudal order, America entered into the orbit of commercial capitalism with surprising speed. And America contributed to giving this system a tremendous vigor, making possible the beginnings of industrial capitalism centuries later. Slavery has nothing to do with feudalism, but everything to do with capitalism [. . .] Indigenous and African labor were the pillars of colonial America. America and Africa, their blood distilled by the alchemists of international commerce, were indispensable to the dazzling growth of capitalist Europe.²⁹¹

I think the situation was even more radical. If it is true that before 1492 there were 'already inaugurated in Europe' some forms of production that would be subsumed in the capitalist system, it is only with the opening to the Atlantic and the original accumulation arising from Latin America that capitalism *is born*. The accumulation and extension of territory, population,

288 Ibid. (Translation: Pearlman, p. 36). In the future we will analyse how the 'claims' or 'demands' of diverse social movements (differentiated claims) are articulated around a hegemonic or 'equivalent claim'; in Peru, certainly, it is the claim of the indigenous population, together with the marginal, excluded, irregular urban sectors, those previously called *Lumpen*. They are the constituent part of the 'people'.

289 'Defending the sovereignty and independence of the nation is of equal importance to the proletariat, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the country's progressive big bourgeoisie. It concerns the nation itself' ('The popular party' [1947], in Löwy, 1980, p. 161 [Translation: Pearlman, p. 82]). These were the times of the 'Fronts'.

290 This led the Communist parties to ally themselves in the 1940s with the bourgeois, liberal, pro-North American parties. See Löwy (1980, pp. 170-205), where one can observe movements in Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, etc.

291 Bagú cit. Löwy, 1980, p. 229 (Translation: Pearlman, p. 140).

and mining wealth primarily obtained in America will not simply produce 'industrial capitalism centuries later', but originates *ipso facto* mercantilist capitalism, capitalism as such (and also later will condition the development of the industrial, imperialist and transnational capitalism).

The Cuban Revolution (1959–)

[231] In Cuba the first socialist revolution in the American continent was produced, in a favourable moment of the Cold War, when world power was divided – which allowed a certain geopolitical movement – through the bipolarity of the USA and of the Soviet Union. That bipolar moment had a short life, some 50 years (1945–89). The collapse of the Soviet Union and socialism in eastern Europe substantially modified the global political horizon and especially the Latin American.

In this as in all revolutions there were singular figures, leaders who drove a popular process, who constituted the symbolic reference of the historical movement and who will earn increasing importance as the decades pass. In this case there are two historical characters who have penetrated the popular Latin American imagination: Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and Fidel Castro. This leadership (like Lenin in Russia, Mao Tse-tung in China, Ho Chi-ming in Vietnam, Agostinho Neto in Angola, Allende in Chile, the Sandinista commanders in Nicaragua) reflects a theoretical question. One would have to meditate on the traditional practical syllogism: the universality of the theory (*Allgemeinheit*), strategic particularity (*Besonderheit*), and uniqueness of the persons who drive the process (*Einzelheit*). Paradoxically, these persons are not the fruit of merely individual biographies, but the production of a dialectic between the unique biography and the claims of a people. The people *invest* the concrete personage with a mythical *ideal of 'ego'* that the people are forging. The *empirical 'ego'* of the concrete political is assigned the function of deciding at key moments the political process, tactic or the strategy to follow – always in participative-democratic reference with respect to the more active militants and to the people themselves – and so one finds within a regime of *fidelity to the truth* (using the expression of Alain Badiou, although changing the sense and location) the *ideal of 'ego'* constructed by the popular claims themselves. The unique person of the political militant (as 'Che' Guevara) has 'to be at the level' of what the people *hope from them*; the mythical ideal of 'ego' that is imposed as a demand of political normativity to the political itself, more than a *vanguard* one is the *rearguard* assuring *throughout* the process that the people discover their own struggles.

The Cuban revolution has a different 'flavour' from the socialist revolutions of eastern Europe, and is similar to those of Asia or Africa – countries of the periphery, almost always post-colonial. It exercises a learned *anti-dogmatic political heterodoxy* that articulated itself in large part within the

popular imagination in the deepest aspects of the culture of the respective continents.

What stand out in the case of Fidel Castro (1927–), son of a landowner of Galician origin, are the intuitions that guided his strategic–revolutionary political action, from before he assumes Marxist ideology:

I was not born poor, I was born rich; I was not a landless peasant, but the son of a landowner; I did not live in a hut with a dirt floor nor did I walk barefoot. I saw poverty without suffering it. *From that* [conclusion that he would have to explain normatively]²⁹² I am not a defender of the landowners *but of the people, the peasants*. [. . .] The revolution was powerful: it *included the faith*²⁹³ of the people, and the dictatorship [of Bautista] succumbed.²⁹⁴

The *last resort* or fundamental reference of all his political action (before assuming Marxism and becoming a socialist revolutionary) is always the people. In defence of his own case, the young Cuban lawyer sees the vision of politics that constitutes their public subjectivity:

This is how *peoples* fight when they want to win their freedom; they throw stones at airplanes and overturn tanks! [. . .] When we speak of the people [. . .] the unredeemed masses, those to whom everyone makes promises and who are deceived by all; we mean the people who yearn for a better, more dignified and more just nation; who are moved by ancestral aspirations of justice,²⁹⁵ for they have suffered injustice and mockery generation after generation [. . .] The first condition of sincerity and good faith in any endeavour is to do precisely what nobody else ever does, that is, to speak with absolute clarity, without fear. The demagogues and professional politicians²⁹⁶ who manage to perform the miracle of being right about everything and of pleasing everyone are, necessarily, deceiv-

292 The 'from that' seems not to follow from the stated premises. In effect, he fails to indicate that the awareness of wealth was discovered in his childhood (when at about 13 years old, he led a strike of the field labourers on his father's property) as guilty, not-merited, an expression of inequality. 'From that' he could not be a 'defender of the landowners'. In the secret of his ethical conscience, the political super-ego of the young Fidel, was born the rebellion, the aspiration to justice, the not wanting to overcome the 'guilt' of his class or origin: his 'original sin', Karl Marx would say (see Dussel, 1993).

293 This concept of 'faith' will have to be taken seriously, since it is repeated constantly throughout the life of Fidel Castro. See Dussel, 1977a, 2.4.7: 'Reason and faith'. 'Faith in the Other, far from being a petty bourgeois fideism or elitism [as H. Cerutti thought], [. . .] is the position of the people themselves; as F. Castro expresses when he says that the people have to have faith, *when they believe in themselves enough*' (2.4.7.5 [Translation: TC]).

294 'I was not born poor, I was born rich' (24 February 1959) (Castro, 1975, p. 151 [Translation: TC]).

295 People, as political category, crosses the modes of production and the ages of a political community that occupies a given territory (for example, France, Mexico or China). It is a category whose historical reference can extend itself for centuries, millennia.

296 It seems here to pulverize those so intelligent, and cynical, observations of the famous work of M. Weber.

ing everyone about everything. The revolutionaries must proclaim their ideas courageously, define their principles and express their intentions so that no one is deceived, neither friend nor foe. [. . .] To these people whose desperate roads through life have been paved with the bricks of betrayal and false promises, we were not going to say: 'We will give you . . .' but rather: 'Here it is, now fight for it with everything you have, so that liberty and happiness may be yours!'²⁹⁷

The exposition of the humanist Castro, before the socialist, shows us already the depth of the political position *from which he will opt later for socialism*. It is like the concept of fetishism in Marx, which he adopted before his option for Communism. They are substantive political attitudes and profoundly normative. The ethical coherence of the politician (whose *claim of sincerity* is opposed to the cynicism of the exoteric position of Leo Strauss, adopted by the fundamentalist Christian and Jewish camp of George W. Bush, like the 'friend/enemy' of C. Schmitt) is based on the clear option for the people, which has to be distinguished from the merely *populist* position. In the 'Discourse of Victory' of 8 January 1959 he exclaims:

The *people* listen, the revolutionaries listen, the soldiers of the army whose destiny is in our hands listen [. . .] To speak *the truth* is the first responsibility of any revolutionary, to deceive the awakening *people* with illusions, always would bring worse consequences.²⁹⁸

Together with the claim of sincerity of the politician is the preoccupation, angst, the responsibility of the politician for the people:

While the *people* are delighted today, while the *people* rejoiced today, we were preoccupied. And the more extraordinary the crowd who came to meet us, the more extraordinary the joy of the *people*, the greater was our preoccupation, because greater also was *our responsibility* before history and before the *people* of Cuba [. . .] Who can stand before the victorious *people* as future enemies of the revolution? The worst enemies who the Cuban revolution can have further on are *the revolutionaries themselves*.²⁹⁹

This text is an example of the normativity of political principles (not of political ethics), in particular of the politicians popular 'by vocation' (never 'by profession'):

Even creating [in some revolutions] the revolutionary class and revolutionaries who wanted to live the revolution. They wanted to live with the

297 'History will absolve me' (16 October 1953) (Castro, 1975, pp. 37-8).

298 Castro, 1975, p. 139 (Translation: TC).

299 Ibid., pp. 139-40 (Translation: TC).

title that they had fought for [. . .] This revolution is not of this class [. . .] The revolutionary who I remember from my childhood walked with a .45 in his belt [. . .] If we accomplished this revolution thinking that as soon as the tyranny was overthrown we would enjoy power [. . .], if each one of us would live like a king. [We have to ask the] question [. . .] because the future of Cuba, of us and of *the people* depends on our examination of conscience [. . .]³⁰⁰ The *people* are interested in knowing if we will accomplish this revolution or if we will fall into the same errors that the previous revolution fell into.³⁰¹

[232] It is important to observe that Fidel Castro *never* refers to the struggle of classes driven by the industrial-worker class. His reference, like all the leaders of the other socialist revolutions of the peripheral or post-colonial world, is simply the people: in a redundant, overwhelming, repetitive way. In the 'First Declaration of Havana' (2 September 1960) the term 'people' is the most frequent in all the text:

The *people* came together today to discuss important questions [. . .] Why? Because our *people* know what they are defending, our *people* know the battle is being fought. And as our *people* know that they are struggling for their survival³⁰² and for their triumph, and our *people* is a battling *people* and a valiant *people*, the Cubans are here [. . .] Our *people* had the right to be one day a free *people*, our *people* had the right to rule their own destinies, our *people* had the right to one day count on leaders who will not defend the interests of the privileged [. . .], but on leaders who put the interests of their *people* and their country before the interests of the voracious stranger; with leaders who put *the interests of the people* [and here Castro specifies the claims of the collective identities that constitute the people], *the interests* of peasants, *the interests* of workers, *the interests* of youth, *the interests* of children, *the interests* of women, *the interests* of elders, above the interests of the privileged³⁰³ and the exploiters.³⁰⁴

That was what the revolution found on arriving to the [delegated exercise of] power: an economically underdeveloped country,³⁰⁵ a *people who were victims*³⁰⁶ of all kinds of exploitation.³⁰⁷

300 Maybe here Castro remembers his studies with the Jesuits in the Belén College of Havana.

301 Castro, 1975, pp. 140-1 (Translation: TC).

302 Observe the first *material* principle of all politics.

303 Here a 'frontier' is fixed that divides the political community between the oppressors of the 'historical bloc in power' (in the terminology of Gramsci) and the 'social bloc of the oppressed' and excluded (the *plebs* who have the aim of being the future *populus*).

304 Castro, 1975, p. 223 (Translation: TC).

305 'Country' indicates something like the totality, the political community that inhabits a common ground, a nation, under the institutionality of a state. Meanwhile, 'people' indicates the social bloc of the 'exploited', 'oppressed'.

306 As one can see, Castro also uses the category of 'victim' suggested by Benjamin.

307 There are 'kinds of exploitation' as social movements or differentiated identities

In a more doctrinal way, political theory in a narrow sense, Castro explains:

In the first place, why is this a *general assembly of the people*? [It] means [. . .], the *people are sovereign*, *sovereignty* is rooted in the people and from it emanate *all the* [institutional³⁰⁸] powers. The *people* of Cuba are sovereign.³⁰⁹

There are clear definitions of a liberation politics that situates sovereignty in the political community, the people and not the state. The life of the people is the normative political instance:

What does it mean to say country or death? It means that to any of us *dying* is not important when our *people live*,³¹⁰ the country *lives*; that none of us is too important to surrender our *life* to the country, so the country keeps *living*.³¹¹

The producing, reproducing and developing of the life of the political community (of the *people*, the *plebs*) is the normative material principle of all politics. Castro declares the theme explicitly; he touches on political philosophy to base this universal principle. 'People' is not a social *class*. This is determined in the economic 'field' or the social 'environment',³¹² and therefore is essentially an economic or sociological category. Meanwhile 'people' is a *strictly political* category and constitutes a collective identity, a political community or a social bloc that crosses moments of the economic field (modes of production, for example) or political field of the history of a country, a nation, a state in its multiple stages:

At the end of more than 100 years, our America, the America of Bolívar, Hidalgo, San Martín, O'Higgins, Sucre, Tiradentes, Juárez y Martí, wanted to be free, [not transformed] into a zone of exploitation, into the backyard of the Yankee political and financial empire, in reserve for voting in the international organizations, where the Latin American countries have been characterized as pariahs of the colossal north that scorns us.³¹³

For the Cuban revolution the heroes of the Latin American people, neither workers nor socialists, are nevertheless emblematic figures of the revolu-

that exist in the 'breast of the people' (to speak as Mao Tse-tung). Castro, 1975, p. 221 (Translation: TC).

308 What we will call *potestas* in future works.

309 Castro, 1975, p. 238 (Translation: TC).

310 This is the content of the universal material principle of all politics.

311 Castro, 1975, p. 238 (Translation: TC).

312 In the architectonic we will distinguish between 'field' and 'environment' (this last is the group of material 'fields' that cross the political 'field').

313 Castro, 1975, p. 240 (Translation: TC).

tion. Why? Because the revolution of 1959 of the Cuban people is a central moment in Latin American history, and from then on, in the memory of the people, not only as participating in a social process, but equally in communitarian intersubjectivity, *actor* also of other heroic events throughout history. The *political* category of 'people' can be expressed strictly in that process of long cycles of history.

One also has to redefine the state. It is not a necessary instrument of domination – against the extreme anarchists. On the contrary:

What has occurred, simply, is that *the instrument* called the state and all its organs of power,³¹⁴ although it can be something at the service of the privileged, is today an instrument of power *at the service of the oppressed* and the exploited of the country!³¹⁵

It is understood that some 'order ordering', when institutionalized power is fetishized and so 'dominate'; others, however, 'order obeying', when the delegated exercise of power is fulfilled as *obedient* 'service'.

We have touched only a few aspects of the originality of Castro's thinking within the process of the Cuban Revolution. There are many other novel moments with respect to the tradition of global Marxism that we cannot explain here. This signifies an enormous broadening of political practice, principles, of the intersubjective reference of collective identity presented as the *actor* of the transformation of the institutions. The *people* is certainly the central category, a question not frequently studied.

[233] 'Che' Guevara, Marxist before Fidel Castro, more *theoretical* (although less *political*), notes other innovative aspects of the Cuban Revolution when he expresses:

Never in America had an event with such extraordinary characteristics occurred [. . .] to such an extent that it has been described by some as the pivotal event in America [. . .] This movement, largely *heterodox*,³¹⁶ in its forms and manifestations [. . .] The first, maybe the most important, the most original, is a *cosmic force* called Fidel Castro [. . .] to us he seems comparable to the greatest historical figures in Latin America [. . .] He has [an] extraordinary desire to listen to the *will of the people*.³¹⁷

³¹⁴ 'Institutions of the delegated exercise of power' of the people.

³¹⁵ 'The working class has to win political power' (Castro, 1975, p. 296). In this exposition of Castro, when the workers have no revolutionary conscience, they struggle for sectoral interests, which 'places a burden on the rest of the people. The worker is taught not to think of the rest of the people' (ibid., p. 295 [Translation: TC]).

³¹⁶ Thinking of the previous phrase: 'the Russian Revolution [. . .] the Chinese Revolution'.

³¹⁷ 'Cuba: historical exception or vanguard in the anti-colonialist struggle?' (April 1961) (Guevara, 1974, pp. 515–16). These expressions of 'Che' Guevara about the 'great director' of the left are extremely important for current debates in Latin America about whether the social or political movements, and political parties of the left, critical, progressive or revolutionary, could have 'leaders' whose unique personality consists in having the 'capacity

A second heterodox aspect consists in:

[. . .] the Sierra Maestra, scene of the first revolutionary column, is a place of refuge for the peasants,³¹⁸ who struggling against the large estates, search for a new piece of land that they seize from the state or some voracious large land-owner to create their small wealth. They are always in continual struggle against the soldiers' extortions [. . .] They can be characterized as [having a] petty bourgeois spirit; a peasant [who] struggles for land.³¹⁹

It was not the actor of the revolution nor the working class, as Marx thought, nor the multitudinous Chinese peasantry of Mao Tse-tung. It was the peasant with aspiration to ownership. In addition, the revolutionaries of *Granma* were petty urban bourgeois, like the principal and first cadres of Sandinismo. Third:

That is what in reality we are, the gently called *underdeveloped*, in truth colonial countries, semi-colonial or *dependent*. We are countries with economies distorted by imperial action. [For this our countries] flow along in the most terrible and permanent *hunger of the people* [. . .] Low wages, underemployment, unemployment: *the hunger of the people*, [. . .] The objective conditions are given by the *hunger of the people*, the reaction to this *hunger* [. . .] We lack in America the subjective conditions of which the most important is awareness of the possibility of victory.³²⁰

It is a decolonizing revolution (or emancipation of a post-colonial country) that assumed the exploitation of the people that originated in the conquest begun in 1492, when mercantile capitalism, the Eurocentric metropolis and the phenomenon of Modernity also began. 'Che' Guevara would not be conscious of these last two phenomena.

'Che' Guevara was innovative in discovering normativity (although he thought it was *ethics*) in the political militant (more than in the bureaucratic professional), linked to the dogmatism into which Marxism had fallen (of Soviet origin, unfortunately, rapidly introduced into Cuba):

In this period of constructing socialism we can see the *new man* being born. His image is unfinished; it could not ever be finished since the process is parallel to the development of new economic forms [. . .] Let me say, at the risk of seeming ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided

of binding, of uniting, opposing themselves to the division that weakens; capacity of directing at the front of all the action of the people' (ibid., p. 516 [Translation: TC]). Although vanguardism is today out of fashion, one does not have to throw the baby out with the bathwater!

³¹⁸ Makes us think about the 'Lacandon jungle' of Chiapas (Mexico).

³¹⁹ Guevara, 1974, pp. 517-18 (Translation: TC).

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 520 (Translation: TC).

by great feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality [. . .] One has to constantly struggle to transform love for humanity into concrete facts.³²¹

Maybe he was remembering the young medical student who wanted to dedicate his life to curing lepers. But, second:

If to this is added the scholasticism that has restrained the development of Marxist philosophy and hindered the systematic treatment of the [revolutionary] period, whose political economy has not been developed, we have to agree that still we are in diapers and it is necessary to be dedicated to investigating all the basic characteristics before elaborating a political and economic theory of greater scope.³²²

Unfortunately, the commentary of the Soviet manuals and the impossibility of developing a politics hindered the Cuban Revolution theoretically. And as if predicting possible detours, he wrote:

In those conditions, one has to have a great dose of humanity, a great dose of the meaning of justice and truth to not fall into extreme dogmatism, cold scholasticism, isolation from the masses.³²³

'Che' preferred to continue the revolutionary struggle, and although he was mistaken geopolitically for not seeing the difference between Cuba and Bolivia, he was not mistaken to consider that politics, when it is militancy, vocation and an example of life, requires giving your life 'so its people live' (as Castro already had expressed). A normative sense of politics can be discovered that does not detract from the realism of political feasibility, so that the strategic theory of *the war of guerrillas* signified, for a time, the prototype of the struggle of the vanguard. Its weakness, due in great part to the military strengthening of the empire and the later fall of the Soviet Union, does not detract from what has been a stellar moment of a model of strategic action, since the politics of liberation, as all politics, learns by errors and right answers, analysed a posteriori.

'Popular Unity' in Salvador Allende's Chile (1970-3)

[234] The Cuban Revolution changed the map of the Latin American political field. Every movement in every country, including the strategy of the empire, modified its premises from this first socialist revolution. In Chile,

³²¹ 'Socialism and man in Cuba' (March 1965); (Guevara, 1974, pp. 632, 638 [Translation: TC]).

³²² Ibid., p. 634 (Translation: TC).

³²³ Ibid., p. 638 (Translation: TC).

the proposal of a 'revolution in liberty' of Christian Democracy (1964-70), reacting against the Cuban Revolution, opened through its failure the path to 'Popular Unity' led by Salvador Allende (1970-3), the first socialist government elected to power. It was a new path in the political innovation of the Latin American left:

Chile is today the first nation of the land called to form the second model of transition to a socialist society [. . .] We tread a *new path*; we walk *without a guide through an unknown terrain*, hardly having as compass our fidelity to the humanism of all eras – particularly Marxist humanism – and having as north the project of the society that we desire, inspired in the longing deeply rooted in the Chilean *people*.³²⁴

The Chilean Revolution, democratic and socialist, took the politics of the left (even revolutionary) from the military or guerrilla 'field', into its first steps in the political field, seriously transformative (in the economic and political field, and with respect to the capitalist and liberal system). Its 'danger' for the North American continental hegemony was rapidly detected and, directed from the Department of State, under the protagonism of Henry Kissinger, the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet was imposed on 11 September 1973. The 'Chilean way to socialism' was abruptly truncated by the violence of the empire. It was a historical experience of the Latin American people. It was the experience of a 'convergence between the socialist (including the communist) and social-democratic parties and the Christian progressive forces [as the MAPU founded by Rodrigo Ambrosio], between all the democratic groups not invested in the monopolistic type of ownership'.³²⁵ Euro-communism in Italy, Spain, Portugal or France, for example, was part of the cascading effect of the Chilean case.

In 1972, the First Latin American meeting of Christians for Socialism (under the call of Gonzalo Arroyo and with the presence of the bishop of Cuernavaca Sergio Méndez Arceo)³²⁶ met in Santiago, and declared:

Socialism presents itself as the only acceptable option for getting beyond a class-based society. The fact is that social classes are a reflection of the economic base which, in a capitalist society, sets up an antagonistic division between the possessors of capital and those who are paid for their labor [. . .] Only by replacing private ownership with social ownership of the means of production do we create objective conditions that will allow for the elimination of class antagonism.³²⁷

³²⁴ Quoted in Roitman Rosenmann, 2005, p. 202 (Translation: TC).

³²⁵ Carrillo, 1977, p. 133 (Translation: TC); quoted in Roitman Rosenmann, p. 204.

³²⁶ See Dussel, 1979, pp. 92-106.

³²⁷ Various authors, *Christians and Socialism* (1973, p. 267 [Translation: Drury, p. 169]).

The Sandinista Revolution (1979-90)

[235] The shadow of the dark night of history covered the Latin American continent under the suicidal cover of military dictatorships, which, beginning with Brazil in 1964, oppressed almost all the Latin American people. For six years (1973-9) a defeatist spirit spread through the left. This was not true of other groups, like the base ecclesial movements. The Christian workers and university youth politicized and committed to the revolutionary movements and the development of liberation theology (of enormous political significance), etc. These constituted experiences that predicted a rebirth *from below* before the Medellín Conference of 1968.³²⁸ Camilo Torres died as a guerrilla in Colombia in January 1966.³²⁹ The new innovative path of the Sandinista Revolution (1979-90)³³⁰ was unexpected, and like a messianic conp (the 'now-time' of W. Benjamin), which inaugurates a new way of mobilizing *popular imagination* to articulate it with revolutionary politics.³³¹

The revolutionary poet, Ernesto Cardenal emerges as a scream from the pain of the repression orchestrated by the dictator Anastasio Somoza, student and graduate of the military school of West Point in the USA. In Cardenal's 'Psalm 5', under the title of 'Hear my cries', we read:

Lord listen to what I'm saying,
 hear my cries
 and my I-can't-stand-it.
 You never plot with dictators;
 your politics are straight.
 They don't fool you with slick campaigns;
 you're not behind them,
 the con-men,
 the party bosses.

Their words are dead;
 you know there's nothing in them,
 their press-releases and statements.

³²⁸ See Dussel, 1979, 1995b.

³²⁹ See his declaration 'To the Colombian people from the mountains' (in Löwy, 1980, pp. 283-5 [Translation: Pearlman, pp. 187-9]).

³³⁰ See the exemplary works of Hodges (1986 and 1992).

³³¹ I want to speak in relation to imagery in the Lacanian sense (as a moment of the trilogy: the imagination, the symbolic, and 'impossible real'), in the Sartrean sense and in that of Castoriadis, but also in the sense of the 'ethical-mythical nucleus' of Paul Ricœur. A people synthesizes in multiple narratives, symbolic, mythical, mutually articulated, the ultimate meaning of their collective existence, historical memory, culture, and what we might call the ritual communitarian celebration as linguistic signs, stories, religious rituals, which express the collective identity of the group (always in process, never as a finished substance). That imagination is carried by all members, continually redefined from historical experiences (being deposited in the fruit of the collective symbolic work) and is the valid starting point of the consensual experiences of the group.

Their speeches are honeyed with peace;
they drip love and kindness
and their stock-piles grow the faster.

They hold peace conferences
more they could not.
They talk of friendship among nations.
In secret they prepare weapons of war
of utter destruction.

Their wavelengths dance with lies,
evil songs in the darkness.
Their desks are heavy with plots.
Lord preserve me from their scheming.

Their mouths are machine-guns
and their tongues deal death.

You will bless the man
who shuns their slogans and campaigns,
their hand-outs and all they say.
You will circle him with armour
and shield him with all your love.³³²

The poetry, the aesthetic, the culture, the critical-liberating religion enter for the first time into Latin American revolutionary politics.³³³ César Augusto Sandino has much to do with this new heterodoxy. It is true that biographically he adhered to a strange sect (the Magnetic-Spiritualist School),³³⁴ which political Sandinismo simply ignores. Sandino interests us politically not for his theosophy, but for his struggle against Northern America and the dictatorship in his country. It is a singular nationalist referent. The Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) absorbs in all ways a certain anarchist, ethical spirit of the historical Sandino, corrected by the doctrine and praxis actualized by 'Che' Guevara (more than Fidel Castro), and from the liberation theology (which replaces the ambiguous 'theosophy' of the historical

³³² E. Cardenal, *Psalms*, 1998, p. 22 (Translation: Blackman, pp. 39-40). 'Punish them Lord/ Make dust of their projects/ and cheap ideas/ of all their memoranda/ When the siren wails the last warning/ you will be with me/ You will be my refuge/ my strength and deep shelter' (ibid.).

³³³ It is not a fundamentalist religion like R. Reagan, G. W. Bush, A. Sharon or Islamism, but a political messianism that respects the secularity of the state, the independence of the political and religious fields, but is committed to the oppressed as an ethical and normative demand. It has assumed and overcome the Enlightenment from the 'second' Enlightenment, of Marx.

³³⁴ Hodges, 1992, p. 141. Hodges criticizes the anthology of Sergio Ramírez about Sandino for having eliminated all texts referring to 'political theosophy'. Sandino, arriving in Argentina in 1904, adheres to the School of Joaquín Trincado, a Masonic theosophist, anarchist (Hodges, 1992, pp. 142f.). So the historical ideology of Sandino was something like a Latin Americanized syncretic theosophic anarchist communism.

Sandino). Sandinismo, through the geo-military situation of Nicaragua (not an island where the empire had a 'beach head' like the Bay of Pigs),³³⁵ with its enormous borders with Honduras and Costa Rica, could never avoid the military hammering of the orchestrated and continual invasion of the 'contras' (with the 'Iran-contra' scandal where the CIA obtained funds from the international drugs trade) nor the mines put in the Gulf of Fonseca. It was, like the Cuban Revolution, a great victorious historical transformation (from a political, economic, cultural point of view, etc.), which nevertheless failed in 1990, in a democratic election, through the exhaustion of a small people attacked militarily by disproportionate forces, although Nicaragua was never defeated.

Although the revolution had its origin in an military insurrection, the FSLN permitted multi-partyism, free press and opposition. The political field was never diminished (like the real European socialist revolutions). From its beginning, and before occupying Managua, the FSLN acted as a 'front', joining forces with the opposition in the 'Group of Twelve'. This was also something new. The bishops themselves condemned the dictatorship. The novelty of the revolution, therefore, was the pluralism in the *cultural* and *religious* impulse that touched the *popular imagination* as in no other revolution. Luis Carrión, Jaime Wheelock, Mirtha Valtodano and other revolutionary commanders were members of the Christian youth. This qualitatively changed the process. The campaign against illiteracy, directed by Fernando Cardenal; the aesthetic cultural creativity, also oriented by another Cardenal, Ernesto; the external relations driven by the cerebral wisdom of Miguel Escoto; the continual mobilization of the base; the agrarian reform; the solution to the indigenous problem on the Atlantic Coast (after initial errors), made possible a new type of revolution toward socialism. The FSLN avoided taboo words like communism, Marxism and even socialism. Sergio Ramírez writes:

We cannot say that all the ideas that motivate the Sandinista revolutionary project were in the mind of Sandino. We have to remember that it is another era [. . .]. Popular democracy³³⁶ can be developed by the Sandinista Front through the organs of *popular power*, that are: the revolutionary government, the State Council and all the remaining forms of *popular power* that the revolution develops in distinct planes and in distinct instances of national life [. . .] Once liberated from foreign dominion in national political life, liberated from the dominion of these historical parallel forms, it is possible to give way entirely to new forces of organization in the country [. . .] The ideas of Sandino are expressed through the beginning of the Program of Agrarian Reform [. . .].³³⁷

335 See 'The first great failure of Imperialism' (Castro, 1975, pp. 334f.).

336 Note the formulation 'popular democracy'.

337 S. Arce, 'Validity of Sandinista thought', in Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo, 1985, pp. 24-5 (Translation: TC).

The FSLN refers, as its fundamental narrative, to the thinking of Sandino (and not to Marx or Lenin, for example). This gave a great ideological autonomy to the vanguard (the commanders of the Revolution), and for this reason the Soviet Union (as in Cuba) would not direct theoretically the Sandinista popular revolution. Its originality was an non-negotiable assumption.

During the visit of Pope John Paul II to Managua, the Sandinista Revolution received him in the plaza of the Revolution with a great poster: on the left was the figure of Carlos Fonseca and to the left an image of the Immaculate Virgin, with the sentence 'Between Christianity and revolution there is no contradiction', which indicated a step forward in the understanding of the Nicaraguan popular imagination. Like Zapatismo (the historical Emiliano Zapata), Sandinismo organized itself politically around a mythical person, who although he had existed empirically was de-historicized politically, transformed into a symbolic reference that semantically indicated the concrete, historical meaning with a national, popular physiognomy far from the well-known dogmatic and abstract universalism of traditional Marxism or socialism. Much more than the Cuban revolution, the Nicaraguan revolution acquired a clear sense of cultural revolution and even religious modifying the exhausted parameters of the left. Its originality was noted immediately, although it was maybe never clearly analysed from political theory until the present.³³⁸ A Latin American 'new left' had emerged, for which the older Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of European socialism lacked validity. The linking with the people, complex, historical, concrete, plural, and with the new social movements, demanded a new political philosophy.

The Zapatista Revolution (1994-)

[236] There were five long years from the fall of Sandinismo, the Berlin Wall and the collapse of real socialism. The Zapatista Revolution started innovatively from a movement that, with the celebration of the so-called 'discovery' of 1492, had permitted the native people of the continent to rethink their centuries-old claims. Indigenous people appeared in the Mexican political field, who, from their own experience of ancient Mayan culture, constituted a creative stage within the Latin American revolutionary tradition finding unexpected resources in the understanding of the popular imagination. Practically and theoretically the 'left' took charge of a political categorical complexity that allowed it to be expressed and organized from a distinctive claim (that of the indigenous peoples prior to the conquest, the colony, the Creole and Mestizo post-colonial modern state) of an enormous criticality and popular intensity. A key sector of the Latin American people had become conscious of, and headed with clarity toward reactivat-

³³⁸ The work of Donald Hodges explains well the real ideology of the historical Sandino, although he does not explain why it was a constitutive myth of the Sandinista movement.

ing various social movements (old or new) to transform the scattered bloc of many social protest movements into *a people with political conscience*. Maybe this is the demand that in some countries (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, etc.) constructs the equivalent hegemonic identity of the Latin American people, in active struggle for their second Emancipation.

'Class' as the fundamental social category of analysis had to articulate itself with another social-anthropological and political category: 'ethnicity'. Traditional Marxism was found to be theoretically defenceless. One had to think again. This added to the cultural (indigenous) field the racial aspect (fundamental classification in the 'coloniality of power' shown by Anibal Quijano) and the political, historical and religious. The catechists of Bishop Samuel Ruiz, in Chiapas, transformed themselves into Zapatista commanders, fully conscious of their dignity, self-determination, economic, judicial, political, religious and cultural originality, and even with regard to agricultural, educational, sanitational technologies, etc. It is a reclamation that is five centuries old and finally surfaces in the political field. It is a confrontation with so-called Western civilization, Modernity, Eurocentrism, the Creole-white superiority and even Mestiza. A revolution in many fields simultaneously. The Zapatista Revolution makes you think!³³⁹

The left will confront perhaps the most creative challenge of its history in Latin America. Now one can see the 'why' of the critique of the mono-ethnic understanding of the state (all the citizens have to be culturally and homogeneously equal) or of the monolithic definition of the nation or people.³⁴⁰ This reductionist univocal fallacy (a nation = a state; a people = a cultural collective identity) is not found solely in the conservative political tradition (dominantly Creole), but equally is defended by the 'Mestizo' (ladino) populist assimilationist movements and also by the majority of the left (in particular, by the old Eurocentric communist parties), with the exception, for example, of J. C. Mariátegui (which proves the rule). Zapatismo profoundly calls into question many unconscious structures of the political-cultural symbolism of the 'national structure of the post-colonial state' (institutionalized from 1810) and opens a historical experience that will constitute a new chapter in global political philosophy. The popular imagination itself will have to rediscover hidden aspects. Within the faces, the movements, the collective identities whose demands constitute the people (as *plebs*) must be the original indigenous ethnicities, who endured the genocide of the expansion of Modernity, the conquest, the domination of the liberal post-colonial state, the benefactor populist state, even the revolutionary, and, finally, the neo-liberal globalizing project, which, as a 'homogenizing steamroller', intends that all the citizens be only equivalent *consumers* (if they are solvent, not poor, without money, because in this case they are exiled to the kingdom

³³⁹ Paul Ricœur (2004, p. 481) exclaimed: 'The symbol makes you think!'

³⁴⁰ See 'Forms of state and multi-ethnic democracy in Latin America', in Roitman Rosenmann, 2005, pp. 167-91 and Villoro, 1998.

of 'nothing', of the Parmenidic 'not-being', gotten rid of, disposable) in a global market, identical in their content. The poorest of the poor culturally, economically and politically, the most diverse among the Different, permit us to cut with greater precision *from below* and *from outside* all the remaining layers of the people. 'Class struggle' (in which the indigenous would be classified as peripheral with respect to the peasant, fulfilling sporadically some 'class practices') did not include 'inter-ethnic struggle', which in addition was a 'struggle among races', 'struggle among cultures', 'struggle among religions', 'epistemological struggle between sages' (as Boaventura de Sousa would say) and many other 'struggles' ignored by the old left. The homogeneity of the citizen of the liberal post-colonial state, even the revolutionary leftist, ignored Differences, where the so-called *equality* of the Eurocentric French bourgeois or Russian socialist revolution negated the right of being Other. It negated the right to Alterity, for whose recognition it was necessary to struggle against the dominating homogeneity. States pretended to be mono-ethnic, from the nationalist Mestiza ideology in the best cases (dominated in fact by the racial 'superiority' of the white Creoles, although they were always a minority), when not from the ideology of the universalist, pro-imperialist Creole elites.

Zapatismo (and its Zapatista Army of National Liberation, the EZLN) questions many traditional categories of political philosophy in general, and standard Marxism also, and demands much greater theoretical creativity than any other previous revolutionary movement. This is because it affects the essence of political power and forms of legitimation (the types of democracy), the ultimate devaluation of vanguardism, the method of transforming institutions, realizing that the critique of ideology is in the end the critique of religion (of theology), and, finally and most significantly, because it signifies an impassioned appeal to a normative conception of the political principles that demands a new type of political actor, the political community and its members as active and symmetrical participants (symmetry not simply postulated, but empirically lived). We can see some aspects of these questions.

[237] It would be good to begin with an anecdote. 'They were joking with Susana, because, they said, in truth the EZLN did not rebel on 1 January 1994, but in March 1993.' Susana had to travel to dozens of communities to gather opinions on the issues within the *Revolutionary Laws* that were approved months before the armed rebellion:

When the CCRI [Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee] came together to vote on the laws, there were passed one by one the mandates of justice, agrarian law, taxes of war, laws and obligations of the people in struggle [. . .] Susana read the proposals in which were collected the thoughts of thousands of indigenous women. She began to read and as she read, the assembly of the CCRI became noticeably more and more worried: *We want to not have to marry who we do not want to. We want to have the children that we want and can care for. We want the right to*

have positions in the community. We want the right to say our words and be respected. We want the right to study and even to be drivers. Thus it continued until it ended. At the end there was a heavy silence. The *Laws of Women* that Susana read signified, for the indigenous communities, a true revolution [. . .] The men looked at one another, nervous, worried [. . .] The *Laws of Women* were approved unanimously.³⁴¹

Zapatismo was, from the beginning, a revolution within revolutions, and the revolution of the female Zapatistas a revolution within Zapatismo and of the Mayan people. The process of liberation *from the external oppressors* began by the confrontation with the traditional internal oppressors. The Mayan woman, although much less dominated than the Ladina, had suffered ancient oppressions. The emancipating process was generalized and began by 'cleaning its own house'. Those who first benefited were the Zapatista women themselves, who from commanders to the ranks would fulfil all the tasks that the revolution demanded, functions before only completed by men.

In the Lacandon jungle, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was 'a small guerrilla column'; urban people, students, a worker, no indigenous, that turned to the mountains; 'it was a nonsense'. Subcomandante Marcos meets an elder, who bumps into him on purpose.³⁴² The elder asks him: 'You aren't hunting?' [To which Sub responds]: 'And you aren't going to your maize field?' The elder smiles and says to him: 'I have heard of you. In the gullies they say you are bandits.' Sub asks him: 'Do you believe that we are bandits? Who do you believe we are?' The elder responds: 'I prefer that you tell me.' To which Sub responds: 'We are the Zapatista Army of National Liberation.' The elder says: 'You go against the true history of Zapata.'³⁴³ And that old sage (from a knowledge dismissed by the 'lazy epistemology', B. de Sousa Santos would say) began his story from 'when the first gods, who made the world, were still taking walks at night', and step by step remembered the Mayan heogonies, reaching Ik'al and Votan, and continued with his narrative. At the end, the Creole Marcos asks him: 'And Zapata?' Old Antonio smiles: 'You already learned that to know and to walk one has to ask.' The Creole Marxist guerrilla from the city had 'bumped' into a *master*. The 'vanguard' had been dismissed. It was necessary first 'to learn'. And the old Mayan, a Walter Benjamin before the corps of Lee, said that 'Zapata appeared in the mountains. He was not born, they say. He just appeared.' His long story concluded with Ik'al and Votan uniting in Zapata. And taking from his pack a nylon purse with a photo of Zapata, he began to analyse it: 'Zapata's left hand is grasping the sabre at the waist. He has in the right a rifle supported, two ammunition belts cross the chest [. . .]' – and

³⁴¹ *La palabra de los armados*, 1994, p. 119 (Translation: TC).

³⁴² See the history of the people and the region in the excellent work of O. Moreno Corzo *The EZLN: Emergence of the Indigenous Subject* (2005).

³⁴³ All that cited and what follows, in Moreno Corzo, 2005, pp. 21–6.

he continues the description, until he says: 'There are two staircases. In the one that emerges from the darkness, are seen more Zapatistas with brown faces, as if emerging from something; in the other staircase, that is lighted, there is no one and cannot see where it goes or comes from [. . .].' That enigmatic elder hands the photo to Marcos and exclaims: 'To this photo I have posed many questions. This is how I reached here' – and gives him the photo. 'So you learn to ask and walk. Remember that you are here, and here this is what happens.'

In this way the vanguard was transformed into a rearguard, the intellectual guerrillas into 'questioners' and the ELZN began to make incursions and internalize itself in the *Mayan popular imagination*:

Thus, as the guerrillas saw, during the birth of the EZLN and the underground how *one by one their convictions fell*, meanwhile the indigenous communal forms of *understanding politics* were affirmed and each time there were more indigenous in the insurgent forces. [. . .] There arrives a moment in which the EZLN cannot make decisions, first, without presenting to the communities what it wants to do so they are aware, and then, without wanting it, a process that is now reflective but was then unwitting: to ask their permission. This was a clash that lost the political-military organization and the taking of individual and vertical decisions, in the face of the taking of collective and horizontal decisions.³⁴⁴

He will clarify further:

We organize ourselves thus because it is the only form that allows us [to work in the Mayan community . . .]. We do not intend to be the *historical vanguard*, one, unique and true. We do not intend to bind under our Zapatista flag all the honest Mexicans. We offer our flag. But there is a greater and more powerful flag under which we can all take shelter. The flag of a revolutionary national movement³⁴⁵ where the most diverse tendencies will fit.³⁴⁶

Vanguardism has been erased from the horizon. The function of the *rear-guard* of the *organic intellectual* will have to be redefined. A *new* way of doing politics, a *new* politics had emerged, which we want to categorize in

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 69 (Translation: TC). 'Increasingly the communities require the EZLN be subordinated to collective decisions-making, until it reaches a moment when, in one form or another, the EZLN is converted into the armed wing of *the communities*' (ibid. [Translation: TC]).

³⁴⁵ We will explain in a future work how 'nation' is tinged with such ambiguity that it would be more convenient to replace it, in a critical sense, by 'people', and in the abstract sense by 'political community'. Because the Mayan ethnicity can be called equally the 'Mayan nation'. So the political community in the territory organized by a state can have a plurality of nations.

³⁴⁶ 'Communication' of 20 January 1994 (Moreno Corzo, 2005, p. 86 [Translation: TC]).

this *Politics of Liberation*. Quickly the revolution is transformed into something *essentially moral, ethical*. More than the distribution of the wealth or the expropriation of the means of production, the revolution begins to be the possibility where the human being has a space of *dignity*.³⁴⁷

In the chivalrous world of *Quijote* or in Prussian authoritarianism *honour* is spoken of. In the Mayan world, Zapatista, one speaks of dignity:

[Those who have treated us unjustly have] *denied* respect and dignity, to those who populated these lands before them [the Creoles and Mestizos] . . . They forgot that human dignity is not only the heritage of those who have resolved their basic needs, but also those who have nothing material possess what makes us different from things and animals: dignity.³⁴⁸

Our dignity is not on offer in the great market of the powerful! If we lose dignity, all is lost. The struggle is happy for all brothers, our hands and our steps are united in the path of truth and justice.³⁴⁹

[238] Dignity is not what is valuable nor value itself; it is the basis of all values. Dignity does not have to be affirmed when not negated; only when it is negated does one have to defend it and proclaim it. In recognizing the Other, the first thing to affirm is the sacredness of its distinct subjectivity. Without this recognition, dialogue, agreement and establishment of a just political field are not possible. The movement demands before anything this affirmation.

There is a second step in the essence of politics, in its final starting point:

To rethink the problem of *power* in this framework of democracy, liberty and justice will require a *new political culture* [. . .]. A *new political culture* will have to be born, and, no doubt, will give birth to *new types* of political parties [. . .] A *new political* relationship will be born. A *new politics* whose base is not the confrontation between political organizations themselves, but the confrontation of their proposals.³⁵⁰

He continues explaining:

It is the right and will of the good men and women to seek and find better ways of governing and governance, what is good for others,³⁵¹ for all, is

³⁴⁷ See my articles about 'dignity' in Dussel, 1995d and 2003.

³⁴⁸ 'Letter to three newspapers', in *La Jornada* (Mexico), 18 January 1994, p. 2 of 'Profile' (Translation: TC).

³⁴⁹ 'Letters to the Civil Front of Mapastepec', in *ibid.*, 12 February 1994, p. 14, col. 2 (Translation: TC).

³⁵⁰ 'Second Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle of the EZLN' (quoted in Moreno Corzo, 2005, p. 85 [Translation: TC]).

³⁵¹ It reminds us of the 'making justice with the widow, the orphan and the poor' of the *Code of Hammurabi*, 2,700 years ago.

good. The voices of the least are not silenced,³⁵² but continue, hoping for the mind and the heart to become *common* [unanimous] where the will of the most is like the least, thus the true men and women grow within and are made great and there is no outside force that breaks them and leads them astray.³⁵³

We will see, in a work in progress, that the ontological description of political power is being reached. It is the *unity* of the *wills* of the community members through *agreement* ('are made common') so 'there is no outside force that breaks them'. This reminds us of that popular chant: 'The people united will never be defeated!' The text continues:

It was always our path that the *will* of the many would be made *common* in the hearts of the men and women in command. The majoritarian *will* was the path into which the one who ordered had to step. If one strayed from the path that was right for the people, the heart³⁵⁴ who ordered had to be changed for another who will obey. Thus was born our *strength* [power] in the mountains, he who orders obeys if he is true, he who obeys orders by the *common* heart of the true men and women.³⁵⁵ No one receives anything from those who order ordering [. . .] The good path is imposed from he who orders obeying.³⁵⁶

Power resides in the community, the sovereign and final instance of all representation. S/he who 'orders ordering' has fetishized the exercise of power in some institution, invested in being the self-referencing subject of power (for example, the state). From this fetishized instance the dominator exercises power in first person ordering.³⁵⁷ It is domination, corruption of power. Meanwhile s/he who exercises institutional power through delegation, obeying the original power of the community, is a 'servant', one who orders obeying. The power of the community is served in the delegated exercise of power of the obedient authority. It is an inversion of the definition of power from the origin of Modernity in its totality to the present, including the bourgeois political philosophy dominant today. It is another ontological and metaphysical origin of power.

In this *affirmative* sense of power, it cannot be 'taken', as if a revolutionary group 'took power' from the state. But power is exercised *delegated*

³⁵² Here begins the description of the construction of unanimity in the agreements, starting from an extreme respect for the minorities.

³⁵³ 'Ordering obeying', communicated 27 February 1994 (ibid., p. 89 [Translation: TC]).

³⁵⁴ The 'heart' for Mayas and Aztecs is the 'place', the seat of wisdom, of practical knowledge.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ 'Communication', 10 June 1994 (ibid., p. 105 [Translation: TC]).

³⁵⁷ The fetishized *potestas* exercises a dominating action, which by mistake is called 'power'. Only the delegated exercise of power of the community is strictly and properly the exercise of full political power.

from an institution that is not a self-referencing inalterable substance, but a structure of human relations (an institutional system) that can be modified ad hoc, the state like any other institution. The Zapatista conception of power is not an anarchist negative conception or fixed or conservative essentialist. It is a new conception that will signify the beginning of the deconstruction of the *system of categories of bourgeois political philosophy* (and also, unfortunately, in the majority of the 'left'). It is the original *locus enuntiationis* of a *Politics of Liberation*.

In the *Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle*, from June 2005, fruit of a long reflection of the Juntas of Good Government (democratic base communities, under the municipality), one is reminded primarily of the need to continue the struggle against globalized transnational neoliberal capitalism, but it does not set aside the institutional level (in particular its material sphere):

We are stirring up a struggle to demand a new Constitution or new laws that take into account the demands of the Mexican people: shelter, land, work, food, health, education, information, culture,³⁵⁸ independence, democracy, justice, liberty and peace,³⁵⁹ a new Constitution that recognizes the rights and liberties of the people, and defends the weak against the powerful.³⁶⁰

[239] In the new twenty-first century the Latin American experiences and those in other horizons of the world have permitted us to deepen the reflection, and, over all, to detect a '*state of rebellion*' of the Latin American *people* that has historical dimensions. It is not, as in 1959, the experience of only one people (the Cuban) who are liberated, in reference to the emblematic figures of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and of Fidel Castro. It is not only Salvador Allende, assassinated by a *coup d'état* decided by Henry Kissinger. It is not even the Nicaragua of the FSLN (1979), which intended the 'second Emancipation' from the northern empire but was defeated by the counter-revolution of the 'contras', organized by the empire itself. Today we contemplate the Zapatistas as the rearguard of a Mayan people of Chiapas. Together with these radical critical movements, the popular masses are mobilized within the *piqueteros* in Argentina, the Morales Movement, in Ecuador with the *Pachakuti* movement, together with the triumph of the Broad Front in Uruguay with Tabaré Vázquez, of Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, of the PT (in crisis, it is true, but with a history that has hardly begun and that will learn from its errors) with Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva in Brazil. There are other experiences in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, to which we have not been able to refer. It is a new panorama in Latin Ameri-

³⁵⁸ Until here all claims are about *content*, 'material'. See § 21.

³⁵⁹ These are properly of the formal sphere of legitimacy. See § 23.

³⁶⁰ Edited by the Revolutionary Clandestine Committee, 2005, p. 18, col. B (Translation: TC).

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

can history, the eruption of a *people* who are maturing politically. All these movements could be defeated, like that of M. Hidalgo in 1810 or S. Allende in 1973, but they will remain indelible references in the future. For this it is necessary to develop creatively a political philosophy that expresses that profound 'state of rebellion', one of whose stages is the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre. The *Politics of Liberation* has this social and political pluralism, always in formation from below, as the principal referent: the Latin American people in historic mobilization, which demands us as intellectuals to produce an organic theory from within that ongoing process of liberation.

Conclusion

The Meaning of the Historical Reconstruction

On the Necessary Decolonizing Turn of Political Philosophy

[240] This new mode of studying history, which we have explained repeatedly in our university courses, has produced, at least in my students, a great enthusiasm around what is perceived to be a principle that fertilizes the theoretical reflection of political philosophy. It is not a mere story. It is a critical counter-story that contains many hypotheses, some of which may eventually be refuted in the future. Its importance is not in the details, but in the whole vision, the new periodification, the framing of themes not studied or discarded by traditional Eurocentric political philosophy. The ridiculous and ideological classification of historical facts into a global history ordered by some ancient, medieval and modern states, a totally Eurocentric proposal without scientific foundation, would not have allowed us to explain the material presented in this work.

At the beginning of this book we indicated that the aim of this treatment of history consisted in adequately situating the *locus enuntiationis*, the location of our *Politics of Liberation*. This location is at the end of the path that sometimes seemed to be lost within the mountains of the story. The story is long, much longer than we supposed before beginning this work. The re-reading of the classics within a different organization of historical material has allowed us to problematize new perspectives, which we will have to explain in the second part of this work, the architectonics of a *Politics of Liberation*. It has not been a waste of time, but rather I hope it will permit the reading of new tracts of study. I believe that at the end I have situated the *locus enuntiationis* within world history.

The theoretical problems we have to resolve are framed from the perspective that the founder of the Marburg School, the Jewish neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen pointed out years ago, when he explained that the critical method consists of putting the poor and the victims into the political space of the poor, the victims, and from there critiquing the pathologies of the state. From that epistemological location, that of the victims, the south of the planet, the oppressed, excluded, new popular movements, ancestral

people colonized by Modernity, by globalized capitalism, all is expressed through 'Alter-worldist' world networks, from where we can *critique the system of the categories of bourgeois political philosophy*.¹

The political philosophy of the centre (Europe and the USA) is extremely narrow in its problematic. It studies only its own subjects, in a traditional way and as a function of its own political practice. All remaining geopolitical spaces are simply scorned, uninvestigated. One believes, like the ostrich (which when attacked hides its head in its plumage), that in treating *its problems* it already has constructed a political philosophy adequate for the world. Its ancient Eurocentric disease leads it to think that its particularity is universal, through which all the peoples of the Earth will have *to pass*, in one way or another.

The journey we have made, with a periodification completely distinct from the habitual, and which we have justified in many of our works, will allow us to take the head (of the ostrich) and scrutinize new horizons, not afraid to tackle the problems of Latin America, which are very useful for Africa and Asia, although not identical to their own and that they need to define and explain. Ranajit Guha, in a recent work, moves along the same path (that we began in the 1970s):

The State remains suspended in *an incomplete present* so long as it is unable to *understand itself and develop an integrated consciousness* in terms of a past. It is the function of history to provide the State with such a past as a record of its development [. . .]. It is thus that State and historiography came to form the strategic alliance known as World-history in order to overcome the negativity of time. The control of the past is essential to that strategy.²

Further, the history of the *path* from a colonial state (the 'State of the [Latin American] Indies' in our case) to another emancipated post-colonial state signifies a process completely distinct from the one followed by the European states, and North American state (through the peculiarity of its being colonial and its particular colonization partly described by A. De Tocqueville). The constitution of the political field, the strategic actions, the metropolitan institutional systems and the clarity with which the normativity of the implicit political principles is shown, that is to say, *the political*, keeps important differences between the centre and the colonial and post-colonial periphery.

I believe that we have at least called into question the always *Hellenocentric* beginning of the histories of politics, and the architectonics too. For

1 Previously, one spoke mistakenly of 'Third Worldism'. I believe that the term 'Alter-Worldism' expresses much better the struggle for *another* world, 'a world in which fit all worlds' (the Zapatista expression), or 'another world is possible' (the motto of the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre).

2 Guha, 2002, p. 71.

CONCLUSION

example, Hannah Arendt, inscribing herself personally in a Jewish tradition, nevertheless is as Hellenocentric as the good German racist M. Heidegger. Their investigations always start from Athens and the Christian world from Augustine of Hippo to Duns Scotus. Leo Strauss, although he incorporates Jewish and Arabic 'medieval' thinking, which is exceptional, does not detect that particular to the Semitic tradition, because at the end esoterically Greek philosophy is imposed (as al-Farabi or to a lesser extent Maimonides). Chinese, Hindustanic, Byzantine and Arabic thinking is outside all possible study and reception in political philosophy. I hope that my exposition has at least whetted the appetite of some studious youth for many new themes in global political philosophy. The Egyptian presence, thanks to Martin Bernal, and Mesopotamian and Phoenician thinking, explained by Giovanni Semerano, allow us to reach Athens better equipped critically. The future will certainly hold more surprises. And the model that we have used to criticize *Hellenocentrism* is itself an indication of how we will also have to dethrone the current *Eurocentrism* of the fashionable political philosophy in Latin America or Spain and Portugal.

The references to the eastern Roman Empire, Byzantine, Islamic and later Ottoman world, whose legacy would continue in Venice and Geneva, models of the modern states, much more than unstable Florence,³ allows us to weaken *Westernization*. From the East came the more complex and developed politics, the inheritance of Hellenism (Platonism and Aristotelianism), Mediterranean Christianity and the great Arabic thinking, the first inheritors of Hellenism, long before Latin-Germanic Europe. The linear sequence Greek-Latin Middle Ages-Modernity is false and hinders the constitution of a secular political field, the complexity of strategic action, and of the foundation of more representative institutions, although in law the western Roman culture achieved a particular genius.

One emerging theme is the new conception of secularization. On the one hand, the secularization of politics is due to the strong institutionalization of the Christian Roman Church, inheritor of the Roman juridical genius, which will demand the Roman state be defined not-religiously, hence its necessary secularization. But, on the other hand, a militant secularism (lay Christian in liberalism, particularly French, and atheist in a certain Marxism at the end of the nineteenth century) led to attacks on the mythical-cultural narrative of the cultures of the peoples of the south of the planet in its central structure. In the name of secularism all *popular imagination* was judged as folkloric, and would disappear rapidly before the rolling advance of science. That Baconian optimism, as Hans Jonas labels it, is in decline. It will be necessary to understand that the older 'critique of ideology' has been transformed slowly into a more specific 'critique of theology' (as Marx indi-

³ The Venetian institutional stability was exemplary at the end of the fifteenth century, the beginning of Modernity. Florence, within the Pontifical States, had to skilfully survive, and from here emerges the strategic art that Machiavelli describes. But the difficult to govern Florence could not be the model for the modern state.

cated: the 'critique of theology is transformed into the critique of politics'). The question of *Christendom* (from Constantine to Hobbes or Carl Schmitt) and the debate about 'political theology' (from Spinoza) has been treated in diverse moments of this historical story.

We have given particular importance to the problem of geopolitical origin in the time of Modernity, with the European invasion of America and 'discovery' of the western Atlantic from 1492. The diverse moments of Modernity (early, mature, late), with sub-divisions such as the 'first early Modernity', which in our hypothesis would be Hispanic and not European-centred, situates modern philosophy one century earlier. It is a proposal that is conscious of revolutionizing more than a programme of philosophical work, and with which I am in agreement more deeply each time.

At base we are against the theoretical colonialism of political philosophy as practised in Latin America (and in Spain and Portugal), for which we plead that all take seriously the 'decolonizing turn' indebted to the philosophy of liberation, insisting on the necessity of starting from new bases in our reflection, which cannot be merely imitative or from authorized commentators on European-North American political philosophy, which necessarily is very different in practice, institutionalization and the perception of the normativity of the political principles practised in Latin America. It has to be overturned directly in our reality and one has to 'seize' it, as with claws (from where comes 'concept', in German *Begriff*, from *greifen*, 'to grasp' or 'to take'), understanding and expressing analytically what the Latin American people are living politically, and not simply reading the classics or famous political philosophers of the centre to imitate them or comment on them. In that case we will only learn about the political situations of Europe and the USA as expressed by their philosophers, and we will not understand anything of our own. Those philosophers cannot express what our people are experiencing, our people who suffer the negative effects of the politics of the 'Group of Seven', in the midst of poverty, of the recent exercise of a democracy searching for its own path, of the distortion of politics in general through corruption, the aim of dissolution or at least the weakening of the particular state (the final barrier to privatization of the few treasures that peripheral people can use) as much in the anarchic left as in the neoliberal right, an extreme political vulnerability in the face of the impossible payment of an unjust enormous external debt.

For the first time we confront the problem of the plurality of cultures or ethnicities in the territory organized by the particular post-colonial state, which hinders the fulfilling of the liberal demand of the egalitarian hegemony of its citizens so one has to define Difference again, with its respective rights and new responsibilities. Zapatismo has demanded that we pay attention to this phenomenon, overcoming assimilationist indigenous politics.

On the other hand, and given the immigration to the USA of a growing Latin American population, more than 30,000,000 Hispanics, we have equally to take charge of the situation of this population that lives in the

'belly of the beast'. Our critical political philosophy has to be adequately conceived so that it is useful to that exiled 'nation', and for this reason in future works we will include the USA in relation to Latin America, a historical-geopolitical framework that allows Hispanics to interpret themselves within that imperial state and in relation to us. Young Hispanic intellectuals are our colleagues and can teach future generations, competing with Anglo colleagues to whom they can contribute critical and novel visions that allow them to leave behind their provincial (although imperial) cloistering.

In the face of the instantaneous presence of civilizations far removed (like the Chinese, Hindustanic, Islamic, Bantu, eastern and western European, US or Latin American) thanks to the means of communication and to multiple institutions of contact (from the World Social Forum in diverse continents, to academic, political, economic meetings, etc.), it was necessary to have a historical-global vision so the new generation incorporates in its daily perspective other civilizations or cultures, and knows to situate itself in that context. Therefore, one has to include in the programmes of study of all university humanities or social science faculties a sufficient knowledge of all those cultures with which inevitably the new generations in the twenty-first century will enter into daily and professional context.

And, finally, we defend the hypothesis that all those universal civilizations (universal in reference to the many cultures that were subsumed during millennia of cultural creation), like that of China, Hindustan, Islam, etc., in dialogue with Modernity, are working to creatively reconstruct their own identity (identity as process and not as substance) starting from their ancestral tradition, but overturning it from their undestroyed originality (found outside the colonial oppressive action) creating a pluriverse future, which will permit them to enter into a trans-modern civilization where the plurality of a dialoguing humanity is present. That labour assumes equally a new type of political articulation in the horizon of regional co-ordination of the particular states (like Latin America) and a new type of global confederation of the particular and regional states.

Fixing our gaze on the '*locus enuntiationis*', for example the World Social Forum,⁴ we will have to overcome 'indolent reason',⁵ a lazy political philosophy that only moves along the beaten path, and we have to ask over and over the same question: where is the political philosophy that aims to

4 See the excellent sociological description of this event in the work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos *The World Social Forum: Manual of Use*, 2005b: 'What is the alternative to a general theory? In my mind, the alternative to a general theory [which as a postmodern critic he rejects] is the work of translation. Translation [between one social movement and another] is a procedure that enables mutual intelligibility among the experiences of the world, the available and possible, as revealed by the sociology of absences and of emergences, without jeopardizing their identity and their autonomy, that is to say, without reducing them to homogenous entities' (p. 119). Taking this into account, our politics will aim to reach a minimal, necessary and sufficient architectonic theory, at least in the political field.

5 See Sousa Santos, 2000 and 2005. 'Indolent': one who does not 'feel' the suffering of the oppressed and excluded, and who is indolent, lazy, with respect to thinking about new themes.

address the socio-economic and political continental events situated *historically*? That has been the theme of this history of a *Politics of Liberation*.

In the future an architectural-theoretical exposition will be carried out that will have to respond to the problems raised *from this locus enuntiationis* to *clarify and describe analytically*, in our Latin American horizon, the meaning of strategic action, the way to transform political institutions and political normative principles. The political philosophies of the twenty-first century, as we can observe now, and as the result of a glance backward to the late eighteenth century, will be judged by history, as a last resort, for the degree of articulation of philosophical thinking with the liberation praxis of the *simple, exploited, impoverished, excluded, majority of Latin American people* that guides their second Emancipation (as Jose Carlos Mariátegui and Jose Martí, among others, expressed explicitly).⁶ The philosophies that respond to their *material claims* (ecological, economic, cultural, religious, etc.), to their *questions of legitimacy* (democratic), to their *strategic feasibility* (beyond conservatism and extreme anarchy, with a realistic and critical attitude), to the demands for respect of their dignity (from implicit normative principles), will influence the political construction whose actors are political agents (in the first place the *people themselves*) and the ones history will record as relevant. In other words: the philosophies that only address: (a) the commentaries of European and North American classics (in Euro and American-centric position) justifying liberal proceduralism, and (b) the tricks of rhetoric or sophistry, because they try to confuse their academic opponents with their twisted fallacies, but they do not 'try to find the truth' (as Aristotle would say), which people need for liberating action, they will remain rusted, forgotten and hidden in the majority of the cases in some dusty corner of the libraries, consumed by the fungi, or will end up in the stomach 'of some rodents', as Marx would say, but will not become part of the *creative memory of the people*, who are the protagonists of political history.

However, this *historical* part of a *Politics of Liberation* is nothing more than an 'outline' we have begun to explain, as it was a story needed to undertake a future *architectonic*, but it is not yet a sufficient exposition. It only *indicates* the path that we must travel to open a global horizon, critically post-colonial and self-consciously reflective. I hope to pick up in an *architectonic* of the *Politics of Liberation* the fruits of this extension.

⁶ They called it 'second Independence'. We have substituted 'emancipation' for 'independence', which today signifies better the content of that expression.

References

- Abensour, M., 2004, *La Démocratie contra l'État: Marx et le momento machiavélien*, Paris: Le Félin.
- Abu-Lughod, J., 1989, *Before European Hegemony: The World System AD 1250-1350*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Acosta, J. de, 1954, *Obras del P. José de Acosta*, Madrid: BAE.
- Acosta, M., 1966, *Vida de los esclavos negros en Venezuela*, Caracas: Hespérides.
- Acuna, M., 1984, *De Frondizi a Alfonsín II*, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor.
- Addas, C., 1996, *Ibn 'Arabí o la búsqueda del azufre rojo*, Murcia: Editora Regional de Murcia.
- Aegidius Romanus, 1929, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, edited by R. Scholz, Weimar.
- Aimes, H., 1907, *A History of Slavery in Cuba (1511-1868)*, New York: Putnam's Sons.
- Alamán, L., 1945, *Documentos diversos*, Mexico: JUS.
- Alamán, L., 1969, *Historia de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año 1808 hasta la época presente*, I-V, Mexico: JUS.
- Alberdi, J. B., 2003, *Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina*, Buenos Aires: Losada.
- Albiac, G., 1987, *La sinagoga vacía: Un estudio de las fuentes marranas del espinosismo*, Madrid: Hiperion.
- Alegre, F. X., 1956, *Historia de la provincia de la Compañía de Jesús de Nueva España*, edited by E. J. Burrus and F. Zubillaga, Rome: Institutum Historicum.
- Aleksandrovna, Y., 1978, *El populismo ruso*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Alexander, R., 1957, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Al-Farabi, 1985, *La ciudad ideal*, translated by M. Alonso, Madrid: Tecnos.
- Al-Farabi, 1992, *Obras filosofico-políticas*, edited and translated by R. Ramón Guerrero, Madrid: Debate.
- Al-Farabi, 2003, *El camino de la felicidad*, edited and translated by R. Ramón Guerrero, Madrid: Trotta.
- Altman, W., Miranda, P. and Wincur, M., 1983, *El populismo en América Latina*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Álvarez, L. J., 1999, 'Republicanization y paz mundial en la filosofía de la historia de Kant', Master's thesis in Political Philosophy, Mexico: UAM-Iztapalapa.
- Ames, R., 1993, *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, New York: Ballantine Books. [ST: Sunzi, 2006, *El arte de la Guerra*, edited and translated by A. Galvany, Madrid: Trotta.]
- Ames, R., 1994, *The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Amin, S., 1974, *El desarrollo desigual: Ensayo sobre las formaciones sociales del capitalismo periférico*, Barcelona: Fontanella. [ET: Amin, S., 1976, *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*, translated by B. Pearce, New York: Monthly Review Press.]

- Amin, S., 1989, *Eurocentrism*, New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Amin, S., 1999, 'History Conceived as an Eternal Cycle', *Review*, 22(3), pp. 291-326.
- Anselm, 1952-3, *Obras completas de San Anselmo*, I-II, Madrid: BAC. [ET: 1865, *Cur Deus Homo or Why God Was Made Man*, London: John Henry and James Parker.]
- Apel, K.-O., 1997, 'Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace as historical prognosis from the point of view of Moral Duty', in Bohman, J. and M. Lurz-Bachmann, *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 79-110.
- Aquinas, Thomas, 1949, *Im decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio*, Torino: Marietti. [ET: *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*.]
- Aquinas, Thomas, 1950, *Summa Theologiae*, Torino: Marietti, 1-3.
- Aquinas, Thomas, 1954, *De Regimine Principium ad Regem Cypri*, in *Opuscula Philosophica*, Torino: Marietti, pp. 253-358. [ET: 1997, *On the Government of Rulers*, translated by J. Blythe, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.]
- Arendt, H., 1958, *The Human Condition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [ST: 1998, *La condición humana*, Buenos Aires: Paidós.]
- Arendt, H., 1965, *On Revolution*, London: Penguin Books. [ST: 1988, *Sobre la revolución*, Madrid: Alliance.]
- Arendt, H., 1978, *The Life of the Mind*, New York: Harvest Books. [ST: *La vida del espíritu*, Madrid: CEC.]
- Arendt, H., 1982, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Aricó, J., 1980, *Marx y América Latina*, Mexico: Alianza.
- Aricó, J., 1982, *Storia del Marxismo IV*, Rome: Einaudi.
- Aristotle, 1959, *Politics*, translated by H. Rackham, London: William Heinemann Ltd.
- Aristotle, 1995, *Politics: Books I and II*, translated by T. J. Saunders, New York: Clarendon.
- Aristotle, 2000, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by R. Crisp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arrighi, G., 1994, *The Long Twentieth Century*, London: Verso.
- Arrighi, G., 1999, 'The World According to Andre Gunder Frank', *Review* 22(3), pp. 327-54.
- Assmann, H., 1971, 'Para un fundamentación dialéctica de la filosofía latinoamericana', *Stromata* 1(2), pp. 3-55.
- Astrada, C., 1948, *El mito gaucho*, Buenos Aires: Cruz del Sur.
- Athenagoras, 1954, *Legación en favor de los cristianos*, in Ruiz Bueno, D. (ed.), *Padres apostólicos*, Madrid: BAC. [ET: *Apostolic Fathers*.]
- Augustine of Hippo, 1964, *La ciudad de Dios*, in *Obras de San Agustín*, Vols I-II, Madrid: BAC. [ET: Augustine, 1984, *City of God*, translated by H. Bettenson, New York: Penguin Classics.]
- Azaretto, R., 1983, *Historia de las fuerzas conservadoras*, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor.
- Azcárate, J. F., 1910, 'Acta del Ayuntamiento de México en la que se declaró se tuviera por insubsistente la abdicación de Carlos IV y Fernando VII', in Hernández y Dávalos, *Documentos para la historia de la Guerra de Independencia II*, Mexico: General Archive of the Nation, pp. 474-85.
- Bacon, R., 1858, *Compendium studii philosophiae*, edited by J. S. Brewer, London.
- Badiou, A., 1988, *L'etre et l'événement*, Paris: Seuil. [ST: 1999, *El ser y el acontecimiento*, Buenos Aires: Manantial.]
- Badiou, A., 1999, *San Pablo: La fundación del universalismo*, Barcelona: Anthropos.
- Bagú, S., 1949, *Economía de la sociedad colonial: Ensayo de historia comparada de América Latina*, Buenos Aires: El Ateneo.
- Balibar, É., 1985, *Spinoza et la politique*, Paris: PUF.

REFERENCES

- Barrhes, R., 1972, 'Escritura política', in *El grado cero de la escritura*, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: 1968, 'Political Modes of Writing' in *Writing Degree Zero*, translated by A. Lavers and C. Smirh, New York: Hill and Wang.]
- Bastide, R., 1967, *Las Américas negras*, Madrid: Alianza.
- Batliori, M., 1966, *La cultura hispano-italiana de los jesuitas expulsos*, Madrid: Gredos.
- Baumgarten, A. G., 1763, *Ethica philosophica*, Carol Herman Hemmerde, Halae Magdeburgicae, 3rd edn (reproduction in Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1969). [ET: *Philosophical Ethics*.]
- Benedict, 1954, *San Benito y vida*, Madrid: BAC. [ET: *St. Benedict and Life*.]
- Beorlegui, C., 2004, *Historia del pensamiento filosófico en América Latina*, Bilbao: University of Deusto.
- Bérard, V., 1930, *La resurrección d'Homere*, Paris: Grasset.
- Berdyaeu, N., 1946, *Essai de Métaphysique Eschatologique*, Paris: Aubier.
- Bergson, H., 1934, *La pensée et le mouvant*, Paris: Félix Alcan.
- Bernal, M., 1987, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785–1985*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Bernal, M., 1991, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. II: The Archaeological and Documentary Evidence*, London: Free Association Books.
- Bernal, M., 2001, *Black Athena Writes Back: Martin Bernal Responds to his Critics*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Beuchot, M., 1997, *Historia de la filosofía en el México colonial*, Herder, Barcelona. [ET: 1998, *History of Philosophy in Colonial Mexico*, translated by E. Millán, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.]
- Beuchot, M., 1998, *La filosofía política*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Bien, G., 1973, *Die Grundlegung der Politischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles*, Freiburg: Karl Alber.
- Blackburn, R., 1997, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern 1492–1800*, London: Verso.
- Blaut, J. M., 1993, *The Colonizer's Model of the World*, New York: The Guilford Press.
- Bobbio, N., 1989, *La teoría de las formas de gobierno en la historia del pensamiento político*, Mexico: FCE.
- Bodin, J., 1993, *Les six livres de la République*, Paris: Le Livre de Poche. [ET: 1967, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, translated by M. J. Tooley, New York: Barnes and Noble.] [ET: 1992, *On Sovereignty*, translated by J. H. Franklin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Bohórquez, C., 1998, *Francisco de Miranda: Précurseur des indépendances de l'Amérique Latine*, Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Bolívar, S., 1990, *Escritos políticos*, edited by G. Soriano, Madrid: Alianza.
- Bolívar, S., 2005, *Escritos anticolonialistas*, edited by G. Pereira, Caracas: Ministry of State for Culture.
- Borchert, D. M. (ed.), 2nd edn 2006, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 10 vols, Detroit: Tomson Gale.
- Botella, J., Caneque, C. and Gonzalo, E., 1998, *El pensamiento político en sus textos: De Platón a Marx*, Madrid: Tecnos.
- Bowser, F., 1974, *The African Slave in Colonial Peru 1524–1650*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brady, R., 1965, *The Emergence of a Negro Class in Mexico 1524–1640*, Iowa: University of Iowa, Graduate College.
- Braudel, F., 1978, *Las civilizaciones actuales*, Madrid: Tecnos.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Brito Domínguez, M., 2001, 'José María Luis Mora: su época y su pensamiento político', in *Seminario de Filosofía Política*, Iztapalapa: UAM, 2001 (unpublished).
- Buber, M., 1991, *Caminos de Utopía*, Mexico: FCE.
- Buchrucker, Chr., 1982, 'Nationalismus, Faschismus und Peronismus (1927-1955)', doctoral thesis, University of Berlin.
- Bunge, M., 1961, *Causalidad: El principio de causalidad en la ciencia moderna*, Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- Buntig, A., 1969, *El catolicismo popular en Argentina*, Buenos Aires: Bonum.
- Campillo, A., 2001, *Variaciones de la vida humana: una teoría da la historia*, Madrid: Akal.
- Campollo, M. L., 1987, '400 años después surgen testimonios incomparables: Tesoros de San Diego', *Casas y Gente* (Mexico), p. 116.
- Cámpora, H., 1973, *La revolución peronista*, Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- Caravale, M., 1997, 'Le istituzioni della Repubblica', in *Storia di Venezia*, III: 'La formazione dello Stato Patricio', Rome: Enciclopedia Italia.
- Cardenal, E., 1998, *Salmos*, Trotta, Madrid. [ET: 1981, *Psalms*, translated by T. Blackman et al., New York: Crossroad.]
- Cárdenas, L., 1936, *La unificación campesina*, Mexico: Library of Social and Political Culture, PNR.
- Cardoso, C. and Pérez Brignoli, H., 1979, *Historia económica de América Latina*, I-II, Barcelona: Crítica.
- Cardoso, F., 1977, *Capitalismo e escravidão no Brasil meridional*, Sao Paulo: Difusao Europeia.
- Carrillo, S., 1977, *Eurocomunismo y Estado*, Crítica, Barcelona. [ET: 1978, *Eurocommunism and the State*, Westport, CT: L. Hill.]
- Casalla, M., 1974, *Razón y liberación*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Castro, F., 1975, *La revolución cubana*, Mexico: Era.
- Caturelli, A., 1971, *La filosofía en la Argentina actual*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Cavo, A., 1836, *Los tres siglos de México durante el gobierno español*, I-II, Mexico: J. R. Navarro.
- Cerutti, H., 1983, *La filosofía de la liberación latinoamericana*, Mexico: FCE.
- Chabod, F., 1994, *Escritos sobre Maquiavelo*, Mexico: FCE.
- Chauí, M., 1999, *A nervura do real, Imanencia e liberdade em Espinosa*, Sao Paulo: Schwarcz.
- Chevallier, L., 1933, *La morale de Leibniz*, Paris: Vrin.
- Chilam Balam, 1991, *El libro de los libros del Chilam Balam*, edited by A. Barrera and S. Rendón, Mexico: FCE.
- Cicero, M. T., 1965, *Les devoirs*, edired by M. Testard, Les Belles Paris: Lettres. [ST: 1994, *Sobre los deberes*, Barcelona: Altaya; ET: Griffen, M. T. and Atkins, E. M. (eds), 1991, *Cicero On Duties*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Clausewitz, C. von, 1999, *De la Guerra*, Mexico: Colofón. [ET: 1993, *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, New York: Knopf.]
- Clavijero, F. X., 1945, *Historia Antigua de México*, Mexico: Porrúa.
- Cole, G. D., 1959, *Historia del pensamiento socialista*, III, Mexico: FCE.
- Cole, G. D., 1960, *Historia del pensamiento socialista*, IV, Mexico: FCE.
- Cole, G. D., 1961, *Historia del pensamiento socialista*, V, Mexico: FCE.
- Colección de documentos inéditos para la Historia de España*, 1842-95, 122 volumes, Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Clavero.
- Collins, R., 1998, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

REFERENCES

- COMG, 1995, *Construyendo un futuro para nuestro pasado: Derechos del pueblo maya y el proceso de paz*, Guatemala: United Nations.
- Confucius, 2003, *Analects*. UIT selections from traditional commentaries, translated by E. Slingerland, Hong Kong: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Conrad, R., 1972, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cooper, D., 1996. *World Philosophies: An Historical Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Copleston, F., 1958, *Histoire de la Philosophie, III: La Renaissance*, Tornai: Casterman.
- Copleston, F., 1964, *Histoire de la Philosophie, I-II*, Tornai: Casterman. [EE: 1993, *A History of Philosophy, Vol. I: Greece and Rome*, London: Image Books.]
- Córdoba, A., 1974, *La ideología de la revolución mexicana*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Cornevin, R. Y. M., 1964, *Histoire de l'Afrique des origines a la 2.e guerre mondiale*, Paris: Payot.
- Cotterell, A. (ed.), 1993, *The Penguin Encyclopedia of Classical Civilizations*, London: Penguin Books.
- Cruz, G., 1942, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Santiago.
- Cruz Costa, J., 1957, *Esbozo de una historia de las ideas en Brasil*, Mexico: FCE.
- Curtin, P. D., 1985, *The Atlantic Slave Trade*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Damasio, A., 1999, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*, New York: Harvest Books.
- Damasio, A., 2003, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain*, Orlando: Harcourt.
- Danel, F., 1977, *Ideología y epistemología*, Mexico: Edicol.
- Dante, 1916, *De Monarchia*, edited by W. H. V. Reade, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [ST: 1992, *Tratado de la monarquía*, Madrid: Tecnos; ET: 1979, *Monarchy, and Three Political Letters*, Westport, CT: Hyperion Press.]
- De Bary, W. T., 1993, 'Introduction', in Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, pp. 1-85.
- De Bary, W. T., 2000, *Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- De Bary, W. T. and Bloom, B.-I. (eds), 1999, *Sources of Chinese Tradition from Earliest Times to 1600*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- De Mier, Fray Servando T., 1922, *Historia de la revolución de Nueva España*, II, 2nd edn, Mexico.
- De Sousa Santos, B., 1995, *Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition*, New York: Routledge. [ST: forthcoming, Madrid, Trotta.]
- De Sousa Santos, B., 2000, *Crítica de la razón indolente: Contra el desperdicio de la experiencia*, Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer.
- De Sousa Santos, B., 2005a, *El milenio huérfano: Ensayos para una nueva cultura política*, Madrid: Trotta.
- De Sousa Santos, B., 2005b, *O Fórum Social Mundial: manual de uso*, Sao Paulo: Cortez Editora.
- Debés Valdés, E., 2003, *El pensamiento latinoamericano en el siglo XX: Entre la modernización y la identidad*, I-III, Buenos Aires: Biblos.
- Decorme, G., 1941, *La obra de los jesuitas mexicanos durante la época colonial 1572-1767*, I-II, Mexico: Librería de José Porrúa.
- Del Campillo, M., 2001, *Crónicas de Indias: ganadería, medicina et veterinaria*, Valladolid: Junta de Castilla et León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura.
- Delbos, V., 1969, *La philosophie pratique de Kant*, Paris: PUF.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Deleuze, G. [1970], new and augmented edition 1999, *L'anti-Oedipe: capitalisme et schizophrénie*, ed. by Félix Guattari, Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
- Deleuze, G. [1987] 2001, *Dialogues*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone.
- Derrida, J., 1994, *Politiques de l'amitié*, Paris: Galilée. [ST: 1998, *Políticas de la amistad*, Madrid: Trotta; ET: 1997, *Politics of Friendship*, London: Verso.]
- Descartes, R., 1953, *Oeuvres et Lettres*, Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade.
- Deutsch, E. 1999, *A Companion to World Philosophies*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Díaz Casalis, A., 1979, *A Pedagogía na filosofia de la Liberación de E. Dussel*, Sao Paulo: PUC.
- Diels, H., 1964, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Diodorus Siculus, 1933, *The Library of History*, translated by Oldfather, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-10.
- Diogenes Laertius, 1968, *Epikur. Griechisch-Deutsch*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, p. 10.
- Di Tella, G., 1983, *Perón-Perón (1973-1976)*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Dix, R., 1975, *The Developmental Significance of the Rise of Populism*, Houston: Rice University.
- Dorfman, A. and Mattelart, A., 1972, *Para leer el pato Donald: Comunicación de masa y colonialismo*, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: 1984, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, translated by D. Kunzle, 2nd edn, New York: International General.]
- Dorfman, A. and Mattelart, A., 1974, *Supermán y sus amigos del alma*, Buenos Aires: Galerna.
- Duns Scorus, J., 1912-14, *Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV: Libros Magistri Sententiarum*, Firenze: Quaracchi.
- Dussel, E., *El dualismo en la antropología de la cristianidad. Desde los orígenes hasta antes de la conquista de América*, Buenos Aires: Guadalupe.
- Dussel, E., 1958, 'Problemática del bien común en el pensar griego hasta Aristóteles', Bachelor's thesis at UNC, Mendoza (Argentina), and Bachelor's final examination at Universidad Complutense, partially published in the Universidad Nacional de Resistencia, Chaco (Argentina), 1967.
- Dussel, E., 1959, 'La problemática del bien común', PhD thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Complutense, Madrid, 3 vols (unpublished).
- Dussel, E., 1965, 'Chrétientés latino-américaines', *Esprit* (July-August), pp. 2-20.
- Dussel, E., 1966, *Hipótesis para el estudio de Latinoamérica en la Historia universal*, Chaco (Argentina): Universidad de Resistencia (CD, A01).
- Dussel, E., 1967, *Hipótesis para una historia de la Iglesia en América Latina*, Barcelona: Estela (CD, A01) (later editions and translations in five languages with the title *Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina: Coloniaje y liberación*) (CD, A02). [ET: *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492-1979)*.]
- Dussel, E., 1968, 'Cultura, cultura latinoamericana y cultural nacional', *Cuyo* (Mendoza), IV, pp. 7-40.
- Dussel, E., 1969a, *El humanismo semita*, Buenos Aires: Eudeba (CD, 03).
- Dussel, E., 1969b, *El episcopado latinoamericano: institución misionera en defensa del indio (1504-1620)*, Cuernavaca: CIDOC, pp. I-IX.
- Dussel, E., 1969c, 'From Secularization to the Secularism of Science', *Concilium* 47, pp. 91-113.
- Dussel, E., 1970, 'Francisco Romero', *Cuyo* (Mendoza), VI, pp. 79-86.
- Dussel, E., 1971, 'Metafísica del sujeto y liberación', in *Temas de Filosofía Contemporánea*, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, pp. 27-32.

REFERENCES

- Dussel, E., 1973a, *Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, vols 1-2; Mexico: Edicol, 1977; vol. 3; USTA, Bogota, 1979-80, vols 4-5. Under the title of *Filosofía ética latinoamericana*, vols 3-5, in CD, 09-13.
- Dussel, E., 1973b, *Para una de-strucción de la Historia de la Ética*, Mendoza: Ser y Tiempo (CD, 07).
- Dussel, E., 1973c, *América Latina. Dependencia y liberación*, Buenos Aires: García Cambeiro (CD, 06).
- Dussel, E. (ed.), 1973d, *Dependencia cultural y creación de cultura en América Latina*, Buenos Aires: Bonum.
- Dussel, E., 1974a, *Caminos de liberación latinoamericana II*, Buenos Aires: Latinoamérica Libros (CD, A04).
- Dussel, E., 1974b, *El dualismo en la antropología de la Cristiandad: Desde el origen del cristianismo hasta antes de la conquista de América*, Buenos Aires: Guadalupe (CD, 05).
- Dussel, E., 1974c, *Método para una filosofía de la liberación*, Buenos Aires: Guadalupe; 2nd edn, Guadalajara: University of Guadalajara, 1992 (CD, 08).
- Dussel, E., 1975a, *El humanismo helénico*, Buenos Aires: Eudeba (CD, 04).
- Dussel, E., 1975b, 'Reforma del plan de estudios de la carrera de Filosofía', *Revista de Filosofía Latinoamericana* 1, pp. 137f.
- Dussel, E., 1975, 'La filosofía de la liberación en Argentina: irrupción de una nueva generación filosófica'. Conferencia presentada en el Coloquio de Filosofía Mexicana, Morelia, agosto de 1975, *Revista de Filosofía latinoamericana* 1, pp. 217-22.
- Dussel, E., 1977a, *Filosofía de la liberación*, Mexico: Edicol [ET: *Philosophy of Liberation*, New York, Orbis Books, 1985; there are German, Italian and Portuguese translations] (CD, 15).
- Dussel, E., 1977b, *Filosofía ética latinoamericana*, III, Mexico: Edicol (partial reprint, 1990, *Liberación de la mujer y erótica latinoamericana*, Bogota: Nueva América).
- Dussel, E., 1978, *Desintegración de la cristiandad colonial y liberación*, Salamanca: Sígueme (CD, A08).
- Dussel, E., 1979, *De Medellín a Puebla: Una década de sangre y esperanza (1968-1979)*, Mexico: Edicol-CEE.
- Dussel, E., 1982a, 'A Report on the Situation in Latin America', *Concilium* 151, pp. 54-60 (CD, C01).
- Dussel, E., 1982b, 'Encuentro de cristianos y marxistas en América Latina', *Cristianismo y sociedad* 74, pp. 19-36.
- Dussel, E., 1983, *Praxis latinoamericana y Filosofía de la Liberación*, Bogota: Nueva América (CD, 17).
- Dussel, E., 1984, *Filosofía de la producción*, Bogota: Nueva América (CD, 16).
- Dussel, E., 1985a, *La producción teórica de Marx: Una introducción a los Grundrisse*, Mexico: Siglo XXI (CD, 18).
- Dussel, E., 1985b, 'Cultura latinoamericana y filosofía de la liberación. Cultura popular revolucionaria: más allá del populismo y del dogmatismo', *Latinoamérica. Anuario Estudios Latinoamericanos* (Mexico) 17, pp. 77-127.
- Dussel, E., 1985c, 'La cuestión popular', *Cristianismo y Sociedad* 84, pp. 81-90.
- Dussel, E., 1986, *Ética comunitaria*, Buenos Aires: Paulinas (CD, A05). [ET: *Ethics and Community*; also available in German, French, Portuguese, Italian, Dutch and South Korean translations.]
- Dussel, E., 1988, *Hacia un Marx desconocido: Un comentario de los Manuscritos del 1861-1863*, Mexico: Siglo XXI (CD, 20).
- Dussel, E., 1990, *El último Marx (1863-1882) y la liberación latinoamericana*, Mexico: Siglo XXI (CD, 21).

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Dussel, E., 1991, *Introducción a la filosofía de la liberación*, Bogotá: Nueva América.
- Dussel, E. and Apel, K.-O. (eds), 1992, *Fundamentación de la ética y Filosofía de la Liberación*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Dussel, E., 1993, *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*, Estella: Verbo Divino (CD, 22).
- Dussel, E., 1994, *Historia de la filosofía y filosofía de la liberación*, Bogotá: Nueva América (CD, 26).
- Dussel, E., 1995a, *The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of 'the Other' and the Myth of Modernity*, New York: Continuum (there is a Spanish edition) (CD, 23.1).
- Dussel, E., 1995b, *Teología de la Liberación: Un panorama de su desarrollo*, Mexico: Potrerillos Editores.
- Dussel, E., 1995c, 'El marxismo de Mariátegui como Filosofía de la Revolución', in D. Sobrevilla Alcázar (ed.), *El marxismo de José Carlos Mariátegui, V Congreso Nacional de Filosofía (Seminario efectuado el 2 de agosto de 1994)*, Lima: Empresa Editora Amauta, pp. 27-38.
- Dussel, E., 1995d, 'Ethical Sense of the 1994 Maya Rebellion in Chiapas', *Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology* (Minnesota) 2(3), pp. 41-56.
- Dussel, E., 1996, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricœur, Rorty, Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation*, New Jersey: Humanities Press (CD, 24.1) (Spanish edition on CD, 24).
- Dussel, E., 1998a, 2006, *Ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y la exclusión*, Madrid: Trotta. [ET: forthcoming, Durham, NC: Duke University Press; PT: 2000, Petropolis: Vozes; IT: in preparation; shorter editions in German, 2000, Aachen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, and in French, 2003, Paris: L'Harmattan.]
- Dussel, E., 1998b, 'Beyond Eurocentrism: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity', in F. Jameson and M. Miyoshi (eds), *The Cultures of Globalization*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 3-31.
- Dussel, E., 2001a, *Hacia una filosofía política crítica*, Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer (on CD).
- Dussel, E., 2001b, *Toward an Unknown Marx: A Commentary on the Manuscripts of 1861-63*, London: Routledge (translation of Dussel, 1988).
- Dussel, E., 2003a, 'Dignidad: negación y reconocimiento en un contexto concreto de liberación', *Concilium* 300, pp. 281-94.
- Dussel, E., 2003b, 'Lo político en Levinas (Hacia una filosofía política crítica)', *Signos filosóficos* 5(9), pp. 111-32.
- Dussel, E., 2004a, 'From Intolerance to Solidarity', *Constellations* 11(3), pp. 326-33.
- Dussel, E., 2004b, *Obras filosóficas de Enrique Dussel (1963-2003)*, on CD-ROM, Mexico: AFYL. Contains books, articles and other works, and theses of books about his works, in Word and PDF, for research purposes. One can also consult all these works at <http://www.clacso.org>, 'Virtual library', 'Select texts', or at <http://www.afyl.org.mx>. The CD-ROM includes the majority of my works (post-1963).
- Dussel, E., 2006, *Filosofía de la cultura y la liberación*, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México.
- Dussel, E., 2007, *Las metáforas teológicas de Marx*, Caracas: El perro y la rana.
- Eastermann, J., 1998, *Filosofía andina: Estudio intercultural de la sabiduría autóctona andina*, Quito: Abya Yala.
- Edelman, G., 1992, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind*, New York: Basic Books.
- Embree, A. (ed.), 1988, *Sources of Indian Tradition, Volume One: From the Beginning to 1800*, 2nd edn, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Epicurus, 1968, *Diogenes Laertius. X Buch. Epikur*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- Escalante, A., 1964, *El negro en Colombia*, Bogotá: National University of Colombia.

REFERENCES

- Eschweiler, K., 1928, 'Die Philosophie der Spanischen Spätscholastik und in den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts', in *Spanische Forschungen der Gorres Gesellschaft*, I(1), Münster/Westfalen: Aschendorff, pp. 302-17.
- Farré, L., 1958, *Cincuenta años de filosofía argentina*, Buenos Aires: Peuser.
- Fernandes, C. R. (ed.), 1982, *Dilemas do socialismo: A controversia entre Marx, Engels e os populistas rusos (Bakunin, Danielson, Engels, Lavrov, Mikailovski, Plekhanov, Tkatchon, Ulianov, Zasluch)*, Rio de Janeiro: Paz y Terra.
- Festugière, A., 1952-3, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, I-III, Paris: Vrin.
- Fetscher, I., 1970, *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen. Kommentar zu den §§ 387-482 der Enzyklopaedie*, Stuttgart: Frommann.
- Fichte, J. G., 1971, 'Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre', in Fichte, *Werke*, III, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Fichte, J. G., 1991, *El Estado comercial cerrado*, Madrid: Tecnos.
- Florescano, E., 1996, *Etnia, Estado y Nación: Ensayo sobre las identidades colectivas de México*, Mexico: Aguilar.
- Florescano, E., 2004, *Historia de las historias de la nación mexicana*, Mexico: Taurus. [ET: 2006, *National Narratives in Mexico: A History*, translated by N. Hancock, New York: University of Oklahoma Press.]
- Fornet-Betancourt, R., 2001, *Transformación del marxismo: Historia del marxismo en América Latina*, Mexico: Plaza y Valdés.
- Foucault, M., 1996, *Las palabras y las cosas*, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences*.]
- Frailé, G., 1965-6, *Historia de la Filosofía*, I-III, Madrid: BAC.
- Frank, A. G., 1998, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Freidel, D., Schele, L. and Parker, J., 2000, *El cosmos maya*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: 1993, *Maya Cosmos: Three Thousand Years on the Shaman's Path*, New York: W. Morrow.]
- Freyre, G., 1979, *Casa grande e senzala*, Rio de Janeiro: O. Pereira. [ET: *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*.]
- Friede, J., 1956, *Los orígenes de la protectoría de Indios en el Nuevo Reino de Granada*, Havana.
- Fromm, E., 1973, *Socio-psicoanálisis del campesino mexicano*, Mexico: FCT. [ET: 1970, *Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Socio-psychoanalytic Study*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; repr. 1996, Edison, NJ: Transaction].
- Fukuyama, F., 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press.
- Furlong, G., 1946, *Los jesuitas y la cultura rioplatense*, new ed. corrected and expanded, Buenos Aires: Huarpes.
- Furlong, G., 1952, *Nacimiento y desarrollo de la filosofía en el Río de la Plata 1536-1810*, Buenos Aires: Kraft.
- García, G., 1910, *Documentos históricos mexicanos*, 2 and 7, Mexico: National Museum of Anthropology.
- Garcilaso de la Vega, Inca, 1967, *Comentarios reales de los Incas*, I-III, Lima: Universo. [ET: *The Incas: The Royal Commentaries of the Inca*.]
- Genovese, E., 1971, *Esclavitud y capitalismo*, Barcelona: Ariel. [ET: *The Political Economy of Slavery*.]
- Gerbi, A., 1978, *La naturaleza de las Indias Nuevas: De Cristóbal Colón a Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: *Nature in the New World: From Christopher Columbus to Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo*.]
- Germani, G., Di Tella, T., and Ianni, O., 1973, *Populismo y contradicciones de clase en América Latina*, Mexico: Era.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Giannotti, D., 1819, *Opere*, I–III, Pisa: G. Rosini.
- Gilson, E., 1951, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, Paris: Vrin.
- Gilson, E., 1952, *Jean Duns Scotus: Introduction a ses positions fondamentales*, Paris: Vrin.
- Gilson, E., 1954, *Las metamorfosis de la Ciudad de Dios*, Buenos Aires: Troquel.
- Giménez, G., 1976, 'Chalma, Sanctuaire de l'Anahuac, analyse ethnosociologique d'un sanctuaire rural', thesis defended in Paris III, Sorbonne Nouvelle, in the Institut des Hautes Études de l'Amérique Latine.
- Giménez Fernández, M., 1960, *Bartolomé de Las Casas, capellán de S. M. Carlos I*, Seville: Schools of Hispanic American Studies.
- Ginés de Sepúlveda, J., 1967, *Tratado sobre las Justas causas de la Guerra contra los indios*, Mexico: FCE.
- Girard, R., 1986, *El chivo emisario*, Barcelona: Anagrama. [ET: *The Scapegoat*.]
- Goldenberg, B., 1971, *Kommunismus in Lateinamerika*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
- Gottwald, N. K., 1981, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250–1050 BCE*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis.
- Gottwald, N. K., 1985, *The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Introduction*, Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
- Greimas, A., 1973a, *En torno al sentido*, Madrid: Fragua.
- Greimas, A., 1973b, 'Un problème de sémiotique narrative', *Langages* 8, pp. 20f.
- Guamán Poma de Ayala, F., 1980, *El Primer Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno*, I–III, edited by J. Murra, R. Adorno and J. Urioste, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: 2006, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*, Abridged, selected, translated and annotated by D. Frye, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co.]
- Guevara, E. 'Che', 1974, *Obras revolucionarias*, Mexico: Era.
- Guha, R., 2002, *History at the Limit of World-History*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gutiérrez, G., 1998, *La ética en Adam Smith y Friedrich von Hayek*, Mexico: Universidad Iberoamericana.
- Gutiérrez, G., 1992, *En busca de los pobres de Jesucristo: El pensamiento de Bartolomé de Las Casas*, Lima: CEP. [ET: *Las Casas: In Search of the Poor of Jesus Christ*.]
- Guy, A., 1985, *Historia de la Filosofía española*, Barcelona: Anthropos.
- Habermas, J., 1963, *Theorie und Praxis*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [ST: 1987, *Teoría y praxis*, Madrid: Tecnos; ET: *Theory and Practice*.]
- Habermas, J., 1999, *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [ST: 2007, *Verdad y justificación*, Madrid: Trotta; ET: *Truth and Justification*.]
- Habermas, J., 2001, *Israel o Atenas*, edited by E. Mendieta, Madrid: Trotta.
- Halperin Donghi, T., 1969, *Historia contemporánea de América Latina*, Madrid: Alianza. [ET: *The Contemporary History of Latin America*.]
- Hammurabi, 1920, *The Code of Hammurabi*, London: SPCK. [ET: W. W. Davies, 1905, *The Codes of Hammurabi and Moses*, New York: Eaton and Mains; ST: F. Lara Peinado, 1986.]
- Handler, J., 1974, *The Unappropriated People: Freeman in the Slave Society of Barbados*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hanisch Espíndola, W., 1963, *El Torno a la Filosofía en Chile (1594–1810)*, Santiago.
- Harden, D., 1965, *Los fenicios*, Barcelona: Ayma. [ET: *The Phoenicians*.]
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A., 2000, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [ST: 2002, *Imperio*, Mexico: FCE.]
- Harrington, J., 1771, *Oceana and Other Works*, edited by J. Toland, London.

REFERENCES

- Hartmann, N., 1960, *La filosofía del Idealismo alemán*, I-II, Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Haya de la Torre, V. R., 1936, *El antiimperialismo del APRA*, Santiago: Ercilla.
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1942, *Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1955, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, edited by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner. [ET: 1975, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1961, *Scritti politici (1798-1806)*, Bari: Laterza. [ET: *Political Writings*.]
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1967, *System der Sittlichkeit*, edited by Lasson, Hamburg: Felix Meiner. [ET: 1979, *System of Ethical Life (1802/3)*, edited and translated by H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox, Albany: State University of New York Press.]
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1969, *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, edited by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner. [ST: 1984, *Filosofía real*, Mexico: FCE; ET: 1983, *Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-1806)*, translated by L. Rauch, Detroit: Wayne State University Press.]
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1971-9, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1973, *Vorlesungen über die Rechtsgeschichte 1818-1831*, ed. and com. by Karl-Heinz Ilting, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
- Heineccius, J. G., 1837, *Elementos de derecho natural de gentes*, Madrid: Vergés.
- Henry, M., 2000, *Incarnation: Une philosophie de la chair*, Paris: Seuil.
- Henry, P., 2000, *Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy*, New York: Routledge.
- Hernández Alvarado, J., 1976, 'Filosofía de la liberación o liberación de la filosofía?', *Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía* 3, pp. 399-415.
- Hernández y Dávalos, 1977, *Colección de documentos para la Guerra de Independencia en México*, Mexico.
- Herodotus, 1904, *The Histories of Herodotus*, New York: D. Appleton and Company. [ST: *Historia*, 5 vols, Madrid: Gredos.]
- Herzfeld, E., 1938, *Altperische Inschriften*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer.
- Hinkelammert, F., 1984, *Crítica de la razón utópica*, San José de Costa Rica: DEL.
- Hinkelammert, F., 1991, *Sacrificios humanos y sociedad occidental: Lucifer y la bestia*, San José de Costa Rica: DEL.
- Hinkelammert, F., 1996, *El mapa del emperador: Determinismo, caos, sujeto*, San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones.
- Hinkelammert, F., 1998, *El grito del sujeto*, San José de Costa Rica: DEL.
- Hinkelammert, F., 2000, 'La inverso de los derechos humanos: el caso de John Locke', in J. Herrera Flores (ed.), *El vuelo de Anteo: Derechos humanos y crítica de la razón liberal*, Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, pp. 79-113.
- Hinkelammert, F., 'El método de Hume y las falacias de la Modernidad' (unpublished), 2003.
- Hobbes, T., 1998, *Leviatán o la material, forma y poder de una república eclesiástica y civil*, translated by M. Sánchez Sarro, Mexico: FCE. [English: 1937, *Leviathan*, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.]
- Hobbes, T., 2000, *De Cive*, Madrid: Alianza, *Tratado sobre el ciudadano*, edited by J. Rodríguez Feo, Madrid, Trotta. [English: 1949, *The Citizen*, edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.]

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Hobson, J., 1972, *The Imperialism [1902]*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Hodges, D. C., 1986, *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hodges, D. C., 1992, *Sandinismo's Communism: Spiritual Politics for the Twenty-first Century*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Höffe, O., 1986, *Kant*, Barcelona: Herder.
- Höffner, J., 1957, *La ética colonial española del Siglo de Oro*, Madrid: Cultura Hispánica.
- Honneth, A., 1992, *Kampf um Anerkennung*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. [ST: 1997, *Lucha por el reconocimiento*, Barcelona: Grijalbo-Mondadori; ET: *The Struggle for Recognition*.]
- Hook, S., 1963, *From Hegel to Marx*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Hooker, R., 1977, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, vol. 5, ed. by W. S. Hill, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, F. W., 1969, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, Frankfurt: S. Fischer Verlag.
- Hösle, V., 1987, *Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- Hourani, A., 2003, *La historia de los árabes*, Barcelona: Vergara.
- Huang Tsung-hsi, 1993, *Ming-i-tai-fang lu (Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince)*, edited by W. Th. De Bary, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hume, D., 1994, *Ensayos políticos*, Madrid: Tecnos. [English: 1994, *Political Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Hume, D., 1998, *Tratado de la naturaleza humana*, Porrúa, Mexico. [English: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by D. Norton and M. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.]
- Huntington, S., 2001, *El choque de civilizaciones y la reconfiguración del orden mundial*, Mexico: Paidós. [English: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.]
- Huntington, S., 2004, *¿Quiénes somos? Los desafíos a la identidad nacional estadounidense*, Buenos Aires: Paidós. [English: *Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*.]
- Ianni, O., 1975, *La formación del Estado populista en América Latina*, Mexico: Era.
- Ibn 'Arabi, 1911, *al-Futūhatal-Makkiyya*, Cairo. [English: *The Meccan Revelations*.]
- Imber, C., 2004, *El Imperio otomano: 1300-1650*, Barcelona: Vergara. [English: *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650*.]
- Instituto de Estudios del Sandinismo, 1985, *El sandinismo: Documentos básicos*, Managua: Nueva Nicaragua.
- Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., 1970, *Populismo: Sus significados y características nacionales*, Buenos Aires. Amorrortu.
- Ipola, E. de, 1982, *Ideología y discurso populista*, Mexico: Folios.
- Isócrates, 1928-1944, *Opera I-III*, Cambridge, MA: Loeb.
- Jaramillo, J., 1968, *Ensayo sobre historia social colombiana*, Bogota: National University of Colombia.
- Jeremias, J., 1956, *Jesús et les païens*, Neuchâtel: Delachaux.
- Jidejan, N., 1969, *Tyre, Through the Ages*, Beirut: Dar El-Machreq.
- Jidejan, N., 1971, *Byblos, Through the Ages*, Beirut: Dar El-Machreq.
- Jullien, F., 1995, *The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China*, New York: Zone Books. [ST: 2000, *La propensión de las cosas*, Barcelona: Anthropos.]

REFERENCES

- Jullien, F., 1996, *Traité de l'efficacité*, Paris: Grasset [ST: 1999, *Tratado de la eficacia*, Siruela, Madrid; ET: 2004, *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*, translated by J. Lloyd, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.]
- Kandel, P. and Monteverde, M., 1976, *Entorno y caída*, Buenos Aires.
- Kant, I., 1961, *Crítica del juicio*, Buenos Aires: Losada. [ET: 1952, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by J. Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press.]
- Kant, I., 1966, *La paz perpetua*, Madrid: Aguilar. [ET: 1972, *Perpetual Peace*, translated by M. Campbell Smith, London: Garland Publishing Company.]
- Kant, I., 1968, *Kant Werke*, 1-10, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Kant, I., 1969, *La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*, Madrid: Alianza. [ET: 1998, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, translated and edited by A. Wood, G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Kant, I., 1988, *Lecciones de ética*, Crítica, Barcelona. [ET: 1997, *Lectures on Ethics*, edited by P. Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by P. Heath, New York: Cambridge University Press.]
- Kant, I., 1999, *La contienda de las Facultades de filosofía y teología*, Trotta, Madrid. [ET: 1979, *Conflict of the Faculties*, translated by M. Gregor, New York: Abaris Books.]
- Kaplan, M., 1983, *Formación del Estado Nacional en América Latina*, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
- Kempff Mercado, M., 1958, *Historia de la filosofía en Latinoamérica*, Santiago de Chile: Zig-Zag.
- Kersting, W., 1995, *Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Kierkegaard, S., 1949, *Post-scriptum aux miettes philosophiques*, Gallimard, Paris. [ET: 1992, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, edited and translated by H. Hong and E. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press.]
- Kinder, H. and Hilgemann, W., 1966, *DTV Atlas zur Weltgeschichte*, Munich: DTV, 1-2 [ET: *The Penguin Atlas of World History*.]
- Kindersley, R., 1962, *The First Russian Revisionists*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kinross, Lord, 1977, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*, New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks.
- Knight, F., 1974, *The African Dimension in Latin American Societies*, New York: Mac-Millan.
- Korn, A., 1938-40, *Obras*, 1-3, La Plata: National University of La Plata.
- Laclau, E., 2005, *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso.
- Lafaye, J., 1977, *Quetzalcóatl y Guadalupe*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: 1976, *Quetzalcóatl and Guadalupe: The Formation of Mexican National Consciousness, 1531-1813*, translated by B. Keen, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]
- Lancel, S., 1995, *Cartago*, Barcelona: Crítica. [ET: 1995, *Carthage: A History*, translated by A. Nevill, Oxford: Blackwell.]
- Landí, O., 1978, *La tercera presidencia de Perón*, Buenos Aires.
- Lannusse, A., 1977, *Mi testimonio*, Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- La palabra de los armados de verdad y fuego: Entrevistas, cartas y comunidades del EZLN*, Mexico: Fuenteovejuna, 1994.
- Lara Peinado, F. (ed.), 1986, *Código de Hammurabi*, Madrid: Tecnos; also J. Sanmartín (ed.), 1999, *Códigos legales de tradición babilónica*, Madrid: Trotta, pp. 79-185.
- Lara Peinado, F. (ed.), 1989, *Libro de los muertos*, Madrid: Tecnos. [ET: 1994, *The Egyptian Book of the Dead: The Book of Going Forth by Day*, translated by R. Faulkner, edited by E. Von Dassow, San Francisco: Chronicle Books.]
- Lara Peinado, F. (ed.), 1994, *Los primeros códigos de la humanidad*, Madrid: Tecnos.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Las Casas, B. de, 1957-8, *Obras escogidas*, 1-5, Madrid: BAE. [ET: 1971, *History of the Indies*, translated and edited by A. Collard, London: Harper & Row. And ET: 1994, *The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account*, translated by H. Briffault, London: Johns Hopkins University Press.]
- Las Casas, B. de, 1958, *De Thesauris*, Madrid: CSIC.
- Las Casas, B. de, 1969, *De Regia Potestate o Derecho a la Autodeterminación*, Madrid: CSIC.
- Las Casas, B. de, 1989, *Apología*, Madrid: Alianza.
- Lau, D. C. and Ames, R. (eds), 2003, *Sun Bin. The Art of Warfare*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Launderville, D., 2003, *Piety and Politics: The Dynamics of Royal Authority in Homeric Greece, Biblical Israel, and Old Babylonian Mesopotamia*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Leibniz, G. W., 1967, *Leibniz sogenannte Monadologie und Principes de la nature et de la grace fondés en raison*, edired by G. Reimer, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Leibniz, G. W., 2001, *Escritos de filosofía juridical y política*, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
- Lemoine Villicaña, E., 1965, *Morelos: Su vida revolucionaria a través de sus escritos y de otros testimonios de la época*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Lenin, V. I., 1956, *Obras escogidas en doce tomos*, vols 1-12, Moscow: Progreso. [ET: H. Christman (ed.), 1966, *Essential Works of Lenin*. London: Bantam Books.]
- Lenin, V. I., 1961, *Obras escogidas*, 1-3, Moscow: Progreso.
- Lenin, V. I., 1976, *Contenido económico del populismo*, Madrid, Siglo XXI.
- León-Portilla, L., 1979, *La filosofía náhuatl*, Mexico: FCE.
- Levinas, E., 1968, *Totalité et Infinité. Essai sur l'extériorité*, Nijhoff, La Haye. [ST: 1977, *Totalidad e infinito*, Salamanca: Sígueme; ET: 1969, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, translated by A. Lingis, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press.]
- Levinas, E., 1974, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, La Haye: Nijhoff. [ST: 1987, *De otro modo que ser o más allá de la esencia*, Salamanca: Sígueme; ET: *Otherwise than Being: Or Beyond Essence*.]
- Levinas, E., 1976, *Difficile liberté*, Paris: Albin-Michel. [ST: 2004, *Difícil libertad*, Madrid: Caparrós; ET: 1990, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, translated by S. Hand, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.]
- Liss, S., 1984, *Marxist Thought in Latin America*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Locke, J., 1976, *Ensayo sobre el Gobierno civil*, Madrid: Aguilar. [English: *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, in J. Locke, 1960, *Social Contract*, edited by E. Barker, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-143.]
- Lockhart, J., 1992, *The Nahuas after the Conquest: A Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- López, J. T., 1982, *Dos defensores de los esclavos negros en el siglo XVII*, Caracas: Catholic University Andrés Bello.
- López Austin, A., 1982, *La educación de los antiguos nahuas*, 1-2, Mexico: Ediciones del Caballito.
- López Austin, A., 1992, *Los mitos del Tlacuache: Caminos de la mitología mesoamericana*, Mexico: Alianza.
- López Molina, A. X., 2002, 'Las ideas políticas de los criollos ilustrados mexicanos en 1808', unpublished work presented in a seminar in the Master's in Political Philosophy (Faculty of Philosophy, UNAM, Mexico).
- Löwith, K., 1964, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche: Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. [ET: *From Hegel to Nietzsche*.]

REFERENCES

- Löwy, M. (ed.), 1980, *El marxismo en América Latina (De 1909 a nuestros días): Antología*, Mexico: Era. [ET: 1992, *Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present: An Anthology*, edited by M. Löwy; translated by M. Pearlman, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.]
- Lukács, G., 1954, *Der Junge Hegel*, Berlin: Aufbau. [ST: 1970, *El joven Hegel y los problemas de la sociedad capitalista*, Barcelona, Grijalbo; ET: *The Young Hegel*.]
- Luna, F., 1972, *De Perón a Lanusse (1943-1973)*, Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Maalouf, A., 1995, *Las cruzadas vistas por los árabes*, Madrid: Alianza. [ET: 1984, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, translated by J. Rothschild, London: Al Saqi Books.]
- Maceyra Cámpora, H., 1983, *Perón, Isabel*, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor.
- Machiavelli, N., 1997, *Opere I*, Torino: Einaudi-Gallimard. [ST: 1999, *De Principatibus*, Mexico: Trillas; ET: 1997, *The Prince*, translated by C.E. Detmold, Ware: Wordsworth Editions.] [ST: 2000, *Discurso sobre la primera década de Tito Livio*, Madrid: Alianza; ET: 2007, *Discourses on Livy*, translated by N. Thomson, Mineola: Dover Publications.]
- MacPherson, C. B., 2005, *La teoría política del individualismo posesivo: De Hobbes a Locke*, Madrid: Trotta. [English: 1964, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, New York: Oxford University Press.]
- Maeschalck, M., 1991, *L'anthropologie politique et religieuse de Schelling*, Louvain: Peeters.
- Mahdi, M., 2000, *La cite vertueuse d'Alfarabi: La foundation de la philosophie politique en Islam*, Paris: Albin Michel. [English: 2001, *Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]
- Mandeville, B., 1997, *La fibula de las abejas o Los vicios privados hacen la prosperidad pública*, Mexico: FCE. [English: 1957, *The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits*, edited by F. B. Kaye, Oxford: Clarendon Press].
- Mao Tse-tung, 1971, *Cinco tesis filosóficas de Mao Tse-tung*, Peking: Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras.
- Marcuse, H., 1967, *Razón y Revolución*, Caracas: Institute of Political Studies. [ET: *Reason and Revolution*.]
- Marcuse, H., 1969, *El hombre unidimensional: Ensayo sobre la ideología de la sociedad industrial avanzada*, Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz. [ET: *One-dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*.]
- Marcuse, H., 1999, *Eros y civilización*, Barcelona: Ariel. [ET: *Eros and Civilization*.]
- Mariátegui, J. C., 1979, *Escritos políticos*, Mexico: Editores Era.
- Mariátegui, J. C., 1987, *Defensa del marxismo*, Lima: Biblioteca Amauta.
- Marsilius of Padua, 1980, *Defensor Pacis*, translated by A. Gewirth, University of Toronto. [ST: Marsilius, 1989, *El defensor de la paz*, Madrid: Tecnos; ET: *Defender of Peace*.]
- Martí, J., 1963, *Obras completas*, vol 6, *Nuestra América*. Havana: Editorial Nacional de Cuba.
- Martí, J., 1977, *Política de Nuestra América*, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: 1977, *Our America: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban independence*, translated by E. Randall; edited by P. Foner, New York: Monthly Review Press.]
- Marx, K., 1920, *The Paris Commune*, New York: New York Labor News Company.
- Marx, K., 1956f., *Marx-Engels Werke (MEW)*, vols 1-40, Berlin: Dierz Verlag. [ST: 1982, *Obras fundamentales (OF)*, Mexico: FCE; ET: 1978, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, edited by R. Tucker, New York: Norton.]
- Marx, K., 1967, *Manifiesto del Partido comunista*, Buenos Aires: Claridad. [ET: 2006, *The Communist Manifesto*, translated by B. Fowkes; edited by F. Engels, New York: Penguin.]

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Marx, K., 1970, *Crítica al programa de Gotha*, Madrid: Ricardo Aguilera. [ET: 2008, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Maryland: Wildside Press.]
- Marx, K. and Engels, F., 1975, *Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), Berlin: Dietz Verlag, divided into four sections, section II being the four essays on *Capital* (see Dussel, 1985b, 1988, 1990). [ST: 1981, *El Capital*, Mexico: Siglo XXI, vol. I/1, 1975; III/8; ET: 1967, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, edited by F. Engels, New York: International Publishers.]
- Marx, K., 1975, *Collected Works* (CW), London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Marx, K., 1982, *Obras fundamentales* (OF), Mexico: W. Roces, FCE.
- Massignon, L., 1922, *La passion d'al-Hallaj*, Geuthner, Paris. [Partial ST: 1999, *La pasión de Hallaj*, Barcelona: Paidós; ET: 1982, *The Passion of Al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam*, translated and edited by H. Mason, Princeton: Princeton University Press.]
- Mellafe, R., 1973, *Breve historia de la esclavitud negra en America Latina*, Mexico: Secretaría de Educación Pública.
- Méndez Reyes, S., 1996, *El hispanoamericanismo de Lucas Alamán (1823-1853)*, Toluca, Estado de México: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.
- Menzies, G., 2003, 1421: *El año en que China descubrió el mundo*, Barcelona: Grijalbo. [English: 2003, 1421: *The Year China Discovered America*, New York: William Morrow.]
- Mészáros, István, 2006, *Más allá del Capital*, Caracas: Vadell Hermanos Editores. [ET: 1995, *Beyond Capital*, London: Merlin Press.]
- Mignolo, W., 1995, *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality and Colonization*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Mignolo, W., 2000, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Miguens, J. E., 1981, *Los neofascismos en la Argentina*, Buenos Aires.
- Minges, P., 1919, 'Suárez und Duns Scotus', *Philosophische Zeitschrift der Gorges-Gesellschaft*, Alber, Freiburg/Munich, 32, pp. 334-40.
- Mir, P., 1972, *Viaje a la muchedumbre*, ed. by Jaime Labatista, Mexico: Siglo veintune editors.
- Miranda, J. P., 1996, *Racionalidad y democracia*, Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme.
- Miró Quesada, F., 1981, *Proyecto y realización del filosofar latinoamericano*, Mexico: FCE.
- Montaigne, M. de, 1967, *Oeuvres Completes*, Paris: Gallimard-Pleiade. [ET: Montaigne, M. de, 1957, *Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*, translated by D. Frame, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.]
- Montesquieu, Ch.-L. de Secondat, 1994, *Cartas persas*, Madrid: Tecnos. [ET: *Persian Letters*.]
- Montesquieu, Ch.-L. de Secondat, 1995, *Del Espíritu de las Leyes*, 1-2, Mexico: Gernika. [ET: Montesquieu, Ch.-L., 2002, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Amherst: Prometheus Books.]
- Mora, J. M. L., 1994a, *Obras políticas*, Mexico: Mora Institute.
- Mora, J. M. L., 1994b, 'Ensayo filosofico sobre nuestra revolucion constitucional', in Mora (1994a), pp. 462-72.
- Mora, J. M. L., 1994c, 'Discurso sobre la necesidad e importancia de la observancia de las leyes', in Mora (1994a), pp. 281-9.
- Mora, J. M. L., 1994d, 'Discurso sobre la necesidad de fijar el derecho de ciudadanía', in Mora (1994a), pp. 385-99.

REFERENCES

- Moreno, R., 1966, 'Modern Philosophy in New Spain', in Mario de la Cueva et al., *Major Trends in Mexican Philosophy*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 130–83.
- Moreno Corzo, O., 2005, 'El EZLN: la emergencia del sujeto indígena', Master's thesis, Political Science, UNAM (Mexico).
- Morin, E., 1996, *El paradigma perdido: Ensayo de bioantropología*, Barcelona: Kairós.
- Moya Pons, F., 1971, *La Espanola en el siglo XVI*, Santiago de los Caballeros: Catholic University Madre and Maestra.
- Narr, K., 'Exkurs über die frühe Pferdehaltung', in H. Franke, H. Hoffmann and H. Jedin (eds), *Saeculum Weltgeschichte I*, Freiburg: Herder, pp. 578–81.
- Needham, J., 1954–85, *Science and Civilisation in China*, 1–5, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Negri, A., 1993, *Nietzsche nella pianura? Gli uomini e la città*, Milan: Spirali Vel.
- Negri, A., 2000, *Spinoza subversivo*, Madrid: Akal. [ET: *Subversive Spinoza*.]
- Niekerk, A. E. van, 1974, *Populism and Political Development in Latin America*, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.
- Nietzsche, F., 1973, *Werke in zwei Bänden*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Nussbaum, M., 1994, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- O'Donnell, G., 1983, *El estado burocrático-authoritario*, Buenos Aires.
- O'Gorman, E., 1945, *Fray Servando Teresa de Mier*, Mexico: Imprenta Universitaria.
- O'Gorman, E., 1957, *La invención de América*, Mexico: FCE. [English: *The Invention of America*.]
- Oliveira, F., 1983, *A Arte da Guerra do Mar*, Lisbon: Marinha.
- Palmieri, A., 1911, 'Église de Constantinople', in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 3:2, cols. 1,307–1,517.
- Pardo Olaguez, J., 2001, 'El proyecto moderno de desarrollo nacional e independiente de Lucas Alamán', Seminar of Political Philosophy, UAM-Iztapalapa (Mexico).
- Parisi, A., 1971, *Filosofía y Dialéctica*, Mexico: Edicol.
- Parry, J. H., 1975, *Europa y la expansión de ultramar*, Madrid: Aguilar.
- Pärssinen, M., 1992, *Tawantinsuyu: The Inca State and its Political Organization*, Helsinki: SHS.
- Patrologia Graeca: Patrologiae cursus completes. Serie Graeca*, edited by J.-P. Migne, Turnholti: Brepols, 1857f.
- Patrologia Latina: Patrologiae cursus completes. Serie Latina*, edited by J.-P. Migne, Turnholti: Brepols, 1844f.
- Patterson, O., 1973, *The Sociology of Slavery in Jamaica*, Jamaica: Sangster's Books.
- Pauw, C. de, 1768–9, *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, ou Mémoires intéressants par servir a l'histoire de l'espece humaine*, 1–2, Berlin.
- Paz, O., 1959, *El laberinto de la soledad*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: 1985, *The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico*, translated by L. Kemp et al., New York: Grove Press.]
- Paz, O., 1990, *Posdata*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Pérez Fernández, I., 1991, *Bartolomé de Las Casas: Contra los negros?*, Mexico: Esquila.
- Perón, J. D., 1973, *La hora de los pueblos*, Buenos Aires: Mundo Nuevo.
- Picard, G. C. and Picard, C., 1970, *Vie et mort de Carthage*, Paris: Hachette. [ET: 1968, *The Life and Death of Carthage: A Survey of Punic History and Culture from its Birth to its Final Tragedy*, translated by D. Collon, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.]

- Picón-Salas, M., 1965, *De la Conquista a la Independencia*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: 1962, *A Cultural History of Spanish America, From Conquest to Independence*, translated by I. Leonard, Berkeley: University of California Press.]
- Pinkard, T., 2000, *Hegel: Una biografía*, Madrid: Acento. [English: *Hegel*.]
- Plato, 2000, *La República*, translated by A. Gómez Robledo, Mexico: UNAM. [ET: 2004, *The Republic*, translated by C. D. C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Company.]
- Pocock, J. G. A., 1975, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Polybius, 1981, *Historias*, Madrid: Gredos.
- Pomeranz, K., 2000, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Popol-Vuh*, 1974, edited by A. Recinos, Mexico: FCE.
- Poulantzas, N., 1972, *Poder político y clases sociales en el Estado capitalista*, Mexico: Siglo XXI. [ET: 1976, *Political Power and Social Classes*, translation editor, T. O'Hagan, London: NLB.]
- Prigogine, I. and Nicolis, G., 2001, *El fin de las certidumbres*, Madrid: Taurus. [ET: Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I., 1997, *The End of Certainty*, New York: Free Press.]
- Propp, V., 1972, *Morfología del cuento*, Buenos Aires: Goyanarte. [English: *Morphology of the Folktale*.]
- Puech, H.-Ch., 1960, 'La religion de Mani', in *Christo y las religiones de la tierra*, 2, Madrid: BAC, pp. 469-525.
- Puente Ojea, G., 1974, *Ideología e historia*, Madrid, Siglo XXI.
- Rawls, J., 1999, *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Redmond, W. B., 1972, *Bibliography of Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America*, The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Ribeiro, D., 1968, *El proceso civilizatorio*, Caracas: Central University of Venezuela. [ET: *The Civilizational Process*.]
- Ribeiro, D., 1971, *El dilema de América Latina*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Ribeiro, D., 1977, *Las Américas y la civilización*, Mexico. [ET: 1971, *The Americas and Civilization*, translated by L. Barrett and M. Barrett, New York, Dutton.]
- Ricardo, D., 1959, *Principios de Economía Política y de Tributación*, Madrid: Aguilar. [English: 1977, *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, New York: Georg Olms.]
- Richard, P., 1981, *Materiales para una historia de la teología en América Latina*, San José de Costa Rica CEHILA-DEI.
- Ricœur, P., 2004, *La simbólica del mal [1963]*, in *Finitud y culpabilidad*, Trotta, Madrid. [ET: *The Symbolism of Evil*.]
- Riedel, M., 1970, *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft und Staat bei Hegel*, Neuwied: Luchterhand.
- Riley, P., 1983, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, New Jersey: Rowman & Allenheld.
- Rittré, J., 1957, *Hegel und die französische Revolution*, Köln: Opladen. [ET: *Hegel and the French Revolution*.]
- Robertson, W. S., 1929, *The Life of Miranda*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rock, D., 1978, 'Repression and Revolt in Argentina', *The New Scholar* 7(1-2), pp. 110-11.
- Roig, A., 1969, *El krausismo argentino*, Puebla: Cajica.
- Roig, A., 1972, *El espiritualismo argentino entre 1850 y 1900*, Puebla: Cajica.
- Roitman Rosenmann, M., 2005, *Las razones de la democracia en América Latina*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Romero, J. L. (ed.), 1977, *Pensamiento político de la emancipación*, Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho.

REFERENCES

- Roscio, J. G., 1953, *Obras*, 1-3, Caracas: General Secretary of the Tenth Inter-American Conference.
- Rosenzweig, F., 1920, *Hegel und der Staat*, Munich: Oldenberg.
- Roth, R., 1981, *Los años de Onganía*, Buenos Aires: La Campana.
- Rouquie, A., 1982a, 'Hegemonía militar, estado y dominación social', in *Argentina hoy*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, pp. 11-50.
- Rouquie, A., 1982b, *Poder militar y sociedad política en Argentina (1943-1973)*, 2, Buenos Aires: Emecé.
- Rousseau, J.-J., 1963, *Du Contrat Social*, Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions. [ST: 1996, *El contrato social*, Madrid: Alba; ET: 2002, *The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses*, edited and with an introduction by S. Dunn, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press].
- Rubio Angulo, J., 1979, *Historia de la filosofía latinoamericana*, Bogotá: USTA.
- Ruiz Méndez, A., 2002, 'Dos conceptos de soberanía en la revolución de la Independencia de México', work from seminar, Mexico: UNAM.
- Saco, J., 1938, *Historia de la esclavitud de la raza Africana en el Nuevo Mundo*, Havana: Editorial Cultural.
- Said, E., 1978, *Orientalism*, New York: Random House.
- Said, E., 1993, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Knopf.
- Salazar Bondy, A., 1967, *Philosophy in Peru*, Lima: Universo.
- Salazar Bondy, A., 1969, *Existe una filosofía en nuestra América?* Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Salazar Bondy, A., 1973, 'Filosofía de la dominación y filosofía de la liberación', *Stromata* 29(4) (October-December), pp. 397-417.
- Sandoval, A. de, 1987, *Un tratado sobre la esclavitud*, trans. E. Vilar Vilar, Madrid: Alianza [originally published in 1647 as *De instauranda aethiopia salute*].
- Sarmiento, D. F., 1963, *Facundo, civilización y barbarie*, Losada, Buenos Aires. [ET: 2003, *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism*, translated by K. Ross, Berkeley: University of California Press.]
- Sarrailh, J., 1974, *La España Ilustrada de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII*, Mexico: FCE.
- Schelling, F. W. J., 1959, *Sämtliche Werke*, 1-4, edited by M. Schröter, Munich: C H. Beck.
- Scheuss de Studer, E., 1958, *La trata de negros en el Río de la Plata en el siglo XVII*, National University of Buenos Aires.
- Schmitt, C., 1979, *El nomos de la Tierra en el Derecho de Gentes del 'Jus publicum europaeum'*, Madrid: CEC. [ET: 2003, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum*, translated by G. L. Ulmen, New York: Telos Press Publishing.]
- Schmitt, C., 1993, *Land und Meer*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. [ST: with prologue by R. Campderrich and epilogue by F. Volpi, 2007, *Tierra y mar*, Madrid: Trotta; ET: *Land and Sea*.]
- Schmitt, C., 1995, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. [ST: 1997, *El Leviatán en la doctrina del Estado de Thomas Hobbes*, Mexico: UAM-Iztapalapa; ET: 1996, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*, translated by G. Schwab and E. Hilfstein, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.]
- Semerano, G., 1984-1994, *Le origini della cultura europea*, 1-4, Florence: Olschki.
- Semerano, G., 2001, *L'infinito: un equivoco millenario. Le antiche civiltà del Vicino Oriente e le origini del pensiero Greco*, Milan: Bruno Mondadori.
- Semerano, G., 2005, *La favola dell'indoeuropeo*, Milan: Bruno Mondadori.

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Sempat, C., 1965, *El tráfico de esclavos de Córdoba, 1588-1610*, Córdoba: National University of Córdoba.
- Sharer, R., 1994, *The Ancient Maya*, California: Stanford University Press.
- Sherman, W., 1979, *Forced Native Labour in XVI Century Central America*, London: University of Nebraska.
- Sidicaro, R., 1982, 'Poder y crisis de la burguesía agraria argentina', in *Argentina Hoy*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Silva, L., 1971, *Teoría y práctica de la ideología*, Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo.
- Silva Gotay, S., 1980, *El pensamiento cristiano revolucionario*, Salamanca: Sígueme.
- Smith, A., 1978, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ST: 1995, *Lecciones sobre jurisprudencia*, Granada: Comares.]
- Smith, A., 1982, *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Smith, A., 1984, *Una investigación sobre la naturaleza y causa de la riqueza de las naciones*, Mexico: FCE. [English: 1976, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, edited by E. Cannan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]
- Smith, A., 1997, *La teoría de los sentimientos morales*, Madrid: Alianza. [English: 1976, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.]
- Soler, R., 1959, *El Positivismo argentino*, Panama: Imprenta Nacional.
- Sombart, W., 1965, *Lujo y capitalismo*, Madrid: Revista de Occidente. [English: *Luxury and Capitalism*.]
- Soros, G., 2000, *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism*, New York: Public Affairs.
- Spinoza, B., 1958, *Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico*, Mexico: FCE; translated and edited by A. Domínguez, Madrid: Trotta, 2005. [ET: 1989, *Ethics*, translated by A. Boyle, and revised by G. H. R. Parkinson, London: Everyman's.]
- Spinoza, B., 1985, *Tratado teológico-político: Tratado político*, Madrid: Technos. [ET: 1998, *Theological-Political Treatise*, translated by S. Shirley, Indianapolis: Hackett.]
- Spinoza, B., 1988, *Correspondencia completa*, Madrid: Hiperión.
- Spinoza, B., 2002, *Complete Works*, translated by S. Shirley, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Spinoza, B., 2003, *Ethics*, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spiro, P., 2000, 'The New Sovereignists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets', *Foreign Affairs* 79(6), pp. 9-15.
- Star, J., 2001, *Tao te Ching: The Definitive Edition*, edited by J. Star, New York: Jeremy Tarcher/Putnam. [ST: 2006, *Tao te Ching: Los libros de Tao*, Madrid: Trotta.]
- Stemberg, F., 1979, *El imperialismo*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Strauss, L. and Cropsey, J., 1994, *Histoire de la Philosophie politique*, Paris: PUF. [ET: 1987, *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]
- Streicher, K., 1928, *Die Philosophie der Spanischen Spätscholastik und in den deutschen Universitäten des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens*, Münster: Aschendorff.
- Suárez, F., 1597, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Salamanca. [ET: *Metaphysical Disputations*.]
- Suárez, F., 1965, *Defensio fidei*, edited by E. Elorduy and L. Perena, Madrid: CSIC.
- Suárez, F., 1967, *Tratado de las leyes y de Dios legislador*, edited by J. R. Eguillor M., Madrid: Institute of Political Studies.
- Subirats, E., 1994, *El continente vacío. La conquista del Nuevo Mundo y la conciencia moderna*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Sunzi, 2006, *El arte de la Guerra*, edited and translated by A. Galvany, Madrid: Trotta. [ET: Sun-Tzu, 1988, *The Art of War*, translated by T. Cleary, Boston: Shambhala.]

REFERENCES

- Tatian, 1954, *Oratio Adversus Graecos*, in Ruiz Bueno, D. (ed.), *Padres apostólicos*, Madrid: BAC, pp. 572–630. [ET: 1982, *Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments*, edited and translated by M. Whittaker, Oxford: Clarendon Press.]
- Torres, J. C., 1983, *Los sindicatos en el gobierno (1973–1976)*, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor.
- Valadés, J., 1938, *Alamán: Estadista e historiador*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Vargas, G., 1938, *A nova política do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio.
- Various authors, 1973, *Los cristianos y el socialismo*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI. [ET: 1975, *Christians and Socialism*, translated by J. Drury, edited by J. Eagleson, Maryknoll: Orbis Books.]
- Vattimo, G., 1998, *Creder e di credere*, Milano: Garzanti. [ST: 1996, *Creer que se cree*, Barcelona: Paidós.]
- Velasco Ibarra, J. M., 1961, *Cuarta Jornada*, Quito: Talleres Gráficos Nacionales.
- Venturi, F., 1960, *Roots of Revolution*, Chicago: Knopf.
- Verdad y Ramos, F. P., 1910, 'Memoria póstuma del síndico del Ayuntamiento. Lic. D. F. P. de Verdad y Ramos', in *Genaro García*, 2, doc. 53, pp. 147–68.
- Vernet, J., 1999, *Lo que Europa debe al Islam de España*, Barcelona: El Cantilado.
- Verón, E., 1969, 'Ideología y comunicación de masas', in *Lenguaje y comunicación social*, Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Verón, E. and Sigal, S., 1982, 'Perón: discurso político e ideología', in *Argentina hoy*, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Viera, A., 1907–9, *Obras completas del padre Antónia Vieira*, 1–15, Porto.
- Vilar Vilar, E., 1977, *Hispanoamérica y el comercio de esclavos*, Sevilla: EEHA.
- Villareal, J., 1978, *El capitalismo dependiente, estudio de la estructura de clases en Argentina*, Mexico: Siglo XXI.
- Villoro, L., 1967, *El proceso ideológico de la Revolución de la Independencia*, Mexico: UNAM.
- Villoro, L., 1987, *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México*, Mexico: SEP.
- Villoro, L., 1998, *Estado plural, pluralidad de culturas*, Mexico: Paidós.
- Vitier, M., 1948, *La filosofía en Cuba*, Mexico: Colección Tierra firme.
- Vitoria, F. de, 1960, *Obras de Francisco de Vitoria*, edited by T. Urdanoz, Madrid: BAC. [ET: 1991, *Political Writings*, edited by A. Pagden and J. Lawrence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.]
- Wachtel, N., 1971, *La vision des vaincus: Les Indiens de Pérou devant la Conquete espagnole*, Paris: Gallimard. [ET: *The Vision of the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest of Peru through Indian Eyes, 1530–1570*.]
- Wakeman, F., 1973, *History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wallerstein, I., 1974, 1980, 1989, *The Modern World-System*, 1–3, New York: Academic Press. [ST: 1979–84, Vols 1–2, Mexico: Siglo XXI.]
- Wallerstein, I., 1977, *The Capitalist World-Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallerstein, I., 1999, *The End of the World as We Know It: Social Science in the Twenty-First Century*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Walzer, M., 1965, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wang Yang-ming, 1963, *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Writings*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Weber, M., 1920–1, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, 1–3, Tübingen: Mohr. [ST: 1987, *Ensayos sobre sociología de la religión*, 1–3, Madrid: Taurus.]

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Weber, M., 1930, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London: George Allen & Unwin. [ST: 1993, *La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo*, Barcelona: Ediciones 62.]
- Weber, M., 1944, *Economía y Sociedad: Esbozo de sociología comprensiva*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: 1968, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich; translated by E. Fischhoff, New York: Bedminster Press.]
- Weber, M., 1951, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Weber, M., 1952, *Ancient Judaism*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Weber, M., 1958, *The Religion of India: the Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Weffort, F., 1967, 'Estado y masas no Brasil', *Revista de la Civilizacao Brasileira*, 7.
- Weffort, F. and Quijano, A., 1976, *Populismo, marginación y dependencia*, San José de Costa Rica.
- Weil, E., 1959, *Hegel et l'état*, Paris: Vrin. [ET: *Hegel and the State*.]
- Werz, N., 1995, *Pensamiento socio-político moderno en América Latina*, Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
- William of Ockham, 1614, *Dialogus*, in M. Goldast (ed.), *Monarchia S. Romani Imperii*, Frankfurt: Biermann, 2, pp. 398–957.
- Williams, E., 1944, *Capitalism and Slavery*, New York: Capricorn.
- Williams, H., 1996, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Wilson, C. H., 1965, *England's Apprenticeship, 1603–1763* (2nd edn, 1984), London: Longman.
- Wolin, S., 2001, *Política y perspectiva: Continuidad y cambio en el pensamiento político continental*, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
- Wolin, S., 2004, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zamora, A., 1958, *Digesto constitucional Americano*, Buenos Aires: Claridad.
- Zavala, S., 1953, *Contribución a la historia de las instituciones coloniales de Guatemala*, Guatemala: Ministerio de Cultura.
- Zea, L., 1949, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica: Del romanticismo al positivismo*, Mexico: El Colegio de México.
- Zea, L., 1957, *América en la historia*, Mexico: FCE. [ET: *The Role of the Americas in History*.]
- Zea, L., 1965, *El pensamiento latinoamericano*, 1–2, Mexico: Pormaca. [ET: 1963, *The Latin American Mind*, translated by J. Abbott and L. Dunham, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.]
- Zea, L., 1973, 'La filosofía latinoamericana como filosofía de la liberación', *Stromata*, 4 (1973).
- Zea, L., 1976, *El pensamiento latinoamericano*, Barcelona: Ariel.
- Zea, L., 1977, 'Liberación latinoamericana y filosofía', *Latinoamérica* (Mexico) 10, pp. 83–91.
- Žižek, S., 2000, *The Žižek Reader*, edited by E. Wright, Oxford: Blackwell.

Index

- Abel 11, 44, 67, 85-6, 88
Abensour, Miguel 405, 408, 411
Abraham 71, 86-7, 106-7, 213, 462
Abu-Lughod, Janet 66, 79
Acosta, Jose de 224-5, 246
actor(s) 4, 14, 131, 171-3, 269, 296,
305, 326-7, 330-1, 344, 352, 439,
449-50, 455, 470-1, 474, 525,
533-4, 554
political xv, 167-70, 205, 333, 420,
422, 542
Adam 68, 82, 213, 301, 321
Agamben, Giorgio 13, 68
Augustus, Caesar 64, 76
Alamán, Lucas 453-7, 459, 463
Alberdi, Juan 453, 459-62, 503
Alegre, Francisco Xavier 235, 434,
437
Alexander 8, 26, 44-5, 49, 58, 79,
100, 138, 172
al-Farabi 91-7, 120, 125, 275, 551
Alighieri, Dante 67, 124-5, 162
Allende, Salvador 440, 508, 516,
522, 528, 535-6, 547-8
Almagro, Diego de 209, 213
alterity 67, 69, 85-8, 98, 124, 182-
3, 191-2, 224, 226, 235-6, 248,
252, 280, 286, 349, 352, 494, 542
Amaru, Tupac 434, 525
ambiguity 268, 297, 303, 338, 347,
409, 413, 425, 468, 474, 477-8,
480, 492-4, 519
Amin, Samir 89, 480-1
Anaximander 12, 50-1
Anselm 105-6, 109-11, 114
Apel, Karl-Otto 93, 231, 371
Aquinas, St Thomas 82, 96, 113,
125, 258, 437, 444
Arbenz, Jacobo 483, 504
architectonic 54, 148, 154, 168, 174,
266, 281, 325, 344-5, 347-8, 355,
361, 363-4, 368, 394-5, 399, 419,
424, 427, 449, 549-50, 554
Arendt, Hannah 63-4, 116, 418,
438-9, 459, 551, xvi
aristocracy 46, 55, 57, 115, 256,
335, 398, 525-6
Aristotle 28, 45, 53, 55-9, 64, 90-1,
94-6, 113-15, 118-19, 125, 163,
166, 225, 250, 277, 300-1, 305,
346, 390, 401, 554
army(ies) 8, 19-21, 23, 27, 41-2,
47-8, 53-4, 61, 74, 100, 103, 107,
109, 144, 151-2, 155-7, 159, 162,
225, 239, 254, 293, 335, 426, 433,
448, 450, 457-8, 483, 486-7, 491,
500, 504, 509, 530, 542-3
Ataturk, Kemal 158, 467
Augustine, St. 44, 67, 77, 85-8, 100,
105-6, 115-16, 124-6, 198, 207,
237, 551
Augustus, Caesar 64, 76
authority(ies) xvi, 4, 10, 16, 21, 23,
30, 40, 42, 46, 59, 71, 97, 105,
124-5, 146, 148, 157-9, 161-3,
171-2, 179, 203, 205, 208, 215,
218, 223, 226, 233, 248, 251, 253,
255-8, 260, 268, 275, 277-8, 291-
2, 312, 333, 335, 357, 361, 372-3,
396, 411, 414, 429-31, 437, 443,
445-8, 475, 517, 546
autonomy 58, 78, 82, 112, 114, 124,

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- 151, 155, 159-60, 162, 164, 166,
174, 201, 223, 256, 286, 334, 366,
398, 431, 434, 478-9, 482, 486,
490, 500, 511, 540
- Averroes
see also Ibn-Rushd 93, 96, 114, 120
- Avicenna
see also Ibn-Sina 93, 96, 115-20
- Ayala, Felipe Guaman Poma de 210-
24
- Bacon, Roger 123-5, 189
- Badiou, Alain 35, 68, 274, 528
- Bagu, Sergio 524, 527
- Bakunin, Mikhail 407, 411
- barbarian(s) 8, 58, 78, 95, 99-100,
103, 158, 192-6, 208-10, 217,
224-5, 392, 398, 437, 455, 459,
461, xv
- Basil 81-2
- Batista, Fulgencio 468, 483
- Bauer, Bruno 415-6, 498
- Bello, Andres 453, 463
- Benedict of Nursia 101-2
- Benjamin, Walter 32, 112, 287, 377,
537, 543
- ben-Maimon, Moses
see also Maimonides 97-8, 125
- Bergson, Henri 33, 119
- Bernal, Martin 15, 551
- Bilbao, Francisco 453, 464
- bishop(s) xvi, 79, 85, 90, 105, 112,
125, 161, 241, 260, 430, 441, 457,
536, 539, 541
- Bloch, Ernst 75, 147
- Bodin, Jean 229, 254-7, 266, 268,
xvii
- Bolívar, Simon 439, 450-1, 454,
457, 498, 532
- Bonaparte, Napoleon 168, 403, 439,
444-7
- Bondy, Salazar 500, 511, 513, 518
- bourgeoisie 37, 46, 104, 127,
139, 154, 254, 278, 285, 290-1,
312-13, 334, 338, 353, 370, 386,
421-4, 452, 466-8, 478-81, 484-
5, 487-90, 492, 495-6, 499-506,
508-10, 512, 515-16, 524, 526
- Brahma 27, 40
- Bronze Age 44-5, 48, xv
- Bush, George W. 68, 415, 530
- Caesar, Julius 62, 64-5
- Cain 11, 44, 67, 85-6, 88, 109, 123,
125
- Calles, Plutarco 483, 495
- Campora, Hector 506, 512-13
- Capac, Guaina 205, 217
- capitalism 30, 70, 104, 130, 132,
134-5, 137, 139, 236, 293, 301,
311-12, 321, 324-5, 329, 337-8,
343, 353-4, 361, 396, 399, 427,
434, 453, 463, 465-6, 468, 480-3,
485, 495, 499-500, 502, 504, 524,
527-8, 534, 547, 550
- Cardenal, Ernesto 537, 539
- Cardenas, Lazaro 467-8, 473, 480,
483, 487-8, 526
- Castro, Fidel 440, 492-3, 525, 528-
33, 535, 538, 547
- chaos 19, 24-5, 28, 40, 57, 92, 97,
101, 145, 165, 167, 169, 217, 257,
259, 282, 297, 322, 449, 455
- Charles I 257, 292
- Charles V 138, 155, 162, 254, 429
- Christendom(s) 67-9, 73-4, 76-7,
79-81, 86, 94, 98, 100, 102-3,
105-6, 109-10, 112, 123, 126,
165, 180, 182, 193, 209, 221, 233,
236, 244, 253, 259-60, 269, 274,
286-7, 391, 414, 417, 429, 431,
442, 444, 551
- Latin-Germanic 27, 85, 97, 192
- Christianity 14, 67-8, 73-4, 76-80,
86, 89, 100, 105-6, 108, 112,
180, 206, 212, 214-15, 217, 221,
224, 259, 321, 387, 391, 415-17,
440-4, 540, 551
- Chrysostom, John 81-2
- Cicero 64-5, 85
- citizen(s) 7-8, 26, 46-8, 53, 55, 65,
75, 86, 159, 161-3, 167, 171,
177-9, 205, 209, 218, 255, 258,
264-5, 280-1, 284-6, 292, 296-7,

INDEX

- 305, 333, 340, 345, 347, 349, 352,
366, 372-4, 378, 383, 384, 398,
418-20, 429, 458-9, 477, 541-2,
552
- citizenship 8, 53, 62, 114, 179,
209-10, 255, 366, 381, 416, 446,
453, 459-60
- civilization(s) 13, 51, 81, 84, 89, 98,
102, 104, 124, 127, 130, 140-1,
183, 193, 195, 225, 236-7, 296,
309, 339, 362, 366, 402-3, 427,
454, 459-61, 501, 541, 553
- Amerindian 191, 425
- Chinese 37, 147-8
- Incan 22, 215
- Mayan 19, 177
- Muslim 88, 188
- Neolithic 25, 426
- urban 6, 16, 80
- Clausewitz, Carl von 151, 402
- Clavijero, Francisco Xavier 235,
435-7, 440
- colonialism 132, 243, 399, 455, 523,
552, xvi
- colony(ies) 7, 44, 46-7, 49, 51-2,
79, 131, 137-8, 184, 198, 205-6,
237, 265, 267, 291, 293, 305, 311,
334, 349, 352, 396-400, 402, 423,
426, 428-9, 431, 434, 453, 455,
465, 482, 540
- Columbus, Christopher 168, 183,
191, 429
- commerce 21, 48, 127, 134, 137,
139, 153, 158-9, 161, 178, 206,
245-6, 280, 291, 293, 366, 375,
381, 402, 423, 439, 456, 501, 527
- commodity(ies) 46, 134-7, 139, 209,
237, 243, 267, 280, 300, 336-7,
395, 423, 457
- common good(s) 26, 56, 59, 81, 115,
144, 148, 177, 281, 314, 348-9
- commonwealth(s) 168, 229, 233,
254-6, 259-60, 263, 265-7, 275,
286-7, 289, 291, 293, 302, 304,
373
- competition 28, 46, 48, 131, 135,
173, 277, 280-2, 339, 342, 383,
424, 464, 505, 520, 526
- Comte, Auguste 141, 466
- Confucius 14, 28-9, 144, 146
- conquest(s) xvi, 18, 95, 131, 138,
147-8, 156, 182-3, 190-2, 198-9,
205-6, 208-13, 217, 217, 221,
224, 235-6, 241, 294-7, 343, 346,
392, 397, 425, 430, 441-2, 460,
462-3, 499, 524-5, 534, 540-1
- conscience 14, 27, 41-2, 75, 141,
175, 192, 197, 202, 228, 234, 245,
248, 266, 271, 283, 285-6, 296,
302, 327-9, 333, 354, 361, 364,
420, 431, 436, 472, 511, 531, 541
- consensus 4-5, 42, 63, 79, 101, 155,
163, 172, 175, 201-2, 204-5, 230-
1, 253, 258, 268-9, 290, 301, 303,
348, 381, 431, 449, 451, 475, 479
- Constantine, Emperor 67, 78-9, 100,
125, 259, 431, 552
- constitution(s) 28, 38, 45, 54-5, 57,
59, 63-5, 68, 91, 112, 120, 176,
188, 238, 248, 280, 312, 344,
351-2, 358, 361, 365, 372, 374,
377, 381, 385, 389, 392, 397-401,
410, 414, 420, 435, 439, 447, 454,
459-61, 506, 511, 547, 550-1
- consumption 20, 61, 392, 395, 423,
455-6, 489, 501-2, 504, 506, 516
- Copernicus, Nicolaus 189, 258
- Cordoba, Pedro de 199, 206
- corruption 28, 40, 57, 63-4, 81,
143, 146, 161, 163, 170, 179, 219,
349, 351-2, 426, 487, 546, 552
- coup d'etat 11, 447-8, 481, 483,
516, 537, 547,
military 501-5
- custom(s) 7, 28, 42, 51, 56-7, 148-
9, 161, 179-80, 204, 219, 255,
292, 318, 334, 339, 342, 362, 379,
393, 401, 443, 447, 451, 461, 468
- Cyrus 170, 177, 340
- Cyrus II 42, 53-4
- Darius I 42, 48, 172, 450
- Dark Age(s) 15, 88, 140
- David 94, 97, 108, 213, 288

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- death 4, 15, 36, 40, 65, 73, 78, 100, 107-9, 146, 196-7, 200, 210, 213, 215-17, 236, 244-6, 249-50, 258, 270, 289, 292, 325, 361, 379, 386, 389, 430, 448, 507, 515, 517, 532, 538
- defence 14, 29, 62, 100, 151, 174, 194, 203-5, 235, 243, 263-4, 295, 297, 302, 456-7, 529
- military 25, 326, 334
- self- 29
- democracy 15, 46, 48, 52-5, 57, 59, 63, 115, 160, 165, 232, 273, 275, 284, 287, 296, 351, 408-12, 422, 454-5, 467, 486, 503, 516, 536, 539, 542, 545, 547, 552, xv
- dependence 139, 159, 395, 434, 446, 449, 454, 464, 466, 523
- dependency 425, 453, 466, 467, 484, 504-6
- theory 130, 465, 507, 527
- Derrida, Jacques 1, 9-10, 98
- Descartes, Rene 41, 187, 189, 226, 258, 270, 272, 288, 339, 393, xvii
- despotism 34, 63-4, 130, 132, 140, 211, 229, 287, 351, 386, 426, 439, 442-3, 464
- destruction 1 19, 52, 63, 87, 158, 219, 237, 266, 293, 351, 407, 444, 457, 538
- devil 107, 111, 218, 442
- Diaz, Benito 434-5
- dictatorship(s) 412, 486-7, 509, 513, 529, 536-9
- Diderot, Denis 339, 341
- Dionysius 12-13
- discourse 1, 2, 55, 109, 114, 130, 167, 197-8, 214, 253, 257, 262, 268, 270, 288, 330, 345, 368, 378, 425, 427, 439, 467-9, 472-9, 485, 487, 487-95, 497-8, 509, 511-14, 519, 530
- divine 11, 14, 19, 26, 40, 55, 57, 59-61, 65, 73, 78-9, 82-3, 90, 92-5, 97, 102, 111, 114, 116-19, 135, 169, 198, 203, 205, 229, 232, 258, 268, 276, 291, 293, 297, 301, 317-18, 327, 414, 443, 450
- domination 7, 11, 59, 62, 67, 74, 76, 95-6, 106, 108-9, 138-9, 141, 191, 210-12, 296-7, 312, 398-9, 403, 410-11, 417, 421, 425, 431, 440, 448-9, 482, 484, 498, 505-6, 519, 524, 526, 533, 541, 546
- dynasty 27-30, 84, 89, 136, 144-6, 149-51, 156, 165, 433
- economics 41, 55, 297, 332, 404, 408, 422, 515, 520, 524, 527
- economy 30, 110, 240, 299-300, 321, 325, 329, 332, 334-5, 383-5, 413, 415, 417, 419, 456-7, 481, 521, 525
- capitalist 331, 464
- political 46, 330, 333, 336, 354, 361, 394, 405, 409, 535
- world- 130, 254
- education 21, 29, 50, 52, 55, 86, 97, 144, 150, 157, 180, 215, 227, 394, 430, 434-6, 458, 465, 486, 516, 547
- election(s) 55, 61, 114, 145, 149, 163, 167, 170, 179, 258, 283, 352, 456, 458, 486-7, 493, 503-4, 506, 508, 512, 514
- elite(s) 7, 9, 21, 45, 51, 54, 66, 70, 73-4, 113, 134, 141, 155, 157, 163-5, 179, 236, 426, 430-1, 433, 439, 452-3, 457, 461-2, 496, 505, 523, 542
- Enlightenment 129-30, 139-40, 188, 206, 235, 309, 339, 340, 353, 387, 390-1, 432-5, 459
- emancipation 41, 85, 180, 228-9, 252, 270, 400, 408-9, 416-20, 422, 426, 430, 432-3, 438-40, 442, 444, 447-8, 450, 455, 461, 463-4, 498, 511, 520, 523, 525, 534, 541, 547, 554
- emperor(s) 8, 21, 29, 30, 34, 42-3, 72, 78-9, 81, 103, 109, 124-5, 132, 145-9, 155, 207, 214, 233, 235, 260, 444, 481
- empire(s) xv-xvi, 7-8, 10, 14, 25-6,

INDEX

- 28-31, 34, 37, 42-3, 45, 47, 58,
60-6, 68, 72-3, 75-81, 84, 86,
88-9, 103-5, 109-10, 112, 114,
123-5, 127, 132, 136, 140-4, 146-
52, 154-60, 162, 166, 168, 178-9,
194-5, 198, 206-8, 214-15, 246,
259, 284, 293-4, 297, 301, 309,
398-9, 402-3, 434, 437-8, 442,
448, 458, 460, 465-6, 487, 496,
499, 532, 535-6, 539, 547
Byzantine 91, 98
Incan 16, 22-4, 205, 222-3,
North American xvii, 106, 416,
452, 523
Ottoman 164, 427,
Persian 52, 54,
Roman 44, 67, 74, 85, 87, 100,
213, 353, 451, 551
world 130-1, 182, 254
enemy(ies) 32, 35-6, 62, 67, 69,
72, 85, 98, 102-3, 115, 151, 157,
167, 171-2, 174, 177-9, 181, 192,
196, 198, 210, 216, 225, 249, 251,
284-5, 295-6, 314, 335, 339, 341,
350, 437, 439, 449-50, 470-2,
475, 477, 479, 481, 485, 496, 499,
503, 505, 513, 515, 520, 530
Engels, Friedrich 80, 413, 419
equality 11, 16, 92, 96, 98, 247,
251, 296-9, 302, 348, 372, 418,
492, 542
ethic(s) 11, 24, 26, 28, 30, 37-8, 42,
46, 55-6, 58, 60-1, 64-5, 92, 135,
173-4, 199, 211-12, 224, 249,
299-300, 321, 325-7, 330-2, 354,
358, 362-3, 393, 530, 534
Eurocentrism 11, 129-31, 139, 141,
196, 214, 224, 226, 309, 427, 435,
439, 457, 462, 523, 541, 551, xvi
Eve 213, 321
evil 6, 11, 26, 39-41, 43-4, 53, 57,
59, 63, 80-3, 85, 88, 90, 92, 95,
106, 115, 119, 143, 148, 172-4,
242-4, 262, 266, 283-4, 288, 297,
316, 362-3, 371, 373, 380, 403,
406, 454, 464, 538
exclusion 73, 141, 182, 252, 270,
370, 458-9, 512
exile 43, 54, 143, 160, 183, 196,
380, 435-7, 458, 514, 517-8
exploitation 89, 138, 151, 192, 211,
236, 246, 254, 311, 381, 423, 426,
434, 478, 482, 524, 526, 531-2,
534
exteriority 42, 67, 69-72, 75, 85-6,
98, 109, 124, 129, 131, 139, 141,
182-3, 190, 192, 197, 252, 420,
494-5, 507, 510
faction(s) 45, 422, 424, 447-8, 455,
457, 482, 485-7, 490, 492, 500,
505-6, 512
family 3, 4, 29, 42, 60, 83, 94, 134,
142, 144, 152, 154, 159, 211, 215,
270, 278, 286, 300, 381, 389, 393,
397, 417, 420, 445, 457
royal 23, 444, 446
Fanon, Franz 141, 468, xvi
Fernando of Aragon
(Ferdinand) 168, 180, 428-9
feudalism 28-9, 84, 88-9, 112, 135,
151, 253-4, 338, 417, 527
Fichte, Johann 353, 378-86, 402
Fierro, Martin 494, 499
Foucault, Michel 141, 264, 344
Francia, Jose 453, 466
Francis of Assisi 112, 180
Frank, Andre Gunders 136, 139,
145, 148, 184-6, 310
freedom(s) 56, 64, 72, 82, 104, 117-
18, 121-2, 177, 179, 231, 246,
248, 271, 275, 277, 286, 292, 301,
345, 350, 353, 355, 357, 360-1,
369-72, 374, 376, 380-1, 385-6,
390, 395, 399, 401, 403, 421, 437,
442, 446, 448, 452, 457, 458, 465,
508, 529
see also liberty
Freud, Sigmund 14, 141, 344, 388,
478, 519
Galileo 189, 258, 262
Gelbart, Jose 508, 515-16
Giannotti, Donato 162, 291

POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- Gilson, Etienne 120, 123
 globalization 1, 6, 61, 99, 129, 131,
 138, 198, 239, 243, 375, 425
 Greimas, Algirdas 470-1
 Grotius, Hugo 226, 346, 437
 Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' 440, 507,
 509, 528, 533-4, 538, 547
 Guicciardini, Francesco 167, 175,
 178, 181

 Habermas, Jürgen 1, 30, 64, 141,
 274, 371, xvi
 Haya de la Torre, Victor 468, 482,
 494, 526
 Hegel, G. W. F. 45, 59, 79, 82, 110,
 113, 129, 139-41, 193, 200, 251,
 253, 260, 309, 311, 316, 350,
 353, 370-1, 385, 387-404, 405,
 409-10, 414-15, 418-21, 424,
 435, 460, 485, xvi
 hegemony 27, 34, 52, 66, 70, 100,
 104, 135, 138, 145, 154-5, 165,
 173, 198, 206, 254, 270, 278,
 290-1, 309, 311, 353, 387, 447,
 449, 453, 466, 479, 481, 484-6,
 490, 496, 502, 504-6, 516, 536,
 552
 Heidegger, Martin 1, 56, 141, 227,
 494, 551
 Hellenocentrism 11, 276, 305, 339,
 551, xv
 Henry, Prince 236, 242, 244
 Heraclitus 12, 49, 51, 84
 hermeneutic(s) 41, 53, 68, 69, 90,
 194, 211, 274, 277, 405, 454, xvi
 Hermes 12, 15
 hero(es) 20, 29, 33, 170, 350, 398,
 404, 440, 443, 450, 469-75, 478-
 9, 487, 493, 525, 532
 Hesiod 49, 68
 Hess, Moses 410-11
 Hidalgo, Miguel (y Costilla) 287,
 435, 447-8, 450, 455, 532, 548
 Hinkelammert, Franz 73, 111, 274,
 313-15, 324, 375, 480, 520
 Hitler, Adolph 168, 404, 481, 486
 Hobbes, Thomas 5, 41, 68, 75, 77,
 85, 91, 97, 145, 190, 207, 229,
 232, 243, 246-7, 251, 257-70,
 275, 278, 280-2, 287-8, 290, 292-
 3, 295, 297, 321, 333, 339, 341-3,
 345-7, 362, 370-1, 373, 423, 437,
 442, 552, xvi-xvii
 Homer 49, 78, 86
 honour(s) 53, 83, 95, 101, 106, 153,
 202, 255, 359, 369, 444, 461, 475,
 545
 Hooker, Richard 257-9, 293, 298
 Hsi, Chu 113, 143
 Huitzilopochtli 20, 51
 Hume, David 229, 300, 312-26,
 329-30, 333, 341, 343, 354-5,
 360-2, 370, 378, 381
 Hutcheson, Francis 325-6

 Ibarra, Jose 473-4, 483, 487
 Ibn-Rushd
 see also Averroes 96
 Ibn-Sina
 see also Avicenna 96
 ideology(ies) 2, 13, 30, 59, 112, 141,
 235, 309, 416, 453, 459, 463-5,
 467, 479-80, 484, 489-0, 492,
 494, 498, 503, 508, 510, 513, 523,
 529, 542, 551
 imperialism 452, 455, 464, 466-8,
 477, 482-4, 494, 499, 502, 526
 independence 238, 278, 372, 396,
 425, 429, 432, 450, 452-4, 456-7,
 460, 464, 481, 496, 522-4, 526,
 547
 indigenous 16, 124, 138, 139-40,
 190-1, 196, 198-9, 201-7,
 209-14, 219, 224, 226, 235, 296,
 344, 425, 430-1, 433-7, 439, 444,
 446-8, 453, 456, 458-64, 467-8,
 488, 521-2, 524-7, 539-44, 552
 Indo-European 12-13, 16, 25, 70,
 73, 82, 403, xv
 industrialization 311 455, 464-5,
 484-5, 488, 496, 502
 Ingenieros, Jose 466, 521
 injustice 11, 43, 53, 57, 63, 72, 81,
 108, 143, 146, 197-8, 218, 240-3,

INDEX

- 246, 251, 300, 314, 321, 371,
380-1, 437, 529, 552
- invasion(s) xvi, 13, 16, 24, 25-6, 38,
42, 44-5, 85, 89, 100, 126-7, 131,
158, 162, 174, 201, 235, 237, 435,
451, 539
- Isaac 71, 106
- Isabel of Castile 168, 180, 183,
428-9
- Isaiah 13, 106, 108
- Islam xvi, 14, 68, 76, 86, 88-96, 98,
114, 123, 126, 156, 189, 206, 237,
553
- Isocrates 50, 52
- Iturbide, Agustin 457-8
- James I 228, 232
- Jesus 68-9, 71-4, 77, 79-80, 83,
94, 98, 106-12, 212-14, 217-18,
221-2, 224, 444
- Joshua 177, 450
- Judaism 14, 67-8, 78, 271-2, 274,
416, 419
- judge(s) 4, 12, 14, 23, 45, 65, 74,
115, 122, 124, 126, 143, 159, 163,
208, 215, 225, 233, 247-9, 251,
266, 271, 285, 293, 295, 299,
301-2, 328-9, 374, 389, 403, 442,
448, 486, 509
- Jullien, Francois 31, 36-7
- justice 9-16, 30, 43, 53-6, 73, 80,
95, 106-11, 123-4, 157, 161, 192,
205, 213, 216-17, 219, 221, 223-
4, 242, 244, 249, 256, 277, 287,
296, 313-14, 321-9, 334, 338,
343, 350, 354, 361, 367, 381, 389,
395, 440, 472-3, 478, 485, 491-2,
496, 529, 535, 542, 545, 547, xv
- Justinian 84, 229
- Justo, Juan 467, 502, 521-2
- Kant, Immanuel 30, 72, 82, 115,
120, 129, 154, 188, 227, 234, 281,
338, 345, 353-82, 385-7, 393,
395, 401, 403, 435
- Kepler, Johannes 190, 258
- Kierkegaard, Soren 123, 259-60,
387, 391, 429
- king(s) xvi, 9-11, 16, 18, 21, 29,
39-42, 48, 51, 61, 72, 75, 86-7,
94, 97, 103, 124, 127, 147, 149,
153-154, 159, 176, 180, 204-7,
213, 217-18, 221-3, 231-4,
253-4, 256-60, 263-6, 268-9,
287, 291-2, 429-30, 435, 441-2,
444-7, 449, 531
- kingdom(s) xvi, 7, 12, 14, 17, 19-22,
27-9, 31, 36, 39-43, 47, 67, 69,
72, 86, 105, 108, 115, 125, 127,
155, 159-60, 164, 168, 198, 205,
212, 215, 217-18, 220-3, 225,
232-3, 236-8, 244, 253, 256, 265,
268-9, 287, 293, 334, 360-1, 363,
365, 368, 403, 428-9, 437, 445-7,
449, 541
- Kirchner, Nestor 522, 547
- Kissinger, Henry 536, 547
- knowledge 9-10, 17, 36, 41, 49,
56-7, 60, 65, 73-4, 77, 84, 90-1,
95, 103, 142-4, 146, 150, 175,
177, 190, 220-1, 225-6, 268, 273,
276, 288, 292, 314, 319-20, 323,
325-6, 329-31, 333-4, 338, 356,
368, 376, 379, 401, 431, 435,
437-8, 519, 523, 553
- Korn, Alexander 466, 468, 503
- Lacan, Jacques 68, 283
- Laclau, Ernesto 31, 408
- land(s) 6, 10, 19, 21, 24, 39-40, 48-
9, 81, 98, 100, 147-8, 151-3, 159,
191-3, 196, 198-9, 204, 215-16,
218, 241, 243, 245-6, 250, 267,
293-5, 297, 304, 310-11, 336-7,
373, 392, 397, 423, 448, 495, 501,
524, 526-7, 534, 536, 545, 547
- Promised 177, 450
- language(s) xv, 4, 8, 11-12, 15, 17,
31, 43, 51, 93-4, 166, 193, 211,
217, 255, 263, 275, 277, 341, 342,
416, 435, 445, 456, 476, 509
- Lanusse, Alejandro 505, 508
- Las Casas, Bartolome de 130, 190,
197-206, 208-10, 223-4, 226,

- 240-6, 253, 268-9, 296, 437-8,
445, 457, xvii
- Lastarria, Jose 463-4, 466
- Leibniz, Gottfried 115-18, 226-7,
317, 354, 365, 373
- legitimacy 10, 14, 24, 30, 78, 145,
155, 163, 165, 171-2, 175, 204-5,
224, 233, 240, 242-3, 251, 259,
285, 372, 450, 458, 554
- Lenin, Vladimir 405, 464, 524, 528,
540
- Levinas, Emmanuel 74, 93, 141,
248, 251, 271, 274, 280, 494, 507,
xvii
- liberalism 293, 298, 301, 303, 343,
408, 420, 460, 462, 465-6, 485,
495-6, 503, 522, 551
- liberation philosophy 93, 123, 425,
494, 498, 500, 503, 506-12, 514-
15, 517-20, 552
- liberty(ies) 5, 67, 82-3, 92, 96, 98,
105, 130, 150, 158, 162-3, 166,
177, 195, 201-2, 204, 233, 243,
245, 251-2, 261-6, 270, 273, 275,
277-8, 285, 288, 292, 294, 296,
297, 299, 302, 304, 333, 343-4,
346, 349-50, 356, 366, 368, 385,
395, 418, 431, 439, 448, 460,
464-5, 492, 530, 536, 545, 547
see also freedom
- Livy, Titus 124, 167-8, 175
- Locke, John 41, 144, 178, 181, 193,
195, 205, 210, 243, 246-52, 257,
290-305, 312-13, 321, 326, 333,
338-9, 341-3, 346-7, 361-2, 370,
397, 418, 423, 459, xvii
- Lopez Rega, Jose 513, 515-16
- Lucifer
see Satan 109-10, 218
- Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio 522, 547
- Luther, Martin 207, 258-9
- Lycurgus 13, 52, 168, 176, 350
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois 141, 478
- Ma'at 14-15, 68
- Machiavelli 28, 31-3, 35-6, 41, 53,
67, 80, 105, 124, 145, 151, 164-
81, 190, 199, 234, 258-9, 281,
288, 335, 380, 429, 459, xv
- Mahoma
see also Mohammed 198
- Maimonides
see Moses ben-Maimon 93, 97,
277, 551
- Mandeville, Bernard 154, 324, 326,
329, 332, 340, 459
- Mao, Tse-tung 36, 141, 493, 509,
528, 534
- Marcos, Subcomandante 543-4
- Mariategui, Jose Carlos 24, 522,
524-6, 541, 554
- market 2, 17, 34, 61, 110, 134-5,
137-40, 144, 153-4, 162, 169,
254, 265, 280-2, 313-14, 321,
324, 326, 330-7, 381-4, 397, 423,
447, 456-7, 464, 467, 482, 485,
496, 500-2, 505, 542, 545
world 130, 132, 145, 253
- Marsilius of Padua 91, 93, 98, 105,
116, 125-6, 162, 207, 277
- Marti, Jose 523-4, 526, 532, 554
- Marx, Karl 36, 72, 76-7, 79, 83,
123, 129-30, 136, 140-1, 224,
260, 267, 273, 287, 299, 322, 325,
341, 361, 365, 382, 394, 399-400,
404-24, 442, 498, 503, 512,
519-22, 524, 530, 534, 540, 551,
554, xvi
- Marxism(s) 141, 291, 409, 414, 439,
510-11, 515, 521, 524-6, 529,
533-4, 539-42, 551
- Medici, Lorenzo de 168, 170
- Memnon 15-16
- Mencius 28-9, 34, 142, 146-8, 150
- Meszaros, Istvan 404-8, 413
- metropolitan 178, 209, 309, 373,
387, 398, 400-2, 425, 439, 453,
455, 466, 550, xvi
- Mier, Friar Servando de 439-41, 455
- military 7, 18-19, 21-23, 25, 29-31,
42, 47, 60-1, 89, 95, 131, 137,
141, 147, 151-2, 155-7, 164,
171-2, 178, 188, 190-1, 198, 215,
223, 249-50, 254, 278, 282, 296,

INDEX

- 309, 326, 334, 340, 398, 430, 437,
439, 447, 450, 452, 454, 457, 461,
477, 487, 490-1, 501-4, 508-10,
512, 517, 535-7, 539, 544
- Mohammed
see also Mahoma 11, 89, 92, 96-7
- Moirá 15-16
- Molina, Luis 82, 245
- monarchy 15, 37, 39, 55, 57-8,
63-4, 104-5, 115, 124, 126, 162,
164-6, 175-6, 232, 254, 256-7,
259, 265, 267, 269, 291, 301, 340,
399, 402, 432, 443, 452, 458, 464
- absolute 30, 42, 44-6, 260, 271,
290, 297, 429
- money 46, 81, 135, 137, 152, 153,
184, 186, 236, 294, 300, 312, 326,
331, 336, 341, 366, 419, 453, 505,
516, 541
- Montaigne, Michel de 193, 339
- Montesinos, Anton(io) de 199, 206
- Montesquieu 63, 129, 339, 341, 350
- Mora, Jose 453, 455, 457-9
- Morales, Evo 412, 522, 547
- morality 30, 64, 106, 111, 234, 248,
251, 314, 319-21, 323-4, 329,
338-9, 341, 353, 358-9, 364-7,
369, 378, 380, 393, 395, 442
- Morelos, Jose Maria 447-9
- Moses 36, 78, 94, 97, 168, 170, 177,
180, 288, 300, 410, 449-50
- Mussolini, Benito 481, 486
- myth(s) 7, 14, 18, 20, 51, 53, 68, 70,
82, 138, 161, 163, 195, 214, 274,
431, 494, 525
- narrative(s) 4, 21, 27-8, 68-70, 86,
143, 212, 268, 274-6, 440, 444,
470, 525, 540, 543, 551
- Nasser, Gamal 467, 481
- nation(s) 13, 20, 48, 58, 65, 69, 72,
87, 90, 94-7, 109, 126, 130, 133,
138, 140, 145, 166, 194, 200, 210,
225, 248, 251-3, 257-8, 268-9,
275, 325-7, 330, 332, 340, 349-
50, 366, 373-5, 377, 398, 403,
421, 445-6, 457-8, 460, 463, 474,
480-2, 488, 493-4, 519, 525, 529,
532, 536, 538, 541, 553
- neighbour(s) 59, 60, 69-70, 89, 194,
242, 277, 287, 296, 300
- Neolithic 5-6, 8, 13, 16, 25, 311,
426, 487
- Newton, Isaac 189, 258, 262
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 11, 13, 61, 74,
119, 280, 340, 403-4, 494
- nobility 19, 22, 29, 54, 148-9, 154,
177, 338, 429, 480, 525
- Occidentalism
see also Westernization 309-10,
435, 551
- O'Higgins, Bernardo 454, 532
- oligarchy 8, 45, 47, 55, 57, 59, 63-4,
115, 177, 351, 353, 434, 439,
452-3, 455, 467, 477, 482, 484-5,
494, 496, 505, 523
- Oliveira, Fernao 243, 435-6
- Onganía, Juan 505, 508-9, 517
- Ongaro, Raimundo 505-6, 509, 512,
515-16
- ontology 24-5, 29-30, 35, 37-8, 54,
60, 92, 115-17, 121, 142, 227,
258, 265, 273, 276, 288, 297, 313,
387, 402-3, 507
- opposition(s) 29, 46, 71, 85, 94, 103,
113, 165, 342, 381, 396, 409-10,
415, 423, 468, 470, 481, 483, 486,
506, 513, 515, 522, 539
- Orientalism 309, 435, xvi
- Osiris 14-15, 27, 53, 68, 73
- participation 10-11, 19, 53-4, 159-
60, 170, 377, 382, 407-8, 411,
463, 481, 484, 487, 495-6, 512
- passion(s) xvii, 60-1, 258, 263-4,
275, 279-80, 282, 288-9, 300,
313, 319-31, 339, 341-2, 376,
450
- Paul of Tarsus 107, 283
- Pauw, Cornelius 235, 310
- Paz, Octavio 431, 513
- peace 25, 31, 39, 71, 87, 97, 123-4,
147, 152, 163, 169, 210, 245, 257,

- 263-5, 275, 283, 321, 324, 342-3, 348, 353-4, 359, 363-4, 370, 373-4, 431, 511, 517, 538, 547
- perpetual 358, 365-7, 371, 375-6, 380, 384-385
- peasant(s) 19, 24, 112, 151-2, 304, 311, 439, 467-8, 471-3, 475, 477, 480, 488, 491-2, 495-6, 501-2, 524, 529, 531, 534, 542, African 2, 51, Bantu 236-7, 240
- peasantry 22, 42, 47, 143, 151, 338, 485, 488, 491, 534
- Perez Jimenez, Marcos 468, 483, 487
- periphery 47, 138, 205-6, 214, 263-4, 309, 311, 397-8, 400, 402, 419, 427, 455, 474, 480-2, 528, 550
- Peron, Juan 168, 467-8, 472-4, 480, 483, 486, 488, 490, 492-3, 500, 503-4, 508-10, 513-16, 526
- Peter, Apostle 213, 221
- Philip III 213, 222-3
- philosopher(s) xvi-xvii, 21, 26, 28-9, 31, 38, 49-50, 52, 54-5, 63, 68-9, 75, 85, 91, 95-6, 115, 120, 125-6, 148, 151, 165, 192, 199, 206-7, 220, 225, 255, 260, 275, 286, 289, 292-3, 300, 334, 341, 344, 354, 381-2, 387-8, 408, 436, 443, 469, 497-8, 503, 507, 519, 552
- Pizarro, Francisco 209, 213, 404
- Plato 14-15, 46, 51-5, 64, 67, 70, 95, 114, 340, 390, 437
- Plotinus 26, 82, 113
- Pocock, John 169-70
- police 14, 30, 161, 200, 225, 304, 395-6, 400, 486, 506, 515
- politician(s) xvii, 56, 64, 94, 97, 142, 148, 165, 168, 171, 173, 292, 367, 376, 406, 445, 477, 529-30
- Polo, Marco 147, 160
- Polybius 63, 65, 163, 291
- Pomeranz, Kenneth 310-11
- Popper, Karl 141, 520
- population(s) 6-7, 17, 19, 38, 48, 85, 140, 165-6, 179, 191, 196, 199, 206, 211, 225, 267, 300, 310-11, 351, 383, 395-7, 439, 444, 450, 454-6, 460, 465, 478, 483, 488, 495, 501, 506, 527, 552
- populism 453, 467, 472, 474, 479-88, 493-5, 500, 504, 509, 511, 515, 519, 526-7
- Posidonius 60, 64
- possession(s) 80-1 295, 299-301, 304, 313-14, 320, 322-324, 336, 343, 370, 383, 392-3
- poverty 102, 141, 212-13, 221, 293, 300, 322, 325, 337, 340-1, 343, 352, 383, 396, 400, 404, 420, 444, 529, 552
- praxis 56, 108-9, 168, 201-2, 212, 217, 285, 422, 426, 439, 447, 494-5, 498, 500, 509-14, 518-19, 524, 538, 554
- priest(s) 16, 19-22, 42, 52, 70-71, 91, 98, 197, 199, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 242, 287, 441, 447-8, 457, 463, 475, 508-9
- prince(s) 33-4, 38, 94, 114, 124, 147-9, 153-4, 167-8, 171, 172-5, 177, 194, 199, 207, 207-8, 218, 232-3, 238, 242, 244, 255-6, 340, 381, 445
- production 3, 5, 9, 21, 34, 61, 102, 118, 132, 135-7, 140, 145, 151, 202, 240, 280-1, 286, 311-13, 320, 325, 337, 341, 382, 384, 394, 413, 419, 423, 425, 467, 475, 484-5, 487-9, 500, 519, 527, 528, 532, 536, 545
- progress 14, 34-5, 104, 237, 335, 337, 339, 342, 344, 353, 362, 366, 378, 387, 424, 436, 439, 454-5, 459, 462-5, 473, 478, 546
- Prometheus 36, 68
- property 159, 210, 229, 233, 267, 290, 293, 298-9, 301-4, 312-14, 321-4, 326, 330, 333-4, 341-4, 346, 380-2, 389, 396, 417-18, 421, 457
- private 24, 98, 152, 195, 209, 293, 310, 353, 370, 392-3, 395, 399-400, 423, 458, 460, 495

INDEX

- prophet(s) 11, 13, 89, 92-5, 97-8,
 135, 139, 170, 178, 268, 275-7,
 321, 442
 Propp, Vladimir 469-71, 477
 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 153, 405
 punishment(s) 4, 30, 41-2, 53, 83,
 203, 216, 220, 244, 342, 389
 Pythagoras 49-50

 Quetzalcoatl 20, 34, 431
 Quijano, Anibal 138, 541

 Rawls, J. 281, 295, 371, 418, xvi
 reason 60, 65, 76, 83, 86, 90, 98,
 108, 114-16, 141, 144, 159, 165,
 168, 172, 176, 192-3, 200-1, 203,
 208, 224-7, 241, 243-4, 247-50,
 252, 255, 257-8, 261, 266, 268,
 272, 277, 279, 282-6, 288-9, 293,
 295, 298, 316-20, 322, 328-30,
 334, 339, 342, 354-6, 358-61,
 366, 368, 371, 374, 376, 382,
 384-7, 390, 434, 444, 455, 457,
 506, 522, 525, 540, 553
 rebellion(s) 11, 25, 52, 66, 68, 73,
 80, 106, 265-6, 287, 304, 372,
 422, 426, 431, 434, 439, 452,
 463 542, 547-8
 reconstruction 76, 168, 272-3
 historical 1, 387, 549
 Reinhold, Karl 378-9
 religion(s) 50, 67, 76-7, 89, 94-6,
 100, 104, 124, 126, 165, 180, 195,
 203, 205, 236, 244, 255, 258-9,
 354, 358, 361, 405, 414-18, 420,
 442-3, 464, 538, 542
 Renaissance 65, 126, 130, 192,
 238-9
 Italian 79, 113, 127, 132, 138, 144,
 158, 164-81, 183, 187-9, xv
 republic(s) 7-8, 15, 43, 46, 51, 54,
 58, 65, 105, 123-5, 149, 158,
 160-1, 163-7, 175-7, 180, 187,
 200, 203-4, 225, 231, 233-4, 256-
 8, 278, 291, 334, 347, 363, 365,
 373-4, 380, 442-3, 445, 451-2,
 456-8, 462, 464, 516, 523-5

 resistance 36, 52, 146, 174, 263-4,
 269, 305, 346, 372, 434
 revolution 5-6, 13, 57, 59, 67, 73,
 76, 112, 138, 181, 187, 189,
 221, 235, 246-7, 297, 335, 344,
 362, 367, 372, 377, 385-6, 391,
 407-12, 417, 422, 426, 432-3,
 438-9, 453, 457, 464, 467, 481-2,
 484, 486, 490, 494, 498, 504, 507,
 509-11, 513, 521-2, 525, 536
 bourgeois 290-2, 296, 304, 338,
 480
 Cuban 528-35
 Industrial 65, 100, 134-5, 139,
 154, 182, 198, 309-13, 326, 381,
 383, 387, 427, 524
 Mexican 473, 479, 502
 Sandinista 537-40
 Zapatista 540-8
 Ribeiro, Darcy 311, 483, 488
 Roca, Julio 463-4, 499-500, 502
 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo 468, 483
 Romero, Francisco 503-4
 Romulus 86, 103, 170
 Roscio, Juan German 439, 442-3
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 338-52,
 354, 362, 365, 388, 434
 Rucci, Jose 513-15

 Salamanca, Rene 515-16
 Sandino, Augusto 440, 538-40
 San Martin, Jose de 450, 454, 532
 Sarmiento, Domingo 453, 455,
 459-63
 Satan
 see Lucifer 107-9
 Savonarola, Girolamo 151, 160,
 167, 178, 335
 Scannone, Juan 517-8
 Schelling, Friedrich 378, 385-7, 402
 Schmitt, Carl 75, 85, 91, 98-9, 119,
 123, 190, 192, 195-6, 208-9, 269,
 284, 374, 442, 444, 530, 552, xvi
 Schopenhauer, Arthur 5, 35, 119,
 227
 Scipio 65, 85
 Scotus, John Duns 115-23, 125-6,

- 226, 258, 317, 551
 secularization 67, 76-7, 94, 105,
 165, 169, 180, 259-60, 275, 290,
 414, 417, 458, 551
 Semerano, Giovanni 11-3, 551
 Semitic 8, 12-3, 16, 27, 31, 45-6,
 51, 67-9, 77, 81-4, 86, 89-92, 97,
 112, 114, 208, 274, 287, 551, xv
 anti- 403
 Seneca 60-1
 Sepulveda, Gines de 130, 190, 192-
 6, 198, 203, 211, 224, 236, 293,
 296, 423, 437, xvii
 Shankara, Advaita 38, 113
 slavery 11, 46, 58, 60, 95, 182-3,
 190, 228, 236-7, 240-52, 293,
 297, 339, 344, 349-50, 527
 slave(s) 8, 11, 25, 29, 46-8, 53, 59,
 61-2, 67-8, 70, 74-6, 92, 102,
 104, 107-8, 130, 138, 140, 153,
 157, 182, 184-6, 190, 195, 197-8,
 200, 202, 218, 236-7, 239-42,
 245-6, 249, 252, 255, 289, 293,
 301, 305, 346, 352, 397, 431, 439,
 444, 446-8, 453, 459, 464, 467,
 484, 525
 socialism 80, 102, 235, 405, 407,
 413, 484, 486, 503, 511, 528, 530,
 534, 536, 539-40
 primitive 24, 74
 Socrates 28, 52-4, 73, 340
 soldier(s) 22, 36, 47-8, 72-3, 151-2,
 157, 161, 174, 197, 203, 398, 450,
 490, 509, 530, 534
 Solomon 94, 97
 Solon 13, 168, 176
 Sombart, Werner 129, 134
 Soto, Domingo de 203, 240, 437
 Sousa Santos, Boaventura de 542-3
 sovereignty 60, 78, 104, 154, 162,
 165, 229, 255-7, 268, 285, 287,
 348, 351, 403, 420, 438, 444-449,
 467, 496, 526, 532
 Spinoza, Baruch 75, 85, 91, 226,
 269-90, 292-3, 295, 297, 331-2,
 379, 411, 552, xvii
 stability 5, 14, 41, 46, 57, 145, 151,
 154, 163-7, 172, 176, 234, 314,
 324, 464
 strategy 1, 31, 32, 35-6, 47, 61,
 190, 192, 198, 201, 211-2, 224,
 249-50, 259, 295, 296-8, 301,
 303, 407, 422, 429, 437, 450, 528,
 535, 550
 Strauss, Leo 79, 530, 551
 Suarez, Francisco 82, 190, 224-35,
 253, 269-70, 272, 346-7, 438,
 445, 447, xvii
 subject(s) 1, 4, 10, 16, 29-30, 36, 39,
 41-3, 63, 73, 82-3, 88, 111, 134,
 157, 159, 173, 179, 204, 207, 209,
 225, 228, 230-1, 234, 251, 255-8,
 264-6, 268-9, 271, 284, 286, 289,
 299, 301, 303-4, 327, 329, 349,
 353, 364, 369, 373, 379-80, 383,
 392-3, 411, 434, 443, 449, 470-2,
 477, 546, 550
 survival 21, 24, 31, 53, 87, 152, 259,
 279-81, 283, 313, 324-5, 346,
 362, 487, 491, 531,
 Susana 542-3
 Tatian 50, 74, 78
 tax(es) 21, 25, 27, 30, 42-3, 72, 148,
 151-3, 157, 160, 166, 189, 210-1,
 216, 257, 334, 430, 448, 456, 458,
 487, 542
 system 14, 84, 215,
 Thales 12, 49-51
 Theodosius 79, 84, 259
 theology 90, 93, 112-3, 275, 277,
 326, 338, 405, 409, 415-6, 429,
 442, 457, 542, 551-2
 liberation 221, 537-8
 political xvi, 75, 85-6, 91, 94,
 98-9, 268
 Thomas, Apostle 440-2
 Thoth 12, 15, 83
 Thucydides 32, 53
 Ti, Mo 28-9
 Toledano, Vincente Lombardo 483,
 527
 Torres, Camilo 507, 537
 Tosco, Augustin 515-6

INDEX

- Totality 31, 34, 54, 58, 70-1, 85-6,
 106, 108-9, 112, 124-5, 182, 201,
 212, 247-8, 271, 287, 314, 316-
 20, 322-5, 330, 339, 349, 356,
 388, 390-2, 394-5, 398-401, 409,
 421, 431, 468, 486, 494-6, 546
 transformation(s) 11, 34, 63-4, 67,
 76, 80, 100168, 176, 183, 285,
 332, 345, 370, 405, 421-2, 464,
 470, 525, 533, 539
 truth 1-2, 16, 27, 32, 43, 53, 65, 68,
 107, 110, 133, 173-4, 197, 200-2,
 204, 285, 340, 410, 498, 528, 530,
 534-5, 542, 545, 554
 Tsung-hsi, Huang 144-54, 165,
 167-8, 334
 Tupi-Guarani 6, 433, 488
 tyranny 46, 53, 55, 57, 63, 65, 115,
 171, 233, 245, 269, 351, 442, 444,
 447, 531
 unity 20, 46-7, 58, 93, 103, 105,
 222, 269, 347, 386, 393-5, 450,
 457, 464, 487, 503, 535-6, 546
 utopia(s) 11, 44, 67, 85, 92, 161,
 210, 213, 220, 352, 364, 367, 383,
 388, 407, 475, 492-3, 496
 value(s) 15, 32, 57, 70, 78, 84, 100-
 1, 129, 135, 140-1, 153, 216-7,
 250, 267, 299-300, 314, 323, 333,
 336-7, 339, 398, 435, 464, 466,
 474-7, 489, 496, 501, 522, 525,
 545,
 surplus 134, 136, 140, 398, 424,
 427, 453, 501, 522
 Vandor, Augusto 509, 513
 Vargas, Getulio 467-8, 472, 477,
 480, 483, 486, 488, 490, 492, 504,
 526
 Vazquez, Tabare 522, 547
 Verdad, Francisco Primo 445-6
 Veron, Eliseo 489, 513
 victim(s) 1-2, 10, 66-8, 70-6, 79,
 85-6, 88, 108, 148, 202, 383, 420,
 422, 473, 477, 531, 549
 violence 4, 9, 12, 19-20, 29, 36, 42,
 101, 152, 169, 177-8, 183, 191,
 197-9, 202, 209-10, 213, 217,
 248, 255, 267, 271, 296, 366, 371,
 380, 386, 402, 437, 477, 489, 513,
 516, 536
 virtue(s) 29-30, 33-4, 46, 49, 56,
 60-1, 64-5, 92, 95, 102, 114, 122-
 3, 142, 149, 154, 163, 165, 169-
 70, 173-4, 176-7, 180, 194-5,
 209, 276, 280, 292-3, 320, 322-4,
 327, 329-30, 338, 340, 342, 345,
 350, 353-4, 359, 362-5, 368, 376,
 388, 401, 437, 442, 458-9
 Vitoria, Francisco de 190, 201, 203,
 206-10, 224, 240, xvii
 Wallerstein, Immanuel 130, 139-40,
 182, 291
 war(s) 7, 18-9, 21-2, 25, 27-8, 30-
 1, 35-6, 44, 51-3, 62, 84, 87, 92,
 94-5, 97-8, 101, 109, 142, 145,
 152, 158, 160-1, 163, 170, 174,
 177-8, 181, 187, 190-6, 198, 200-
 4, 210, 221, 225, 239-40, 243-5,
 247-51, 257, 261-2, 267, 282,
 289, 291-2, 294-7, 310, 321, 343,
 359, 362, 364-6, 373-4, 378, 380,
 382, 386, 388, 401-3, 437, 447,
 450, 453-4, 466-8, 477, 480-2,
 501, 503-4, 507-8, 521, 523, 528,
 535, 538, 542
 warrior 7, 25, 29, 32, 38, 47, 54, 61,
 64, 98, 100, 156, 177-8, 190, 236,
 340, 388, 393, 403, 461
 wealth 14, 17, 45, 53, 95, 134-5,
 140, 144, 153-4, 192, 206, 213-4,
 294, 300, 321, 326, 330, 334,
 395-6, 400, 424, 430, 440, 444,
 454, 457, 460, 489, 496, 501, 528,
 534, 545
 Weber, Max 27, 30, 74, 129, 133,
 135, 139, 141, 170, 262, 310
 Westernization
 see also Occidentalism 195, xv
 William of Ockham 116, 207
 Witt, Jan de 270, 278, 286, 288, 290
 Wolff, Christian 82, 226-7, 354


POLITICS OF LIBERATION

- worker(s) 43, 134, 136, 239, 293,
302-4, 311, 331, 337, 352, 372,
392, 398, 422, 424, 467-8, 472,
474-5, 478, 483, 485-8, 490-2,
495-6, 501-2, 505-6, 508, 511,
513-6, 521-2, 524, 531-2, 537,
543
worship 4, 17, 22, 49, 77, 107, 110,
194, 203-4, 220, 225, 277, 471
Wycliffe, John 126, 258
Xenophon 53-4
Yang-ming, Wang 141-4
Yrigoyen, Hipolito 467, 500, 502
Zapata, Emiliano 440, 540, 543
Zarathustra 11, 13, 70
Zea, Leopoldo 465, 500, 513, 518
Zenon 28, 64
Zeus 12, 51, 60
Žižek, Slavoj 68, 274, 283

Lightning Source UK Ltd
Milton Keynes UK
08 March 2011

168905UK00001B/1/P





Politics and Liberation

Enrique Dussel

"If Enrique Dussel had been born in the United States, France or Germany he would be an intellectual celebrity. Author of dozens of books in Spanish, few have been translated into English. This book seeks to begin to remedy this injustice."

Ivan Petrella, Associate Professor,
Department of Religious Studies, University of Miami.

Politics of Liberation presents a world political history, a partial and initial attempt at describing the history of political actors, the 'people', and their philosophical inspirations. It is a decolonizing of political history to begin to tell the accurate world story. In order to explore a politics of liberation a true world political history has to be told and understood.

The frameworks to be overcome include: 1. Hellenocentrism, which neglects the non-Greek and non-Roman influences on Greece and Rome; 2. Westernization, which neglects the Byzantine world among others in terms of political development; 3. Eurocentrism, which neglects or denigrates the world outside of Europe when describing political history; 4. the periodization of political history according to European standards; 5. the falsely assumed secularization of politics; 6. the colonizing of Latin American and other peripheral political philosophies; and 7. the exclusion of Spain/Portugal and Latin America from modernity.

This is not simply one alternative reading, but it is a counter-narrative, describing the world's tradition of politics. It examines what has been said and what has not even been investigated. The starting point is the suffering of the people..

Enrique Dussel is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the Iztapalapa campus of the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (Autonomous Metropolitan University, UAM) and also teaches courses at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM). He has an undergraduate degree in Philosophy (from the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo in Mendoza, Argentina), a Doctorate from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, a Doctorate in History from the Sorbonne in Paris. He is the founder with others of the movement referred to as the Philosophy of Liberation, and his work is concentrated in the field of Ethics and Political Philosophy. **Thia Cooper** is Assistant Professor in the Religion Department of Gustavus Adolphus College in Saint Peter, MN and author of *Controversies in Political Theology: Development or Liberation* (SCM Press, 2007).



www.scmpress.co.uk



Cover design: oel no. 16 (Lebris) Ltd